Human Rights Abuses: Magnitsky Sanctions

Mark Francois Excerpts

Thursday 8th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

I apologise for intervening on my right hon. Friend so early on, but he has mentioned Russia several times. He will be aware that there has been much talk about ceasefires, but there is no sign of one yet, because Putin still thinks he is winning in Ukraine. Would he agree with me that, if we really want to compel Putin to stop killing Ukrainians, we need to increase sanctions on the Russian Government, particularly on their hydrocarbons, which means action not just by us and Europe, but further sanctions from the United States?

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I absolutely agree with my right hon. Friend. We have a tool here that can be used to drive back those who act badly—in this particular case, against a country illegally invading a neighbouring democratic state—so we should use this ability to sanction those involved and to increase such sanctions dramatically. I know Labour Members will be raising this issue, but they will have noted what he has said.

The UK and the US have imposed extensive additional sanctions on Russian individuals and entities under the Russia-specific sanctions regimes. However, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) may want to note, those regimes use broader designation grounds and, crucially, do not usually acknowledge an individual’s direct involvement in human rights abuses in Ukraine or elsewhere. That distinction matters, and this should be rectified by the UK Government. The symbolic and moral force of the Magnitsky sanctions is precisely to name perpetrators and link consequences directly to human rights abuses, and that is what sets them apart. In sheer volume, the contrast is stark. The US has imposed well over 5,000 such Russia-related non-Magnitsky designations, and the UK about 2,900. Yet despite this scale, the absence in most cases of any explicit human rights attribution in such regimes means an important opportunity for accountability is being missed.

As a mechanism in the Government’s foreign policy toolkit, Magnitsky sanctions have a huge potential. However, important gaps remain in their implementation, raising serious concerns about their overall effectiveness. There is no publicly available information on the number of Magnitsky sanctions evidence dossiers received by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. However, based on estimates since the inception of the UK’s Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020, the FCDO receives on average about two or three dossiers of evidence per month from civil society organisations, which often identify between three and 15 individuals or entities alleged to be implicated in human rights violations. This means that since July 2020, the FCDO has received evidence on anywhere between 360 and 3,000 alleged perpetrators of serious human rights violations. In stark contrast, only 229 individuals and entities have been sanctioned under the global human rights regime and global anti-corruption regime, to date.

The limited number of Magnitsky sanctions imposed undermines their effectiveness. Designations tend to overlook broader command structures, instead focusing on isolated actors, excluding key backers or enablers and failing to adopt when sanctioned entities rebrand. For example, Chen Zhi is one of the many leaders of scam networks with bases in south-east Asia trafficking and torturing vulnerable individuals to compel them to scam citizens here in the UK and abroad. The news that the UK and the US sanctioned some of those responsible is always welcome, but those sanctions fail to target Cambodian Government figures who are themselves implicated in the practice, or who turn a blind eye to those violations.