Ukraine: Non-recognition of Russian-occupied Territories

Richard Foord Excerpts

Thursday 29th January 2026 Westminster Hall

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

It is an honour to serve under you in the Chair, Sir Jeremy. I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel), who is chair of the all-party parliamentary group on Ukraine and who has advocated daily for Ukraine ever since the full-scale invasion.

The hon. Gentleman talked about Stalin, and that is a good place to start, because Russia’s attempt to dress up its occupation of Ukrainian territory as legitimate statehood is not new; it is very much from Stalin’s playbook. When Nazi Germany invaded Poland in 1939, the red army followed from the east just over two weeks later, and the Soviet authorities staged elections to so-called people’s assemblies in western Ukraine and Belarus. Those elections were rigged and held in an atmosphere of repression, with armed militia forcibly bringing people to the polling stations, so it is little wonder that those assemblies then voted to join the Soviet Union.

However, the fact is that Putin will never truly secure legitimate ownership of Ukrainian territory without the consent of the Ukrainian people, and that is consent they will never give. Max Weber said that

“the basis of every system of authority…is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige”.

Legitimacy is earned not through power or coercion, but through belief. Putin does not have that belief from the Ukrainian people and never will.

That has not stopped the Kremlin trying to manufacture the illusion. In 2023 Putin signed a decree defining residents of occupied areas of eastern Ukraine who refused Russian passports as stateless, exposing them to the threat of deportation. That is coercion dressed up as “choice”; it creates a paper trail designed to support a false narrative that Ukrainians are willingly accepting Russian rules.

That façade also exists in education and social services. In education, Russian occupation authorities claim that students in occupied Ukraine have the choice to continue learning Ukrainian and that most simply do not. The resulting decline in Ukrainian study is then presented as evidence of popular support for Russian control. In social services, the occupied territories are also being weaponised. A clear example is Russia’s maternity capital scheme—a state payment to citizens after the birth of a second or third child—which has now been extended into the occupied territories of Ukraine. By making that support conditional on parents and children holding Russian citizenship, the authorities pressure families to accept Russian passports for their newborns.

I would like to say something about the occupied territories in Donetsk, and particularly the fortress belt. Russia is not simply trying to hold territory on a de facto basis; it is trying to turn occupation into a reality even for those parts of Donetsk and Luhansk that it does not occupy and, through peace talks, to achieve on a de jure basis what it has not achieved by military means. It is for the Ukrainian people to determine what their war aims are and, through these peace talks, what, if anything, they are prepared to concede. However, they know the risk in conceding the strategically important fortress belt in the Donetsk oblast, because that roughly 50 km chain of fortified cities has formed the backbone of Ukraine’s eastern defences since 2014. Kremlin officials have demanded that Ukraine cede control of that portion of Donetsk as a condition for any ceasefire agreement. That is cynical; as the Institute for the Study of War notes, Ukraine has spent more than a decade reinforcing that line, and I think we can all forecast that conceding it would make life much easier for a further Russian invasion in the future. The institute also says that withdrawing would mean Ukrainian troops moving into less defensible terrain to the west, where any new defensive line would run through open fields and would abandon obstacles such as the Oskil and Siverskyi Donets rivers. Russia would win through diplomacy what it has not been able to win militarily, and Ukraine would be left with a weaker defensive line.

To conclude, non-recognition denies Russia the legitimacy it seeks, and blocks the laundering of conquest through sham votes, coerced passports and captured institutions. For 80 years, our security has rested on the simple principle that borders cannot be changed by force, which dates back all the way to the Westphalia treaty in the 17th century. If we allow that principle to erode now, we do not preserve peace; we invite further war. If we accept occupation, we do not buy stability; we promote permission.