Oral Answers to Questions

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I regret to have to tell the right hon. Gentleman that the reality on the ground in Libya is that there is no authority to engage with. I am afraid that at the moment I can report no progress on those measures. The urgent need now is to see a Government of national unity created and for the Libyan people to deal collectively with the threat to their society that is posed by the establishment of ISIL cells. Once we have such an authority in place, we will of course re-engage with that agenda.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Ind)]

As the United Kingdom was one of the leading countries that helped the Libyan people overthrow Colonel Gaddafi, do we not have both a political obligation and a political interest to help all the democratic forces in Libya trying to create a new, decent country? While I recognise that the Government do indeed have a priority in that respect, I urge my right hon. Friend to ensure that the British Government do all within their power—perhaps even more than they are doing at the moment—over the crucial weeks and months that will determine whether Libya does indeed become a moderate, secular force or continues to be a hotbed of anarchy and potential terrorism.

[Mr Hammond]

I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend that the next few weeks and months will be crucial for Libya. Would that it was as simple as getting behind the democratic authority in Libya—it is not clear that there is a democratic authority behind which we can get. We need a coming together. I do not want to overplay the prospects, but the UN Secretary-General’s special representative, Bernardino León, is making some progress, and the Prime Minister’s envoy, Jonathan Powell, is also working hard. We will continue to engage, because having a stable Government in Libya is vital to our security.

Ukraine

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Tuesday 10th February 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

Despite the slightly churlish remarks towards the end of his remarks, I welcome the right hon. Gentleman’s generally supportive approach to this issue, and he is right that Vladimir Putin evidently miscalculated the resolve of the international community to stand firm on this issue. That resolve did not appear without prompting, however, and required a lot of consensus building. Candidly, I will say also that the catalyst of the destruction of Malaysia Airways flight MH17 pulled some of, shall we say, the weaker brethren into line, and ensured a clear and robust alliance on this issue. In particular, the UK and the Netherlands can claim credit for having been key elements in stiffening resolve in that crucial European Council meeting last July.

The right hon. Gentleman asked a sensible question about new restrictive measures, and our priority will be to achieve an early roll-over of the tier 3 sanctions. The package of tier 3 sanctions is due to expire at the end of July, and the strongest possible signal that could be sent to the Kremlin would be an early decision to extend that sanctions period, perhaps to the end of 2015. The Kremlin’s knowledge that sanctions will continue, and—most importantly—that it will not have the leverage point of the EU, at 28 member states, having to re-agree a consensus to renew them, removes a lot of its incentives for mischief making, so that will be our priority. I expect that tomorrow, if matters have not progressed or there is bad news from Minsk, the European Council will task the European External Action Service to scope options for further sanctions.

A number of perfectly robust allies are now beginning to be slightly concerned about the scale of damage being inflicted on Russia’s economy. We want to hurt the Russians and we want them to pay a price for their aggression in Ukraine, but we do not want the Russian economy to collapse. There is now concern about the scale of damage being inflicted.

The right hon. Gentleman asked me to clarify the position on lethal aid. He is right to say that Ukraine cannot beat the Russian army—it does not have the scale of forces, and the Russian army has enormous reserves that it could potentially throw into the conflict. He asked about the circumstances in which we would supply lethal aid, but we have not defined those circumstances. All I have said is that we will not rule out the possibility of supplying lethal aid, and we want to reserve the right to review that position. In my statement I said clearly that we cannot afford to see the Ukrainian army collapse, so perhaps he will take from that a steer as to where our thinking lies.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the UK contribution to the diplomatic effort, and there are two strands to that. There is a forward strand that includes discussions with the Ukrainians and the Russians. In my judgment—being perfectly objective about this and not waving a little flag for the sake of it—the German Chancellor is in the best position to conduct such discussions with the Kremlin. She has channels open with the Kremlin that we, the Americans, and others do not have.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about opening out the Normandy process, but if we were to open out that grouping—it is currently four: Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France—we would not be able just to insert the UK but would have to widen that group quite significantly. The United States, naturally, would say, “Well, if the UK is going to join, we must have a seat,” and other European Union partners would also expect to be present, most obviously Poland and Italy. We would therefore have a significantly wider group, and our judgment is that for this phase of the process, maintaining that Normandy format is the best way forward.

The second strand of diplomatic activity is behind-the-scenes activity to hold together the European Union consensus and ensure that the EU is aligned with the US, Australia, Japan and other partners. That is a significant diplomatic-legwork task—unglamorous but vital—and I assure the right hon. Gentleman that the UK has played a leading role in designing the sanctions packages, identifying the individuals, companies and sectors to be targeted by sanctions, and building and maintaining consensus in Brussels and around the capitals of Europe. General Sir Richard Shirreff says that the Prime Minister is a “diplomatic irrelevance”, but I suggest that perhaps he should consider carefully the meaning of the word “irrelevance” and where it might best be applied.

The right hon. Gentleman talked about Russian coercion and the energy exposure of the European Union to Russian pressure, all of which we are acutely aware of. There is also Russian corruption and the influence of Russian money in the politics of some Balkan countries—even now, one party in the recent Bulgarian general election launched its manifesto in the Kremlin, which may provide a clue, and we are acutely aware of all those things. Europe must make itself more resilient against Russian influence, and that is an important part of the agenda going forward.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

The Foreign Secretary and I were both at the Munich security conference when Chancellor Merkel explained her position and her opposition to helping with military assistance to the Ukrainians on the grounds that, even with that assistance, Ukraine would not be able to defeat the Russians. The Foreign Secretary has repeated that observation today, but may I respectfully suggest that that is missing the point? The question at issue is not whether the Ukrainians could defeat the Russians—of course they could not. At the moment, however, as the Foreign Secretary has pointed out, the Russians are flooding in a whole supply of military equipment—heavy weapons, rocket launchers, heavy artillery, tanks and armoured vehicles—to their supporters in Donetsk and Luhansk. If the Ukrainians are deprived of the military means to defend their territory, that matter will be resolved in the next few weeks. It will be no use coming to the aid of the Ukrainian army when it has already been defeated and when the territory controlled by the Russians has greatly expanded. At this stage, the objective must surely be to impress upon President Putin that Ukraine will be able to defend itself, and therefore that, if the Russians try to resolve the matter by military means, it will take not days or weeks, but months. Against that background, would there not be a much greater likelihood that President Putin would also see the inevitable need for a political and not a military solution?

[Mr Hammond]

I am afraid that my right hon. and learned Friend and I will probably have to agree to disagree on that. The position is this: if Russia was intending to make a full-scale military push into Ukraine, it has the forces available to do it. Approximately 10,000 Russian forces are along the border with eastern Ukraine, and it has sophisticated weaponry in large quantities and air forces that could be mobilised. The Russians are already able to do that.

We judge that the intervention the Kremlin is making is carefully calculated to improve the position of the separatists on the ground and to apply pressure to the Ukrainian regime, but there has not so far been a wholesale land grab—it has been the consolidating of separatists’ positions. We judge that the Ukrainian army at the moment is able to hold the line and that, broadly speaking, it is doing so.

I have said that we will reserve the right to keep under review the question of supplying lethal aid. As my right hon. and learned Friend very well knows, many in the United States are debating openly whether a large package of military equipment assistance should be provided to Ukraine. That would clearly change the parameters of the debate. We are watching that debate very closely.

Foreign Affairs Committee (Hong Kong Visit)

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Sir Richard Ottaway), the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Central to the concern that the House is expressing is the question of whether the United Kingdom can reasonably be accused of interfering in the internal affairs of China. I was privileged to serve as Foreign Secretary for the final two years of British sovereignty over Hong Kong and I was personally involved in the final stages of the negotiations. If the Committee had been trying to comment on matters that were irrelevant to either the joint declaration or the Basic Law, there could be a legitimate complaint that those were the internal affairs of China. However, the question of the franchise in Hong Kong goes to the very heart of the joint declaration and the Basic Law.

The Chairman of the Committee was entirely correct to say that it is patently absurd to suggest that the right—in fact, the obligation—of the United Kingdom Government to take an interest in the fulfilment of the commitments expired when sovereignty transferred to Hong Kong. Only 17 years have passed in the 50-year commitment by the Chinese Government to fulfil those obligations. That commitment was part of an international agreement reached with Her Majesty’s Government, and it is an obligation, not just an entitlement, for the British Government and the Committees of this House to monitor these matters and to express their views on them.

I genuinely believe that the Chinese Government have done themselves a disservice by taking this step. They have demonstrated not their strength but their weakness. The idea that vetoing the issue of visas would resolve the issue was simply wrong. I understand that the Committee is, quite rightly, going to continue its work, and all that has happened is that this action has created some very adverse publicity for the Chinese Government, which could easily have been avoided. They should have welcomed the Foreign Affairs Committee and used the visit as an opportunity to put forward their point of view. They could have explained that, under their own proposals, there would be a mass franchise. They could also have explained the justification for their belief that the selection of candidates should be under their control.

As to whether the Chinese Government would have persuaded the Committee, we cannot say one way or the other, but that is how they should have operated. They have done themselves a disservice in a much wider sense than simply the implications for Hong Kong, because part of the reason for the original commitment by Deng Xiaoping to two systems in one country was not just to find a solution to the issue of Hong Kong; infinitely more important to Chinese policy and Chinese national aspirations is whether Taiwan will one day agree to rejoin the motherland. Central to the Chinese Government’s position ever since Deng Xiaoping has been an attempt to reassure the people and the Government of Taiwan—now a democratic Government with a pluralist system and the rule of law—that their way of life would not be endangered by some agreement at some stage to peacefully join with China under the People’s Republic. The controversies that are convulsing Hong Kong at the moment do enormous damage to the credibility of the Chinese Government’s ability to put forward that argument. They should realise that, and it is astonishing that they still persist in the policy that we are debating.

Central to these issues is not just the question of democracy in Hong Kong, but the rule of law, which is not just about the number of political parties, the candidates or free elections. We all understand what the rule of law means. A fascinating speech was made by the current leader of China and a policy was implemented by the National People’s Congress just a few weeks ago, when the Chinese Government declared that the priority objective for the immediate future was the rule of law in China—but they described it in a specific way. They said that China would be utterly committed to the rule of law “with Chinese characteristics”. That is an interesting qualification. I recall the days of the Soviet Union, when people referred to “people’s democracies” and we knew that the addition of “people’s” was in practice a negation of the democracy itself. Once people start having to qualify democracy, it is an excuse to try to justify ignoring it. So when China is now committed to the rule of law “with Chinese characteristics”, it is worth asking what the characteristics are.

I have a reason to think I know what those characteristics mean and I wish to share it briefly with the House. When I was Foreign Secretary, one of my obligations was to have a series of negotiations with the then Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, about the handover of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic. I vividly remember one meeting in Beijing when I said to him that what was important to the people of Hong Kong when they became part of China was not simply that they would have elections, a pluralist political system and so on, important though that was, but that they would also continue to enjoy the rule of law. I knew what I meant by that, as this House would, but I have never forgotten his response, which was, “Please don’t worry, Mr Rifkind. We in China also believe in the rule of law. In China, the people must obey the law.” I had to point out to him that when we and the people of Hong Kong talked about the rule of law, we were talking not just about the people obeying the law, but about the Government obeying the law—the Government had to be acting under the law and there had to be an independent legal and judicial system. Manifestly, the then Chinese Foreign Minister not only did not agree with me, but had not the faintest idea what I was saying; he could not understand that distinction, and we see that elsewhere; we see it in Putin’s Russia at the moment. The view is that Governments make laws and therefore, if they do not like them, they can either ignore them or change them with impunity, and that is a very serious matter.

It is now 17 years since the transition. I think we have to acknowledge that in many fundamental respects Hong Kong remains very different from China. Compared with the rest of the People’s Republic, it is an open and relatively free society, and we should commend the Chinese Government for the extent to which they have carried out not only much of the letter of the commitment, but a significant amount of its spirit. If they had not done so, Hong Kong would not be the open society that it still remains today. But this House, like the world as a whole, is conscious that these distinctions are being eroded, and in the short term the situation is rather grim if the Chinese Government are determined to nibble away wherever they can at the freedoms that the people of Hong Kong enjoy and are entitled to continue to enjoy.

In the medium to longer term, the difference between Hong Kong and the rest of China will erode, but not in the direction that the current Chinese Government would like; it will not be by Hong Kong becoming more like China, but in the longer term by China becoming more like Hong Kong. Already the pressures within China for a more open and more pluralist system, and for some choice in the election of its leaders, are becoming very significant. To be fair, the Chinese Government have already experimented in some local elections with allowing more than one candidate and a real element of choice, albeit in a very restricted way.

The final point I make is simply that the Chinese Government’s current assumption about pluralism, democracy and the rule of law is that they are western values, not Chinese ones. The evidence that discounts that, showing it to be worthless as an argument, is not what happens in the west; it is found by looking at the transformation of Taiwan, at Hong Kong and, to a significant degree, at Singapore—all Chinese communities that not only talk about democracy, but practise it. They practise pluralism and have independent judicial systems, and that clearly corresponds to the wishes of the people they govern. So we are talking about universal values, and the Chairman and members of the Foreign Affairs Committee have done a great service, not just to this House, but to Hong Kong and to China as a whole, by opening up this debate in the way that we are able to do today.

Oral Answers to Questions

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

Of course we value the benefits that being in the European Union brings us, principally through the single market but also with security, as we have seen in the confrontation with Russia over Ukraine. What we now need to do is address the bits of the European Union that are not working effectively, that are holding Europe back so that it is no longer competitive in the world and that represent a failure of democratic accountability so that we get a European Union that is acceptable to the British people. We as a Conservative Government will allow the British people to have the final say on that.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

I caution my right hon. Friend that it is rarely wise to reveal too much detail of one’s negotiating objectives more than six months before the negotiations can possibly begin. In such circumstances, one’s negotiating partners tend to give a very hostile response even in areas where they might ultimately be willing to compromise.

[Mr Hammond]

My right hon. and learned Friend’s advice is very wise. I think the correct approach is probably to show a little ankle, but not too much. We need to be clear to our European Union partners that we are entering negotiations with a constructive agenda. We want to get a reformed European Union and a renegotiated relationship between Britain and the European Union that is acceptable to the British people, but the hurdle is high because it will be the British people, under a Conservative Government, who make the decision in a referendum in 2017.

Oral Answers to Questions

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Tuesday 28th October 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

We will be working closely with our American allies, and General John Allen in his newly appointed role will be the overall co-ordinator of this programme, but the Americans have made it very clear that while the Free Syrian Army will be part of this programme of training and equipping, the whole thing will not operate under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army; other organisations who are judged to be moderate and share our objectives will be able to participate.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

But does the Secretary of State accept that in Syria it is going to be months, if not years, before the Syrian moderate opposition will be strong enough to push back the Islamic State terrorists in the north? Is there not a fundamental gap in international strategy, including that of the British Government, if that is what they are relying on to remove Islamic State in Syria?

[Mr Hammond]

My right hon. and learned Friend is absolutely right; it will take time—it will take time to train and organise the force that will be able to do this. In the meantime, we will use coalition air strikes to contain and degrade ISIL, but defeating it on the ground will take Syrian boots, and training those Syrian boots is going to take time.

Palestine and Israel

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Monday 13th October 2014 Commons Chamber

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

I listened with great care to the sensitive speech that we have just heard from the hon. Member for Easington (Grahame M. Morris), and I compliment him on his balanced remarks. I find this a very difficult issue to address, and I do not think the answer to the question that the House is having to consider is absolutely on one side or the other.

It fell to me when I was Foreign Secretary to commit the United Kingdom Government for the first time to a two-state solution with a Palestinian state. I have never wavered in that view and I believe that the earlier that state comes about the better, both for the Palestinians and for the middle east as a whole. I also share the frustration of the hon. Gentleman and that of many other hon. Members about the impasse, which has causes on both sides of the dispute. I believe that the Israelis are totally unjustified in their settlement policy. But I must also say that the way in which the Israelis, having withdrawn from Gaza, have been subject to an ongoing attack by Hamas from within Gaza has clearly had a massive influence on Israeli public opinion. That has made it more difficult to make the progress we would like.

For me, the most important question is what practical benefit agreeing this motion would have. It might make us feel good and it might make us act in a similar way to a number of other countries around the world, but recognising a state should happen only when the territory in question has the basic requirements for a state. Through no fault of the Palestinians, that is not true at the moment.

It seems to me that the motion is premature. I say so for the following reason. We do not have a Palestinian Government; there are actually two Governments. Palestine is split, not because of the Israelis but because of the conflict between Hamas and Fatah. Not only are the boundaries of the Palestinian state not known but there is no Palestinian Government with any control over foreign policy or defence policy or who have an army with which to protect the territory of that state. That is not a criticism; it is simply a factual description of what would normally be a precondition. The United Kingdom did not recognise the state of Israel until 1950. It was only after what the Israelis call their war of independence that the Israelis demonstrated that they had created a state not simply through a declaration but through having the fundamental requirements.

We know that there have been occasions elsewhere in the world when states have been declared without the means to carry out the function of a state. We have seen it in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, where the Russians recognise an independence that is bogus in reality. We saw it in South Africa, where Transkei and Bophuthatswana were declared independent states when, of course, they were never any such thing.

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

On the issue of the boundaries of a state of Palestine, surely their basis —although not their detail—is very clear and is internationally agreed to be the 1967 boundaries?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

I will not take issue with the right hon. Gentleman on that, but I think that the boundaries are perhaps the least of the problems that we are addressing. I am saying something that has applied to British policy for generations, as it has to the policies of other countries. We recognise a state when the territory in question has a Government, an army, military capability—[Interruption.] That might not be something of which hon. Gentlemen would approve—

[Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

I am sorry, but I do not have time.

Hon. Members might not approve of that policy, but it has been pursued for many years.

[Mr Andrew Love (Edmonton) (Lab/Co-op)]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

No, I am sorry. I am afraid I cannot in the time available.

We are told that 135 members of the United Nations—many of which have relatively little connection with the middle east, although some have a great connection—have recognised Palestine as a state. That has had no effect. It has received 24 hours of publicity but has had no marginal, massive or significant impact on the course of history. There is a great risk that today we will make ourselves feel important and that our own frustration will lead us to vote for a motion that will not have the desired effect and will perhaps make the problems that need to be addressed in reaching a two-state solution more difficult to deal with.

I will not detain the House any further, but will simply say that symbolism sometimes has a purpose and sometimes has a role, but one does not recognise a state that does not yet have the fundamental ingredients that a state requires if it is to carry out its international functions. At the very least, I would respectfully suggest that the motion is premature.

Oral Answers to Questions

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Tuesday 17th June 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mark Simmonds]

The hon. Gentleman raises an important point, and I can give him an assurance that we are heavily engaged from a diplomatic perspective in trying to support the international community in finding a resolution to the challenges that the eastern DRC has faced for far too long. To that end I met both the Rwandan Foreign Minister and Senator Feingold, the US special representative for the region, to encourage everybody to work together, both to find a lasting solution to remove the militia groups that operate in the eastern DRC, including the ADF and the FDLR, but also to find long-term solutions to the big problem.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

We should welcome the resumption of diplomatic relations with Tehran and their normalisation, but is it not necessary to reassure our closest allies in the middle east that there are severe limits for the foreseeable future as to the kind of relationship that we can have with Iran? Will it not in fact be the kind of relationship that the west had with the Soviet Union during the cold war—diplomatic relations, trade and practical co-operation in specific areas?

[Mr Hague]

There are limits, and it will start off with a small diplomatic team and we will seek to build that up in stages as relations develop, so it will be a small embassy to begin with. Of course, many difficult areas of relations will remain, including on the nuclear issue, on regional stability and on human rights in Iran, and we will not shrink from pursuing those issues just as strongly as we always have.

Iraq and Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Monday 16th June 2014 Commons Chamber

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

In the light of Tony Blair’s protestations to the contrary, I commend the shadow Foreign Secretary for making it clear that he accepts that the crisis in Iraq today has its roots in the chaos that has continued since the ill-judged invasion of that country in 2003.

Does the Foreign Secretary agree that long-term stability in Iraq cannot be achieved until the Iraqi Government accept the need to incorporate and absorb the Sunni population in Government at the highest levels, proportionate to their legitimate entitlement, and will he make it clear to the Iraqi Government that serious support from this Government will not be possible until that happens?

[Mr Hague]

Yes, I do agree with my right hon. and learned Friend. Only yesterday, I made it very clear to the Foreign Minister of Iraq that the support that will be received from the rest of the world will be closely related to progress made on that issue of bringing Shi’a, Sunni and Kurds together. This is essential. As I mentioned in my statement, President Obama has made it clear that support of various kinds from the United States may well be conditional on political action by the Iraqi Government, so that message is very clear.

Ukraine

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Monday 28th April 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

Four German observers are involved, which is a matter of great concern to Germany and to us. Chancellor Merkel spoke very clearly about these matters on Friday, saying that we needed to adopt additional sanctions and that G7 and EU measures come with the full support of Germany. She has called for the extension of the EU list of names, for further additions to it and for intensified preparation for the wider economic measures that may prove necessary. The support of Germany is certainly there.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

Does the Foreign Secretary recognise that his very strong condemnation of the continuing aggression of Russia towards Ukraine is an acknowledgement that the rather symbolic sanctions measures taken thus far—despite the annexation of Crimea—have had absolutely no impact on Mr Putin’s thinking or his continuing behaviour? Does my right hon. Friend accept, and will the western community now accept, that the time for wide-ranging trade, economic and financial sanctions has come? Will he confirm that Her Majesty’s Government will undoubtedly support at the very least economic, financial and trade sanctions if a single Russian soldier again crosses the border into its neighbouring state?

[Mr Hague]

My right hon. and learned Friend will have heard me talk about the intensified preparation of those sanctions. That is going on now; I gave a little detail about it in my statement. I mentioned earlier the debate about the criteria for imposing those sanctions, but a Russian military invasion of eastern Ukraine certainly triggers such sanctions—certainly in the view of the United Kingdom and, I think, of the great majority of European Union nations. We stand ready to take such measures and we will not shy away from them.

Ukraine

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Tuesday 18th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

I must make some progress now.

Our national interest depends on a rules-based international system where nations uphold bilateral and global agreements in a whole variety of areas, from trade to security. We have worked with Russia in recent years to uphold agreements such as the non-proliferation treaty. The credibility of the international system rests on there being costs attached to breaking binding commitments and refusing to address disputes through peaceful diplomacy. The door to diplomacy, of course, always remains open, as it has been throughout this crisis. We have in recent days continued our efforts to persuade Russia to enter into direct talks with Ukraine and to take part in an international contact or co-ordination group, but faced with these actions it will be necessary to increase the pressure and our response.

Following the invasion of Crimea, the European Union took action at the Council meeting on 6 March to suspend visa liberalisation talks and talks on a new EU-Russia co-operation agreement. The Council also agreed that unless Russia de-escalated the crisis, we would move to a second stage of sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes against named individuals. Yesterday, the Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels, which I attended, decided to introduce such measures, including travel restrictions and an asset freeze on 21 individuals, not just in Crimea, but in Russia. These people are responsible for actions that undermine or threaten Ukraine, and the measures have been taken in close co-ordination with the United States and allies such as Canada, Japan and Australia. Preparatory work is under way for a third tier of sanctions, including economic and trade measures. The European Council will consider further measures later this week, in the light of President Putin’s speech today and Russia’s actions in recent days. The British Government are clear that further measures need to be taken and, in the light of President Putin’s speech today, we will argue at the Council for the strongest position and range of measures on which agreement can be obtained in the European Union.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

The most important thing the Foreign Secretary has just said is that the further measures the United Kingdom will be seeking will include economic and trade sanctions against Russia because of its annexation of Crimea. Will he confirm that that is indeed the case, and that the UK will seek financial sanctions and economic sanctions against Russia, and seek to persuade other countries to go down that route?

[Mr Hague]

Let me be precise about what I said. I said that the preparation is under way for a third tier of sanctions. The Prime Minister said after the last European Council that we must be ready to pursue far-reaching measures, including in the economic, trade and financial areas. I have also said today that at the Council, which takes place on Thursday and Friday this week, the Prime Minister will argue for the strongest position and range of measures on which agreement can be obtained. That is the position I have set out.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

The crisis we are living through is a crisis not just for Ukraine but for every European country, including the United Kingdom. For the first time since 1945, a European state has invaded the territory of another European state and annexed part of its territory. The Foreign Secretary, the Prime Minister, President Obama and other European leaders have stressed, as has the shadow Foreign Secretary, that this is a crucial moment in the history of Europe. That fine rhetoric will be justified only if it is matched by our response to what is happening and what could still happen. Sadly, the measures on visa controls and asset freezes for individuals, which have been announced by both the United States and the European Union, are a pathetic and feeble response. They do not match the seriousness of the situation, which those implementing the responses have acknowledged that we face at the present time.

The issue is not simply one of Crimea. Crimea is of no strategic importance to Russia—Sevastopol is important but it has had control of Sevastopol for years. The Russian objective is effectively to control all the areas of the former Soviet state, not necessarily by reintegrating them into the Russian Federation but by ensuring that they become Russian dependencies. That will happen because we have seen already that the response to the measures announced so far has been one of contempt by Moscow, and that could continue if we do not respond more robustly.

The only way in which we can effectively hope to have a significant impact on Mr Putin's thinking is through financial and economic sanctions. That approach has become much more effective in recent years. We know that Iran is at the negotiating table because of the success of the financial and banking sanctions it has experienced. Dare I say it, but the United Kingdom withdrew from Suez because of the United States’ threat of financial sanctions against this country—a threat that was very effective even many years ago.

The Russian economy is not the Soviet economy. It is much more integrated and I noted with some interest that the chairman of Gazprom apparently sold all his shares in the company some days before the crisis reached its peak. Financial sanctions will not change the world, but Putin would have to live with a Russian economy in which no other part of the world would invest and in which billions were coming off the Russian stock exchange. The crucial ingredient is access to the world financial markets, particularly the financial markets of this country, of Europe and of the United States.

I listened with great interest to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and I was encouraged when he said that the further measures for which the British Government will be pressing will be economical and in trade: they have to be, and they have to include financial sanctions. Of course, one cannot impose sanctions against another country without accepting some difficulties for oneself. I was encouraged that the Financial Times, of all newspapers, given its normal clientele, said this morning in its editorial that the Europeans

“must decide whether it attaches more importance to its international credibility than its commercial interest.”

I believe that that is a proper reflection of the measure of events.

We must also face the crucial question of what happens if the British Government are robust—I hope that they will be; in the light of what the Foreign Secretary has said, perhaps they are being robust, but I shall wait to see what happens—but cannot get the agreement of some other European countries. What will happen if they remain, in my words, feeble in their response? Western unity is important—I do not doubt that—but western action is even more important. If, at the end of the day, we cannot get unanimity, I would want to see the British Government, as well as, I hope, the American Government and those of a range of European countries, imposing financial sanctions, even if we cannot get full unanimity in the international community.

We must ensure two things. First, Mr Putin must feel financial pain in the Russian economy because of what he is doing. Secondly, we must be able to look ourselves in the eye and say that we did all that we could, all that was reasonable and all that was available to us to ensure that the horrors of the 1930s were not repeated, not in exactly the same form, but in a form that will damage European security and stability for a generation to come.