English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Siân Berry Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 2nd September 2025 Commons Chamber

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

There are ideas in this Bill that devolve powers that we Greens can support. A layer of strategic government with funding and fundraising powers could empower areas of the country, such as Sussex, to improve daily life for our citizens and could strengthen democracy. However, it is worrying that the process for doing that so far and the ways in which decisions are moving forward on the reorganisation of local government have not listened to people who want to maintain their district and borough councils and have not properly engaged local people in devising new proposals rather than just commenting on them. If this is done without consent or respect for local areas, it will not be democratic or empowering.

Clause 57 is very unfair in grandfathering in existing mayoral arrangements for local councils but not preserving any committee systems—not even those chosen recently by referendum. On fair voting, the Bill is inadequate. For the new elected mayors, the Bill specifies a supplementary voting system that is better than first-past-the-post, but, as other Members have pointed out, that should be used next year in Sussex. Also, for the new authorities where new councillors are being elected, there is a genuine missed chance to have a fairer voting system for councils too.

The Bill is dangerously light on the democratic scrutiny of new mayors and combined authorities, and poor on standards in public life. There should be transparency duties on mayors to disclose their lobbying meetings, as Ministers do and all MPs should. Mayors will also be able to appoint commissioners for different areas of their powers, which will be powerful positions that are likely to be well remunerated. Yet the Bill appears to be silent on any higher standards of accountability, transparency or conduct for such people. Mayors and commissioners should all come under the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, as other people in this place do. There are big missed chances in the Bill in terms of new duties for poverty and inequality, climate, nature, healthy air, land and water pollution and health, particularly in relation to the impacts of transport and housing policy. On health determinants, the Bill mentions prosperity but not poverty or inequality; nor does it mention the huge chance to improve health by cleaning up filthy air pollution. Why not?

Greens will be arguing for all these goals and duties and more to be put in place firmly and clearly in the Bill, and for them to be matched with powers, funding and the ability to raise and use investment for homes, transport, education, justice, social justice, public health and all these other things to close the gaps that have so shamefully grown under successive Governments and continued Labour austerity. This Bill could help to deliver great things, but it will take many big changes, much work and much listening to good ideas from this part of the House for the Government to achieve that.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Second sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 16th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Andrew Cooper]

Q Do you believe that this Bill will do that?

Gareth Davies: As we have said, it is not going to be quick or easy, but this is the right approach. It is just going to need substantial application of shoulder to the wheel and strong leadership of the new Local Audit Office, when that is created. That will make a big difference because it will have a loud voice in this area of work, and all the levers necessary to acquire the capacity required to perform to a high standard and to restore proper accountability. Even though we know that will not be easy, and we have explained why it is not simple, I think that is the right approach.

Bill Butler: This is getting tedious, but I agree with Gareth. It is a local issue. It is fundamentally important that we recognise that these are local democratic bodies and that the Local Audit Office, and auditors, need to operate independently from them and without unnecessary interference from anywhere else. The job needs to be done properly, and framework in the Bill for reforming local audit is exactly the right direction to go.

As I think we said, we need to address a number of environmental issues now to see that benefit. The risks you described apply to all 716 sets of unassured accounts. In my experience in this area, although audit does not always find a problem, I find it difficult to believe that there are not significant problems lurking where audits have not been completed. I hope there are not many. I would be delighted, but very surprised, if there were none.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

Q I want to press you slightly on the make-up of audit committees. Mr Davies said that it was not for him to say, but given the varied make-up of councils across the country, I do not think it would be too hard for you to say that an opposition councillor could be the chair, or something along those lines. In your experience, what makes a good audit committee?

Gareth Davies: It is about the person and their skills and approach more than any office they hold or party they come from. You need the right approach and the right skills to do a good job. I have seen elected politicians fulfil that role brilliantly. The reason I said what I said is that I am a bit suspicious of anything that says, for example, “We must have an independent chair who is not a member of the council.” The audit committee is there to be part of the council’s governance arrangements. If it is too independent of the council, it does not engage with the machinery of running the council or influence the decision makers sufficiently, in my experience. If it is entirely made up of members who, with the best will in the world, do not have the skills required to perform a role that sometimes has technical elements, that model also has weaknesses.

The best models I have seen consist of a cross-party committee of members who are very interested in getting value for money for the taxpayer and ensuring that controls are operating properly across the council, and in ensuring that the council is maintaining public trust; you need people with those kind of motivations, supplemented with some independent membership. The chair does not necessarily have to come from that independent membership, but it must be somebody who is prepared to read all the accounts and ask difficult questions about why a surprising number has appeared out of nowhere.

That is why I would not be prescriptive. You need a mix of skills around the table and the committee must be connected to the leadership of the council, so that difficult messages coming out of the audits are relayed to the decision makers, raised in full council if necessary, and certainly raised with the executive or the mayor. That linkage needs to be clear and fully operational for it to work properly.

Bill Butler: That is not different—

[The Chair]

We are going to finish.

Bill Butler: I will be brief. I have chaired quite a few audit committees, but not in local government. A good audit committee works. It ensures that the organisation operates effectively by being part of it, while everybody knows that if it has a problem, it will voice it and it will be trusted. That is what you are looking for in any audit committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We will now hear evidence from Richard Hebditch, coalition co-ordinator at the Better Planning Coalition, and Naomi Luhde-Thompson, member of the Better Planning Coalition steering group and director of rights community action at the Better Planning Coalition. We have until 5 pm for this panel.

[Siân Berry]

Q Could each of you lay out what you think are the benefits of the Bill from a planning perspective? Are there lessons from London? We just listened to John Denham talking about how there is a gap at London level below the unitaries, but there is nothing in the Bill that is changing the way the boroughs are, and maybe that works; maybe it does not. Can you tell us more about that?

Richard Hebditch: I think the Bill could be a very powerful tool from a planning point of view. The ability to co-ordinate across housing, transport and planning is really important. As in the London model, which obviously you know very well, that can be very powerful. One thing that is interesting with the Bill is the comparison with London’s accountability. What has been really important in London is the fact that you have the directly elected Assembly, committee structures with powers, and active civil society and media. There is also the statutory passenger watchdog in London, London TravelWatch, of which I am a board member. There is a developed infrastructure to scrutinise what the strategic authority and the mayor do, and that is important. Particularly given the increased powers there will be for strategic authorities elsewhere to call in planning applications and have mayoral development bodies, it is important to have that level of accountability.

[Siân Berry]

Naomi, do you have anything to add?

Naomi Luhde-Thompson: I could mention a little bit about public participation, but I do not know if you have a question on that later.

[Siân Berry]

Q Others might. I want to move to duties. We see duties for health and health inequalities in the Bill already. Are there any other duties that you would like to see added, potentially in Committee or at the next stage?

Richard Hebditch: As I mentioned, these are potentially very powerful bodies, as the Bill collects powers and duties from other legislation, rather than being a stand-alone piece of legislation. The health duty is potentially important. We would like to see duties around climate and nature. Those are long-term issues; they are not the kinds of things where, as a mayor or an authority, you are under short-term pressure—or, necessarily, pressure from central Government—to deliver, but they are really important. In the collection of duties from elsewhere—on local transport plans, for example—there are duties to have regard to national policy, but not in terms of the exercise of your functions, so these strategic authorities will be powerful delivery bodies in their own right, not simply as plan-making and strategy bodies, which makes it important to have those climate and nature duties as well.

Naomi Luhde-Thompson: The Labour Government in Wales introduced a different format in the Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015—a public authority duty. It has a series of goals, and each public authority has to carry out those duties in relation to their functions. I should declare that I am a member of the Eryri national park authority, so I have a very close view of how this is actually carried out. It comes to the point about where the public interest is in the proposals in front of us. There is growth and a bit about health, but where is the public interest? It does not seem to me to be properly explained or described in the Bill that this is all about delivering on the public interest—what is the Government’s role in doing that?

There is a bit of confusion between the two Bills. Look at the health duty in this Bill and then look at the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, which is obviously in the Lords at the moment. There is no consultation for health groups in the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, but there is a health duty on the combined county authority. It is just not connected. On the spatial development strategies, it is not particularly mentioned as a group, but there is a duty on the CCA, so it is really important to examine the connection between the two a bit more closely.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q I have two questions, one at the strategic level and one at the community level. Obviously we are pushing through strategic planning powers for mayors. I am interested in your assessment, given your huge expertise, of whether that is the right function, and what we need to do to ensure that it delivers sustainable development, which is obviously our objective.

At the community level, we obviously want to build in a way that is sustainable, but we need to make sure that there is public consent. I am interested in how we ensure that strategic planning powers sit alongside community engagement and community consent to make sure that there is a whole place sense of the direction of travel and the development that needs to happen, in a way that builds public support.

Naomi Luhde-Thompson: On public participation, the UK is a signatory of the Aarhus convention. Article 393 of the trade and co-operation agreement is really clear that when you are doing something that has an impact on the environment you must have a proper process of public participation. It must happen at an early enough time to influence the outcomes; otherwise, what is the point of having people involved? You are literally just asking them, “What colour do you want the gates to be?” You are not asking them to be involved in the full decision.

The issue that you have here—I will talk about the products that are produced—is that, if you look at the spatial development strategies, it specifically says in the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, in proposed new section 12I of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004:

“No person is to have a right to be heard at an examination.”

That is completely the opposite of what you have on local plans: any person who makes representations must be given the opportunity to be heard in front of the examiner. That is not going to send out a strong signal that you actually want people to participate in the making of these spatial development strategies.

It is not a sell-out event to go to a plan examination, so I do not think that you need to be worried about that. I do, however, think that you need a right to be involved at that stage, and it cannot be at the discretion of someone else. I think that is one of the issues: if you have to wait for somebody else to give you consent or permission to enter that space, you do not have a right to enter it, because it is at somebody else’s discretion. That is why the formulation of such a right of access—a right to participate—is really important.

Your other point was about the duties, and how that is carried out. I would be really interested to see how the local growth plan is supposed to comply with, for example, the environmental principles policy statement. How does it combine with that? How does it combine with the spatial development strategy? What is the interaction there? It is quite complex, if you look at the organogram of the different plans that, if you are a member of the public, might affect and shape the place in which you live, and therefore what the purpose of all these plans are—whether they are there to achieve sustainable development in the public interest—and how you are supposed to get involved in influencing the outcome of the decisions that are made through these plans.

Richard Hebditch: It is probably also worth talking about the resourcing of all this. As people have discussed, we have the local government reorganisation at the same time. The new format for local plans, which are out of date, has new housing targets as well. Then we have the SDSs—spatial development strategies—on top of that. How do we make sure that we have the resourcing to develop all those things, which are happening at the same time? We then have wider planning reform, and we might have another planning Bill in the new year. There is a lot of potential chaos at the same time. I am sure the Government want to address that, and the resourcing for planners to develop the SDSs is very helpful, but there is a risk of not necessarily having a clear road map for how you get to that place. As I was saying, we are very supportive of the idea of spatial development strategies and the strategic layer, but the journey there is going to be quite chaotic. I think it would be good to look at issues around workforce skills and the timing of all the different things that are going on.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mrs Blundell]

Q Thank you, Minister, for appearing before us today. In Rochdale borough, where I am an MP, we will never forget the appalling case of Awaab Ishak, who of course was the two-year-old toddler who lost his life as a result of the local housing association’s failures. This came after Rochdale Boroughwide Housing removed elected representatives from its board. They were the people who could voice the concerns of local people on the representative body. Do you agree that local councillors or the local authority should be represented on housing boards, and that their statutory role on those boards would only serve to strengthen the voices and protect the rights of tenants?

Miatta Fahnbulleh: We are clear that councillors have an absolutely fundamental role to play in the democratic system that we are trying to create. They are not only elected, but champions and conduits for their community.

As we drive through these reforms, there is a question about how we build on the power of councillors and the role that they play, whether within our neighbourhood governance structures or, indeed, in how they interact with the mayor, and the accountability and scrutiny of the mayor.

You can have our assurance that councillors have a fundamental role in the landscape and are part of the infrastructure that we need to build on. There are huge opportunities for that as we take the process forward.

[Siân Berry]

Q Minister, has today’s evidence shown a gap opening up, with the simultaneous creation of unitaries alongside these new mayoral bodies, in terms of real professional scrutiny, accountability and actual checks on these powerful new bodies between elections? In particular, will you look again at resourcing the scrutiny of the mayors and bringing in opposition-led scrutiny, which is what has existed successfully and constructively in London for 25 years now?

Miatta Fahnbulleh: We recognise that, if you like, the scrutiny landscape is not as it should be, which is why some of the measures that we are driving through the Bill try to address that. We are moving at pace and creating institutions at pace—we recognise that and do not resile from it. We are doing so because we looked at the inheritance and were not pleased with it, so we thought that we had better make some progress in the time that we have.

However, it is absolutely the case that strong, accountable leaders are only as strong and accountable as the scrutiny institutions that you build around them. I think they have emerged organically in some instances, but we hope to use the Bill to create more structure around that so that alongside—hopefully—powerful mayors and powerful local authorities, we have that scrutiny function in place. Again, we will learn from what is working well and we will look at how we build on what is working well.

[Siân Berry]

Q My question was about resourcing. Have you had assurance that you will get some resources for this?

Miatta Fahnbulleh: Resourcing is a challenge across the piece. As we think about the structures that we are creating, we are also thinking about how we build capacity, because if we do not do that, we will create structures that will not be effective, which is not the outcome that we are trying to achieve.

[Lewis Cocking]

Q Minister, we have heard a lot of evidence today about how metro mayors work in urban areas—we have heard some successful examples. However, we have hardly heard any evidence at all about metro mayors in the shires or in rural communities. How do you see the positives of metro mayors working in rural communities?

Miatta Fahnbulleh: There are two things that I would say. Even in our urban areas, or what are defined as urban areas—for example, North of Tyne—there are big rural constituencies within them. Actually, many of our metro mayors straddle urban areas—in some instances, there are core cities—and rural areas.

The benefits are the same for both. If your starting position is, “How do we drive economic growth?”—that is one of the big issues—the evidence of the last decade and a half, as well as that from other countries, is that such a strategic level creates a massive opportunity to unlock growth. That is as true for our urban areas as it is for our rural areas.

However, I would also say that, yes, there is a model that we are trying to drive forward, but it has to be specific to particular places. There will be different constellations, if you like, of strategic authorities. That is okay, because what matters is that we create governance structures that can fundamentally drive outcomes that are tailored and specific to those areas.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Third sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th October 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We absolutely recognise the hon. Member’s point about democracy. Directly elected mayors can play a powerful strategic role. They are a key new part of the devolution architecture that we have seen work well across the country. I point to Greater Manchester, which has delivered the fastest growth of any local economy. They sit alongside strong democratic structures that we will have in local government. The Bill is complementary to that and does not cut across or undermine those structures.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. This is not my first Public Bill Committee, but I have had the whole summer to forget how these things work, so I look forward to being firmly guided by you if I stray from good practice.

I will speak to new clause 35. In that context, I emphasise how friendly, constructive and helpful the new clause is intended to be as a way of getting the Committee started on a good note. I ask Ministers to take the need for it on board, although I will not press it to a vote. I tabled the new clause to ensure that, more broadly, words such as “strategic” and “local”, where they relate to a level of government or a level of area of policy, have a consistent meaning for strategic authorities, constituent authorities and community-level groups.

I will give some examples of possible confusion growing in the areas cited in new clause 35. We have a strategic road network, which is in fact a national network managed by National Highways. We have new strategic authorities, which will have to manage a key route network, analogous to the Transport for London route network. We also have local roads managed by local authorities. In the Bill, however, we have strategic authorities being asked to make a local transport plan. That could be more helpfully named a strategic transport plan.

Another area of policy I am very familiar with is the community infrastructure levy. In later clauses, we will discuss new applications of the mayoral community infrastructure levies. I have experience of how, more locally, spending on what most local councils call strategic community infrastructure levies is done by local authorities. Decisions on local CIL spending, which is what councils normally call is, are made closer to the community, often by ward councillors or neighbourhood forums.

We are slightly better off in planning, where there is a national basis for decisions on nationally significant infrastructure, and where strategic planning applications may be called in by regional strategic level mayors under current or new structures. However I do think that we lack rigour, sometimes logic, and often clarity in all these terms now. More thought about making things more standardised and easier to understand would be very welcome. I am not proposing a vote on this new clause, but what I would like to hear from the Minister today is that she will take this away, ask for at least a report on the current range of terminology we have ended up with in different areas of policy, and consider potential further amendments and the fuller review the new clause calls for.

[The Chair]

As a point of advice, if people want to contribute after I have called the Minister to sum up then just let me know in advance and I will call the Minister at the end, so she can respond to a variety of points that have been made. I do not want the Minister to have to keep getting up and responding to every speech. I know people are new to Committee, but it helps the Minister be able to sum up her consideration of all the points that have been made.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I am sympathetic to the intentions behind the new clause, and the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion makes a good point regarding the tapestry of terms that we have in a very complicated local government structure; however, the Bill already includes defined terms relevant to interpreting local government structures. For example, clause 1 defines exactly what strategic authorities are. My concern is that taking a one-size-fits-all approach might have unintended consequences by altering existing definitions that have been deliberately tailored to work in specific legislative contexts. My view is that as we go through this process of standardising the new structure, with strategic authorities now established in legislation working alongside local government and community structures, the roles and the definitions of different structures of government will become much clearer. I hope the hon. Member will not press the new clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Functions of Strategic Authorities and Mayors

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move amendment 261, in clause 2, page 2, line 21, after “economic development”, insert “, poverty and socio-economic inequality,”

This amendment would make poverty and socio-economic inequality an area of competence for devolved authorities, ensuring they can take action to address the root causes of disadvantage in their areas.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

[Siân Berry]

The amendment relates to the fact that the new strategic authorities simply must be tasked with reducing inequality as well as creating growth. We know that growth for growth’s sake does not trickle down or help everyone equally. The strategic authorities must be tasked with understanding, measuring and reducing socioeconomic inequality. The socioeconomic duty in the Equality Act 2010 is not yet commenced for England, but if it were the amendment would have to be made.

The amendment would make poverty and socioeconomic inequality an area of competence for devolved authorities, ensuring they can take action to address the root causes of disadvantage in their areas. As co-chair of the all-party parliamentary group on poverty and inequality, this is an issue close to my heart. In July, the officers and I sent a letter to the Secretary of State for Education and the Minister for Women and Equalities to ask about the urgency of commencing the socioeconomic duty. We said,

“The urgent need for the duty could not be clearer. Rising child destitution, increasing reliance on foodbanks and untimely excess deaths attributable to austerity policies all highlight the imperative for a legal tool to reduce socio-economic inequalities”.

We also said,

“Activation of the Socio-Economic Duty marks an important shift from piecemeal responses to rising poverty and widening inequalities, to a proactive systemic approach, embedded across all policy areas”.

The Bill is an opportunity to embed those principles.

I do not believe that these two actions—the commencement of the duty and the writing of this Bill—are mutually exclusive in achieving these goals. I cannot see why, given the Government’s promise to enact the duty, the new bodies should not be set up with it in place and in mind. I know that organisations including many local authorities are already preparing to comply with it in England. Towards the end of last year, one of my Green party colleagues on the London Assembly questioned the Mayor of London with some urgency about the work that he is doing with local authorities and agencies across London to prepare for this. We are now approaching the end of this year and it is still not in place. I believe that the Bill is the right place to start putting this into legislation.

I do not plan to push the amendment to a vote, but I would like to hear more from the Minister about when the Labour Government plan to bring the duty into force, and what plans Ministers have to use a statutory instrument to apply it to strategic authorities and mayors. Even if they will not accept the amendment, I would appreciate anything on the record asking those bodies to get ready for the duty, so that when they are set up, they can hit the ground running on addressing poverty and inequality in their areas.

[David Simmonds]

The Opposition have some sympathy with the amendment, but we spent time reflecting on its implications and appropriateness for the Bill. I suspect that, to a degree, the Minister and I agree on this point. If we reflect on the legislative framework around our local authorities from their earliest origins, the relief of poverty and addressing inequalities—the duties that the amendment refers to—have been enshrined. It goes back as far as the Poor Laws, but in more recent years the National Assistance Act 1948 compelled all local authorities to support those destitute in their areas, and the Localism Act 2011 gives scope for local authorities to use their economic powers through activities such as procurement in ways that specifically benefit the local area.

The Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023, which was much debated and broadly had cross-party support, is reflected in a lot of this Bill. It was specifically about local authorities using their powers to support the economy of their local area. Just a short time ago, some of the members of the Committee were in this room debating the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, in which the Government set out a vision—contested to some extent—about how those measures affecting local authorities will address persistent issues of inequality. We recognise that sometimes that is about legislation, but sometimes it is about Government action.

Mention has been made of food banks, which were rolled out under the last Labour Government as a means of addressing persistent issues of poverty. I remember them being opened during my time as a local authority councillor, and Gordon Brown visiting and saying, “This is an example of how we expect local authorities to address some of these persistent issues.” Local authorities already have these duties at both the strategic and the micro level. I question whether it is necessary to add an amendment that, in essence, reflects existing duties throughout all the different tiers of local government in England.

--- Later in debate ---

We believe that the intent and objective are right, and that we have set out the thematic areas in a way that allows mayors the discretion and ability to work across a range of policy areas to deliver that objective. I hope that the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion is happy with that explanation.

[Siân Berry]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Single foundation strategic authorities

[Vikki Slade (Mid Dorset and North Poole) (LD)]

I beg to move amendment 4, in clause 3, page 2, line 27, leave out subsections (1) to (3) and insert—

“(1) A unitary district council or a county council may submit a proposal to the Secretary of State for designation as a single foundation strategic authority.

(2) A proposal under subsection (1) must be prepared in such form and contain such information as the Secretary of State may by regulations prescribe.

(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations designate a unitary district council as a single foundation strategic authority if—

(a) a proposal has been submitted in accordance with subsection (1), and

(b) the Secretary of State is satisfied that the designation is appropriate having regard to the need to secure effective and convenient local government in relation to the areas of competence.”

This amendment would restrict the Secretary of State's power to designate a single foundation Strategic Authority. Instead, a local authority would initiate the request by submitting a proposal to the Secretary of State.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Holmes]

As the hon. Lady knows from when we were on the BBC’s “Politics South” programme some weeks ago, I rarely agree with Liberal Democrats, but I suspect that she and I agree on this point. I know that she stands for her area and, as a former council leader, for the wider area, and that she knows a lot about the Isle of Wight. I did not know that she got married there, but I am sure it was a lovely wedding, because the Isle of Wight is a beautiful place steeped in history. She is absolutely right that while Hampshire and the Isle of Wight have been together geographically, they have also been together in the way organisations have worked, over hundreds of years. I see the Solent as the water motorway connecting the mainland to the Isle of Wight. We could not interact without having it there. “Hampshire and the Solent” is the wrong name for the proposed mayoralty, because it leaves out the distinct identity of a proud people on the Isle of Wight.

[Siân Berry]

I want to express my sympathy with the amendments related to the Isle of Wight. It is not miles away from the area that I represent, Brighton Pavilion. I know many people there who are similarly proud of their distinct identity. I note that the name for the new combined authority that will envelop Brighton is “Sussex and Brighton”. If it is good enough for us, it is good enough for the Isle of Wight.

[Paul Holmes]

I agree. I have had many a night out in Brighton, and I know that it is a very vibrant city. If it is good enough for Brighton to be named within that county, I do not see why the population of an island in this United Kingdom should not be named as part of its mayoral authority.

I say to the Minister, in the same spirit of co-operation in which I know she will respond, that if there is no movement in the decision on the name, that risks wider implications for the Bill. Many other areas will then start to think about why we went through the parliamentary boundary commissions’ changes to the names of our seats. That was a very difficult thing; people were not recognised.

The Isle of Wight has a precedent for being treated differently. It has always received special dispensation in the boundary discussions that we have had before. It would therefore be perfectly sensible for the proud and great people of the Isle of Wight to be recognised and have their name in a proud county name, if this devolution goes forward.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th October 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Moving from devolution by deal to devolution by default is at the heart of the Bill. Clause 6 and schedule 2 are essential to achieving that. The Bill ensures that strategic authorities have a consistent set of functions, and these provisions standardise how they exercise those functions. Many existing strategic authorities have complex and varied arrangements for agreeing fundamentals such as budgets and transport plans. That makes it hard for the public to understand how decisions are made and, therefore, to hold the strategic authority to account.

The provisions in clause 6 and schedule 2 would create a transparent and consistent default voting arrangement—a simple majority. It would unblock decision making to ensure that the right decision, even if it is difficult, can be made. In mayoral strategic authorities, the mayor must be in the majority for a vote to pass. Mayors are directly accountable to all voters in their area, so it is right that decisions cannot be made if they disagree. The Government expect mayors and other strategic authority members to continue to work together to build consensus. We heard time and time again in the evidence sessions that the model works well when the mayor works in partnership with its constituent authorities, but it is important that one member cannot get in the way of the right decisions being made for the entire area. It is therefore imperative that clause 6 and schedule 2 remain within the Bill to ensure that mayoral strategic authorities can operate effectively, and to provide the public with clarity on how decisions are made, so they can hold these institutions to account.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I rise to speak to new clause 48, tabled in my name. I also want to raise another issue for consideration by the Minister at a future stage.

In clause 6, the new rules for mayoral combined authorities give simple majority voting for relevant decisions by bodies to adopt budgets or policies, such as spatial development strategies, local transport plans and other strategies set out elsewhere in the Bill. For example, schedule 2 outlines that

“a resolution to adopt the strategy is to be made by a simple majority of the constituent members present and voting”.

There are other rules to do with a tied vote.

I think that the Bill should also amend the Greater London Authority Act 1999 to give simple majority voting for decisions by the London Assembly on the budget and mayoral strategies of the Mayor of London. That is for consistency of decision making across the different authorities and bodies, and for fairness to London’s democracy. Along with many Opposition Members, this is something that I have wanted for some time now, as I was a member of the London Assembly in my previous job. In these Committee debates I will frequently bring up examples from my long experience of being part of an effective scrutiny body in a devolved authority at the strategic level—I feel that I have a good handle on how it works.

Using “a simple majority” is the right way to go about this. The Minister has talked about building consensus and working in partnership. I really value it when cross-party working can result in genuine dialogue, with mayors that will listen and make changes, and bodies scrutinising or working with them to put forward their own ideas and have them taken up. Those are all really healthy things for our democracy. New clause 48 would simply amend the parts of the 1999 Act that outline how the Assembly votes. Currently, the Act requires at least a two-thirds majority for any changes to be made, and the new clause would instead insert the words “a simple majority”. It is a very simple change, which the Minister should consider.

The second issue I want to raise relates to forward plans, which are incredibly useful for the general public, or anyone who wants to influence mayoral decisions and the decisions of combined authorities or local authorities. At the moment, only local authorities have this particular requirement written into law, under the Local Authorities (Executive Arrangements) (Meetings and Access to Information) (England) Regulations 2012, which clearly set out how key decisions are to be included in forward plans. I am not talking about planning decisions but key decisions, as set out in the schemes of delegation. Those forward plans are required to be published in advance, so that people who want to influence or scrutinise those decisions can bid to change them, or for things to be taken into account at the appropriate time.

Again, this certainly comes out of my experience in the London Assembly. It unanimously passed a motion in 2022 that was put forward by one of the Liberal Democrat members and me, which said that the Mayor of London should publish a forward plan. However, he did not agree to do that, as he said that he was complying with everything in legislation; so the answer seems to be for legislation to require both the Mayor of London and these new combined authority mayors to publish a forward plan along the same lines. Looking at the 2012 regulations, it would be very simple to change the current wording, “local authorities”, to “strategic and local authorities”, if the Minister wanted.

I also point the Committee to the excellent report published last month by the GLA oversight committee, a cross-party committee currently chaired by a Labour member of the London Assembly. It makes exactly the same request: for a forward plan of key mayoral decisions to be put into the 1999 Act. Because of the complexities of the different regulations, I have not tabled an amendment for such a change, but I hope the Minister would consider the question of effective scrutiny of these new bodies and the ability to influence them. I hope she could potentially come forward with a new clause at a later stage for us.

[David Simmonds]

The Opposition support the amendment; the principle of having a simple majority is sound. In oral evidence, we heard about why Manchester works and London does not, and there is a logic to implementing those measures consistently across the country. We support introducing that consistency.

There is a broader question, however. I understand what the Minister and the Government are trying to achieve; it would clearly be frustrating if one authority was effectively acting as a blocker. However, I asked the Minister earlier to give us some assurances about the treatment applied when financial impacts occur that affect one or more of the constituent authorities in a combined authority area. There will be cases—we have seen them in planning, for example—where an authority argues that to deliver its housing target, a site in another local authority’s area must be developed, because it does not have sufficient developable land to hit the target that it has been given; legally, it is not that authority’s decision. There will be other examples.

I am mindful of some of the Government’s amendments that introduce a lot more scope into this Bill for mayors and combined authorities to undertake their housing responsibilities. One of the main routes for funding is through borrowing against the housing revenue account, which is ringfenced. Each individual local authority has a legal duty to balance that account and the power to borrow against it; it also holds all of the legal housing duties and responsibilities. The purpose of the measures is to make mayors the vehicle for the delivery of asylum accommodation, as opposed to asylum hotels, as is the case now to some degree. Yesterday, on the Floor of the House, another Minister in the Department alluded to this in his response to a question about asylum accommodation.

Those decisions will have a significant impact on the legal obligations of the authorities that sit beneath the mayoral authority. There is a risk that being outvoted in a decision made at combined authority level would put an individual constituent authority in breach of its legal obligations to balance its dedicated schools grant, its housing revenue account or some other element of its council tax account. Will the Minister, either now or in writing, set out what arrangements will apply in the likely situation of a conflict between the legal obligations on a constituent authority to balance the budget and the strategic decisions put forward by the combined authority? How will the conflict be resolved without undue detriment to the constituent authority in particular, which is the one that will find itself in court?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will respond to the amendment to clause 48, and then I will pick up the specific questions from the hon. Member. The GLA has a different and long-established governance model. In London, the mayor is elected by the people of London to make decisions; the Assembly’s role is to scrutinise those decisions. As a London MP, I think that model has worked well for London for well over 25 years. It is tested and it strikes the right balance between the executive authority of the mayor and the scrutiny of the Assembly.

[Siân Berry]

It is notable that recently the London Assembly has, on a number of occasions, made constructive changes to the mayor’s budget at stage one of budget setting, which have simply been overturned at the second stage. This tendency, I think, is part of the growing need for a change in the threshold.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We think that the model works well. We have heard representations from constituents, local authorities, Assembly members, and the mayor himself. Any model needs to evolve; as we think about how we expand the powers of the mayor, which we want to, we will also be thinking about reforming the GLA to make it fit for purpose in the 21st century. We will take into consideration some of the points that have been made in this Committee.

On the specific question about decisions at the strategic authority level putting an individual local authority in breach of its legal obligations or jeopardising its financial viability, all our experience of combined authorities is that they always operate within the legal duties of constituent authorities. I struggle to think of an example where constituent authorities have been put in such a position by their mayor and the decisions of the collective. There are sufficient safeguards in place to mitigate that risk.

I hope that majority working will benefit the collective area. This Government will make sure that clear legal obligations on constituent authorities are not breached. I am happy to write to the hon. Member to provide further reassurance on that point. I think we agree that we want clear and effective decision making with a democratic mandate, that will not jeopardise individual authorities by forcing them to breach their legal requirements and/or putting them in financial distress.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Simmonds]

The Opposition have some sympathy with the points that have been made in the debate. It is an area in which there is scope to move towards a degree of consensus. I think that we all recognise that part of the underlying thinking behind the mayoral combined authority is that it brings a new element of leadership, and from those models where they are established, such as in London, we can identify some of the issues. As we heard at the start of the Committee, there is clear evidence about accountability.

One of the issues that persists in London is that there are a number of advisers—whether they are commissioners or not is a moot point—who undertake sometimes quite highly paid roles on behalf of the mayor, but they are not visibly accountable to the GLA, the boroughs or anybody else. That begins to undermine public confidence, and it clearly creates a sense of distance between those who are elected and those who they are there to serve.

While I agree that there is no reason why somebody who is elected should not occupy those roles, one of the issues with the proposed amendment is that there is clearly a risk of constraining them—in particular, in relation to the wording of the proposed amendment. When we consider some of the statutory roles that might be occupied—directors of children’s services, statutory directors of social care, monitoring officers, section 151 officers and others who have legal duties—there is a risk that by defining it as narrowly as the amendment does, we create some concerns about the interaction between those who are part of the professional officer corps that serves local government and those who are political appointees. I do not think that that is intentional; it is simply a risk that arises from the way in which it is drafted.

We will not be supporting the amendment, but I am mindful of the comments that have been made by those on the Government Benches about the need to ensure that those who occupy the roles are fit to do so, and that they are publicly accountable, because they will be public servants and they need to be answerable to effective scrutiny measures for the work that they do.

[Siân Berry]

I want to participate in this debate, despite having not tabled any amendments. I am grateful to the Members who have done so. The issue of commissioners is interesting. It is also interesting that the Government have chosen this model to codify in the Bill. From my experience, I believe that the London model of how this is done is far ahead of other combined or strategic authorities that already exist, and of the Government’s imagination in terms of the Bill. London Assembly members are used to having the equivalent of commissioners—deputy mayors—to scrutinise. The Assembly members do that effectively, not only by asking the deputy mayors questions and making them accountable, but also by providing them with evidence and new ideas, and by highlighting problems across the strategic area. Many effective changes have been brought through in that way.

However, to have those kinds of commissioners without that level of scrutiny is a mistake. In that respect, I am not in favour, and I am not convinced by the argument from my Liberal Democrat colleagues that people who are separately responsible for running services—many of them statutory services—and who have a lot of other responsibilities and duties in the constituent part of the strategic area are the right people to be given those kinds of roles. It is a really interesting question.

I have also found that, aside from a very short period when a Green deputy mayor was appointed to serve under an independent mayor in London, most mayors seem to be allergic to appointing anyone from an opposition party to any of those roles. There are examples of independently minded, effective, delivery-focused people. Chris Boardman, in Manchester, was mentioned. However, there does seem to be a party political element to the appointment of the roles, if the Minister and the Chair were to look at the record.

In conclusion on this clause—and it will come up in relation to other parts of the Bill—we collectively need a wider discussion about scrutiny and governance of the new roles. Some of the comments earlier from the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner suggested that if we all got together in a room, we might be able to come up with a better idea than what is being proposed. I very much agree with that. There are things that we should be discussing.

It was pointed out to us in evidence that we will lose something like 90% of our elected representation in certain areas. In certain parts of the country, people will end up with somewhat of a deficit of overall elected representatives—people to come to with casework. More should be looked at on whether or not a model more like the London Assembly could be adopted, where people are separately elected with strategic responsibilities. In London, there are constituency Assembly members, and Assembly members who are London-wide and take a more strategic view. Those are good models that have worked, and the Government and others should look at that. It is not up for debate today, but my new clause 15 proposes a review of scrutiny, which I will argue for later. When the Government come to look at this in review, which inevitably they will have to do, I hope they will look again at potentially having more directly elected—

[David Simmonds]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Siân Berry]

I will.

[David Simmonds]

I am listening attentively to what the hon. Lady described. We heard in evidence from Councillor Sam Chapman-Allen of the District Councils’ Network that under these proposals, shire England stands to lose 90% of its elected representation, which the hon. Lady referred to. There is not anything really concrete in the Bill that sets out what scrutiny should look like—what those minimum standards should be. There are elements about conduct and things like that, but that is very basic. Does the hon. Lady have a view about what a good model should look like, so that local residents can exercise their control over what happens in their neighbourhood effectively?

[Siân Berry]

I am attempting in my speech not to be too biased towards what I am used to, because that is a failing as well. We should discuss this in a very open way. Other new clauses I have tabled contain proposals for things such as a citizens assembly. We should look at international examples as well. When there are proposals to spend a significant amount of money on the commissioners, there is value in spending an appropriate amount on decent scrutiny and elected representatives. Again, I am biased—I am an elected representative. I think we are good value, but that is a case to be made.

Finally, I cannot find any mention in schedule 3 about guidance that the Secretary of State may issue to commissioners about conduct, standards and transparency. I would like some reassurance from the Minister about guidance on those aspects of the job. Even if they are not elected, they are accountable to the public and must be given a process and regime of standards, and potentially be brought into existing standards systems. Without scrutiny, standards and regulations to govern their behaviour, I worry about this in the same way as several other Members today have.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Commissioners can and will support mayors in getting the job done for their communities. They are not compulsory. There is no obligation on a mayor to appoint commissioners, but it gives the mayor the option of increasing capacity and expertise to do that. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion talked about the example of Greater Manchester, where they have council leaders who are portfolio leads. It is worth pointing out that Manchester also uses commissioners—for example, on active travel—so it can be complementary or can supplement. It is just giving them an additional set of levers in order to respond.

It is also worth pointing out that there will be some roles that the mayor has accountability for that they simply cannot delegate to councillors—for example, strategic planning powers, where direct delegation to a commissioner might expand the mayor’s capacity to dispense with that responsibility. However, to the point about checks and balances, which has been made time and again, it is important to be clear that we completely agree on the need for accountability for commissioners. They will be accountable to the mayor for their performance, who has the power to terminate their appointment, and the combined authority or combined county authority must also agree before any non-mayoral functions are delegated to the commissioner. Critically, the combined authority or combined county authority overview and scrutiny committee will also have the power to recommend the termination of commissioners if they think the commissioner is not performing or delivering. A two-thirds majority of members of the authority is required to accept that recommendation.

[Siân Berry]

Does the Minister believe that the people who are able to recommend that the commissioner be terminated have sufficient ways to discover whether or not they should be?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The hon. Member made the point about the scrutiny of commissioners, which is a fair and valid point, and my hon. Friend the Member for North West Cambridgeshire made the point about flexibility in different contexts, particularly for smaller strategic authorities. We have come at this in such a way as to allow local areas as much flexibility as possible, but these are valid points about making sure that the model is flexible enough to respond to specific contexts. We will provide further detail in statutory guidance on the selection and appointment of commissioners, as well as other operational matters that the combined authority or combined county authority will need to consider, and we will take some of the points that have been raised as we do that in due course.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Simmonds]

That was a fairly shameless political pitch, but we should just reflect on the debates that took place across the Dispatch Boxes yesterday during Housing, Communities and Local Government questions, when it was highlighted that we have a Mayor of London who is quite happy to issue precepts to indulge his personal political priorities but is an abject failure in discharging his mayoral functions around housing. Thousands of people are unable to find homes in the capital because the mayor is failing to build out more than 300,000 planning permissions that have already been granted by the local authorities. That is an injustice that is being inflicted on the citizens of our capital, and this provision, as envisaged by this Labour Government, potentially inflicts the same, or an even greater, injustice on other areas of the country. For those reasons, we remain deeply concerned about it.

Particularly in an environment where, as we heard earlier, local authorities were left £1.5 billion worse off—net—by the Government’s decision to introduce additional taxes on their employees, the temptation will be for the mayoral precept to be seen as the catch-all or safety valve through which additional taxes can be extracted to meet whatever demand central Government choose to impose, without central Government being accountable for it. That is why we oppose the measures.

[Siân Berry]

I had not previously heard the Conservatives’ argument on this issue, and I have to say that I disagree. The Minister said that the original intention of the policy was to allow for a wide range of precepting, and if there is one thing that directly elected mayors are really accountable for, it is the level of precept that they set.

I am in favour of creativity in conversations with the electorate about what initiatives, appropriate to the local area, might be funded by precept on a short-term basis or just in the local area. The way that the provision is set up allows mayors to be properly accountable for that. I worry less about it resulting in huge tax rises without consent, because consent is built in at election time.

I appreciate the concerns about austerity continuing in councils that are underneath and part of the combined authority if mayors are taking up available taxpaying powers. In every debate in this Committee, I would love to bring up the fact that all this reorganisation is happening in the absence of an end to austerity. The Government need to provide more funding to local councils so that this is not all being taken in council tax, which is a very unfair tax.

[Vikki Slade]

I have no principled objection to the mayor setting a precept. I found it confusing when I heard Mayor Houchen explain how he had a zero precept. How does anything get done? Where does the money come from? [Interruption.] I am sure he has a salary, and I am sure he has an extensive office that is paid for by someone. I accept that the principle of a precept is, in some respects, self-limiting, but what bothers me is that the combined authority mayors have no referendum cap, unlike upper-tier, lower-tier, police and crime or fire authorities.

It is fire authorities I particularly want to speak to, because although some Government amendments have been tabled on the role of the mayor in terms of fire and rescue, there is almost silence in the Bill about the role of the fire and rescue service, while embracing it completely and almost making the whole service disappear. I am really concerned that fire authorities are already desperately under-resourced. Dorset and Wiltshire Fire and Rescue Service gets £1.76 a week per household. It has desperately been trying to get a 20p per week increase, but has been told, “No, you can’t have that.” There is nothing in the Bill that protects and ringfences any money for fire services, whereas there is more talk about police services. I am looking for some reassurance and commitment about how fire services funding will be properly resourced and ringfenced to make sure that no area suffers as when we had those horrendous wildfires, where fire services had to beg, borrow and steal equipment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Clause 16 will prevent individuals from being a Member of Parliament, or of the devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland, and a mayor of a strategic authority at the same time.

The Government are clear that mayors are central to delivering the growth, economic prosperity and change that local communities want. Already, the impact of our mayors, from West Yorkshire to the North East, from Greater London to the West Midlands, is being felt clearly. However, their responsibilities will only increase once this Bill is in law.

It is right that the role of mayor receives the officeholder’s full time and attention. Both MPs and mayors have a duty to represent the constituents that elected them. Fulfilling two different democratic roles could lead to conflicts of interest, given the differences in public expectations for each role and the differing responsibilities of a mayor and an MP. Clause 16 prevents that conflict and will ensure that regions benefit from their mayor’s full time and attention.

[Siân Berry]

I agree with the principle of not having too many people able to do double-hatting, but it is a fact that there have been overlapping periods when mayors of different combined authorities and London have also been MPs, either at the beginning or end of their term. That has been dealt with in a pragmatic way, with nobody overextending those kinds of double-hatted jobs.

As I understand it, and I would like the Minister to clarify this, writing this rule into statute would mean that, while nobody would be prevented from campaigning to be a mayor or an MP while in either of these jobs, at the moment they are elected, the situation then becomes illegal. An instant resignation takes place on that day. There would be immense disruption across a wide area—perhaps not so much for one constituency, as we have got used to having by-elections for various reasons, but in holding a mayoral by-election.

I wanted to check whether the Government’s intentions here, in making that resignation statutory and instant, are not a bit too much, when these issues have been previously worked out. Does there need to be more detail in the clause to allow for a transition period?

[David Simmonds]

The Opposition have a high degree of sympathy with the points made by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. It is very striking when we compare our local and regional democracy with those of other countries: in our nearest neighbour, France, with the cumul des mandats, there is almost an expectation enshrined in their politics that, for someone to become Member of the national Parliament, they will have represented their area as a mayor. Indeed, when President Chirac cast around to find someone who was eminently qualified to become Prime Minister of that country, he took the view that there was nobody within the National Assembly who could possibly meet that standard; it needed to be somebody from local or regional government. He lighted on Alain Juppé, the well-reputed mayor of Bordeaux, who served with great distinction as Prime Minister. If we begin to introduce restrictions of this nature, it will significantly constrain the ability of our politics to rise to the challenges that our communities and our areas face.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

If I may finish, I will give way to hon. Members. The point about transition is a fair one. To clarify, we are setting out in legislation that, at the point someone is elected as a mayor, they resign as an MP, and vice versa. It is at the point of gaining office that this comes into effect. In response to the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion’s example of the transition period when campaigning, there are flexibilities within that.

[Siân Berry]

I appreciate that, but these are two things in different directions. A sitting mayor who becomes an MP would need to resign as mayor that day, given what the Minister has just outlined for us. A mayoral by-election across a large area is a much bigger thing than a parliamentary by-election, and I am not sure that making it instantly statutorily illegal has been properly thought through.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will take the other interventions.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fifth sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 16th October 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Manuela Perteghella]

I do not think we are seeing that at the moment. We are not seeing it with metro mayors or combined authorities, so that is why we would like to see a mandatory duty to convene.

Mayors wield significant powers over transport, housing, skills and regeneration, and it is imperative that local councils and community representatives are included in conversations about how such powers are used. New clause 42 would also promote joined-up public service delivery, because regular meetings with all stakeholders, including the first tier of councils and local services, will eventually result in better co-ordination on cross-cutting issues, which could be regional.

The measure would also—I will say this again and again—strengthen accountability and transparency in this new, exciting, revolutionary programme. Residents should be able to see that their local leaders are meeting openly and regularly, working together on the priorities that matter most to their communities. The new clause would ensure that. Fundamentally, the point of devolution is to bring power and decision making closer to the people whose lives are directly affected by those decisions.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart—my huge apologies for arriving late to proceedings.

I want principally to talk about new clause 19, in my name, which sets out a duty on mayors to establish a citizens assembly. It would place on the mayor of a strategic authority a duty to convene, within the first year of their election and at least once annually after that, a citizens assembly consisting of local people. There would be an additional non-legally binding duty to take account of the recommendations of the citizens assembly. The new clause defines the term “citizens assembly”, and its account of the method of selection and the need to be representative of the local community are taken from descriptions of citizens assemblies that have already been commissioned by Parliament, including on climate change.

A lot needs to be done to the Bill to help it live up to its title. There is a real need for this kind of empowerment.

[Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)]

In a certain way, the citizens assembly is the electorate, and there is an election for mayors. Why does the hon. Lady feel the need for more engagement and more citizens assemblies, when there is a ballot and a free and fair election?

[Siân Berry]

I take the hon. Member’s intervention in good spirit. I will talk about the ability of a standing citizens assembly not simply to react—even voting, at the end of a mayor’s term, is a reactive act—but to consider and make proposals. Mechanisms for getting ground-up proposals from the local community are lacking in the Bill.

[Perran Moon (Camborne and Redruth) (Lab)]

For clarification, when the mayor is not meeting one of the 80 parish and town councils, they would be meeting a citizens assembly. Can the hon. Lady give an example of any precedent, anywhere, of a mayor meeting with and reporting to a citizens assembly, or is this a new proposal?

[Siân Berry]

The hon. Member asks about the mayor meeting the citizens assembly, which misunderstands what a citizens assembly does. It does not ever have to see the mayor if it does not want to. It is there, in its own right, to consider things. I will explain more about how they work in a moment—

[Paul Holmes]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Siân Berry]

No, because I need to get to end of my sentence. I intend to explain how citizens assemblies are different.

Citizens assemblies are not town hall meetings, and they are not a method for the public to hold the mayor to account. They are a completely different part of democracy, and have been very successful. I mentioned that Parliament has convened one on climate change. We have also seen them used successfully to consider knotty issues in other countries, such as changing to marriage laws to be more inclusive. Where, at the political level, an issue is contentious and divisive, a citizens assembly sitting and considering it can come to quite sensible recommendations—taking politics out of it. It is a good way to build communities of democratic citizens. We know that people who take part in citizens assemblies and have their voices listened to go on to greater engagement and participation in political life.

The method of selection is essentially sortition or lottery. These are people who are akin to a jury—often they are called citizens juries—who are selected as uninterested people, so far, in the issue to be considered. They convene and set their own agenda. They will hear and request evidence. They will hear from people directly affected and potentially from experts. The agenda is driven by them. They then make recommendations. There is no requirement for the mayor to be involved in the process at all, in terms of their time, but the new clause suggests that the mayor should take account of the recommendations when they have been put together in such a careful way.

The new clause also suggests that the agenda of what would be a standing citizens assembly would be discussed and agreed between the mayor and the citizens assembly as it goes forward.

[Mike Reader (Northampton South) (Lab)]

I am a Labour party member, so I love a meeting that is a talking shop—anyone who has ever been to a constituency Labour party meeting will know exactly what my experience has been. The idea behind a citizens assembly is really positive—empowering people—but I see a couple of challenges. First, on the Energy Security and Net Zero Committee we looked at how we get community empowerment, and we could not find a single piece of evidence that said that standing citizens assemblies actually make a difference. They become a talking shop. Could the hon. Member give us an example of where a citizens assembly has successfully happened? That would give some precedence and make it more than just a great idea.

[Siân Berry]

That is a good question. Certainly, the evidence from the citizens assembly that was commissioned by Parliament to look at climate change has been extensively used by the Climate Change Committee when thinking about what interventions in climate policy would work and be more successful. I would enjoy it if more councils put together citizens assemblies on things like traffic reduction policies, because often it is the loudest voices, who are already empowered to talk in public, who are listened to most on such issues.

The closest comparison is to a jury. People respond incredibly well, individually, to being part of a citizens assembly—to the idea that they can consider the issue in the way that they choose as a group and to the way that their recommendations are then listened to. It is empowering. The fact that the title of the Bill has empowerment in it has prompted me to want to talk about citizens assemblies.

[Vikki Slade]

I am really sympathetic to the idea of citizens assemblies. In fact, when I was at Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole council, we looked at how we could create something that was representative of different types of community—a quasi-citizens assembly—including carers, young people and employers, to get more genuine breadth. Having looked at citizens assemblies, the cost per assembly can be hundreds of thousands of pounds. Within the hon. Member’s vision for the new clause, does she have any idea of what the costs might be? Those might need to be balanced.

[Siân Berry]

When I was a local councillor, we spent tens of thousands of pounds on a citizens assembly—again, that was to look at climate measures and issues around reducing traffic and air pollution. I believe it is good value.

[Sean Woodcock]

As a Cherwell district councillor I was very keen on promoting citizens assemblies for the purpose of discussing climate change, but that is not the only thing that people might want to gather to talk about. Is the assumption that the subject would be prescribed by the mayor, or would it be okay for a citizens assembly to get together to discuss the death penalty, immigration or whatever? Could the hon. Lady clarify that?

[Siân Berry]

The new clause specifies that an assembly would consider “relevant local matters” and that those are matters that would be agreed between the mayor and the assembly. Any sensible body would want to be considering issues that are soon to be the subject of decisions by the mayor—that would make perfect sense.

I will cite some polling to show that the public do not have much of a problem understanding this concept. When asked by YouGov in 2023, 55% of people said they would trust a citizens assembly to make policy recommendations in their “best interest”. That compares with 14% of people trusting MPs. In May 2024, YouGov asked the public if they would trust a citizens assembly “a great deal” or “a fair amount” to tell them the truth. Fifty-nine per cent said they would, compared with 17% of people who would trust MPs. Hon. Members can see that this is something that the public respond positively to.

Certainly a mayor who is governing a very large area and seeking to win consent for a policy would do well to have put in place a process of consideration by a citizens assembly. I hope that good mayors out there would use the process to engage citizens as part of wider consultation measures, to get comments on their proposals from people directly affected and a representative sample of the local public.

The proposal is supported by Compass, which I worked with in drafting it. In its “From Whitehall to Townhall: What the English Devolution Bill Needs” report published in August, Dr Jess Garland wrote:

“Across the country, councils have used citizens assemblies to understand local priorities on issues from climate to neighbourhood policing. These practices engage a randomly selected and representative group of residents in the decision-making process, learning about the challenges and trade-offs, and coming to decisions collectively. Such measures aim not to replace representative political structures but to support and add credibility to them, helping tackle difficult issues and improve understanding of local priorities, but they have a wider benefit, helping to build the trust and connection that underpins a thriving democracy.”

[Paul Holmes]

I rise to speak to new clause 19 in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. I wholly respect the reasons why she tabled it. However, I intend to speak against it, because of the burdens that it would place on the mayor, as well as some of the additional costs that it would introduce, as the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole intimated.

I should declare at the very beginning that I am a firm believer in democracy. Just as my party does when it puts itself forward to run this country and I stand for election, everyone who wishes to be a mayor will put before their electorate a manifesto, and if those manifestos are worth the paper they are written on, they will state very clearly what that mayoral candidate intends to do during their term. Occasionally, the Labour party adds things that were not in its manifesto, or possibly drops things that were in it, but a prospective mayor’s manifesto should be very clear about what they want to do for their residents.

Therefore, residents who engage with the electoral process—granted, turnout needs to be higher—will know very clearly what the winner was promising, whether they disagree with them or not. I am accountable to my constituents. A mayor will be accountable to their constituents. What is the point of establishing another body that chooses to meet when it wants and, as the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion said, might not even need to meet the mayor?

[Siân Berry]

I agree that a citizens assembly is not about accountability, but would the hon. Member care to comment on the issues that I raised about trust and consent for policies that are being put forward for implementation?

[Paul Holmes]

I will—that is called an election. That is my point. I understand that the hon. Lady comes at this from a genuine position—I hope she accepts that I do, too—but the accountability and trust element is a general election, or an election for the role of mayor, at which they will be held accountable for whether they have committed to and, more importantly, delivered what they said they would do. That is the key process, and key accountability structure, of the Bill.

Although new clause 19 is very well drafted, it would place a huge cost burden on the new authority, or the mayor, to establish a citizens assembly, not to mention the administrative burden of selecting 40 people from the area “by sortition or lottery”. Although I do not believe in prescriptive legislation, I think that the new clause would be open to interpretation in many different ways and would add huge costs to the operation of the authority or the mayor, at a time when it is generally accepted that the public finances are not in the way they should be. The mayor must not be overburdened in delivering their key priorities and strategic aims by the additional expenditure that would be required.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Holmes]

The suggestion fills me with horror—I am open in saying that it fills me with utter dread. The electoral process is the point. The hackles on my neck stand up when the words “citizens assembly” are mentioned because we have the electoral processes. Already, every day, people out there in our communities form groups and challenge the mayor. Every day in this job, we are lobbied by groups with well-intentioned policy aims.

[Siân Berry]

Has the hon. Member considered the occasional lack of involvement in those groups by a genuine cross-section of the community, and how a citizens assembly could directly address that problem?

[Paul Holmes]

I think that most campaigning groups are filled with people who are utterly enthralled and want to achieve the outcomes of that group. It is a bit of a generalisation to say that there is not a proper cross-section of the community in those groups, because those people are motivated by an interest and an issue that affects them and their lives every day.

The cost and the administrative burden really concern me. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion outlined that new clause 19 would not necessarily force the mayor to engage with the citizens assembly—I believe she said that it “suggests” they should do so—but the new clause clearly states:

“The mayor must…take into account any recommendation made by the assembly either at a convened meeting, or in regular consultation; and…publish a response to any such recommendation within two months beginning on the day on which the mayor first receives the recommendation.”

That is a very different proposition.

[Siân Berry]

As I understand it, the drafting means that recommendations could be made by the assembly

“either at a convened meeting, or in regular consultation”.

[Paul Holmes]

Subsection (6) of the new clause’s proposed new sections clearly states the words I quoted, which include:

“The mayor must…take into account”.

Therefore, what the hon. Lady has said about what the new clause would establish is not necessarily correct. I believe that it would overburden the mayor in his day-to-day role.

I hope that those who read the Hansard report tomorrow will see clearly that I am very much not in favour of citizens assemblies. If a citizens assembly wants to get in touch with me, I will make that very clear. I am not against scrutiny or accountability and I am certainly not against constituents getting in touch with me to suggest how they can make their area better—that is why I am in politics. We all do that every day.

Every mayor, including the Mayor of London and hopefully the Mayor of Hampshire and the Solent, when that role is established, is a politician who is accountable to their electorate. The new clause would overburden the role of the mayor at a time when finances are already tight. I oppose it, and I hope that my party spokesman will too.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Simmonds]

The purpose of amendments 297 and 298 is to forestall the possibility—with reference to the Minister’s earlier comments—that, when in response to a request to collaborate or engage with an issue an organisation legitimately says it is not prepared to do so, that is followed by multiple repeated requests, which would create a situation in which there was a foreseeable conflict that should be avoided. That is the purpose of the amendments, which sit together. We will see what the Minister has to say about how that particular risk will be managed.

[Siân Berry]

I am speaking to clause stand part. Broadly, I very much support the duty. I do not agree with the amendment moved by the Conservatives. I cannot see how that would be logical or work when a mayor or council might well change. Similarly, in the sense that I would like it clarified today, I raise the issue of why the clause only seems to allow for collaboration between pairs of mayors. The various proposed new sections for the different Acts in this clause—often in the proposed new subsection (4)—seem to mandate that the two areas must be adjoining. A mayor may therefore only make a request to a neighbour, and I do not think that they may request to collaborate with a number of neighbours. However, a key transport connection in the strategic rail or road networks could lie in the next mayoral area beyond. A mayor might want to approach the other mayor about the possibility of collaborating on approaching Great British Railways about some financing ideas, for example. Likewise, a key hospital or employer might be in a nearby mayoral area that is not adjoining—a collaborative project at a strategic mayoral level might still be appropriate.

For a mayor in the middle, potentially a chain of collaborations could be set up, but were it a transport link, if the mayor in the middle was not that bothered or was focused on other things, such as digital tech rather than transport links, they might be able to stand in the way. I want to check whether the clause needs some amendment to allow for more flexibility in how mayors collaborate, and with which other mayors.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I note that amendments 297 and 298 relate only to the mayors of combined authorities and combined county authorities, not to the Mayor of London. That inconsistency runs contrary to the Bill’s goal of standardising and simplifying arrangements across England. More broadly, the clause already gives mayors discretion to decline a request to collaborate. The provision is intentionally flexible—it would not be appropriate or practical to prescribe those interactions in statute in advance. Any issues around repeated or unreasonable requests can be addressed through statutory guidance, to which mayors must have regard. That guidance will set clear expectations for constructive engagement without imposing unnecessary legal rigidity. Mayors should retain the freedom to initiate or decline collaboration requests as they see fit, provided they act reasonably and in accordance with any guidance.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Sixth sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 16th October 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (Miatta Fahnbulleh)]

I am delighted to serve under your chairship, Ms Vaz. It is great that there is broad support across the House for this schedule. We have introduced this framework to tackle obstructive parking, so although I appreciate the sentiment behind the shadow Minister’s amendment, I do not believe it is needed.

In common with other traffic management measures, traffic authorities know their roads best and are best placed to consider what level of provision is appropriate and in what locations. The schedule already gives the Secretary of State the power to set what conditions must be in every licence issued and what additional conditions licensing authorities can set, as well as powers to fine operators or suspend or revoke licences where the licence holder does not comply with those conditions. We will publish guidance on best practice for deciding on parking provision and enforcement, but since we think that there are enough safeguards in our proposals, I ask the shadow Minister to withdraw his amendment.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I wanted to make a speculative point about schedule 5, although I have not tabled an amendment.

[The Chair]

If your point is specifically on schedule 5, you can make it when we debate the schedule. We are currently debating amendment 300 proposed to schedule 5.

[Siân Berry]

It is specifically on schedule 5, so I will bob during that debate, Chair.

[Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)]

I rise in support of amendment 300, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner. It is important that we bring in more powers to tackle this issue. When I was leader of Broxbourne council, about six years ago, we were asked whether we wanted to be a trial area for e-scooters—we said no, thank goodness. My constituency is right next door to London, and we have had a number of issues with people parking on the outskirts of London and taking the vehicles out of where they are licensed. Walking around London—not just the Palace of Westminster, but the wider community—we see large problems with hundreds of scooters all in the same place, which I suspect are very popular locations for pick-up and drop-off.

We need more powers for local authorities to tackle the issue. I mentioned earlier that many of councils will want this power now, rather than having to wait for mayoral combined authorities to be set up. Amendment 300 would be important in holding these companies to account. They are getting away with far too much at the moment and it is putting people off walking, especially if someone is pushing a buggy or is disabled. There are lots of issues. I am sure there will be cross-party support, as we have all seen this problem when out and about. We really need to regulate this. I am not always in favour of more regulation, but the companies could have done much more without legislation and have failed to, so it is time for stricter regulation. The amendment would be important in solving some of these issues.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Schedule 5 sets out the details on giving the Secretary of State the ability to empower local authorities to license on-street micromobility services, such as dockless cycle schemes, operating in their areas. We have had a good, broad debate on this, and I think there is support across the Committee for the view that this area must be tackled.

All licensing regimes will contain mandatory conditions and additional local conditions, which will bring the consistency that all parties seek, while ensuring flexibility to meet the needs and priorities of different areas. The framework allows for new micromobility modes, such as pavement robots and e-scooters, to be incorporated in future, to ensure that our local leaders will always be able to manage their streets effectively.

The schedule sets out clear, consistent processes and powers for local authorities to feel confident that these services are operating safely and effectively in their areas, and are well integrated into the transport networks of the future. I commend schedule 5 to the Committee.

[Siân Berry]

As I indicated, I would like to make a rather speculative suggestion in relation to schedule 5, which is to ask whether Ministers have considered, or might consider, extending these kinds of provisions on the licensing of micromobility to also cover managed delivery services, many of which currently use micromobility-type vehicles, or vans. Those tend to cause similar problems, which could be solved in similar ways, and that would add up to helping to achieve the same goals as this schedule.

Essentially, Ministers could add delivery vehicles and managed delivery services to be licensed in the same way as micromobility vehicles. As with this schedule, the details of how that was done would come in guidance afterwards, so Ministers could choose between something relatively light-touch or something a bit more useful.

Reasons to consider this suggestion include traffic generation and the ability to speak regularly to, or regulate, the companies involved to allow for more consolidation, so that journeys are carried out more efficiently. Powers to regulate and license food delivery by bike might be very useful in relation to issues of safety and workers’ rights. We know that freelance delivery riders report huge time pressures and poor working conditions, and people who have problems with how some of the micromobility hire services are used by users also often report the same kinds of issues with delivery riders. Although I do not want to create a huge amount of bureaucracy, I think the issues are similar, and Ministers might look either now or in the future at widening the scope of these kinds of powers for the authorities that we are considering today.

[Paul Holmes (Hamble Valley) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair as usual, Ms Vaz. I want to make a quick remark, notwithstanding the fact that the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner, may want to speak to this. Briefly, I welcome that the Minister’s and the Government’s recommendations, contained in schedule 5. The Minister does not know those of us on the Opposition Benches too well at the moment—she will do by the end of this Bill Committee—but, if she can get my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne to agree to extra regulation, that is absolutely good enough for me. He is well known as somebody with strongly held views about the role of the state in local government from when he ran his excellent local authority and administration. The Minister has managed to achieve something that I, as his Whip, have never managed to achieve.

I welcome this sensible piece of regulation. One of the things I welcome in the Bill is the assurance the Minister has given, and which is set out within the House of Commons Library paper, that it would grant strategic authorities and county or unitary authorities where a strategic authority does not exist. That is a sign that the Government are listening to the wants of local authorities—as the previous Government did when they licensed pedicabs, for example, with my former colleague Nickie Aiken getting that Bill through. I wanted to place on the record that I believe this is a welcome piece of regulation—but the Minister should not get too carried away and start making regulations everywhere willy-nilly.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I want to speak in support of my amendment 368, to schedule 9. It belongs in this debate because it would broaden the issues in schedule 9 beyond simply workplaces. I have been working on the amendment and on these proposals with Transport Action Network—I should declare that I used to work for a predecessor to that excellent campaign. There is a technical part to the amendment and a more forward-looking part, so I will talk about it in three parts.

First, we need to ensure clarity in the Bill about what counts as a local transport plan, in terms of the power to levy what are currently called workplace parking levies, but actually parking levies more generally. Section 179 of the Transport Act 2000 says that a local licensing scheme, which is what a workplace parking levy scheme is,

“may only be made if it appears desirable for the purpose of directly or indirectly facilitating the achievement of local transport policies of the licensing authority.”

I believe that the Bill, however, moves the responsibility for setting such policies through a local transport plan from the local traffic authority to the combined strategic authority, and that other provisions requiring due regard to a strategic authority’s local transport plan do not fix this, as the condition in section 179 of the Transport Act 2000 relates to the authority’s own policies, not other policies it needs to pay regard to. Without an amendment, the Bill could inadvertently scupper proposals that are under development for new workplace parking levies or at least create new legal risks for them.

Many people will know that Nottingham has had a workplace parking levy since 2012, which has helped it to invest £1 billion in transport—not all of it came from the levy, but a lot did—which has made public transport relatively more attractive than driving to work. There has been a virtuous circle of improvements and investment as a result of that initiative. We know that Oxfordshire is considering introducing a workplace parking levy, and Leeds is considering introducing one too, again to invest in new tram infrastructure. Nottingham. Edinburgh and Leicester are also considering that in some detail, and there are definitely discussions in London between boroughs and the Mayor. Several mayors of the new combined authorities could make good use of these powers. It is up to local authorities to do this, and they should definitely be able to do it, which is what I am concerned about.

Secondly, the omission in the Bill of an extension of the power to create parking levy schemes to strategic authorities is odd. Indeed, it is an exception to the other powers that the Bill extends to them. It makes sense to combine this power with the body that in some cases also sets the local transport plan. That does not mean that a workplace parking levy would need to cover the whole of a combined authority area. Parking spaces, by definition, cannot move, so an intricate map of things that were being levied and not levied could definitely be put together. Strategic authorities have the scale to adopt the visionary approach of some of the larger areas making plans that I have already mentioned.

Thirdly, the amendment would do a big thing in extending the current law beyond workplace parking. There are many reasons why I want to argue for that. Since the pandemic, there has been a notable shift from the dominance of travelling to work to other purposes, particularly leisure. We see that on the roads, but we also see it on the railways. It is a general travel trend. It therefore makes sense to consider broadening the scope of levies such as this beyond simply commuting to workplaces, and include other trip generators, particularly when leisure travel makes up the majority of mileage. I want to say clearly that parking spaces on the public highway would be out of scope, no matter what. This would be for parking on private land, and I think the existing rules for workplace parking levies are very clear on that.

I will give a few examples of ways in which this could form part of a truly integrated set of transport policies, be beneficial in generating investment, change travel behaviours and make good applications to things such as safety and congestion. One fairly obvious example is out-of-town retail parking. This would help councils with struggling high streets to level the playing field between those high streets and sprawling out-of-town retail. We see councils around the country subsidising town centre parking, forgoing revenue to revitalise high streets. With this measure, they could instead charge a small fee for parking at out-of-town developments, and make that an incentive as an alternative to forgoing revenue that can be spent on sustainable travel. With new investment, those kinds of parking levies could unlock more reliable, cheaper bus services, improving access to town centres and, potentially, essential things in the periphery of the city for people who do not own a car. Car dependency is a genuine equalities issue.

There is also the question of big car parks. This is a land use question, really. Big car parks use up land. They are very profitable for the private landowners, but this measure could genuinely create a new incentive to convert unproductive land into much-needed homes. Big car parks are often near to city centres, and the higher-density social housing that could replace those car parks would be very desirable to many towns and cities. On a slightly smaller scale, it could nudge owners of under-used garages to redevelop those sites for housing as well, doing infill and increasing the density. I could go on for a long time about the potential benefits to land use planning of enabling local authorities and strategic authorities to make plans for parking that is an unproductive use of land into something better.

Then we have leisure. Leisure uses concentrate in cities and town centres, but in some rural areas, transport and traffic problems are caused by big attractors and tourist destinations. Having a way of raising revenue to improve sustainable travel to those places and disincentivise the promotion of car travel would be excellent. It would increase access to exciting, educational tourist destinations to people who live in urban areas and do not own a car. If attractions outside London or other cities cannot be reached by public transport, people are stuck if they do not own a car. It would potentially be a way of increasing visitors and helping to get investment for more access for visitors to some of these places if we can stop looking at them as places only to drive to.

That is essentially my case. The existing rules around workplace parking levies are extremely rigorous. There is a process for gaining consent, and there have to be public enquiries. There is a good process there that, if extended to other ideas—and the limits on that extension could be set out in regulations—could have a really beneficial impact on transport planning, traffic reduction, car dependency and could potentially increase the viability of towns, cities and rural areas right across the country.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

There are a few amendments to work through, so let me take them in turn. On amendment 246, although I share the desire of the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole to ensure that the general public can hold their authorities to account, particularly on something as important as parking, the amendment would limit the ability of combined authorities and combined county authorities to effectively discharge their functions. It would prevent the mayor and elected members from delegating functions to officers or commissioners—that is the intent of the amendment—but delegating those functions to individuals with the specialist knowledge and capacity to carry out those functions effectively is an important and long-standing feature of how those authorities operate.

I can absolutely reassure the hon. Member that officers are already accountable to the authority, and to its overview and scrutiny committee. The Committee yesterday debated commissioners, and their accountability to the mayor and the oversight committee. Likewise, where a combined authority or combined county authority exercises civil enforcement powers they may do so only with the written consent of relevant constituent authorities. We believe that sufficient safeguards have been put in place to address the important point that the hon. Member raises.

I share the concerns that amendment 348 seeks to address. I agree that vehicles parked on pavements can cause serious problems for all pedestrians, especially people with mobility issues or sight impairment, as well as for prams and pushchairs. All mums in the House, and indeed dads, could attest to that. The Government are already considering measures to address pavement parking. We know and have heard that it is an issue. As the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole stated, the Department for Transport put out a consultation in 2020. We will publish a formal response to that consultation in due course. In the meantime it is worth saying that highways authorities may continue to introduce specific local pavement parking restrictions using their existing powers. We know that pavement parking is an issue. It is an issue that the Government and the Department will come to more fully.

On the specific matter of varying parking charges across different areas, local authorities already have the ability to vary charges within the levels set in national guidance. Obviously, they have to take the decision to vary carefully, and do it alongside public consultation.

Amendment 291 essentially seeks to prevent mayors of combined authorities and combined county authorities from increasing charges for vehicle parking, and from using the proceeds of those charges. The Bill does not provide mayors with powers in respect of parking provision. Parking restrictions inherently apply with localised variations—we acknowledge that. Consistent enforcement across a combined authority and combined county authority area is therefore not appropriate. That is why the Government have determined that powers relating to parking provision should continue to be exercised by local authorities. Combined authorities and combined county authorities will not have powers to provide paid-for parking places. The Bill does provide combined authorities and combined county authorities with the ability to take on powers on civil enforcement of contraventions of bus lanes and moving traffic restrictions. Critically, any proceeds in any case are ring-fenced, in the way that they are with local authorities, for environmental measures and public transport schemes. The scenario would not arise in which parking charges could be used to fund something other than those narrowly defined areas.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 87, in schedule 8, page 142, line 20, leave out from beginning to “that” in line 25 and insert

“under section 33 or 33A of the Traffic Management Act 2004 or under a permit scheme prepared under section 33 of”.

This amends the definition of “permit authority power” in relation to combined county authorities so that it conforms with the definition used in relation to combined authorities in section 89A of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 (as inserted by this Bill).

Under schedule 8, the mayors of combined authorities and combined county authorities will have a power to direct local highways authorities in the use of their powers on these roads, including over traffic, highway, street and permit authorities. The power of direction will help mayors to deliver their local transport plans and assist places in developing more integrated transport networks.

The role of a permit authority is to provide permits for roads and street works. The amendment will make a minor adjustment to ensure that the definition of a permit authority is coherent throughout schedule 8. This is an important amendment to ensure that schedule 8 delivers on our aims of a consistent framework of powers across all combined authorities and combined county authorities.

Amendment 87 agreed to.

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move amendment 328, in schedule 8, page 147, line 7, leave out “key route network”.

This amendment, alongside Amendments 329 to 333 would apply the traffic reporting duty to all local roads within the area of a Local Transport Authority.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 329, in schedule 8, page 147, line 11, leave out “key route network”.

This amendment is related to amendment 328.

Amendment 330, in schedule 8, page 147, line 16, leave out “key route network”.

This amendment is related to amendment 328.

Amendment 331, in schedule 8, page 147, line 21, leave out “key route network”.

This amendment is related to amendment 328.

Amendment 332, in schedule 8, page 147, line 25, leave out “key route network”.

This amendment is related to amendment 328.

Amendment 333, in schedule 8, page 147, line 28, leave out “key route network”.

This amendment is related to amendment 328.

Amendment 334, in schedule 8, page 148, line 2, at end insert—

“(c) publication of reports, including the standardisation of data across reports”.

This amendment would enable guidance to cover the publication of reports and data, in addition to covering the preparation of reports.

Amendment 335, in schedule 8, page 148, line 4, after “preparing” insert “and publishing”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 334.

[Siân Berry]

These amendments all do the same thing. Amendments 328 and all the amendments up to 335 would simply remove the words, “key route network” from the part of the Bill that specifies traffic reporting duties. Essentially, they would apply the traffic reporting duties to all local roads within the area of a local transport authority, not simply the key route network.

When it comes to strategic transport planning and its informed scrutiny, I believe that requiring data collection and reporting only for the key route network makes no sense. We, the public, those doing the transport planning and those scrutinising it at all levels of government need to have better data about traffic on local roads, too. The strategic level is the right level at which to require that data to be organised and published, so as not to place new burdens on local authorities, but giving those authorities new tools to work with as well. Obviously, resources must be put in place to enable that, but the benefits—achieving good-value investments, effective policy that serves the public good, and benefits to public engagement and scrutiny—will be huge.

Strategic authorities do the strategic planning, setting the direction for where major developments go. Major developments affect not only key route networks, but local roads as well. Those authorities are also the ones more likely to be moving forward with things like demand management policies and congestion charges—I have already talked about workplace parking levies being able to be run at that level. All of those policies are needed to tackle traffic and congestion, but to be able to plan them, it is really important that good information about local roads is out there and collected. Local authorities have far fewer powers to tackle traffic, but they would also benefit from this kind of information when implementing policies such as safer speed limits and bus lanes. Bringing this duty all under the strategic authority would be a gift to local authorities, and would make transparency much easier as well.

I have tabled further amendments that ask for similar data collection and publication at the strategic authority level, which I will speak to later. In concept, this mirrors the new planning data-related transparency requirements that have come from the same Department that has introduced this Bill. More generally, the system of outcomes frameworks proposed by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government currently has big gaps in it—this is just one of them. That system needs to be looked at again. In its consultation on outcomes frameworks, MHCLG recently admitted that transport was a unique area and that the Department had work to do with DFT on reporting. This particular example seems like one where the Department would benefit from thinking things through again and potentially doing exactly what this amendment suggests—if not now, then at a later stage of the Bill’s passage.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will speak to amendment 328 in particular. As the hon. Member has set out, the amendment would expand the duty of combined and combined county authorities to make reports on traffic levels to all roads within their area, rather than just key route network roads.

I believe that any duty to make reports on traffic should be accompanied by meaningful powers to give effect to such reports directly. That is why, elsewhere in the schedule, mayors of combined and combined county authorities are given a power to direct the highways authority in the use of its powers on such roads. These amendments would give combined and combined county authorities duties to make reports on traffic on such roads, but without any direct control of the traffic itself.

With all of these issues, there is a balance. There is no duty to direct the overseeing local authority, and we think that there is a balance between the strategic and the local. Local highways authorities will know their roads and the specifics of local roads best, and we therefore believe in the principle not only that they should report, as they do now, but that they are best placed to influence the traffic levels on those roads. That is why I ask that the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion withdraw the amendment.

[Siân Berry]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the schedule, as amended, be the Eighth schedule to the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Schedule 8 will provide mayors with a power of direction on key route network roads and transfer duties to make reports on these roads to them. Combined authorities and combined county authorities have an important role in co-ordinating local transport networks, including local roads.

Although local highways authorities will rightly continue to manage local highways, mayors of combined authorities and combined county authorities will be required to propose a key route network. This will allow places to work together at the appropriate level to manage traffic and ensure that there is effective traffic planning. To this end, mayors will gain a power to direct highway authorities on these roads, helping them to deliver their local transport plan. The powers balance the important role of local highway authorities in maintaining the road network while helping mayors to co-ordinate and lead transport planning at a strategic level. I commend the schedule to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

You are welcome to say it all again.

[Siân Berry]

This seems the right point to bring this up. The Minister has talked about how the schedule creates powers to make directions in relation to roads that are not on the key route network. The Minister will have many decisions to make about regulations, and the complexity is coming out in our debates. Are discussions taking place in Cabinet about replacing the Office of Rail and Road with something broader to capture more of this area? The Office for Rail and Road only covers National Highways roads—the strategic road network. I wonder whether the key route network would benefit from being included in the work of the office, which could be named the Office for Integrated Transport and could also cover local roads, buses and active travel. Has the Minister had discussions with the Department for Transport about that?

[Vikki Slade]

In general I am supportive of the schedule, but I want to raise a slight concern. Proposed new section 2A of the Road Traffic Reduction Act 1997 makes quite a few references to “local road traffic” and “key route networks”. That seems to be a clash of two different terms. It refers to local road traffic using local roads but also to the key network.

Subsection (2) of the proposed new section refers to producing a report to specify targets to reduce the levels of

“local road traffic using key route network roads”.

The impact of that will probably be that that local road traffic will use non-key networks, but there is nothing in the Bill that says where that traffic will go. As much as we would all like it to disappear, it generally does not, and that takes us back to the comments from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion about a report on all roads. That feels potentially cumbersome, and I worry about the costs. There seems to be a mismatch here; there is a requirement to produce something, but nothing is said about its possible implications and impact. I do not expect the Minister to have the answer now, but I am sure she can come back with it to help me understand what the impact of the reports might be. I would hate to see local authorities having to deal with the impact of something done in good faith at a strategic level.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Government amendment 88 ensures that the combined authority or combined county authority is the only local transport authority for the area with the associated powers and duties once it has completed its first full financial year. That includes having responsibility for local transport planning, bus partnerships and bus franchising, and is in line with its role as the strategic decision-making authority for the area, with other responsibilities such as producing the local growth plan. Constituent councils sometimes need to retain certain local transport powers to continue the operation of, for example, a local authority-owned bus company. That will still be possible through bespoke arrangements provided for in secondary legislation.

Turning to Government amendments 89 to 97, 99 and 100. Paragraph 4 of schedule 9 currently sets out the voting arrangements for adopting local transport plans for mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities. These amendments extend the provision to cover all types of combined authorities and combined county authorities. This will provide standardisation and clarity for non-mayoral combined authorities and non-mayoral combined county authorities about the requirements for adopting their local transport plans.

Regarding Government amendment 92, there are currently no provisions in schedule 9 for the type of vote needed to adopt a local transport plan in non-mayoral combined authorities and non-mayoral combined county authorities. The amendment provides a clear voting arrangement: a simple majority vote of constituent members. That is in line with the approach taken for mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities in the schedule. It ensures that a majority of the constituent members agree with the decision on top of the consent requirement provided for in Government amendment 96.

Government amendment 94 provides detail on how votes to adopt the local transport plan occur in non-mayoral combined authorities and non-mayoral combined county authorities. In line with the existing provisions in schedule 9 for mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities, the amendment ensures that each constituent member has one vote. Unlike mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities though, no member of a non-mayoral combined authority and non-mayoral combined county authorities will have a casting vote. In the event of a tie, the resolution would not pass. A clear majority would be needed. This amendment is important to bring clarity to how votes to adopt local transport plans are taken in all types of combined authorities and combined county authorities.

Finally, on Government amendment 96, the standard voting arrangement for making decisions in non-mayoral combined authorities and non-mayoral combined county authorities will be a simple majority vote, as is provided for in clause 6. However, in the English devolution White Paper, the Government committed to ensuring that key strategic decisions would have the support of all constituent councils. Adopting a local transport plan is one of those key decisions. Existing non-mayoral combined authorities and non-mayoral combined county authorities already have provisions in their constitutions that require local transport plans to be agreed by all constituent councils.

We know that these provisions provide reassurance to prospective constituent councils, which is why the amendment introduces a requirement for non-mayoral combined authorities and non-mayoral combined county authorities to get the consent of all their constituent councils before adopting a local transport plan. I commend all the amendments to the Committee.

Amendment 88 agreed to.

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move amendment 265, in schedule 9, page 149, line 37, at end insert—

“(4D) In preparing or revising a local transport plan, a local transport authority must have regard to the air quality guidelines established by the World Health Organization.”

This amendment requires all local transport authorities, including mayoral combined authorities and combined county authorities, to have regard to the World Health Organization’s air quality guidelines when preparing or revising their local transport plans.

This is a simple amendment that I worked out with the Healthy Air Coalition and my good friends who campaign on air pollution, such as Rosamund Adoo-Kissi-Debrah who works in memory of her daughter. The health burden of air pollution falls hardest on those with the least choice—children, old people and low-income communities living near congested roads and industrial corridors—yet the current legal limits for nitrogen dioxide and fine particulate matter are four times higher than the World Health Organisation recommends.

The latest figures from the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs may show improvements in some cities. Areas such as London and Nottingham are now technically compliant with the legal limits, but compliance with outdated legal limits does not mean the air is safe to breathe. The Bill gives combined authorities a crucial opportunity to align transport planning with public health outcomes and the correct goals.

Combined authorities have shown some real willingness to act, but their ambition can be constrained by national standards that lag far behind the World Health Organisation’s evidence and guidelines. The Bill is a chance to change that by ensuring that local transport plans are designed not just to meet the legal minimum but to deliver genuinely clean and healthy air for communities.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I support the arguments made by the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole. We seem to have a lot of new responsibilities, and in transport we lack clarity about where the money is coming from. I agree with the idea of integrated settlements, but will transport continue to receive what it currently does? Will the new authorities be well funded? With austerity so entrenched in local authorities and all this reorganisation happening, will any of that start to be reversed?

With that in mind, I have put forward two new clauses with ideas to solve some of those issues. I will briefly outline why Members might consider supporting new clauses 17 and 18, which are closely related.

New clause 17 is an attempt to put together so-called total transport authority powers for the strategic authorities, to help them to be more of an integrated transport authority than would be achieved by simply transposing local transport plan powers over from the Transport Act 2000. It would add strategic responsibilities around planning and integrating different modes and transport providers in a total transport authority’s area. To be clear, it is not necessarily about providing all those things; many are provided by different parts of the public sector. It is about having responsibility for integrating them.

New clause 17 is also about bringing in integrated ticketing. That is crucial, not just for the convenience and benefit of passengers on public transport, but as a way—particularly at the scale of a strategic authority, which is where these kind of total transport authority responsibilities sit—of achieving the ability to cross-subsidise different modes of travel. This is a good way of making efficiency work in terms of funding, raising money and making the most of the ability to use revenue to create borrowing for investment.

The Department for Transport conducted a viability trial of total transport solutions in 2019 . It was focused on rural areas, and found that local authorities made savings—relatively modest, but they were at the local authority level—and services could be improved without additional costs. This saves money at the wider Exchequer level. If we are talking about the providers of public services listed in the new clause—NHS trusts, local authority social care providers and school transport provision in the area—strategic authorities are asked to look at better integrating those obviously integratable types of transport, and make them more efficient.

The new clause would also enable cross-subsidisation between profitable and non-profitable streams of transport provision. We see that in the London budget, with which I was intimately familiar for many years. The tube network is able to make a profit, which helps to subsidise bus journeys, and that is to everyone’s benefit. That is worth Ministers’ consideration in more detail, and I hope the new clause will prompt them to do that.

It was not my intention to go over the top with this, so I tabled a second new clause—new clause 18—which asks Ministers to look again at tax increment financing, instead of attempting to amend powers already in the Bill. There are clear benefits from tax increment financing. The ability to add a levy to, for example, business rates, as has been done in the past, or potentially on VAT in an area, and to use that to borrow for significant investment, is potentially really powerful. It was used in part for the Northern line extension to Battersea, for example—a glimmer of new tube line that suddenly happened because of that kind of initiative. New clause 18 asks Ministers to look at this issue again and to consider the power for strategic authorities.

We are all wondering where the money might come from. We can see the potential benefits of this level of organisation, but the new clause would put some more powers in place and prompt further reviews of what might be done to help these bodies stand on their own two feet. As we discussed earlier in relation to precepts, powers to raise money will not necessarily lead to a lot of new taxes and levies; they are self-regulating via the process of democracy and are therefore not to be feared.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will respond to the question from my hon. Friend the Member for North West Cambridgeshire and then turn to new clauses 11, 17 and 18.

I assure my hon. Friend that grandfathering arrangements apply. Existing local transport plan voting arrangements for Cambridgeshire and Peterborough that have already been brought into their constitution will apply, and the amendments in the Bill will not override them.

I welcome the intent behind new clause 11 and completely agree with the principle that we need to ensure that the local transport authorities we are creating, which have an vital role to play in our areas, have the resources and funding to do that well. The hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole asked whether we have thought this through. We actively have, but more important is that places have thought it through; there is a clamour to move in this direction and to put in place strategic transport functions, because the huge opportunities are recognised.

We already have a mechanism through the spending review by which we can judge and calibrate whether individual local transport authorities have the resources to do the job required. All local transport authorities will make a judgment about the demands versus their funding as part of the spending review decision.

It is worth noting for the Committee that funding for local transport increased in the spending review settlement, with £15.6 billion put in place for transport for city regions, £2.3 billion for areas outside of city regions and £1 billion for buses. That was in addition to local transport funding provided through the local government settlement. That is both proof and an example of how conversations about what is needed are being matched by resources provided.

Alongside that, we are creating as much flexibility as we can through the local government finance settlement, where we are moving to more consolidated multi-year funding, but also through the Department for Transport giving local leaders greater funding certainty and flexibility, again with multi-year funding settlements, which allows them to plan better.

Finally, as we discussed on Tuesday, there is the question of capacity. We must include capacity to ensure that combined authorities and combined county authorities are doing the job that is being asked of them by their respective constituent authorities, voters and us. That is why we are committing to include funding for capacity building.

On new clause 17, I share the desire of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for transport integration. Strategic authorities have been created to seize the opportunities to come together across a larger geography on transport, economic development and regeneration. However, the new clause would duplicate many of the existing powers and actions of strategic authorities, as well as the new powers already being introduced by the Bill.

In addition to the new powers over planning, clause 21, in part 2 creates a new power for mayors to convene other public bodies to assist with their aims. This power could be used to bring these bodies together without creating a new class of authority. Strategic authorities already undertake significant work to bring together transport modes and functions in their areas, and already have wide-ranging public transport powers. We encourage authorities working on these plans to engage with providers, including those of community transport.

I recognise that new clause 18 is well intentioned and well reasoned, but I do not believe that it is necessary. Existing mayoral strategic authorities possess borrowing powers for all their functions, including transport, which enables them to invest in projects and infrastructure. Through the Bill, we are also enhancing the opportunities for mayors to raise revenue so that they can invest more in local transport. This includes enabling the existing mayoral council tax precept to be spent on the full range of growth levers, including transport, and giving mayors the power to charge a mayoral community infrastructure levy. If mayors of established mayoral strategic authorities wish for changes to existing powers, they will be able to express this through the statutory right to request process. For all those reasons, I ask hon. Members not to push their new clauses to a vote.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 9, as amended, agreed to.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Simmonds]

I rise to ask some brief questions of the Minister, perhaps starting with the last point, about where there is a conflict. London is a good example. The Mayor’s total failure to achieve the housing targets set by central Government is creating a knock-on pressure at local authority level. We know that, in trying to unlock developments, the Government are currently engaged in discussion about significantly reducing the target for affordable housing. There is the potential for call-in powers to create a conflict with the housing duties of the local authority against its overarching objectives. I can think of places in or close to my constituency—a good example is Hendon circus, where 27 years ago I chaired a planning committee that granted consent. That is still a derelict site, despite multiple interventions with the Mayor of London, because it has basically been ping-ponging between developers. We need to make sure that this legislation has rigour and will actually deliver.

Will the Minister provide some assurance that an effective mechanism will be in place? It is all very well talking about mayoral powers to direct planning authorities, but we often see a mayoral failure to progress developments, to the frustration of a planning authority. How will we ensure that there is that rigour, so the homes for which planning consents are granted actually get built?

[Siân Berry]

I, too, have much experience of the London system of planning—of putting together the London plan and its implementation through strategic planning applications. I have a couple of things to say.

First, as alluded to by the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner, we have heard alarming reports today that the well-worked-through, evidence-based requirements that were put into the London plan may be undermined by an unclear process. We would like assurance that once the processes are carried out—once local people have engaged and many local authorities have given evidence in respect of a plan and some policies—the policies are kept in place and used by the mayors who have gone to so much trouble. We hear rumours of CIL holidays and other really worrying things. I will not ask for answers on that now, but we will discuss the community infrastructure levy later.

The issue I want to raise is the transparency and clarity of the online information that accompanied the Mayor of London carrying out his strategic planning responsibility in respect of individual planning applications. As an expert user of that online information in the past, I know it is vastly worse than what is commonplace and very good from most local authorities. One does not get easy access to the accompanying documents or other people’s comments as they come in; they can be incredibly useful in local authority planning applications. By contrast to the national infrastructure planning process, the documents associated with the planning application are not published and the timetable is not necessarily available. I had endless trouble while trying to scrutinise and take part in the process.

I beg the Minister to look at putting in place a more standardised way of making the planning applications that are intervened on by mayors, and the process that happens, more transparent. It should match either of the other two planning levels we have. At the GLA end of things, it has not been very good.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We all share the desire to see housing built. I will not make the political point that the last Government, of which the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner was part, categorically failed to do that. The challenges faced by the Mayor of London are the function of systematic failure over 14 years and a housing market that is in a very difficult position.

We absolutely want to see house building at pace. First, we are putting in place a requirement that there has to be a spatial development strategy that sets out how the mayor will deliver housing needs—a core document that will ensure that it bites. Mayoral call-in powers can be used only once that spatial development strategy is in place. Once house building has been granted permission, we want to see it built out effectively. Obviously, we will keep this under review to ensure that the duty to direct comes alongside the call-in and that the spatial development strategy works effectively to deliver the outcome we want to see.

On the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion’s point about the transparency of the process, residents across the piece often find the planning process, whether at the strategic or local authority level, pretty opaque and hard to navigate. We will continue to look at that, because it is important that when strategic or local planning decisions are made, residents understand why, how, and how they can fully engage in the process.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 31 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 11 agreed to.

Clause 32

Development orders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

My hon. Friend’s amendment 304 is not an amendment that the Minister should be fearful of. It is not trying to catch the Government out. It is about trying to advance and speed up the densification of our urban centres. We would see a reduction in the necessity for the Government’s housing targets, which favour rural areas rather than urban centres. In many urban centres, housing targets have been reduced, but in rural areas they have been increased. If we approved an amendment such as this, where building could be fast-tracked and sped up in urban centres, we would see a reduction in building in some of our semi-rural areas. I hope the Minister, in her winding up, looks favourably on this amendment; it is a perfectly sensible option, and I hope she will endorse it.

[Siân Berry]

I endorse the amendment. It is extremely sensible to have this kind of priority in place. It is extremely reminiscent of planning policy guidance note 13, which was abolished by the coalition Government in 2011 and was originally put in place under the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister in 2001, if I recall correctly. It was part of an integrated transport policy, making sure that homes and transport were planned in concert and that there was a sequential test for focusing first on areas that were already developed—areas close to urban centres—and then allowing for sequential use of greener areas.

That is something that we lack in planning policy at the moment. Having a policy that is entirely either/or, or where we free up things completely or not at all, without a sequential test, has led to a lot of conflict in planning policy lately. Something that sets a sequence of priorities is much more sensible, and I think the Minister should look at it.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon for her constructive and helpful amendment 252. In principle, the ability to integrate a land use framework and energy plan at the strategic level obviously makes sense. Regarding the amendment as drafted, the Government have consulted on a land use framework but have not yet provided a response, so the land use framework is not a tangible thing that strategic authorities can hinge their plans on.

Similarly, strategic spatial energy plans, which I have a lot of support for, and which I hope to see across the country, are at an embryonic stage. We do not know how high level they will be. The principle—that as strategic authorities are thinking about their strategic plans they should think about a whole host of things—holds, but we do not think that the amendment is appropriate because of the frameworks that it hinges on.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Seventh sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st October 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Clause 33 and schedule 14 will give mayors of strategic authorities the ability to raise a mayoral community infrastructure levy, or MCIL. I am sure Members will be aware that the Mayor of London’s ability to charge MCIL in London was critical to funding delivery of the fantastic Elizabeth Line. We want to extend the same power to other regional mayors so that they too can fund vital infrastructure that will drive growth and create opportunities in their areas.

The power will not be unconstrained. Mayors will need to have a spatial development strategy in place, meaning that they will have to have a clear plan for meeting overall housing and development targets in their area. Mayors will also need to develop and introduce a CIL charging schedule, which will undergo public consultation, examination and approval. That means that the levy rates that apply to MCIL will strike an appropriate balance between supporting development through infrastructure provision and the potential effect on viability of development. We will provide further detail on what MCIL can be spent on through regulations.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

It is a pleasure to have you back in the Chair today, Sir John. I support the clause and schedule 14. It is really important that we have devolved fundraising powers, and this is one of the ways in which that can be done.

I have a question for the Minister about the rules for what mayoral CIL in different areas can be levied to fund. In London, the current regulations restrict spending by the mayor to funding roads or other transport facilities. Is the Minister making changes in the Bill, or will she do so through regulations?

[Vikki Slade (Mid Dorset and North Poole) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to have you back in the Chair, Sir John. I welcome the introduction of MCIL. We have spoken before about how these authorities will be funded, and this is another tool in the toolbox. I am slightly concerned about how it will sit alongside strategic CIL and neighbourhood CIL. I would be really concerned if this took away the portion of money that is available for local neighbourhoods through neighbourhood forums or town and county councils to spend on hyper-local infrastructure, which can otherwise never be funded. I am also interested in the pieces of infrastructure that currently are funded through strategic CIL by an upper-tier authority. Will those responsibilities pass in full across to the mayor, so that we do not end up with a situation where the mayor gets the CIL, but the council gets the responsibility?

That is one of the reasons why we have tabled new clause 1, although the Minister may say we do not need part of it. The first part of the new clause states that the Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of the Act, prepare and publish guidance on the implementation and administration of community infrastructure levy charges—tt may be that that is going to happen anyway. More importantly, there is the issue of error and incorrect charging. I have been speaking to my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Mr Dillon), who has been involved with the CIL Injustice Group, where there have been miscalculated charges, with councils charging up to £100,000 for the community infrastructure levy completely incorrectly. We know that CIL is supposed to be charged on additional dwellings for commercial use, not on self-builds or extensions, but that has happened in a number of councils around the country. There are a couple of councils in Surrey—Waverley in particular has a huge problem. The new Liberal Democrat council in West Berkshire had to pay back £300,000 in total to 18 different constituents who had all been incorrectly charged. In my own county of Dorset, there are cases where people have been incorrectly charged.

In some instances, people have been building their own home and suddenly had a notice put on the path outside. Some have been chased down for huge amounts of money, and some for tiny amounts of money, and have had court charges applied to them. It is a problem that needs solving. Last Monday in the Chamber—I believe you were present, Sir John—two Conservative Members raised cases from their own constituencies. A previous Minister said that a series of households had been badly hit. It is clear that the CIL regulations are not intended to operate in this way. We do not believe our new clause would create a significant new burden on the Secretary of State; it is there to assist, and we would be grateful for a commitment that its provisions will be rolled into the legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The clause introduces schedule 19, which requires mayoral combined authorities and county authorities to produce and publish a local growth plan—a critical tool and document for driving the developments, jobs and prosperity that we want to see in areas. We will discuss schedule 19 in more detail later in the debate.

[Siân Berry]

I rise to speak to my new clause 29 and new schedule 1, which seek to replace clause 38 and schedule 19. They would replace local growth plans with inclusive economy plans, which, following an enhanced process of consultation and approval, would have the same prominence in terms of policy priorities as the proposed growth plans. While we have adopted much of the same drafting and general process, wherever the goal of growth appears, my new version says instead that our goal would be an inclusive economy or economic inclusivity.

It is important to confront the harmful concept of growth for the sake of growth. Prioritising economic growth, wherever it may come from, above everything else is wrong. Growth may be the Government’s No. 1 mission, but what is the point if it does not serve the people? Growth alone is insufficient to address inequality and the environmental crisis. For example, gross domestic product has roughly doubled since 1980, yet the richest five households in the UK own more wealth than 13.2 million people. When it comes to jobs, growth has not delivered, with low pay and stagnant real wages the reality for most.

A test of the Bill, and indeed the Government, will be whether it succeeds in moving beyond growth alone to creating an economy where everyone can thrive. That has to begin with clear intentions for the type of economy we want to build, not growth at any cost. In the case of local government and the new strategic authorities, how this is codified in the prescribed strategies for each area is important. That is the core reason why, working with the Centre for Local Economic Strategies, I have proposed this change to the core goals in the central economic strategy that each local authority will produce.

Those comparing our new schedule with the original will see that, in paragraph (3), proposed new sections 107L of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 and 32A of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 add further steps to the process of developing a plan so that it can be tailored to each local area through appropriate local indicators of progress. Paragraph (4) of the new schedule would require mayors to bring the public into both setting local indicators and setting out how the plan will help to achieve the inclusive economic outcomes that cover the necessary ingredients for a good life in that area. That is because, if they are going to shape a local economy, they need to listen and deliver for the people who live and work in it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Perran Moon (Camborne and Redruth) (Lab)]

I am troubled by this concept. In my constituency, which is one of the most deprived in the United Kingdom, we have an opportunity to invest in a vast range of renewable energy to mine again critical minerals that will accelerate the transition away from fossil fuel use in order to transition to an economy based on green energy. I would like the hon. Lady to clarify this, but I think she is suggesting that that kind of growth is not acceptable in some way, and that we cannot have good-quality green growth that supports jobs in areas of extreme poverty and deprivation and deals with the challenges of international imports from areas of the world that do not share our values.

[Siân Berry]

That is a good question. Where there are opportunities to develop new industries and new jobs and create new economic activity, my new schedule enables local communities such as those in Cornwall to set inclusive economy indicators. In the examples given, that might mean that those new industries are owned and managed by the local people and the local community, rather than through outside investment from extractive industries that will take the profits elsewhere. Those are things for the local community to decide under the new schedule.

I will just finish the quote from the report by the New Economics Foundation and its allies:

“At a time of eroding trust in politics, this is a major problem for combined authorities elected to make the economy work better for people .”

My new clause and new schedule will help authorities to become more purposeful about developing their own unique economies and economic opportunities in a way that truly builds a better economy that serves local people, and not just more production and profits that can be extracted away from them without improving everyday lives. It will bring more people more inclusively into the local economies that we want to develop.

I will not press my proposals to a vote today, but I hope that the Minister has listened and will recognise that the current Government proposals could create the wrong incentives and the wrong measures of progress, and might risk producing the wrong outcomes for the people who live in the areas that will be governed by these economic plans. I also hope that she will make improvements similar to my proposals before the next stage of this Bill.

[Paul Holmes]

I will speak briefly not only to clause 38 but to new clause 9 and new schedule 1. Although the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion has indicated that she does not wish to push these measures to a vote, it is important that we address her well-intentioned amendments. I absolutely agree with her about the economic situation that this country currently faces, caused by the Labour Government. However, we have a fundamental disagreement about the solution that she outlines.

That is because the Government are doing the right thing here in making sure that local growth plans are adequate and can do what they say on the tin: deliver economic growth for the people the mayor serves and the people we serve. I would argue that, if the economic situations are right, as set down in the powers that the Government are outlining, inclusivity is absolutely enshrined within those powers. If we have growth, twinned with the protections currently within legislation in this country, such as environmental protection, corporate social responsibility and some of the equality legislation that we have, inclusivity will be delivered by the new businesses created by the people being empowered to set them up, and those businesses will be able to grow because of some of the measures that the Government are introducing.

The hon. Lady mentioned consultation and inclusivity in terms of people being able to shape their futures. I believe that that is a debate that we had last week when we were considering her amendment on citizens’ assemblies—she knows my oft-stated view on those. I will not tell the Committee that view again, because my blood pressure might rise slightly if I did. Once again, however, I will argue that the point at which there is inclusivity and advocacy from people is at an election, and that the mayor will be judged at an election on whether they have been able to deliver economic growth and whether they have fundamentally made life better for their constituents over the time that they have been in office.

[Siân Berry]

Is the hon. Member really saying that that he is against asking the people of a local area what would constitute a good economy for them and making that the focus of the mayor’s economic indicators? Also, if all of these proposals are going to be put into manifestos at election time, how long does he envision the manifestos for these mayoral elections being?

[Paul Holmes]

The way that people want their economy to go is to have growth, and for them to be able to pay their bills, feed their families and have good jobs. I say to the hon. Lady that any mayor who does not put those things in their manifesto is not worth electing. An election is the point at which the mayor should be held accountable. Any mayor who says that they would not want to make their local economic situation better and improve the lives of their citizens should not be elected. The current legislation that we have enables people perfectly reasonable input into the journey that a mayor might take over their mayoral term.

I believe that over the course of the last few Governments, the House of Commons has made great strides in protecting the environment and in making sure that mayors and public authorities, as well as private businesses, are responsible in how they treat their people, but also grow with the environmental and other protections that are necessary. While I understand the hon. Lady’s argument and I genuinely have a great deal of respect for her, the unintended consequences of the new clause and the new schedule will be to restrict growth, and to restrict the power of the mayor to have a responsible attitude to enabling growth on an even basis within the system that we currently have.

The hon. Lady’s proposals would be restrictive, but they would also take us back. A mayor should be unrestricted in their ability to deliver the growth and prosperity for the people they serve. I do not believe that the new clause and new schedule would do that. I know that the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion is not pushing those to a vote, but if she did, we would not be able to support it, and we would vote against it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. She pre-empted the second point that I was about to make, which is that local nature recovery strategies are critical for every part of the country. Decisions that impact on land use and nature recovery will still need to consider the relevant policy framework, including the local nature recovery strategies that exist across the country. Any strategic planning decision will have to have regard to those local strategies. Thirdly and finally, we recognise that economic development sits alongside nature recovery. The two should not be and do not need to be in conflict.

[Siân Berry]

On a point of clarification, I recognise that the Minister has set out that the local nature recovery strategies will have to be regarded, and also that local growth plans will be very important. Which does the Minister see as having greater weight in local planning and strategic planning decisions?

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Holmes]

Is there a clearer example than that of how this issue could contribute to the local growth plans that we are discussing?

The legislation is being drafted at a time when the operational environment is changing. The Minister needs to accept that, as the hon. Lady outlined, because of the proposals, there has been a major asset transfer to our town and parish councils that means they have become quite fundamental and large-scale landowners. Some of that development opportunity—that opportunity to look strategically at where growth needs to come into our local communities—is, crucially, allocated to some of our town and parish councils, but the legislation completely and wilfully removes them from any consultation exercise with a mayor.

I think that this is a pragmatic Government, and that the legislation was drafted before they realised that the consequences of some of the proposed measures were that district councils, because of the funding situation, had started to move some of those assets. The Minister needs to realise that the operational environment has fundamentally changed because, as I have said, it is crucial that town and parish councils are included in relation to land holdings as well as some of the operational responsibilities that they now have. Otherwise, the proposed local growth plans will not deliver on the key aspiration that has been outlined.

[Siân Berry]

Apart from seeking views, there is a requirement in the amendment to share draft proposals and the evidence base. Does the hon. Member consider that to be an important part of correcting errors in the evidence base and in the assumptions of the draft proposals, which only those councils might have information about?

[Paul Holmes]

I absolutely agree, because local parish councillors are experts in the areas that they represent—sometimes more so than district councillors or county councillors, because it is a smaller area. I think that the amendments from the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon are perfectly acceptable—I hope that the Minister agrees—and that she is trying to rectify an unintended consequence of the legislation. In many areas, it tries to streamline some of those aspirations, but in this area it is cutting its nose off to spite its face. We will support the amendments, and I hope the Minister will also support them and come back to us on how she imagines that she will strengthen her ability to consult town and parish councils.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Eighth sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st October 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

The Member who tabled amendment 262 is temporarily not present. I will suspend the sitting for 20 minutes—[Interruption.] Let us carry on.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I beg to move amendment 262, in clause 43, page 44, line 24, leave out “prosperity” and insert “poverty and socio-economic inequality”.

This amendment is linked to Amendment 263 which would ensure that the health improvement and health inequalities duty focuses explicitly on tackling poverty and socio-economic inequality, rather than using the broader term “prosperity”.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 263, in clause 43, page 45, line 20, leave out “prosperity” and insert “poverty and socio-economic inequality”.

This amendment is linked to Amendment 262 which would ensure that the health improvement and health inequalities duty focuses explicitly on tackling poverty and socio-economic inequality, rather than using the broader term “prosperity”.

[Siân Berry]

I apologise, Dame Siobhain, for my temporary absence at the crucial moment. I would very much like the Committee to listen to my proposals for amendments 262 and 263. [Interruption.] Apologies, Chair—is there an issue?

[Paul Holmes]

We were going to have a break, but then we did not when you came in, so it is fine.

[Siân Berry]

I will be as quick as I can—it is a very short speech.

Although the health improvement and health inequalities duty is very good, the determinants of health outlined in clause 43 are limited and lacking in consideration for the impacts on health from a wide range of activities that these new authorities will be able to influence. My amendments aim to fix that. It is positive that the Opposition parties all immediately spotted the need for improvement to this clause, and that both Liberal Democrat colleagues and I have aimed to fix it, albeit in different ways.

Amendments 262 and 263 would replace references to “prosperity” with “poverty and socio-economic inequality” in the clause. They would make clearer what causes and exacerbates ill health. I do not believe that “prosperity” on its own is sufficient. I will not repeat all my earlier arguments, but there is much supporting evidence for this from a range of organisations, including the Centre for Local Economic Strategies, the Reclaiming our Regional Economies programme, and the all-party parliamentary group on poverty and inequality, which I co-chair. This is just one of the ways that the Bill can make improvements, by focusing on reducing inequality and not simply creating growth within these new strategic authorities. I hope that the Government will accept my changes.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Lady for the intention behind the amendments. I completely understand her key points. I think there is consensus that tackling health inequalities and their determinants is a key priority, which is why we included this clause in the Bill. We have deliberately drawn from the well-established approach in the Greater London Authority, which names “prosperity” among the general health determinants. It is deliberately broad so as to encompass a wide range of things. Our intention is not to establish an exhaustive list here, but to ensure that we cast the definition broadly enough to cover the issues of poverty and inequality that the hon. Lady raises.

There is a gradient across society for the determinants of health inequality, and my concern is that if we were to replace “prosperity” with poverty and inequality, we would cast the definition too narrowly. The broader “prosperity” definition captures poverty and social inequality, but it also captures other critical factors. Although we absolutely agree with the intent, we have tried to craft the legislation in a way that is broad and permissive, but that critically draws on the experience and track record of the Greater London Authority. With those reassurances, I hope the hon. Lady will consider withdrawing her amendment.

[Siân Berry]

I will withdraw the amendment for now, but I hope we see some measures coming through from the Minister, particularly in regulations. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move amendment 257, in clause 43, page 44, line 29, at end insert—

“(e) access to green space and nature,

(f) exposure to environmental harms, including air pollution, water pollution, land pollution, and any other form of environmental pollution,”.

This amendment would expand the list of general health determinants for the purposes of the new health improvement and health inequalities duty as it applies to CCAs, so it includes access to green space; and exposure to environmental harm.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 253, in clause 43, page 44, line 29, at end insert—

“(e) nitrogen dioxide level and general air quality,”.

This amendment would include air quality as a general health determinant which combined authorities must consider in their duty to reduce health inequalities.

Amendment 258, in clause 43, page 44, line 32, at end insert—

“(5A) In subsection (5)(e), the reference to ‘green space and nature’ includes—

(a) any multifunctional green and blue space, and

(b) any urban or rural natural feature

that is considered to deliver any environmental, economic, health and wellbeing benefits for communities and nature.”

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 257 and describes “green space and nature” for the purpose of this section.

Amendment 259, in clause 43, page 45, line 25, at end insert—

“(e) access to green space and nature,

(f) exposure to environmental harms, including air pollution, water pollution, land pollution, and any other form of environmental pollution,”.

This amendment would expand the list of general health determinants for the purposes of the new health improvement and health inequalities duty as it applies to CCAs, so it includes access to green space; and exposure to environmental harm.

Amendment 254, in clause 43, page 45, line 25, at end insert—

“(e) nitrogen dioxide level and general air quality,”.

This amendment would include air quality as a general health determinant which CCAs must consider in their duty to reduce health inequalities.

Amendment 260, in clause 43, page 45, line 29, at end insert—

“(5A) In subsection (5)(e), the reference to “green space and nature” includes—

(a) any multifunctional green and blue space, and

(b) any urban or rural natural feature

that is considered to deliver any environmental, economic, health and wellbeing benefits for communities and nature.”

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 254 and describes “green space and nature” for the purpose of this section.

[Siân Berry]

I intend to speak at some length on the amendments—my apologies, Dame Siobhain, but this is a very important issue to me, as Members will hear from my speech.

My amendments 257, 258, 259 and 260 would all add access to green space and nature and environmental pollution to the list of potential determinants of health. They would also define the terms “green space and nature” in the Bill, in terms of green and blue space, as well as natural features in general that deliver benefits in health and wellbeing. The amendments would not necessarily expand the defined scope of the new health improvement and health inequalities duty as it applies to combined authorities, but they would add clarity and support to strategic authorities that recognise the importance of those health determinants.

My amendments would add what I would argue are some inarguable determinants of health that are particularly connected to economic and trade activity, transport and land use, and so on. They would add air pollution, water pollution, contaminated land and any other forms of environmental pollution, as well as any that capitalism might invent and disperse in the environment in future. They are broad and helpful amendments.

The amendments seek to strengthen the Bill’s provisions by explicitly recognising exposure to environmental harms as a general health determinant. They make it clear that the conditions in which people live—the air they breathe, the green spaces they access and the pollution they are exposed to—are fundamental drivers of health outcomes. I cannot see why currently the Bill completely omits environmental factors from its list of health determinants, despite overwhelming evidence that air pollution and green space profoundly affect health. The Minister commented in response to the previous amendment that the list is intended not to be exhaustive but to be broad enough, but in this case, by not including the environment at all, it is very much not broad enough.

I have been working with the Healthy Air Coalition and the Wildlife and Countryside Link on the amendments, and there is so much evidence that makes it clear that, on the environment and health, the Government have left important gaps that we should fill today. I will be pressing the amendments to a vote today. The 2022 chief medical officer’s annual report was, I think, the first to highlight the link between health inequalities and poor air quality. According to the report:

“Studies of hospital admissions and mortality show increased health risks associated with exposure to air pollution among those living in areas of higher socio-economic deprivation.”

According to Asthma + Lung UK, people with lung conditions in the poorest neighbourhoods are seven times more likely to die from a lung condition than those in the richest areas.

It was my honour earlier this year to present the Clean Air (Human Rights) Bill, alongside colleagues from across parties in the House. That Bill is also named Ella’s law, after Ella Adoo-Kissi-Debrah, whose death from asthma at age nine has helped to prompt a sea change in how we view the impact of air pollution on health and its close links to inequality. My Green colleagues in the other place are now working towards Zane’s law with the parents of Zane Gbangbola, who died at age seven when hydrogen cyanide was carried into his home by floodwater from a contaminated landfill site. It would have been Zane’s 19th birthday today.

Including environmental harms in the list of health determinants would honour the goals of Ella’s law and Zane’s law. It would recognise that lives can be profoundly affected and even ended by environmental pollution and the harm it brings. My amendments would ensure that combined authorities embed both the prevention of environmental harm and the protection and enhancement of natural infrastructure at the heart of their work on health inequality.

Even in their own terms, the amendments are fully aligned with the Bill’s wider objective of providing greater local prosperity, better public services and improved wellbeing. In brief, access to nature will deliver directly on all three by boosting productivity and skills through improvements to mental and physical health, by reducing NHS costs—if everyone had good access to green space, the estimated savings would be over £2 billion a year—and by attracting investment and supporting regeneration through high-quality environments.

The amendments would play a big part in ensuring that combined authorities take into account the well-established relationship between the environment and public health inequalities when exercising their other functions too, particularly in transport, housing, planning and regeneration. Strategic authorities are uniquely placed to consider risks from pollution and to plan at the landscape scale for natural benefits, connecting parks, rivers, floodplains and urban trees across boundaries. The amendments would provide a framework for joined-up, place-based decision making and good, popular place making—the kind of integrated governance that devolution is supposed to achieve. Embedding these goals on health inequalities into statute would also help to prevent local disparities, ensuring that clean air, water and land, and access to nature is a universal right, not a postcode lottery.

In conclusion, recognising that access to green space and exposure to environmental harms are core health determinants is essential to tackling inequalities that persist across England. Devolution is about empowering local areas to act. These amendments would empower them to tackle the root causes of poor health, not just the symptoms. The Government should take them up, and today I will be pressing them to do so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank both hon. Members for their heartfelt contributions to the debate. Let me put it on record that we absolutely recognise that air quality is one of the greatest environmental threats to our health and that its impacts are not felt equally in our society. Action by local authorities is absolutely pivotal in improving air quality locally. The Environment Act 1995 already requires combined authorities and combined county authorities to work directly with local authorities on air quality action plans for their areas. Local air quality management statutory policy guidance also sets out ways of joint working with public health professionals to ensure that plans reduce health risks and disparities in affected communities to which local authorities must have regard.

Equally, we recognise the importance of environmental factors beyond air quality to people’s health. The scope of the general health determinants in the Bill has intentionally been crafted broadly. Some examples are given, but it is not our intention to set out a definitive list, as we think that would be too constraining. Combined authorities and combined county authorities remain the experts in their local areas. They will understand how air quality or environmental issues are impacting on their local communities, and they are best placed to decide how to consider general health determinants to deliver for their communities.

[Siân Berry]

Will the Minister clarify how the list in clause 43 as it stands was put together? It is bizarre that the use of tobacco and those kind of lifestyle choices are somehow explicitly listed, when environmental factors as a whole are left out.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Those are examples that we are giving based on existing precedents and drivers that we know local authorities are grappling with, but the list is not exhaustive. The intention is for it not to be exhaustive or definitive. We want to keep it broad, so that combined authorities and county authorities can decide the core determinants in their areas.

We as a Government are committed to the enhancement and protection of our environment. It is the Government’s intention to publish a revised environment improvement plan to protect and restore our natural environment with delivery information to help to meet the ambitious Environment Act 2021 targets. This will help us to restore our natural environment, improve environmental quality, create a circular economy, protect environmental security and improve people’s access to nature. That is something we want to hardwire into what the Government are doing and what we are seeing at all levels of government.

However, I come back to the point that it is important to cast this as broadly as we can, to allow constituent strategic authorities and mayors to establish the determinants that are most pertinent in their areas. While I have sympathy with and support the intent behind the amendments, there is enough provision in the Bill as drafted to ensure that what strategic authorities are doing is aligned with a host of national and local requirements already in place to drive health equality and improvements in the environment.

[Siân Berry]

I thank the Minister for her comments. I cannot accept that a detail such as tobacco use was put in, and standards of housing as a result of Awaab’s law and the things have gone on there, and yet environmental factors have not yet been included. I am determined that they should be, and I still intend to push this to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Division 48

Ayes: 3

Noes: 8

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move amendment 255, in clause 43, page 44, line 40, at end insert—

“107ZC Health and Wellbeing in All Policies Strategy

(1) A combined authority must prepare and publish a Health and Wellbeing in All Policies Strategy setting out how it will meet the duty under section 107ZB.

(2) In preparing the strategy, an authority must consult with such bodies it considers relevant, including but not limited to—

(a) directors of public health within the authority area;

(b) Integrated Care Boards within the authority area;

(c) NHS bodies providing services in the authority area;

(d) representatives of the voluntary, community and social enterprise sector in the authority area; and

(e) the Equalities and Human Rights Commission.

(3) The strategy must—

(a) include an assessment of the health and wellbeing impacts of all strategic authority policies and programmes;

(b) seek to reduce inequalities with locally appropriate targets, set for—

(i) the end of a 10-year period beginning on the day on which the strategy is published,

(ii) regular periods during the period to which the 10-year target applies, as the combined authority deems appropriate (“interim targets”);

(c) consider the findings of any consultations conducted by the authority in relation to the strategy; and

(d) set out the reasons why the proposed strategy has been adopted.

(4) 10-year targets under sub-paragraph (3)(a)(i) must include consideration of—

(a) life expectancy,

(b) healthy life expectancy,

(c) infant mortality rate,

(d) rates of obesity and overweight,

(e) rates of anxiety and depression, and

(f) suicide rates

within the authority area.

(5) Interim targets under sub-paragraph (3)(a)(ii) should include consideration of—

(a) household relative poverty rates,

(b) employment rates,

(c) relative child poverty rates,

(d) educational attainment rates defined as five or more GCSEs at grades A*-C,

(e) the proportion of people in the authority area meeting recommended physical activity levels, and

(f) the proportion of people in the authority consuming five or more fruit and vegetables per day.

(6) A combined authority must publish a report on its progress implementing the strategy and towards the targets set out under paragraph (3)(b).

(7) A report under subsection (6) must—

(a) be published one year after the day on which the strategy is published, and every year thereafter,

(b) be presented by the Mayor of the authority at the authority’s annual general meeting, and

(c) be made publicly available.”

This amendment requires mayoral authorities to develop a Health and Wellbeing in All Policies Strategy.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 256, in clause 43, page 45, line 36, at end insert—

“24B Health and Wellbeing in All Policies Strategy

(1) A CCA must prepare and publish a Health and Wellbeing in All Policies Strategy setting out how it will meet the duty under section 24A.

(2) In preparing the strategy, a CCA must consult with such bodies it considers relevant, including but not limited to—

(a) directors of public health within the CCA’s area;

(b) Integrated Care Boards within the CCA’s area;

(c) NHS bodies providing services in the CCA’s area;

(d) representatives of the voluntary, community and social enterprise sector in the CCA’s area;

(e) the Equalities and Human Rights Commission.

(3) The strategy must—

(a) include an assessment of the health and wellbeing impacts of all strategic authority policies and programmes;

(b) seek to reduce inequalities with locally appropriate targets, set for—

(i) the end of a 10-year period beginning on the day on which the strategy is published,

(ii) regular periods during the period to which the 10-year target applies, as the combined authority deems appropriate (“interim targets”);

(c) consider the findings of any consultations conducted by the authority in relation to the strategy;

(d) set out the reasons why the proposed strategy has been adopted.

(4) 10-year targets under sub-paragraph (3)(a)(i) must include consideration of—

(a) life expectancy,

(b) healthy life expectancy,

(c) infant mortality rate,

(d) rates of obesity and overweight,

(e) rates of anxiety and depression, and

(f) suicide rates

within the authority area.

(5) Interim targets under sub-paragraph (3)(a)(ii) should include consideration of—

(a) household relative poverty rates,

(b) employment rates,

(c) relative child poverty rates,

(d) educational attainment rates defined as five or more GCSEs at grades A*-C,

(e) the proportion of people in the authority area meeting recommended physical activity levels, and

(f) the proportion of people in the authority consuming five or more fruit and vegetables per day.

(6) A combined authority must publish a report on its progress implementing the strategy and towards the targets set out under paragraph (3)(b).

(7) A report under subsection (6) must—

(a) be published one year after the day on which the strategy is published, and every year thereafter,

(b) be presented by the Mayor of the authority at the authority’s annual general meeting, and

(c) be made publicly available.”

This amendment requires CCAs to develop a Health and Wellbeing in All Policies Strategy.

[Siân Berry]

Amendments 255 and 256 would add a health and wellbeing in all policies strategy to the requirements of the Bill. Life expectancy in England has stalled since 2010, something that has not happened for well over a century. According to Professor Sir Michael Marmot, that is a sign that society has “stopped improving”.

The Government have committed to halving the gap in healthy life expectancy between the richest and poorest regions of England, but that cannot be achieved without concerted action from the strategic authorities. Good population health is the foundation of a thriving economy. The Government have committed to halving the gap, and amendments 255 and 256 would go further than the Bill does currently to achieve that, simply by requiring mayors and strategic authorities to have regard to health through adoption of a health and wellbeing in all policies strategy document. The amendments would also require consultation with relevant entities and create accountability through targets and metrics. I commend the amendment to the Committee.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I go back to the core principle underlying the duty. We believe that a driving purpose of the strategic authority should be to improve health outcomes and reduce health inequalities, so we are absolutely aligned with the intent behind the amendment, and nothing in the Bill prevents local partners from agreeing to align on an area-wide approach or strategy. We are very clear that we must allow combined authorities and county authorities local discretion to decide the best way to fulfil the duty and deliver for their communities. We do not want to overprescribe or constrain local thinking and innovation—indeed, many local areas throughout the country are well ahead of the national Government in some of their thinking in this area.

Critically, we want to simplify requirements in planning and delivering health and care services to create more flexibility for areas to respond to the needs of their local populations. We believe that will enable mayors and integrated care boards to best align the opportunities for strategic planning. We do not believe that it is necessary or appropriate to add further mandatory planning requirements in the Bill, but we will continue to monitor how the new duty beds in and its impact across the country, so we can ensure that the intent is aligned with practice and delivery. I hope the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion will withdraw her amendment.

[Siân Berry]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 259, in clause 43, page 45, line 25, at end insert—

“(e) access to green space and nature,

(f) exposure to environmental harms, including air pollution, water pollution, land pollution, and any other form of environmental pollution,”.—(Siân Berry.)

This amendment would expand the list of general health determinants for the purposes of the new health improvement and health inequalities duty as it applies to CCAs, so it includes access to green space; and exposure to environmental harm.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Vikki Slade]

Amendments 3 and 9 would require that, when a mayor or a mayoral strategic authority wishes to obtain more powers, those powers are subject to parliamentary scrutiny. It is fairly common practice for Members to be called into a Statutory Instrument Committee to make changes to such things. If we are going to ensure full transparency and ensure that mayors do not exercise powers beyond what seems appropriate, there should be some level of parliamentary scrutiny.

Amendment 3 would place a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to seek Parliament’s approval through secondary legislation before implementing those requests. We do not believe that decisions around funding and changes of law should be made without that oversight and approval. It is hugely important to maintain the highest level of democracy; to remove that would be a missed opportunity. We therefore ask that the legislation should be protected from abuse whereby future Secretaries of State could implement requests without laying them before Parliament.

[Siân Berry]

I have a broad interest in this group of measures. First, I will raise some issues with the clause as a whole; then I will speak to new clause 53, and then new clauses 32 and 33 on a separate topic. I hope hon. Members will bear with me as I work through those three parts.

I support clause 49, which provides a way for mayors of strategic authorities to usefully request more powers, but the gap in the Bill highlights that we need the Government to make bolder policies in the areas of competence so that strategic authorities can request that they should be devolved to the lower levels. I will turn to the example of housing in a moment but, in general, it would be great to see strategic authorities working together to develop models of rent controls. As I understand it, however, because those powers do not currently exist centrally, strategic authorities cannot make requests for them under the clause. We need to be bolder at the centre to maximise the effectiveness of devolution on such issues.

If a Bill is not the right place to create a new power that is usable only in a local area, what is? Can the Minister explain why the Government have not taken the opportunity of the Bill to allow councils or new authorities to request those kinds of powers in areas where the Government do not currently act? It is on that principle that my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol Central (Carla Denyer) tabled new clause 53, which I will speak to now. It does not do what I just suggested, but it does allow for clear reporting of the conversations between mayors and the Government on the use of clause 49 powers. That includes where authorities have made requests for powers to be created and devolved to them, even when there is no existing national power to devolve.

If the Secretary of State’s goal is to make sure people take back control of their own destinies, it is only right that this power should be considered. Ministers need to pay serious attention to the full range of powers that mayors are already saying they need in order to make a material difference to people’s lives. As the Secretary of State for Housing said in his speech at the Labour party conference, communities have been held back because they do not have the power to make the changes they want. The new clause would at least help to keep track of the powers mayors are asking for under clause 49, as well as the additional powers they are telling Ministers to legislate for to enable them to do the best for their communities and, ultimately, to fulfil their areas of competence.

The new clause is not prescriptive as to which policies and areas need to be considered, but as I implied earlier the area of competence that inspired it is housing. That is because we are in an acute affordability and evictions crisis, and mayors have been calling for rent control powers from Ministers for some time. For example, in 2023, the Mayors of Manchester, Liverpool and London wrote to the then Secretary of State calling for a rent freeze, in order to immediately relieve the pressure on millions of people in the private rented sector in their areas. Recently, the Mayor of London said that the power to control rents was now at the top of his list in terms of devolution. His position follows many years of pressure and dialogue with politicians such as the Greens on the London Assembly—of which I used to be one—and with independent grassroots renters groups.

That is just one example of the kind of power that would be involved. Rent controls are something close to my heart, and we heard new figures today showing that 172,000 children are now in temporary accommodation in the UK. On average, people spend 36% of their income on rent—in my constituency, it is 42%. This is a classic policy for that issue.

The annual report the new clause requires would recognise the need for transparency over the discussions taking place about powers in the Bill—in the absence of the changes I have asked for in it—and also let us see what is going on in the conversations happening outside of the powers in the Bill.

New clauses 32 and 33 do what I just talked about and what clause 49 does, but at the level of the strategic authority. This is about the strategic authority having a duty to have a plan for devolving more of its powers and duties to smaller local authorities in its area. I recognise that the aims of devolution can often be in tension, particularly in terms of the balance between scale and geography. It is correct to have some powers at the level of combined authorities, so that they cover sufficiently large populations and enable authorities to exercise strategic policy making. But large authorities will not necessarily empower local people to address issues that are unique to their area; they might not represent the diversity of things going on around that area, and issues that people really care about in local communities might be better addressed using deeper local knowledge.

The new clauses do not prescribe a single model for this further local devolution. There is such diversity. We have discussed today the differences between coastal areas, rural areas, towns and larger urban areas. We have talked about areas with countryside and nature to protect, areas that need new investment, and areas with unique industries that could be developed locally.

I do not think that we should be prescriptive in our new clauses; we should just put in place a legal duty that makes some kind of move towards subsidiarity across the whole of English local government. Under the new clauses, the strategic authority would have a duty to set out how it would devolve its own responsibilities to the lowest possible level for effectiveness—including, where they exist, district, town and parish councils. I think that would be a really positive thing that would please most Opposition Members on the Committee. I hope that the Minister will take that onboard and come up with some way of codifying the need for the new strategic authorities to avoid becoming too centralised and to make a plan for listening and devolving powers down to the right level.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank hon. Members for their amendments and new clauses. Let me say a word about clause 49, and then I will speak to those.

We are clear that devolution is a continuous process. Our intention in the Bill is therefore to create a framework to establish mayoral strategic authorities and empower them to deepen devolution. That is what the right to request, which we have been debating, does. Critically, the right to request will hardwire the process of continual extraction of power from the centre—from Whitehall and Westminster—to our local areas, which is why the clause is so important.

In my view, amendments 9 and 3 are too constraining, as not all mayoral requests will require a legal process in order to be implemented. For example, requests to change funding, or pilot schemes or partnerships, do not have any legal requirements and do not require legal clearance. My concern is that the amendments would make the process too onerous and bureaucratic and, critically, slow it down. Anyone involved in the devolution process knows that extracting power from Whitehall is slow and painful as it is. I would not want to add further hurdles to that process.

I appreciate the intent behind new clause 32, but similar mechanisms to those proposed in it already exist. Any combined authority or combined county authority can enter into a joint committee with another local authority and collaborate across boundaries to jointly discharge their powers. Also, the additional requirement proposed by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for strategic authorities to publish a community empowerment plan may end up being too burdensome and, critically, risks conflating the roles of the strategic and the local authorities.

We are clear that we want to see double devolution, and that we want to extract power from Whitehall and make sure that it is pushed down to the strategic authority level, the local authority level and, critically, the community level for community empowerment. We will go on to talk about neighbourhood governance—we have talked about it before in debates. There is a vital role for local authorities to enable and enshrine that community empowerment and engagement, and there is a risk that we conflate the strategic economic role of the mayor and the combined authority with the critical enabling role of the local authority.

Earlier, Members across the Committee talked eloquently about the need for us to ensure that local authorities continue to have a vital role and are empowered. I would not want to take something that I think is a core competency of local authorities, which are well placed to drive that community engagement, and lift it from the local authority level to the strategic level.

Finally, on new clause 33, the Bill already provides adequate powers for strategic authorities to request and receive functions and duties from non-departmental public bodies. On clause 53 and the notion that the right to request should be made transparent, while the process is transparent, I think it is important that we create the space for mayors to have detailed policy conversations with the Secretary of State and with Secretaries of State across Departments, and that those conversations can be open, frank and sensitive. We do not want to create a process whereby we constrain mayors’ ability by publishing all the detail. The outcomes will be put in the public domain, but it is important that we create the space for mayors to undergo a policy process and that we allow an internal and private space for frank, robust policy conversations to happen in this context.

[Siân Berry]

Will the Minister take this opportunity to urge those mayors who are seeking greater powers to continue to do so, and to talk about it in the public sphere, as they have done?

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Ninth sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd October 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

It is great to have you back in the Chair, Dame Siobhain. I also wish to speak against this clause and against the Government suddenly pushing through local government reorganisation in this form. Of course, local government reorganisation does happen. Councils can, by consent, currently make such changes. The Government’s imposition of these changes, in a process that seems rushed and top-down to many people across the country, is against the spirit of devolution and against the spirit of the title of the Bill.

I do not believe that the introduction of new strategic authorities demands a quid pro quo of abolishing all remaining two-tier authorities in such a dismaying hurry, and I do not believe that one size fits all. I have served in unitary authorities, and I understand that they can work well. I am not a huge fan of county councils, but nevertheless, it should be up to local areas to do this by consent.

One point that is important to make is that there is no strong case for this change on cost or service delivery grounds. There is no consistent or conclusive evidence to justify a belief that the much larger councils that the Government want will result in services that are cheaper to run. Why even force attempts at savings of this sort now, when local government is still struggling so badly? Research from Unison has shown that councils across England, Wales and Scotland are facing a collective funding shortfall of £4 billion by the financial year of 2026-27, and a cumulative funding gap of £7.4 billion by 2027-28. Let us please fix austerity first.

There are other problems, and I draw on the experience and expertise of the Association of Green Councillors in making these points. With this process, we are likely to see the destructive marginalisation of community identity in many places. There is no serious evidence to back up the choice of target for councils to serve 500,000 people, which Ministers have been asking for in their correspondence to councils. Many people in localities already affected are struggling to see how this will not result in arbitrarily drawn, essentially meaningless sub-county unitary councils with no identifiable sense of place.

Many very substantial towns, with history and a strong identity, often associated with strong values of independence of thought as well as governance, community spirit, welcome, inclusion and mutual support—places that people love—are currently or imminently in danger of being wiped off the local government map. They too are saying we should fix austerity first. The Committee has heard strong evidence of a clear and dramatic reduction in community representation from these changes, and we are already an under-represented population. Look anywhere in Europe or North America and people have far more peers, elected from their community, to represent them in decision making.

Unlike in so many other countries—unlike so many city council members or state representatives—our councillors, although they work hard, do not work as full-time representatives. I see no plans to make these new councillors with extra duties full time. Many existing councillors put in time way over what their allowances might cover, given the poor support and resources they often receive. They are overworked, and the job of councillors in these new super-unitaries is set to become harder if they are to maintain the strong community connections they currently have.

Hard-working local representatives also take on so much casework, helping people directly when public and private services drop the ball and helping them to navigate complex systems. We must not forget the value of a friendly face from the community who just listens and takes someone’s case up in a crisis. Have Ministers considered that the loss of thousands of people doing casework, advice and support work of this kind could have an impact on the caseloads of the hard working and hard-pressed staff and MPs taking up casework in local areas already? Have Ministers considered the impact on local advice services?

[Sean Woodcock]

Like the hon. Lady and councillors in my area, I too get casework, and one of the frustrations that people have in areas where there are two levels of local government—district and town councils—is that they sometimes go to one council and are told, “Sorry, we can’t do it. You need to go to the other one.” The priority for residents is surely getting things fixed and sorted. Does she not see benefit in having all services under one roof, so that the councillor knows that he can go straight to his officers and get it fixed, without having to say, “Sorry, it’s not my department”?

[Siân Berry]

I do not disagree with the essence of that point, but the Government are seeking to impose reorganisation, which could abolish a whole tier of councillors overnight and cause a spike in casework and the need for advice services. I do not believe they have really considered the impact of the transition.

This week, I met AdviceUK, whose survey of member groups found that the average advice service in the country has lost three staff members or volunteers in the past year, and needs three more advisers just to meet current demand. Have the Government considered that such services might face a spike in demand as a consequence of this reorganisation and the loss of community representation that is being imposed?

There are surely consequences for democracy. In contrast to the cost-saving argument, there is clear evidence that size matters when it comes to democracy and accountability, even with unitary authorities that work well—my constituency is in a well-established unitary. The proposed increase in population and geographic scale is likely to have a damaging effect on a range of democratic criteria, including electoral turnout, public trust in councillors and officers, and levels of participative engagement.

[Paul Holmes]

The hon. Lady is making a very interesting point. It has been argued that a single tier, under one authority, might improve democratic participation, but does she agree that someone in Hedge End in my area, whose council headquarters will be far removed from them geographically, may feel that their council represents them less, and therefore democratic participation would be reduced?

[Siân Berry]

Having been a local councillor, I can see the other side of the Government’s argument. A local councillor based further away, representing a larger ward, will have to work very hard to maintain the face-to-face interaction with their community that makes residents feel represented. I do not believe the Government have really considered that. No matter how hard-working councillors are—even at Green levels of all-year-round hard work—residents will have less familiarity with who their local councillors are and what they do, which may increase alienation from local democracy and feed populist narratives.

The hon. Member for Hamble Valley made this point well, but I have to complain that, unlike the new strategic authorities, which are about devolving power, forced and hurried local government reorganisation was not in the Labour manifesto, so I must oppose the clause.

[Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Siobhain. I agree with much of what has been said already. This clause goes to the very heart of the Bill and highlights why it is bad.

I led Broxbourne council, a district council, and was a county councillor on an authority that represented 1.2 million people, so I can say from experience that bigger does not always mean better. I wish other Committee members had been elected to councils so that they could have had that experience. I only wish that it worked in the ways that Labour Members have described, and that it were so easy to get things done in large authorities. From my experience of serving on a large county authority, I know that councillors are more removed from the residents they serve. Those authorities are very officer led, and it is very difficult to get things done. At the end of the day, it is the residents who fall out from that.

District councils have planning powers, the best way to transform lives. I fear for what will happen to planning services when we have big new unitary authorities of 500,000 or 400,000 people. Those services will be far removed from the people the councillors are making decisions for.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Tenth sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd October 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Clause 57 and schedule 25 will simplify and bring consistency to local authority governance arrangements. By abolishing the committee system, we will ensure that all councils operate an executive form of governance, providing clearer, more easily understood governance structures at a local level and more efficient decision making.

We will accept the continuation of the 13 legacy directly elected council mayors, while introducing measures to prevent the creation of any new ones. This will ensure a more consistent approach to governance and avoid the potential confusion caused by the establishment of new regional mayors for strategic authorities and mayors for councils. It is at this strategic level that we think the single focal point of leadership for the area and direct electoral accountability and mandate works best, and we believe this provision delivers the right powers in the right places.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair this afternoon, Ms Vaz.

I rise to speak against clause 57; I believe it is extreme control freakery and overreach from the Government and in no way essential to this Bill. Why impose a leader and cabinet model on all councils, even against their will, along with all these other changes? The Government can see only the benefits and, like a poorly run council, they ignore the critical risks.

Good governance benefits in many places from a deeply involved voice for principled opposition councillors to vote on policy, check the numbers, put forward good ideas and raise mission-critical questions about issues such as fire safety, service quality or big projects and contracts, even when that is uncomfortable for the administration. Places need the right to choose, democratically, a new model of governance when appropriate—especially when councils face problems and need a fresh start.

Changes of this sort are sometimes made after a crisis or a period of problems; I will talk in the next debate about changes made by referendums. I hear the claims of stagnation and indecision often levelled at committee systems, but I point out that under the current system people who see that happening have the right to change the model and try something else. A new administration can vote to switch to a leader and cabinet for a period, or to a mayor, if it wishes, or the people can make the change themselves by calling a referendum. The Government want to take away all that choice. That is very wrong and this clause is overreaching in the extreme.

Given the exceptions being made for mayors in the mandate for leader and cabinet, it seems that the committee system is the one most under attack from the Government in this Bill, so I want to provide some words and examples from cross-party local councillors about its benefits for their areas. In July 2025, Sheffield city council voted unanimously for a motion defending its democratically chosen model, stating that

“the benefits of the Committee System demonstrated in Sheffield include: greater collaboration across political groups in policy formulation and in decision making; overcoming party political tribalism and focussing on areas of agreement, not antagonism; improving the culture of the Council, with officers and Councillors focusing on what is best for the city; all Councillors being involved in the decision-making of the Council, and greater accountability to the electorate; and improved outcomes for the residents of Sheffield”.

That is a cross-party view.

[Sam Carling (North West Cambridgeshire) (Lab)]

I ran a constitution review for Cambridge city council while I was a councillor there, and we spent a lot of time talking about the committee system versus the cabinet system. Does the hon. Member not agree that what she has just described is an example of really positive culture in a council, which can be had regardless of the governance system? Does she also agree that the key thing about the committee system is that it is slow, inefficient and leads to much worse scrutiny? Under a leader and cabinet system we have scrutiny committees, and we end up with much more detailed questioning of evidence in those than in a committee system.

[Siân Berry]

I implore the hon. Member to listen to the rest of my speech and further points I shall make on other amendments. In Sheffield, at the same time, the council resolved unanimously that

“Sheffield benefits from fairer, more representative governance arrangements, and that people expect the Councillors they elect to have a vote on the decisions that affect them”.

Bristol also has a committee system, and Bristol Green councillors have told me how their cross-party committees have had a series of task and finish groups, where policy is developed with the input of councillors from all parties. They say that, while everyone does not always agree, this process allows for much more rounded development of policy ahead of implementation, not just scrutiny afterwards or divisive call-ins. There is rich debate, with more voices taking part in it.

Those councillors also say that the committee system also allows for back benchers to have more influence and input, with a positive effective on equalities as well, so that more councillors with a variety of different characteristics have space to input, and that, in turn, has a positive effect on policy development. New councillors also have more of a chance to develop their skills and interests than under a cabinet model, where only a handful of councillors have proper influence and are hand-picked by the leader or mayor in many cases. Sheffield councillors also say:

“The critical budget-setting process has worked better in Sheffield since the committee system was introduced, avoiding last minute wrangling and hasty deals between the parties. This is because the detail of the budget process is worked through each Committee in the months leading up to the budget, so all councillors are involved. This contrasts with the last budget brought under our Cabinet system where the budget proposal was voted down as the council meeting descended into chaos.”

I also urge the Committee to note that none of the councils that have issued section 114 notices in recent years have been run under a committee system. Worcestershire city council has had a committee system since 2017, implemented after a council motion that was proposed by Conservatives and seconded by Greens. Councillors there tell me that they see scrutiny within the committee system working really well to improve policy before any decisions are made, and it has improved cross-party working relationships and helped to build consensus.

The council has also been independently praised for its collaborative approach, and was commended in the Local Government Association’s corporate peer challenge in April, which said:

“The peer team found evidence of good governance across the organisation. The peer team found there was positive Member collaboration across political groups which makes the most of the opportunities in this type of governance and there was comprehensive coverage of council business at Policy Committees”.

I can speak on cabinet governance from my previous experience as a councillor in a Labour council, as it is currently the choice of the Labour administration in Brighton and Hove, where my constituency sits. Cabinets can obviously be quicker to act through a rapid decision-making process, but that has risks too. For good reason, the saying is not “Measure once, cut once”. I have noticed a disturbing trend of scrutiny committee time being squeezed by leaders and cabinets, with some councils having just one broad scrutiny committee—I did not experience that and I honestly cannot even imagine it working in agenda terms.

A single scrutiny committee has, by definition, only a limited time to examine a wide range of upcoming decisions in any detail, and surely has no space on the agenda for the kind of through pre-decision scrutiny or issue-based evidence gathering to generate ideas or feedback on services that good scrutiny committees also do, and which I have seen. There are further risks; along with maintaining first past the post, the leader and cabinet model preferred by the Government is a recipe for seeing purely one-party decision making in more places, overriding all opposition voices when key decisions have to be made. One-party states are not more efficient or effective.

[Manuela Perteghella]

Does the hon. Lady agree that the heart of the issue is actually choice? In this brave new world of unitary councils, local councils should have the ability to choose and shape their own future governance model.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I quite agree. We have heard a lot about the benefits of this new model, and this change is a sign from the Government that they are not even going to trust their new unitaries to choose their own governance systems. I find it a really strange addition to the Bill.

The Electoral Reform Society, in its 2015 report “The Cost of One-Party Councils: Lack of Electoral Accountability and Public Procurement Corruption”, estimated the cost to the public purse of councils having weak opposition to be about £2.6 billion a year. Finally, in November 2017, the current Prime Minister told BBC Radio 4’s “Today” programme, “In my experience in life, the best decisions are made with proper scrutiny, and the worst mistakes come from not having scrutiny.” The Government should listen to that man. This clause—of all the bad parts of the Bill—is the most exact opposite of community empowerment. If it stays, the Bill should be renamed the “Very Little Devolution and Too Much Centralised Control Bill”.

[Paul Holmes]

I will speak briefly to clause 57. The Opposition recognise why the Government are bringing in this system. As I have said before, I was a councillor in a unitary with a leader and cabinet system, and I think that that delivers the fastest decisions, and the most accountable decisions when there is a full council. In fact, we were able to constitute an overview and scrutiny committee, the chairmanship of which we gave to the opposition.

--- Later in debate ---

Local authority governance and executives

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move amendment 315, in schedule 25, page 251, line 1, leave out “Duty to move” and insert “Moving”.

This amendment, alongside Amendments 316 to 325 makes the Bill’s provision for legacy committee systems match the provisions for legacy mayor and cabinet executive systems, while maintaining the prohibition on new systems other than leader and cabinet executive.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 318, in schedule 25, page 251, leave out lines 9 to 19.

This amendment is related to Amendment 315.

Amendment 316, in schedule 25, page 251, line 10, leave out “must” and insert “may”.

This amendment is related to Amendment 315.

Amendment 319, in schedule 25, page 251, leave out lines 27 and 28.

This amendment is related to Amendment 315.

Amendment 320, in schedule 25, page 251, leave out from line 33 to the end of line 7 on page 252.

This amendment is related to Amendment 315.

Amendment 321, in schedule 25, page 252, line 8, at end insert “or committee systems”.

This amendment is related to Amendment 315.

Amendment 322, in schedule 25, page 252, line 12 after “executive” insert “or committee system”.

This amendment is related to Amendment 315.

Amendment 323, in schedule 25, page 252, line 14, after “executive” insert “or committee system”.

This amendment is related to Amendment 315.

Amendment 325, in schedule 25, page 252, line 18, after “executive” insert “or committee system”.

This amendment is related to Amendment 315.

Amendment 326, in schedule 25, page 252, leave out lines 20 to 24.

This amendment removes provisions relating to the discontinuance of the committee system.

Amendment 327, in schedule 25, page 254, leave out paragraph 7.

This amendment removes provisions relating to the discontinuance of the committee system.

[Siân Berry]

Having spoken about clause 57 as a whole, I will now speak to amendment 315 and the other amendments in the group, which support its goals. As the Government will not listen and have not removed the clause, the amendment is essential. It is about fair play. While maintaining the prohibition on new systems other than leader and cabinet executive, it would simply match the Bill’s provision for legacy committee systems to that for legacy mayor and cabinet systems.

Allowing places that have chosen committee systems to choose for themselves whether to change their governance back is important. I will highlight briefly, for the record, the story of two places that have chosen by referendum, driven by the people, to move to committee systems, and their case for allowing their choice to stand, unless and until they decide to make a different choice. As the Local Government Association told us in its evidence, it is not right for these democratic decisions to be disregarded. Councils using the committee system should be allowed to retain their governance system until they or their communities choose to move to a leader and cabinet system.

My first example is Sheffield. This is from the Green councillors, and the full story is available in their written evidence. Sheffield is a good example of the committee system being a success and making things better for residents after a crisis. Over time, the people of Sheffield became very dissatisfied with how the council ran things under the cabinet model, and particularly its disastrous handling of the long-running street trees fiasco. That brought Sheffield into disrepute. The Lowcock report on the eventual independent inquiry into the street trees dispute found:

“While a Strong Leader cabinet model with fewer checks and balances arguably gives authority to get things done, it can also, as in this case, enable the wrong things to be done without serious challenge.”

The ruling administration of Sheffield city council never agreed to switch to a committee system; that was people power. More than 26,000 people signed a petition demanding a statutory referendum. On 6 May 2021, the people of Sheffield voted by 65% to 35% to require the council to change to a committee system. For Sheffield, the committee system works better. The Green councillors told us:

“We know from talking to our residents and our election campaigns that people wanted to see parties working together”

after all this strife. They continued:

“They wanted to see an end to secretive decision-making behind closed doors and they wanted to see all the councillors taking responsibility for making decisions, not just a select few...There has been a culture shift, making working conditions better for staff, as well as improving outcomes for residents of the city. Even amongst those who were doubtful of the benefits of the committee system, very few argue for a return to the Cabinet regime.”

As mentioned in my last speech, the council voted unanimously to defend the committee system against the changes in the Bill. In June 2025, the Labour leader of the council issued a statement, with cross-party support:

“Since its implementation, and the publication of the Lowcock Report in 2023, we have been on an improvement journey to listen, change and rebuild trust with the city, a journey which was recognised in our recent nomination for Most Improved Council at the LGC Awards.”

My second example is Bristol city council, which changed after a referendum in 2022 from mayor and cabinet to a committee system. The Liberal Democrats proposed the motion to Bristol city council to bring about the referendum. It was seconded by the Greens and supported by the Conservatives. The city was given the choice of continuing to have a mayor and cabinet or changing to a committee system. The referendum result was 59% in favour of the change.

The people of Bristol, by a sizeable majority, expressed their dissatisfaction with the mayoral model, and cited a desire for more transparency, less tribalism and less power concentrated in one person as reasons for moving to a committee system. Under the new system, the people of Bristol now expect all councillors to take part in making decisions that affect the city, and that all councillors and political parties should work within the committee system to the benefit of local residents.

There has been more public engagement too since the committee system came in. There have been more public questions and statements, with each committee having a public forum. There has been a marked improvement in the governance of the city with this refreshment of the governance model. That has been evidenced in council worker surveys and through feedback from residents. Far from the predicted slowing down of policymaking, policies have been developed in good time and delivered, and many people have commented on the overall improvement in the working culture of the council.

The people of Bristol have now twice rejected a leader and cabinet model via referenda, once in 2012 to vote for a mayoral model, and again in 2022 in favour of a committee system. Those were local decisions, and to overturn the most recent decision only three years after it was made, without another referendum, would directly overturn the clear democratic mandate of the people of Bristol. It is not in the spirit of devolution to not respect places that have chosen what kind of local governance suits the people of that area. If people vote for a committee system in a referendum, they think it will work for them. It is not about what members of the governing party think will work or would like to operate, and it is not up to them to impose that on places where they are not in power.

My amendment is constructive: it respects the way in which the Government want to create new authorities. However, where authorities that remain in place and have made a decision, the Government need to be consistent between legacy policies for mayoral authorities and legacy policies for committee systems. I hope the Government will act and make the schedule consistent in what legacy systems it respects. I commend the amendment to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I am grateful for the Minister listening to those important points, which I stress again are cross-party points. I look forward to seeing further developments on the clause, I am happy to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move amendment 336, in schedule 25, page 253, line 25, at end insert—

“Duty to introduce code of conduct, inductions and ongoing training (England)

4A (1) Every local authority must adopt and enforce a code of conduct for elected members that—

(a) includes provisions addressing harassment, discrimination and online abuse; and

(b) provides for independent investigation of alleged breaches, overseen by the monitoring officer.

(2) Every local authority must provide a structured induction programme for all newly elected members, which must include—

(a) professional standards and responsibilities;

(b) equality and diversity duties; and

(c) family-friendly and inclusive working practices.

(3) It is a duty for local authorities to provide further such training every two years following the election of new members to the authority.

(4) Local authorities must also make provision for continuing professional development for elected members.

4B (1) A monitoring officer’s functions shall include responsibility for—

(a) investigating breaches of the code of conduct in accordance with paragraph 4A of this schedule;

(b) promoting councillor welfare and wellbeing;

(c) ensuring compliance with equalities duties; and

(d) maintaining transparent procedures for the handling of complaints.

(2) Every local authority must publish an annual report on complaints received by the monitoring officer, including—

(a) the number of complaints received, and

(b) outcomes of those complaints.”

This amendment ensures that all local authorities are required to maintain clear and enforceable codes of conduct for councillors, tackling harassment, discrimination and online abuse and mandates induction and continuous training on equalities and conduct. It embeds and extends independent oversight by monitoring officers.

The amendment deals with a separate matter of inclusive practices. It is aimed at improving more diverse access to elected office and arises from work I have been doing with the organisation Elect Her, which aims to motivate, support and equip women in all their diversity to stand for political office in Britain, and to nurture an ecosystem of organisations reshaping the political system so that all women can thrive once elected. Its research found that weak codes of conduct, poor induction for new councillors and lack of financial recognition all deter women from entering and continuing in office. The amendment would help deal with that.

Elect Her’s report on Scotland by demonstrates how inclusion can improve when councils adopt stronger codes of conduct, structured induction and clear reporting mechanisms. The amendment would introduce a duty to have a code of conduct for elected members, which would include provisions against harassment, discrimination and online abuse. It would provide for independent investigation of alleged breaches overseen by the monitoring officer, and a structured induction programme for newly elected members.

Setting the stage for behaviour is crucial, particularly when new councillors are elected, before things start to go wrong. The programme would include important information and training on professional standards, equality and diversity duties, and family-friendly and inclusive working practices. It would also mandate that the training should be refreshed, particularly following the election of new members. Continued professional development is also covered by the amendment. It asks monitoring officers to investigate breaches of the code of conduct and gives them duties to promote councillor welfare and wellbeing, equalities duties and transparent procedures for complaints. It also asks for an annual report on complaints.

The provisions are sensible suggestions that I hope the Government will take up. Although I will not press the amendment to a vote, it speaks to the fact that while we have discussed potential problems with workload that councillors in these new authorities may have, which are also inclusion issues in some cases, the Bill could more directly address some of the issues that we know affect people’s ability to carry on in the job. We have received disturbing evidence from Elect Her on the extent to which councillors report abuse. We know that women and minorities are disproportionately likely to experience abuse, and we have a duty to do what we can in the Bill to make being a local councillor a more inclusive job. My amendment addresses some of the systemic barriers that might stand in the way of local democracy truly representing all of our communities. I hope the Government will look again at the options.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The Government fully understand that greater devolution relies on local authority members embodying the highest standards of conduct, so we absolutely agree with the spirit of the amendment. We have consulted on proposals for comprehensive reform of the standards and conduct framework for local authorities in England. Our response to the consultation will be published shortly and will set out in detail the scale of our ambition for a whole-system reform of the standards and conduct framework.

Our ambitions go significantly further than the amendment in terms of introducing a clearer and consistently applied framework for standards and conduct, and ensuring misconduct is dealt with swiftly and fairly in every type and tier of local government. We will bring forward legislation as soon as parliamentary time allows, so I ask the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion to withdraw the amendment.

[Siân Berry]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Manuela Perteghella]

I beg to move amendment 250, in schedule 25, page 254, leave out lines 3 to 12.

This amendment retains the statutory requirement for public notices to be published in printed local newspapers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move amendment 264, in clause 58, page 60, line 25, at end insert—

“(e) requiring that local engagement activities under paragraph (d) meet minimum standards to ensure meaningful community participation, including—

(i) the use of deliberative processes such as citizens’ panels, assemblies, or community conversations;

(ii) the active inclusion of communities most likely to be impacted by the policy measures, and communities underrepresented in policy making; and

(iii) reporting, and publication of resulting reports, on how community input has influenced local plans and decisions;

(f) providing existing local democratic bodies, including parish and town councils, with appropriate powers, funding and infrastructure to support and facilitate such participation.”

This amendment requires regulations on neighbourhood governance to set minimum standards for involvement, including deliberative processes, inclusion of underrepresented groups and transparency.

This is a really important amendment. It proposes a minimum standard for meaningful community involvement be added to this part of Bill on neighbourhood governance. It aims to put people at the heart of the new local decision-making structures by setting minimum standards so that community involvement is inclusive, uses deliberative methods and clearly shows how people’s views have shaped decisions. It would also give local councils the powers and funding that they need to make that happen effectively. The problem with the Bill as it stands is that “appropriate arrangements” is left undefined. That risks weak or inconsistent community participation. The amendment would ensure that the arrangements meet minimum standards and would make engagement consistent, inclusive and transparent.

The Bill’s success depends on whether it achieves what the Minister has been assuring us of throughout these proceedings: a shifting of democratic power. It needs to ensure that decisions are made with people rather than consulting them or imposing on them. I am sure we are all aware of the ladder of engagement, where final decisions are simply waved in front of people for consultation. That is the bare minimum and, in many ways, the worst form of engagement with the public. People will often look at a big proposal and respond in great detail, only to then see that nothing has changed. That really undermines trust. We need to make sure that people can see how their voices are shaping outcomes at a local level. This amendment would enable us to rebuild public trust through the Bill.

We need to ensure that we actively facilitate and enable community participation, and it is important that it is properly funded. Doing a consultation is a very separate thing to participation. We do know that people want participation. Demos polling from 2024 found that 63% of the public would very likely accept an invitation to take part in participation exercises of this kind, but 41% said that they would be less likely to take part if they believed that the Government would not listen to what they had to say. I recognise that the Bill presents the opportunity for secondary legislation to fill these gaps, but if the Government cannot support the amendment, it would be helpful for the Minister to put clearly on the record that those regulations would include deliberative processes, real involvement and reporting back on the ways in which decisions are changed, as the amendment would require.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I am pleased to see the focus on community engagement in this amendment. However, we already have powers to set standards for local engagement through regulations, and that is what we will do. We are currently working with local government and the community sector to understand what best practice looks like and what is already happening on the ground. My view is that it is right and appropriate that different principal authorities work out the best way to engage their communities, which can be very diverse and will need different approaches.

We are clear that principal authorities can and should already be working to support their communities through meaningful and robust community engagement and coproduction. The very best councils already do that, and we have examples of that across the country. It does not always happen in the way that it does with the very best, so we will work with and support councils to have meaningful community engagement. At the heart of this is giving communities and residents—people in our localities—proper voice, agency and ability to drive decision. We will ensure that we design this in a way that enables and supports that.

[Siân Berry]

I appreciate the detail of the answer that the Minister is giving me, but I would like some further reassurance that poorly performing councils will face some sort of redress under the system that she is talking about.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

As I said, for this to work, we need councils to enable it. We will introduce a set of measures including peer-to-peer support—so, where we have great practice, sharing it with other councils—as well as capacity building and training, in order to make sure there is meaningful community engagement, because we believe it is fundamental. If we get this right, it is fundamentally about empowering our communities and residents. Every tier of government, from national Government through to strategic authorities and local authorities, will all have to play their part to ensure we do that well.

[Siân Berry]

I am content with the Minister’s response, so I beg to ask to leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I beg to move amendment 222, in clause 58, page 60, leave out lines 31 and 32 and insert—

“‘local authority’ means—

(a) a county council,

(b) a district council,

(c) a London borough council;”.

This narrows the types of local authority in England that are bound by the requirement to make arrangements to secure effective neighbourhood governance.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

Amendments 312 to 314 aim to achieve the same thing: formally guarantee the introduction of the supplementary vote system, which is already being legislated for, at next year’s local mayoral elections, including the newly established combined authority areas of Greater Essex; Hampshire and the Solent; Norfolk and Suffolk; and Sussex and Brighton, in which my constituency lies.

The Government have clearly admitted, accepted and legislated for the need to return mayoral elections to a more proportional system—in this case, supplementary vote, which achieves a majority vote for whoever wins. The Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government said on Second Reading:

“We are backing the ambition and untapped potential of local areas with a more ambitious role for the mayors representing them. That must be underpinned by elections that command public confidence. Because of changes made by the last Government, mayors can be elected on just a fraction of the vote, despite serving millions of people and managing multimillion-pound budgets.”—[Official Report, 2 September 2025; Vol. 772, c. 185.]

I will give a few examples of the election outcomes we might expect if we go ahead with next year’s elections under first past the post. I remind the Committee that the results will be baked in for four years in each case and have serious implications.

[Andrew Cooper]

We have established a principle in this country of changing our electoral system via referendum. We had a referendum on the alternative vote system during the coalition era. The Bill is going to switch the system back to single transferable vote as it was when it was originally envisaged, so I believe that it is fair enough to go ahead without a referendum. But what the hon. Lady is proposing would be to change to an entirely different system without any democratic mandate to do so.

[Siân Berry]

I want to clarify that I am talking about the supplementary vote for mayoral elections in clause 59.

To return to some examples of mayoral elections under first past the post with results that are not optimal for democracy or public confidence: the 2025 Cambridgeshire and Peterborough mayoral election saw Paul Bristow elected on 28.4% of the vote, with a turnout of 32.9%. That gave 9.3% of the entire electorate a satisfactory result.

In none of my examples am I saying that the result was wrong, but they are not results that clearly command the confidence of a majority of the people in the area —that may well have been the case had a second vote been counted, but no second vote was allowed. I do not think that is a good way to conduct things. The 2025 West of England mayoral election saw Helen Godwin elected on 25% of the vote. With turnout at 30%, that gave 7.5% of the entire electorate a satisfactory result. The 2025 Hull and East Yorkshire mayoral election saw Luke Campbell elected on 35.8% of the vote. With turnout at 29.8%, that gave 10.7% of the entire electorate a satisfactory result.

In contrast, the last election held under the supplementary vote system in 2022 for South Yorkshire saw Oliver Coppard elected with 71.4% in the second round, up from a first round vote of 43.1%. That is a sea change in confidence and mandate compared with some of those marginal wins on a small turnout that we have seen in other areas.

[Paul Holmes]

The hon. Lady says that Oliver Coppard got 71% of the vote in the second round, but her quote leads me to believe that the number of people who voted was no different from what it would have been under first past the post. Is that correct?

[Siân Berry]

I stopped reading out turnout results, but turnout was 42.8%—much higher than in previous examples. To be honest, I would prefer a ranking of all candidates down the ballot paper, but I believe that when people are able to use their votes to express both their first and second preferences they are not discouraged from turning out. When parties are not forced to put out leaflets all about who might win but leaflets are instead about the actual issues that might affect people’s lives, turnout goes up. It is really important that this change is made.

On consistency, I want to raise an issue from Sussex. A motion passed by East Sussex county council makes a really good point:

“When Sussex decided to join the priority programme there was no suggestion that there would be any democratic disadvantage from being at the front of the queue”.

That is the problem: the areas that have stepped forward sooner are being forced to accept a substandard election system. I recognise that the motion at East Sussex county council was to delay the elections, and that is not my wish either. I absolutely recognise that there is a timetable challenge: if the amendments were accepted today, they would need to wait until the Bill was enacted to come into force. We cannot make changes to an imminent election, so I do not intend the press the amendments to a vote today.

However, I call on the Government to fix the situation. I would like the Minister to go away and talk to colleagues about how she might be able to fairly resource all the areas holding mayoral elections, including those that have chosen to go first and should face no penalty, so that they can conduct next year’s elections under the supplementary vote in the way that other areas will benefit from later.

[Paul Holmes]

I have to speak to this group of amendments because only one party has consistency when it comes to a “one vote, one election” philosophy: the Conservative party. It is lovely to see the weird and wonderful array of views on electoral systems from parties that want to gerrymander political systems to try to suit their own ends. That is what we have seen this afternoon.

At the mayoral elections, the first-past-the-post system worked because it clearly showed that when the people entitled to vote have one vote, the candidate who gets the most votes wins. We would always argue that that is the simplest and fairest system for the election of a single politician. I do not often compliment the Government, but they have always been consistent on this issue when it comes to mayoral elections. But we cannot keep asking the same person to be subject to two votes and claim that in the second round they have 71% and therefore an overwhelming mandate, when the turnouts under AV or SV are not markedly different from first past the post. Actually, the 41% turnout cited by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion still means that fewer than half the total electorate voted for that winning candidate so the hon. Lady’s argument against first past the post is exactly the same as that in favour of the gerrymandering political voting mechanism that she wants to bring in.

[Siân Berry]

I would not claim that a turnout of nearly 43% is a triumph, but the hon. Member has to admit that it is a good turnout compared with that of most local government elections.

[Paul Holmes]

I would argue that it is up to us as politicians and candidates in the election to advertise the position and generate excitement among the electorate, so that people vote for them. It was still 41%, I think, in the election that the hon. Lady cited; it was below half the total electorate, so this is not a panacea for improving electoral participation.

Also, I know that the hon. Lady was advocating for SV, but the Liberal Democrats have always been vehement in their approach to AV, despite the fact that they lost the national referendum that they managed to get on the AV voting system. [Hon. Members: “You gave it to them.”] We gave it to them because that is coalition, but they lost and we won, so I am quite happy with the outcome. They lost a test on the national system.

AV was used in mayoral elections and PCC elections when these positions were created, and turnouts were demonstrably low and very low in some cases—12% to 18%. They are now massively higher. Okay, they are not high enough, but they are higher now because they have become a constant and well-established institution in our voting system. That is not because of the voting system. It is because the system has been allowed to bed in and people have the choice of whether to elect a PCC or mayor or not. That is one of the bedrocks of our political systems today.

I thought I was triggered on the amendment where I saw the words “citizens’ panels”, but now I am even more triggered; we have a long history of speaking about citizens’ panels and citizens’ assemblies. As I said at the beginning, there is a clear need for local people to have a straightforward system that does what it says on the tin. The Conservative party will always believe that first past the post is the system that does that. Other parties want to gerrymander a system to try to suit their own preferred political outcomes.

The Minister said that directly elected people need to have the widest possible mandate and number of people voting for them. Her Prime Minister secured 32% of the vote in a national election and won a majority of the size that he did. [Interruption.] It is not a reason to support another system at all. I do not think that the Minister can advocate for a different voting system in one case, but then—the Government’s position is confused on voting systems—accept that a 32% vote share got well over 60% of the seats on a turnout, I think, in the high 60s. That is not exactly representative, either. The Government need to have a solid position on all kinds of elections, not just ones that suit their potential candidates.

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[Siân Berry]

I will speak briefly on new clause 51. It is really encouraging that there is a cross-party effort to reinvigorate community ownership funding, which has lapsed. Although I am excited about the pride in place funding, which is quite extensive and goes into local areas in quite an intensive way, I think the community ownership angle of that is limited to the geographic area covered. Things such as sporting assets or community assets that serve a whole town may not be within that area. I would like to hear from the Minister that, if she will not accept new clause 51, something will be done for other parts of the country to ensure a fund to support community ownership.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will try to work through all the amendments. Let me start with amendment 373. I appreciate the commitment of the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon to protecting historical assets. The Government are proud to support communities to celebrate heritage buildings and assets, and there are already protections in place for them to do that. Historical buildings that are valued by local communities, but do not meet the criteria to be nationally listed, can be listed by local authorities as non-designated heritage assets. That protects them through the national planning policy framework, so the protection is already there.

On amendment 40, I reassure the Committee that we already have established processes in place to ensure that local authorities are adequately funded to deliver new policies, and this is no exception. The new burdens doctrine requires that all new responsibilities placed on local authorities are properly assessed and fully funded by the relevant Department. We are assessing the cost of the process for local authorities and will provide new burdens funding accordingly.

On amendment 41, I can confirm that we are assessing the costs of independent valuation to local authorities. Where the owner and community buyer cannot agree a purchase price for an asset through negotiation, the local authority must appoint an independent valuer. We will provide new burdens funding to meet those costs accordingly, once assessments have been finalised and tested with local government. I hope that that provides some assurance.

On amendment 374, we know that some community groups may not come forward as they do not have the capability or capacity to put together a bid for an asset. The intention of the 12-month sale period is to give communities time to organise and to raise the funding required. We will continue to work with community organisations to ensure that they have the support to do so. Requiring local authorities to step in to purchase assets where there is no community buyer would put too much of a burden on local authorities, and we could end up with local authorities taking over and having to run theatres and pubs. Although those assets might have value for the community, that does not feel appropriate for a local authority.

We think we have the balance right and that this measure is proportionate. As my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury said eloquently, however much we might want a particular asset to stay in its original form, sometimes that may not be viable. We do not want buildings becoming dilapidated when they could be retained in a different way.

On amendment 42, we are already putting requirements on local authorities to enable and facilitate this process. For example, they must arrange that joint meeting between the asset owner and the community buyer at the start of the process and enable that process of negotiation and, as I have said, local authorities again need to step in to provide the independent valuer if negotiations fail. We think that is the right role for the local authority, not least because it has to be an arbiter in the process.

However, we want there to be enough capability across all our communities, irrespective of the level of social capital, to be able to take on these powers. There is a range of community organisations with the expertise and experience to provide this kind of support to communities, such as Plunkett, Power to Change and Locality, and we are working with those organisations on the additional support that they can provide to communities across the country.

Amendment 249 would restrict what an asset owner can do with their property once listed. We think that it is ultimately up to local planning authorities to consider planning applications in accordance with their development plans and other material considerations. That could include the listing of an asset of community value. The weight afforded to material considerations in making the decision will be decided on a case-by-case basis, and we think it is right that that is left to the local planning authority.

Critically, the national planning policy framework already includes important safeguards to protect against the unnecessary loss of social, recreational and cultural facilities that serve an important value for the community. We think that the balance between what already exists in the planning system and the protections that we are providing through the community right to buy is right and appropriate.

Finally, on new clause 51, let me be clear: this Government are absolutely committed to empowering our communities. We are giving communities everywhere the power to take ownership. Our pride in place programme, which the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion talked about, is providing £5 billion over 10 years to support 244 places, to enable and support them to take on such community assets of value.

We will continue to review this area, because we are committed to communities having a stake in and ownership of their assets, and we are committed to doing our part as a Government to enable them to do that. With that, I ask the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon to withdraw her many amendments.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th October 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Manuela Perteghella]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dame Siobhain. The new clause would place a legal duty on mayors of combined authorities and combined county authorities to be transparent about how public money is spent. It is a simple but powerful measure designed to build public trust in the devolved government that the Bill creates. The mayor would have a legal duty to ensure that their financial information is not just published, but accessible, clear and understandable to the public. The new clause would also require mayors to publish a policy explaining how their authority will engage with local communities on spending priorities and major financial decisions, and to review the policy regularly. That engagement could include citizens budget forums, public consultations, participatory budgeting sessions or even budget roadshows travelling around the authority area.

Lack of transparency in local finance can erode public trust and allow serious problems to build up unnoticed. In recent years, several councils and combined authorities have faced financial distress or even bankruptcy. Across the country, there is a sense that combined authorities are powerful but distant. They make big spending decisions, yet few people understand how the decisions are made. Transparency is the foundation of public confidence in local leadership. The new clause also aligns with the wider principle of good public finance management by supporting the work of all the committees and local auditors who depend on accessible financial information, while enforcing public sector accountability and ensuring that mayors and chief executives know that they must communicate clearly.

Some may argue that the new clause would place another duty on already busy mayors and combined authorities, but this is not about extra bureaucracy; it is about basic democratic accountability. Frankly, if a mayor’s office can manage hundreds of millions of pounds in its budgets, it can surely manage to explain where the money goes. Devolution should bring power closer to the people, and that must include the power to see, question and understand how public money is being used.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

It is a pleasure to have you back in the Chair, Dame Siobhain. I will speak to my new clause 15, which proposes an independent review of the adequacy of scrutiny and accountability arrangements within six months of commencement. We have had plenty of debate in Committee about scrutiny and accountability of new strategic authorities and the larger new unitary authorities, but new clause 15 is solely about the mayoral combined authorities.

Given the scale of the powers on offer, the Bill is relatively light on scrutiny and consultation requirements. There are duties carried over from existing legislation relating to strategic authorities taking on the functions of, for example, fire and rescue authorities, and to the appointment of commissioners to whom strategic mayors would delegate functions, but quite honestly, only one new measure in the Bill adds to scrutiny over the carried over measures. That is clause 9 and schedule 3, about the termination of the commissioner role and a role for the overview and scrutiny committee to recommend dismissal. In the rest of the Bill, the underpinning of the scrutiny arrangements for these powerful new combined authorities will be derived from local councils, as established by the Local Government Act 2000, but I am yet to be convinced that such an underpinning will provide enough scrutiny and challenge of these powerful new bodies.

[Paul Holmes]

I want to drill down into the perceived lack of scrutiny of the new combined authorities. The hon. Lady just said that they would essentially follow the current arrangements in local authorities. Is she saying that she is unhappy with the existing level of scrutiny in local authorities, or does she just want the added safety her new clause offers?

[Siân Berry]

I will cover some of those issues, but yes, I am not completely happy with how many local councils work. Some carry out the bare minimum. I think we need more minimum guarantees built into this new process, and the Bill is the right place to introduce them.

As I said, the current model is basically an expanded local authority model, based on the idea, I think, that a combined authority is a collection of local authorities so the underlying scrutiny arrangements are sufficient. However, that has already been stretched by the more powerful mayors, and it will be stretched further when the new authorities are set up.

The new powers in particular need more scrutiny. For example, public bodies in every area will need to have regard to the growth plan. Growth plan objectives will be decided by the central authority, but how will they be developed and scrutinised? A strategic authority will be the local transport authority for its region, so it will gain a key route network of roads and can instruct the traffic authorities in its area on the management of the network. These are additional powers, so there is a role for additional scrutiny. Local plans and planning decisions will need to conform to the strategic authority’s plan—that is set out in the Planning and Infrastructure Bill—but how the powers are used deserves scrutiny, challenge, questions and accountability. These authorities are also taking on land assembly and housing powers. They can make mayoral development orders, and set up many huge budgets within mayoral development corporations. I do not think the local authority scrutiny model can cover the questions that might need to be asked in those circumstances.

There is a process for giving the new strategic authorities even greater powers in the future, but there is no associated process in the Bill for reviewing the scrutiny arrangements as those powers increase. New clause 15 would require a review of the scrutiny arrangements to match the new powers given to strategic authorities, which they may request as the Government devolve further. A safety net for scrutiny is needed somewhere in the Bill. I am aiming to fix a genuine problem.

Many existing strategic authorities have struggled to establish a truly collaborative approach between the local authorities and the members of the committees that exist to scrutinise those authorities. Quite often, the members feel that they should represent their own local authority and do not necessarily take a collective approach to scrutiny in the committee. I believe that problem will increase, particularly where we establish authorities that may lack a strong collective identity like that Greater London or Greater Manchester, where people automatically feel that they will be standing up for that area. In these new invented areas, we need legislation to ensure that scrutiny will reflect a common identity and collective approach.

This issue is a reflection of quite a lot of existing problems with scrutiny in councils. I will cite some of the conclusions in the Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee’s 2017 report. It looked at the effectiveness of local authority scrutiny committees and concluded that scrutiny was marginalised in too many authorities, which could contribute to service failures. The Committee also found evidence that scrutiny committee chairs often did not challenge their leaders, picking instead safe, less controversial topics, and that the fact that the committee chairs are appointed meant that they were more likely to keep quiet and use their role as a way to prepare for a future cabinet position. In the local authority model, the leaders can choose their cabinet, and we have already discussed many times in this Committee how the new mayors will be able to choose their commissioners. I am sure that Members can see how the same dynamic might occur.

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[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I acknowledge the intent behind new clauses 3 and 15. We all agree that transparency, accountability and greater scrutiny are needed, and that there is room for improvement in our system.

On the specifics of new clause 3, all local authorities must publish annual accounts along with an annual governance statement. The local government transparency code 2015 requires local authorities and combined authorities to publish regularly on their websites information about spending and assets, including, as a minimum, all spending over £500, which must be published quarterly, and all land and building assets held.

All mayoral strategic authorities are expected to follow the principles and processes described in the English devolution accountability framework. That sets out how mayors will be held to account by central Government, at local level, and by the public. As part of the local assurance framework, mayoral strategic authorities must describe their arrangements for enabling effective and meaningful engagement with local partners and the public. My argument is that we have the legislative framework, and that this is now a question of practice.

Everyone wants information about public spending and Government accounts to be as accessible as possible. It is as much a problem for central Government as it is for local government and lots of bodies and institutions. I would argue it is a question of practice and of improving the way we do things. Through digital technology and the ability to use different methods, we can make this information far more accessible. I do not think we need further legislation. We need to improve our practice and innovate and modernise so the public can better hold all of us to account. That is an endeavour across all levels of government and all public institutions, so the new clauses duplicate existing arrangements and do not really get to the heart of the issue that we all recognise we need to resolve.

I absolutely agree with the intent behind new clause 15. We have stated on the record that we understand the need to strengthen the accountability and the scrutiny mechanism for strategic authorities. We said this in the English devolution White Paper, my colleague said it in the House, and we are committed to that. I assure the Cttee we will consider how to strengthen the scrutiny of strategic authorities, because I completely agree that as they acquire more powers, it is right we have accountability and scrutiny frameworks that are robust and fit for purpose, to ensure they are held to account for how they use the powers we confer on them.

The challenge I have with the new clause from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion is that the independent panel she is recommending would mean we have to wait over a year after Royal Assent to respond to this critical issue, because we would not want to pre-empt the recommendations of the panel. In some respects, the very thing that the hon. Lady is trying to force us to do may well end up slowing our ability to do.

[Siân Berry]

Is the Minister honestly saying that if there was a call from Parliament to review scrutiny within one year of Royal Assent, she would not be telling us that was too soon? The reason one year is written into the new clause is that is a very reasonable deadline.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We acknowledge this is an area we want to strengthen. As I said in the last debate, we are working to make sure that we are taking in view the scrutiny models that we apply, including local public accounts committees and the models proposed by think-tanks and other organisations, in the context of the big reforms to the local audit and assurance framework we are driving through. I ask the Committee to give us time to do the work properly, so that we design something that is fit for purpose and aligned with the big reforms we are driving through. There is no resiling from the belief that we need to strengthen the arrangements. I put that on record and am happy to give those reassurances. Let us get on with the work of figuring out how we do that in the best possible way, by engaging with strategic authorities and critical stakeholders, rather than put in the Bill a requirement that may, in fact, slow the pace at which we are able to develop proposals. On that basis, I ask the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon to withdraw her new clause.

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[Manuela Perteghella]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 6 would allow the Secretary of State, given parliamentary approval, to introduce a proportional representation vote system in elections of local authority councillors, not just mayors and police and crime commissioners. Under first past the post, as the Committee will know all too well, local people are left feeling that it makes no difference who they vote for in local elections. We mentioned this earlier with mayors, but councillors too can be elected on a minority of the overall voting public. We should be able to feel that going to the polling station and casting a vote matters, and that we get to contribute to who makes key decisions about the management of our families’ social care, our children’s schools or keeping our streets clean. That is what the majority of people really care about. We have already discussed how first past the post does not allow for that, and was disastrous when introduced for mayoral elections.

Those of us who have been councillors know that too many local people have been left feeling frustrated and not properly represented by the people elected in their areas. As the Government want to see a fairer voting system for mayors and police and crime commissioners, why not go a step further and introduce a proportional representation voting system for all councillors? I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts on that. If elected councillors are supposed to be elected representatives, we must make it so that they are elected in a representative way. I hope that the Minister can accept the new clause, because I cannot see why we are treating mayors and police and crime commissioners in one way, while forgetting local councillors in changes to the electoral system. If she cannot, we will press it to a vote.

[Siân Berry]

I very much support the new clause, and put my name to it to demonstrate that. I want to say a few words about why the new clause is so appropriate for the Bill. It would allow the Secretary of State by regulations to introduce proportional representation voting for local authority councillors. Importantly, the regulations would be subject to the affirmative procedure, so that Parliament would get its say.

This measure has precedent. As we will all recall, the electoral system for mayors was changed from the supplementary vote to first past the post via an amendment tabled by the then Government during Committee stage of the Elections Act 2022—it was not part of the Bill on Second Reading, and there was no wider consultation. There is obviously no recent precedent for changing the local government system for England, but the Scottish Government—at the time a Labour Government in coalition with the Liberal Democrats—changed the local elections to the single transferable vote through the Local Governance (Scotland) Act 2004. The Welsh Government, at the time a Labour minority Government, legislated to give councils the option of switching to the single transferable vote in the Local Government and Elections (Wales) Act 2021.

Under the new clause, the Secretary of State might decide to go for different degrees of change, after talking to people about what might be more appropriate. The alternative vote and the supplementary vote are very similar; they are both preferential systems that are very suited to single member positions. I think that that is why the Government have chosen to return to the supplementary vote for mayors. I would argue that the alternative vote is better, gives voters more choices and guarantees a majority through a process of consensus, but that is one of the options. My favourite is the single transferable vote—I am waiting for the interventions—because it is a bigger change.

However, for local government, because the single transferable vote is so suitable for multi-member constituencies, and because it is so simple for voters—people just choose their favourites, and the voting system works out the right consensus and the members who have the broadest support—it is an excellent system and ought to be considered. It may be very suitable for the larger unitaries, where more members per ward could be put together to make it work in a proportional fashion. However, the new clause would not mandate any of that; it would be for the Secretary of State to decide.

In January, in a debate in the House on proportional representation for general elections, I said this about the Bill:

“We have an opportunity, presented by imminent local government reorganisation—the creation of combined authorities and potentially very large councils—to shift to a more proportional system, potentially using multi-member wards and the single transferable vote. That is the system used in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland. It is incredibly simple for voters to cast their preferences. The election counts are extremely exciting…It delivers candidates based on consensus, not division…it delivers for many people”.

The real benefit—this has obvious benefits for Northern Ireland—is that it delivers

“not only hardworking representatives in the administration but people whose job it is to listen and represent them from opposition parties.”

For larger councils, that could really help, as I said in that debate, with

“the potential remoteness of the uber councils that are being talked about.”—[Official Report, 30 January 2025; Vol. 761, c. 469-470.]

If there are multi-member wards, ward councillors whose roles in the combined authorities pull them out of local areas could leave local responsibilities to their colleagues. Having a range of people represented at the local ward level would be so beneficial and I believe that needs looking at. We need to urgently consider that change for local government.

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[Paul Holmes]

The Liberal Democrats and Greens want to bring in a vast array of different voting systems, in different stages of elections, but residents locally expect to have one vote, one system, to elect three, two or one councillors in a ward—one member, two member, three member ward—in a constituency in a small geographical region, so that they know the people they are electing. Those councillors across the whole of the country, Liberal, Green, Labour, Conservative, are local champions. They have a very small and bespoke role among their electorate.

The hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole asked why people keep electing Liberals in Eastleigh, and I will be honest with her. In the 2021 local elections, the Liberal Democrats secured 42% of the vote in my Eastleigh borough, and the Conservatives polled 36%. We won one ward in my council, and the Liberal Democrats won 36. The hon. Lady might think I am a bit nuts, but I think that system is right. Everyone knows who they are voting for in their ward, and there are two or three candidates per party. They are electing a councillor who will then make an administration with a leader and a cabinet. My party went without, and I think it is unfair most of the time, but that is the system I back because it is the easiest, clearest and most accountable to the people who we serve.

I will make one last point and then I will let the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole intervene, if she wishes. I promise I am not being facetious, but I am having genuine difficulty understanding the speech made by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. It may be my naivety; if she wants to explain it, I am perfectly accepting of that. In previous debates in this Committee, the hon. Lady said that the larger councils proposed by the Government would often mean that the link between a ward councillor and their constituents or ward would be diminished, because of the larger geographical area. If I am not wrong, in her speech on this new clause, she essentially said that would not be the case, as there would now be a diminishing of the link between that geography and the councillor under this voting system. I am not sure whether the two are mutually exclusive.

[Siân Berry]

There is confusion because I have argued that larger councils could lead to greater remoteness, certainly because the town hall may be many miles away. However, people will still be electing ward councillors, and my argument is simply that, should a person’s local ward councillors be part of the administration, they may see them very rarely. In those circumstances, it might be beneficial to have a range of local councillors from different parties, potentially with an increased number per ward, so that they represent more different points of view and can listen to constituents in different ways.

[Paul Holmes]

The hon. Lady explains perfectly; I disagree with her. We absolutely agree on the geographical link for super-councils—I have already said that I do not believe that the Government have a democratic mandate for those. However, the answer to larger councils is not changing to a voting system where we create more councillors, or saying, “Because we want to move to a different system, we will go from a three-member ward to a six-member ward with multiple parties.” I think that actually complicates the situation for many constituents and residents.

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[Siân Berry]

May I add that this is a really interesting debate and one that we should continue to have under my new clause? To answer the hon. Gentleman’s question, Conservative Members have argued repeatedly that there will be a loss of representation from the abolition of the lower-tier councils. Does he not agree that this a way to mitigate that?

[Paul Holmes]

No, I do not; we should keep the current system in place. I believe that, even though we are essentially going from three to two tiers, we are not actually going to one tier in this country, because mayors are being created as well. There is a direct link between the mayor and the local people, and there is a direct link between these new councils and local people. Again, I do not think the answer to simplifying the electoral system and making representation easier is to create more councillors from different parties in a ward. That is expensive and lacks democratic legitimacy, and I think the current system is perfectly acceptable. We are always going to be on the losing side on this one. Smaller parties often want to change the system to ensure that their parties have more victories and more legitimacy in democratic chambers. The Conservative party has a long and proud history of opposing proportional representation.

I remind the Liberal Democrats that they have tried and tested a change in the electoral system, and when they went to the country seeking it, they lost. Therefore, people have been asked whether they want to change the voting system in a national election. I think that the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole would find that if there were referendums—we know that the Government are against referendums in the Bill—many people across this country would choose not to change the voting system in local government too. The current local government electoral system works, and it suits its purpose. People know who their councillors are; they are linked to them and know that they often represent an area that they deeply care for and are passionate about—even Liberal Democrat ones in Eastleigh. We oppose the new clause, and will vote against it if it is pressed to a vote.

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[Siân Berry]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is a pleasure to move the new clause in the name of the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), who is a well-known enthusiast for allotments. I am a keen gardener in a space similar to an allotment, and my colleague Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb in the House of Lords is also a huge enthusiast. I hope that this issue and this kind of provision will continue to be discussed in the other place, whatever happens in the Commons. The Bill quite rightly puts health and wellbeing at the heart of a lot of the strategic functions of the new authorities. Sadly, however, it neglects the role that access to allotments and green spaces can play in boosting public health. The new clause would rectify that with some specific proposals for allotments.

Across England, demand for allotments is huge. People have really embraced the health and social benefits that they can provide. There is much more awareness of the environmental benefits that they can deliver, supporting pollinators much better than other kinds of managed land. They can be part of green corridors, linking together nature-rich spaces. The demand has led to long waiting lists, while allotments are being taken away. In 1950, there were 1.5 million allotment plots, but we have only around 250,000 today. The biggest losses have been in urban areas, where people need them the most. There are now 108,000 people on waiting lists. For example, in Portsmouth, one in every 25 adults is waiting. That is one person on every bus sitting waiting for an allotment.

At the moment we do not have many legal tools for councils to fix that. There are no reporting requirements on councils and there are no waiting time limits for councils to drive forward ambition on providing allotments, but the Bill provides an opportunity to fix that.

The new clause would create a duty to increase allotment provision and boost public health, to report on allotment and nature-rich provision in areas, and to fund community organisers to widen public access to those resources. It would also require action if allotment provision falls below a certain threshold. The new clause takes inspiration from Scotland—we have not just invented it for England here. Under the Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015, the Scottish Government have mandated a 50% or less waiting-list-to-allotment ratio, a maximum wait of five years or less, as well as annual reports. That has not been an insupportable burden on local authorities there; indeed, they have taken it up with some enthusiasm. It would be brilliant to have that in England. It would provide legal direction, but also practical levers for councils and real imperatives for them to act.

[Sam Carling (North West Cambridgeshire) (Lab)]

When I was a council cabinet member, I had responsibility for allotments. We are talking about strategic authorities, and the hon. Lady is talking about powers for them. I can see a duty in the new clause; I cannot see how it would help councillors who have responsibility for allotments to improve the situation, and I fear that having a combined authority stick its nose in could create extra bureaucracy and undermine the hon. Lady’s aims.

[Siân Berry]

Putting this duty on to individual smaller councils might be burdensome, but at a strategic authority level, collecting this information would seem to be really positive. As we have been discussing throughout the Committee, on many issues—land use, planning and support for community right to buy—there are levers for them to act. At a strategic authority level, it would be great to have some co-ordination—people from different councils getting together to find out how each of them is acting on this issue.

Let us not forget our aim here. We are talking about putting this issue within the health duty somewhat, and we know that time spent on allotments and other green spaces will reduce cardiovascular risk, improve mental health and lower people’s stress. We know that in areas where green space provision is better, men live three years longer and women nearly two years. We need to extend those benefits to the 20 million people who currently lack access to green space within a 15-minute walk, and allotments are some of the healthiest and most rewarding green spaces we can provide. The new clause is a path to more nature, more access to that nature, and improved public health.

[Manuela Perteghella]

Allotments are also about producing our own food, and developing skills in doing so, which is important. They are also social spaces, so they are good for social cohesion. Because of all those benefits, does the hon. Lady agree that at a strategic level, when there is a land use framework and planning, authorities can put in place spaces for allotments?

[Siân Berry]

Those are all excellent points that I could have made. Allotments cross many different policy areas and areas of benefit. My experience of allotments and community food growing projects of this kind is that they are social, but they are also multicultural—they are about sharing people’s experiences.

[Vikki Slade]

Allotments also offer an opportunity for intergenerational activity. I wonder whether the hon. Member for Broxbourne would like to spend some time at an allotment, because it does not look like something he would like to do.

[Siân Berry]

That is a great point—allotments are intergenerational space. They do have an effect on health for no reason; they are beneficial and great. They are a tradition in this country that we are losing. Let us get this action put into the duties on authorities. I urge the Minister to look favourably on how this extension to the proposed health function could be constructively included in what happens in the new strategic authorities.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We understand the intention behind this provision on allotments, and we are big fans of allotments and nature-rich spaces. However, I would point out that a duty to provide allotments already exists and sits with local authorities, which is the appropriate level. In addition, the provision of nature-rich spaces is already being tackled through multiple Government initiatives, whether that is the access to nature programme or the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006, which places a duty on all public authorities operating in England to consider, from time to time, what action they can take to further the conservation and enhancement of biodiversity.

We recognise the need for green spaces and allotments for communities. We think that there is already sufficient provision in legislation, so the new clause is unnecessary. Actually, putting the duty at the strategic authority level is not appropriate; it should be at the local authority level. For that reason, I ask the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion to withdraw the motion.

[Siân Berry]

I take those points constructively, as they were intended. I hope that this issue can be looked at during future stages in a cross-party manner, so that we can put something together. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 16

Duty to contribute to delivery of nature, clean air and climate targets

“(1) When exercising their functions, a strategic authority, mayor, or local authority must contribute to—

(a) meeting the targets and carbon budgets set under Part 1 of the Climate Change Act 2008;

(b) meeting the targets and interim targets set under Part 1 of the Environment Act 2021;

(c) meeting the limit values set under Schedule 2 of the Air Quality Standards Regulations 2010; and

(d) the delivery of the programme for adaptation to climate change under section 58 of the Climate Change Act 2008.

(2) A strategic authority, mayor or local authority must not make any decision that is incompatible with the duty described in subsection (1).

(3) Within one year beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must publish guidance describing the contribution that each strategic authority should make toward meeting the targets listed in subsection (1).

(4) Guidance under subsection (3) must include clear metrics and measurable terms for strategic authorities, mayors and local authorities to meet.”—(Siân Berry.)

This new clause requires strategic authorities, mayors, and local authorities to act in accordance with the statutory Climate Change Act and Environmental Act targets, carbon budgets, Air Quality Standards Regulations, and climate adaptation programme across their functions. The Secretary of State must publish guidance for defining authorities’ contributions towards these objectives.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is my pleasure to make the case for new clause 16, which would introduce a climate and nature duty into the Bill. I have been working with a tremendous group of campaigners who, like me, cannot see why the duties are not currently in the Bill. Those campaigners include the Climate Emergency Group, the Wildlife and Countryside Link, the Healthy Air Coalition and Friends of the Earth. As I have previously argued, the Bill lacks strong safeguards to ensure that the new authorities embed climate action and nature recovery, and action on deadly air pollution in their work. There is a growth duty, but not yet any equivalent duty for climate mitigation, adaptation or nature recovery.

Subsection (1) of the new clause sets out the different targets that ought to be passed down from national Government to strategic authorities. Subsection (2) would compel local authorities and strategic authorities not to make decisions incompatible with the duties—in other words, not to make things worse. Subsection (3) is a really important part of the new clause and would require the Secretary of State to publish guidance describing the fair contribution that each area must make toward meeting the national targets. That is what we currently lack. There is nothing in the Bill that helps to achieve the national targets through the actions of the strategic authorities that we are creating, and that is an important gap. I am not idly making this point; reaching our national targets requires a contribution from the authorities with these important powers, areas of competence and actions. Leaving out how we will share out the contribution to the national target—leaving it out altogether—just does not wash.

The evidence from the allies I have been working with, and from monitoring of what goes on at council level, shows that every council scoring 20% or below in the climate action scorecards that get produced is in England or Northern Ireland. That is because we have had the duties passed down by the Governments in Wales and Scotland. It is our duty to ensure that this Bill fills the gap.

Precedents exist not only in Scotland and Wales, as I have mentioned, but in London, because this is done effectively under sections 42 to 44 of the Greater London Authority Act 2007. Each of them systematically passes on a duty for the GLA—the Mayor and Assembly combined—to act to address climate change. This has led to more action in London. It has meant that the Mayor has produced results. The legislation mandates the creation of a climate change mitigation and energy strategy. The strategy, the law says, will contain proposals for the contribution to be made in Greater London towards the mitigation of climate change. These are not hard clauses to write. These are not hard things to pass down, and yet these things are missing from the Bill. That is why we have put together new clause 16, which should be adopted. It could be adopted today, and I intend to divide the Committee on this issue.

We have had discussions about these issues before. We talked about clause 2 and the different ways in which air pollution might be included in the legislation governing the new strategic authorities, and the Minister responded in a similar way each time. For example, this was a typical response:

“The principle and the intention are that we are baking our climate and environmental obligations into the way that we are thinking about how we drive the economy.” ––[Official Report, English Devolution and Community Empowerment Public Bill Committee, 21 October 2025; c. 327.]

It is no good giving these assurances—setting up a baker in a back room behind a curtain—for climate, pollution and nature action, when for so much else, the targets, accountability and duties, is clearly stated in the Bill. As I mentioned before, there is an issue of fairness. Talking to each local area about what contribution each of them will make cannot be done behind closed doors. It requires a transparent process, which the new clause provides for.

The measure has massive and wide support not only from the kinds of campaigners that I associate with on a daily basis, but from more than 100 hundred businesses, which have twice signed open letters in support of such a duty. For them, it would provide the certainty needed to unlock support and drive green investment. The Local Government Association has made it clear that councils require further statutory duties, powers and resources to lead on climate action, while 150 councils responded to a climate consultation, with the vast majority in favour of these duties in England. The District Councils’ Network in its general election prospectus, London Councils, the Association of Directors of Environment, Economy, Planning and Transport, and 88% of UK100 members all called for a climate statutory duty.

The Minister also said this in Committee:

“National Government and local government at all levels, along with business and individuals, must continue to make a contribution to tackling climate change and improving the quality of the environment around us.” ––[Official Report, English Devolution and Community Empowerment Public Bill Committee, 21 October 2025; c. 327.]

Those words need to be reflected in the Bill, and the new clause would do that very effectively. We have the opportunity right now to embed climate, clean air and nature duties for all local authorities and strategic authorities, and to make sure that they hit the ground running for our national environment targets. That would mean no delay for them to take action on clean power, warm homes, clean air and making space for nature. We know very well that there is willingness on the part of local authorities to act, so why would the Labour Government not use the Bill to codify that, and help, inspire and support them in further action?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Member, who has consistently talked about the challenge of tackling climate change and the important role that local government has to play in that. We absolutely recognise the imperative of climate change and nature recovery, and the vital role that all levels of government, including our strategic and local authorities, can and must play in that endeavour.

Local authorities already have a statutory duty to improve air quality in their areas. Thanks to the combined efforts of local authorities—for example, the Mayor of London—we have seen huge improvements. That is testimony to the fact that, when all tiers of government work together, we can tackle these big structural issues. My key point is that the existing tools and duties already support the things that the hon. Member is trying to achieve through her new clause. For example, we have talked before in the Committee about the local nature recovery strategies, the biodiversity duty under the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006, and the Environment Act 2021. All of that requires public authorities to consider, take account and take action to conserve and enhance nature and biodiversity.

On the point about climate adaptation, I recognise that there is both an urgency and an imperative for us to take action, and Local authorities are at the vanguard of wanting to push this already. The Government are working with a number of local authorities that have come forward with climate risk assessments, and that is something we hope and expect to see at authorities across the country. In October we launched a local authority climate service, which provides tailored data on climate change impacts to enable local authorities to do their assessments and think about adaptation strategies. We also ran the first adaptation reporting power trial for local authorities last year, providing guidance and support on how to assess climate risks to their functions and services.

That is all to say that this Government recognise the importance of this issue, and we are taking action. Acting and working in collaboration with all tiers of government to respond to the climate change and the nature recovery challenges is the way we do that. Further duties at this stage would not add to that; what we need is action and collaboration, and that is what this Government are cracking on with.

[Siân Berry]

I hear the Minister’s words, which are very similar to previous words, but I do not believe she has really dealt with the key things this new clause does that others do not: subsection (1) specifies that local authorities and strategic authorities must contribute, and not just consider; subsection (2) requires authorities not to make things worse; and subsection (3), in particular, sets out the importance of defining fair contributions. The mirror of what happens at an international level needs to happen fairly at a local and strategic level in this country. Those points were not answered to my satisfaction, so I must push the new clause to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I will, as briefly as I can, because this is an interesting concept, outline the proposals in new clause 30 for the establishment of a public engagement commission. I have been part of some rocky debates in Committee, and I commend the new clause as a less fraught way to consider deep public participation, to come to terms with the benefits of participatory processes in appropriate situations and to look at democratic innovation in other ways.

The key issue here is that, as additional powers are gained, the choices and challenges facing public authorities in general—particularly these new ones—are becoming harder, along with the issues they are considering and the world situation. The need for citizen participation grows with that if we are to maintain trust and confidence in our public institutions. We need these new institutions to build trust and public confidence from the start.

The new clause closely relates to our legal obligations under the Aarhus convention, of which I am quite a big fan, as conventions go. It was adopted in 1998, when the Rio process really started to bed in, in the period when I started to become very involved in politics. I am certain that some of the processes taking place within central and local government as a result of our signing up to the convention encouraged my interest in politics, and led to some of the people who I work with now becoming my colleagues, so I am a big fan. The Aarhus convention links environmental rights and human rights. It establishes that

“sustainable development can be achieved only through the involvement of all stakeholders”

and it focuses on interactions between the public and public authorities in a democratic context. It is absolutely wonderful, but we are miles behind other countries in how we do that.

There are some really good examples of engagement in Britain. However, I see Ministers in the current Government not acting in the spirit of the convention, who are not keen to hear from the public, or who are certainly not keen to engage with them in new ways. I hear a lot about how engagement with the public slows down building—they put it less politely than that. We need to think more about how we undertake this kind of democratic innovation, not just in planning applications but in the wide range of powers and services that we are devolving. It should be part of the Bill’s DNA, and the new clause would do just that.

The new clause would set up a national body to guide and spread best practice, and it would take on the task of engaging and involving the public in innovative ways on very big and difficult questions—it would be a really positive addition to the Bill. The proposed public engagement commission is modelled on the French National Commission for Public Debate, which is celebrating its 30th anniversary—we can feel the vintage this comes from. The French commission started out by looking at big schemes such as TGV lines, and it has organised consultations on 130 schemes and projects. Some of the projects have been modified, some have been significantly redesigned, and some have actually been abandoned as a result of the public engagement. It is a success story in France, and we could make use of it here.

We had the National Infrastructure Commission, which governed planning applications, and that has recently been widened to the National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority, so it is intended to look at services as well. I think that a similar commission looking at strategic and national-level engagement would be a positive addition in helping us to fulfil some of our rights. Obviously, the commission would not intervene on every scheme, but it might intervene on schemes at a range of levels to establish best practice. It would be an ideal place to look at some of the knottier issues that we have come across.

I will finish with a few examples. I can see that Members do not want to debate this and they are feeling a little confused about what it might actually do. We have talked about proportional representation and voting systems today. For subjects that can be difficult to discuss, such as planning issues, which can descend into name calling, we could try different methods of engagement. We could listen to how to modify projects—that is an obvious one. We could also look at local growth plans and think about how they could be scrutinised to involve the public more. There is also the neighbourhoods work that the Government are still proposing. All would benefit from the involvement of this commission.

The commission could also try out and report back on new digital approaches. It could make sure that consultations work for younger people, while also ensuring that the digitally excluded can also join engagement exercises. Getting that kind of balance right is very hard, and establishing a commission to make sure that it works well would be a good thing. On things such as community infrastructure and mayoral levies, which are raised and spent in the local area, the commission should look at participatory budgeting and establish best practice. We know that mayoral development corporations are not really designed to be directly accountable or involve the public, but the commission could look at how those bodies could engage more effectively in local areas.

It is interesting that in engagement connected with new towns, it is people in the local area who are consulted when new towns are intended mainly to attract new people to an area. How should people who might come to live in an area be consulted? Those are interesting challenges and I think that the commission would be a positive addition.

More seriously, I hope that the Minister will recognise that there is a participation gap in relation to the Aarhus convention in this Bill. I hope that she will go away and look again at how that affects environmental rights and compliance and about how that might work at a national level. She should also think about how this challenge today might affect a wide range of different participation processes at the Government level.

Apologies for again making a very long case for a new clause. I do not table them idly.

[Paul Holmes]

I hope that the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion does not develop a complex because I speak on all of her new clauses. She is a doughty parliamentarian who has deeply held views, and I do not want her to think that I oppose them because of any personal vendetta. However, as I am sure many expected, I rise to speak against the new clause because it lets politicians off the hook. It also does what I suggested many of the hon. Lady’s previous new clauses do.

The politicians, mayors and combined authorities we are talking about must have democratic legitimacy. They are accountable to their electorate in the traditional ways, which is an election at the current engagement levels that many mayors have. It is inherent within our system that if a mayor wants to be re-elected and build up incumbency so that people in the region say they are doing a good job, they will go out and show that they are working hard for those people.

The hon. Lady mentioned that we should follow France on this. These are not usually words that come out of my mouth, but I remind her that we are nearly at the end of the collapse of the Fifth Republic. I am not sure how much the commission helped, given how they have conducted their affairs over the last few months.

Much of the new clause adds a burden to an already overstretched and inadequately funded model. This is not to knock the Government, but establishing these authorities will be an incredibly long and complicated process, and there is going to be some disruption. The new clause would add a burden to many authorities for something that I do not think will deliver the outcomes that the hon. Lady expects.

I am a fan of Parliament and of the British Government, and I want them to do well—not that the Committee could see that from today—but I also believe in the position of the Secretary of State, and I think that asking the Secretary of State from “time to time” to lay a report before Parliament on the work of the public engagement commission during the period, and progress towards improving public engagement, is both setting up the Secretary of State for a fall—I am not sure how to measure public engagement—and letting the Secretary of State off the hook. The last Conservative Government and the Labour Government before them were in office for between 12 and 14 years. I could do it twice if I managed to survive as Secretary of State for 12 years—it may happen one day.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We all agree that we need stronger community engagement, and a big strand of what we are trying to do through the Bill is to ensure that our communities across the country have greater powers and voice. A new commission is not the answer. The answer is in the doing—us doing the job of enabling all levels of Government, including our national Government, to engage the public and our communities better.

There is a role for the LGA, supported with funding, in building local authorities’ capability to do community engagement effectively. We have discussed the neighbourhood governance structure that we are trying to build, and creating an effective locus for communities to exercise their voice and power, and to be interlocutors with local government. We are building the network for neighbourhoods, which will bring together communities and partners to share best practice, as the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion is suggesting, and strengthen the capability of communities to exercise their voice and power.

Critically, we are already putting this into practice through pride in place. We are putting investment into communities, organising community leaders on to neighbourhood boards to make decisions about the things that matter. While I appreciate the need for greater community engagement, I think that rather than set up a long-winded commission, we should crack on with the doing. That is what the Government are committed to.

[Siân Berry]

A standing commission that offers regular advice to all the groups that are trying to innovate would be a boon to them, not a burden as the hon. Member for Hamble Valley said. I believe that reporting back from “time to time” is completely normal language in Bills that set up an independent agency or organisation and we want to receive reports back; it definitely does not mean anything in particular.

I remind the Minister that there are risks if we do not do something to ensure that we stand by the important rights that people expect to be upheld. It is not just full of opportunity and excitement, as my previous speech implied; there is genuinely a risk that the new bodies—these unfamiliar, geographically drawn strategic authorities—will rejected by the public if the Government do not get this right. Trust is a crucial metric that we cannot measure ourselves—it just happens or not in other people. We need people to genuinely trust the new bodies. We cannot tell someone to trust them—they do or they do not. The Government must ensure that they are doing that right.

I do not want the reforms to fall flat any more than Ministers do. I think this provision is an important thing that could be done to ensure that they succeed better than they otherwise would. However, I am not going to press it to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I have been working on the new clause with the Centre for Local Economic Strategies. The new clause would require strategic authorities to prepare community wealth-building action plans and makes provision for partnerships with anchor organisations such as hospitals, colleges and employers, to support them. That would create the opportunity for organisations to come together to build collective action on things such as procurement, employment and the better use of owned assets in the local area. It would also grant mayors a right to request levies on private equity in local public services to limit extraction. The new clause is tailor-made for Labour Members, whose party outside government has long championed community wealth building.

In brief, community wealth building is the practice of creating an inclusive and democratically owned economy. It puts people before private equity profits, and champions the kind of economic development activity that is overlooked by industrial strategies, focusing instead on the everyday economy, where most people—our carers, our cleaners, our builders—work. Community wealth building is the missing piece of the puzzle to unlock growth for the benefit of everyone, everywhere. Scotland has a Community Wealth Building (Scotland) Bill passing through its Parliament. England must not be left behind.

We have all heard about Preston’s remarkable success in this field. Analysis of Preston’s programme in The Lancet Public Health found fewer mental health problems than expected during the community wealth building programme compared with similar areas, as life satisfaction and economic measures improved. The analysis found that the approach can provide an effective model for economic regeneration, potentially leading to substantial health benefits. Community wealth building is also part of the economic strategy of my city of Brighton and Hove, with a consensus to work on it over successive administrations.

To further the case, I will quote comments on the London borough of Islington’s programme made in November 2024 by its director of inclusive economy. She said:

“As I say very clearly to our team, this is not about levelling the playing field. This is about tilting the table. In an economy like Islington, we have to focus our limited resources on those who are least served by this economy…It’s about sustainability, it’s about justice, and that idea of creating prosperity for everyone. The core focus is on being locally rooted—trying to make sure that the money we spend and the efforts we make are all rooted within Islington and our wider regional economy”,

and that such programmes

“make sure that the big businesses who are in our local economies are able to engage with a local supply chain and local employment practices so that we can create that virtuous circle at a local level.”

The Islington programme director also commented on how equality is helped, saying in the interview,

“Similarly, lots of investment money typically goes to male-owned businesses. We’ve set up a series of programmes aimed at supporting underrepresented entrepreneurs.”

They reduce rents in their affordable workplaces if the operators support local people’s employment and local businesses and work on the supply chain. She also gives the example of dedicated incubation programmes

“to make sure that we ‘tilt the table’ in the favour of people who are least served by this economy.”

She says that, in short,

“It is about trying to make prosperity local”.

Who in this room could disagree with that?

I hope that the new clause is taken in the constructive spirit in which it is intended and receives a positive response from the Minister.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Lady for tabling this amendment. As a proud Co-operative MP and as part of a Government who are driving through changes to the economy that put people at the heart, I support the intent behind this amendment. I know of the good work CLES does to drive this agenda across local and regional government. As I have said before, for us, the purpose of devolution is to equip and enable our mayors, local authorities and communities to rewire the economy so that it works for local people and fundamentally builds the wealth of communities. That is clear.

However, a duty to create a separate community wealth building plan will not achieve the intent of the new clause. These approaches should be embedded in the local growth plans that mayors are developing. We see that in practice if we look across the country at what our Labour mayors are doing, whether that is in Greater Manchester, the Liverpool city region or the West of England combined authority. Their approach builds in the principles of building community wealth, of co-operatives and mutuals and of community power, with a strong emphasis on the everyday economy.

We can legislate as much as we like, but what is important is the doing and the practice. We are clear that our job is to empower and equip our local leaders to do this. Many of them are already at the vanguard and well ahead of national Government because of the legacy of the previous Government. We will work with our mayors and strategic authorities to embed this in their local plans.

Critically, we are making sure that there are clear levers at the community level to drive this approach, for example, through the community right to buy. We agree with the intent, but a separate plan is not the way to deliver it. It needs to be fundamentally baked into the way that mayors drive local economic growth—a way that will put their communities at the heart and not just improve living standards, but build the wealth of those communities.

[Siân Berry]

I thank the Minister for her response. I am not entirely convinced that these measures are as baked in as she said. All these issues are vulnerable to election cycles. Something more specific along these lines, potentially within the requirements of the local economic plans, would help to ensure that people consistently see this approach taken across the country. The Minister talked about Labour mayors, but is she convinced? I am not sure that other mayors will take this on board, despite the proven benefits. However, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 34

Local government data

“(1) LURA 2023 is amended in as follows.

(2) In Section 84, in subsection (2)(b), after “planning and development” insert “including in relation to economic conditions, transport, tourism and nature”.

(3) In Section 91 (Interpretation)—

(a) after “(g) Part 8 of GLAA 1999,” insert “(ga) Parts 2 and 3 of the Transport Act 2000”;

(b) after “(k) this Part or Part 4 or 6 of this Act” insert “ the Environment Act 2021, Part 3 of the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025, Part 3 of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026”.”—(Siân Berry.)

This new clause extends data standardisation powers contained in the Levelling-Up and Regeneration Act 2023 to encompass Local Growth Plans, Local Nature Recovery Strategies and Local Transport Plans. Currently, proposals in these other plans may not constitute “development”, so would be outside the scope of existing powers.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Siân Berry]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 34 is about something that I do not think Ministers have yet considered, but it would be of real benefit to the efficiency and transparency of these new authorities. The Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 created a number of new powers to standardise planning data, including local plans, planning software and the ways in which we can get information about planning applications and policies. The new clause would make sure that other activities of the strategic authorities were, from the start, set up to provide a similar level of data. We are talking about spatial data, spending data, data for inward investments, and data for the jobs created in association with different parts of economic plans. It would be marvellous to put that level of digitalisation of public data into the Bill, for the same Department mandated the planning data reforms that are being taken up extremely well.

We must do something about this either now or at the next stage of the Bill. We have seen provisions in the Bill—I have tabled other amendments on this—say things like, “Mayors must publish in such a manner as the mayor thinks appropriate.” That kind of wording is a recipe for PDFs inaccessible to organisations such as Natural England seeking to scrutinise or interact with these different strategic authorities around the country. Ministers themselves may want to know some data about what is going on in these local authorities, as well as the public at large—civil society. If we do not make things standardised, we will end up having to go through multiple inaccessible PDFs. Sometimes, those are Excel documents that have been turned into PDFs, and yet the Excel documents are not released. It would be tremendous for standardised, accessible data in API formats—searchable, integratable and comparable—to be produced as a matter of course through the Bill.

The measure would also help to support the goals of the Aarhus convention, which is all about transparency and being able to find out information. It would also be a gift to people who want to create things like accessible apps, websites and maps for pamphlets about the services in a local area. Those are the kinds of benefits that the Government talked about at the time of introducing the requirements on planning. They need to look again at whether they want things published in multiple different ways that become hard to integrate later, or whether they want things to be organised a little better from the start. The new clause is tabled in a constructive way. I hope that Ministers will ask their teams to explore the idea and talk to the people working on planning. It would be of huge benefit not to have to unpick a mess of data for these new authorities later on.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The hon. Lady has set out the Government’s ambition to move away from a document-led planning system to a data-driven one, where planning data is openly available and more easily accessible. I recognise the intention to expand the data standards provision to ensure that it covers other types of plans produced by strategic authorities, such as the local growth plan or the local transport plan.

The Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 grants the Secretary of State the power to specify in regulations which planning information must meet set data standards. Given that data standards can evolve, the Secretary of State also has the power to define those standards. The definition of planning and development is already broad enough to capture the types of data that would be used for the plans sought to be covered by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion.

The Government are confident that existing powers in the 2023 Act are broad enough to make the new clause unnecessary. I come back to the consistent theme of many of my responses to the hon. Lady: it is now in the doing and the acting. We have the powers in statute to respond; it is about how we put those into practice. I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the new clause.

[Siân Berry]

I implore the Minister to go away and look at this again. The courts have confirmed that transport schemes, such as the cycleway running along the Embankment, do not count as development. Therefore, the wider applicability that I think the Minister was asserting may not be in place without some kind of amendment to make sure that things such as the local economic plans, local growth plans, nature recovery strategies and local transport plans are fully covered by the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act. It may need some changes that I think the Minister is unaware of at the moment. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

[The Chair]

We now come to new clause 41, which was debated with amendment 358 and is in the name of the hon. Member for Bath (Wera Hobhouse), who is not a Committee member. Does anyone wish to press the new clause to a Division?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We now come to new clause 53. Does anybody wish to move it?

[Siân Berry]

I do not wish to move the new clause, but my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol Central (Carla Denyer) may bring it back on Report.

New Clause 56

Authority involvement in local skills improvement plans

“(1) Section 1 of the Skills and Post-16 Education Act 2022 is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (7), after ‘relevant authority’ insert ‘and, where the specified area covers any of the area of a Strategic Authority, the Strategic Authority’.

(3) After subsection (7) insert—

‘(7A) Where a specified area covers any of the area of a Strategic Authority within the meaning of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2025, the Secretary of State may approve and publish a local skills improvement plan for the specified area only if satisfied that—

(a) the Strategic Authority and the employer representative body for the area have exercised joint leadership in developing the plan,

(b) the plan has been agreed by both the Strategic Authority and the employer representative body, and

(c) the boundaries of the plan align with the strategic authority boundaries.

(7B) For the purposes of subsection (7A), “joint leadership” means that—

(a) strategic priorities for skills development in the area are agreed by both the Strategic Authority and the employer representative body, and

(b) spending priorities relating to devolved adult education funding are jointly determined.

(7C) A local skills improvement plan may only be altered if both the Strategic Authority and the employer representative body agree to any proposed alterations.

(7D) Where there is disagreement between a Strategic Authority and an employer representative body exercising joint leadership under subsection (7A), either party may refer the matter to the Secretary of State, who may—

(a) issue guidance to resolve the disagreement;

(b) give directions to either or both parties to ensure effective coordination;

(c) require the parties to adopt alternative arrangements for decision-making;

(d) approve and publish a plan that addresses the disagreement.

(7E) In exercising functions under subsection (7D), the Secretary of State must have regard to—

(a) the effective delivery of post-16 technical education and training in the area,

(b) employer engagement in identifying local skills needs,

(c) value for money in delivery of services by Strategic Authorities, and

(d) democratic accountability of Strategic Authorities in delivering such services.’

(4) Section 4 of the Skills and Post-16 Education Act 2022 is amended as follows.

(5) In subsection (1), at the appropriate place insert—

‘“Strategic Authority” has the meaning given by section 1(2) of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2025;’”.—(Manuela Perteghella.)

This new clause would require Strategic Authorities to exercise joint leadership with employer representative bodies in developing Local Skills Improvement Plans. The amendment also requires Local Skills Improvement Plan boundaries to align with Strategic Authority boundaries to enable effective coordination and provides dispute resolution mechanisms where joint leadership arrangements encounter difficulties.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Simmonds]

I echo those comments, Dame Siobhain. The Bill may be poor, but the organisation and support have been flawless—[Interruption.] And the quality of the heckling is without parallel. I know we will be returning to many of the topics of debate later on in the parliamentary process, so we will have the opportunity to relitigate and seek to deliver the necessary improvements to the legislation. I thank all the officials, all those who contributed to the Bill, and the witnesses, whose evidence has been so helpful.

[Siân Berry]

To what everyone else has said, I want to add that, while I have spent a lot of time in the Committee complaining that scrutiny is not done well, we have done a really good job of scrutinising this Bill. My team has had the most amazing support from the Public Bill Office and the Clerks, and the Chairs have been fantastic, so thank you very much, everyone.

[The Chair]

I extend my thanks to all the Members, who made it very easy to Chair, and to all the staff for their support. I am just grateful that the microphones continued working after the first day.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.