Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Richard Fuller Excerpts

Monday 5th September 2011 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

As the hon. Gentleman will be aware, one Parliament cannot bind another. It would not be appropriate for me to suggest or require that a future Government act in a particular way when addressing such points. It would be reasonable and appropriate, however, to consider these matters carefully and in a measured and appropriate way, examining the security issues at that point in time in the same way as this Government sought to do in our counter-terrorism review, which led to the creation of this Bill. We consider that a five-year renewal period, allowing each Parliament the opportunity to take a view on this important issue, strikes the right balance.

[Richard Fuller (Bedford) (Con)]

I join my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) in welcoming this measure. May I probe the Minister a little further on the spirit of the renewal every five years? Will he give some guidance about whether, in his view, we should have a thorough and complete review of these measures every five years rather than sending them through on the nod for another five years, saying that they seem to be working? Many of us would have liked to have seen the Government go further to undo some of the damage done by the previous Government and it is important that we hear whether the Minister anticipates the review every five years to be more thorough than the annual on-the-nod review.

[James Brokenshire]

As I said to the hon. Member for Cambridge, I would certainly anticipate a considered review of counter-terrorism powers when the time arrived. That would be the appropriate way to proceed and to examine the renewal. The time period will also allow further and broader consideration of the security position at that point and of what measures might be required, necessary and appropriate to deal with the risks, challenges and issues that face our country.

I do not wish to detain the House, but I should explain briefly that amendments 11 and 13 make necessary technical changes to clauses 19 and 20 in consequence of Government new clauses 3 and 4. Amendment 11 ensures that the Secretary of State is not under a nugatory duty to report on the exercise of her powers under the Bill at a time when her powers have expired or been repealed. Similarly, amendment 13 ensures that the independent reviewer is not under a duty to report on the operation of the Act for periods when the operative powers are not in force.

Amendments 8 and 20, which were tabled by the Opposition, relate to when the Bill may come into force —currently, the day after it receives Royal Assent. It has been suggested, and I have consistently and strongly refuted such suggestions, that the police and the Security Service will not be ready to implement the new system when the Bill is expected to receive Royal Assent because the additional investigative resources that will complement the new system will not be in place. On that basis, and on the basis of wider suggestions that the powers under the new system will be insufficient to protect the public, it has also been suggested that the new system should not be introduced before the 2012 Olympics.

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[Shabana Mahmood]

May I welcome the Minister formally to his place? It is a pleasure to continue on Report the debate that we had in Committee.

I shall speak to new clause 7 and amendment 20, which stand in my name and those of my right hon. and hon. Friends. I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation of the Government’s movement in relation to the introduction of new clause 3 and new clause 4, which, as he explained, envisages a five-year sunset clause and moves us somewhat further on than did our debate in Committee.

New clause 7 would replicate the position under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, which brought in the control order regime, and the amendment would limit to 12 months the powers under the TPIMs regime and would, therefore, require their annual renewal by Parliament.

Our new clause began in Committee as an amendment, which I moved, and was based on oral evidence given in Committee by Liberty, Justice and others. It was introduced to reflect our concerns that the Government’s legislation will mean fewer checks and balances on what are exceptional measures. Many in the House agree that they are undesirable and in an ideal world we would not have to have them, but they have proved necessary, given the serious terrorist risks that we face.

I do not often agree with Liberty, particularly on control orders, because our starting points for the debate are different, but I was struck by its evidence in Committee, when the organisation made it clear that it would rather—to be fair to Shami Chakrabarti, she said that she would choke on these words—take existing control orders, with their annual renewal, meaning a 12-month limit on their power, over the new TPIMs regime. The reasons for that—and why I agree with that position—primarily relate to the importance of bringing such exceptional measures back to the House for regular, annual review and, if Parliament deems it appropriate, for renewal.

[Richard Fuller]

I was not on the Committee, but in the evidence I noted Lord Carlile’s comments about the point of annual renewal. He said that

“annual renewal has been a bit of a fiction, to be frank,”

and went on to issue a challenge, stating that

Parliament should have the courage of its convictions and decide whether it wants a regime like this or not.”—[Official Report, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Public Bill Committee, 21 June 2011; c. 23-24, Q70.]

How does the hon. Lady square that with her view of annual reviews?

[Shabana Mahmood]

I am grateful for that intervention, and I will come to Lord Carlile’s evidence in Committee. He clearly did not think that annual renewal was needed, but recent developments, in particular the introduction of the Government’s draft Bill four days ago, make annual renewal even more necessary than before. I will turn shortly to the reasons why.

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I also say to the hon. Gentleman that when an individual is put on police bail, it is with a view to bringing a prosecution. If that process were started in the knowledge that the intelligence could never be converted into evidence, applying for police bail would be a sham. I am not sure that many judges would let an individual get away with that.

[Richard Fuller]

rose—

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

rose—

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[Shabana Mahmood]

The right hon. Gentleman does not, so I shall press on.

I spoke of the draft Bill that the Government published a few days ago, which seeks to introduce control order powers by way of emergency legislation. That Bill, which we will discuss at length shortly, raises many questions, and an early opportunity for Parliament to take stock of the operation, implementation, practice and working of that regime will be welcome.

[Richard Fuller]

The hon. Lady is being extraordinarily generous in giving way. The question that I should like to ask is from the perspective of the people who are under control orders and similar restrictions. Such people have not been brought to trial and no evidence has been presented to them to substantiate the reasons why they are under such restrictions. She is advocating annual reviews, and increases as well as decreases in powers, but has she considered the commentary on the mental health implications for the people who are subject to control orders? In that regard, does she believe that some period of certainty for those people on how they will be treated will be welcome?

[Shabana Mahmood]

The first part of the hon. Gentleman’s intervention makes my point for me. This is about the balance of risk. It is in the interests of those who are under control orders for Parliament to look at such measures at regular intervals rather than once every five years. His intervention supports rather than goes against my point.

[Richard Fuller]

rose—

[Shabana Mahmood]

I shall make some progress, because I am about to wind-up on new clause 7.

The Minister spoke of the comments made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins) on Second Reading. My right hon. Friend spoke powerfully on the merit of reaching a settled position on such measures, but I should tell the Minister that given what has happened in the past few days, we are clearly not at a settled position on the Bill. In fact, the Government unsettled matters further by introducing the draft Bill a few days ago. For that reason, the Opposition believe that an annual renewal measure is merited and needed now more than ever, and we shall later seek to press new clause 7 to a Division.

I am grateful for the Minister’s comments on amendment 20, which is in my name and those of my right hon. and hon. Friends. He updated the House and told us from the Dispatch Box that the police say that they will be able to meet the increased risks that we face under TPIMs with the additional resources, but I am afraid that I do not feel reassured by what he said, and we need to consider the matter in greater detail in the House this evening.

By way of background, I should add that amendment 20 began life in Committee, as the Minister noted, and was introduced following evidence given to the Committee by Deputy Assistant Commissioner Osborne, the national co-ordinator for counter-terrorist investigations. It is important to consider his evidence in detail. He was asked by my right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) about the time scales that he was working to in relation to the TPIMs regime, given that we have the Olympics next year, which is a particular concern. He said:

“To get the resources that we anticipate we need will take more than a year, in terms of being able to get people trained and to get the right equipment. Until we have got that, we will not be able to start to bed things in and see how it works and how it transpires. It also depends on how many people actually go on to the TPIMs regime and how many people come off it. There are a lot of inter-dependents there. The control order put people in the protect and prepare part of the Contest strategy. TPIMs moves them back into the pursue element of the strategy, which is a slight paradox because it was only due to the failure to get sufficient evidence to prosecute them that we moved them into the control order in the first place

He was asked further questions about resources by the hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Stephen Phillips). He asked why Mr Osborne was saying that it would take a year for the new regime to bed in, to which Mr Osborne replied:

“I think I said it would take a year to procure and train sufficient additional assets before it would be ready to do that. We have to order some of the assets so that they are made in advance. To train a surveillance officer and then have them fully able to operate in a challenging environment probably takes at least 12 months before they are deployable. Once they are deployable, they have to work within the environment under a new set of regimes that will need to bed in.”––[Official Report, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Public Bill Committee, 21 June 2011; c.9-10.]

That important evidence is the reason I moved the amendment in Committee and why I tabled amendment 20 for debate today. I was extremely concerned about the position on resources. The evidence from Mr Osborne was obviously stark, and it raised in my mind the spectre that if the Bill were passed by the end of this year, as we anticipate it will be, we would create a concerning situation: the additional resources required to meet the increased risk might not be deployable, and if they are, it seems they might be only partially ready. That is not, to my mind, a satisfactory state of affairs. The amendment therefore seeks to prevent the Bill from coming into force until the resources are online and would put in place a mechanism by which to get agreement between the national co-ordinator and the Home Secretary on the additional resources required and to get them ready and online.

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[Shabana Mahmood]

I entirely endorse my right hon. Friend’s point, which reminds me that, under the Bill, access to electronic communications must be provided to suspects. One of the justifications for that is that the suspects will be monitored in that way, and the equipment will be provided by the Home Office. Presumably, some kind of software or hardware wiring will be needed to enable the suspects to be traced, and to listen in on conversations. Again, I do not believe that those technical assets could be procured overnight, especially given the different kinds of asset that might be needed to deal with different kinds of risk.

[Richard Fuller]

I fear that Opposition Members might be trying to scare Members of Parliament when there is no real justification for doing so. In Committee, the hon. Member for Bradford South (Mr Sutcliffe) spoke of increased threats, saying:

“I visited some of our prisons and I saw some of the terrorists who had been prosecuted, and they really are scary people. Next year, a large number of them will be released on licence, and they will be back in society, so the threat is always there.”––[Official Report, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Public Bill Committee, 23 June 2011; c. 55.]

Does not that show that our police and security forces are constantly having to meet these threats? If the police feel comfortable managing people who have been convicted and are coming out of prison, this modification of control orders into TPIMs is a minor issue in comparison. The hon. Lady is building this issue up into something that it is not.

[Shabana Mahmood]

I entirely disagree with the hon. Gentleman. In fact, he almost makes my point for me. The police do an incredible job of trying to protect us from the serious risks that we face, not only from the individuals who are or have been subjected to a control order, but from the many hundreds, possibly thousands, more who are of interest to them in their investigations into potential terrorism offences. The risk is always there, which is why we had to bring in the control order regime and why we believe those powers are necessary. Elements of the Bill decrease those measures in such a way as to increase the risk. We are told that the risk can be mitigated by the additional resources, but it cannot be eliminated. We have a real fear that those additional resources will not be ready by the time the Bill comes into force. For that reason, amendment 20 would reassure the public; its purpose is really no more than that.

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[Richard Fuller]

Annual review is just a veneer; to see that, we need only consider the number of Members present to debate it. I also believe that it is always whipped through by the Government party. The people under these control orders have never had the advantage of having been brought to a proper trial, and what they want is some certainty. They want certainty that this Parliament will handle its responsibilities thoughtfully and thoroughly, and that would require conducting a thorough review that could then be used to advise the Government and inform Parliament in a real debate. Does the hon. Gentleman not accept that that would be a major difference?

[Mark Durkan]

I am sorry to disagree with the hon. Gentleman, but I do not believe that it will be a tonic to the mental health of people under these orders if they know that Parliament will not seriously discuss the matter for another five years. I do not see what relief or redress that offers them. I agree with the hon. Gentleman, however, about the issue of our pretending that annual review will somehow of itself offer comfort to people under these orders in that it might result in their being reprieved from their exigencies. I would not give that false comfort or promise, and nor should we.

Based on the experience that we have all had of the many previous annual renewals, the hon. Gentleman also makes a valid point in saying that the Chamber might take its responsibilities in this regard somewhat lightly, but let us therefore be exposed to condemnation for such dereliction of duty and for not turning up every year to consider renewals duly and properly, rather than pretend that it is sufficient to do that on a five-yearly basis. Considering the issues at stake under this Bill, the attendance for the current debate is not particularly unimpressive in comparison with the likely attendance, which the hon. Gentleman indicts, for an annual review debate.

We should not kid ourselves about the false merits of a five-year sunset clause as opposed to an annual review, and nor should those of us who might vote in a Division to keep a version of annual review delude ourselves about the extent of the impact of annual reviews. However, annual reviews might ensure that the various other parliamentary means of scrutiny—whether through the Backbench Business Committee or Select Committees—are used to condition such reviews and, perhaps, explore more of the alternatives.

In the context of our deliberations today, I and others regret the fact that good amendments that were submitted on police bail and the conditions that could be attached to that are not available for us to discuss. Through discussing them, we would have been able to consider possible restrictions in cases where the police so far have only limited evidence that is not amenable to their taking the case to full prosecution. For such cases, there are means within the standard criminal law that can be deployed and developed, and amendments were tabled that offered that option. Through having annual reviews, some such alternatives might build up more of a head of steam. I am not saying we need annual reviews in the same style as in the past, but if we were to use annual reviews and the other parliamentary means now available to us, we could make more of this system.

Focusing now on the substance of the Bill, control orders are a poor tool and a crude weapon, but whereas TPIMs might appear to be softer, even when looked at through the bubblewrap of all the claims that the Government make for this Bill, they are also a poor tool and a crude weapon. Some of us have experience of how counter-terrorism measures can be deployed in counter-productive ways. They can act as grist to the mill of those who would radicalise others and try to spread subversion and dissident tendencies. They can also be used in ways that get in the way of good police work, and good police interface and engagement with communities whose sympathies and confidence are essential in holding the line against terrorist and subversive tendencies. We should therefore always tread lightly in relation to measures brought before us and offered as necessary and justified on the basis of countering terrorism.

Parliament should be particularly wary when we are given the assurance that these powers will not merely be activated on the basis of secret intelligence by mysterious Executive servants who may or may not appear before Select Committees or anybody else in Parliament, because there will be a degree of judicial oversight through posts such as special advocates. We should be very wary about being casual about any provisions that involve constant reference to words such as “special” and features such as “secret,” but that is precisely what we have in the TPIMs cocktail that is before us, and it is the same cocktail that was before us in relation to control orders. We as a Parliament should at least be trying to provide some sort of antidote to that, or diluting it through putting in place the kind of scrutiny and challenge that an annual review might provide.

I have listened to the arguments for and against these amendments. I am not impressed by the Government’s arguments, including those of the Liberal Democrats, in favour of their proposed measures. I support the Opposition on annual renewal, while not being under any illusions that that will be any great shakes in itself, but I certainly do not support the Opposition in trying to insinuate that somehow this legislation is dangerous in itself and exposes us to new risks because it damages control orders. I do not believe control orders have been necessary or effective in the way that they have operated. In fact, that has been dangerous in some regards, because sometimes both the terms and conditions of control orders have been interpreted randomly and capriciously, so that not only have people’s movements been restricted, but people have been made amenable to prosecution, and the threat of it, for supposed breach of unreasonable conditions.

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[James Brokenshire]

My right hon. Friend has taken a very consistent line on ensuring that those suspected of terrorism offences are brought to justice and that the courts are used appropriately. We need to do all we can to ensure that that happens, which is why we are taking forward measures such as post-charge questioning, which he has advocated clearly, and why we are continuing to examine the way in which intercept evidence might be usable in the courts and how the Privy Council review continues in relation to that. I agree with him that we need to be looking at a package of measures, that this is not about one instrument in itself and that it might be appropriate to take a range of steps. I would not want to suggest in this evening’s debate that this is about one issue. The Government are taking forward a range of measures as part of their counter-terrorism review and this Bill is just one part of that.

[Richard Fuller]

Before the Minister moves on, may I ask about the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) and the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas)? The hon. Lady mentioned that there had been no convictions of people on control orders. By supporting the Government today, we will be extending the TPIMs regime by five years. What comfort can the Minister give us that that record of no convictions will be improved by a more thorough prosecution of the evidence and by bringing to trial the people under control orders? Can he say anything to give us some assurance that that system of containment rather than prosecution will change to one of prosecution and bringing to justice rather than one of just containing a problem and leaving people on one side?

[James Brokenshire]

I would point my hon. Friend in the direction of the Bill’s provisions, which clearly underline our desire to prosecute people when the evidence is available. That is part and parcel of the additional investigative capabilities intended to be available to the police and the security services. I believe that this approach will contribute to our being able to achieve the sorts of steps that he is advocating in terms of seeking to prosecute where there is admissible evidence that could be brought before the courts.

I deal now with some of the other issues raised in this useful and constructive debate, which has been a symbol of some of the other consideration of the Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge raised the issue of Libya and he will doubtless have heard clearly the comments made by the Prime Minister during the statement preceding this debate. It is the Government’s long-standing policy not to comment on intelligence matters, but I can make it absolutely clear that the Government’s clear policy is not to participate in, solicit, encourage or condone the use of torture or inhumane or degrading treatment for any purpose.

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[Mr McFadden]

I will keep my remarks brief, because I know we all want to get on to the debate about relocation. However, I wish to say a word about new clause 5, which shows the difference between the Bill before us and what the Government know they might have to do. The new clause and the draft Bill on enhanced TPIMs measures published last Thursday represent the Government taking out an insurance policy against the failure of the Bill before us this evening.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) reminded us that we are debating the matter around the 10th anniversary of 11 September. It is important that the House remembers that, because that incident, more than any other, forced Governments around the world to reassess their thinking and their expectations of what terrorists were capable of. It also forced all of us in democratic regimes to look again at the protections in law and law enforcement that we can give our citizens against terrorist activity. That is the basis of this whole debate and the Bill.

We did not get here entirely by choice. We got here partly because of court judgments shaping the regime for us in an involuntary way. The problem is simple: what do we do when we cannot bring someone to prosecution, but we have a good and reasonable suspicion that that person would engage in terrorist activity if they could, and there may be inadmissible evidence that they have tried to do so? There has been an assumption running through this debate that such people are necessarily less dangerous than those who have been convicted. That is not necessarily so. If they were able to carry out their intent, they may in fact be far more dangerous than people who have been convicted of other terrorist events.

The Government have published draft legislation that is an insurance policy against the Bill, and they cannot have an in-principle objection to the measures within their own draft Bill. Whereas the Bill before us states, unbelievably, that the Secretary of State must grant terrorist suspects access to mobile phones and the internet, the draft Bill would give the Secretary of State discretion over that. Whereas the Bill before us disarms the Government from giving the public the protection that relocation can provide, the draft Bill would reinsert that possibility. The question that the public will ask, and which the Minister must believe they will ask very seriously should the draft legislation be needed in future, is why the Government did not include those powers in the Bill before us. Why wait until an incident has happened?

I repeat the question that I put to the Minister before. What would he say to the victims of terrorism in such circumstances? Would he say, “We knew we might need these powers, and we could have legislated for them, but we chose not to because we believed that the balance of civil liberties was wrong”?

[Richard Fuller]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr McFadden]

Not at the moment.

Let us deal with the point about civil liberties. The Minister has said several times that the motivation behind the Bill was a perceived imbalance in the last Government’s civil liberties legislation. The notion that we are some sort of quasi-police state or overly authoritarian state is complete nonsense. In this country we enjoy freedom of expression, religion and association that is the envy of the world. That is why so many dissidents from regimes around the world have sought refuge here. Indeed, the criticism that is sometimes levelled, and perhaps with validity, is that we have been very generous in accommodating dissidents from other regimes, and that sometimes our freedoms have been abused by some of those individuals. It is simply the wrong analysis and the wrong starting point to say that civil liberties in this country have been fundamentally compromised. That is not the case, but because the Government believe it and have carried forward into government the wrong analysis that they developed in opposition, that is leading to the wrong policy and to greater risk for the public. New clause 5 addresses that to some extent, but people will not understand why it, and the draft emergency legislation, were not put into the Bill.

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[Hazel Blears]

I am delighted that my new clause has been selected. The Minister will know from our lengthy debates in Committee that this is the issue about which I feel most passionately and which I believe is one of the biggest flaws in the Bill. The Government’s decision not to have a power of relocation is fundamentally flawed and flies in the face of the evidence, of logic and not only of my personal views, but of the views of some very, very knowledgeable and experienced people in the police, of Lord Carlile, the independent reviewer, and of Lord Howard, the former Home Secretary—a range of people who feel that the Government are limiting their options for controlling suspected terrorists and providing the public with the security and protection that we, as parliamentarians, have a responsibility to try to achieve.

My new clause 1 is a simple and straightforward measure that would provide that the Secretary of State may include in a TPIM notice the power to direct that a terrorist suspect should reside at a specific address that is not his home address or an address with which he has a connection, as is provided for in current legislation. To tie the Home Secretary’s hands in providing that a suspected terrorist has either to live at home or in the area where his known associates are gathered is absolutely ludicrous. Therefore, my amendment would provide that the Secretary of State may direct that the suspected terrorist is relocated to a different area so that they can be properly monitored and the public protected.

[Richard Fuller]

The right hon. Lady made a forceful opening to her comments, and I am interested to listen further. In her advocacy of enforced relocation, has she looked for inspiration to other democratic countries that forcibly relocate people who have not been subject to a trial?

[Hazel Blears]

There is a range of examples of countries that have attempted to deal with the threat for international terrorism with different legal provisions. France is often cited as a place where people are brought to trial under the criminal justice system. People are often held for months, if not years, under the investigatory process adopted by an inquiring magistrate. Indeed, the powers in some European countries are perhaps more draconian—the hon. Gentleman’s words, not mine—than any that we have ever had on our statute book. Therefore, to try to portray our country as one that does not accord with the rule of law or have effective judicial oversight, as the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) has on a number of occasions, is an absolute travesty when we look at the real circumstances.

[Richard Fuller]

I am grateful to the right hon. Lady for giving way, and I shall enjoy the opportunity to ask her the question again. The question was not about draconian measures. She is advocating a specific measure—forced relocation—and my question was specific. What other democratic countries has she used as her inspiration for this measure—which she makes out to be so important—which involves the forced relocation of people who have not been convicted in a trial?

[Hazel Blears]

I have not used any other country as my inspiration. What I have used, as my commitment in new clause 1, is a genuine analysis of the evidence provided by the police and other experienced people in the field in asking what measures we can take to ensure that the public are properly protected from the serious harm intended them by some of the most dangerous people in this country. It is right and proper that our Parliament should decide of its own volition what the appropriate measures are. We do not always look to other countries, which have very different legal systems to ours. I am absolutely convinced that the power of relocation can add to the security of this nation, which is my prime and most important concern when looking at this legislation.

I want to emphasise the point that the kind of people subject to either control orders or, in future, TPIMs are unfortunately some of the most dangerous people we could ever have to deal with in this country. There has been some suggestion that people who have been prosecuted through the criminal justice system are somehow more dangerous than those who are subject to administrative orders. If hon. Members looked at the judgments of High Court or Court of Appeal judges who have seen the intelligence and the information about the people upon whom we seek to impose such orders, they would perhaps revise their position. There are currently only 12 such individuals subject to control orders, and the expressions used by judges in relation to them include “trained soldiers” and “committed terrorists”, determined to be martyrs to their cause and determined, whatever steps we take, to cause the maximum harm to innocent people in this country. Those are statements by judges, not given to florid language, having seen the intelligence that the services hold in relation to some of those people. We are talking about a maximum of a dozen people who are very dangerous indeed. That is the measure that we must use in asking what powers we seek to use, whether they are proportionate and whether they are the right powers. It is my submission that the power of relocation of some of the most dangerous people in our country—committed terrorists—is a proportionate.

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[Shabana Mahmood]

I am mindful of the time, so I will try to keep my comments relatively brief.

I endorse the powerful contribution made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears). She spoke with great passion about an issue that has concerned her for some time. It certainly concerned her in Committee, and it has concerned Opposition Front Benchers, too.

Relocation has been a central issue in the debates that we have had about the Bill, both on Second Reading and in Committee, and it is one of the most important issues that we are taking forward on Report. New clause 1 seeks to add the power of relocation to the Bill to replicate the position in relation to control orders under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005.

It is clear from the evidence that the relocation power has proved extremely useful in disrupting terrorist activity. It is regularly described by police and others as one of the most useful and effective powers that they have under the control orders regime. We know that nine of the 12 current control orders have relocation as part of the control order.

The importance of relocation as a measure to be made available to the police in meeting the terror threat was made clear at the evidence sessions held by the Public Bill Committee. We heard evidence from Deputy Assistant Commissioner Stuart Osborne, for whom, like my right hon. Friend said, I am starting to feel slightly sorry. She quoted him, but I will repeat the important bit of the quote again because it will concentrate the mind of the House:

“The relocation issue has been very useful for us being able to monitor and enforce at the current time. Without that relocation, and depending on where people choose to live, that could be significantly more difficult.”

He added:

“The new freedoms that will be given to individuals will significantly increase the challenges that we have to face, and managing those challenges will increase the resources that we need. The degree to which we are successful in managing them depends on both the extent of the Bill and the additional resources that we get.”––[Official Report, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Public Bill Committee, 21 June 2011; c. 5-6, Q 10 and 14.]

The importance of relocation as a measure was further highlighted by Lord Howard and Lord Carlile. Lord Howard, the former Home Secretary, has described the power as the single most useful power in ensuring that the package of measures that we have is sufficient to keep us safe.

It is clear from the evidence that the police gave to the Committee that the additional risk created by removing relocation from the TPIMs regime could be mitigated by the additional resources, but it would not be eliminated and there are of course degrees of mitigation. In Committee, DAC Osborne was only “hopeful” that the risk would not increase if the Bill were passed, which does not fill me with a huge amount of confidence.

It is clear, and we must recognise, that there is an irreducible minimum number of people who pose a serious threat to our country and we have to have an adequate and effective way to manage that risk. Relocation is clearly an important part of that package of measures. It is our view that, if the new clause is added to the Bill, the policing challenge that DAC Osborne and others will face will be reduced and our collective security protected. It has always been our concern that if this Bill closes off the power of relocation to the Home Secretary—if it deprives her of being able to use that power—that would deprive her of an incredibly important tool in her kit bag for dealing with the threat posed by a very small number of people. For those reasons, we will support new clause 1 in the Division.

[Richard Fuller]

It is a pleasure to be able to make a brief contribution to this debate.

I listened to the rhetoric of the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) in her opening speech in support of her new clause, and it made me even more scared about giving Administrations a fiat on the treatment of people in our judicial system, rather than leaving that with the judges. On many occasions, both in this debate and in Committee, the right hon. Lady talked about the importance of balance, but I feel that, in the sharpness of her rhetoric and the blithe way challenges were laid down and comments were made about loosening and potentially putting us at risk, her speech did not betray any balance whatever. That highlights one of the risks in giving the Executive the power to restrain and control people who have not been brought to justice. Both in the specific instance of relocation and more generally in the tone of Opposition Members, a disservice is being done to this Government’s attempts to return us to some semblance of the traditions of British justice that we achieved before the period of the so-called “war on terror”—before 2001—and we should remember that control orders were not introduced until 2005, and that therefore they were not in place between 2001 and the Iraq war, which some would argue was the period of greatest risk.

I wish to make a couple of comments on the specific issue of relocation. I have a lot of respect for the right hon. Lady and I do not mean to pick on her; I am just picking on her point. I challenged her earlier about democratic countries from which she drew inspiration. I could not think of any either, so I did some research on a well-known search engine. I looked up forced relocation of individuals. Kazakhstan featured prominently. There were also a few honourable mentions for Cambodia—not the current Cambodian Government, but I think we can work out which Government—and for Burma. Kazakhstan, Cambodia and Burma are not exactly the paragons of virtue in this respect that I would like our Government to follow as they attempt to strike the difficult balance of maintaining both the security of the nation and the liberty of the individual.

May I also refer to one not particularly tabloid-friendly comment on relocation? A number of Members have talked about meeting people who are subject to a control order or its equivalents and who have been subject to relocation. We must remember that those subject to control orders have not yet gone through full justice in our country. Many other countries, including the United States, have laws against cruel and unusual punishment. Relocation has the most significant negative impact on the mental health of these individuals. In evidence in Committee, Dr Korzinski said:

“What I am concerned about…is the absence of any sort of safeguards with respect to the impact on the mental health of the individuals who are subjected to these regimes. I can say quite unequivocally that it has been catastrophic in all the cases that I have worked on.”––[Official Report, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Public Bill Committee, 21 June 2011; c. 43, Q121.]

That may not be the most popular of reasons to oppose the right hon. Lady’s new clause, but there are also many others, such as support for our justice system and achieving that balance that she advocates, but which I do not think she spoke to today. I shall support the Government on this new clause.

[James Brokenshire]

My hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Richard Fuller) made some powerful and important points in his succinct contribution.

As I think the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) accepted in her opening comments, we are revisiting a subject that we debated in detail in the Public Bill Committee, when amendments with the same effect were tabled by Opposition Members and the same arguments were made in support of them. As was made clear following the carefully considered counter-terrorism review, despite the aspersions that the right hon. Lady seeks to cast, the Government concluded that it should not routinely be possible under the TPIM system to require an individual to relocate, without consent, to another part of the UK.

The debate in Committee frequently turned to the question of balance—specifically, the balance between protection of individual liberty and security for the wider population. This is an area where there is a very careful balance to be struck, and where views on where the right balance is may differ. The previous Government took the view that compulsory relocation was necessary as one of a wide range of potential obligations under the control order provisions. Our conclusion, as we made clear in January, is that a more focused use of the restrictions available under the Bill, together with the significantly increased funding we are providing for covert investigation, will allow us to protect the public effectively without the need for this potentially very intrusive power to be routinely available. That is where our approach departs from the Opposition’s, and why we are seeking to strike a different balance from that marked out by them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Richard Fuller]

Unlike the shadow Home Secretary, many of us regard this as a lost opportunity to put behind us legislation that is a scar on our constitutional and judicial structures. References have been made to 9/11, which we will be remembering this Sunday. I was in New York on that day, and the memory is still visceral. The event has unleashed a decade of sometimes good, sometimes poorly thought through legislative responses to real and apparent and sometimes not-so-real threats. Over the years, there has been growing opposition to some of those more extreme measures—the push for 90 days’ detention without trial, the preamble to the Iraq war, with the promotion of non-plots, such as the ricin plot, and the sexing up of dossiers as a basis for our going to war, and of course the control orders. These are all part of an approach to the control of terror that says there is never enough doubt.

This is not a point of balance. We need to have a balance for the rights of all people in this country, and one of the most sacred rights is the right to a free and fair trial. That opportunity has been lost today, but I believe that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has done her best to have a thorough and meaningful review of the measures that the Government consider appropriate for the times. This is not a mere nod-through of legislation. The debate has been robust.

[Hazel Blears]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Richard Fuller]

Very briefly, yes.

[Hazel Blears]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I know that he does not have much time. These are obviously incredibly difficult issues for anybody to determine. What would he do with the handful of people for whom prosecution is not an effective route—because of the need to safeguard intelligence—and who cannot be deported or taken through the criminal justice system, but who pose a significant threat to the safety of the decent, law-abiding people in our country?

[Richard Fuller]

That is an interesting challenge. I will be brief. I simply would not accept the premise that we cannot take them through the criminal justice system. The whole thrust of my perspective is that we should always seek to do that. That is what I would try to persuade Governments of all hues to do. When people, of any hue, get to the Front Bench, they always have access to more information than the rest of us. It is hard for the Executive branch ever to give up counter-terrorism powers, because they would face the sort of challenge that we have heard from the Opposition Front Bench this evening—that perhaps there is some risk or that someone will be caught out as a result of the changes. However, it was always a risk that something could go wrong, even under control orders. The reason it is wrong to give such powers exclusively to the Executive and why they should rightly be in the hands of the judiciary is that the judiciary can make a fair, non-political response to the matters of fact before it.

However, that opportunity has been lost. We shall again have to go through secret evidence, secret hearings, special advocates and no access for the suspect to the evidence against them. I trust our Home Secretary in her review, as many other hon. Members have said they do. We trust that she has done this for balance, and we hope that she is right. However, let me end with a quotation by Shami Chakrabarti of Liberty, which has been strongest in its opposition to the legislation:

“But under that Act”—

the Bail Act 1976—

“you are heading for a charge…It may be a long process…but at least you can stand outside the Old Bailey saying, ‘Justice has been done’…The problem with these administrative, shadowy, quasi-judicial systems is that they potentially go on for ever and you never know why.”––[Official Report, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Public Bill Committee, 21 June 2011; c. 50, Q137.]

We will put this Bill to a vote this evening, and I am sure that the Government will succeed. We will review the position again in five years and hopefully lose this part of our legislation.