British Indian Ocean Territory

Tim Roca Excerpts

Wednesday 28th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Tim Roca (Macclesfield) (Lab)]

I feel I should put on record at the beginning that I am not the Government’s trade envoy to Mauritius—[Hon. Members: “Yet!”] Hansard can record a diplomatic silence at this point.

This debate ultimately turns on whether we understand the world as it is, not as we might wish it to be, much as some believe otherwise. We still live in an economically, militarily, politically and morally interconnected world, and that interconnectedness has not gone away. It has become more contested, more multipolar and certainly more strategic, but it has not ended. That matters, because this deal must be judged not on slogans or hyperbole but on whether it secures the United Kingdom’s security interests in that interconnected world.

One of the central lessons of recent years is that uncertainty invites challenge. We see that every day in the South China sea. China has asserted expansive territorial claims that many countries do not recognise and that the international courts and tribunals do not recognise. What happens in response? Other states deliberately sail ships and fly aircraft through those waters and airspace to contest those claims and to test resolve. Uncertainty becomes a pressure point and ambiguity becomes an opportunity for interference. If we allow ambiguity to persist over the Chagos islands, and in particular over Diego Garcia, the same dynamic could apply.

Our claims may be strong historically, but they are being increasingly contested in international courts. That does not make the base more secure; it makes it more vulnerable. It creates exactly the kind of grey zone in which hostile actors thrive, including an ever-expanding Chinese navy. This treaty removes that uncertainty. It closes off the space for challenge, rather than leaving it open.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

The mistake the hon. Member makes is in buying into China’s narrative that there is a grey zone in the South China sea. There is no grey zone. China should not be there, but it could not care less. It goes there anyway. The idea that some agreement we make with Mauritius is going to stop China acting at a later date is complete nonsense, as China proves in the South China sea every day.

[Tim Roca]

I disagree with the hon. Member, because the two situations do have parallels. In the South China sea, people are challenging Chinese sovereignty, and it has been proved not to have standing in international courts. At the moment, ambiguity is starting to arrive in our position over the Chagos islands. This treaty would remove it and remove cause for the Chinese navy to take advantage.

Against this backdrop, I want to restate the tests that I set out in an earlier debate on this deal. Does the agreement protect our national security? Does it command the support of our allies and professional security community? Are the costs proportionate to the benefits? On each of these tests, the answer remains yes. Diego Garcia is a keystone of our joint security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. It is where UK and US forces operate together against terrorist threats. It is a logistics, communications and intelligence hub, and it is central to safeguarding the global trade routes on which our economy depends. Without a secure base, all of that is placed at risk.

Our Five Eyes allies in Canada, Australia and New Zealand support this deal, and our strategic partner India supports this deal. I want to address briefly the noise around President Trump’s social media posts, which the Minister dealt with very well earlier. Social media is not statecraft. What matters is the settled position of the United States, its military leadership and its security agencies. On that, there has been clarity for some time. The Pentagon, the State Department and successive US Defence Secretaries—Republican and Democrat—have supported this agreement.

As I said at the beginning, interconnectedness is incredibly important and we cannot ignore the fact that international opinion matters. Yes, the world has changed. Power today is exercised through force—hard power has become incredibly important—but it is also still exercised through legitimacy, alliances and rules. If we expect others to respect international rules where it suits us, whether in Ukraine or the South China sea, we cannot be seen to apply them selectively elsewhere, except in the supreme national interest.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

I am a great admirer of the hon. Gentleman; he is courteous and thoughtful, and I always listen to what he says with great focus and attention. He is criticising the dangers of ambiguity, and I agree with that point. Does he accept, however, that we have not cleared up the ambiguity about whether nuclear weapons could ever be on Diego Garcia if the Americans and the British wanted them to be? It is no good saying, as the Minister did, “We never talk about deployments of nuclear weapons.” We are not asking about deployments of nuclear weapons. We are asking about the legal position if the case was that the Americans or the British wanted to have nuclear weapons, temporarily or permanently, on Diego Garcia. If we transfer sovereignty to a country that is signed up to be part of a nuclear-free zone, that is bound to call into doubt the ability to have nuclear weapons there in the future. Can he clear up that point?

[Tim Roca]

I cannot clear up that point for the right hon. Member, but I have great confidence that ministerial colleagues would be able to. We have been told at all points that this treaty would ensure the continued effectiveness of the base in the way that it is run now. There was an Ohio class submarine there in 2022, and I hope those arrangements continue under this treaty. From what I have heard from Ministers, there is no reason that they would not.

Let us turn to the costs of the deal. It will cost a fraction of the defence budget for an irreplaceable asset—

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Could the hon. Member clarify precisely how much of the cost of the Chagos islands deal will come from the Ministry of Defence budget?

[Tim Roca]

I am sure that has been set out already in several debates. The point that has not been set out adequately and cannot be set out in huge detail is that, in exchange for providing the United States with facilities on Diego Garcia, the in-kind support in terms of intelligence and other matters that we receive from the United States must run into the billions every single year. Although we cannot put a figure on that, it is a really important element in this debate.

There is no prosperity without security, and there is no security without certainty. In an interconnected world, those are not abstract principles; they are strategic necessities. That is why, in my view, this is a sensible, hard-headed deal, and a confident assertion of the United Kingdom’s national interest.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Mullan]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. It is extraordinary that Labour Members are prepared to defend the deal, while admitting that they do not even know if our accusations are correct. They could say that they do not agree with what we are proposing, but to admit that they do not know whether nuclear weapons will be allowed on the island and that they are happy to support the deal anyway is disgraceful.

We must address the wider consequences of this decision. If Labour is willing to abandon the Chagos islands so easily, what message does that send to our other overseas territories? The International Court of Justice may have issued an advisory opinion in 2019—[Interruption.] What I say is true; the world is watching. We have had pressure put on us in relation to a sovereign territory and we have collapsed, but Labour Members want us to think that the rest of the world will not interpret our standing from that.

[Tim Roca]

We have heard from chief Ministers and leaders of the other British overseas territories how disappointed they have been in the rhetoric used by the Conservatives in trying to drag them into the situation. There is no question about our commitment to the British overseas territories. This deal is a completely separate matter.

[Dr Mullan]

The people who we should be worried about are not the people in charge of the British overseas territories—we should be worried about the people who are watching what we do and making decisions about how they will act, as we saw with previous attempts to take control of those territories. Does the hon. Gentleman think that Argentina will observe this situation and not draw a lesson from it? Of course it will.