Asked by: Paul Flynn (Labour - Newport West)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to the Answer of 19 December 2006 to an oral question from the former hon. Member for North Devon, on Nuclear Weapons, Official Report, column 1902W, what plan his Department has for ensuring an adequate supply of tritium to maintain the UK's nuclear weapons' capability until 2055; and what the projected cost of those plans is.
Answered by Philip Dunne
This information is being withheld for the purpose of safeguarding national security.
Asked by: Paul Flynn (Labour - Newport West)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to the reply of 17 March 2011, Official Report, column 514W, on radioactive materials transport, whether the practice of displaying radioactive materials hazard warning signs on vehicles carrying special nuclear materials will continue following the retirement from service of High Security Vehicles.
Answered by Philip Dunne
It is not current Ministry of Defence policy to display radioactive material hazard signs on the Truck Cargo Heavy Duty (TCHD) Mk3 when transporting special nuclear materials. Adequate safety arrangements, as required by legislation, are in place to ensure the necessary information is available to emergency services in the event of an incident.
Asked by: Paul Flynn (Labour - Newport West)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, on what date the decision was made not to proceed with developing a future theatre nuclear weapon (FTNW); and how much had been spent on (a) the vehicle element and (b) the warhead element of the FTNW programme up to that point.
Answered by Philip Dunne
On 18 October 1993, the then Secretary of State for Defence informed Parliament (Official Report, column 32): "we have concluded that our previous requirement for a new stand-off nuclear weapon capability is not a sufficiently high priority to justify the procurement of a new nuclear system in the current circumstances. Instead, we will plan, after the WE177 eventually leaves service in the long term, on exploiting the flexibility and capability of the Trident system to provide the vehicle for the delivery of our sub-strategic deterrent."
Also on 19 July 1993 (HC Deb vol 229 cc83-4W), the then Minister for Defence Procurement provided the following information about expenditure to evaluate options for the Future Theatre Nuclear Weapon:
Expenditure to the end of March 1993 on studies of possible vehicles:
Year | £ |
1989-90 | 928,518 |
1990-91 | 1,372,329 |
1991-92 | 1,870,285 |
1992-93 | 2,658,471 |
Information on costs incurred on the Future Theatre Nuclear Weapon warhead programme was withheld for reasons of national security. Those reasons no longer apply but this information is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.
Asked by: Paul Flynn (Labour - Newport West)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what (a) enforcement action was taken and (b) warning letters were issue against the Atomic Weapons Establishment by regulatory authorities in 2014 and 2015; and which of those enforcement actions are ongoing.
Answered by Michael Fallon
The Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) received a single Improvement Notice from the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) on 8 June 2015. This Improvement Notice remains open; the ONR and the AWE have agreed a set of actions that enable this to be closed by the due date of 30 September 2016.
No regulatory authority has taken enforcement action against the AWE in 2014 and 2015, and no warning letters have been issued.
Asked by: Paul Flynn (Labour - Newport West)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the costs were of repairing structural defects to the A45 facility at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (Project Phoebe).
Answered by Michael Fallon
The cost of Project Phoebe was £20.1 million (excluding VAT).
Asked by: Paul Flynn (Labour - Newport West)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, on how many occasions since 1 January 2014 explosives stored at the Atomic Weapons Establishment have been found to be wrongly labelled; on what date it was discovered that such explosives were wrongly labelled; and what (a) types and (b) quantities of explosives were involved in each such case.
Answered by Michael Fallon
Since 1 January 2014, there have been two occasions on which anomalies have been discovered in the labelling of explosives at the Atomic Weapons Establishment. In each case a small discrepancy was discovered through the checking and accounting process in place. In neither case were any explosive licence limits exceeded, and there was no requirement to notify the Authority or the Regulator.
On 14 August 2015, it was identified that a container labelled as containing 0.054 Kg of explosives actually contained 0.063 Kg.
On 6 January 2016, it was identified that a container labelled as containing 0.10716 Kg of explosives actually contained 0.0872 Kg.
The explosives concerned were Hazard Type 1.
Asked by: Paul Flynn (Labour - Newport West)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what actions have been undertaken in response to finding reference TRF0195 of the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator's assessment of the Astral Climb 12 nuclear emergency exercise; and on what dates each such action was closed out.
Answered by Philip Dunne
Finding TRF 195 from the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator's assessment of Exercise Astral Climb 2012 called for documented arrangements to be reviewed and updated to reflect two changes in practice: the responsibility for the medical response and the monitoring instrumentation. This action was completed in August 2013. The finding also called for a review of Convoy and Station Nuclear Emergency Organisation Team response arrangements; this review was carried out in 2015.
Asked by: Paul Flynn (Labour - Newport West)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, when he plans to publish the UK's Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2015 Update to Parliament.
Answered by Michael Fallon
A further update will be published this year.
Asked by: Paul Flynn (Labour - Newport West)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment he has made of the sources of (a) arms and (b) armed vehicles obtained by Daesh.
Answered by Penny Mordaunt
Daesh has obtained weapons through capture, and through the black market. It has also captured a variety of armed and unarmed vehicles. In addition, Daesh has produced its own Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), including vehicle-borne IEDs and suicide bombs, improvised rockets, mortars and munitions.
Asked by: Paul Flynn (Labour - Newport West)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what evaluation his Department made of the number and location of civilian workers who work at the al-Omar oil field in Syria before ordering Royal Air Force planes to bomb that facility; and how many civilians have been killed as a result of UK military action on targets in Syria to date.
Answered by Michael Fallon
UK air strikes are conducted in accordance with Rules of Engagement and International Humanitarian Law.The risks of collateral damage or civilian casualties are assessed and mitigated based on intelligence and the use of precision guided weapons. There have been no reports so far of civilian casualties as a result of UK air strikes in Syria.