(15 years, 3 months ago)
Commons Chamber
Mr Murphy
The hon. Gentleman knows that not to be the case. Stuart Tootal made his position very clear at the weekend.
I do not doubt the sincerity of Ministers’ words. I have made that plain at each and every turn when I have spoken from the Dispatch Box. However, there is real confusion and concern about their actions. The reason for the growing anger is that they know that the Government’s actions are sometimes enormously unfair, and, in the case of defining the covenant in law, utterly confused.
Let me explain why I think that the Government’s position is flawed. In the Armed Forces Bill, the Government have provided for an annual report on the covenant, explicitly using the term “covenant”. However, Ministers are choosing to overlook the fact that there is no legally binding definition of the term to accompany its use, which means that Ministers can themselves determine how it is interpreted.
In his evidence to the Public Accounts Committee last month, the most senior official in the Treasury, Sir Nick Macpherson, said that
“there was a point in the middle of the last decade where the MOD lost control of public spending.”
Can the Minister explain what impact that has had on the military covenant?
Mr Murphy
At the same time the hon. Gentleman’s party was demanding more spending on the Army, more spending on the Navy, more spending on the Royal Air Force, more aeroplanes and more ships. When there was real concern about funding, his party was demanding ever more spending. He cannot be in denial about that.
I would rather rely on the evidence of one of the hon. Gentleman’s own Ministers in the debate on the Armed Forces Bill. He was very clear, and the Secretary of State must be clear as well in terms of meaningful commitment. The Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the right hon. Member for South Leicestershire (Mr Robathan), the veterans Minister, said that the Government had no intention of placing in law a legal definition of a covenant.
Mr Murphy
That is probably going to be the hardest question I am asked all day. Just why have the Government U-turned on this issue, given that it was not a pre-election promise, but a post-election commitment? It is for the Secretary of State and his Ministers to articulate the reasons for their Government’s action.
I come back to the point about principle rather than statutory obligations.
The right hon. Gentleman suggested that Conservative Members were pointing the finger elsewhere. Does he not agree with his parliamentary colleague, the right hon. Member for Barking (Margaret Hodge), who, as Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, agreed with the following finding:
“The Department has failed to develop a financial strategy identifying core spending priorities”?
The report in question also said:
“The Department’s poor financial management has led to a…shortfall of…£36 billion”.
Does he agree with his parliamentary colleague? Why was the military covenant not part of his Government’s core spending priorities?
(15 years, 3 months ago)
Commons Chamber
Nick Harvey
I should correct the hon. Gentleman by saying that the meeting in question took place at RAF Kinloss. What I said to the Moray Task Force, whom I was meeting at the time, was that the costs of moving the in-depth maintenance facilities from Marham and, indeed, paying to relocate the staff of the contractors involved would be so prohibitive that it would potentially undermine any savings that might accrue from closing a base. The economics of moving the in-depth maintenance facilities for Tornado at this stage in Tornado’s life cycle would, as I said on Thursday last, be very questionable indeed.
11. What steps his Department is taking to increase the effectiveness of project management for its major projects.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Peter Luff)
The National Audit Office’s recent major projects report shows that the well-documented problems with some of the largest procurement projects have generally been caused by poor and deliberate policy decisions, and that project management itself is improving. But we are doing more to improve project management, including: running a programme to increase skills; forming a major projects performance board to review our most significant projects regularly; and appointing Bernard Gray as Chief of Defence Matériel, where he will build on the improvements made by his predecessor.
Following numerous Select Committee recommendations, the Department’s own guidelines run to eight pages in setting out what should be included in project histories, yet the £4 billion Nimrod project history runs to just two pages; makes no mention of senior responsible owners or senior staff changes; and took the Department seven weeks to produce, even though it already has this document, which is marked unclassified and had no redactions. Will the Minister write to me within the next month listing all the major defence projects that do not comply with the Department’s own guidelines on documentation and what the gaps in documentation are?
Peter Luff
I am reluctant to turn this into a diary session for my diary secretary, but I think it would be very helpful to discuss this important issue with my hon. Friend. Departmental good practice guidance on maintaining project histories allows scope for project team leaders to interpret it and decide what best meets the needs of their project depending on its size, complexity and nature. The format and content are not mandated and, frankly, the problems with the Nimrod MRA4 project are about the most well-documented of any major procurement programme we have.