Iran

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Monday 20th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

I beg to move an amendment, to leave out from “House” to the end of the Question and add,

‘supports the Government’s efforts to reach a peaceful, negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue through a combination of pressure in the form of robust sanctions, and engagement led by the E3+3 comprising the UK, US, France, Germany, China and Russia; and recognises the value of making clear to Iran that all options for addressing the issue remain on the table.’.

I have a genuine respect for my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron). It is courageous sometimes to put forward a view that may have very little support, but as I listened to his speech, I could not but irresistibly be reminded of the remark that was made about a Minister in the 1930s, who had the reputation of being very logical. It was said of him that starting from a false premise he had moved inexorably to the wrong conclusion. I say to my hon. Friend in all honesty that I feel that he is in that situation.

Of course, we all want to see a peaceful resolution of this dispute by negotiation. I agree with my hon. Friend that there is a powerful case to see if we can have a normalisation of relations between the United States and Iran, but it takes the two to have such a negotiation, and, as he himself conceded, when President Obama put forward such a proposal, it was rejected in Tehran. There is no evidence that Tehran has changed its position. If it has changed it, it would be very easy for it to say so.

I want to go straight to the question raised in the motion rather than to the wider issues involved, and that is whether there is a powerful or persuasive argument at this moment in time for renouncing the use of force. I presume my hon. Friend means not by the United Kingdom, but by the west—the international community in general. I believe he is profoundly wrong for three reasons. First, if the United States—the key country in this regard—the west and the international community renounced the use of force at this stage, I believe that Israel would be more likely to decide to act unilaterally. The Israelis know perfectly well that their military capability is far less than that of the United States and that the Americans, with their cruise missiles, bunker-busting bombs and other capabilities, stand a much better chance of destroying or severely degrading Iran’s nuclear capability. As long as the United States has not ruled out that option, the Israelis are under much greater pressure to allow the negotiations the best possible opportunity to produce the desired result. If that option is removed from the table, particularly by the United States, the Israelis will say, “We are sorry, but sanctions are not working and the negotiations are going nowhere. Every week that passes creates a more dangerous Iran. If no one else will act, we will.” I say to my hon. Friend that, for anyone who understands the Israeli position, this is not scaremongering, but the most likely consequence.

[John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Lab)]

If the Israelis do act unilaterally, what sanctions should be applied to them?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

The Israelis acted unilaterally against Iraq when they removed the Osirak reactor, and both the western world and the Arab world breathed a huge sign of relief. It would ultimately depend on how successful the Israelis could be, and that is a separate question.

Secondly, this is inevitably an extraordinarily complex period of diplomacy and, as other hon. Members have noted, diplomacy requires maximum pressure. It requires carrots and sticks. To reduce unnecessarily the pressure we can apply would be to act fundamentally against our own interests. There are circumstances—very limited circumstances—when it is right to rule out the use of force in advance. Let me give an example, because it is a question of disproportionate responses. When Argentina occupied the Falkland Islands, some rather foolish people said, “The United Kingdom has a nuclear weapon, so why does it not just threaten Argentina that it will use it if it does not withdraw from the Falkland Islands?” The Government at the time rightly said that under no circumstances was that an option, because it would have been an incredibly disproportionate response, and that was of course the right position to take.

However, we are not in such a situation. When a country is contemplating acquiring nuclear weapons, as the rest of the world believes Iran is, even if my hon. Friend does not, and when we know that that would dramatically alter the geopolitical balance of power in the Gulf—the capability of producing a nuclear weapon in a few weeks is as serious as actually having one—that is a huge threat. We can debate whether it is a legitimate threat, but the possibility of using conventional force to destroy that capability in order to prevent the emergence of such a nuclear weapon state is not inherently unreasonable, extreme or irrational.

[Dr Sarah Wollaston (Totnes) (Con)]

Is it not in Israel’s gift to de-escalate the situation and move away from a nuclear arms race by declaring its own nuclear capability?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

That might be an option, but the political reality is that Israel has had nuclear weapons for 30 years and that has not led to Arab countries threatening seriously to develop their own nuclear capability. The reason the Saudis and others have reacted in such a hostile way to Iran is that they know that Iran is intent on geopolitical dominance in the Gulf region by being the only country of the Muslim world, other than Pakistan, to have nuclear weapons capability or the reality of it. I believe that we cannot rule out a military response because the potential for such a response must be part of the equation.

[Paul Flynn]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

I do not want to accept too many interventions, for the reasons you have mentioned, Mr Deputy Speaker.

Thirdly, the use of force will never be a desirable response, but it might be the least bad one if all else fails. In considering that, let me put to the House what I think is a very important point. Many commentators have drawn attention to all the downsides of a military response. They suggest that an attack by the United States—let us concentrate on the United States at the moment—would lead to a hike in the oil price, which is correct. They suggest that it might lead to increased terrorist support by Iran for Hezbollah or Hamas and to attempts to block the strait of Hormuz and all that that would entail, and they are right. There are various other downsides, too. But, when we think about it, we find that almost all the examples—the correct examples that have been given—of the adverse consequences of a military strike by the United States are relatively temporary. They are short to medium-term: they might last a few days, weeks or possibly even months, but they would gradually cease to have any impact.

The alternative, however, of an Iran with nuclear weapons capability is not temporary; it is permanent. Therefore, we have to come to—we cannot avoid coming to—a judgment. If diplomacy fails, if negotiations go nowhere and if sanctions do not deliver, we will at some stage still have to come to an honest judgment: whether the downside, which I do not deny exists, nevertheless has to be borne if the long-term objective is either to destroy or seriously to degrade Iran’s nuclear capability.

That brings us to a crucial question: would such action in fact do so? Do the Americans have the capability? That is ultimately a military question, and we are not privy to the military advice that the President may be receiving. If the advice is, “No, it wouldn’t,” it is not worth considering the option, but, if the advice is that we could either destroy or seriously degrade Iranian nuclear capability so that it is pushed back five or 10 years, that is a different argument.

[Mr Baron]

I am listening very carefully to my right hon. and learned Friend, but does he not accept that even the US Defence Secretary admits that a successful military strike would only delay the programme for about a year—those are his words, not mine—and that what my right hon. and learned Friend ignores is the possibility that a strike could actually do much worse and inflame a regional war?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

Panetta was probably referring to the consequences of an Israeli attempt to damage Iranian nuclear capability which, because the Israelis do not have cruise missiles or bunker-busting bombs, would clearly have a much more limiting effect, even if it had some limited success.

In the interests of time, I shall share my final point with the House. Sometimes the inference of those who argue against even the option of a military response is that the world would be a much more peaceful, happy and gentle place if only we renounced the use of force, even as an option, in resolving this dispute. I say to my hon. Friend, however, that we have to contemplate— for a very brief moment, Mr Deputy Speaker—the consequences of Iran becoming a nuclear weapon state. There is not just the one response, to which my hon. Friend referred—whereby the Saudis themselves, pretty certainly, feel obliged to become a nuclear weapon state, Egypt and Turkey perhaps follow them and, therefore, the middle east, which is already the most dangerous part of the world, becomes incredibly volatile for all the perfectly obvious reasons that I do not have to go into. The only alternative, which my hon. Friend touched on, is that in order to discourage any Saudi, Egyptian or Turkish response of going nuclear the United States would have to give a nuclear umbrella guarantee to the Arab and Gulf states of the region, just as it has to NATO members, to Japan and to South Korea. In each case, when the United States gives such a guarantee, however, the guarantee is not credible unless the United States has bases in the area, as it has had in western Europe and has in the far east.

My hon. Friend’s view leads to the point that, if Iran became a nuclear weapon state, to have any prospect of discouraging the Saudis and others from becoming nuclear powers themselves, we would have to envisage not just for a few weeks, a few months or the odd year or so, but for the indefinite future, the middle east as a region where the United States, far from disengaging, became more committed and involved than it ever has—committed by guarantee not just to go to war, but if necessary to use its nuclear weapons in the defence of what would then be its allies, in the sense that NATO is an alliance, alongside the need for bases in the region, with all the inflammatory consequences of American troops in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf on a permanent basis.

The stakes are very high, and my hon. Friend cannot just sleep quietly, saying, “I don’t think we should have the military option, and everything would be peaceful if only people accepted the judgment that I have come to.” It has to be an option. We must hope that it never comes to that, but it cannot be ruled out at this stage. It is no one’s interests that it should, and therefore I commend the amendment to the House.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

I call Mr Jack Straw. The same unofficial time guidelines still apply.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Alexander]

The environment in the middle east—the sectarian divides, the history of tension and its multifaceted nature—surpasses even that of India and Pakistan in its potential threat not just to regional security but to global security. It would be a very brave or very naive individual who, in the absence of the sorts of communication that were the foundation of our capacity to maintain peace over the 50 years of the cold war, presumed that we could feel confident that, whether intentionally or inadvertently, there would not be a heightened risk of nuclear conflict in the region. That is why it is right that the House try today to speak with one voice in urging on the Iranians a different course from the one implicit in the scenario that the hon. Gentleman depicted, which is the development of nuclear weapons.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

My hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) has twice mentioned nuclear deterrence, but would the right hon. Gentleman agree that nuclear deterrence requires a threat from a nuclear armed state to deter another country with a nuclear weapon? Other than the Saudis and other Arab states themselves becoming nuclear weapon states, that would require an American nuclear umbrella guarantee, with all its implications, including American bases in the region, for the indefinite future.

[Mr Alexander]

I listened with great care to the point that the distinguished former Foreign Secretary made about the American security guarantee and the potential for basing within the Gulf and elsewhere. I would also suggest, though, that given the financing of A. Q. Khan in the past, one would also need at least to countenance the possibility that, rather than rely on an American nuclear umbrella, other states in the region might take matters into their own hands. Although it might take 10 or 15 years for the development of nuclear technology, it could spur the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other means, principally financial, rather than through research. We should work extremely hard to avoid any of those scenarios in these circumstances.

--- Later in debate ---

[Patrick Mercer]

Of course I do. I was trying to make a point. The right hon. Member for Belfast North has made his point. In defence of my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay, I know his record and his background. I watched the 3rd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers in action in the native city of the right hon. Member for Belfast North and they never appeased anyone. It is a fine battalion and he is a fine officer.

Some fascinating statements have been made tonight. I cannot support my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay, despite my admiration. I find the amendment interesting. I found the comment from my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) that American action might be acceptable or amenable—forgive me, I am paraphrasing and have not quite got the right phrase—in the short to medium term wholly remarkable in the light of what has happened in Iraq and what is happening in Afghanistan on the Pakistani border. I really do not accept that.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

Perhaps I can explain to my hon. Friend what I was saying. I think that it will be clear from the record, if he reads it tomorrow. I was saying that there would of course be serious consequences from a military intervention by the United States, which could last weeks, months or even one or two years—who knows? However, if the alternative is Iran having a nuclear weapon on a permanent basis, which would mean a massively enhanced threat from a nuclear weapon state, one cannot simply dismiss the military option because there would be a significant downside for one or two years.

[Patrick Mercer]

I am most grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend. However, the words still sit uneasily with me. I do not believe that we are in the business of tinkering with world peace.

I found Defence questions earlier today very depressing. The right hon. Member for Belfast North said in this debate that this situation is the biggest threat to world peace. We are already involved in a regional war in this area. As my hon. Friend the Member for The Cotswolds (Geoffrey Clifton-Brown) made so very clear, the country that we are talking about borders Afghanistan, and the regional war stretches through Afghanistan, into Pakistan and touches nuclear-tipped Russia at one end and the potentially nuclear-tipped Iran at the other. We cannot afford any ill-judged military action.

I do not want to sound like a stuck record and to go through all the points that have been made about Iran’s hideous rhetoric; the fact that she may be working on a weapons programme: the fact that, as we speak, she has troops involved in an exercise in southern Iran, called in support of the military leadership; the fact that she is threatening to close the strait of Hormuz; and so on. However, I will say this. When I visited Tehran, some interesting things came to mind. For instance, until I was taken down the boulevard of Bobby Sands—there is a boulevard of that name in the centre of Tehran—I had not realised that Great Britain, and Iran’s relationship with Great Britain, had such high relevance in Iranian and Persian thinking. I had not realised that Great Britain punched above its weight in Iranian thinking. I had not realised that Iran saw Britain as perfidious Albion—I am generalising hugely, of course.

Much of the west’s foreign policy is seen, obviously wrongly, as being dictated by ourselves as a tiny but important nation. I had not realised that a Tehranian might say, “Heavens above, it’s raining again. It’s typical British weather.” All the ills of the world seem to be laid at this country’s door. That puts us in an extremely important position in negotiating with Iran. Many of the Foreign Secretary’s comments therefore give me heart.

When I was in Iran, the Iranians said to us, “Are you honestly suggesting that we support al-Qaeda? Please demonstrate.” Of course, we said, “Well, we have the evidence.” “Do you?” “No, we only have circumstantial evidence.” Of course, we are used to hearing misinformation and black propaganda—we need look no further than our intervention in Iraq under the last Government, in the second Gulf war. In Iran, we said, for instance, “We have heard that the central shura of al-Qaeda is resident here in Tehran”. The reply was, “Please point it out, because it is not. There is no evidence to suggest that that is the case.”

Similarly, we asked British troops in Afghanistan whether they could demonstrate whether any of the weapons being used against them had come from Iran. The answer was yes, but there were also weapons that had come from France, the USA, Germany and Britain herself. There was nothing to indicate a relationship between al-Qaeda and Iran, despite everything that we were hearing from the western press.

Here is the rub: the single most important thing I heard in Iran was that the current generation of leaders there fully understand what it is like to be involved in a war of national survival. Many of the individuals who are now of political maturity were young men of military age during the Iran-Iraq war. One Member—forgive me, I cannot remember which—said earlier that nuclear weapons had only ever been used once. That is true, but let us not forget that in the Iran-Iraq war, when hundreds of thousands of men were killed in action and millions of people died, weapons of mass destruction were used willingly.