Armed Drones

Mark Field Excerpts

Tuesday 1st December 2015 Westminster Hall

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) for securing the debate. As ever, he made a thoughtful and insightful contribution. He is also a man of boundless optimism—after all, he suggested that we would hear from the Chilcot inquiry “shortly”.

Unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, have undoubtedly proved devastatingly effective. Militarily, as my right hon. Friend pointed out, their use has assisted in expelling al-Qaeda from large tracts of Pakistan—albeit not without some cost, and I agree precisely with what he and General McChrystal had to say—and from Yemen. Politically, drones have allowed the US in particular to pursue strategic objectives without needing to put boots on the ground in an era when, as we all know, there is very little appetite among western electorates for their countries to engage in further overseas military adventures.

Without doubt, the development of drone technology will continue apace in the years ahead. Drones will assuredly be an essential part of the furniture of international warfare and, as a consequence, their use will require a thorough overhaul of international law and regulation. That overhaul is still to come.

In the euphoria that surrounds the decisive deployment of drones to eliminate terrorist leaders from afar, it is also worth reflecting—as the hon. Member for Cardiff West (Kevin Brennan) did earlier—that before the world is too much older our enemies will also enjoy access to this technology, with potentially calamitous effect. Terrorists and even criminal extortion gangs will soon be able to operate hardware of this sort, the cost and capability of which is rapidly coming within their range.

The use of drones by the UK military was first avowed as recently as September, when the Prime Minister announced the extrajudicial killings of two UK citizens, Reyaad Khan and Junaid Hussain, who had joined ISIL in Syria and featured prominently in a propaganda video that promoted and encouraged terrorist attacks on UK soil. Of course, the UK Government wished to place those deaths on the record lest details seeped out via a freedom of information inquiry, as happened in July regarding joint US-UK air strikes over Syrian airspace. Moreover, the US policy of routine avowal of fatal drone attacks created the risk that eagle-eyed observers might notice that the two operations resulting in the deaths of Khan and Hussain had not been similarly gazetted. It is better to take the initiative rather than allow lurid conclusions to be drawn. In November, Mohammed Emwazi—alias “Jihadi John”—was similarly dispatched in co-operation with the US military.

For as long as such ISIL-supporting British terrorists were at large on Syrian soil, it would evidently have been impossible to bring them to trial. To be fair, there is a distinction between the situation today and that in Ulster some 40 years ago. Of course there were ungoverned spaces in parts of Londonderry and Belfast, but there are massive tracts within Syria that make it impossible to bring people to trial. None the less, their terrorist activity was designed to cause mayhem on UK soil. We are de facto at war with the so-called Islamic State, and as a consequence Khan and Hussain might properly be regarded as combatants. However, the strong inclination in the post-Iraq war era to provide watertight legal cover for all military operations led, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden said, to the drone raid being classed as “self-defence” under article 51 of the UN charter.

That has opened up a series of contentious issues. For example, were the primary subjects of the drone attack “directing an attack”, and was such an attack “imminent”? As a consequence, our intelligence agencies will need to show after each drone strike that they have carefully considered the operation of article 51, unless we have the change in law that I will come on to. We need to keep the terms of such drone operations under regular, if not constant, review.

[Mr David Davis]

My right hon. Friend makes an incredibly important point. One of the difficulties with such a legal basis is the requirement of imminence, which gives us an evidential problem. Presumably there was some sort of terrorist cell in this country that was about to carry out a terrorist action, and the Government have failed or refused to answer questions about whether there have been any arrests in the follow-up to that strike. That gives us a problem. The Government may have good reason for not giving us the information, but when drone strikes are carried out they will have to be ready to provide an evidential chain of some sort to show that what they did was correct.

[Mark Field]

I very much agree with my right hon. Friend’s comments. It seems to me that we need to keep the terms of drone use under regular, if not constant, review, and that before seeking ministerial authorisation the intelligence agencies would have needed to conclude that the individuals posed an imminent and clear threat to national security. It is also essential that our security services satisfy themselves that a drone strike, rather than any attempt at apprehension, is both necessary and proportionate. The issue of collateral damage—the impact of a strike upon innocent civilians in the vicinity—has been incredibly controversial, especially in Pakistan and Yemen, where it has often been recognised that US strikes have necessitated discreet co-operation with host Governments.

In truth, the increasingly sophisticated monitoring of mobile phones, other telephony and emails has enhanced the ability to target suspects with virtually pinpoint accuracy—it was notable that the only other fatalities in the two UK strikes this summer were associates. That is a good thing; we should try as far as possible to minimise collateral damage.

Nevertheless, I agree with other contributors to the debate that there is now an urgent, and possibly unanswerable, case for updated legislation to govern the use of—not to mention the continued reliance upon—new drone technology. That would allow the Prime Minister and the Government of the day to act with the timing and precision required to wage effective operations, without first having to consider how to navigate the complex labyrinth of precedent, law and parliamentary approval that currently blunts us. The US War Powers Act goes some way to providing a template in that regard, bestowing on the Executive branch the ability to give the green light to action without congressional approval, while maintaining a series of vital checks, safeguards and balances.

It is worth recalling that US legal justification in relation to the use of drones on overseas targets has historically been markedly less strenuous. That has arguably caused difficulties in the ungoverned parts of the world where “Five Eyes” co-operation is often strongest—Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan and, more recently, parts of Syria. The UK security services’ knowledge that intelligence passed to their US counterparts is used to launch drone strikes without, for example, any clear imminent threat to national security, potentially places the UK military, and our own workers, in a legal quagmire.

Although a common protocol among western allies would be ideal, that would necessitate an open political debate about the desirability of adopting the hit list approach that the US military have for selecting drone targets. For the Obama Administration, that approach has essentially involved a rolling update of named individuals, with the list being refreshed whenever there is a successful drone attack involving the assassination of terrorist targets. Needless to say, such an approach is far removed from the necessity for the prior legal approval of each and every step under British law as it currently stands.

Thank you, Mr Stringer, for allowing me to speak for rather longer than my requisite minutes, but I did take some interventions. I very much look forward to the Minister’s response to the debate, and to her recognising that we need new legislation and some genuine thought about the matter, not just in the context of what is happening in Syria but, I suspect, for many years to come.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kevin Brennan]

I will just make a little progress. That is why it is so important that we have this debate, and why the Joint Committee on Human Rights inquiry is so important. I understand that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman), who is not here today, has written to the Secretary of State for Defence expressing her concern about the Ministry’s lack of co-operation with that inquiry. Will the Minister, in her response, confirm that the Committee will get the Ministry’s full co-operation, obviously within the parameters of what it can say on this matter?

[Mark Field]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Kevin Brennan]

I will, briefly, but I am conscious of time. If the hon. Member for East Renfrewshire (Kirsten Oswald) will forgive me, I probably will not give way a further time.

[Mark Field]

If article 51, which states that there has to be an imminent threat, is to mean anything, the security services—and, indeed, Ministers who are considering the issue—need to be in a position to update such a list constantly. The notion that an individual is on a list until such time as they are eliminated or assassinated seems to be at odds with article 51. There needs to be a process whereby the question of whether a person is still an imminent threat to the UK is regularly turned over in people’s minds.

[Kevin Brennan]

I agree with the right hon. Gentleman. I will be interested to see whether the Minister illuminates that issue further in her response to the debate.

I want to raise one other issue, which is whether there should be an inquest into the death of Reyaad Khan. The case, it is fair to say, is fairly unique, but it has possibly led to similar cases. To some extent, an inquest might help establish some of the legal parameters in such cases. I have received representations on this—not from constituents, but from others. As I understand it, section 9 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 effectively grants global jurisdiction in respect of the potential unlawful killing of a British citizen. There is no question but that the issue of legality has been raised, and is under debate; we would not be here today if there was not a question mark about the legality. Can the Minister tell us whether the Government have a view on whether an inquest would be appropriate, if it is correct that the 1861 Act has global jurisdiction, and that the action that led to the death of this British citizen, albeit one who was acting in such a way as to be an enemy of the UK, was physically initiated in the UK, although the weapon used to carry it out was physically located elsewhere? Given the time constraints, I will not go on much longer, but I am interested to hear her response.

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[Martin John Docherty]

I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s intervention. Her point recognises the limitations on intelligence. I will cover that in a moment.

An estimated 222 civilians have been killed in United States strikes, including the American and Italian hostages killed in recent drone strikes in compounds. The use of drones without robust and accountable rules of engagement removes not one additional extremist or terrorist, but acts as a recruiting sergeant for the most heinous of blood cults. The present policy of power to kill anyone anywhere in the world without oversight or safeguards is a failed strategy that perpetuates the illusion that military force is effective in combating extremists.

[Mark Field]

Will the hon. Gentleman accept that, as I suggested, part of the issue is that in Pakistan and Yemen there is co-operation between whatever authorities there are—I would not say there is a functioning Government in either of those countries—and the US military? That is part of the problem. Drones are a recruiting sergeant because of the anger in what is essentially a collection of civil wars with a lot of militias in place.

[Martin John Docherty]

Strangely, I would not disagree or agree. We are seeing the continued emergence of extremists. The recent dreadful attacks in Paris and Beirut show the exacerbated position that we find ourselves in.

As my hon. Friend the Member for East Renfrewshire said, our mistake could be in believing that electronic communication or signals intelligence is infallible. We know from experience that this is not the reality we wish it to be. This was mentioned in detail by the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden. Our ability to scrutinise and inform the policies that improve intelligence should be welcomed—I hope the Minister will welcome that—as it seeks to improve conditions for armed forces and civilian staff who are at the coalface of engagement.

Finally, the future development of this technology will challenge our military planning and, critically, our own use of drones, especially the development of autonomous drones. Although there is a policy not to develop that technology, I urge the Government to agree to the UN resolution for a moratorium on the development of such technology until we better understand the ramifications on our society.

Reserve Forces

Mark Field Excerpts

Tuesday 17th November 2015 Westminster Hall

[Mr Philip Hollobone (Kettering) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the future of the reserve forces.

May I say what a pleasure it is to see you in the Chair, Sir Roger? May I also thank the Backbench Business Committee for granting time for the debate? I have called it because the defence of the realm is the most important duty of Her Majesty’s Government, and the reserve forces are an ever more important part of that. The recruitment and retention of reserves is an important issue for the House, and this is a good opportunity to hold the Minister to account for the way in which the Ministry of Defence is tackling it. Progress has been made, but I am sure the Minister will admit that more can and must be made. What better way to hold any Minister of the Crown to account than on the Floor of the House?

My understanding is that Her Majesty’s Government intend the armed forces to comprise the following numbers of servicemen and women by 2020: 29,000 in the Royal Navy, 31,500 in the RAF and 82,000 in the Army. They are to be supported by 30,000 Army reservists and 5,000 Royal Navy and RAF reservists. As of 1 October, the trained strength of the tri-service volunteer reserve stood at 25,970—an 11% increase on the year before. However, the target of Her Majesty’s Government is for the tri-service reserve to total 35,060 by 1 April 2019. Maths was never my strong point, but I reckon we have 9,000 reservists to go to get to that target—a 35% increase on where we are now. Broken down by force, the target would be 30,100 reservists in the Army, 3,100 in the Royal Navy and 1,860 in the RAF. That would seem to be a tough challenge for Her Majesty’s Government to meet, and I look forward to the Minister giving us the confidence that they are on track to do so.

The reserves are an important part of our defence. I know a little about the subject because in a previous life I served, in a humble capacity, as a member of the Territorial Army for eight and a half years. During the cold war, Trooper Hollobone was prepared to stand in a trench to hold back the Russian hordes advancing over the north German plain. I am pleased that that never came to pass, because I am not sure that I and my few pals would have been able to do very much in the face of the Russian onslaught, although we would have done our best.

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

I should point out that my long-standing friendship with Trooper Hollobone goes back to my university days. However, my only military experience with him on the front line consisted of the very nice lunches we had at the Honourable Artillery Company—which, I should point out, he paid for.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hollobone]

I welcome that helpful contribution. The hon. Lady is known throughout the House for her experience in military affairs. She is in charge of the all-party group on reserve forces and cadets, and she is a distinguished serving member of the armed forces parliamentary scheme. In other words, she is a lady who knows what she is talking about, and she gives the Chamber very wise counsel. There are many very good things about Her Majesty’s armed forces, but one of the bad things is that they can be too rigid in applying themselves to future challenges. The threat of cyber-warfare is a big unknown, and we have to be flexible and adaptable, and to think outside the box in meeting that challenge. The hon. Lady is absolutely right: we need to get people on board who understand cyber and IT. If we have to change our recruitment and retention processes to make sure that such people are contributing to Britain’s defence, we should do that, and we should do it quickly. The announcement of the extra expenditure suggests that the door of Her Majesty’s Government is open to such thinking. I very much hope the Minister will pass the hon. Lady’s wise words on to the Treasury, No. 10 and all the others who make these big, important decisions.

[Mark Field]

I would like to echo the words of the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon).It is very positive that the Government have recognised the great danger of cyber-attacks not only in the military sphere, but in the commercial sphere. Given that the Bank of England has been so robust about the importance of resilience and the potential gaps in that respect in the commercial sphere, does my hon. Friend agree that Ministers should look again at having a reinsurance package in the cyber area, rather like what Pool Re provides in the terrorism area?

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[Mr Hollobone]

Having completed that course myself, I know that it is a very challenging experience. The deaths of the applicants were tragic. The publicity around the horrendous circumstances of that incident will, funnily enough, encourage others to come forward, in a perverse way, because they will have seen how difficult it is to get into the special forces. My understanding is that the exercise in question was not actually run by the special forces, and I would imagine there is quite a lot of concern among the special forces that the tragedy has been branded as their responsibility. My clear understanding is that it was not run by the special forces. Part of the challenge and the attractiveness of the special forces to potential recruits is the very difficult nature of the task presented to them, and we must not dilute that in any way.

One thing I am sure we can all agree on is that pro rata, we have the best armed forces in the world and the best special forces in the world. We have centuries of experience in developing our military capability; we know what makes people tick and we know how hard we can push people. Sometimes, tragically, it goes wrong, but those are a minority of occasions. The bulk of the training that both regular forces and special forces receive is some of the very best in the world, and we should be very proud of that.

Like the hon. Lady, I welcome the announcement of extra spending on special forces, as well as extra spending on cyber-warfare. In providing the capability for both, the reserve has a golden opportunity to contribute. We will not tackle these issues just through regular personnel; we have to attract reservists with specialist skills.

[Mark Field]

On a budgetary point, while the commitment to additional spending within what we might call the defence budget is obviously welcome, does my hon. Friend share my view that we need to be a little cannier about the way in which we utilise the soft power that comes with the 0.7% in the Department for International Development budget for a range of areas, such as community cohesion in foreign lands? We can utilise elements of that budget for precisely this sort of element of the reservist side. Even if we cannot commit ourselves, as many of us would like to, to a 2% or even higher percentage of GDP for defence, at least elements of what would traditionally be the defence budget can come through the important soft power of DFID.

[Mr Hollobone]

My right hon. Friend makes an extremely good point. I am all for maximising the military component—that is a clumsy phrase—of our defence spending. Using our soft power budget legitimately to enhance our hard power capability is fine. I am all for, for example, sending armed forces personnel on aid programmes in other countries to become familiar with the language, culture and how those countries work, because that will help our hard power defence effort.

I am pleased that the Government are committed to spending 2% of our GDP on defence. I cannot for the life of me understand why the Government will not enshrine that in law, because if we have enshrined the defence spending into law, enshrining the 2% commitment in law should be no issue. I am confident that a majority of this House would support doing just that, if the Minister were so minded.

As I understand it—the Minister can correct me if I am wrong—there is an issue regarding medical reservists, who will make up about 50% of Defence Medical Services by 2020, with some specialties such as neurology and urology being provided entirely by the reserve forces. There is, understandably, concern about the approach some NHS trusts are taking on medical reservists—the NHS is hard pressed, and we need all the doctors we can get—but there are benefits for crossover expertise between doctors working in the NHS and doctors working with our reservists. Some years ago, I had the privilege of visiting our front-line A&E facility in Afghanistan, which I think is the most advanced A&E facility in the world. It is manned by NHS doctors, who can bring their expertise back to the UK. There are lots of crossover benefits, but there is considerable range of practice within the NHS regarding the ease with which reserve doctors are allowed to leave their NHS posts to fulfil their reserve training commitments.

Oral Answers to Questions

Mark Field Excerpts

Monday 19th October 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Dunne]

As the hon. Gentleman may be aware, the United States marine corps declared the operational capability of its fleet of F-35Bs—the same aircraft that we will be flying—in August. Our aircraft are engaged in testing, evaluation and training in the United States.

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

Does the Secretary of State agree that some of the concerns about Chinese investment in critical infrastructure in this country, which have understandably been raised, can be placated by reference to the work that has been done between our security services and Huawei in relation to investment in telecommunications? Will he look on that as a useful template that can be utilised as and when there is investment in the nuclear industry by Chinese investors?

[Michael Fallon]

I will certainly look at that example. However, as I said earlier, when there are security concerns about any of our power stations or other parts of the nuclear grid, it is up to the office of the independent regulator to ensure that they are fully protected.

Counter-ISIL Coalition Strategy

Mark Field Excerpts

Monday 20th July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

The hon. Gentleman needs to reflect on what would have happened last summer, when ISIL was within a few miles of the gates of Baghdad, if countries in the region and those outside it—such as the United States and eventually ourselves, after our vote—had not intervened. What would have happened if Iraq had shattered into pieces? What would the effect have been on the overall stability of the region and, indeed, on the economic prosperity of this country?

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

I fully accept that co-operation in these matters requires embedding, not just in military activities but in areas such as intelligence and humanitarian assistance. It must be clear to my right hon. Friend, however, that the real concern is a result of the aftermath of the vote in the House in August 2013. Will he make a full statement on behalf of the Government at some point on where the royal prerogative arises in these circumstances? Many of us are concerned about that. We had a vote in Parliament, and I am concerned that Parliament is overriding the will of the Executive. We need clarification on that at the earliest opportunity.

[Michael Fallon]

The debate and vote that we held towards the end of August 2013 were on whether the House would accept military action against the Assad regime and its potential use of chemical weapons. That predated the rise and viciousness of the ISIL phenomenon that we are now confronted with.

My right hon. Friend also raises a more intriguing point on the extent to which the Executive of the day should be bound—rightly bound, I think—by the debates that take place in the House. I want to give him a clear answer. It is for the Government of the day to defend this country and the values our country believes in, and then to be accountable to this House for their actions.

Defence Reform

Mark Field Excerpts

Monday 27th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

My hon. Friend raises a good point. I have already mentioned defence intelligence as a key element within that pillar and that defence medical is being brought together for the first time. We will want to see what other elements we can introduce that fall within the broad joint arena, not least because we owe it to the younger generation of officers, who have a much more joint approach, to ensure that they have a genuine career structure and that those involved in areas such as logistics, who are invaluable to the delivery of our service, are not regarded as ineligible for some of the top posts in defence.

[Mr Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

I share the Secretary of State’s unequivocal support for this report. Given the streamlining to which he has referred, will he take this opportunity to guarantee that defence procurement will be both more efficient and more cost-effective in the future than it has been in the past?

[Dr Fox]

Yes.