Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting)

Max Wilkinson Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 12th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mr French]

I am sure that the Minister will have heard that contribution from my hon. Friend and will be able to pick up on that in her comments. He is right to identify that such a distinction has been made in the Bill.

What does this mean? For example, will an hour-long Twitter poll on what a club should do be sufficient? We have seen how clubs have sought to use X in some quite funny ways at times, but on something as serious as this, we need proper consultation. Instead, does the Minister expect that clubs will engage in a full, proper and open consultation with their fans, such as one that includes a call for evidence, votes on different proposals and genuine engagement from the clubs themselves? Otherwise, this all risks just being for show, rather than real consultation.

Why stop at just consultation? If a proposed change is sensible, justifiable and supported by a club’s reasoning, why would the club not be able to win over the majority of its fans, if the fans agree it is in the best interests of the club? Why are the Government, in this Bill’s drafting, afraid of allowing fans to have a real and final say on these matters? This is not about allowing fans to micro-manage a club; it is about recognising that the symbols, colours and names of clubs are all held in trust, not owned in a transactional sense.

Football club owners are, in truth, temporary stewards. Their role is not to reshape the soul of a club but to protect it and hopefully strengthen it before passing it on. Far too often we have seen the reverse: owners who arrive with branding ideas and marketing consultants, determined to reshape the club’s visual identity to fit a certain commercial strategy, often with little or no understanding of the local footballing tradition in that community. Supporters have had to campaign, protest and plead to get what should have been theirs almost by birthright: a say in the symbols of their club. Does the Minister agree that clause 49, if limited to just consultation, risks becoming just a tick-box exercise, particularly in clubs without strong fan representation models in place?

There is a precedent for this kind of requirement. In Germany, the so-called 50+1 rule ensures that fans retain majority voting rights over key aspects of club identity and operation. In Spain, the socios model does so too. To be clear, we are not calling for full fan ownership, but we are saying that, on issues of identity, the final word should ultimately rest with the fans. Let us remember that this amendment would apply only to three specific heritage areas: the club’s official name, the badge—or crest, depending on how we want to describe it—and the home shirt colours. This is not about banning innovation or marketing altogether. It is simply saying that, when it comes to fundamentals, supporters should have a say.

[Max Wilkinson (Cheltenham) (LD)]

We have seen in the past things such as the renaming of St James’ Park in Newcastle to the Sports Direct Arena, and other fans groups around the country have been furious when historic stadium names have been changed to sponsors’ names. Would the shadow Minister extend the sentiment that he is now expressing to those circumstances as well?

[Mr French]

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s contribution, and that is the point that we were discussing earlier with the hon. Member for Sheffield South East. We were seeking clarification from the Government on how that would affect the consultation of fans on the relocation of stadiums or a change in their ownership. I agree that it is crucial that fans have a say in the naming and history of their ground.

[Max Wilkinson]

The hon. Member for Great Yarmouth (Rupert Lowe) once fell foul of this when he attempted to change the name of the Dell to the Friends Provident stadium. Perhaps we might consult him on his learnings from that experience after we have completed this Committee.

[Mr French]

I am not sure how to answer that. How Members decide to use their time is a decision for them, but the hon. Gentleman has made the point well. Without wishing to put off Government Members, the argument behind my amendment is deeply Conservative in some ways; it is about tradition, continuity and community. It is about respecting the past while also securing the future. It is about recognising that football is strongest when it listens to the people who love it most.

The clause is a step forward, and we think its inclusion in the Bill is important. Without our amendment, however, we are concerned that the clause will lack the legal bite required to safeguard the symbols that matter most to supporters. In truth, clubs that respect their fans would already seek that approval; the amendment would simply ensure that those who do not are held to the same standard. To be clear, no one should be able to change the name of Barnsley FC, the badge of Wigan Athletic or the home colours of Aston Villa without the backing of the very people who built the stands and carry the soul of the club every single week across multiple seasons.

I urge the Minister and colleagues across the Committee to back the amendment. Football’s future must be modern and well run, yes, but it must also be anchored in tradition, and the tradition belongs to the fans.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr French]

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, and I know that certain players have sought to do that through advertising and other financial arrangements. We are talking about clubs at the lowest level, and we do not believe that is a particular risk of this amendment.

One of the key failings of the football system in recent years has been the concentration of financial risk at the lower levels of the pyramid. Clubs overextend themselves chasing promotion, owners gamble recklessly to stay afloat, and supporters ultimately bear the costs when that does not work and when clubs collapse. The last thing we believe we should be doing is introducing a new statutory cost that could tip the balance for smaller clubs already running on the thinnest margins. This amendment is not about letting anyone off the hook; it is about recognising scale, and recognising the difference of scale in the football pyramid.

Will the Minister please commit to publishing a full impact assessment of the levy’s distribution before regulations are laid? Without that, how can Parliament be sure that the burden will not fall disproportionately on those least able to bear it? One of the justifications for the levy is to secure the regulator’s operational independence, which is a principle that we support, but independence should never mean insulation from scrutiny. If clubs are paying the regulator’s bill, they should at least know where the money is going and have confidence that it is not being wasted.

The Minister has maintained that football regulation cannot be one size fits all, and we understand that is her reason for leaving the wording of the Bill quite open-ended in places. Clause 53 is sound in many ways, but in practice it risks imposing an undue burden on the very clubs that the Bill is supposed to help—those rooted in their communities, run on small budgets and kept alive, more often than not, by volunteers, not venture capitalists. In that spirit, I will be pressing this amendment to a vote.

[Max Wilkinson]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler. Earlier in our deliberations—I cannot remember how many sittings ago—the Liberal Democrats made the case for extending the Bill’s scope to the sixth tier, the National Leagues. Effectively, we feel that helping those clubs up the pyramid would be useful, and on a cross-party basis, we have discussed support for the National League’s 3UP campaign, which we can take forward after Committee as a group of Members who are interested in football.

This amendment is quite simple, as it is about extending the Bill’s scope to the sixth tier. It would give clubs in National League North and National League South the opportunity to apply for an exemption from the levy, were it to be extended to that level. Clubs at that level may well not have the capacity to take on the administration associated with regulation. Such increased financial protections for lower-league clubs—those in the National League and National Leagues North and South—would align with the principles of the Bill.

[Mr Dillon]

It is a privilege to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler. New clause 24, tabled in my name, seeks to introduce a fair and transparent exemption procedure for football clubs in administration. When a football club enters administration, it is not merely a financial event; it is often a crisis that rocks the entire community, as we saw in Bury. Supporters, many of whom have been lifelong followers, are left facing uncertainty and fear for the future of their club, which is often the heartbeat of their town or city.

New clause 24 seeks to strike a vital balance by maintaining the integrity of the levy while allowing compassionate and evidence-based interventions when a club is on its knees. It would ensure that exemptions are not handed out indiscriminately, and that the regulator must assess each case on its merits and satisfy itself that the club’s financial difficulties are not a calculated move to evade its levy responsibilities. Most importantly, the new clause would give clubs a chance.

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[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the shadow Minister for his points. Clubs will be subject to a number of rules from different football authorities. Failure to comply with them may indicate that the club is in some financial difficulty and may prompt the regulator to assess the risk profile of the club. Changes in a competition’s rules may lead to clubs taking additional risks or may threaten the financial soundness of the system. The regulator therefore needs to be aware of such changes so that it is in a position to reassess the long-term financial sustainability of clubs and whether, as a result of the rule change, additional regulation is needed.

The shadow Minister did accept that there is no veto in the clause. I reiterate once again that UEFA are happy with the Bill as drafted. He drew the Committee’s attention to a specific line in the Bill, but I remind him that it has not been changed from the previous iteration of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 55 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 56

Part 6: overview and interpretation

[Max Wilkinson]

I beg to move amendment 76, in clause 56, page 45, line 39, after “organisers” insert

“or by a regulated club”.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 77, in clause 56, page 46, line 4, after “organiser” insert

“or directly received by a regulated club”.

Amendment 78, in clause 56, page 46, line 17, after “organiser” insert “or a regulated club”.

Amendment 79, in clause 56, page 46, line 24, after “organisers” insert

“or by any club participating in a competition organised by one of those organisers”.

Amendment 80, in clause 57, page 47, line 9, after “organisers” insert

“or by a regulated club”.

Amendment 81, in clause 57, page 47, line 19, leave out from “revenue” to “in” in line 21 and insert

“received by one specified competition organiser or regulated club in or in respect of that season compared to the relevant revenue received by that specified competition organiser or regulated club”.

Amendment 82, in clause 57, page 47, line 29, after “organisers” insert

“, or by any regulated club participating in a competition organised by one of those organisers,”.

[Max Wilkinson]

Clubs in the English football pyramid currently barter as a collective for funding from broadcasters, but it is not hard to imagine a future in which Liverpool, Manchester City, Arsenal, Chelsea—the hon. Member for Spelthorne has now gone so I can say that—or other big clubs decide that they are going to barter alone. That has happened in other European countries. In fact, Spain had to legislate to stop Barcelona and Real Madrid cashing in on their massive marketable machine that massively distorted the Spanish game.

These amendments are fairly simple. They build in a future failsafe to stop the threat of that happening. If it does happen, the revenue gained by those clubs will be taken into account in the redistribution of funds in the game. It seems like a logical failsafe to introduce to the Bill, which we hope will be accepted.

[Stephanie Peacock]

I thank the hon. Member for his amendments. We understand the intent behind them but believe that the drafting of the Bill sufficiently captures the current primary sources of revenue in the game. We will discuss clause 56 more fully during the clause stand part debate, but to summarise briefly, among other things, it defines which revenue streams are in scope of the backstop process. Revenue in scope is called “relevant revenue” and is limited in the Bill to revenue received by a league for broadcast rights to league matches.

Broadcast revenue is undisputedly the main source of revenue in English football, but we acknowledge that that may not always be the case. Football’s financial landscape is dynamic and its economic model may not remain static. That is why the Bill already allows for the definition of “relevant revenue” to be amended if necessary. The Secretary of State can amend the definition by making regulations, but only after consultation with the leagues, the regulator and the FA. That flexibility future-proofs the definition of “relevant revenue” against potential changes in the structure of the industry while ensuring that the definition remains firmly rooted in the current reality.

We expect that, throughout the distributions process, the leagues will effectively represent the interests of their constituent clubs. However, the backstop process, including the final proposal stage, is ultimately about resolving distributions between the leagues. It is about how money earned by the leagues flows from one league to another, not between individual clubs. It is therefore right that, given how finances currently flow, it is revenue received by the leagues as a whole, not individual clubs, that should be considered. I am therefore unable to accept the amendments.

[Max Wilkinson]

We recognise the numbers—although we Liberal Democrats now outnumber the official Opposition—so we will not press this to a vote. However, it is worth considering that, in future, we might end up in a situation where some of our bigger clubs start to try to negotiate on their own for their broadcast revenue. The Minister did not reassure me that that could not happen. As I understand it, we do not have legislation that would stop that. There is nothing in the game to stop that apart from Arsenal, Manchester United, Chelsea and Manchester City deciding to play together nicely.

Although we are not reassured, there is no point in forcing this to a vote. But we hope that the comments may be taken forward and taken into account by the regulator in future, and perhaps we will have this discussion again as and when those big clubs decide that they are going to kick up a stink and try to ruin the rest of football for everyone else. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Mr French]

I beg to move amendment 124, in clause 56, page 46, line 3, leave out subsection (2) and insert—

“(2) In this Part, revenue received by a specified competition organiser is ‘relevant revenue’ if—

(a) it is revenue received as a result of the sale or acquisition of rights to exploit the broadcasting of football matches included in a competition organised by the specified competition organiser, and

(b) it is not revenue that the specified competition organiser distributes to a club by virtue of a team operated by the club being relegated from a competition organised by the specified competition organiser.”

Clause 56 introduces the framework for the resolution process, which is a formal mechanism through which the Government’s new regulator may intervene to help to resolve disputes between football authorities, competitions and clubs in certain prescribed areas. The clause is important because it sets the boundaries of when and how the Government’s new regulator may be invited, or, in some cases, compelled to step into the room on issues that until now have been managed internally within the football pyramid.

We understand the intention behind this process. It reflects years of unresolved tensions in the game between different tiers of the pyramid, between governing bodies, and, most notably, between the Premier League and the EFL. Clause 56 and the following clauses in part 6 provide the bones of a system for dispute resolution, in the hope of reaching consensus where negotiation has failed. In principle, that has merit. However, we believe that the clause as drafted risks crossing a line—not into oversight, but into interventionism. It risks turning the regulator from a referee into a participant, and that risk becomes very real when we consider what types of decisions might fall within that process.

That is why I have tabled amendment 124, which would exclude parachute payments to the regulated clubs from the scope of the resolution process, as was the case in the Bill that the Minister supported during the previous Parliament. Clause 56 is not procedural, but foundational. It defines who can apply to trigger the resolution process, namely certain governing bodies and competition organisers, and what is meant by the term “relevant revenue”. In subsection (2), this is revenue received

“as a result of the sale or acquisition of rights to exploit the broadcasting of football matches included in a competition organised by the specified competition organiser, or…from any other source specified, or of a description specified, in regulations made by the Secretary of State.”

In essence, the provisions allow disputes over financial redistribution to be brought before the Government’s new regulator, which may then facilitate a resolution or, in some cases, take further steps to impose one. The specific issue we have with the clause, which was introduced by the Government, relates to the parachute payments of financial support offered by the Premier League to clubs that are relegated to the EFL to help them adjust to the significant drop in broadcasting and commercial income. This is obviously an important point, given the wage bills and so on when clubs go down, but it is never far from being controversial. Some see the payments as being necessary to ensure financial continuity and competition in the Premier League on the way up, while others argue that they distort competition in the Championship on the way down, solidifying clubs as so-called yo-yo clubs that go up and down regularly.

Bringing parachute payments within the scope of the regulator’s resolution process, as clause 56 does, takes a significant step towards Government involvement in revenue redistribution among private members of the competition. That is not regulation; it is reallocation. In our view, it is an inappropriate function for a state-backed regulator.

The amendment does not oppose the resolution process in principle; it supports it, and in fact returns the Bill to what the Minister previously supported. Can she tell us what has changed, and why she felt the need to make the change when she previously had no issue with this part of the Bill? My amendment seeks to make sure that the Government’s regulator does not intervene in areas that are already managed by mutual agreement between competitions.

Parachute payments are, by their nature, a Premier League solution to what is often a Premier League problem. They are not imposed on the EFL or funded by it, and although their knock-on effects may be debated—I have my own views on that—they should not be subject to arbitration by a third party.

If we allow the Government’s regulator to adjudicate disputes over parachute payments, we risk setting a precedent that any form of commercial agreement, no matter how internal, can be referred for outside resolution. We believe that that would be a mistake, and would likely undermine the willingness of top-flight clubs to continue sharing revenue in any form at all. If the Minister starts this process off on the wrong foot with clubs and this is not done in the right way, we fear that resentment would set in from day one. With the top flight already questioning—