Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateStephanie Peacock
Main Page: Stephanie Peacock (Labour - Barnsley South)Department Debates - View all Stephanie Peacock's debates with the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport
(2 days, 19 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt continues to be a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler. I do not know whether the Minister has ever run a company that was approaching either administration or insolvency, but had she, she would know that a number of incredibly onerous and important duties are placed on the directors of such companies, which are literally minute by minute, in terms of them being shown to be acting responsibly. That can include, potentially, having multiple board meetings during a day, which are minuted, in order to revisit the “going concern” statement that the company does indeed have sufficient resources to meet its obligations as they fall due.
The penalties for failing to act responsibly and in accordance with the Insolvency Act 1986 in such circumstances can include being barred as a director of any company by the Secretary of State for a number of years, whereas the jeopardy in this Bill is possibly losing the ability to own a football club or to be an officer thereof. On the basis that we can all become millionaires or start-up billionaires and buy a football club, it is very concerning that we are putting in law the ability to override the directors of said companies’ obligations under the Insolvency Act. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell us whether the Government have taken any legal advice on the specific question about the potential conflict between obligations on directors under the Insolvency Act and obligations on owners and officers under the Bill.
I will respond to the points made by the shadow Minister and then come to those from the hon. Member for Spelthorne. The appointment of an administrator would not delay a club entering administration, as that is a separate process from the appointment of a specific administrator. My officials have met both relevant teams in the Insolvency Service and the Department for Business and Trade to ensure that the provisions in the Bill do not impinge on the existing insolvency processes. That speaks to the point made by the hon. Member for Spelthorne.
As for the shadow Minister’s other questions on precedent, special administration regimes exist for various purposes, such as the water utilities or energy suppliers. They have distinct processes for entering administration. The provision in the Bill does not go as far as that. Ideally, the provision will not need to be used frequently, if at all, but if it is, it will look to ensure that fans can feel more confident than they do now. It works alongside the requirements but it still stands alone, so I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 47 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 48
Duty not to relocate without approval
I beg to move amendment 91, in clause 48, page 40, line 18, at end insert—
“(e) if the arrangements would represent a significant upheaval of the connection between the fans of a club domiciled in England and Wales and the club (taking into account the following non-exhaustive factors: proximity to home ground, proximity to other clubs’ grounds, journey time for fans and any other factors that the IFR deems relevant) the club’s fans have actively approved the arrangements.
(4A) In order for the Regulator to be satisfied with subsection (4)(b), a regulated club must take reasonable steps to establish that the majority of the club’s fans domiciled in England and Wales do not consider the arrangements to constitute significant harm to the heritage of the club.”
I hope that everyone is appropriately refreshed after the lunch break. I will not seek to go to VAR to rehash any of the debates we had before lunch, but we have great sympathy with the points made by the hon. Member for Sheffield South East. We also believe that fans should have a strong say if clubs seek to move ground, as we have debated. The obvious questions, which we will come to in the next set of debates, are about what fan consultation and approval would look like. I know that that will be part of our heritage discussion in a moment, so I will not proceed on that now.
In thinking about some of the hon. Gentleman’s examples—Wimbledon being the most obvious one—I recall that as a teenager, or a bit younger, I would watch Wimbledon play at Crystal Palace, at Selhurst Park. They were the Crazy Gang in south London at that point, and they would often play there. So I understand his point, especially about the move to Milton Keynes and the controversy that that caused. As he highlighted, thankfully, we have not had too many examples that are similar to the American franchise system, where, in the National Football League, the Raiders have moved a number of times over the years, to different cities, depending on the financial attraction of each state.
Beyond the Man United and Everton examples, which we have discussed, there are other clubs who have moved. The one I first think of, which is closest to where I am from, is the Arsenal move a number of years ago from Woolwich Arsenal in south-east London to Islington. It is an interesting point, because a lot of the fans in south-east London are still strong supporters of Arsenal because of their generational links. For example, my brother-in-law’s grandfather was an Arsenal fan, so he is an Arsenal fan. The London example is probably not the best one, because it is simple to argue that fans can get across London fairly easily. It would be more dramatic if a club were being moved to the other end of the country, which is the point he is making—he is nodding in agreement.
I will be interested to know how the Minister and the Government view the amendments and how this issue might impact the regulator’s operations. I have a lot of sympathy for the amendments, and I will listen carefully to the Minister’s response.
Welcome back to the Committee after lunch, Ms Butler. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East for tabling the proposals, which seek to strengthen the protections on club heritage. The safeguarding of football heritage will be a key priority for the regulator, and there are a number of provisions in the Bill to uphold that key objective. It is vital that fans can have their voices heard at their clubs, especially regarding key heritage assets that can play a significant role in community identity and history.
That is why, as we will discuss in relation to clause stand part, clause 48 requires clubs to consult their fans and have regard to their views on a proposed relocation of a home ground. It is also why the regulator will determine whether the relocation will result in significant harm to a club’s heritage. This is not a binary decision, however, and in lots of cases will require a holistic approach and for the regulator to consider a number of factors, including not just the views of current fans, but the club’s history and the ability of fans to get to the ground. We would expect the regulator to engage and consult fans of the club, because it would be necessary to do so to ascertain the impact on club heritage. As the shadow Minister touched on, we will discuss this further in a little bit.
Amendment 91 would require the club to take reasonable steps to establish the views of the majority of supporters, rather than allowing the regulator to take the multifaceted approach that the Government think is best suited to the nuanced issue of club heritage. The importance of fan voices being heard is why the regulator spells out a number of protections for heritage assets, such as the home brand and home shirt colours, among others. Any breach of these duties would qualify as a relevant infringement by the club. Although we expect that the regulator will take an advocacy-first approach, a range of sanctions will be available.
Although the Government understand that the intention behind new clause 14 is to further entrench these duties, this legislation has been designed so that the duties apply across the clubs, with the regulator ensuring compliance. Amending articles of association can be resource-heavy and require shareholder agreement. It also does not guarantee that there will be compliance. This is not something that the Government see as an appropriate or necessary step to require all clubs to take. Instead, the Bill will protect fan consultation through other means. For those reasons, I am unable to accept the amendments.
I thank the Minister for the reply—I think. That was a bit of a reply about new clause 14 but she did not really address amendment 91 and the regulator being required to take account of factors such as relocation over distance and where fans live. In some ways, I think that is the strongest part of this discussion, because it is the thing that worries fans the most.
I talked about taking a holistic approach, and I said that the regulator must consider a number of factors—not just the current views of fans but the club’s history and how fans get to the ground. I acknowledge some of the examples that my hon. Friend has given, and I was really pleased to visit the new Everton stadium a few months ago. We obviously recognise that sometimes it is very legitimate, and other times it is not. That is why we have gone for the holistic approach.
Yes, and I have obviously drawn attention to some of them in my remarks. That is why we do not want to be prescriptive; we want the regulator to be able to take a holistic, case-by-case approach.
Clause 48 places a duty on clubs not to relocate from their home ground without approval from the regulator. As we just discussed, home grounds play an important role in the history of a club and are often the club’s most valuable asset. These grounds are where many thousands of fans watch their teams play every weekend. Relocating them to areas that have no connection to the heritage and history of a club can have a significant impact on those supporters and the local area, as we saw when Wimbledon moved to Milton Keynes, which my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East just spoke about.
The impact of a home ground relocation on fans and the club is why we are legislating for the regulator to pre-approve any proposal in that regard. As subsection (4) of the clause sets out, the regulator must be satisfied that the proposed relocation would not “undermine the financial sustainability” and significantly harm the heritage of the club. This Government have added a requirement for the regulator to be satisfied that the club has taken
“reasonable steps to determine the views of… fans”
and taken those views into account.
The Government do not want to stifle development where it brings value and aligns with the heritage of the club. The clause makes the important and necessary recognition of the vital role that home grounds play in communities and adds an extra layer of protection to them while leaving room for clubs to evolve and continue to develop. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 49
Duty not to change crest, home shirt colours or name without approval
I beg to move amendment 140, in clause 49, page 40, line 31, at end insert—
“(1A) A regulated club must notify the IFR if it is considering making any material changes under subsection (1) and the IFR must monitor the reasonable steps taken to independently establish that the changes are supported by a majority of the club’s fans.”.
This amendment would require the IFR to take steps to independently oversee a club’s fan consultation process on the material changes specified.
I thank hon. Members for tabling the amendments to clause 49. We will discuss the clause in more detail in the clause stand part debate, so I will reserve some of my comments until then. To summarise, however, the clause places a duty on regulated clubs not to make changes to key items of club heritage without the support of the majority of the club’s fans and approval by the Football Association.
As set out in clause 7(4), the regulator is already required to monitor compliance with obligations. However, we do not think it appropriate for the regulator to be directly involved in every instance of a heritage change. As a light-touch regulator, we do not expect it to intervene where clubs are already meeting what is required of them. Instead, it will be able to have a wide view, and intervene where there are concerns.
Any change to heritage assets will necessarily come under significant scrutiny by fans and the public, as well as the FA through its existing fan engagement standards. Additionally, in any case of non-compliance, the regulator will have sufficient enforcement options at its disposal. The process is therefore appropriately safeguarded without the need for direct regulatory involvement each time.
Turning to amendments 111 and 92, club names are a vital part of the club’s heritage. The legislation therefore introduces legal protections for that heritage asset. The FA has a long track record of being able to take a considered approach to name changes, listening to fans and heritage concerns, and taking appropriate action. That was demonstrated in the case of Hull City: the FA blocked multiple attempts to change the name to “Hull Tigers”. The FA, with oversight of all levels of football, is also in a good position to ensure that name changes do not have unintended implications for clubs that are outside the regulator’s scope.
The Government therefore believe that the FA is in the best position to take into account fan opinions and all the other relevant considerations, with the regulator acting as an enforcement backstop. That is in addition to any mandatory licensing requirement for clubs to consult their fans on any matters relating to the club’s name, among other heritage assets.
The shadow Minister asked which fans will be consulted. For the most part, clubs will be in the best position to understand the demographics of their fans. The regulator will be able to provide guidance for clubs for on how best to consult fans. Clubs in the lower leagues will tend to have a more local fanbase, whereas larger clubs will have fanbases from across the world, as the hon. Member for Sheffield South East pointed out. That is why we want to implement proportional and flexible proposals.
We all feel concerned about this issue. It is not about the clubs that already consult well; it is about those that do not consult, but will be compelled to consult by the legislation, and will not really want to—they will find ways around it. The regulator can give guidance, but if a club does not follow that guidance, what will the regulator’s likely course of action be?
We will come on to enforcement, but a range of enforcement options will be available to the regulator, if it feels that a club is not doing what it asked the club to do.
To add to the point made by the hon. Member for Sheffield South East, if a club—the Minister gave the example of Hull—decided that it wanted to go ahead and change its name to “Hull Tigers”, but the regulator felt that the fans had not been consulted thoroughly enough, could the regulator deduct points from a club?
No, there are no sporting sanctions in the Bill. Those are not in scope. To take the point about the FA further, it has a long track record of being able to take a considered approach to name changes, to listening to fans and heritage concerns, and to taking appropriate action.
I welcome the fact that the Minister is saying, “Let’s trust existing organisations to do it”, rather than bringing it within the purview of a higher regulator. On the basis that the FA has exercised such responsibilities when it comes to names, why cannot it be trusted to have the same consideration for emblems and colours?
As I said, the FA, with oversight of the levels of football, is in a good position to ensure that name changes do not have unintended implications for clubs that are outside the regulator’s scope. It has done that point on names well. That is why we want to leave it to do the good job it is doing.
I thank the Minister for her response. Although the Bill tackles financial sustainability, it has a real ability to rebuild trust between fans and football clubs. I feel that all three amendments are still worthy of being pressed to a vote, and I commend amendment 140 to the Committee.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Clause 49 requires a club to establish that a majority of domestic supporters approve any material change to its emblem, crest or predominant home shirt colours. A club’s name, home shirt colours and emblem are intrinsic parts of its heritage, intertwined with decades of club and supporter history. The decision to materially change any of them therefore requires considered thought and consultation. The clause means that changes can still be made, but only if, and once, fans have voiced their support. In practice, we expect that could take place through a formal survey of fan opinion, as we saw last season with Bristol Rovers, where supporters opposed the final proposal that was put to them, resulting in the club halting the redesign of their emblem.
The clause also requires clubs to get FA approval prior to changing the name that the club’s team plays under. The view of supporters is a significant factor in the FA’s decision making. However, the FA may also need to balance wider considerations regarding to a name change. That might include whether there would be any adverse effects on other clubs throughout the pyramid. The existing FA rule has been used to prevent name changes, which have been proposed in the past against the wishes of fans, as I mentioned with the example with Hull City. Codifying this as a legal duty will mean there are additional powers to ensure clubs do not make changes without proper approval and allow the regulator to respond to instances of non-compliance. The clause serves one of the key objectives of the regulator: protecting the heritage of English football. I commend it to the Committee.
I am still a bit uneasy about those clubs that are not going to enter into the spirit of the really important part of the Bill: proper fan consultation. I come back to Sheffield Wednesday and its owner, who thinks sitting down for 10 hours of deliberation with hand-picked fan groups and not answering any questions amounts to a consultation—it does not.
I was interested in what the Minister said about how the regulator will have the right to issue guidance about how consultation should happen, and then there can be enforcement if the guidance is not followed, which means the guidance effectively becomes a requirement. I hope that we can elaborate on that later in the Committee’s discussions, as she indicated we would, because, without those backstop powers, there will be some club owners who regard the club as their personal possession and believe that no one has a right to interfere in how they run it.
Names interact with other clubs in the pyramid, which is not the case with shirts and colours, and we think there are strong provisions in the Bill for fan consultation.
I hear what the Minister said, but I want to think about that. I know what her good intentions are, but I also know there may be some people out there with bad intentions; it is about making sure that they come in line with the Minister’s good intentions. I am holding back to see what further discussions we have, but this is really important. It is a wider issue: there are so many clubs with so many disparate fan groups, and owners will pick and choose if there is not certainty. That is why I raised the issue, which I think we ought to come back to, of a clear role for the Football Supporters’ Association, the body that oversees fan groups in this country. It has a neutral view of which groups are the most important and relevant in different clubs, and it can help the regulator enormously in what, in some cases, will be a challenging process of trying to identify the fan groups who really speak for fans in those clubs.
I will not put the hon. Member for Sheffield South East at risk with his own side by talking too fondly about the comments he just made—I will not make it sound like we are trying to do a double act—but we have heard a lot of concern in our debates on the clause, and the amendments tabled to it, about how it will work. The hon. Member mentioned that some club owners—one would hope only a minority of them—would seek to expose loopholes in the Bill. That is why we tabled amendment 111, which would introduce a safeguard by requiring a clear vote and the approval of the majority of fans.
There are a number of risks for the Government with this Bill, but one of the biggest is this: if it does not protect the things it is designed to protect—in this case, the heritage of a football club and a say for fans—what is its purpose at all? If one of the examples we have discussed plays out in future, that question will be asked of the Government. In our future debates on the Bill, perhaps they can provide more clarity about their thinking, and perhaps they will incorporate some of the arguments we have made today.
I am grateful to hon. Members for their contributions. We believe that we have strengthened measures in the Bill to put fans and communities back at the heart of the game and to protect football heritage. All regulated clubs will now be required to have an effective framework in place to meet and consult regularly a representative group of fans on the specified relevant matters, including any proposal to relocate the home ground and some of the issues we have just discussed. We expect that the regulator will be best placed to understand the circumstances of individual clubs across the country. It will produce guidance to support clubs in meeting its requirements, and it will take into account things like precedent and ensuring proportionality.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 50
Duty to notify of changes in circumstances relevant to the IFR’s functions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The clause places a duty on all regulated clubs to notify the regulator of any material change in circumstances that is relevant to the regulator’s functions, as soon as reasonably practicable. The regulator will need a complete picture of each club in order to effectively regulate. Full transparency and timely updates will allow the regulator to stay up to date on any relevant changes in real time.
The duty to notify in the clause is an ongoing duty on regulated clubs. By contrast, the annual declaration mandatory licence condition applies to licensed clubs only. The annual declaration is about creating an annual touchpoint for clubs as part of the licensing regime, rather than requiring an annual licence renewal. It will allow clubs to declare a summary of any matters that they notified, or should have notified, over the past year.
I will not rehash the Minister’s description of the clause, but it raises a number of questions about the interpretation of the clause and the requirements on clubs. What guidance will be provided to clubs to determine what constitutes a “relevant” change in circumstances, because that is very open to interpretation? What might such a change look like? We are not trying to micromanage, but we think clubs might find it helpful to understand, even if it is via a list of frequently asked questions from the regulator, what constitutes a change of circumstances so that they do not accidently fall foul of well-intentioned drafting.
Could the duty to notify a change in circumstances be accidentally disproportionate to lower league clubs? We have discussed at length that those clubs generally do not have the same administrative resources as the big clubs. Will the regulator look to have a more flexible approach to clubs lower down the pyramid that may not have the ability to notify as quickly as those at the top?
We expect the regulator to look at this on a case-by-case basis. As we have said throughout, we very much intend for the regulator to be proportionate depending on where a club sits in the pyramid.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 51
Duty to keep fans informed of insolvency proceedings
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The clause places a duty on all regulated clubs in relevant insolvency proceedings to keep fans informed of the progress of the proceedings. Any fan that has experienced their club going into administration can attest that it is a worrying and often confusing time. Although the regime will look to best protect clubs, it cannot be zero-failure. However, the clause is intended to make the process more transparent for fans when the worst happens. The duty will apply only as far as is reasonable and will not fall on the administrators or any body not regulated by the football regulator. The clause was added to the Bill in order to mitigate unnecessary worry and confusion for fans.
I have a few questions. How will the regulator assess whether a club has sufficiently fulfilled its duty to keep fans informed? Could the requirement to disclose information during insolvency proceedings create additional reputational or financial risks for clubs? How will the clause be applied consistently while respecting confidential obligations to creditors? We have spoken a lot about insider information. If the Minister does not have the answers today, it would be helpful to get them in writing in order to understand how some of these complex legal matters might work.
I am happy to write to the shadow Minister. I appreciate that we added this clause; it was not in the previous iteration of the Bill. That is why I was keen to talk about reasonability. We appreciate that insolvency is a complex, fast-paced, changing and challenging situation, but we also appreciate—Members have talked about different clubs that have gone into administration—the worry for fans, so we want to keep them as informed as reasonably possible. The shadow Minister asked me for something further in writing and I am very happy to provide that.
Again, I am concerned about the clash of duties. The Minister has already told us that her team and the insolvency team have met and considered this issue. In a period of liquidation, not putting additional debt into a company, or indeed spending cash, is one of the directors’ responsibilities, but this will undoubtedly cost the club. Has the Minister sought and received reassurances that this approach is consistent with the Insolvency Act?
Perhaps I will add the answer to that question to my letter to the shadow Minister, and I will copy it to the hon. Member for Spelthorne. The clause is clear that the duty will apply only as far as possible, because we do not want to add a burden at an already difficult time. As this is quite a complex but important point, I am happy to write to both hon. Gentlemen.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 51 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 52
Duty to publish a personnel statement
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The clause requires licensed clubs to prepare a personnel statement and submit it to the regulator for approval. Alongside the statement, clubs must provide an explanation as to why they consider it to be accurate. The owners and officers who control and run football clubs are vital to their sustainability. Therefore, the regulator needs to know who is running the show behind the scenes in order to implement its regime effectively.
A personnel statement must outline each of the club’s owners and its ultimate owner, as we have discussed; its officers, with a job description for each; and its senior managers and their roles. Once the statement has been submitted, the regulator will review it and decide either to approve it or to modify it. Any modification to the statement must be made in consultation with the relevant club to ensure that the statement is accurate. Once the statement is approved by the regulator, the club must publish it online, increasing transparency and accountability in football. Subsequent statements must be submitted to the regulator if an old statement becomes out of date—for example, after the departure or hiring of an officer.
Let me also highlight the role of the Secretary of State’s guidance in providing clarity to owners about who meets the definition of someone who exercises significant influence or control. We committed in the other House to producing the Secretary of State’s guidance before clubs are required to identify owners who meet that definition to the regulator. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 52 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 53
Duty to pay a levy
I beg to move amendment 133, in clause 53, page 42, line 3, at end insert—
“(1A) But the IFR may not require a club with fewer than 10 full time equivalent employees to pay the IFR a levy in respect of a chargeable period during which the club is a licensed club.”
This amendment would exempt clubs with fewer than 10 full time equivalent employees from having to pay the levy.
It is a privilege to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler. New clause 24, tabled in my name, seeks to introduce a fair and transparent exemption procedure for football clubs in administration. When a football club enters administration, it is not merely a financial event; it is often a crisis that rocks the entire community, as we saw in Bury. Supporters, many of whom have been lifelong followers, are left facing uncertainty and fear for the future of their club, which is often the heartbeat of their town or city.
New clause 24 seeks to strike a vital balance by maintaining the integrity of the levy while allowing compassionate and evidence-based interventions when a club is on its knees. It would ensure that exemptions are not handed out indiscriminately, and that the regulator must assess each case on its merits and satisfy itself that the club’s financial difficulties are not a calculated move to evade its levy responsibilities. Most importantly, the new clause would give clubs a chance.
I thank the shadow Minister for his amendment, and I thank the hon. Members for Cheltenham and for Newbury for their new clauses. I acknowledge the intent behind them.
We will shortly discuss the levy in more detail when I speak to clauses 53 and 54, but in short, the Bill gives the regulator the power to collect a levy to recover its running costs from football clubs that hold an operating licence. I will outline why the Government intend to resist this amendment and these new clauses before directly answering some of the specific points that hon. Members have put to me.
The levy arrangement follows the precedent of other regulators, such as the Financial Conduct Authority, the Competition and Markets Authority and Ofcom. As the regulator is designed to improve the financial sustainability of English football, it is vital that the associated costs do not burden clubs, especially those further down the pyramid.
Amendment 133 and new clause 5 seek to address similar issues relating to ensuring that small or lower-league clubs are not burdened by unaffordable costs as a result of this regulation. I assure the Committee that the Bill is already designed with National League clubs in mind. The regulator will be tasked with improving the financial sustainability of football, and placing an undue burden on small clubs would be completely contradictory to that aim.
Clause 53(10) introduces a statutory requirement for the regulator to have regard to each club’s individual financial circumstances, and the league in which it plays, when setting the levy. Given that requirement, we expect that the levy will be proportionate, with the Premier League—specifically the six clubs with the highest revenues—covering the majority of the cost. That solidarity will reduce the burden on clubs lower down the pyramid. No club should be charged more than it can afford.
Through its levy rules, the regulator will also have the power to exempt clubs from paying the levy. That power, provided by clause 53(8), ensures that there is a mechanism to avoid burdening clubs. If certain conditions set by the regulator through rules are met, the regulator has the discretion to exempt clubs from paying the levy—that answers the shadow Minister’s question. The power will work in conjunction with the requirement on the regulator to consider each individual club’s financial resources, and the competition in which it plays, when setting the levy, as well as the requirement to consult all regulated clubs on its levy rules.
On new clause 24, I agree wholeheartedly that the regulator should not place an undue burden on a club that has already entered administration. I reassure the hon. Member for Newbury that the regulator will set out its levy methodology, including the discretion to set the levy according to a club’s individual circumstances, and to exempt a club completely if specified conditions are met.
The regulator has a core objective of improving the financial sustainability of English football, and I am confident that it will be cognisant of the impact that the levy could have on any club, and especially a club in administration or other financial distress. The Bill’s provisions, such as the regulator’s discretion to exempt certain clubs from the levy, if necessary, account for that core objective.
In response to the shadow Minister, I note that there is no cap, but the regulator can set costs related only to its functions. As I have just outlined, under the powers granted to the regulator by the Bill, it could exempt small clubs from the levy, if that is deemed necessary. However, we do not think that mandating a complete exemption in legislation is appropriate. Exempting a whole league before an assessment has been made of whether clubs in that league can afford the levy would be disproportionate.
I want to clarify whether the Minister is entirely comfortable that the Government are in no way able to control the amount of money spent by the regulator. If, in fulfilling its duties, the regulator decided it was important to fly business class to meet UEFA and FIFA once a month—if I were the regulator, I could probably make the case that I was fulfilling my duties by doing that—it would create a huge cost and involve hiring additional staff. Are the Government really prepared to give the regulator a blank cheque?
There is no cap. However, I draw the hon. Gentleman’s attention to the regulatory principles we addressed earlier in the Bill. Obviously, the regulator needs to be proportionate and reasonable. The regulator will guide its operations according to those principles.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for taking the words out of my mouth, because I was going to conclude by drawing the Committee’s attention to a letter placed in the Libraries of both Houses when the Bill was in the other place. The letter, dated 6 March, was sent by Baroness Twycross, who took the Bill through the Lords. I will not detain the Committee by reading out the letter—Members can look at it—but it breaks down the proportions. Obviously, costs are based on the impact assessment and are indicative, so they are not meant to be prescriptive; it is meant to be an indicator. The letter may be helpful if the Committee would like more detail.
I have listened carefully to the Minister’s arguments, and she has made some helpful clarifications. However, due to the lack of a cap, as my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne said, it is difficult to rely on the letter for what club certainty might look like in the future. We have discussed at length how well-intentioned plans can easily spiral, which is why we believe amendment 133 is important in helping to safeguard the clubs with the smallest means and those lowest down the pyramid.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Decisions on the new clauses will be made at the end of the Committee’s considerations.
I beg to move amendment 18, in clause 53, page 42, line 8, leave out “leviable functions” and insert “functions under this Act”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 22.
These amendments will make all regulatory functions under the Bill fundable through the levy. As drafted, the Bill sets out the specific functions that will be funded through the levy, making a distinction between the funding of leviable and non-leviable functions—I will discuss those concepts in greater detail shortly. Currently, the former would be funded via the levy and the latter via rules set by the regulator.
These amendments would make the funding mechanism simpler and more reliable by clarifying and ensuring that the regulator will be able to recover litigation costs related to non-leviable functions. If the regulator were unable to recover those costs, there is a risk that it would either be unable to use some of its powers or have to seek Government financial assistance to fund them. That is why we propose these changes.
I listened very carefully to the Minister’s explanation of these amendments, which have been introduced at a fairly late stage. I hope she can provide some clarity on a number of questions.
First, was it always the Government’s intention to have these separate streams of funding, as she has described, or is this a way of expanding the IFR’s powers to charge the levy? I am unclear about why the change has happened now, because we have obviously been through a lot of consultation and the Bill has been in the other place for some time. It is not necessarily clear why these changes have come about at this stage, so I would appreciate an answer.
Lastly, when the Minister described the charges as non-leviable, the natural question was, “Who picks up the bill?” Are we talking about taxpayers, and if we are, what are those costs? Exposure to risk would obviously be a major concern for taxpayers and, I suspect, a number of Government Departments following the spending review. I appreciate her comments about how the Government believe that the functions may not be used or required, but there needs to be an answer about the risk of those non-leviable payments and what that might look like in the future.
I am grateful to the shadow Minister. First, it is certainly not about expanding, and we have been very clear that we do not want scope creep. He asks “Why now?” We have always maintained that we want the best legislation and the best outcome. We very much listened to the debate in the other place. We reflected on that, and we believe that this is just a simpler, less complex way of going about it.
On his last question, I can very much assure him that it is quite the opposite. By making these changes, the costs will not have an impact on taxpayers. We are clear about that.
I am still unclear on that point, but I am happy to have the answer in writing. Who will pick up the bill when the levy cannot be charged to clubs, and what will that bill look like? I am not at all clear about how that will play out in practice. I am not sure whether I am misunderstanding the Minister, and I am happy to have it in writing, but I am not clear what it means.
I say gently that I think the shadow Minister is misunderstanding, and I am happy to write to him. The amendment means that all functions can now be covered by the levy, whereas previously there were two funding mechanisms in the Bill. It is a technical change.
I agree with the Minister—my understanding of what she just said is the same—but that leaves a tiny bit of clarity still to be given. Will all the normal running costs of the regulator be met by the levy, and none by the taxpayer?
Yes, that is the intention.
Amendment 18 agreed to.
Amendments made: 19, in clause 53, page 42, line 13, leave out “leviable functions” and insert “functions under this Act”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 22.
Amendment 20, in clause 53, page 42, line 14, leave out “leviable functions” and insert “functions under this Act”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 22.
Amendment 21, in clause 53, page 42, line 19, leave out “leviable”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 22.
Amendment 22, in clause 53, page 42, line 26, leave out subsection (4).—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment removes the definition of “leviable functions” so that the IFR may charge a levy for all of its functions under the Act.
I beg to move amendment 105, in clause 53, page 42, line 42, at end insert—
“(6A) Once the IFR has established a levy under subsection (1) and made the required payments under section 96, the IFR must only fund its functions under this Act through its own revenue streams.
(6B) For the purposes of subsection (6A) the IFR’s ‘own revenue streams’ are any amounts payable to the IFR from regulated clubs under subsection (1).”
This amendment requires the IFR to be self-funding through the industry levy, but after it has paid its initial costs and the Secretary of State’s establishment costs to the Treasury.
The amendment would require the Government’s new regulator to be self-funding through the industry levy, but after it has paid its initial costs and the Secretary of State’s establishment costs to the Treasury, so that it is entirely self-sustaining. That is not unreasonable; taxpayers are already being squeezed by this Government, so it would be ludicrous to suggest that they should foot the bill for the Labour Government’s regulator. That is why I tabled the amendment, which seeks to place a clear financial obligation on the regulator to ensure that, after covering its start-up and establishment costs, it becomes entirely self-funding through the industry levy.
The principle behind the amendment is simple: if we are to create an independent regulator for football, its independence must extend beyond structure to include financial independence from the taxpayer. The clause gives the Secretary of State discretion to determine the mechanics of the levy, but it leaves unanswered an essential question: who ultimately pays—we have had a bit of discussion about that—and for how long? The amendment provides a clear and reasonable answer: the taxpayer may support the regulator’s launch, as might be expected, but once that is done, the regulator should stand on its own two feet.
Let us not forget the purpose of the Bill: the regulator is intended to be arm’s length, neutral and shielded from political interference. However, the Government have gone to great lengths to compromise that independence through their appointment, as we have discussed, and the principle would be fully compromised if the regulator remained financially reliant on the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, or the Treasury for that matter. Independence is not just about who makes the appointments, but about who signs the cheques.
If the regulator is to carry out its duties credibly—overseeing financial discipline, enforcing ownership standards and planning across the football pyramid for the long term—it must operate free from any perception of ministerial influence. That means being self-funding. The idea that the British taxpayer should continue to fund the ongoing operations of this new body is simply not justifiable, particularly at a time when families are feeling the squeeze and public services are under pressure. If clubs need a regulator—and the Government have decided that they do—then clubs, not pensioners in Bexley or shop workers in Barnsley, should pay for that regulator.
The amendment would also introduce discipline into the regulatory model. It would ensure that the Government’s regulator lives within its means, plans sustainably and operates efficiently, just as it will expect clubs to. We must avoid the slow drift we have seen with other public bodies, where what begins as temporary state support gradually hardens into permanent public subsidy with no sunset clause or accountability.
By requiring the regulator to repay its start-up costs and then operate independently, we would make a clear distinction between initial public investment and long-term industry responsibility. It is not unreasonable to ask that football, having accepted the need for regulatory oversight, for which many have lobbied, now contributes to that oversight on a permanent and self-sustaining basis.
That gives rise to a number of questions for the Minister. Is there a timeline for when the regulator is expected to be self-funding, or will it continue to draw on the public purse for a number of years? What provision, if any, has been made to recover the taxpayers’ outlay once the regulator begins to collect levy income? I would be grateful, as would taxpayers across the country, for reassurances from the Minister that those issues are being addressed, and that the taxpayer will not be left to subsidise the industry without a clear exit plan.
My amendment would protect the principle of independence. It would safeguard the public purse and ensure that those who arguably benefit from oversight are the ones who pay for it. Football is told that it will get a strong, credible and financially sound regulator, but taxpayers deserve clarity, discipline and fairness in how that regulator is funded. I therefore urge the Committee to support the amendment and make the regulator accountable to the industry it oversees, not dependent on the Government that created it. Let us build something that is self-sustaining, responsible, and fit for the future.
During our debate on the technical changes proposed by the Government, we discussed the removal of the non-leviable functions. That means that everything will be levy-funded, so there will be no cost to the taxpayer. We absolutely agree with the hon. Gentleman’s points about the regulator being self-sustaining and self-funding. The Government also agree that the regulator should not be able to borrow money at its own discretion, which is why it is already prevented from doing so in paragraph 37(2) of schedule 2, which sets out that the regulator cannot borrow money unless explicitly permitted to as part of the financial assistance from the Secretary of State. We expect that that would occur only if absolutely necessary and in extreme circumstances, and would be provided only subject to conditions set by the Secretary of State.
There is no need for the restriction to be duplicated. We absolutely agree that the regulator should be fully funded through the levy, and that is exactly what the levy is designed to do. I will come on to that in more detail when we discuss the levy under clause 53 stand part. The Bill ensures that the regulator’s source of funding for all regulatory functions is the levy. Any financial penalties it imposes through enforcement action can also be used to offset any litigation costs and reduce the burden on compliant clubs.
I appreciate that the Minister said that she will come on to that subject in a later debate, but can she be clear about start-up costs and their recovery for taxpayers? How is it envisaged that those costs will be repaid? I appreciate the point she makes about levy contributions, but how will the start-up costs that have been incurred now, along with the cost of the shadow football regulator, be recovered, if at all?
I would like to address that later, if possible. I have heard the question, and will make sure the hon. Gentleman gets an answer. For the reasons I have set out, I hope he will withdraw his amendment.
I beg to move amendment 6, in clause 53, page 43, line 35, after “club” insert
“and in particular that the starting point for calculation of the levy payment applicable to a particular club should be a percentage of annual revenue”.
This amendment would require the IFR to have regard to a football club’s percentage of annual revenue when calculating a levy payment.
I encourage the Minister to say whether she thinks that the levy payment should relate to the income of clubs. Some clubs are clearly mega-rich—multi-million pound businesses, every year—but other clubs’ income is down in the few thousands of pounds. My amendment is probing, really, but will the Minister confirm whether clubs’ income is the basic building block on which the levy will be formulated?
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East for tabling his amendment. The Government completely understand the importance of any charges on clubs being transparent and proportionate and offering value for money. That must be achieved while maintaining the regulator’s operational independence and flexibility to respond to industry developments in the future. I will come on to discuss the levy in detail, but I will set out the key points now for clarity, in relation both to this amendment and to how the Bill ensures the levy is affordable for clubs.
The regulator must set out in levy rules how the annual levy payments will be calculated. The Bill explicitly requires the regulator to have regard to the club’s financial resources and position in the pyramid. That would include revenue. It should ensure a proportionate approach where no club, big or small, is asked to pay more than what is fair and affordable. Premier League clubs are expected to shoulder the majority of costs, reducing the financial burden on smaller clubs.
It would not be appropriate to prescribe an exact methodology for charging the levy in legislation, as doing so would remove the regulator’s ability to explore other possibly more effective and proportionate methods of charging. That would be counter to the agile and independent regulator we want to create. For example, a club might have a relatively low organic revenue, but its owners might have very deep pockets. The regulator might want to take that into account to ensure that charges are fair, proportionate and relative to circumstances.
I also want to highlight that there is a statutory requirement for the regulator to consult industry on the levy. Every regulated club will be consulted. That transparency means that no club will be surprised by the changes asked of them. That will be sufficient to ensure the levy is fair and proportionate. For the reasons I have set out, I am unable to accept the amendment.
Before I speak on clause 53, I draw the Committee’s attention to a procedural matter. In preparing for the debate, officials identified some inconsistencies in the impact assessment published on the Bill’s parliamentary web page and gov.uk. It appears that as figures were updated during the development of the impact assessment, they were not reflected in the summary of costs on one page at the beginning of the paper, which was related to the compliance cost and operational cost. The figures are correct in the main body of the impact assessment, and the total cost that those figures added up to is still correct. The inconsistencies also featured in the version submitted by the previous Government. For full accuracy and transparency, we have now corrected it, and the impact assessment on gov.uk was updated last night. We have notified the Public Bill Office to ensure the parliamentary website is updated as soon as possible, and there will be an updated version in the Library shortly.
Having provided that clarification, I will now discuss clause 53, which enables the regulator to charge a levy to licensed clubs that covers the regulator’s running cost. That follows the precedent of other regulators such as the Financial Conduct Authority, the Competition and Markets Authority and Ofcom. The levy methodology is an operational assessment that the regulator is best placed to make independently. By making football clubs more sustainable in the long term, the regulator will be providing a service to the industry. It is only fair that as a wealthy industry, football, as opposed to the taxpayer, should cover the cost of regulation, as has been well discussed by the Committee this afternoon.
The cost of regulation would represent just a tiny fraction of football’s more than £6 billion annual revenue. The industry will also benefit from regulation, which will deliver a more stable pyramid of sustainable and resilient clubs, and so help protect the commercial value of English football. The legislation puts robust checks and balances on the regulator. It will be limited to raising funds to meet a set of tightly defined costs that are necessary for regulatory activity only. It is clear in the clause what the levy covers and how the money will be used, ensuring the regulator’s transparency. As I alluded to in the discussion on Government amendments 18 to 26, all costs can now be funded through the levy.
However, the regulator will not have a blank cheque. It will be subject to numerous safeguards including annual auditing by the National Audit Office, and its annual accounts will be laid before Parliament. That and other safeguards, such as the Department for Culture, Media and Sport’s responsibility as a sponsor, will provide the necessary transparency and scrutiny to deliver value for money.
In addition, as I set out when we discussed the previous group of amendments, the clause also requires the regulator to have regard to a club’s individual financial position when setting the levy charge. Specifically, that covers the financial resources of a club and the league in which it plays. That should ensure a proportionate approach where no club, big or small, is asked to pay more than what is fair and affordable. That will be aided by the requirement for the regulator to consult all licensed clubs, which I will speak to in more detail in the debate on the next group of amendments. In addition, once operational, the regulator will have a legal requirement to set out its levy charges annually and consult all regulated clubs on its methodology.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 53, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 54
Section 53: consultation and publication
I thank the shadow Minister for tabling his amendments. Amendment 102 would require the regulator to consult every regulated club, the Secretary of State, the Treasury and others that the regulator considers appropriate, for minor changes to the levy rules. Clause 54 imposes a statutory duty on the regulator to consult the Secretary of State, His Majesty’s Treasury and regulated clubs, as well as other appropriate stakeholders, on its levy rules. However, clause 54(2) sets out that consultation is not needed for minor changes to the levy rules. This is intended to allow the regulator to make immaterial amendments or corrections such as typos or minor rewording without excessive bureaucratic burden.
The amendment would add a layer of unnecessary process that is unjustified given the extensive consultation requirements on substantial changes. It is not in anyone’s interest, especially the regulator’s, to stretch the definition of minor, which is a well-recognised legal term. If the regulator does not consult on a change that has made a material impact on a club, it could face a legal challenge through a judicial review. That will ensure that the regulator is accountable for what it considers minor.
I do not know whether the Minister has ever conducted a judicial review, but we could not get one done for £9,000.
I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s point, but refer gently to my earlier comments. We are talking about typos and very minor changes. I give that example to show that the regulator is accountable for what it considers minor.
On amendment 103, requiring the regulator to publish the information on costs laid out in clause 54(4) six months before the chargeable period would create an operational challenge and would simply not work in practice. The regulator would have to estimate its costs for a chargeable period, having only half a year’s costs to base it on. That could lead to inaccurate levy charges, which could see the regulator underfunded or clubs needlessly burdened. The current requirement to publicise charges as soon as reasonably practicable strikes the right balance between adequate notice for clubs and operational flexibility for the regulator to ensure an accurate and appropriate levy charge.
For the reasons I have set out, I cannot accept the amendments.
I listened carefully to the Minister’s response, which was fairly limited. I do not have enough confidence in her replies to withdraw the amendments. We are concerned about the impact on clubs and about the loophole in the interpretation of minor changes. I am not clear on the regulator’s accountability to stop scope creep. I suggested a number of options that the Government might look to adopt instead and did not hear any response to them. On that basis, and linked to some of the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne, I wish to press the amendments to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Clause 54 imposes a statutory duty on the regulator to consult the Secretary of State, His Majesty’s Treasury and regulated clubs, as well as other appropriate stakeholders, on its levy rules. This requirement to consult on draft levy rules will ensure that the views of clubs are considered as the regulator determines its charging methodology.
The statutory requirement in the clause to consult the Secretary of State and the Treasury will provide further scrutiny and assurance that the regulator’s proposed methodology is fair and proportionate. Allowing the regulator to propose its own charging structure within the strict safeguards outlined in clause 53, and with consultation requirements, enhances its independence and allows for greater scrutiny and accountability of the regulator.
The regulator can be held directly accountable for its charging decisions and the outcomes they produce. The levy is of course an operational matter that should be determined independently by the regulator, in consultation with those it will affect. The regulator will have the necessary information to design a levy based on a robust financial assessment of clubs to ensure that charges are fair and evidence-based. Giving the regulator the discretion to set charges reinforces operational independence and mirrors the approach of other regulators, such as Ofcom and the Financial Conduct Authority.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 54, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 55
Duties to notify and consult the IFR
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
To achieve its objectives, which include a club financial soundness objective, a systemic financial resilience objective and a heritage objective, the regulator will need information from the relevant competition organisers. The clause places a duty on the competition organisers to provide that information, and in the event that they do not, they would be liable to be sanctioned.
A competition organiser must notify the regulator if there is a risk that the regulator may not fulfil its objectives. That is with regard to the club financial soundness objective or the regulator’s systemic resilience objective. In addition, the organiser will need to notify the regulator if it is in breach of a commitment it made as an alternative to a financial discretionary licence condition, or if a club has breached the rules of a specific competition run by the organiser.
The organiser will also have to consult the regulator if it proposes to change its own rules. That is necessary given the interaction between the regulator’s regulation and that of a specified competition organiser. The regulator wants its own regulation to be necessary and proportionate and not to overburden the clubs. It is therefore important to understand any changes in other rules that clubs need to abide by, given that they may increase or decrease the financial risk of clubs.
In all cases, the relevant information will act as an additional source of data to inform the regulator of risks within the industry and whether the regulator needs to impose additional regulation or proceed to enforcement and sanction to ensure the long-term financial sustainability of the industry. I commend the clause to the Committee.
The clause sets out a series of duties that require various football stakeholders, including leagues and governing bodies, to notify and consult the Government’s new regulator in certain circumstances. At its core, the clause is intended to improve co-ordination and to prevent regulatory surprises, which in principle is reasonable. We all agree that where the governance of the game affects financial sustainability or club integrity, the Government’s regulator should be aware and engaged.
I will focus on subsection (6), which is a far more consequential provision than it might first appear. I believe it strikes at the very heart of one of the most sensitive and important issues in football governance: the independence of sport from Government control. Subsection (6) imposes a statutory duty on specified competition organisers to consult the regulator when they either add or remove a relevant rule of a specified competition, or vary a relevant rule of a specified competition. I note the comments of the hon. Member for Sheffield South East about when the regulator is involved in a competition and when it is not, with regard to the FA Cup. Some clarity on that would be much appreciated.
In short, the provision means that competitions such as the Premier League, the EFL and the FA Cup would be required—based on the wording of this part of the Bill—to consult the Government’s football regulator every time they change or amend a rule deemed to be relevant by the regulator itself. That might sound innocuous, but let us be clear about what it means in practice: for the first time, a politically appointed regulator, accountable to the Secretary of State, who has received donations from that regulator, would be given a formal, statutory role in the internal rule-making processes of English football competitions.
This is not a light-touch oversight mechanism; we fear it might end up being a direct institutional influence. As we know, it is not compatible with UEFA’s requirements on the non-interference of Government. UEFA statutes are clear that national football associations and their affiliated leagues and competitions must be free from political or Government control. The relevant rule is article 7bis (2) of the UEFA statutes, which states:
“Member Associations shall manage their affairs independently and with no undue influence from third parties.”
Article 9 goes on to state:
“A Member Association may in particular be suspended if state authorities interfere in its affairs in such a significant way that...it may no longer be considered as fully responsible for the organisation of football-related matters in its territory”.
It is pretty clear that the FA will no longer be considered fully responsible for the organisation of football-related matters in its territory should the Bill pass with this provision. Moreover, FIFA echoes that approach in its regulations, particularly in article 14 of the FIFA statutes, which ensures that member associations, such as the FA, remain autonomous and free from governmental or political influence. Article 15 of the FIFA statutes further requires members to be neutral in matters of politics and religion, to be independent, and to avoid any forms of political interference.
Subsection (6) brings us dangerously close to the line, if not across it. Unfortunately for the Minister, the Government seem to be on the wrong side of that line. I will press the Minister on that point, because however carefully the clause may have been worded in terms of consultation, in reality it inserts the Government’s new regulator into the core rule-making processes of the football pyramid. Once that principle is established, the scope can grow.
We know that there are international concerns about scope creep, as I mentioned when speaking to amendment 97.
“UEFA is concerned about the potential for scope creep within the IFR. While the initial intent of the IFR is to oversee the long-term financial sustainability of clubs and heritage assets, there is always a risk that, once established, the IFR may expand its mandate beyond these areas”.
Those are not my words.
Will the Minister confirm whether UEFA has been consulted on the drafting of the clause, and whether the Government have received written assurances that this level of regulatory involvement is compatible with UEFA’s independence rules? If she has, will she place a copy in the Library? If she has received any correspondence to the contrary, will she also place that in the Library so that the Committee has confidence ahead of Third Reading and can scrutinise the provision properly? What safeguards are in place to prevent this from being interpreted—either in Brussels or somewhere else—as a breach of sporting autonomy?
This is not theoretical—it is a real and dangerous risk for English football. Let us remember, in recent years, that other countries have faced disciplinary threats or warnings for perceived interference in football. We have seen federations sanctioned before. National teams and clubs have been threatened with exclusion from competitions. For example, Greece was briefly suspended from international football in 2006 after the Greek Government passed a law that interfered—that was the term used—with the autonomy of the Greek football federation, in violation of UEFA and FIFA regulations. In 1999, Moldova’s clubs and national team faced a ban from UEFA competitions, after it was deemed that there was political interference in the running of its football federation. In 2002, FIFA suspended Zimbabwe and Kenya from international competitions due to perceived Government interference in the football administrations of those countries.
I thank the shadow Minister for his points. Clubs will be subject to a number of rules from different football authorities. Failure to comply with them may indicate that the club is in some financial difficulty and may prompt the regulator to assess the risk profile of the club. Changes in a competition’s rules may lead to clubs taking additional risks or may threaten the financial soundness of the system. The regulator therefore needs to be aware of such changes so that it is in a position to reassess the long-term financial sustainability of clubs and whether, as a result of the rule change, additional regulation is needed.
The shadow Minister did accept that there is no veto in the clause. I reiterate once again that UEFA are happy with the Bill as drafted. He drew the Committee’s attention to a specific line in the Bill, but I remind him that it has not been changed from the previous iteration of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 55 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 56
Part 6: overview and interpretation
I beg to move amendment 76, in clause 56, page 45, line 39, after “organisers” insert
“or by a regulated club”.
Clubs in the English football pyramid currently barter as a collective for funding from broadcasters, but it is not hard to imagine a future in which Liverpool, Manchester City, Arsenal, Chelsea—the hon. Member for Spelthorne has now gone so I can say that—or other big clubs decide that they are going to barter alone. That has happened in other European countries. In fact, Spain had to legislate to stop Barcelona and Real Madrid cashing in on their massive marketable machine that massively distorted the Spanish game.
These amendments are fairly simple. They build in a future failsafe to stop the threat of that happening. If it does happen, the revenue gained by those clubs will be taken into account in the redistribution of funds in the game. It seems like a logical failsafe to introduce to the Bill, which we hope will be accepted.
I thank the hon. Member for his amendments. We understand the intent behind them but believe that the drafting of the Bill sufficiently captures the current primary sources of revenue in the game. We will discuss clause 56 more fully during the clause stand part debate, but to summarise briefly, among other things, it defines which revenue streams are in scope of the backstop process. Revenue in scope is called “relevant revenue” and is limited in the Bill to revenue received by a league for broadcast rights to league matches.
Broadcast revenue is undisputedly the main source of revenue in English football, but we acknowledge that that may not always be the case. Football’s financial landscape is dynamic and its economic model may not remain static. That is why the Bill already allows for the definition of “relevant revenue” to be amended if necessary. The Secretary of State can amend the definition by making regulations, but only after consultation with the leagues, the regulator and the FA. That flexibility future-proofs the definition of “relevant revenue” against potential changes in the structure of the industry while ensuring that the definition remains firmly rooted in the current reality.
We expect that, throughout the distributions process, the leagues will effectively represent the interests of their constituent clubs. However, the backstop process, including the final proposal stage, is ultimately about resolving distributions between the leagues. It is about how money earned by the leagues flows from one league to another, not between individual clubs. It is therefore right that, given how finances currently flow, it is revenue received by the leagues as a whole, not individual clubs, that should be considered. I am therefore unable to accept the amendments.
We recognise the numbers—although we Liberal Democrats now outnumber the official Opposition—so we will not press this to a vote. However, it is worth considering that, in future, we might end up in a situation where some of our bigger clubs start to try to negotiate on their own for their broadcast revenue. The Minister did not reassure me that that could not happen. As I understand it, we do not have legislation that would stop that. There is nothing in the game to stop that apart from Arsenal, Manchester United, Chelsea and Manchester City deciding to play together nicely.
Although we are not reassured, there is no point in forcing this to a vote. But we hope that the comments may be taken forward and taken into account by the regulator in future, and perhaps we will have this discussion again as and when those big clubs decide that they are going to kick up a stink and try to ruin the rest of football for everyone else. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I recognise the hon. Gentleman’s experience with Derby, and I understand his point. That is why I said there are a number of opinions, and this a very controversial subject. I have engaged with EFL clubs as part of this process, and we get a variety of opinions, even before we get to asking the Premier League clubs for their opinion, so I absolutely understand his point. This amendment is about trying to exclude parachute payments from this part of the Bill, rather than trying to take a decision on what parachute payment levels should be in any shape or form. That is the distinction we seek to make with the amendment, and I commend it to the Committee.
I thank the shadow Minister for the amendment, as it gives me the opportunity to speak to one of the key changes made in the new version of the Bill that this Government introduced. The amendment would take parachute payments out of the scope of the backstop, as they were in the previous Government’s Bill. The regulator needs to be able to consider all relevant revenue sources as part of the backstop process to get an accurate picture of any proposal’s impact on financial sustainability. That is why it was right to amend the definition of “relevant revenue” to ensure parachute payments could be considered as part of the backstop if necessary.
The shadow Minister pointed out that I supported the Bill when in Opposition, but I draw his attention to an amendment I put down then to this effect. We have had a clear and consistent view on this issue throughout the passage of both Bills through Parliament. We believe that allowing the regulator to make more informed decisions, rather than restricting what it can consider, will help to achieve the best possible outcome for the future of the game.
I beg to move amendment 27, in clause 56, page 46, line 27, leave out
“means an order under section 62(1) or (3)”
and insert
“has the meaning given by section (Distribution orders)(6)”.
This amendment is consequential on the insertion of NC4.
The amendment is consequential on Government new clause 4, which we will debate later. Although it depends on that later change, the amendment would change clause 56, which is why we are discussing it now. We will also discuss clause 56 in more detail later, but one of the things it does is set out key definitions of key terms used throughout the backstop provisions. One of those defined terms is “distribution order”, which is the order made by the regulator at the end of the backstop process. It is designed to resolve the questions for resolution if the leagues have not managed to do so during mediation. Currently, the Bill’s definition of “distribution order” refers to clause 62, but we propose to remove clause 62 and replace it with new clause 4. New clause 4 completely changes the final stage of the backstop process. I met the shadow Minister and the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Cheltenham, to discuss this ahead of the Bill Committee. It moves the backstop away from a binary, winner-takes-all model, and allows the regulator discretion to design a solution to distribution issues.
We will have a chance to debate that fully when we debate clause 62, so I will withhold some of my comments until we get to that point. This simple amendment just updates the definition of “distribution order”, so that it appropriately refers to new clause 4 instead of clause 62. It is vital that we make these sorts of consequential changes, to ensure that the legislation remains coherent. Therefore I hope that Members will support this amendment.
As the Minister said, we will come on to debate these issues later, but again, I just want to place it on the record that she has been really listening to concerns that have been raised about the pendulum nature of the previous backstop. This is a much better process, which we will come on to discuss in more detail. Thanks to the Minister, we will discuss it further, but it is a much better framework that we will now be putting in place for the regulator to decide on any disputes or failures to agree between the leagues.
Amendment 27 agreed to.
I beg to move amendment 28, in clause 56, page 46, line 42, leave out subsection (7).
This amendment removes the definition of “the question or questions for resolution” which is now superfluous.
I begin by acknowledging the comments from my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East. I appreciate him putting that on the record. Of course, we will have a fuller debate on the broader change later, so as I said, I will reserve my wider comments till we get to that point.
The backstop aims to ensure that where the industry cannot resolve the issue, revenue is distributed between the leagues in a sustainable way that furthers the regulator’s objectives. As I will set out in more detail when we debate clauses 57 and 58, it allows the leagues to apply to the regulator to intervene and help them to resolve specific issues that are in dispute between them. The issues that need resolving are referred to in the Bill as the “questions for resolution”. We will further discuss the process for triggering the backstop when we come on to debate clauses 57 to 59.
Put briefly, the triggering process requires a league applying to the regulator, showing that certain conditions listed in clause 57 are met, and putting forward a set of proposed “questions for resolution”. The other relevant league has a chance to respond to that proposal. The regulator will then consider the application and the response, and will decide whether to trigger the process. If it decides to trigger, it also decides exactly which questions must be taken forward and resolved through the backstop process. Therefore, the questions for resolution are set out at the very beginning and carry through, determining the scope of the whole process. They are the questions that the leagues discuss in mediation, as we will see when we debate clause 60, and they limit the scope of any regulator distribution order—something that we will discuss further when we come on to debate Government new clauses 3 and 4—to issues of financial sustainability.
Setting the questions for resolution is therefore a very important step that demands a clear statutory process and a rigorous approach by the regulator. That is even more important in the light of the proposed changes that Government new clauses 3 and 4 will make. Those new clauses propose a new model for the backstop—a staged regulator determination. They move away from the binary, winner-takes-all, final-offer model and increase the regulator’s discretion to devise its own solution for distributions. Because of that increase in discretion for the regulator, it is important that the scope of the distributions process is well defined from the outset, so that all parties are clear about what the regulator will and will not rule on if the leagues ultimately cannot agree to an industry solution themselves.
These amendments therefore strengthen and clarify the process for—[Interruption.]
I have indeed—clearly.
These amendments therefore strengthen and clarify the process for setting the questions for resolution. They highlight the importance of a league proposing specific questions for resolution when it applies to the regulator. They emphasise that if the regulator agrees to trigger the backstop, it will not take a sweeping approach and try to rule on every possible aspect of distributions. It must set out specific questions that it will resolve, and its powers are then restricted to resolving those questions.
These amendments make it clear that questions must meet certain tests in order to be resolved through the backstop. Those tests are twofold. First, the regulator must consider that leaving the questions unresolved presents an apparent threat to the regulator’s objectives. Then they must consider that the questions could not be resolved within a reasonable time by the regulator exercising any of its other functions.
The amendments clarify that the regulator need not take forward all the questions proposed and that the regulator can modify the proposed questions. They will also require the regulator to take into account representations from the other league that accompany the application. That will give the regulator the flexibility to pick out which questions it is appropriate and within its remit to address, without forcing it to either accept every element of an application or reject the whole application outright.
The amendments also set out procedural requirements. They require the regulator to consult the FA before setting the questions for resolution, ensuring that the national governing body has a chance to raise any views about the scope of the backstop process. They will also ensure that the regulator transparently sets out what questions it has chosen and how it made that decision. The questions for resolution will then be taken forward into the mediation phase. That will ensure that all parties understand the specific aims of the mediation stage.
The Minister is setting out how important it is to get the distribution arrangements right. This is the part of the Bill that may be the most critical in ensuring that the pyramid is sustainable, which is the objective. It is great that the Government are working hard to get the backstop arrangements right, as she said. Does she agree that, once the regulator is in place, it will be important to have the state of the game report already in place—with an analysis of what is going wrong in the financial distribution and how it could be put right—before a distribution agreement is made and the backstop powers are used to bring that about?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and he touches on something we will discuss later. It is important that the state of the game report takes place swiftly. That is an important part of the Bill. Of course, it is a backstop, and we are keen that a football-led solution is the priority and that people get round the table. I often quote Dame Tracey Crouch, who was one of my predecessors as sport Minister, and obviously we know how involved she was in the Bill. In the previous Bill Committee, she made a short but very focused speech, which I encourage hon. Members to read, on how the backstop should be a backstop. I often quote that speech.
For the reasons I have set out, the amendments are vital for supporting our new backstop model, and I hope that they will be accepted. I commend them to the Committee.
Amendment 28 agreed to.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Clause 56 is the first clause of part 6, which relates to financial distributions and the backstop mechanism in its totality. I understand the desire on both sides to apply appropriate scrutiny to a part of the Bill that could significantly impact the future financial landscape of football, and I hope through this debate to demonstrate that the approach taken in part 6 is the most proportionate and effective one.
These backstop powers have been introduced to help ensure that an agreement can be reached between the leagues on the distribution of revenue from the selling of TV broadcast rights. If the leagues cannot agree a deal, it will allow the regulator to step in as a last resort and impose one. A solution to this issue is vital to ensure the future financial sustainability of the football pyramid. The process has been designed to encourage an industry solution while providing the assurance that, should one not be reached, the regulator can ensure that one is put in place.
The Government have listened to industry, to members of both this Committee and its equivalent in the last Parliament, and to concerns raised in the other place. We have taken on board the points raised regarding the original distribution model in the Bill, and we have therefore tabled targeted amendments to improve the mechanism. As I have said more than once, I will set out the detail in a later group. We are confident that the regulator will have the powers necessary to ensure a timely, satisfactory distribution order, while not unduly inhibiting the ability of industry to resolve the issue itself.
Clause 56 sets out an overview of the backstop powers and outlines some key definitions that are important for clearly setting out the scope of these powers, including “relevant revenue”, which I will come on to in just a moment. Importantly, this clause also makes clear right at the outset in subsection (1) that the regulator can impose a distribution order only if the leagues are unable to reach an agreement during the backstop process. In other words, even after the process has been triggered, a regulator-imposed solution remains a last resort, only to be used if industry fails to strike a deal.
One of the key terms defined in this clause is “relevant revenue”. It expressly includes broadcast revenue because this is the predominant source of revenue for the relevant leagues, and this is the revenue that underpins the financial flows between the leagues. This clause also allows the Secretary of State to specify other kinds of revenue to be included as “relevant revenue”. This is simply to future-proof the policy; for instance, if broadcast revenue is no longer the main source of income for the leagues. However, there are safeguards on the use of this power. The Secretary of State must consult the regulator, the FA and the relevant leagues, and can use this power only when there has been a material change of circumstances. Any use of the power will be subject to the affirmative procedure in Parliament.
The previous Government’s version of the Bill explicitly excluded parachute payments from the definition of “relevant revenue”. Our version of the Bill no longer makes this distinction, allowing the inclusion of parachute payments where appropriate. This change was made to ensure that the regulator can consider all relevant aspects of revenue distribution as it makes a financial assessment of the game. Parachute payments can be included in the backstop only if the regulator considers that issues relating to parachute payments present an apparent threat to its objectives, such as the sustainability of the pyramid.
Another important definition in this clause is the “qualifying football season”. This determines which seasons can be in scope of the backstop. In effect, it limits the regulator’s power to only the next six football seasons, which prevents excessively long regulator orders or premature applications for seasons far in the future.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 56, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Vicky Foxcroft.)