Banking Reform

Debate between Mark Hoban and Lord Tyrie

Thursday 14th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hoban]

The shadow Chancellor was the Minister who stood by when bank balance sheets ballooned and banks took on these risks. He did nothing to tackle that problem. As the Governor of the Bank of England said in May:

“With the benefit of hindsight, we should have shouted from the rooftops that a system had been built in which banks were too important to fail, that banks had grown too quickly and borrowed too much, and that so-called ‘light-touch’ regulation hadn't prevented any of this.”

Only two politicians were quoted in the FSA’s report on the failure of RBS as champions of light-touch regulation—the shadow Chancellor and the former Prime Minister, the architects and cheerleaders of light-touch regulation at home and abroad. They should recognise the costs that the British Government and economy have borne as a consequence of banking failure— £140 billion between 2007 and 2009. We must recognise the need for a stable banking system to ensure stable and sustainable growth in the UK economy.

As Sir John Vickers proposed, we are ring-fencing retail banking, imposing the higher capital standards required by him and introducing a binding minimum leverage ratio on banks. The shadow Chancellor asked some questions in the mix of his lengthy contribution, but he did not apologise for his role in the banking crisis. However, I shall respond to his tests. First, we have achieved international agreement with our European partners to implement Vickers through capital requirements directive 4 and capital requirements regulation. We have achieved that goal and are working to introduce a binding leverage ratio with international partners. Vickers can, therefore, be implemented through the existing international regulatory framework.

The shadow Chancellor talked about a banking union. Banking union is a product of the requirement for fiscal union and will be needed to promote stability in the eurozone, but that will not flow through to non-eurozone EU member states—an important distinction to make. Banking union is about the sustainability of the eurozone, not the EU.

The shadow Chancellor asked about hedging. Sir John Vickers recognised the need to ensure that retail customers and small businesses could access the hedging products necessary to manage risk on their balance sheets. However, we have gone beyond Vickers in imposing higher and tighter standards on how derivatives can be managed by a ring-fenced bank.

I have set out a clear programme of reform that responds to the mistakes of the previous Government and ensures a stable and sustainable banking system that underpins, not undermines, economic growth.

[Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con)]

The White Paper just published contains an impact assessment, paragraph 104 of which makes clear a point that we heard in extensive evidence—that costs to small businesses will rise as a consequence of these proposals. We also heard evidence that the scale of the rise would depend on the Government’s decision on the design of the ring fence. They have now published a lead option for that design, so what is their estimate of the increased cost of these proposals to small business lending?

[Mr Hoban]

We have considered Sir John’s recommendations carefully, including the cost on banks, the economy and business, but we felt it was in the interest of business to ensure that a wider range of products could be sold within the ring fence, including complex ones such as derivatives. We set out, in our cost-benefit analysis, to look at the cost of the package as a whole, not to break it up into particular areas. I am confident, however, that we will have a more stable banking system in a position to lend to business on a more sustainable basis. Through these reforms, we hope to increase competition in the banking system, which is in the interests of small businesses and will help to improve competition on price. I think, therefore, that this is a good package for businesses and will ensure the stability of the economy.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Mark Hoban and Lord Tyrie

Monday 23rd April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hoban]

I think that there is adequate provision in the Bill on consumer credit; the FCA has the powers to tackle that issue and I am confident that it will be able to make appropriate use of the remedies available to it. A different issue about pre-payment schemes has been raised, but that does not fall within the scope of the Bill. Of course there is a mechanism in the Bill to move the regulatory perimeter if appropriate, but I think that it is the Minister with responsibility for consumer affairs who needs to respond on that point.

I know that we want to move on to deal with the next group of amendments, but before concluding I just wish to say that there is support across the House for new clause 4, which enables us to complete the transfer of regulation from the OFT to the FCA. That does yield important benefits for our constituents. We need to get that regime right if we are to ensure that there is a reasonable supply of affordable credit to our constituents and that they are well protected—that is the goal we are all aiming at. The Bill contains the powers to do that, and I commend new clause 4 to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 4 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.



New Clause 1

Retrospective reviews of Bank performance by court of directors and publication of court minutes

‘(1) Section 2 of the Bank of England Act 1998 (Functions of court of directors) is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (5) add—

“(6) The court shall conduct retrospective reviews of the performance of the Bank with respect to its functions and objectives.

(7) The court shall determine the particular matters to be reviewed under subsection (6).

(8) The court must publish a report on each review carried out under subsections (6) and (7) unless the court decides that all or part of such a report should not be published for reasons of confidentiality or because it would endanger financial stability.

(9) When all or part of a report of a review is not published under the provisions of subsection (8), the court must—

(a) publish as much as possible of the report,

(b) send a copy of the full report to the Chairman of the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons or, in exceptional circumstances, inform the Chairman of the Treasury Committee of the reasons for not sending it, and

(c) publish the report or part of the report as soon as possible after the court decides that the considerations in subsection (8) no longer apply.

(10) After each meeting of the court, the Bank shall publish minutes of the meeting before the end of the period of two weeks beginning with the day of the meeting.

(11) Subsection (10) shall not apply to minutes of any proceedings where the court has decided that publication should be delayed for reasons of confidentiality or because publication would endanger financial stability.

(12) Where any part of the court’s minutes is not published under the provisions of subsection (11), the Chairman of the court shall inform the Chairman of the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons of the reasons.

(13) Any part of the minutes of a meeting of the court must be published as soon as the court has decided that the considerations in subsection (11) no longer apply.”.’.—(Mr Tyrie.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hoban]

We are clear that we want to see the court’s minutes published, which I think is absolutely vital, and that we want to see those retrospective reviews in place. The questions my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester has asked are whether we have gone far enough, whether the proposals should be in the Bill or whether we should just accept the proposal put forward by the court. Tonight I have committed to listening to those arguments—he made a powerful speech—and returning to the issue when the Bill goes to the other place.

[Mr Tyrie]

Will the Minister clarify a couple more points? First, when he says that he is committed to the publication of the court’s minutes, does he mean the publication of the full minutes or only a summary record of them, which it appears is what was proposed before. Secondly, he thoughtfully suggested that the non-executives of the Bank should commission internal reviews. Will they also be permitted to look at, assess and comment on the merits of the material they receive?

[Mr Hoban]

I think that it is important that the court’s non-executives perform a full role in scrutinising the Bank’s activities. They need to be able to look at the output of those reviews, consider them and express their views on them. On the issue of minutes, I will not say that we are getting into a semantic debate, because that would be unfair. What we want to do is ensure that a proper record of the court’s meetings is published.

I am not sure that the minutes should necessarily be verbatim, reporting every word that everyone has said, but they should certainly be a very good summary, catching the thought processes that took place in the court and the issues that were debated and discussed, so that Parliament and stakeholders can hold the Bank to account for the way in which it has used its powers not just when it comes to the Financial Policy Committee, but in other areas. I hope that that gives my hon. Friend the reassurance he looks for on our commitment to transparency and on ensuring that we do all we can to strengthen the transparency arrangements of the Bank of England.

I am very conscious that a number of other points were made, and I want to discuss them. The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) tabled two amendments on the appointment of the Governor of the Bank of England and Parliament’s role in it. We do not have time tonight to go into the detail of that procedure, but the Chancellor has said that there will be an open process, and having heard the debate in the House he will reflect on it when thinking about how the process should develop.

I turn to Government amendment 1. In Committee, the hon. Member for Nottingham East argued for a check on the PRA’s ability to decide not to disclose the use of its veto over the FCA. The Government accept that the PRA will always be the best placed organisation to determine whether or when to disclose the use of its veto, but there is room for an element of independent consideration when it decides against such disclosure. The Government have therefore decided to place a duty on the PRA, through amendment 1, to consult the Treasury on a decision not to disclose, and this will ensure that proper disclosures do take place.

I will respond in writing to the remarks that my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) made on the use of skilled persons. He raised some important issues.

[Mr Hoban]

What is important is that the PRA establishes its process for consultation with regulated firms. It is required to set out in its annual report its process of consultation.

In conclusion, this is an important part of the legislation, and I am very disappointed that the hon. Member for Nottingham East has tabled a wrecking amendment that would take the guts out of the Bill. I thought that the Opposition supported the reform of financial regulation, but they clearly do not, so I hope that if the hon. Gentleman puts his wrecking amendment to the vote the House will oppose it.

[Mr Tyrie]

I am grateful to the Minister for what I have heard this evening. He has shown enough flexibility for me to feel able to withdraw new clause 1, but before I do so it is just worth my spelling out what I think I have heard.

I think I have heard that we are going to have the publication of the full minutes of the court of directors, and that we are going to permit and, indeed, encourage the court—the non-executives of the Bank of England—to commission internal reviews, to assess them and to give us their assessments, made available to Parliament.

I heard also about some flexibility on whether we will go beyond the affirmative procedure when looking at macro-prudential tools. Their proper scrutiny is extremely important for millions of people in this country. Whether we will go as far as a super-affirmative procedure I do not know, but an element of flexibility has also been provided for there.

With that in mind, my intention is not to push new clause 1 to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 10

Mortgage rate forewarning

‘The Treasury shall bring forward recommendations within six months of Royal Assent of this Act requiring mortgage lenders to forewarn existing customers about potential interest rate changes and their impact on the affordability of mortgage repayments.’.—(Chris Leslie.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Royal Bank of Scotland (FSA Report)

Debate between Mark Hoban and Lord Tyrie

Monday 12th December 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hoban]

The approach taken by the hon. Gentleman, who seeks to try to blame everybody for the crisis, overlooks the key role that the shadow Chancellor—who is not in his place today—played in the design of the regulatory system that led to the problems we saw at RBS. That design—driven by the shadow Chancellor, who took great credit for it—meant that no backstops were in place when RBS took those decisions.

The other point that the hon. Gentleman should bear in mind is that only three politicians are named in the report as having put pressure on the FSA to adopt a light-touch regulatory regime. One was Tony Blair, one was the right hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown), and the third one—the person who is missing from the Opposition Front Bench today—is the shadow Chancellor, the person who in his first speech as City Minister called on the FSA to adopt a light-touch regulatory regime, a regime that, when confronted with the challenge of RBS, turned from a light touch to a soft touch. It is, of course, the taxpayer who has picked up the bill for the fundamental flaws in Labour’s regulatory regime.

The hon. Gentleman talked about disqualification of RBS directors. It is a pity that the previous Government did not think about that issue in the aftermath of the financial crisis. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills has referred the report to counsel to see whether it is possible to disqualify the directors of RBS.

The hon. Gentleman talked about approval for acquisition. We will look carefully at the proposal Lord Turner made, but the reality is that the FSA had powers to intervene, but chose not to use them—partly as a consequence of the light-touch regime foisted on them by the previous Government.

When the hon. Gentleman talks about bonuses, let us not forget that it was under the previous Government that bonuses could be paid out in cash and taken straight away. Under the regime in place now, bonuses are deferred, paid out in shares and can be clawed back. Let us not forget that the moment that it was possible to exercise the maximum leverage on Sir Fred Goodwin—the banker Labour knighted—was the moment when it gave away his pension scheme. So I will take no lessons from the Labour party on the way in which we should deal with the problems of RBS.

The hon. Gentleman referred to the Bank of England and seemed to question whether it was able to take on the additional responsibilities. I thought he was moving away from his party’s position of supporting the package of reforms that we have put forward. Let me remind him that it was the Bank of England that identified the problem of the mispricing of risk in the financial markets. The problem was that the regulatory structure it had to deal with meant that the Bank did not have the power to tackle the problem—nor, indeed, did the FSA. What we are faced with is a problem of dealing with the regulatory regime left to us by the previous Government. They chose not to make these reforms when they were in government; we are taking action now to ensure that we have the right regime in place to tackle those risks and ensure that we have a stable, but successful, financial services sector.

[Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con)]

Powerful institutions do not leap forward to explain themselves when they make mistakes, and neither did the FSA. The fact is that the almost 500 pages of this report would never have been written had it not been for the unremitting pressure from the Treasury Select Committee. I would like to thank my colleagues on that Committee for helping me to secure this report from the FSA. Furthermore, to make sure that the report was of adequate quality, we took the unprecedented step of sending our own specialist Committee advisers into the FSA with full powers to examine papers and personnel in order to check that the papers underlying the compilation of this report were fairly reflected in it.

Is it not now crucial that the new regulators—the Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority—are subjected in future to far more vigorous parliamentary scrutiny than the FSA has been in the past? Will the Government commit in the draft legislation to secure a much higher level of parliamentary scrutiny of these powerful quangos than we have had hitherto?

[Mr Hoban]

I, too, commend the work of my hon. Friend and his Select Committee, along with the work done by Bill Knight and Sir David Walker in scrutinising the FSA’s report and making consequent improvements to it. One of the challenges we face is, as my hon. Friend said, to ensure that there is proper scrutiny. He commented on the fact that it took the pressure of his Committee to produce this report. The reality is that the existing powers in section 14 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to require a report to be produced where there is regulatory failure have never been exercised. One measure we have put in place in the Bill is to enable such reports to be produced on a more regular basis—not at a Minister’s request but in response to objective triggers to ensure that reports are published in a timely fashion so that we can learn the lessons from past mistakes. I think that is a helpful way of enabling Parliament to hold the regulators to account. We look forward shortly to responding not just to my hon. Friend’s Select Committee report, but to that of the pre-legislative scrutiny Committee.

Northern Rock

Debate between Mark Hoban and Lord Tyrie

Monday 21st November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hoban]

That was a lame response to my statement. The previous Government presided over the failure of financial regulation and an irresponsible banking culture that led to the collapse of Northern Rock. Now we have to deal with their legacy, and that includes the agreement that they struck with the European Commission requiring Northern Rock to be sold by 2013. Given the hand we were dealt by the previous Government, we had to do three things: get the best deal for the taxpayer, for the consumer and for Northern Rock and the north-east. The deal that we announced last week did just that.

The hon. Gentleman asked about proceeds. As we have said, this is a one-off transaction, and the proceeds will go towards paying down the debt. He asked whether it would have been better to hold on to Northern Rock longer. The reality is that Northern Rock is currently loss-making, and it is expected to make losses in the first part of next year. The best outcome for Northern Rock is to be acquired by somebody who wants to use the base in Gosforth to expand the business and offer a better deal to consumers and the staff of Northern Rock. David Fleming, the Unite trade union official, said:

“The treasury’s decision to sell Northern Rock to Virgin Money marks a significant moment in the history of this north-east based financial institution. After three years of turmoil and upheaval for the workforce at Northern Rock, Unite hopes that today will be the start of a secure future.”

Let me deal with Virgin Money’s capital position, which the hon. Gentleman raised. Virgin Money has clearly set out to be a strong and dependable partner. Its core tier 1 capital ratio is 15%, which is much higher than that of many existing high street banks, which averages about 10%. Of course the FSA will approve the capital structure and will have to give its approval of the transfer of ownership, and hon. Members should welcome that support.

On mutualisation, I made it clear, as did the Chancellor, that we were open to offers from existing mutuals to buy Northern Rock for a stand-alone remutualisation, but no firm bids were made in the final round. No one came forward with a well worked-out plan on how Northern Rock could be remutualised on a stand-alone basis, and that is why we took the decision we did. It was in the best interests of the taxpayer, the consumer, the north-east and Northern Rock to sell the business to Virgin Money.

[Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con)]

In the Treasury Committee’s recent report on competition in retail banking, we argued strongly that competition, and not just short-term revenue maximisation, should play a major part in the sales of the nationalised banks. Have consumer interests influenced the Treasury’s decision to sell Northern Rock now, and does the Minister agree that increasing competition should be central to future divestments?

[Mr Hoban]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. We have studied the Treasury Committee’s reports on competition carefully. We agree with him that competition is vital to improve outcomes for consumers, whether they be business or personal; and, to the extent that divestments of banks help to deliver improved competition, that is something to be welcomed and borne in mind. There are other areas where we can look to improve competition in the banking sector. The Independent Commission on Banking has made its proposals, and we will respond to them in due course.

Eurozone Crisis

Debate between Mark Hoban and Lord Tyrie

Thursday 3rd November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hoban]

Let me first tackle this issue of who kept us out of the euro. The fact that a previous Conservative Government secured an opt-out from the Maastricht treaty meant that we were not going to join the euro. Also, one of the things that we did when we came into office last May was to close down the euro preparations unit in the Treasury. We are taking action on contingency planning for a whole range of outcomes, and that work is under way in the Treasury.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether work would be put on hold on the three legs of the deal that was agreed last week. It is important that the euro area continues to work on those three legs, particularly on the ring fence and on the recapitalisation of the banks. They are important parts of the package, and they are needed to ensure that the eurozone is stabilised. He talked about the various European mechanisms that are in place to support finance. He will remember that the Greek bail-out was originally paid for purely by the eurozone; the UK did not contribute to it and has not contributed to subsequent parts of the bail-out package for Greece. We have negotiated that when a permanent mechanism is put in place to replace the one that the previous Government signed us up to, which we do have to contribute to, that permanent mechanism will not require UK participation. That is an achievement of this Government, getting us out of the mess that the Labour Government put us into in May last year.

The hon. Gentleman referred to the IMF. He will have to remember that it was he who led opposition to increasing our subscription to the IMF—[Interruption.] He says that that was to safeguard Britain’s subscription to the IMF, but it would in fact have marginalised the UK in international debates on tackling the global economic problems that we face today. Labour should think very carefully about its repudiation of the legacy left to it by the previous Prime Minister, who agreed to a trebling of resources for the IMF. We need to take action to stabilise the situation in the eurozone. The uncertainty is casting a chilling effect on the UK economy, and it is important that those issues are tackled as soon as possible.

[Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con)]

I wonder how much we can reasonably learn from the Minister, given that the negotiations are taking place in Cannes and that he is here with us today. Anyway, there are one or two questions that we might ask. What assurance can he give us about the UK banks’ exposure not only to Greece but to other eurozone countries at risk? What confidence does he have that the eurozone banks have the capital strength required to withstand a eurozone default?

[Mr Hoban]

My hon. Friend asks some interesting questions. I think that I would rather be here in the House than in Cannes at the moment—[Interruption.] It is important that Parliament should hold Ministers to account on these matters, and I am here to answer its questions. On my hon. Friend’s first question about the strength of the UK banks, there has been a process with the leadership, through the European Banking Authority, which is based here in London, and it concluded that the UK banks did not need to be recapitalised. That is partly a consequence of the measures taken over the past two or three years to increase banks’ holdings of capital and highly liquid assets, which have helped to ensure that they are to an extent insulated from the problems in the euro area.

On my hon. Friend’s wider question about the strength of the European banks, I can tell him that, in calculating the amount of additional capital that banks should hold, the EBA determined that they should hold 9% core tier 1, and that, crucially, their holdings of sovereign debt should be marked to market rather than held at face value. That led to the calculation that banks across Europe need to hold an additional €100 billion of capital.

Equitable Life (Payments) Bill

Debate between Mark Hoban and Lord Tyrie

Tuesday 14th September 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hoban]

The ombudsman’s letter is clear. She said that she welcomed much of the Government’s approach, including the appointment of an independent commission, the publication of a clear timetable for the beginning of payments to those affected and our commitment to consider representations on the best way forward. I do not feel that I can give the House the outcome of a private meeting, but the ombudsman reiterated her findings, which were set out in the report that she published in July 2008 and which the previous Government sat on for six months before responding. She will also have the opportunity to make her views known when the Public Administration Committee works on this. I just want to do all that I can to ensure that the recommendations published by the ombudsman in July 2008 are honoured, and that is the task that we have to achieve.

[Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend accept that the six-month delay to which he alludes is just the tip of the iceberg? We faced years of delaying tactics, not least a calculated attempt to try to prevent the parliamentary ombudsman from even producing a report.

[Mr Hoban]

Indeed, and it was the work of my hon. Friend, who was characteristically modest in his intervention, that found a way in which the ombudsman could publish her second report into Equitable Life. Had he not found the way through, we would not be in this position today, so the House and policyholders owe him a debt of gratitude for getting us to this position.

My hon. Friend is absolutely right that the previous Government did everything they could to avoid a second ombudsman’s inquiry into Equitable Life. The Penrose report, published in 2004, demonstrated that there had been regulatory failure at Equitable Life over a decade covering both Governments—I have no problem accepting that. However, the previous Government could have acted in 2004, but instead they dug their heels in—and here we are in 2010 with policyholders still waiting for justice.

Banking Reform

Debate between Mark Hoban and Lord Tyrie

Thursday 17th June 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hoban]

I welcome the hon. Gentleman to his new role and I am grateful to him for his welcome to me. Although I listened very carefully to his remarks, I am not quite sure whether the Opposition accept our proposals or whether they are stuck in the past defending to the last the former Government’s regulatory architecture, which they put in place in 1997. It is time that the Opposition faced up to this problem: do they accept that the system put in place by the right hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown) was flawed and needs reform, or are they the last people to defend the status quo in this country?

The hon. Gentleman asked a number of detailed questions. Let me address them. He recognised the build-up of systemic risk in the economy over the course of the past 13 years, but he must acknowledge that the reforms introduced by his right hon. Friend in 1997 took away from the Bank of England the power to monitor and respond to those risks.

The hon. Gentleman asked about the appointments to the Financial Policy Committee, and they will be consistent with the approach currently adopted towards the Monetary Policy Committee. He referred to the Bingham report and the collapse of BCCI and, as he will remember from the exchange between the right hon. Member for Edinburgh South West (Mr Darling) and my right hon. Friend the Chancellor yesterday, the Chancellor is going to look into that matter.

The hon. Gentleman is right to say that the FSA has made progress, and that is one reason why we are delighted that Hector Sants has agreed to lead the FSA through the transition period and then to become the chief executive of the PRA. No matter how far the FSA improves in the execution of its role, the reality is that the flawed architecture that the hon. Gentleman’s Government put in place undermines all that it does. This package of reforms ensures that we have the right regulatory architecture in place to identify and tackle the systemic risks to which he referred and ensures proper protection for consumers so that they will never again be let down.

[Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con)]

Is it not clear that if public money is to be put at risk during a financial crisis, the only person with the moral authority to take a decision will be the Chancellor of the Exchequer? Surely the Chancellor of the Exchequer should therefore have the power to assume the chairmanship of the Financial Policy Committee during a crisis. Will my hon. Friend confirm that that will be possible under the legislation that will be brought before the House?

[Mr Hoban]

My hon. Friend makes a good point about who takes control in a crisis. My right hon. Friend the Chancellor was very clear yesterday that, given his responsibilities in respect of public finances, he will ultimately be in charge in such situations.