Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Robert Buckland and Gavin Newlands

Thursday 6th September 2018 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

Thank you very much Mr Speaker; you are forgiven. I welcome the Attorney General to his post, and it is good to see the indefatigable Solicitor General still in his place.

Given the current knife crime epidemic in England and Wales, with rates up by 54% in three years, I know that the Government and the Met have been looking to Scotland, and particularly Glasgow, where hospital admissions for slashes and stab wounds have fallen by 65% in 12 years. Will the Solicitor General update the House regarding what policies and practices enacted in Glasgow will be replicated in London, or in England and Wales more widely, following a delegation visiting Glasgow?

[The Solicitor General]

Yes, the hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to raise the excellent Glasgow example. I am making plans to visit Glasgow as soon as possible. Only last month I spoke to the Scottish Law Officers about their experience. I am deeply interested and want to learn more as quickly as possible.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Robert Buckland and Gavin Newlands

Thursday 21st December 2017 Commons Chamber

[The Solicitor General]

I will try to respond with similar brevity. My hon. Friend is absolutely right to talk about prevention, and we are consulting on further restrictions on the online sale of knives to under-18s, and on tightening up the law on the possession of knives in educational institutions other than schools.

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

I wish a happy Christmas and a good new year to you and your family, Mr Speaker, and to Members and staff across the House.

Knife crime is still a big problem in Scotland, but of the 35 children and teenagers killed as a result of knife crime in the UK so far this year, none was in Scotland. Does the Solicitor General agree that in his and his Cabinet colleagues’ efforts to reduce knife crime, they would do well to look at the work of Police Scotland’s violence reduction unit, which has helped to oversee a 69% decline in the incidence of handling an offensive weapon in a decade?

[The Solicitor General]

We have a long history in the England and Wales jurisdiction of learning lessons from our friends in Scotland, and I would be interested to explore those particular factors further with the hon. Gentleman. I am sure that we can enter into correspondence on that.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Robert Buckland and Gavin Newlands

Thursday 14th September 2017 Commons Chamber

[The Solicitor General]

The hon. Lady is right to say that all parts of our community deserve protection from the law. Only a few weeks ago, I was glad to take part in a hate-crime awareness campaign, which was launched alongside the CPS’s publication of new, revised guidelines, which particularly emphasise the scourge of online hate crime. I assure her residents and, indeed, those in my constituency that when such crimes are perpetrated, no effort will be spared in detecting the perpetrators and dealing with those crimes, because there is a clear public interest in doing so.

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

In relation to crime, and bearing in mind the Government’s insistence on excluding the EU charter of fundamental rights, does the Solicitor General agree that it is wrong for them to allow what the Law Society of Scotland called

“the potential for the erosion of human rights”,

despite different parts of the UK having voted to remain in the EU?

[The Solicitor General]

I do not see an erosion in human rights. The Government are absolutely committed to our membership of the European convention. The charter of fundamental rights does not add anything substantive to UK human rights law, and the underlying principles of EU law will, of course, be brought into our domestic law by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. The hon. Gentleman can reassure his constituents that the Government are utterly committed to rooting out hate crime wherever it exists.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Tenth sitting)

Debate between Robert Buckland and Gavin Newlands

Committee Debate: 10th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 21st April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

On a point of order, Mr Owen. May I add my remarks to yours? We wish my hon. Friend well and hope that he has a swift recovery from his operation.

Clause 109

Implementation of warrants

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

I beg to move amendment 293, in clause 109, page 87, line 39, leave out subsection (3).

This amendment would remove the provision which allows a targeted equipment interference warrant to be served on a person outside the UK for the purpose of requiring that person to take action outside the UK.

--- Later in debate ---

[Gavin Newlands]

I will not detain the Committee long. I hear what the hon. and learned Gentleman says and broadly agree with it. I rise merely to point out the differences between the two amendments before us. The SNP’s amendment would insert an additional subsection that adds the additional defence and leaves subsection (3) in, whereas the Labour amendment removes that.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras. We are familiar with the arguments and our response is that the information gateway, which allows people to take concerns directly to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, caters for the public interest. For that reason I urge him to withdraw the amendment.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Eighth sitting)

Debate between Robert Buckland and Gavin Newlands

Committee Debate: 8th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 19th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Gavin Newlands]

I will not detain the Committee for too long; these issues have already largely been addressed. Amendments 304 and 305 seek to remove paragraphs (d) and (e) from clause 78(2). In a Bill replete with vagueness, those two subsections stand out as being particularly vague. The new clause that I will come to in a moment would require a data retention notice—or warrant, as we would wish—to be issued only for a specific investigative or operational purpose. The SNP has tabled amendments that will bring greater clarity to when and why a warrant would be issued.

As we know, communications data are defined as data that would be used to identify, or assist in identifying, the who, where and how. However, instead of allowing a blanket surveillance approach that treats everyone as a suspect, the amendments would allow the police to apply to a judicial commissioner for targeted retention warrants, in which data are required for the purposes of a specific investigation into serious crime, or for the purpose of preventing death or injury. I trust that these amendments are acceptable to the Government.

[The Solicitor General]

I rise to address the concerns of the hon. Gentleman. It is good to hear from him; I should have said that during the last group. He has made the point about his concerns of vagueness. However, I would argue that it is very important that a notice can have a degree of flexibility within it, because a single telecommunications operator may provide a number of different communications services, such as mobile telephony and internet access. However, there may be different complexities and sensitivities about the different types of communications data that are generated by those services. Considerable preliminary work is carried out between the Government and telecoms operators in advance of the service of a retention notice. That covers a number of issues, including the type of data that will be retained, the complexities of the operator’s systems, and the relevant security requirements. Flexibility is needed to ensure that the notice can appropriately reflect those issues, and that it imposes the minimum requirements necessary to meet the operational requirements.

What we are counter-intuitively getting at is to make sure that there is necessary give and take within the system to prevent what the hon. Gentleman and I would regard as an overweening approach from the Secretary of State, which would impede the ability of communications service providers to carry out their operations. For that reason, I respectfully urge him to withdraw the amendment.

[Gavin Newlands]

I hear what the Solicitor General has said, but I do not wholly agree with him. I reserve the right to bring this back at a later stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Gavin Newlands]

The SNP has tabled the amendments to provide for clear, appropriate and limited grounds on which data retention warrants may be issued. The amendments require that the data to be retained are specified and that organisations served with warrants to retain communications data should be identified rather than merely described.

Amendments 315 and 317 affirm that organisations that have been served a notice or warrant to retain the communications of their customers are properly and explicitly identified. The term “description of operators” is far too vague and we urge that it is changed to “or operators”. Amendment 328 ensures that those organisations are defined and named before a retention notice can be issued. Amendment 338 removes the possibility of the Home Secretary being able merely to describe the telecommunications operators that she wants to target. Amendments 361, 374 and 375 provide the basis for a concrete description to be included when there is any variation of a notice.

The amendments attempt to bring to the Bill some clarity, which is sadly lacking. It is not good enough that the Home Secretary can sign a notice that merely describes who is impinged on or directly affected by these intrusive powers, because that approach opens up the space for the powers to be abused. We need to act to ensure that, as much as possible, we operate a targeted approach.

[The Solicitor General]

I understand the purpose behind the amendment in that, in the opinion of the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North, it would ensure greater specificity in the giving of notices. However, I shall give a brief example of what a “description of operators” might be. With this provision we would have been able to give the same retention notice to all wi-fi providers supplying wi-fi to the Olympic park in London during the 2012 Olympics. In these circumstances the operators are providing precisely the same kind of communications service and the data required to be retained are the same. Whether a notice relates to a description of operators or to a single operator, it can only contain what the Bill’s provisions allow and the Secretary of State must consult with the operators to which it relates. Operators also have the opportunity to refer the notice back to him or her in relation to any aspect of it. Therefore, on that basis, I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

[Gavin Newlands]

I am content to withdraw the amendments at this stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Gavin Newlands]

This is the first speech I have made in this place that has required an intermission. It has been suggested that I start from the beginning as I cannot remember where I had got to. I am nothing but a crowd pleaser, Ms Dorries, but I have found the place where I left off, so I shall continue.

I was saying that the question whether the Bill is in accordance with the law is up for debate. If this part is left unchanged, Liberty and others suggest that it will be in conflict with human rights law, including breaching the EU charter of fundamental rights and freedoms. In July 2015, the High Court upheld its challenge and struck down sections 1 and 2 of the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, finding them incompatible with the British public’s right to respect for private life and communications, and protection of personal data under articles 7 and 8 of the EU charter of fundamental rights.

In addition, we should be mindful that the challenge against DRIPA is ongoing and that the outcome will have an impact on whether this part of the Bill is lawful, although I suspect not. On that basis, I question whether ICRs will do the job the Government intend them to do. The Home Office has become entrenched with regard to ICRs and its fixation with them is clouding its ability not only to look at alternatives, but to assess whether ICRs are proportionate, necessary or in accordance with the law. The SNP believes that ICRs fail those three basic assessments.

I want to quote an unlikely ally, who, in 2009, said in Committee:

“Our consideration of the regulations comes against the backdrop of an increasingly interventionist approach by the Government into all of our lives, seemingly taking the maxim ‘need to know’ to mean that they need to know everything. Certainly, we need to know what the Government’s intentions are in relation to the creation of a new central database, which would create a central store of our electronic communications.”—[Official Report, Fourth Delegated Legislation Committee, 16 March 2009; c. 6.]

That ally was none other than the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire), now Minister for Immigration at the Home Office, speaking in a Delegated Legislation Committee on an EC directive with very similar provisions to parts of this Bill. That statutory instrument was passed by the House, but notable opponents included Members who are now Scottish Secretary, Home Secretary and Minister for Security—the Minister in charge of this Bill.

We in the SNP are mindful of the evidence that has been presented and submitted to the Committee, but it is our opinion, backed up by case law, that the power to retain ICRs is incompatible with the right to privacy and the protection of personal data, and I urge hon. Members to amend the Bill and ask the Government to think again.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to hon. Members for this important debate, which, although it relates to an amendment, inevitably strayed into what is, in effect, the stand part debate on communications data.

The hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North set out his case comprehensively, but his arguments relate to measures and proposals that are not before the Committee. We have moved a long way from 2009, and certainly from 2012, when the original draft Bill was considered by a predecessor Joint Committee. We are not in the situation where the Government will hold a centralised database. That sort of measure was rightly opposed by my right hon. Friend the Minister for Immigration and other of my hon. Friends at that time, because we are naturally suspicious of an organ of Government directly blanket-holding such data.

That is why this provision is not remotely like that. It does not contain anything like the provisions that the hon. Gentleman rightly cautions against, most importantly because the retention of that data is not in the hands of Government. That arm’s length approach is a key difference, which I am afraid undermines all the seeming quality of his argument.

[Gavin Newlands]

Will the series of private databases under the Bill be any safer from hacking than a central Government database?

[The Solicitor General]

The hon. Gentleman makes a proper point about security. This, in respect of the code of practice and in collaboration with the industry, will be at the forefront of everybody’s mind. What is important is that the Government do not have a pick-and-mix or help yourself avenue within which they can mine data for their own capricious purposes.

The framework of the Bill quite properly severely circumscribes the circumstances within which the Government can seek access to that material. Most importantly, when it comes to content, the warrantry system—the world-leading double lock system we are proposing—will apply. An internet connection record is not content; it is a record of an event that will be held by that telecommunications operator. It relates to the fact of whether or not a customer has connected to the internet in a particular way. If it goes further into content, the warrantry provisions will apply. It is important to remember that framework when determining, and describing and putting into context, what we are talking about. The Committee deserves better than indiscriminate shroud-waving about prospects and concerns that simply do not arise from the measures in the Bill.

The hon. Gentleman quite properly raised the Danish experience. The Danish Government and authorities are in regular conversation with the United Kingdom Government. That dialogue goes on because they are naturally very interested to see how our model develops, although there are important differences that should be set out briefly. The Danish legislation was not technology neutral, unlike these proposals, because it specified two options that proved unworkable. We work with operators case by case so that the best option for their network at the appropriate time will be determined. The Bill builds on existing data retention requirements, such as the retention of data necessary to resolve IP addresses, which regime already exists under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. The full cost recovery underpinning by the Government means that there is no incentive for communications service providers to cut corners, as I am afraid happened in Denmark. There are important differences between the two.

The hon. Gentleman rightly talks about IPV6. Although it is a great aim and something that all of us who have an interest in this area will have considered carefully, it still is, with the best will in the world, a way away, I am afraid. It will take a long time for all service providers to implement in full, and until then, there will be both types of system. Even with IPV6, CSPs may choose to implement address sharing or network address translation, meaning that it is not the guaranteed solution that perhaps has been suggested. Servers who host illegal material are much less likely to move to that system, meaning that, in practice, IPV4 may well remain with us. We therefore have to act in the interim, because, as has been said, the drift away from what I have called conventional telecommunications to the internet carries on whether we like it or not. We have to face up to the world as it is, rather than the world as we would love it to be, and therefore take into account the fact that we are in danger of being unable to detect criminality and terrorism.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Robert Buckland and Gavin Newlands

Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 14th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Lady. I am not saying that another name cannot be added. With a wider original warrant that says “Persons A, B and others unknown”, of course an extra name can be added. If the warrant’s original terms of reference are narrow—if they just include A and B—adding person C requires applying for a new warrant. With the greatest respect, I cannot make it any plainer or clearer than that. An ordinary warrant cannot be turned into a targeted, thematic warrant; that is the point. If a new warrant is needed, it must be applied for, and then the double lock will work.

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

Will that not be an incentive to make all warrants wide? The Solicitor General is saying that, when the original warrant is narrow, additional warrants will be needed, but when it is wide, names can be added.