English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting)

Sam Carling Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th October 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Vikki Slade]

There is a role for experts, but the role of the commissioners, as they are seen through this lens or this organisation, is far better suited to people who are elected. Councils around the country, including Manchester, can appoint individuals to do specific roles for a specific period of time, but the role of commissioner lies in those strategic decision-making pieces that are integral to their shape, and they ensure that an individual cannot independently run a fiefdom. I think it is really important that there are local people who are accountable. There is nothing to stop an organisation from appointing an individual expert, as they do all over the country, but they do not need to be called “commissioners”.

[Sam Carling (North West Cambridgeshire) (Lab)]

With your permission, Sir John, I will make some references to schedule 3 as well as clause 9, just to do it all in the same place. I will start by responding to some of the hon. Lady’s points. She raises some valid concerns. I will just give the perspective of someone who lives in quite a fractious combined authority area. I think my combined authority board currently has two Conservatives, two Lib Dems and two Labour—that is not enough people, so it must be 3:3:2, but I cannot remember which way around.

We also have the Manchester system at the moment, whereby different people hold different portfolios, which has led to a lot of politicisation. We have a Conservative mayor now, and we previously had a Labour mayor, but under both there was a lot of game-playing going on and a lot of difficulty, so I think it would be helpful for the mayor to be able to appoint commissioners just to get on with delivering their strategy. They are directly elected, and although I disagree with my mayor on a lot of things, I accept his mandate. It may well be helpful for mayors across the country to be able to deliver the strategy that they have stood on.

My concern relates to the relative sizes of combined authorities in a uniform approach to commissioners, and whether we can look at how to deal with that. To give an example, Greater Manchester has 3 million residents; Cambridgeshire and Peterborough has around 1 million. Similarly, the Greater Manchester combined authority has 3,500 staff—or 4,600 if you include Transport for Greater Manchester—while Cambridgeshire and Peterborough combined authority has 139 employees, according to a freedom of information request from March 2024. The difference in scale is significant, and obviously the amount of work for commissioners to oversee is therefore significant.

I do not want to put the Minister on the spot now, but could she write to me at some point to give context on whether the Government have considered modifying the number of commissioners that a combined authority mayor can appoint with respect to that variance in size, or perhaps the allowance payable to those commissioners, so they would be more part time in smaller authorities? I note that amendment 293, which we will discuss later, relates to allowances, and I can imagine that the Government want to allow flexibility so that local areas can do what is best for them, which makes perfect sense.

Within my area, if commissioners were paid at director level, that could cost well over £1 million. Senior officers can earn in excess of £100,000, which is a significant sum, and it is more than mayors themselves or many Government Ministers earn. That may well be appropriate in London, where it works and seems to be doing a great job, but London is a lot bigger than some other authorities. I thank the Committee for listening to those thoughts, and if the Minister could give some clarity on how we can deal with some of those issues, I would be really grateful.

[David Simmonds]

The Opposition have some sympathy with the points that have been made in the debate. It is an area in which there is scope to move towards a degree of consensus. I think that we all recognise that part of the underlying thinking behind the mayoral combined authority is that it brings a new element of leadership, and from those models where they are established, such as in London, we can identify some of the issues. As we heard at the start of the Committee, there is clear evidence about accountability.

One of the issues that persists in London is that there are a number of advisers—whether they are commissioners or not is a moot point—who undertake sometimes quite highly paid roles on behalf of the mayor, but they are not visibly accountable to the GLA, the boroughs or anybody else. That begins to undermine public confidence, and it clearly creates a sense of distance between those who are elected and those who they are there to serve.

While I agree that there is no reason why somebody who is elected should not occupy those roles, one of the issues with the proposed amendment is that there is clearly a risk of constraining them—in particular, in relation to the wording of the proposed amendment. When we consider some of the statutory roles that might be occupied—directors of children’s services, statutory directors of social care, monitoring officers, section 151 officers and others who have legal duties—there is a risk that by defining it as narrowly as the amendment does, we create some concerns about the interaction between those who are part of the professional officer corps that serves local government and those who are political appointees. I do not think that that is intentional; it is simply a risk that arises from the way in which it is drafted.

We will not be supporting the amendment, but I am mindful of the comments that have been made by those on the Government Benches about the need to ensure that those who occupy the roles are fit to do so, and that they are publicly accountable, because they will be public servants and they need to be answerable to effective scrutiny measures for the work that they do.

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[David Simmonds]

These amendments concern the remuneration of commissioners and have two purposes.

There is a long-established principle within the arrangements for the remuneration of elected officials in local government that an independent panel, which is able to take evidence from the public and other good sources in the local area, will make a recommendation to the local authority about what the scheme of allowances payable should be. That brings a degree of transparency. Councils are currently required to consider the recommendations and to update their scheme from time to time, including voting to renew it each year. That has certain elements. One is whether commissioners—in this case, those who are appointed and are part of a mayoral combined authority—should be eligible for the local government pension scheme.

We heard an announcement from the Secretary of State on this issue, and it is the view of the shadow team that it is a sensible step. Changing the local government pension scheme from a final salary scheme to an average salary scheme was led by councillors, and it was instrumental in convincing a very large body of appointed officials to move over to that scheme, saving the taxpayer millions of pounds. However, it is also important that those appointed as commissioners are considered for eligibility and that each mayor is transparent about the recommendations and advice they have undertaken around that.

The second point to consider is around remuneration. We often hear it cited that there are people in the civil service, the NHS and local government who are paid more than the Prime Minister, which is used as a benchmark for excessive pay. Whether or not we agree with that—personally, I do not, as I recognise that there is a professional salary structure for these roles, in which those people will participate for the whole of their careers, that is very different from the context for politicians—it is none the less important to recognise that those who are appointed into mayoral roles should be subject to some degree of constraint.

As is the case with local government, it seems reasonable that we do not see elected officials appointed on a very significantly higher salary than senior professionals who are advising in the same field. The amendments aim to bring a degree of transparency and rigour to that, and to ensure that, in the potential circumstance where a mayor chooses to stretch the limits of their powers of appointment, shall we say, there is some degree of constraint so that the public can see that the taxpayer pound is being carefully husbanded.

[Sam Carling]

We have just heard the Minister speak about having statutory guidance on this issue. Does the hon. Member agree that one way of making this change, rather than through these amendments, would be for the guidance to include some clear indications to the remuneration panels about what roles they should consider comparable for mayoral commissioners. That might be council leaders or cabinet members rather than senior officers; or it may be senior officers, where appropriate.

[David Simmonds]

I understand the issue that the hon. Member is highlighting. One thing that emerged from the debate about councillor pensions was that they were essentially taken away by a decision of Parliament, without the process of legislation. One of the risks here is that statutory guidance, robust as it can be and coming with a duty to “have regard”, can be changed quite quickly. Therefore, if this is not clearly set out on the face of the Bill, the ability of this Parliament and of local communities, as we are observing, to exercise the degree of accountability and scrutiny that they might wish is undermined. That is why we have proposed these amendments.

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[David Simmonds]

I draw the Minister’s attention to the existing arrangements for independent remuneration panels. She has referenced the proposals for how this kind of situation will be handled. However, we can envisage circumstances such as those that we heard about in Greater Manchester, where the mayoral commissioners are effectively drawn from the leadership of those local authorities.

There is a degree of ambiguity in proposed new sections 52A(6) and 113E(6), which refer to allowances paid

“in respect of the same special responsibilities”.

For example, I think of a situation where someone is a cabinet member with responsibility for transport in a constituent authority and also undertakes a strategic transport role as part of the combined authority. We as politicians would recognise that those are two different things, in the same way that a Minister undertaking duties in the Government is paid separately from their role as a Member of Parliament because those two things are distinct.

Transparency and clarity are important to retaining public confidence. Clearly, we do not want to create a situation where there is a degree of dispute, such as where a mayoral combined authority expects the constituent council to pay, or vice versa, and where an individual who wishes to take up those duties is inhibited from doing so. It would be helpful if the Minister could set out how the statutory guidance will address that issue so the Committee can be confident that we will not see this act as a barrier to participation in the governance of these new authorities.

[Sam Carling]

I have some more thrilling financial commentary, so I hope the Committee will forgive me. First, I welcome what the Minister has just said. Exactly this situation happened in Cambridgeshire and Peterborough, where our mayor went on medical leave for some time. His deputy, Councillor Anna Smith, who is a good friend of mine, ended up taking on the deputy mayoral role, so she had to drop hours at work and faced a significant loss of income. Our council took the decision to pay her as essentially a cabinet member, but it was not ideal. Clause 10 will resolve so many issues.

I want to highlight a discrepancy in that, at present, there is usually no allowance for members who sit on the combined authority board. A lot of the time, it is the leader of the council who does so, and it is often considered to be part of their portfolio, but it is not always leaders who sit on the board. That can lead to people taking on a very significant commitment without any financial support, despite potentially having to reduce hours at work and the like, if the councillor in question has a job, as many do. That is not conducive to having a diverse range of elected representatives to do these jobs.

Following local government reorganisation, if we have fewer leaders on boards and more holders of other portfolios and councillors, we may see this problem increase. I encourage the Minister to consider either altering the clause or making other provisions as the Bill progresses to allow combined authorities, if they wish, to pay an allowance to their board members for that role.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I understand the concerns expressed by the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner and the context in which that could arise. Our judgment is that if the independent remuneration committee does its job, we can mitigate around that. There is always a balance. We are trying to live the spirit of the Bill and to create as much autonomy, space and power for the mayor and constituent authorities to make such decisions, rather than us specifying nationally. As we get representations from strategic authorities going through the process, we will reflect that in statutory guidance, but we think we have the right balance. The important role that the remuneration committee will play will help to mitigate some of the risks the hon. Member mentioned.

On the specific example raised by my hon. Friend the Member for North West Cambridgeshire, we are not prohibiting elected members from sitting on the combined authority. It is within the gift of the combined authority. Again, we are giving as much flexibility as possible for an authority to come up with measures that work for a particular local area.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 11

Mayoral combined authorities and CCAs: precepts