Luke Evans
Main Page: Luke Evans (Conservative - Hinckley and Bosworth)Department Debates - View all Luke Evans's debates with the Cabinet Office
(2 days ago)
Commons ChamberThat is the million-dollar question. Why were the Government not prepared to say something that was manifestly evidentially true to all and sundry?
The third example is that on 15 October, the Prime Minister said that the deputy National Security Adviser acted entirely independently, without consultation with Ministers or special advisers, and without political involvement. However, the CPS has now made it clear that there were multiple discussions about what the DNSA would and would not say, starting with one such discussion on 3 July 2025. Moreover, the DNSA’s first witness statement was sighted by
“the then National Security Adviser and the…Cabinet Office Permanent Secretary”,
and
“sent to the…Prime Minister through No.10 private office”,
including special advisers.
Is it therefore not incredible either way that the deputy NSA did not discuss the biggest spy case this century with his boss, the National Security Adviser, and was left to his own devices to provide the evidence?
I think we all find it difficult to believe that the deputy National Security Adviser was left entirely to his own devices.
A fourth example is that on 20 October, the Minister for Security, who is in his place, told the House:
“Final evidence went in in August, and I can give the hon. Gentleman an assurance that there is nothing the Prime Minister or any Minister could have done thereafter.”—[Official Report, 20 October 2025; Vol. 773, c. 640.]
We now know that there were meetings between the CPS and the Government on 3 and 9 September to attempt to rescue the case. Why did the Security Minister tell the House something that was not correct?
Peter Swallow
The Minister quite clearly set out the range of threats posed by China. I am clear that China poses a threat. I also think that we have to be mature enough in this Chamber to accept that the way we deal with the second-largest economy in the world has to be to recognise the threats it poses to our democracy and our national security, but also all the ways in which we have to work with it.
I stood for election on a manifesto that committed to our co-operating with China where we can, challenging them where we must, and competing with them where we need to. I genuinely think that is a mature way of dealing with a state that does not share our values, and that poses a great threat to our democracy and to the way that citizens and residents of this country operate within a democracy, but that is also the second-largest economy in the world. As the former director of MI6 said on the “Today” show on the BBC this morning,
“we need to learn to walk and chew gum at the same time.”
We need a mature acceptance of the risks that China poses, and that means recognising that we cannot just walk off the pitch and not deal with the second-largest economy in the world. It is infantile and not realistic to suggest otherwise.
If the new Act had been in place sooner, it is possible that these men could have been prosecuted successfully under it. I therefore have a simple question for Conservative Front Benchers, and they need to be clear on this point: why did they wait so long to replace a vital piece of security legislation, and make sure that we had the appropriate tools to keep this country safe? I am happy to take interventions on that point.
Peter Swallow
As has already been set out, the threat from China has evolved over time. I would have loved it if the previous Labour Government had amended the Act, but it was the Conservative party that held a consultation, and then sat on the results for eight years and did nothing.
In its inquiry on China from July 2023, the Intelligence and Security Committee, of which I was a member at the time, concluded that China was a threat. The Committee took evidence not from junior security officials, but from the chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, the director general of the Security Service and the director of GCHQ, the chief of Defence Intelligence and—this is an important “and”—all the deputy National Security Advisers at the time. That is already public; they reported to the Committee.
That report is clear and unambiguous in calling out China as a national security threat to UK interests. It is also crystal clear, taking the report as a whole, that China’s threat is both live and active. The report was from July 2023, and the alleged offences took place, apparently, from December ’21 to February ’23. I am aware that the refresh of the integrated review of ’21 was in March ’23. However, the Committee’s inquiry started taking evidence from those senior officials from November 2017 to a similar time in 2019, and then the subsequent Committee carried on its work. Senior national security officials were giving evidence to the ISC about China being a national security threat well before the offences happened in this place.
If we have the directors of all the intelligence agencies suggesting that China is a threat, it does not get much better than that. We have great deputy national security advisers, but their line managers—their directors, their bosses—were also clearly stating that China was a national security threat. In fact, the word “threat” is mentioned 284 times in that 207-page report.
The key word in this whole episode involving the deputy National Security Adviser—that is, the DNSA for intelligence, defence and security, not the other two remaining DNSAs, unless the Minister wants to correct me—is “active”. The question is whether China was an active threat, as underscored by the testimony to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy yesterday. The evidence in the ISC’s report would suggest that China has been known to be an active threat for some time. I have mentioned the various reviews. Indeed, in his own witness statement, the DSNA refers to China conducting “large-scale espionage operations”. Again, this is not a historical reference or a past-tense reference; it is clearly referring to the here-and-now operations taking place today. There is clearly an active threat, not just a general or undetermined threat.
China being an active threat was also underscored by the director general of the Security Service’s recent speech, in which he referred to China’s
“cyber-espionage…clandestine technology transfer…interference in UK public life”
and
“harassment and intimidation of opponents”.
Once more, these threats are not just historical; they are current and active, happening in the UK right now. They have not stopped. They are increasing. They continue.
The real threat to our security is not necessarily what others do in the shadows; it is what one’s own Government hide from the light. That is the essence of what we are trying to get to in the motion before us—we are asking the Government to publish the papers.
Let me take a step back from this issue to look at the way in which the public will perceive it. This is the biggest spy story in this country’s history, at least in this century. We can get into the tit-for-tat about what the PM did or did not know, whether the National Security Adviser speaks to his deputy or not, who told the deputy National Security Adviser that he needs to toe the Government line, and how the Labour manifesto got into the witness statements, but I want to concentrate more on the bigger picture.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) rightly pointed out the behaviour of the Government. The Prime Minister could have sorted this out by coming to the House and speaking about this topic. He could have laid it all out and put it all forward. The only thing we have had has been a statement before Prime Minister’s questions. Of course, we Back Benchers cannot ask questions after such statements—there is no way for us to do so. If the Government are so angry, why is more action not being taken? Why are people not being fired, and why are we still having this debate several weeks on if all the information is so crystal clear that this House can move on?
I am worried that this is a pattern of behaviour with the Prime Minister, because we saw this with the ambassador. The Prime Minister was the decision maker on that issue, but he did not come to this House; he sent one of his Ministers. I expect that the retort from Labour Members will be, “It was always thus”, but the reason this saddens me so much is that the Prime Minister is being judged by the standard that he set. He said that he would do things differently, but he is not. He is not coming to the House to explain when he could do so. We know that the information and the decisions rest with him.
When I pushed the Minister, the hon. Member for Barnsley North (Dan Jarvis), about leadership last time, that was not directed at him—I have a great deal of respect for him. He is following the leadership of the Prime Minister, who has not come to this House to explain what is going on. If this issue is as clearcut as Labour Members have said, that would be an easy case to make and this House would believe the Prime Minister, but we are not there. That is why I worry, because it leads to a wider debate and wider concerns among the public about whether something is going on.
Bradley Thomas (Bromsgrove) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend agree that the most obvious point is that, despite the Government’s disappointment at the collapse of the trial—we have heard numerous Ministers, including the Prime Minister himself, stress that—it is shocking that they appear not to have done every single thing possible to bolster the case and put the CPS in the best possible position to secure a prosecution? The two just do not add up.
It is true that the Government have repeatedly expressed disappointment, but—still more disturbingly, in a sense—so has MI5. It is quite unusual for MI5 to intervene, by means of a speech by its head which made it very clear that MI5 was profoundly disappointed that this matter had not gone to court. Had it done so, it would have been the culmination of years of work done by MI5 to try to deal with Chinese espionage in Whitehall and Westminster.
I will not, because I have taken two interventions already. My worry is about what the public perceive, because it is a statement of fact that since the Chancellor went to China, decisions have been made about the Chagos islands, for example, or British Steel and £1 billion—what is going on there? A spy case has now been dropped, and there is the possibility of a super-embassy and even ID cards. My constituents are coming to me seeing a running theme.
Tom Hayes
When I hear the hon. Gentleman speak, I listen to what he is saying—I think he could be a very good replacement for the shadow Minister on the Front Bench. The question I want to ask, though, is this: what is his view on the relationship of the UK to China? Ought we to engage and, if so, on what terms, or should we be economically decoupling? What is his view about the nature of that relationship?
To repeat the quote we heard earlier, we need to walk and chew gum at the same time. It is easy to call China a threat, but still to engage. That is exactly what the Chinese Government do to us: they say, “We’re embarrassed. We’re upset. You promised us something”, and we just say, “Oh, I’m terribly sorry about that.” We could stand up for ourselves and say what we think. Let us not forget that we are in a trade deficit with China; it is economically in China’s interest to be working with us, as much as it is in our interest to be working with China.
My worry, though, is that the public are joining dots. The Government will say that there are no dots to be joined, but the longer this goes on and the more incidents come out, it becomes harder to make that argument. That brings us full circle to where I started, because this is about transparency and releasing the documentation.
Peter Swallow
I am grateful to the hon. Member for giving way and for bringing us back to where he started. He started his speech by suggesting that the Government were intervening unduly in this case. He then went on to suggest that the Government did not intervene unduly enough. Can he be clear on this: is his position and that of the Opposition that the Government should have interfered in an independent prosecution, or not? It is unhelpful to be saying both things at the same time.
I feel I am being misquoted, because I have simply asked for all this to be resolved by publishing the information. The Government could come out and say that China is a threat. I have also said that we can call it a threat and work economically with the Chinese. That is what I hope will happen. [Interruption.] I will finish at that point.
I say to the right hon. Gentleman—whom I hold in high regard, not least for the work that he did on the ISC—that I can give him the assurances that he seeks. I can also assure him and the House how seriously this Government take the challenges that we face from countries right around the world.
Let me return to the DNSA’s evidence. As his written evidence makes clear—this is an important point that the House will want to note—from the moment the DNSA’s witness statement was submitted, he was a fully bound witness in criminal proceedings. His evidence had not yet been heard or tested in court, so his witness evidence could not be and was not shared, and this was later confirmed by the CPS.
In this debate and in recent weeks, there have been a number of different, and at times conflicting, claims about this Government’s involvement in the case, and I want to address those claims directly today. At the DNSA’s request, the word “enemy” was removed from the first witness statement during the drafting process, because it did not reflect the Government’s policy at the time. The DNSA made amendments to ensure that his witness statement text reflected his assessment of the strongest elements of the evidential material provided by Counter Terrorism Policing, by demonstrating that the information that was alleged to have been provided was prejudicial to the safety or the interests of the UK.
When CTP approached the DNSA to write a supplementary statement in November 2024, he was specifically asked to comment on whether China posed an active threat to the UK’s national security during the period of 31 December 2021 to 3 February 2023, and to confirm whether that remains the position at the time of writing. That is why paragraph 6 of the second statement references part of the current Government policy towards China.
The Minister is making a powerful point about the active threat. At this point in time, do the Government perceive China to be an active threat?
As the hon. Gentleman knows—I think I may have even said this to him previously, and certainly to the House—China presents a series of threats to the Government. I will say a little bit more about that.
As time is short, I want to focus on the DNSA and the evidence that he has given, because that is important for the House. The DNSA confirmed to the JCNSS yesterday that he used language from an answer to a parliamentary question in his third statement, in which he provided the current Government’s position as context, as had been requested. The DNSA’s third statement was written in a way that ensured consistency with his first two statements.
For the sake of clarity, I will say it again: the current National Security Adviser had no role in either the substance of the case or the evidence provided. There has been misreporting, speculation and fabrication about the officials’ meeting that the National Security Adviser chaired on 1 September—the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) mentioned it just a moment ago. I can tell him and the House that a meeting of senior officials took place on 1 September to discuss the UK’s relationship with China. The meeting was specifically set up to provide—