Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: Iran

Stephen Crabb Excerpts

Tuesday 19th October 2021 Westminster Hall

[Caroline Nokes (in the Chair)]

Before we begin, I encourage hon. Members to wear masks when they are not speaking, in line with current Government guidance and that of the House of Commons Commission. Please also give each other and members of staff space when seated and when entering or leaving the room.

[Stephen Crabb (Preseli Pembrokeshire) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered Iran’s compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

May I start by saying what a pleasure it is to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Nokes? I refer colleagues to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I am grateful for having secured the time for this important debate, which is timely given Iran’s escalating nuclear violations and the continuing uncertainty around negotiations on the JCPOA nuclear deal. This is one of the most serious and most pressing foreign policy challenges of our time.

Before I get into those arguments I would like to take a moment to recognise the contribution to this Chamber made by our dear friend Sir David Amess. As we heard yesterday, Sir David never missed an opportunity to use whatever debating opportunities were available to press Ministers on the causes and issues that were close to his heart. He certainly used Westminster Hall to its fullest. As a member of the Panel of Speakers, he chaired many of the debates that took place here. I know that colleagues will miss seeing him in the chair, masterfully overseeing proceedings in a way that one can only do with 40 years of service under their belt.

There is every chance that Sir David would have sought to speak today. Last December, I had the pleasure of following him in a debate on this very subject. As ever, he spoke with great authority about Iran, his hopes for real, positive change in that country, and its need for true democratic revival. In his own words,

“I am now, unfortunately, in my fourth decade of saying negative things about the Iranian regime; it would be good to still be here in Parliament when I can say something positive about it.”—[Official Report, 9 December 2020; Vol. 685, c. 431WH.]

How sad and how tragic that he is not here to contribute today, and that he will not be able to say something positive about the country that he knew very well and loved. As a man of faith and strong conviction, a man who loved history, he had a deep interest in and affection for the wider middle east. He demonstrated that being a friend of Israel is no barrier to being a friend of Arab nations, too. In many ways, he was an embodiment of the Abraham accords long before they were signed.

Just a few weeks ago, Sir David tried to bend my arm into joining his delegation to Qatar. He knew of my interest in and desire to visit that country, and we both spoke in a debate on UK-Qatar relations a year ago. Unfortunately, constituency activities meant that I could not go, but I knew that travelling with Sir David would have been a very enjoyable experience. He was on the delegation on my first visit to Israel with the Conservative Friends of Israel, and I can say from first-hand knowledge just what a wonderful, funny, kind and generous travelling companion he could be.

Sir David was clear-sighted about the true nature of the Iranian regime and its malign influence throughout the middle east. In his speech last year, he spoke about Iranian terror activities in the region and here in Europe, and he warned of Iran’s ballistic missile programme and uranium enrichment activity. When it came to Iran, Sir David was simply someone who got it. Yes, he was hopeful, and almost romantically he longed for positive change for the Iranian people, but make no mistake: he was hard-head and clear-sighted about the immediate threats and challenges posed by Iran, and the need for strong countermeasures. That is very much my theme for this afternoon as we return to the subject of Iran’s compliance with JCPOA.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

I congratulate my right hon. Friend on sponsoring this important debate. Does he agree with me that if our colleague’s concerns were correct then—they certainly were—they would be even greater now, since a difficult Government in Tehran have been replaced by a Government who are simply beyond the pale in their principlist agenda, and in their view, as articulated by President Raisi, that sanctions are an opportunity for Iran, rather than something to be feared? Does my right hon. Friend fear, as I do, that dealing with a man who deservedly has the title of the “Butcher of Tehran” is going to be murderously difficult, notwithstanding the fact that the Biden Administration are far more positive than their predecessors when it comes to advancing the JCPOA?

[Stephen Crabb]

I thank my right hon. Friend for that intervention. He is entirely correct. The truth is that the situation has moved on at some pace in the 10 months since we last debated this subject, which is why it is so timely to bring it back to the House this afternoon. It is an uncomfortable truth that Iran can now be described as a threshold nuclear weapons state. The regime is enriching uranium to greater purities than ever before; it is in retention of ballistic missiles that can deliver nuclear and conventional payloads; and it continues to impede the International Atomic Energy Agency’s access to sites, personnel, and even monitoring equipment and data. The director general of the IAEA has spoken about this very subject today. That has far-reaching and serious consequences for UK foreign policy, for our national interests and for international peace and security. Given Iran’s well-documented systematic non-compliance with JCPOA, it is unsurprising that there is widespread apprehension about the future of the nuclear deal. Make no mistake, the reason that talks have stalled is that Tehran prefers to build more leverage through its nuclear violations.

While much of the focus of commentators on the JCPOA talks in Vienna has been on the intentions of the Biden Administration and the actions of Tehran, questions need to be asked now about whether the JCPOA is even capable of addressing the realities of Iran’s nuclear programme in 2021. Accordingly, I believe it is essential that the UK works with international partners to utilise the remaining diplomatic levers available to curtail Tehran’s nuclear belligerence before the situation deteriorates even further.

Aside from Iran’s continuing nuclear violations over the past year, it is worth pointing out that Iran has also engaged in a shadow bombing campaign against oil tankers navigating international waters, with one such attack involving the killing of a British national. Iran and its network of Shi’ite ally militia groups have routinely attacked military personnel in Iraq with dozens of drone and missile strikes, again killing a UK serviceperson. Iran has plotted the kidnap of foreign nationals and continues to hold British citizens and dual nationals hostage. An Iranian diplomat was sentenced in February for his involvement in a bomb plot against an Iranian opposition rally in Paris, which was attended by a number of our colleagues from this place, including Sir David Amess. Mercifully, that attack was foiled just in time.

[Robert Halfon (Harlow) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the original purpose of the nuclear agreement that the west made with Iran was that it would reduce Iranian terrorism around the world and ensure that Iran moved towards becoming a democratic state? We were told at the time that those would be the beneficial effects of the agreement, but none of those things has happened. In fact, terrorism, particularly around the middle east, has got worse, funded and sponsored by Iran.

[Stephen Crabb]

My right hon. Friend is correct. The JCPOA has done nothing to dissuade the Iranian regime from conducting those wider activities in the middle east, undermining democratic states and the social and economic order of countries in the region, and sponsoring proxies. Last week, the scenes of street battles that we saw in Beirut raised the distressing possibility of a much-feared civil war in Lebanon. That should serve as a reminder of revolutionary Iran’s legacy. Wherever Iran exerts influence, it destroys the viability of the fragile but sovereign nation states that it preys on by fanning the flames of ethnic, sectarian and political division within each society for its own gain.

[Christian Wakeford (Bury South) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend makes an important point. When we talk about destabilising nations, we always think of China and Russia, but Iran, especially in the middle east, plays a fundamental part in failing the peace process, whether through Hezbollah or Hamas. We should proscribe every single group linked with the revolutionary guard, including the political wing of Hamas.

[Stephen Crabb]

Unsurprisingly, I agree with my hon. Friend’s remarks. Wherever Iran seeks to operate and influence, it creates roadblocks to peace and long-term prosperity for peoples throughout the middle east.

Against that backdrop, Tehran has also spent the last year systematically and aggressively advancing its nuclear activities. Iran’s nuclear programme is now deep into uncharted territory, and its new hard-line Government have thus far shown no inclination or intention to stop. That represents a comprehensive breach not only of the JCPOA but of safeguards obligations, as well as the non-proliferation treaty. Iran is openly enriching uranium to 60% purity for the first time ever, meaning that it is just a short jump to the level required for a nuclear weapon and a world away from the 3.67% permitted under the JCPOA.

Iran has installed advanced centrifuges, capable of enriching uranium at greater purity levels and in greater quantities, including at its controversial underground nuclear facilities. Iran now has stockpiles of enriched uranium far in excess of the limited amount permitted by JCPOA. The IAEA has confirmed that Iran has produced hundreds of grams of uranium metal, which is a significant component of nuclear weapons and has no credible civilian application. Iran has also repeatedly stonewalled the efforts of the IAEA to monitor its nuclear activities and investigate worrying discoveries of nuclear materials at previously undeclared sites. Many of those advancements are irreversible. The international community may yet—I believe it is unlikely—reach agreement with Iran to remove some stockpiles of enriched uranium out of the country. However, the technical knowledge, the know-how and the advancements cannot be rolled back and those are the very building blocks of a weaponised nuclear programme.

[Dr Murrison]

My right hon. Friend is being very generous and is right to say that technical understanding and knowledge cannot be unpicked. That, in a sense, is more important than the quantum of enriched uranium. Does he agree with me that Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid are right to be deeply concerned about what is going on? I am sure my right hon. Friend agrees with me that the state of Israel has to be protected against an existential threat from what is happening in Iran.

[Stephen Crabb]

My right hon. Friend is right to draw attention to the position of Israel and the fears and concerns within Israel. However, it is not just Israel; numerous other countries throughout the region live in fear of an Iranian regime armed with nuclear weapons.

It is a view widely held in security and academic circles that Iran’s breakout time—the time required to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one nuclear weapon—may now be as little as several months. Some analysts are even talking in terms of a matter of weeks. That is an alarming decrease from the estimated 12 months’ breakout time that was at the heart of the JCPOA in 2015. By extension, a return to the JCPOA would not represent a return to the JCPOA of 2015. The situation has fundamentally changed for the worse and there is a new baseline.

I recognise that the ongoing negotiations will make it difficult for the Minister to touch upon specifics, but I encourage him to ensure that the UK considers the implementation of supplementary nuclear restrictions by the UK, our E3 partners and the US to compensate for the reduction in Iran’s nuclear breakout time. I particularly hope that restrictions such as the destruction of advanced centrifuges or components and a moratorium on centrifuge R&D and production are under consideration. The IAEA still has an essential role to play in the enforcement of the restrictions. Accordingly, I urge the Minister to ensure that the IAEA continues to have the UK’s full support and that it is empowered to finally verify the full extent of Iranian activities, both declared and otherwise.

I feel the international community keeps missing opportunities to hold Iran accountable. I believe that the Biden Administration have miscalculated by choosing to ease political and economic pressure on the Iranian regime, and that the expectation that doing so will lead to Iran renegotiating a stronger and longer JCPOA is misguided. I understand Iranian officials have already flatly rejected the idea. Conversely, the deliberate failure to meaningfully respond to Iranian non-compliance has led the country to commit ever greater acts of defiance and escalation. It seems that the collective failure to reprimand Iran for each acceleration of its nuclear programme simply underwrites its next transgression.

I strongly welcome the Foreign Secretary’s comments this month about working

“night and day with our friends and allies across the world to stop”

Iran from becoming a nuclear power. That is unmistakably an important commitment. I have said that the UK needs to be clear-sighted about its policy towards Iran. I have also reflected that the belief shared by some in Government back in 2015 that the JCPOA and our re-establishment of diplomatic ties with Iran would lead to rapprochement was not well founded. The regime has long since stopped warranting the benefit of the doubt. The Iranian Government have a consistent track record of banking any concessions they are given and using whatever means are at their disposal to push for more concessions, while never really altering the fundamental trajectory of their foreign policy and military goals.

I have heard it said—in fact, I read it in an article just last month by a former UK diplomat—that Iran is effectively posturing to secure maximum economic and diplomatic concessions, and that actually it has limited interest in seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. I regard such views as dangerously naïve, reflecting a long-standing desire on the part of some in western diplomatic circles to keep giving Iran the benefit of the doubt. There is a misguided and dangerous notion that if we keep showing more love and give more concessions to Iran, that will trigger a fundamental change of posture in Tehran, and it will emerge as a responsible member of the international community. I fear that Iran is continuing to play the international community like a fiddle.

As I listened to the Foreign Secretary’s recent remarks about Iran and the need for a network of liberty, I could not help but think that now—[Interruption.]

[Caroline Nokes (in the Chair)]

Order.

--- Later in debate ---

On resuming—

[Stephen Crabb]

I do not wish to take up too much of the time left for this debate, as I would like other colleagues to have a chance to speak. I have taken a considerable amount of time to set out some of my arguments and concerns around the strategy that Iran appears to be pursuing.

I spoke of my encouragement from comments made by the new Foreign Secretary. I spoke about the importance of being clear-sighted about Iran and my concerns that the international community is at risk of being played by the Iranian regime, who constantly seek further concessions. They bank them and fundamentally do not alter their trajectory in any meaningful way when it comes to their military and foreign policy goals.

I will close my contribution with an appeal to the Minister, who I know has been listening very carefully. He was in the debate that we held in this Chamber 10 months ago on the same subject, and he is intimately knowledgeable of the details of the subject matter. We have a key moment coming up towards the end of next month with the board of governors of the IAEA meeting in Vienna. The option of censuring Iran for its continuing violations of the JCPOA is, I think, an option diplomatically that we need to keep in play. I do not expect the Minister to comment fully on that, but I ask that he listen, because we need to show as an alliance of freedom-loving nations that we continue to consider the full range of options in response to Iran’s strategy—diplomatically, economically and, yes, ultimately militarily, but that is not a subject for this afternoon.

[Caroline Nokes (in the Chair)]

I can see that a good number of Back Benchers are wishing to contribute, so I will not put you on a formal time limit yet, but please be considerate of fellow speakers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Crabb]

I am grateful to the Minister for his remarks and those clear statements of his understanding of the position regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. I am pleased that there seems to be agreement in the Chamber this afternoon on the facts on the ground. We have independent verification of those facts. I believe there is a strong measure of consensus in the room about just how serious the crossroads is that we have now reached with Iran. There is widespread concern, as expressed this afternoon, about the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran, and the consequences not just for the middle east region but for international stability and the whole world.

I believe there has been a strong message this afternoon to Ministers and the Government on the need to be robust and keep all options on the table—we completely understand why the Minister cannot comment on some of the detailed specifics that have been put to him. I believe that Iran’s regime responds only to strong pressure, and I remain sceptical about moves to give further concessions to the Iranian regime when it has shown so consistently in the past that it banks them and then seeks further concessions.

The hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn (Tulip Siddiq) has reminded us just how sensitive some of the issues around hostage taking are, and of the links between those issues and some of these big, strategic questions that we have discussed this afternoon. I am grateful for a very constructive and interesting debate.

Question put and agreed to. 

Resolved,

That this House has considered Iran’s compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.