Defamation Bill

Debate between Paul Farrelly and Stephen Phillips

Wednesday 12th September 2012 Commons Chamber

[Paul Farrelly]

Amendment 9 is the first of a series aimed at either improving or clarifying the Government’s thinking on clause 4 regarding “responsible journalism”. Clearly, the right hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes) has given the Government more food for thought, and he usefully clarified that his new clause 4 would in no way be a replacement for clause 4 but that it would be an additional safeguard. I want to say at the outset that I welcome the Bill’s recognition that responsible journalism should be protected, in the public interest. However, during the passage of the Bill we want to make sure that what is codified is not a step back from the current case law that has been largely welcomed, and we also do not want to give a charter for sloppy, frivolous, inaccurate or sometimes downright nasty journalism.

The clause in effect codifies the defence of qualified privilege established in the judgments in the cases of Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd and then Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe, as we have heard. One of the concerns among serious journalists about the current state of the law, and therefore about the construction of this clause, is that the list has the potential to be interpreted by lower courts in particular as an inflexible tick-list: a set of hurdles, each and everyone of which needs to be surmountable before the defence can be deployed.

In his landmark judgment in the Reynolds case in 1999, Lord Nicholls enumerated 10 different matters that a court could take into account in allowing a defamatory article the protection of qualified privilege. They are slightly different from the nine in paragraphs (a) to (i) in subsection (2), but clause 4 seeks to capture their essence. Lord Nicholls made it clear from the start that his list was by no means exhaustive and was meant to be flexible, depending on the circumstances. He said:

“The weight to be given to these and any other relevant factors will vary from case to case”.

That important point was underlined in 2006 in the very different case of Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe. The first case concerned an article in The Sunday Times regarding the former Irish Taoiseach Albert Reynolds, whereas the Jameel case concerned a Wall Street Journal article in the aftermath of the events of 9/11 saying that US law enforcement agencies and the Saudi Arabian central bank were monitoring bank accounts associated with prominent Saudi business men. The central question was what sort of reporting might be in the public interest, even when the imputations and the allegations carried might be untrue and defamatory. In the Jameel case, Lord Bingham of Cornhill set out very clearly how the Reynolds factors should be interpreted:

“Lord Nicholls....intended these as pointers, which might be more or less indicative, depending on the circumstances of a particular case and not, I feel sure, as a series of hurdles to be negotiated by a publisher before he could successfully rely on qualified privilege.”

That is indeed how the lower courts had interpreted the list. In the Jameel case, the House of Lords was critical of the High Court—in that instance, Mr Justice Eady—and the Court of Appeal in denying qualified privilege on one narrow ground taken from the list.

Indeed, because of the operation of the lower courts, newspapers and non-governmental organisations also prepare for and approach Reynolds defences according to a tick list. That accounts for the complaints about how costly it is in practice to “run a Reynolds”. The likely bill would be calculated by totting up how much it would cost to satisfy the court that each of the 10 factors had been satisfied.

In Committee, the Government said that the wording in the preamble to subsection (2) of clause (4) already made it quite clear that the list was not exhaustive. The purpose of amendment 9 is to make it even clearer that a court should take all circumstances into account. I admit that the wording is essentially not mine, but is taken from the noble Lord Lester’s Defamation Bill, a private Member’s Bill that gave much impetus to the Bill that we are now considering.

Amendment 10 is aimed at probing, as we did in Committee, whether or not clause 4 is a step back from the case law as it has developed. The right hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark mentioned the case of Flood v. Times Newspapers, which came up in Committee. For the uninitiated, that concerned the case of a policeman, Detective Sergeant Gary Flood, who was being investigated internally by the Metropolitan Police over alleged corruption by wealthy Russians but who was later cleared. The central question for the case was whether it was in the public interest for the fact of an investigation to be reported, with the officer’s name, even though the allegations were plainly defamatory and he was eventually cleared.

The Supreme Court found this year that in the circumstances of that case, the newspaper group could rely on qualified privilege. The case is very recent, coming just weeks before publication of the Bill, and I mention it in relation to the amendment because there is concern among serious journalists and defamation lawyers that the clause as drafted is a step back from Flood. Indeed, the case is not even mentioned in the explanatory notes.

The concerns crystallise around the drafting of clause 4(2)(g) and the question of whether courts will require newspapers in every case to investigate and prove the truth of allegations that are subject to investigation—for example, by the police, as they were in the Flood case. As drafted, paragraph (g) appears to go beyond Reynolds, where one of Nicholls’ factors or tests is to “verify the information”, which is a very different thing to verifying the truth of the allegations. That is where the concerns about paragraph (g) lie.

[Stephen Phillips (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point about the reporting of investigations, but is not one of the problems with the potential removal of paragraph (g) the fact that it essentially enables journalists to print almost anything, subject to the other conditions, without taking any steps to verify the truth of something that is not under investigation? If the paragraph is removed from the Bill, it will amount to a charter for libel.

Defamation Bill

Debate between Paul Farrelly and Stephen Phillips

Tuesday 12th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Phillips]

What a fine idea. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Minister will be able to tell us whether that is the Government’s preferred solution—as, given the quality of my hon. Friend’s intervention, it may well be.

In 1996, Larry Page and Sergey Brin were still at Stanford university. They had met only the previous year, and Google was still two years away from being incorporated. For what it is worth, Mark Zuckerberg was 12 years old at the time. If any Members foresaw what the internet would do for the instantaneous communications that we now have, they were entirely silent in the debates that led to what became the Defamation Act 1996. I know that, because I have read the reports of those debates. We, however, are in a different position. We have the benefit of subsequent events, and—with the possible exception of my right hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle (Sir Peter Tapsell)—not one of us can now contemplate life without the technologies on which we rely for our daily existence. Perhaps it was ever thus with technological change, but, by the same token, change brings specific issues that must be addressed.

Chief among those issues here has been the ability not only to create defamatory material that is instantly accessible to millions of people with internet access, but to disseminate that material anonymously. Even this week, the common law has demonstrated the flexibility of existing mechanisms to assist those who are determined to protect themselves, but, as always, that has come at a cost. I believe that when Parliament intervenes in an area such as that addressed by the Bill, we must do what we can to help, and the Bill does that—although, like my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire (Nadine Dorries), I have not the slightest doubt that it is another area that we will have little option but to address again, certainly within the next decade, as user-driven change in internet and other technological architectures develops further.

The scale of the problems—the need to balance free speech against other competing rights, the need to address the costs associated with striking that balance correctly, and the need to deal with technological and other changes—is vast. In those circumstances it might well be thought that ambitious reform was called for, but, again, that sort of understandable reaction must be balanced with the caution that good legislators enjoy, and which has been the hallmark of the House from time immemorial. Too frequently, ambitious legislative change reveals itself not only to have unintended consequences, but to stultify the development of appropriate solutions by the courts to problems of which no one has yet dreamt. That point was made earlier by my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon. Incremental change has been the hallmark of good legislation in this and other areas, and the Bill is rightly no exception. The Government are to be commended on that.

I want to deal with three specific aspects of the Bill: the provisions that seek to codify existing substantive law in a manner that is readily accessible and understandable to the layman, the provisions that deal with the defences for which free speech calls in a modern society, and the provisions that seek to bring reputational protection within the reach of those who have not the funds with which to instruct expensive lawyers.

As for the first—the attempted codification of parts of the existing common law as it has now developed, particularly in recent years—my colleagues who sat on the Joint Committee with me are aware that I and others, notably Lord Morris, had our reservations. The difficulty Parliament faces in this area is that our attempts to reduce the nuances of the common law to writing are on occasion ineffectual. The Marine Insurance Act 1906 was a codifying Act prepared by Sir Mackenzie Dalzell Chalmers when he was permanent under secretary at the Home Office. He was subsequently chief justice of Gibraltar. As the draftsman of both the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 and the Sale of Goods Act 1893, if anyone could achieve the codification of four centuries of common law, he was the man. Yet subsequent events tell us that he got things wrong, such as the test in relation to loss, which now differs between marine and non-marine insurance. Can he be criticised? No, but the experience teaches a valuable lesson: that codification is not always successful in reflecting either the existing law or its nuances or flexibility.

Attempted codification can, through drafting error, lead to uncertainty, change and stultification, all of which can lead to increased costs for litigants. However, I am persuaded that it is desirable in clauses 1 and 2—as well as in part of clause 3—only for two reasons: first, because the codification is modest in scope; and, secondly, because, as Lord Mawhinney, who chaired our proceedings, persuaded those of us who were sceptical about either the necessity or desirability of pursuing this path, if the protection of the law of defamation is to be made more accessible, it must be written down as simply as possible in a manner that most can understand. That point was made well by the right hon. Member for Tottenham. While I had reservations, therefore, I am now persuaded that these clauses have their rightful place in the Bill. Better and more erudite minds than mine will have addressed the question of whether or not they do what they are supposed to do. If they do not, it will not be for want of trying.

The second area I wish to discuss is the defences with which the Bill deals. One clause at least—clause 3—involves a slight amendment to the existing defence of fair or, as the Supreme Court seems to have taken upon itself to rename it, honest comment. We are now renaming “honest opinion”. It is my understanding that the change is minor—I would be grateful for confirmation of that from the Minister—and merely removes the necessity for it to be shown that the matter on which the opinion is expressed is in the public interest. If so, there seems to have been little justification for any such limitation in the first place. Any such limitation between public interest and private interest is unjustifiable and unprincipled.

That step is therefore to be welcomed, as is the new defence—in so far as it is a new defence—based upon, or clarifying, Reynolds v. Times Newspapers: responsible publication on a matter of public interest. That does much to clarify what would no doubt have been clarified by the common law in due course, but at vast expense and inconvenience to litigants and those defamed.

The third area on which I want to touch is those parts of the Bill that I perceive to be addressing substantive matters that affect cost and accessibility. Among those is the removal of the presumption of jury trial. In no other significant area of civil litigation has jury trial been retained, at least in practical terms, and the evidence that the Committee received appears to demonstrate that, even in the field of defamation, trials have increasingly been conducted before judges alone. However, the threat of jury trial—with the processes it involves and the reluctance of judges to intervene early to remove matters from a jury, with the consequent prolongation of litigation and considerable increase in cost—has long exacerbated the chilling effects of the existing law, and many of us are only just persuaded that it should even be possible to retain a discretion to permit a jury in a libel or slander case.

[Paul Farrelly]

I agree with what is being said. I have inquired into these matters for several years. The publishing industry and the newspapers have long pleaded for an early resolution of meaning, and the retention of juries is inimical to that. It plays into the hands of those litigants who have no interest in a resolution because their intention is to use force of money and arms to prolong the agony as long as possible.

[Stephen Phillips]

The hon. Gentleman makes a valid and compelling point, and I agree with him. I do not sit on civil cases, but I do still sit as a recorder for a few weeks each year. When judges know there is going to be a jury, they are reluctant to take anything away from the jury because it is supposed to be determining the factual issues. In order to reduce the costs associated with litigation, in most defamation cases there should be no jury, just as there is no longer a jury in other cases heard in the Queen’s bench division, whereas a century or so ago there was the discretion to order one, and, indeed, one was frequently ordered, with all the consequent increase in cost and delay.

The third area on which I want to touch is the one I consider to be the most important aspect of the Bill, clarifying or codifying as it may be: the requirement that in order to be actionable a statement must cause, or be likely to cause, serious harm to the reputation of the claimant. There is, of course, once again every indication that this is the direction in which the common law was moving in any event, but here, in an age when trivial statements are capable of being published immediately, we, as a Parliament, can give our sanction to this worthwhile development and enshrine it once and for all as part of our law. It will lead to fewer cases—certainly fewer trivial cases—being brought forward and therefore to a reduction in costs. It is consistent with the balance that I believe must be struck between free speech and the protection of reputation; it is consistent with the need to render the law accessible in a written form to ordinary individuals not versed in the intricacies of precedent; and it is consistent with enabling courts to act at an early stage in order actively to manage cases and to drive settlement and compromise in those which are serious and require early redress. Like the rest of this Bill, in my judgment—which I think the House shares—these provisions are to be welcomed. They deserve, and should command, our entire and full support.