Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Luke Evans and Gregory Stafford

Committee stage
Tuesday 17th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Gregory Stafford]

I have some brief questions for the Minister about this important clause, which has serious implications for patient liberty and for public protection. We must ensure that decisions are clinically and legally sound. First, how will the proposed changes to initial and renewal detention periods help conditions and services and manage public risk more effectively, particularly in forensic or high-risk cases? Secondly, do longer detention periods after revocation of a community treatment order reflect a higher perceived risk, and if so, is there clear clinical evidence supporting that extension to six months? Thirdly, are we confident that the new timelines strike the right balance between protecting the public and ensuring patients are not detained longer than necessary? Finally, and as an adjunct to that, what other considerations are there in the clause or the Bill to keep the public safe and to make sure that decisions are correct in the context of clause 29?

[Dr Evans]

Clause 29 addresses the length and renewal of detention periods under the Mental Health Act. I begin by acknowledging the important step that this clause represents in shifting towards a more rights-based, patient-centred model, as enshrined in the Bill.

Clause 29 would shorten the initial period of detention for treatment under section 3 of the Mental Health Act from six months to three months. Subsequent renewal periods are, likewise, reduced from six months to three months and then from one year to six months. This is clearly informed by the principle of least restriction, as is rightly highlighted in the explanatory notes in paragraph 212.

On that basis, we welcome the direction of travel, but, while we agree with the principle of moving towards shorter, more proportionate detention periods, we have questions and concerns about implementation, consistency and safeguards, which I hope the Minister will address.

First, will shorter periods lead to better outcomes, or just more paperwork? The goal here is to ensure that detention is not allowed to drift and that patients are not held in hospital for longer than is necessary without rigorous justification. However, the clause still allows for indefinite renewal in increments, once those shorter initial periods expire. Can the Minister assure us that these changes will result in more meaningful reviews and not just more frequent rubber-stamping of detention? It would be helpful to understand whether the Government have assessed the clinical capacity, particularly among responsible clinicians and approved mental health professionals, to conduct these reviews with real rigour. If not resourced properly, we risk replacing one form of inertia with another.

Secondly, what safeguards exist against the resetting of detention periods on transfer? I am by no means a legal expert, so forgive me if I have completely misinterpreted this, and I bow to the legal expertise of the Minister, the Government and, most importantly, to able staff in the Box. However, clause 29(2) introduces into section 19 of the Mental Health Act new subsection (2A), which provides that if a guardianship patient is transferred to hospital, they will be treated as if they had been admitted on the day of transfer. In practical terms, does that not reset the detention clock?

To my eyes, this concept of resetting the detention clock appears most clearly in subsections (2) and 29(5)(d) of clause 29, where a patient who is transferred from guardianship to hospital, or who has their community treatment order revoked, is treated as if they had been newly admitted to hospital on that day. This effectively resets the start date of the detention period. Clause 29(2), which will insert proposed new section 19(2A) into the Mental Health Act, states:

“But, in the case of a patient falling within subsection (2)(d), section 20 has effect as if the patient has been admitted to hospital in pursuance of an application for admission for treatment on the day on which the patient is transferred.”

New paragraph 5B of schedule 1 to the Mental Health Act states that the modifications

“apply in relation to a patient transferred from guardianship to a hospital in pursuance of regulations made under section 19…In section 20(1)(a)…for “admitted”…there is to be substituted “transferred”.

In new paragraphs 5C and 5D of that schedule, the same resetting principle applies to patients whose CTOs are revoked, with renewal detention starting from the date of revocation, not from their original hospital admission or order.

In practice, this could mean that if a patient is placed under guardianship on 1 January and transferred to hospital on 1 April under section 19(2)(d) of the Mental Health Act, then under proposed new section 19(2A), they would be treated as if they had been newly admitted on 1 April. Therefore, even though they have been under compulsion since 1 January, the new three-month detention clock begins on 1 April. Likewise, a patient under a community treatment order that was issued on 1 February and revoked on 1 August will, under paragraph 5D, start a new in-patient detention period on 1 August, not 1 February.

On one hand, that makes sense. We do not want people whose state is fluctuating to be released, or simply to time out. On the other hand, if we are looking purely from the patient’s perspective, as the legislation asks us to do, with regard to the principles in clause 1, that could be a problem. Will the Minister clarify how many times such a reset could occur for a single individual? Is there any form of oversight, review or reporting requirement where this happens? That mechanism might be necessary in some clinical contexts, but without safeguards it could become a back door to prolonging detention, which is something that the clause seeks to reduce. Is there some kind of register or mandatory recording of these incidents to spot repeat patterns?

Thirdly, another issue that needs addressing is the creation of possible complexity. Paragraphs 218 and 219 of the explanatory notes set out a separate but equally important issue. Clause 29’s welcome shortening of detention periods—from three months to start with, then three months, then six months, then annual reviews—is not applied evenly to patient groups. Who gets the shorter periods? Most civil patients detained under part II and some patients on revoked community treatment orders. Who does not get them? Patients detained by a hospital order from a court, if their CTO is revoked within six months of the order, as in paragraph 218. And, of course, restricted patients—typically those involved in more serious offences.

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[Gregory Stafford]

Does my hon. Friend think that if there is a backlog, that could undermine patient rights or clinical progress in some way? How will the tribunal system be able to cope with that increased workload and meet its legal obligations to provide timely tribunals so that patients get the best care?

[Dr Evans]

That is a difficult balance to get right. I appreciate that the Government have said that the Bill will take 10 years to implement, but if these measures come into force from day one, we will start to see automatic referrals come through. There will be a lag as the transition happens, but my hon. Friend is absolutely right: we can foresee scenarios where patients who want to be referred into the tribunal are waiting in inappropriate care places, which may be to the detriment of their personal care and may actually make their recovery worse. He is right to highlight that question, which is why having a broad understanding of how many extra referrals are coming would be useful.

Clause 32 focuses on conditionally discharged restricted patients who are subject to deprivation of liberty conditions. It rightly ensures that those patients are brought within scope of automatic referral, first after 12 months and then every two years. Again, that is a positive step, ensuring that even those not detained in hospital will still have access to a review of their conditions. Crucially, the clause also gives the tribunals the power to vary or remove those DoL conditions.

Can the Minister say more about how that important power will be used? What criteria will the tribunals apply to assess whether a condition is genuinely necessary and proportionate? Will patients be legally represented in those hearings by default? Will another advocate be there, or will it be someone else in their place? Here, too, I would welcome some clarification from the Minister. I hope he will forgive my legal naivety, but my mother always said, “It’s better to ask a dumb question than stay dumb forever.”

The explanatory notes talk about DoL conditions. The current legal framework for authorising the deprivation of liberty for individuals who lack capacity is complex and in transition. Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, deprivation of liberty safeguards have been the established mechanism since 2009 to ensure lawful deprivation of liberty in care settings. However, the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 introduced liberty protection safeguards as modernising replacements, designed to simplify and broaden protections.

LPS are widely seen as an improvement to DoLS, because they extend safeguards to a wider range of settings, including hospitals and people’s own homes where deprivation of liberty might occur. They also streamline the assessment process, reducing bureaucratic delays and better reflecting person-centred decision making. The Law Commission and various stakeholder groups have supported LPS as a way to address the significant practical and legal challenges posed by DoLS, including the so-called DoLS backlog, where assessments have been delayed for many vulnerable individuals.

Despite that, I do not believe that LPS have yet been implemented, leaving DoLS still in force. I wonder if we are therefore creating ambiguity as we update the Mental Health Act through the Bill’s clauses, such as those addressing conditional discharge and deprivation of liberty, without clarity on how those will intersect with the forthcoming LPS framework that will be introduced under separate legislation. That raises important questions about the sequencing and co-ordination of legislation reform. How will the Government ensure coherence and avoid conflicting provisions when different statutes address overlapping issues at different times?

Given that context, have the Government abandoned the planned implementation of LPS, or do they remain committed to bringing them into force? If the implementation is still planned, will the Government provide a clear timeline for when LPS will replace DoLS? How do the Government intend to ensure that the provisions we are debating will align with or adapt to the introduction of LPS? What steps are being taken to ensure that vulnerable individuals and professionals who navigate this complex legal landscape will have clear, consistent safeguards and guidance through the transition? Clarification on those points is essential to avoid legal uncertainty and to ensure that the reforms provide coherent protection for those deprived of their liberties.

Clause 33 deals with patients who are not under DoLS conditions. It will ensure that even those who are under DoLS conditions, such as detained restricted patients or conditionally discharged patients with lesser restrictions, receive automatic tribunals. It will reduce the current three-year referral intervention for detained restricted patients to 12 months and introduce automatic referrals for non-DoL conditionality discharge patients after two years and then every four years. Again, that is a step forward, but four years feels like a long gap between reviews for those discharged with conditions that still significantly affect their daily lives. Will the Minister explain the thought behind the chosen timeframe? If a person’s condition changes, is there a mechanism to trigger an early referral outside the normal cycle?

The clauses show progress. They reflect a clear intention to strengthen patients’ rights, increase oversight and address historical injustices, particularly for those living under deprivation of liberty conditions in the community. But with complexity comes risk, and we need to ensure that patients understand their rights and the legal support available. The tribunal system must be properly resourced to uphold the safeguards that we place in the legislation.

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[Gregory Stafford]

Like the hon. Lady, I see many benefits from the clause. Like many Committee members, I am surprised that the Government intend to vote against it.

As has been mentioned, the clause was inserted in the House of Lords by my noble Friends Earl Howe and Lord Kamall. I think it introduces a very valuable and forward-looking provision—namely, a mandatory debrief session within 30 days of discharge. It introduces a formal mechanism for learning from patient experiences following detention under the Mental Health Act. Although patient feedback mechanisms exist in some services, they are not consistently applied or mandated. The clause ensures that every detained patient has the opportunity to reflect on their care with an independent advocate, and that their feedback contributes to service improvement. It reflects a broader shift in mental health law towards transparency, accountability and the patient voice, and aligns with the recommendations from the 2018 independent review of the Mental Health Act, which the Government have used as an argument in favour of many of the other clauses.

Clause 35 is more than just a procedural addition. It represents a shift in culture towards embedding the patient voice and accountability in the mental health care system. It recognises the importance of empowering individuals after detention, supporting their recovery, and learning from their lived experience to improve future services. Mental health charities and third sector organisations have strongly endorsed the clause, seeing it as a meaningful step towards a more rights-based, transparent approach to care.

Clearly, the clause empowers patients, because it gives them a structured opportunity to share their experiences and influence service provision. It promotes transparency by requiring hospitals to report publicly on what they have learned and how they have responded. It supports quality improvement by encouraging services to reflect on and address systemic issues in the delivery of care. Furthermore, it has independent oversight through the involvement of IMHAs, which helps to ensure that feedback is gathered impartially and respectfully.

The reforms prioritise professional clinical opinion, safeguard children from inappropriate influence during periods of acute vulnerability, and elevate the patient voice in the post-care process. In doing so, they align the Mental Health Act much more closely to modern standards of care, international best practice and evolving public expectations. I believe that the clause is essential to strengthening the Bill and ensuring that our mental health system becomes not only more effective but more compassionate, responsive and just.

[Dr Evans]

I rise to speak to clause 35, which would insert new section 23A into the Mental Health Act 1983. It was introduced and passed in the Lords, and rightly so. As the hon. Member for Thurrock said, it seems surprising that anyone might want to take it out.

The clause was introduced as a new duty to offer all patients detained under the Act a consultation with an IMHA within 30 days of discharge. The purpose is to review their experience of hospital and learn from that experience through a report shared with hospital managers. Currently, the Mental Health Act makes provisions for access to IMHAs primarily during detention, particularly around decisions concerning treatment and care planning. However, once a patient is discharged, formal advocacy tends to fall away, unless pursued through broader NHS complaints mechanisms. There is no statutory duty to engage with patients post discharge, to understand how they have experienced their care or to systematically learn from those experiences.

In that context, the clause represents a welcome and important step forward. We know from successive reviews from the Care Quality Commission, NHS England and, of course, the independent review of the Mental Health Act, led by Sir Simon Wessely, that patients often feel disempowered during their detention. Many describe experiences of coercion, poor communication or even trauma. Yet those experiences frequently go unheard: lost in the silence that can follow discharge. Clause 35 seeks to change that, creating a pathway for those voices to be heard, and, more importantly, for services to learn from them. I strongly support that principle.

We need to clarify one thing first: the clause says a patient must “be offered” a consultation within 30 days —it is no more formalised than that. It is not a statutory requirement to take part, but purely to offer. That is important when it comes to making sure that reports are made in partnership with the patient. That is positive language, which would help to support the decision making and feedback loop.

In their rebuttals, I appreciate that the Government may ask whether the clause would mean hospital managers marking their own feedback. They might also ask how we would deal with CQC capacity. Those are reasonable questions, but at the heart of the clause, as agreed by the Lords, is the fact that all too often patients’ thoughts after discharge are not fully taken into account.

[Gregory Stafford]

Surely the fundamental part of the Bill is self-assessment and self-reflection. That does happen in some cases, and certainly in other parts of the healthcare system, but in this area generally does not; when it does happen, it is done in an inconsistent manner. The clause seeks to formalise things and to ensure that there is a benchmark by which service users and patients can feed back to the service they have just come from, to improve services. Does my hon. Friend share my confusion about why the Government would want to take that out?

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend makes a strong point. In clinical practice, we know that reflective learning is important, but that is not mandated. As we have seen from the reports, part of the reason why we do not see improvements is that we do not know about them. The clause gives patients the chance to empower themselves in a statutory, regulated way, which then allows us further transparency on how those issues arise.

Let us not forget that patients with good experiences would also have the chance to feed those back, further helping to support the services and hopefully leading to beacons of best practice up and down the nation so that we could then learn from those. That is the idea behind the clause: making sure that the likes of the regulator would be able to share lessons about not only those who have struggled but those who have done well. Clause 35 really offers a rare opportunity to hardwire the patient voice into the feedback loop of mental health services. That is a principle that I and my Opposition colleagues strongly support.

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Luke Evans and Gregory Stafford

Committee stage
Tuesday 17th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your leadership, Sir Desmond, especially on such a warm day. I hope that there is not too much hot air in the Committee to keep us even warmer.

Clause 22 will introduce a series of important amendments to the operation of community treatment orders under the Mental Health Act 1983. The clause has the stated aim of strengthening clinical safeguards and ensuring continuity of care between hospital and community settings. The Opposition support these goals in principle.

Let me set out the current legal position. At present, decisions to place a person on a CTO require two professional inputs: the patient’s responsible clinician and an approved mental health professional. The responsible clinician can vary, suspend, recall or revoke the order, often with no statutory obligation to consult the clinician who will be managing the patient’s care in the community. 

Clause 22 will change that. It introduces the new role of the community clinician—defined as the approved clinician who will oversee the patient’s care in the community—and requires their involvement at key decision points in the life of a CTO. Specifically, it requires a written statement from the community clinician that the CTO criteria are met, where they are not the responsible clinician. It obliges the responsible clinician to consult the community clinician before varying conditions, recalling or revoking a CTO, unless such consultation would cause unreasonable delay. It also includes the community clinician in the process of renewing a CTO, again via a written statement. 

These are not insignificant changes. They mark a shift towards multidisciplinary accountability and a greater emphasis on the continuity of care between in-patient and community settings. The Opposition strongly support both principles. However, there are several points that I would like to probe constructively, and I hope the Minister will respond in the spirit of improving what is clearly a well-intentioned clause. 

First, the term “unreasonable delay” appears multiple times in the clause as an exception to the duty to consult the community clinician, but I cannot see it defined in the Bill or in the explanatory notes. Could the Minister clarify what constitutes “unreasonable delay” in practice? Will guidance be issued to ensure consistency across trusts and clinicians? We must ensure that this exception does not swallow the rule or become a loophole in time-sensitive situations.

Secondly, what happens when clinicians disagree? The clause requires the agreement of the community clinician in writing before a CTO can be made, but it is silent on what happens when there is disagreement between the responsible clinician and the community clinician. This is not a hypothetical concern; differing clinical views are common and can be a healthy part of multidisciplinary practice. Could the Minister confirm whether there is a proposed resolution mechanism where clinicians differ? Would the decision default to a tribunal or a second opinion, or is the CTO simply not made?

Thirdly, as the Minister has mentioned, on the operational readiness to implement this clause, the new duties on community clinicians are not trivial. They are being asked to produce written statements, engage in formal consultations and be available to advise on time-sensitive decisions such as recalls and condition changes. Can the Minister reassure the Committee that a workforce impact assessment has been or will be conducted? Will there be investment in community mental health staffing and digital infrastructure to ensure that this duty is workable?

Fourthly, I want to raise the issue of handover and role clarity. The clause will introduce a new statutory role—the community clinician—but patients often transition rapidly between settings. There may be uncertainty about who holds that responsibility at a given time. Will guidance ensure that community clinicians are formally designated and that responsibilities are clearly recorded at the point of discharge?

I want to end on a constructive note. Clause 22 is a step in the right direction. It reflects many of the recommendations of the independent review of the Mental Health Act, including the emphasis on least restriction and on therapeutic benefit. I encourage the Government to consider defining or clarifying unreasonable delay in regulations or guidance, introducing a clear process for resolving professional disagreement, and committing to publish a plan detailing workforce support, guidance and digital infrastructure to ensure that this takes place.

Clause 23, which is linked to clause 22, will introduce two important amendments to the operation of community treatment orders under the Mental Health Act 1983. As things stand, section 17B(2) allows a responsible clinician to attach conditions to a CTO if they are necessary or appropriate, to ensure the patient receives treatment, to prevent risk to health or safety or to ensure engagement with services. Such conditions can include where the person lives, their attendance at appointments and even lifestyle restrictions such as abstaining from alcohol or drugs. However, we know that these conditions can be seen as coercive. Patients often feel that breaching them means automatic recall to hospital. In practice, some CTO conditions may drift toward overreach rather than clinical necessity.

The clause responds to these concerns in two ways. Subsection (1) will remove the words “or appropriate” from section 17B(2), meaning that CTO conditions must now be strictly necessary, not just advisable or convenient. The Opposition support this narrowing of the threshold. It sends a clear message that CTO conditions must be clinically justified, proportionate and tailored to the individual’s needs. However, I ask the Minister how clinicians will be guided in applying the new “necessary” test. Will the code of practice be updated with examples and scenarios? Crucially, what measures will be taken to ensure that patients are clearly informed that a breach of a CTO condition, in itself, is not automatic grounds for recall?

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. Taking a step back to my hon. Friend’s point about “necessary”, is he concerned, as I am, that it is not clear to those responsible what “necessary” means? We could open ourselves up to potential legal challenges and disputes, which would give lawyers lots of money but would have no benefit for the patients.

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend makes an incredibly important point. Some later clauses try to address a problem where a patient was consenting to a community order, but the restrictions were so tight that it worked out as deprivation of liberty. My hon. Friend is absolutely right that knowing what is necessary is important to provide a clearly defined structure for the patient. Patients worry that if they breach that protocol, they will be automatically recalled. That might prevent them from breaching the conditions in the first place, but on the other hand it is a sword of Damocles above them. In no way does that create a beneficial therapeutic environment for them.

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[Gregory Stafford]

I thank my hon. Friend for his comprehensive analysis of the provisions under discussion. Does he understand amendments 54 and 55 to mean that, although there would be a narrowing of who can be chosen as the nominated person, there would still be some flexibility for the child to choose? Does he have any concerns about a situation in which a minor—someone under the age of 16—may, for whatever reason, choose somebody who the health professionals believe is not the most appropriate person, and does he have any sympathy with the idea that, given a parent has responsibility for the child in every other aspect of their life, the parent should have that same responsibility in this context?

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend has identified the nub of the issue, and his intervention leads me on to an example that demonstrates the problems that we are talking about. I have chosen to debate these provisions in the order shown on the selection list because I wish to understand whether the Minister believes that Government amendments 40 and 41 will deal some of the issues that I am about to raise. There clearly has to be flexibility in dealing with these situations, but it is worth exploring what could go wrong. The nub of the issue is that they may well go wrong. Let us take an example.

Say that A is 16, and she is struggling with anxiety and behavioural issues. She has had serious suicidal episodes and previous drug use. She lives at home with her loving, supportive parents, who have always acted in her best interests and want to engage constructively with her care, but A is under pressure from a 19-year-old boyfriend. He is controlling, and discourages her from speaking to her parents or professionals. When asked to nominate a trusted adult, A names him. Under the Bill as drafted, the nominated person could be accepted, provided A is deemed to be competent. That would give her boyfriend access to her care decisions and significant legal standing. Under amendments 54 and 55, that would not be possible because he does not have parental responsibility, and therefore could not be appointed.

That example illustrates why the amendments matter. Children, especially those in crisis, may be vulnerable to coercion, grooming, or misplaced trust. Loving parents, who have legal obligations to protect and care for their children in every other walk of life—as my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon pointed out—could find themselves legally sidelined.

Are there risks in amendments 54 and 55? We must consider the edge cases. Not all children under 16 live with those who are trusted and have parental responsibility. There are estranged families, kinship carers, informal fostering arrangements and situations of abuse. A strict parental responsibility requirement could exclude the very people relied on by a child. I ask the Minister whether there is flexibility in the amendments for exceptional cases in which someone without PR may be appropriate, with oversight. Do Government amendments 40 and 41 already address that point? Forgive me if I have misinterpreted, but they seem to be bridging amendments. Would guidance or a statutory code of practice provide a better mechanism to balance protection and flexibility? What assessment has been made of children in care or informal arrangements, where parental responsibility might technically lie with a local authority or estranged parent, especially under the changes proposed by Government amendments 40 and 41?

There are potential routes forward. One option might be to require PR by default but allow exceptions if the child expresses a clear competence preference, the AMHP agrees that a person is suitable and poses no safeguard risks, and a senior commissioner or legal oversight has sign-off. That is a possible way of keeping amendments 54 and 55 alive, and it would keep within the spirit of the amendments by protecting children from harmful influence without removing their voice in complex or marginal cases. We could also explore adding an explicit safeguard power to override a child’s nomination where there is concern of coercion or abuse, regardless of parental responsibility status. Again, I think that may be what Government amendments 40 and 41 are trying to do, but I would be grateful to see whether that is the case.

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting)

Debate between Luke Evans and Gregory Stafford

Committee stage
Thursday 12th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend is spot on about training. It is one thing to enshrine these measures in primary legislation; it is another thing to have the training and interpretation that go with them. One of the reasons that we have not tabled an amendment on the matter, as yet, is that there could be some concerns about what “cumulative” or “escalating” behaviour looks like. Ask any clinician and they will say that they have seen patients who are on the borderline and are struggling. It can be unclear whether they are within or outside the definition; they could be wavering between the two, given the state of their mental health. That is a real concern, but the broader pattern of identifying the picture of what is happening could be helpful and important.

One way to address the issue would be to review the data and legislation. Would the Government consider carrying out a review two years after the implementation of the Bill, specifically to look at the working of the legislation through the lens of public safety? I hope that there will be no concerns, but that would provide a backstop and a legal safety net. We do not want to wait another 40 years if there are changes that need to be made.

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend’s request to the Government for a review two years after implementation. Does he agree that it needs to be cross-governmental? The Home Office and other bodies such as the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and the NHS will need to be involved.

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend makes an incredibly important point. We heard on day one how these services interact, and that is completely correct. We need to look through the lens of public safety, because while we are quite rightly enshrining the autonomous nature of the patient as an individual, there is also the question of what we look at as a society. It includes the likes of local councils, mental health care and NHS care. Schooling could also be involved, as well as the judiciary and the Home Office. I think it is reasonable to ask the Government to look at that, in the light of recent high-profile cases, and say, “What are we doing? Does the legislation really do what we think it does?”

Clause 5 is a good step forward, but we must make sure that it is fit for purpose and that we have a review mechanism in place. I do not think that it necessarily needs to be in statute yet, but it will be interesting to hear the Minister’s response. Conducting a review on such a change, through the lens of patient safety, would be very useful.

There is also the matter of resources, which we keep coming back to. Change in detention criteria will rightly push us towards community-based alternatives—that is the whole point of what we are doing—but unless those alternatives are properly resourced with staffing, crisis services, housing and follow-up care, we will risk replacing one form of system failure with another. I appreciate that the Secretary of State is committed to reporting each year to the House, but will the Government publish a timetable and framework to support the implementation?

As we heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley, training is also critical. Professionals need the tools and time to learn the framework. They need support, implemented in real time, often under pressure and in complex, high- stakes circumstances.

Clause 5 is a welcome and thoughtful step in modernising mental health law. It will strengthens patients’ rights, sharpen clinical practice and bring us closer to a system that balances safety, liberty and humanity. However, we must be mindful about the risk of delayed intervention. In borderline cases in which the threshold is not clearly met but concerns remain high, we must ensure that there is still a route to timely, compassionate support. Otherwise, we may swing the pendulum too far in the opposite direction, from the overuse of detention to the underuse of care.

On Second Reading, I said:

“There is little greater moral burden than deciding for someone who cannot decide for themselves where care ends and control begins.”

Clause 5 typifies that burden: we are deciding who should be detained and why. I said:

“Make no mistake, this is what this House is grappling with”,

and indeed it is what our Committee is now looking at in detail. I also said:

“Involuntary care should never be the first instinct or answer, but a resort to prevent harm to both the individual and those around them.”

I said that compassionate care demands precision not only in its delivery, but in its design. I concluded:

“Without precision, we simply have sentiment.”

I promised then, as I promise now, that

“we will endeavour to ensure that the Government’s sentiment becomes a commitment.”—[Official Report, 19 May 2025; Vol. 767, c. 850-851.]

That neatly sets the scene for discussing Government amendments 26 to 29.

[Gregory Stafford]

Before my hon. Friend moves on to the amendments, I want to press him on the point about training, which my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley brought up. I support the change to the thresholds for detention but, given that it is potentially quite a significant change, what level of training will be required? Does my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth have any suggestion about how long it will take to train the relevant professionals so that there is consistency when the Bill becomes law? Does he feel that there should be a period of cooling off or training time before this part of the Bill is implemented, so that the training can catch up?

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend makes an important and poignant point. The Government have rightly stated that this change could take up to 10 years to implement, but we need to ensure that the most important safeguards are set out. Elsewhere, the Government have suggested that they will be in the code of practice. When we were discussing section 5 of the Mental Health Act and other issues, I said to the Minister that we need a constructive timetable, not only to know what the roll-out will look like but so that we can consult with the professions and ensure that they are able to deal with it.

Later, we will again discuss the interface between the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the changes that bring in new tests. That will be really important. We will also discuss the change of statutory safeguards for electroconvulsive therapy and changes to the statutory safeguards around who the second clinician will be—there is quite a feast of movements through this legislation. Make no mistake: that is what the country wants, but the Government must clearly set out some rationale for the timetable.

Unfortunately, the Opposition’s proposal for a costed plan was defeated. We wanted to set out some kind of concrete timetable over 18 months to ensure that we do not slip back, and to give the Government the flexibility to make the necessary cultural and legal changes. I hope that that addresses some of my hon. Friend’s concerns, but he was right to put that point to the Minister.

I oppose Government amendments 26 to 29, which would remove the reference to detention

“by a constable or other authorised person”,

and to delete the proposed definition of “authorised person”. I support the argument advanced powerfully in the other place by Baroness May, whose experience as a former Home Secretary gives her deep insight into the interaction between policing and mental health. Of course, it was under her premiership that the entirety of this discussion was progressed. I thank her for everything she has done, although I am not quite so thankful for the workload that it has created for me in my evenings and weekends. Her central message was clear: we must stop treating mental health as a policing issue and start delivering the right care from the right person in the right place. I wholeheartedly agree, as I am sure the Committee does.

I understand what the Government are trying to achieve. On the face of it, the amendments are technical. They seek to ensure that detention under the Bill is solely based on necessity where there is a risk of serious harm or the need for urgent treatment, and that it is not tied to who is doing the detaining. On paper that sounds reasonable, but in practice those changes will remove vital clarity and will risk baking in a system that has already failed too many people in mental health crisis.

Let us look at the problem with removing “authorised person”. The Bill, as amended in the Lords, wisely recognises the need to broaden the group of people who can respond to mental health incidents so that they include not just police officers, but trained and equipped professionals, mental health nurses, paramedics and approved mental practitioners—people who are qualified to care, not just to detain. The definition of “authorised person” in clause 5(7) ensures that only those with training competence and safety considerations are empowered to act, so it provides a framework for accountability, not a free-for-all. By removing the framework, the Government amendment would create a legal vacuum: it tells us that someone must be detained, but not by whom. In doing so, it would leave NHS trusts, police forces and local authorities with a lack of legal guidance and with a risk-averse default to the police.

I think we agree that the police should not be the first responders. As Baroness May has reminded us, and as many officers have told me, the police are routinely called out to mental health incidents, not because they are best placed to respond but because there is no one else available or authorised. That is neither fair to the police nor fair to the individuals in crisis. A police uniform can escalate distress. A custody cell is not a place of recovery. An officer guarding a patient in accident and emergency for 29 hours, as the Metropolitan police have reported, helps no one—not the patient, not the police and not the public. The 2019 College of Policing snapshot found that 95% of mental health-related calls did not require a police response. That is staggering. It underlines why we must build up the capacity and legal authority of clinical professionals, not erase them from the statute.

I turn to the Government’s argument and why it falls short. The Government’s case is that removing the phrase

“by a constable or other authorised person”

will de-emphasise the police and make the law more flexible. Ironically, however, removing the clarity about who may act risks re-entrenching police dominance in these scenarios, simply because no one else will feel legally empowered to intervene. The Government argue that the definition is unnecessary or potentially restrictive, but I say the opposite: a well-drafted enabling definition gives confidence, clarity and a lawful mandate for healthcare-led responses. This is not about excluding the police altogether. There will always be situations in which an immediate threat to life or serious violence requires a police presence, but that should be the exception, not the structure around which our mental health law is designed.

[Gregory Stafford]

I think, from what my hon. Friend has said and what the Minister said at the outset, that Members on both sides of the Committee want the same thing, which as far as possible is to keep the police out of the making of these decisions, unless of course—I made this point on Second Reading and was intervened on by the hon. Member for Ashford—someone with a mental health issue has a firearm or something like that. The clear point of dispute is about whether the phrase that was placed in the Bill in the other place achieves that. Would my hon. Friend not agree that someone who has served as Home Secretary and Prime Minister and the noble Lords, who have vast experience in healthcare over many years, have probably got the definition right, which is why the Government should support the wording currently in clause 5?

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend is right: we agree that this is not a place for the police unless there is an absolute sign of criminal intent. The problem is that what happens is a member of the public sees something, reports it to the police and, naturally, it is the police, the fire service or the paramedics who come forward. If a person is unsure about someone behaving in an irrational manner, which by definition someone with a mental health issue could well be doing, the likelihood is that they will call the police and the police will be the first responders. We know that they tend to be the fastest to respond.

Slightly widening and refining the definition of who can respond would allow us to build a framework and culture that might encourage a first responder—we often say that the AA is the fourth emergency service; it may well be that mental health services would be the fifth emergency service and could respond. That is what we need for service provision. The idea behind this is to try to crowbar the police out of that position, unless absolutely necessary, as my hon. Friend rightly says. Allowing a new framework would be good for safety and good for the police, because they would be freed up to do other stuff. More importantly, it would get the care as quickly as possible to the people who need it the most.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Evans]

I bow to the hon. Member’s expertise on this; the problem is that all the evidence shows that the police are the first there. I would like to see much more of him and his colleagues being able to respond and carry this out. We are giving them the legal certainty to do so. That is the argument for making sure that we have codified safeguards around who is and is not able to make such decisions. At the moment, it is purely the police who are called out to these situations, but this gives us another legal weapon with which we could fight this inappropriate use.

The aim is to codify the safeguards around who can exercise detention, ensure accountability and, importantly, enable health-led alternatives to police detention. Are the Government confident that the decision does not leave a legal grey area around which profession or agency has the statutory power to detain, especially during urgent community or hospital-based crises?

On the authorised person category in the section 135 and 136 powers, the Government say in their letter:

“Extending these powers to ‘authorised persons’…could potentially lead to staff, patient and public safety issues.

That is precisely why the Lords amendment included a tightly defined category of authorised person, subject to the Secretary of State’s regulation, mandatory training and safety provision. The intent is to ensure that when a professional, such as a trained mental health nurse, is better placed to respond than the police, they can do so lawfully and appropriately.

The Government say:

“Section 135 and 136 powers have been designed for police officers who have specific training, equipment and access to rapid support”.

Many frontline NHS and social care professionals, including AMHPs, crisis team members and community psychiatric nurses, already respond to acutely distressed patients in highly volatile environments. They lack the police powers, but not the clinical expertise. The amendments would bring clarity and lawful backing to the situations they already manage. Take, for example, a mental health nurse in a community who arrives at a person’s home to conduct an urgent assessment. The individual is clearly experiencing psychosis, and is at immediate risk of self-harm. Under the current law, the nurse must call the police, delaying the care and potentially escalating the situation. Under the amendment, they could lawfully detain, provided they are authorised and trained.

There are also confusions over the emergency response roles. The Government letter states:

“There is a very real risk of confusion over who should respond in an emergency if multiple agencies have the same powers, which could lead to delays.”

That concern is valid, but confusion is far more likely under the current law, where roles are unclear and NHS professionals must sometimes act unlawfully or wait for overstretched police. A regulated and accountable authorised person category, established in law and detailed in the code of practice, would clarify responsibilities, not blur them. Have the Government done any modelling of the delays and safety risk caused by not empowering suitably trained healthcare professionals to act in urgent situations?

The letter also highlights concerns from stakeholders that this is

“a radical proposal with a number of serious and potentially dangerous consequences and should not be pushed through without proper consideration”.

These proposals were not developed in isolation; they were advanced in the House of Lords, where the former Mental Health Act reviewers, legal experts and mental health professionals carefully considered their scope. They are also consistent with the direction of the 2018 independent review, which emphasised reducing coercion, racial disparity and the overuse of police powers.

The “right care, right person” initiative already expects health professionals to step in, but—unless I stand corrected—the initiative is not underpinned by any legal reform. Without amending the Act, health staff are still expected to take on crisis care without the powers of protection that they need to safely or lawfully do so. How can we expect health-led responses to mental health crises without giving health professionals the power in law to act?

Turning to guidance and the code of practice, the Government say that they will issue further guidance on police handover protocols and the legal frameworks. While guidance is welcome, it is not a substitute for statutory reform. Guidance cannot grant powers to detain or protect professionals from liability. We can have legal clarity with this framework.

If the Government want to push ahead with removing the amendments, will the Minister consider committing to a formal consultation with NHS England, the AMHP leads, frontline staff and patients on creating a legally robust authorised persons role? Would he consider piloting models of community-based urgent response teams that include AMHPs and trained nurses with delegated powers? Would he legislate for police exit strategies in A&E and community crisis responses that are enforceable, not just guidance based? Given our discussion about new clause 24, there is clearly scope for a sensible piece of work in the grey area to improve the interface for patients, clinicians and police. I think that is one we can all agree on.

[Gregory Stafford]

I agree with my hon. Friend. I think we agree on both sides of the Committee that, where appropriate, police should not be the first responders to this issue, although, obviously, there will be situations where they should be. If the Government push ahead with removing the amendments, is there any indication in the Bill, or indeed elsewhere from the Government, of what they will do to achieve what Members on both sides of the Committee seem to want, which is to avoid, as far as possible, having the police as the detainers and responders? If there is nothing else, I cannot see why the Government would want to remove the amendments made by the noble Lords in the other place.

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Under the last Government, the “right care, right person” initiative was launched with the Humberside police force to try to ensure appropriate care, but that is an example in isolation.

One solution would be to include guidance in the codes of practice, but it would not have the statutory footing to allow that legal certainty, which is the concern. Another would be to include something in the annual statement that we will receive from the Government. We should work collaboratively to try to find a decent piece of work to look for the evidence base and build a delivery plan to help the police extract themselves from situations, when appropriate, and care givers to insert themselves. It is admirable to share a problem that is difficult not just in England but in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

I agree that the Government are right to proceed with caution, but caution is not the same as inaction, especially when lives are at stake and the law no longer reflects the reality of mental health care. The amendments are not about expanding police powers; they are about reducing the need for police involvement by giving others the lawful authority to act. Although maths may not be my strong point, I am not blind to the make-up of this Committee; I realise that the change will inevitably happen. I want to press the Minister on how he proposes to reduce the burden on the police to safeguard them from thousands of hours spent dealing with mental health crisis issues. In extreme cases, they are not appropriate responders.

This is the key issue to improve so many aspects of our society. We could improve the working life of the police, allowing them to do what they are paid to do, trained to do and passionate about: policing and protecting their communities. We could improve life for the public, because it would free up the police to tackle crime and keep them safe. Most importantly, we could provide the correct care to those patients at their biggest time of need. I hope the Minister will set out how the Government plan to achieve that.

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

Debate between Luke Evans and Gregory Stafford

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Evans]

I entirely agree with the hon. Lady’s end point and with the thrust of what she says. Causality is not causation, and we need to be very careful. When we get to the later clauses of the Bill, that will be at the forefront of our discussion.

We cannot deny the reason we are having this legislative debate in the first place: the observation that black men in particular are subject to community treatment orders far more than any other group in the country. However, we must not make a lazy causal analysis and say, “Well, just because that is the case.” For example, black men have a higher risk of prostate cancer, and white people a higher chance of coeliac disease, because of the genetic basis. Is there something in that? Is there systemic bias by clinicians, as she hinted? That all needs to be explored.

The hon. Member for Shipley beat me to the punch when it comes to my closing statement. We owe it to our children and young people not to legislate in haste, so I welcome the spirit of the amendments, and I welcome the debate, but we must be careful to ensure that we are truly legislating for and defining exactly what we know. Otherwise, we risk creating other inequalities and unintended consequences or, worse still, a system that becomes even more flabby and difficult to manoeuvre through. That is the last thing we want for our patients, clinicians and the public.

[Gregory Stafford]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Furniss. I have some criticisms of the specifics of the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Winchester, but I entirely support him and congratulate him on the passion with which he spoke about them. As I remember, his maiden speech touched on a number of these issues. Whether they are within the scope of the Bill is for the Clerks and the Committee to decide, but he made several extraordinarily good points that I hope the Government will take away. If the Bill is not the appropriate place for them, there should be another avenue.

The lead amendment is about the ICB register. It would insert a new subsection to extend the duty on integrated care boards to establish and maintain a register for those at risk of detention to cover all children and young people who meet certain risk criteria. As drafted, the duty to maintain a register under clause 4 may not explicitly include all under-18s. Therefore, the amendment would ensure that children and young people are proactively identified and supported before reaching a crisis point that might lead to detention.

Clearly, there are positives. As the hon. Member stated, early intervention might help to prevent unnecessary detention by identifying risk earlier, which is especially important for children. Likewise, there is a strong argument about equity and care to ensure that young people receive the same proactive planning as adults. That would clearly lead to improved safeguarding through better tracking of vulnerable minors in the mental health system. A corollary to that would be better data collection on youth mental health needs, which I think we would all support. We would be able to use that information to support more informed policymaking and resource decisions.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth highlighted, however, and as I highlighted in the debates on other clauses, there would clearly be a resource demand, especially on ICBs, from expanding registers and services. Likewise, there is the complexity of implementation, because defining who qualifies as being “at risk” may be subjective. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Winchester, when he sums up on the amendments, to give us some indication of how “at risk” would be defined, or whether that would simply be down to the mental health professional or some other medical professional. There are also, of course, privacy and consent concerns related to maintaining a register for minors. Again, the hon. Member may have thought about some practical things that could assuage my concerns about that.

There may also be a risk of stigmatisation. We have to be very careful, especially with children and young people, because being labelled or treated differently due to being on the register would not help their mental health. We would have to have some really strict privacy and data-sharing controls to ensure that they were protected within the proposed system.

As I said in my intervention, I entirely support the aims of amendment 47 because it would specify the risk factors for detention for those on the register of people at risk of detention under clause 4. The criteria for identifying such individuals are left to be defined in regulations as the Bill stands. The amendment would mandate in law specific evidence-based risk factors—which I agree are risk factors for the issues that the hon. Member is talking about, particularly those linked to trauma and social disadvantage—rather than leaving them to discretion.

At a general level, the amendment recognises the role of trauma and social determinants in mental health crises—I congratulate the hon. Member on clearly explaining some of the factors. Going back to our debate on the previous group of amendments, that would improve the early identification of individuals at risk, promote preventive care, strengthen equity and provide clarity and consistency. However, like my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, I am concerned about prescribing a relatively small list and therefore limiting the clause’s flexibility—there may be risk factors that are not listed in the amendment or ones that we have not even thought of.

[Gregory Stafford]

I agree with the hon. Lady; that is my understanding, but perhaps the Minister can confirm that when he sums up. The flexibility in the clause is one of its strengths.

[Dr Evans]

Does my hon. Friend share my opinion that it makes sense to agree with the Government? The impact of social media and the evidence coming out about using mobile phones and about the impact of certain sites have been debated in this House for the last five years—since I have been here—and there have been advances. Legislation has been brought forward, but there is a growing consensus on both sides of the House that it never quite keeps up. Allowing the Secretary of State to add risk factors as they come up, even in policy guidance, might be a shrewder way to future-proof the Bill against those difficulties. In 1983, we were not discussing or even thinking about the likes of Facebook, yet here we are. With the advent of artificial intelligence, who knows where we will be in another 40 years?

[Gregory Stafford]

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. To touch on his point about social media, it is a very useful tool, but is deeply pervasive and can cause the bullying, harassment and mental health issues that he describes. As far as I can tell, the risk factors in amendment 47 would not cover something like that unless it was part of something else—for example, part of domestic abuse, armed conflict and so on.

--- Later in debate ---

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent case for new clause 11, which could potentially solve funding issues I have raised. He mentioned the NHS 10-year plan. Will he suggest that the Minister looks at ensuring that, if new clause 11 is not passed today, the details in it are fed through into the plan? When it is published, which the Minister has indicated will be relatively soon, the information and outcomes my hon. Friend is trying to achieve through the new clause could be in it.

[Dr Evans]

Far be it from me to tell the Minister what to do, but if I were a wise Minister, I might look at where my predecessors had benefitted from further information and where they may have stumbled. The Bill has been looked at for a number of years by many people from outside and inside the House. Many have been involved throughout its progress, including a former Prime Minister, who tabled amendments in the other place. There is definitely the ability to learn from what the last Government found and to use that information in the kinds of plans that we need.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Evans]

Amendment 52 would amend clause 5 to introduce an important distinction in the grounds for detention under section 2 of the Mental Health Act, namely on whether a person has the mental capacity or competence to consent to admission. This amendment, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, raises questions that go to the heart of how we balance liberty and protection, autonomy and risk in our mental health system.

Under the current Mental Health Act, and indeed under the Bill as drafted, an individual can be detained for assessment if they are experiencing a mental disorder and if serious harm could be caused to themselves or others unless they are detained. There is no distinction based on whether they have the capacity to consent to care. In other words, a person who has full understanding and decision-making ability may still be detained against their will to protect them from themselves.

The amendment proposes a change to that approach, so that if someone lacks the capacity to make a decision about admission and treatment, the current protection should apply—they can be detained if they are at risk of harming themselves or others. But if someone has capacity, understands what is happening and what the risks are, and still refuses care, they should be detained only if they pose a risk to others and not just to themselves.

I will give a brief example to try to bring that to life. Imagine a young adult, aged 22 and living with long-standing depression. They have attempted suicide in the past, but they now clearly and repeatedly say that they do not want to be admitted. They understand the risks, are coherent, consistent and judged by clinicians to have capacity. Under the Bill as it stands, that person could still technically be detained, but under this amendment they could not unless they pose a risk to someone else.

Why does this amendment have merit? There is much in it that is compelling. It puts autonomy at the centre of the mental health framework, which the Committee discussed and agreed on earlier. It aligns more closely with the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which already allows people to make unwise decisions so long as they understand what they are doing. It also echoes the principles in the UN convention on the rights of persons with disabilities, which calls for supported decision making over substitute decision making. It could reduce unnecessary or overly paternalistic detentions, especially of people from marginalised groups who are already disproportionally affected by coercive care.

[Gregory Stafford]

I am interested in the points that my hon. Friend is raising. Could he give any examples of the situations he is talking about? It would help the Committee, and certainly help me, to understand the practical realities of what he is talking about.

[Dr Evans]

I will try to elucidate a little further. We know that some people have fluid capacity, such as those with dementia or depression. How do we ensure that people have safeguards for themselves and the wider community, while respecting their capacity and allowing them to be masters of their own destiny? The Bill literally says that we want to see individual autonomy, and by definition, there is always a balance to be struck. The Bill shifts more to the paternalistic side, which brings some challenges because it could create gaps in protections, as I will explain.

There are clinical situations in which a person in mental health crisis—for example, in the early stages of a manic episode or a severe personality disorder crisis—may present with superficial capacity but be at grave risk of harm. Are we confident that clinicians can assess capacity accurately in real time, in often pressured and emergency contexts? Might we inadvertently tie the hands of practitioners trying to prevent suicide or serious self-injury? If capacity becomes the gateway to protection, what support and guidance will be provided to ensure that it applies fairly, consistently and safely?

That is important when we talk about detention, because detaining people is one thing; the next thing is how we get them out. To understand that, it is worth focusing on the crucial interaction between the Bill and liberty protection safeguards. It is worth my briefly explaining to the Committee what LPS are, how they evolved and why they matter. Liberty protection safeguards are the new legal framework that replaces the old deprivation of liberty safeguards, or DoLS. DoLS were designed to protect people who lack capacity, but had become widely criticised as complex, slow and limited mainly to hospitals and care homes.

In response, the Conservative Government introduced LPS through the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019, to simplify the process and extend protections to community settings such as supported living and people’s own homes. Given that we are talking about Darzi’s shift, that is important. With that context, I turn to the key concerns before us today: how the Bill interacts with LPS, especially when individuals move from hospital detention to community care.

To illustrate why this matters, let us consider the case of Mrs A. She is a 55-year-old woman with bipolar disorder and mild dementia. She was detained under the Mental Health Act after a severe manic episode put her at risk. While in hospital, the Act governed her detention and treatment. After several months, Mrs A stabilises enough to be discharged, but because of her dementia, she lacks the capacity to consent to her care arrangements in the community. She requires supported living, with 24/7 care, which means that she will continue to be deprived of her liberty, but now in the community. Because she is no longer detained under the Mental Health Act upon discharge, the liberty protection safeguards must authorise the deprivation of liberty in the community.

This requires careful consideration. An LPS assessment and best intention decisions are required, and formal authorisation must be in place before she leaves hospital. This transition point is critical, because without clear protocols, Mrs A could find herself deprived of liberty without lawful authorisation—a breach of her human rights. Information sharing between hospital staff, community providers and local authorities may be delayed or incomplete. There may be confusion among professionals about who is responsible for co-ordinating the handover. Training gaps might lead to the inconsistent application of safeguards.

The Bill reforms detention in hospitals, but there is some opacity regarding how the handover to LPS in the community will be managed. Will the Bill ensure a seamless transition, with no gaps in safeguards? If it does not, then how will this be provided? Will there be statutory duties to mandate information sharing and co-ordinate reassessments? How will professionals across health and social care be trained to navigate both systems effectively?

The Bill rightly aims to reduce inappropriate detentions and enhance patient autonomy in hospital, but protections under LPS in the community must be equally robust to maintain dignity and rights post discharge. How will the Government guarantee parity of safeguards across settings? The Bill also seeks to address disproportionate detention rates among ethnic minorities. We must be equally vigilant that the reforms and the wider LPS regime do not perpetuate inequalities once individuals leave hospital. We therefore need to ask the questions: what monitoring is done and what safeguards will be in place?

On detention, I gently ask the Minister to clarify the Government’s plan to manage the vital interface between the Mental Health Act and LPS, even as the Bill stands, to embed clear statutory duties, guidance and accountability to protect all individuals like Mrs A throughout her care journey.

What is the Government’s view on distinguishing between those with and without capacity in the context of detention for self-harm risk? Has the Department assessed the clinical and operational implications of requiring real-time capacity judgments before detaining someone at risk to themselves? Will the Government consider a limited override provision in extreme cases where the risk is immediate, catastrophic and the capacity assessment is finely balanced? We will see more of these kinds of cases as we go forward, with more and more people living with the likes of dementia or acquired brain injuries.

If the Government do not support the amendment as drafted, might they consider refining the code of practice to provide clear guidance on how capacity, autonomy and right to self are waived? The amendment presents a thoughtful and principled intervention. It is not perfect in my eyes, but it challenges us, rightly, to consider whether our mental health laws strike the right balance between protection and personal freedom.

Amendment 53, like its partner on section 2, reflects a growing consensus that the law should better respect the autonomy of people with mental health conditions, especially when they have the capacity to make informed decisions. In introducing a necessary distinction, if someone can truly understand the consequences of refusing treatment and they pose no risk to others, should the state override their decision on their own behalf? The amendment would add a capacity-based distinction into section 3, mirroring the earlier amendment on section 2. Specifically, if a patient lacks capacity to consent to a medical treatment, they may be detained if there is risk of serious harm to themselves or others. If a person has capacity, they may be detained only if there is risk to others. In short, if a person is mentally unwell but understands the consequences of refusing treatment in this case and only poses a risk to themselves, they would not be eligible for detention under this amendment.

Imagine a woman with anorexia nervosa who is dangerously underweight, has a good understanding of her condition and the risk, and refuses in-patient treatment. Under the Bill as it stands she can be detained, but under the amendment if she is judged to have capacity and only poses a risk to herself, she could not be detained under section 3. Therefore, there are huge and far-reaching consequences to the amendment. The wider science is moving towards capacity, but it needs to answer some of these questions. Some are even being grappled with now—take the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill. This truly cuts to the heart of humanity and I am sure there are varying views not only across the Committee, but across society. Similar questions will arise when it comes to capacity.

To that end, the question posed is not simple. In some cases, such as severe anorexia or chronic suicidal tendencies, capacity may be technically present but clinically contested. The stakes could not be higher. The amendment challenges us, and therefore the Government—and rightly so—to ask: are we doing enough to balance liberty and care? Do we have the right clinical tools, legal thresholds and ethical safeguards in place?

New clause 24 is on a different but related subject. This Back-Bench amendment relates to the application for admission in respect of patients who are already on hospital grounds but have not yet been formally admitted. This is really important, because it comes down to the ability. As my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley said, when it comes to the mechanism this is the day-to-day reality. Someone, just because they turn up in A&E, is not under the care of A&E per se until they are admitted. That is when the clinicians will take control. If they just give their name, at what point do we have that grey area? That is the matter of contention in day-to-day working.

Currently, under section 5(1) of the Mental Health Act, applications for detention or admission can be made only in relation to patients who are already admitted to hospital—that is the key part. This leaves a grey area for people who come to hospital voluntarily, perhaps by walking into A&E and seeking help or being brought by an ambulance or the police, but have not yet been formally admitted. The amendment would explicitly allow applications for admission to be made as soon as someone attends or is brought into hospital to seek help, even before formal admission.

--- Later in debate ---

[Gregory Stafford]

Just in case my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge is not following this Bill in Hansard, I will pass on the hon. Lady’s compliments to him. Like her, I have great respect for him; I am not trying to denigrate his great work on the amendments and the new clause. All I am suggesting is that, from a layperson’s perspective, there are some elements that need tightening up, if not changing altogether. I take the hon. Lady’s point about pre-legislative scrutiny, but obviously these amendments and the new clause were not part of that because they have only just been tabled. I therefore think it is entirely appropriate to be debating them now.

[Dr Evans]

I have spoken to my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge and looked into this issue a bit further. Psychiatry is already looking towards future capacity and trying to bring the two pieces of legislation together. I believe that Scotland has already moved in that direction. We are therefore into the cycle of chasing legislation for something behind us. I appreciate the concerns, but that is why the Government need to be alive to these situations. At the end of the day, the nub of the issue is patients getting caught up between capacity and safety under the Mental Health Act. Does my hon. Friend agree?

[Gregory Stafford]

I thank my hon. Friend for his extraordinarily helpful intervention. I was not aware of the changes, and I certainly had not heard of fusion before, or about what is going on in Scotland. Of course, if the new clause had already been enacted in another part of the United Kingdom in some form, I would be much more comfortable with it. But, as I said in relation amendments 52 and 53, if the new clause is to pass in its current form in this Bill or in some future form in another Bill, there has to be a focus on proper training and guidance. Because there is potentially such a legal quagmire, we must ensure that people understand the legal framework within which they can do this.

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

Debate between Luke Evans and Gregory Stafford

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Evans]

I rise to speak to Liberal Democrat amendments 1 to 7 and 51 to clause 4. I welcome the intention behind the amendments, which aim to enhance the care and treatment review process for people with autism and learning disabilities, particularly by addressing housing and accommodation needs and ensuring that key advocates receive reports.

There are positive elements of the amendments that are worth highlighting. I understand the good intent of including housing and accommodation considerations explicitly in reviews, as it recognises that a person’s living situation is often central to their wellbeing and recovery. Additionally, ensuring that nominated persons and independent mental health advocates receive reports promptly promotes transparency and patient advocacy. Shortening the review intervals from 12 to six months could lead to more responsive care planning.

However, I have some significant reservations about the statutory implications of blurring housing, for example, so directly with the care and treatment review process. Housing is traditionally managed under separate statutory frameworks from health and social care, so to embed housing as a statutory element within these reviews risks creating confusion about which agency holds responsibility and may expose health bodies or commissioners to legal obligations that they are neither funded nor structured for.

I have a few questions for the Liberal Democrats. In their eyes, how would the Government ensure clarity over the statutory duties applied to housing recommendations arising from the reviews? Would that not risk delaying or complicating discharges if housing issues became a statutory sticking point within health-led care reviews? Moreover, housing provision often depends on local authorities and housing departments that have their own complex eligibility criteria and resourcing constraints. Are we confident that ICBs and responsible commissioners would be able to co-ordinate effectively across these boundaries, especially given the patchwork of funding and powers in play?

[Gregory Stafford]

To take that point slightly further, given that pretty much every local authority has a different set of criteria by which to determine people’s housing needs, how would, for example, an ICB that potentially crosses multiple local authorities with differing housing needs be able to understand the complexities within the current structure, and ensure that the patient is served best?

--- Later in debate ---

[Gregory Stafford]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers. As I have indicated, I have a lot of sympathy with the amendments, but some practical constraints need to be teased out.

Amendment 1 seeks to ensure that housing needs are explicitly considered during a care, education and treatment review meeting. I can see the pros of that. Clearly, a holistic approach recognises that stable housing is fundamental to mental health and recovery, especially for vulnerable individuals. Addressing housing barriers may reduce unnecessary hospital admissions. Likewise, it could lead to improved discharge planning, ensuring that patients are not delayed in hospital due to a lack of suitable accommodation. All Governments, of every colour and political party, want to see collaboration between health, social care and housing services, and the amendment brings those things together.

As I said in an intervention, however, local authorities and NHS bodies such as ICBs may face challenges to co-ordinating housing assessments within the CETRs. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth mentioned, his constituency crosses a number of local authority boundaries, while my seat of Farnham and Bordon, with two thirds of it in Surrey and one third in Hampshire, has that same issue. The county councils are wonderful and Conservative run, but Waverley is run by Liberal Democrats.

The hon. Member for Winchester, who moved the amendment, recognised the issue of implementation capacity, but there are also likely to be resource constraints. These days, local authorities spend most of their money on social care, education and the bits of health that sit within their remit, so there may be insufficient housing stock or funding to meet the identified needs that the amendment would bring forward. There are therefore practical implications.

[Dr Evans]

Thinking that through, how does my hon. Friend feel that existing statutory requirements to provide accommodation will balance out if we provide another statutory requirement on accommodation in these plans? Does he worry, as I do, about creating a risk, for example, of pitting someone with severe learning disabilities against a homeless person if there is resource rationing thanks to the practicalities of how many houses we have? Members throughout the House agree that we need to build more houses, but until that happens, such local authorities have the resources issue.

[Gregory Stafford]

I agree. Even if the Government build the number of houses that they propose—I have some scepticism—there will always be the potential conflict or disagreement on prioritisation in the housing register and list. As my hon. Friend says, that might well lead to local authorities having to change their criteria, which are not necessarily consistent across local authorities, and, as in his example, potentially pitting a homeless person against someone with mental health needs.

The amendment would also have the potential for scope creep. I have a lot of sympathy with what it is trying to achieve, but expanding CETRs to include housing might dilute their focus and overburden the process. I am interested to hear from the mover and supporters of the amendment how they would ensure that the CETR continues to have that core focus on the health and wellbeing of the individual, rather than potentially be bogged down in the mire of housing issues.

Moving on, amendment 51 would ensure that the care and treatment of individuals with autism or learning disabilities explicitly considered the impact of accommodation and relocation in the planning and decision-making process. Again, I have a lot of sympathy with that. It would promote holistic care planning, reduce trauma and disruption, support continuity of care and, I think, align with the person-centred principles throughout the Bill, which all of us support. Again, however, amendment 51 might complicate discharge planning, if suitable accommodation were limited.

--- Later in debate ---

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend is entirely correct. We operate in a resource-confined area. It does not matter what the resource envelope is; it will always be confined. If we use resource to service the very laudable aims of the amendment, it will take resource and money away from another area.

[Dr Evans]

Would my hon. Friend speculate on a question that I hope will be answered by the hon. Member for Winchester? It is about the evidence base behind choosing six months instead of 12. GPs would do learning disability reviews every year, for example, and it is an annual thing with asthma and in similar areas. Is the hon. Member for Winchester aware of an evidence base for why it should be six months? There may not be one—often these can be arbitrary, in terms of just giving a clinical judgment—but I wonder whether there is a specific reason for choosing to reduce the period between reviews to six months.

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend attributes to me a level of clairvoyance that I do not possess, but I am sure that the hon. Member for Winchester or the hon. Member for Guildford will pick up that point.

The resource implications are not just about the funding. They are about increased workload and the pressure put on the professions and services. As my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley said, the amendment would divert attention away from delivering care, if it is not balanced properly. My hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth is right to ask, “Why six months?” Why not nine months, eight months or any other period? Is there a clinical basis for six months?

Royal British Legion

Debate between Luke Evans and Gregory Stafford

Tuesday 1st April 2025 Westminster Hall

[Dr Evans]

The hon. Member is spot-on; it is pivotal to ensure that the story is continued all the way through, not only in our nation but across the world. He leads me nicely on to my next point, because the Royal British Legion education programme, which will bring stories from the second world war into classrooms using educational resources and digital capsules of VE Day stories, is under creation. The RBL is honouring the sacrifices of those who came before us while ensuring that their legacy shapes our future. Of course, it is not just world wars that we need to continue to remember but more recent conflicts, too: Korea; the Falklands; Northern Ireland; Bosnia and Kosovo; and the Gulf deployments in place like Iraq and, of course, Afghanistan.

Nationally, the RBL’s impact is undeniable—distinct, poignant, respectful and powerful—but an organisation is only as strong as the sum of its parts, so I turn to the Royal British Legion branches in Hinckley and Bosworth. I am privileged to have the following RBL branches in my constituency: Barwell and Earl Shilton; Burbage; Market Bosworth; Ashby-de-la-Zouch; and Ibstock.

The Hinckley branch is branch No. 96, being the 96th legion to be created since the Royal British Legion was formed in 1921. I know that it is continually active and proactive today, and is managed by some fantastic volunteers, not least the chairman, Lloyd Bagshaw, who is sitting in the Public Gallery today. He is ably supported by Lee Bushill, the vice chair; Mick Nolan, the treasurer; Kiah Brown, the secretary; Ian Walker and Troy Phillips, who are both standard bearers; Dave England, the parade marshal; Lew Snooks, the deputy parade marshal; and the aforementioned Elaine Ward, who is the poppy appeal organiser.

The Hinckley branch has organised numerous public events to commemorate key anniversaries from the Falklands to Korea and D-day. A key focus of the branch’s three-year plan is tackling social isolation, which affects veterans of all ages and is often linked to mental health concerns. The branch’s initiatives include visiting care homes to run accessible activities, participation in coffee mornings and breakfasts for veterans, teaching in schools, and providing support to bereaved families. Families may also request the branch’s standard bearers to attend services and pay homage to the fallen and to veterans. I can only imagine what that must mean to the families affected; it is a powerful demonstration of the community spirit that exists among the armed forces. Fundraising remains vital and the branch’s poppy appeal consistently raises over £40,000 annually. That is a significant total, which shows the perpetual gratitude and benevolent support of the district’s community.

In summing up the contributions of my local RBL branch, I will quote Lloyd Bagshaw himself:

“The fundamental keystone to the foundation of these success falls at the feet of the small cohort of passionate volunteers that assist the Branch in all its activities; primarily during the Poppy Appeal period each year. Many of these volunteer fund raisers are not even Legion Members, they merely have the desire and wish to support the appeal. Without such support and enthusiasm from the community, the Branch and indeed the Legion as an organisation, could not survive. The breadth of my gratitude and sincere thanks to these men and women have no limit.”

Lloyd asked me to single out one particular member of the branch, Mr Ian Walker, who he described as having:

“a passion and commitment to the branch that goes above and beyond.”

Therefore, I would like to take this opportunity to do exactly that.

Now, it is said that

“A superior man is modest in his speech, but exceeds in his actions”—

and none more so than the current chairman of Hinckley branch, Lloyd Bagshaw. Other members of the branch tell me that

“typically, of Lloyd, he has omitted, what we all consider to be, a primary nomination—himself."

Several years ago, the branch was facing an uncertain future. Membership had dwindled, activities were scarce and survival was in doubt. Seven years ago, Lloyd joined and saw not the challenges but potential, and without hesitation he took action. With more than 40 years of service in the Royal British Legion, Lloyd was elected chairman unopposed—a testament to the trust placed in him. From day one, he worked tirelessly to restore connections, rebuild relationships and revitalise the branch. His efforts strengthened ties with the Royal Naval Association, St Mary’s church and the local council, creating a support network that transformed the organisation.

Today, the branch is thriving. Events are planned, awareness is high and the community presence is firmly established—all thanks to Lloyd’s leadership. His dedication even uncovered a forgotten milestone, the branch’s centenary, in 2023. Most telling of all, membership has more than doubled under his stewardship, now proudly standing at 87. In the words of one branch member,

“Simply put, we are only here today due to his hard work, selflessness, commitment and enthusiasm.”

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

I thank my hon. Friend for giving way and for securing this debate. He is absolutely right that branches are at the heart of the Royal British Legion, but so are the clubs. A number of clubs in my constituency, especially the Hindhead club in Beacon Hill, are under significant financial pressure due to increasing costs—not least, I am afraid, because the Royal British Legion is the landlord and is trying to put up the rent. Does my hon. Friend agree that it would be great if the Royal British Legion nationally and the Government came together to preserve the clubs as well as the branches?

[Dr Evans]

The service contribution in the community is really important. The role an MP can play, as my hon. Friend no doubt does, is to pull everyone together to have these discussions and see whether a solution can be found. That veteran support is what we all crave in our constituencies, and I am pleased to see him championing his club today.

Turning to the national future and support for our veterans, I was pleased and proud of the last Government’s support for veterans. To give a brief overview, the Office for Veterans’ Affairs was set up in 2019 and the former Prime Minister appointed a Minister for Veterans’ Affairs to his Cabinet to report to him directly, with the aim of taking on the challenges faced by our nation’s veterans. Further work by the previous Government included a veterans’ strategy action plan, trauma network and health innovation fund. Therefore, it would be great to hear from the Minister today what steps the current Government are taking to build on the progress made by the previous Government to support the legion’s current priorities.

Those include: strengthening the armed forces covenant duty to include UK and devolved Governments and to cover all policy matters; ensuring that all public bodies ask individuals whether they or immediate family members have served in HM armed forces; ensuring that military compensation is never treated as an income source by means tests for welfare benefit; introducing a national protocol to provide consistent access to public services for armed forces’ families, including increased special educational needs and disabilities support for service children; and removing barriers for families of non-UK service personnel to stay in the UK, waiving fees for indefinite leave to remain and the minimum income requirement. Perhaps the Minister could supply reflections on those issues, as the RBL has raised them specifically.

Time is short; this speech is long. I thought it apt to close this speech simply by reflecting on what happens on the 11th day of the 11th month at the 11th hour. There are times when no words can do justice; silence is the only response that speaks the loudest—felt, felt but not forgotten.

NHS Performance: Darzi Investigation

Debate between Luke Evans and Gregory Stafford

Monday 7th October 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I have removed my neck collar, which I am allowed to do, but if Members see my head wobbling, I ask them to intervene and I will put it straight back on. I welcome the hon. Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) to his place. With the respect that he talks about and commands, I am sure he will be an asset to the House.

I come to the debate with a slightly unique perspective, and three minutes is very little time to make my point. I have been a doctor since 2007; I sat on the Health and Social Care Committee for three years; and, most recently—and probably most obviously—I recently had spinal surgery on my neck. However, that is not my only foray into the NHS: I have had both knees and my shoulder operated on and my appendix out, and I ended up in intensive care with bilateral pneumonia after that, so I have seen a fair amount of it.

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

The bionic man.

[Dr Evans]

Absolutely. In this debate, health is a political football. It always strikes me that there is a rising tide across the western world, and at the four points of the nation. In Scotland, the NHS is run by the SNP; in Wales, it is run by Labour; in Northern Ireland, it is also separate; and we had the Conservatives, who have now handed it over to Labour. All of them are struggling, and we would do well to remember that. I came into politics not to change the world but to solve that—that sounds cheesy. In my last two minutes I have a set of suggestions—as any good doctor would do, I will look at the short term, the mid term and the long term—to try to improve it.

We could start with a root and branch review into prescribing, which is one of the most wasteful things in the NHS. On top of that, it is worth looking at the European working time directive, which hampers doctors when they study. Overnight, that could increase the ability to see more patients by a couple of percentage points. I spent nine months waiting for my operation, and there were a number of appointment letters. I had the ability to understand them and work my way through them, but a root and branch review of communications—the simple bread and butter of the NHS—would be very welcome. Comparable data across the nations, to see what goes on, is so important.

For the medium term, I would like statementing when people go into the NHS. Everyone knows how much it costs when they go to America—£40,000 for a ski accident. It costs that much here, and people would do well to remember that when they do not turn up to their appointments. On the IT system, we focus a lot on patients but I would like more focus on the staff and how they can use IT. I would like capping of GP lists—a sensible way, now that we have a workforce plan in place, to grow our staffing.

Finally, for the long term, in the 20 seconds I have I suggest a national service for SEND, taking education and health together to deal with mental health. Some 40% of the child and adolescent mental health services referrals in Leicestershire relate to autism and ADHD. That is a real problem that could easily be solved. In my final five seconds, I suggest an NHS centre for clinical excellence to share best practice. It is not good enough.