National Armaments Director

Neil Shastri-Hurst Excerpts

Wednesday 25th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

Today this House is quite properly considering the scale and seriousness of the threats we face, from those requiring conventional deterrence in Europe to those of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. The case for strengthening our armed forces is not just compelling but essential. However, we must be honest about how we fund this renewal, and what we are willing to sacrifice to do so.

Let me be clear: the case for increased defence spending is self-evident. Like many others, I have long argued that we must invest more in our sovereign capability, critical munitions, advanced deterrence and national resilience, including by expanding both the remit and the resourcing of the national armaments director. The strategic significance of that role has grown substantially. In today’s volatile security environment, the national armaments director is not merely a procurement official; they are the principal architect of our defence industrial strategy, responsible for ensuring that our armed forces are equipped not just adequately, but decisively. Their portfolio spans capability planning, acquisition reform, exportability and the stewardship of our defence supply base, from the factory floor to the frontline. In an age of contested logistics, technological disruption and rapid rearmament by authoritarian regimes, the role is fundamental to preserving both operational readiness and sovereign capability.

Delivering a credible deterrent in today’s world means accelerating procurement cycles, building in modularity and adaptability, strengthening domestic supply chains, and driving long-term collaboration between government, industry and academia. It means ensuring that we can surge production in a crisis, replenish stockpiles at speed and invest in the innovation that gives us the strategic edge. That cannot be done in isolation or as an afterthought. That work must be led, co-ordinated and embedded across defence planning, not in spite of fiscal pressures, but because of them.

If we are serious about resilience, readiness and regeneration, we must empower the national armaments director with the authority, capacity and resources to act not simply as a technical overseer, but as a strategic enabler at the heart of defence policy. Only then can we translate increased spending into real-world capability, and ensure that British power is not only credible on paper, but deliverable in practice.

However, this investment must not come at the expense of our international development commitments. Funding defence by slashing foreign aid is a false economy. Worse, it risks undermining the strategic posture that we seek to build. Aid is not an indulgence. It is not a soft option, and it is certainly not a luxury for easier times. It is an instrument of national strategy—a projection of British values, a tool of soft power, and a forward-deployed asset in the defence of the realm. When Britain pulls back from the world, our adversaries do not hesitate to step in. China in particular has understood this dynamic. It does not wait for crises to send in troops; it sends in investment, infrastructure and influence, often to the very regions from which we have retreated. When we reduce aid, we do not save; we cede ground and create vacuums that others are all too willing to fill.

Let us be frank: foreign aid and defence are not in conflict. They are complementary. One builds resilience, prevents crises and supports our allies; the other protects us as those crises unfold. A truly strategic posture requires both, because real security does not start when the first shot is fired. It starts in the classrooms of conflict zones, in the clinics of fragile states, and in the partnerships we forge before troubles take root. If we choose to retreat from the world, we shall find that the world does not retreat from us.