Russia’s Grand Strategy

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Thursday 19th January 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Rhondda (Sir Chris Bryant), who made some powerful points. Here we are again debating Russia’s strategy. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin), who held a similar debate a year ago. It was a year ago that I and, indeed, others in the Chamber predicted that Russia would invade Ukraine. Few believed us. That reflects a poor understanding of Russia as well as of Russia’s strategy and what Russia stands for.

When we play the board game Risk, we quickly appreciate how difficult it is to defence the largest continent. It covers 11 time zones and, over millenniums, its sheer size has made it vulnerable to invasion. That has come from the Vikings, the Mongols, the Teutonic order, the Polish, the Lithuanians, the Napoleonic French and twice in one century from the Germans. Russia eventually appreciated the value of choosing a strong, central, authoritarian leader to hold its disparate principalities together, backed by the Orthodox Church, pursing a policy of expansionism. Simply put, Ivan the Terrible pushed east, Peter the Great pushed north, Catherine the Great pushed south and, of course, Stalin pushed west. That is the Russian mindset: if we are not expanding, we will be attacked.

After world war two, perhaps we thought that things might be different. It took the US diplomat George Kennan’s observations of Joseph Stalin’s re-election speech —there were no other candidates—to make Washington realise that America’s wartime ally was going back to its old ways. His “Long Telegram”, as it became known, formed the cornerstone of America’s post-war grand strategy called “containment”, which eventually won the cold war.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, we naively hoped that Russia would perhaps again join the international fold. Sixteen years later, when President Putin addressed the Munich security conference in 2007, we did not require another long telegram to interpret his clear intentions: Russia was resorting to type. The west ignored his blatant warnings and, only a year later, Putin began redrawing the map of eastern Europe, beginning with Georgia.

[Richard Foord]

I agree with the right hon. Member that Russia uses its size to bully and intimidate other countries. He may recall that, last May, Dmitry Kiselyov used his Sunday night show to talk about how Russia has the capability to

“plunge Britain to the depths of the ocean”.

With Russia’s approach of singling out the UK, does he agree that we must stand strong with our NATO allies, given that collectively we have so much more strength as 32 NATO countries?

[Mr Ellwood]

I am grateful for that intervention, which takes us back to the first speech. It is clear that we continue to be spooked by the rhetoric from Russia. It requires political will to stand up, rekindle that cold war statecraft and look our adversary in the eye, conscious of the escalatory ladder. Today, I ask: when will the penny drop?

Today’s conflict is not just about Ukraine. Our post-world war two global order was built on the pursuance of democracy, accountability, freedom and the rule of international law. That has never looked as fragile as it does today as both Russia and China have openly broken away from those objectives, not just pioneering a more authoritarian approach to governance but encouraging other countries to follow their lead.

We should finally accept that the elites in both Russia and China want to see not just America but the west weakened. So it is welcome news that we finally see some serious NATO hardware heading Ukraine’s way, with greater resolve to stand up to Russia. Once again, I welcome the UK leading in that, ever pushing the envelope of acceptable international support for Ukraine, but as I hope the debate illustrates, we continue to limit ourselves to tactics and military assistance. We do not think enough about strategy.

The conflict is not likely to end any time soon. Russia’s ability to endure hardship is far greater than ours in the west. Putin wants to drag the conflict out, so I offer this strategy to help conclude the conflict in 2023. First, let us agree the mission. The ramifications go well beyond Ukraine. Let us all agree what the mission is and what success actually looks like.

Secondly, as I have said so many times in the Chamber, let us secure UN safe haven status for the port of Odessa so that all, not just one fifth, of those vital grain ships can reach international markets and lower the cost of living everywhere. Thirdly, let us establish a major Ukrainian armaments factory in eastern Poland. Gifting kit is absolutely the right call now, but it is not sustainable in the long term, so we should let Ukraine develop its own equipment, whether it be the Leopard or anything else, in eastern Poland.

Fourthly, let us list the Russian state-sponsored Wagner militia group as a terrorist organisation. Fifthly, let us directly sanction President Putin. He is responsible for the war, so let us freeze his personal assets as well. Sixthly, as Ukraine will not be joining NATO any time soon, let us invite Ukraine to join the joint expeditionary force, which is the critical security umbrella that will help deter Russia from attempting to invade in the future.

Finally, to further leverage our leadership and support for Ukraine, let us appoint a senior UK-Ukraine envoy, answerable directly to the Prime Minister, who would help co-ordinate Whitehall support and align our efforts with those of our international allies. The first duty would be to organise a major Marshall plan conference in the spring and begin post-conflict assistance planning. Those are seven strategic objectives to help put the fire out and stand up to Russia.

I will conclude by shining a rather sad light on our own defence posture. We are heading into another cold war, more dangerous than the last, and it saddens me to say this, but we are ill-prepared militarily for the threats coming over the horizon, particularly when it comes to the British Army. Three critical components that contribute to the quantity and quality of our land warfare capability and more widely to the full spectrum of armed warfare are the tank, the armoured fighting vehicle and the recce vehicle.

Our tank, the Challenger 2, was introduced 25 years ago. Back then, we had over 900; today, we have cut our main battle tank numbers to just 148. Those will now finally gain an upgrade, but that will not be complete until 2030. Our armoured fighting vehicle, the Warrior, was introduced 30 years ago—a competent but now dated workhorse, able to carry infantry and protect them with its 30 mm Rarden cannon. All 700 are being axed and replaced by the Boxer—a wheeled, not tracked, vehicle—and we are choosing the variant that has no turret, so no serious firepower. Those will not be completely introduced until 2032. Finally, there is our recce vehicle, the Scimitar. That was introduced over 50 years ago. It should have been replaced by the Ajax three years ago, but a litany of procurement problems means that it is still unclear when that will happen.

I make it clear that as the European security picture deteriorates, all this is frankly a mess—a dog’s dinner. No wonder the head of the British Army, General Sir Patrick Sanders, broke ranks last week to say that this is all unacceptable. Our Army is now too small and it is using equipment that is already obsolete. The new integrated review must address the sad state of our land forces and their combat effectiveness. We need a bigger defence budget or we will learn the hard way how our economy is impacted by the failure to invest in and utilise our hard power.

To conclude, my message to the House today is: let us look beyond Ukraine. International storm clouds are gathering once again and on our current trajectory the world is set to splinter into two dangerously competing spheres of ideological interest. What Russia is attempting to do here is just the beginning. There is a worrying absence of international leadership—of strategy—as to how we collectively respond. This is no time for strategic ambiguity and no time for quibbling about our defence posture. Containment, once again, is required. Our actions on the international stage in the past earned us a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Eight decades later, how the world has changed! Let us show that we deserve to keep that seat at the top table and rekindle our political will.

--- Later in debate ---

[Leo Docherty]

My right hon. Friend will know from her time as a Minister that we never speculate or comment on possible future proscriptions from the Dispatch Box, but I am grateful for her intervention.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) pointed out that he made some of these insights more than a year ago. He pointed out that Russia is a pariah state. Frankly, the fact that Russia is now a pariah state shows that this war is a failure of Putin’s strategy.

[Mr Ellwood]

I just want to reiterate the point that has just been made. This entire debate is because of the absence of a strategy in handling Russia, of which listing the Wagner Group would be one aspect. The Minister dismisses that idea by saying that we do not speculate. Perhaps he could humour those here who are calling for it by saying that he will at least take it away and put it to No. 10 as part of a wider package of measures that have been put forward today to say, “Yes, we need to lean into this. We need to construct a strategy that will allow us to stand up to Russia in advance of the completion of defeating Russia in Ukraine.”

[Leo Docherty]

I did acknowledge the remarks of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford. I did not dismiss them. I acknowledged them and said clearly that we do not speculate or comment on possible future proscriptions from the Dispatch Box, which is the settled position of this Government.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford made some good comments about the need to reflect the new security reality in the IR refresh and the procurement obligations that that will bring about. That was a valuable comment. My right hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Sir John Whittingdale), who has longstanding expertise and interest in this area, pointed out rightly that the UK Government and the British people have no argument with the Russian people, but they have with Putin because of his outrageous use of warfare.

My right hon. Friend also alluded to the importance of Operation Orbital. That has had an important legacy of success that is allowing us to train thousands of Ukrainian soldiers, who will go and do their duty heroically. He referred to Vladimir Kara-Murza. I was pleased to meet Evgenia Kara-Murza this week in London. We will continue to do all we can through our ambassador in Moscow and our consular officials to support him and his family. He referred to the lack of media freedom. He also asked about frozen assets. As I said, we look at all options for using Russian frozen assets to support the reconstruction of Ukraine.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Ludlow (Philip Dunne) pointed out the importance of Putin’s weaponisation of energy and sought reassurance about the IR refresh. I reassure him that we will seek to use that as an opportunity to reflect the new security reality. The Scottish National party spokesperson, the hon. Member for Angus (Dave Doogan), talked of Putin’s enemy abroad tactic, which was interesting. He talked about UK tanks; we are very proud of those and hope that other nations will follow our example. I do not think that his justification for the SNP’s approach to nuclear was compelling, but we do not want to get stuck on that. I can reassure him that institutionally, we are doing everything we can to embed deep expertise on Russia in the Foreign Office and beyond.

I come now to the questions from the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty). I thank him for his continued support in this policy area. We look at all options with regards to frozen Russian assets and their possible use to support Ukrainian reconstruction. He made a series of good points about Russia’s malign influence in the western Balkans. We will continue to call that out when we see it. He put the issue in the global context with reference to China. This war is consequential in terms of China’s role globally. We are very aware of that. That is part of our integrated review.

The hon. Gentleman talked about what we are doing with the global south. The bottom line is that we will always partner with nations that value democracy, open economy and freedom, because in the long term that is much more enduring, powerful and stronger than tyranny and autocracy. That is why, ultimately, we should all be collectively very optimistic and upbeat about the capacity of the alliance supporting Ukraine to expel Russian troops from its border and liberate its country. We look forward to supporting Ukraine for as long as it takes.

Ukraine

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Monday 31st October 2022 Commons Chamber

[James Cleverly]

The right hon. Gentleman makes an important point about where the only credible threat to international shipping would come from. If grain ships were attacked or the export of grain were prevented, the world would see who was ultimately responsible for imposing even more hunger on the world, on people in the global south and on people who are already suffering because of food insecurity and famine. The world would see who was truly to blame for imposing greater hardship on people who are already suffering.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

I absolutely endorse the support that Ministers are giving to Ukraine, but we have entered a darker chapter: as Putin is up against the wall, he is resorting to non-conventional means. Bearing in mind the escalatory ladder, I suggest that our support therefore needs to move from the battlefield to Ukraine’s infrastructure. Odesa is a critical port and the grain ships are not getting out at the scale necessary to feed the world. I suggest that the Foreign Secretary go to the United Nations General Assembly and secure a resolution to create a safe haven around the port, so that Britain can lead the international community in a maritime flotilla to support the grain ships departing from and entering the port.

[James Cleverly]

My right hon. Friend makes an incredibly important point about the significance of grain exports from the Black sea, and I have listened to his proposal. Russia needs to immediately reverse its pause on its involvement in Black sea exports. We will look at any options that increase the flow of food to the global south and to the people who need that food more than ever. I take my right hon. Friend’s suggestion seriously. Ultimately, we want to do whatever we can to increase grain exports immediately.

British Council Contractors: Afghanistan

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Thursday 23rd June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Vicky Ford]

I also send my thoughts to those affected by the terrible earthquake two days ago. The UK is one of the largest donors of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, and we are already working with teams on the ground, including the UN, non-governmental organisations and the Red Cross, to get assistance to those who need it.

The hon. Gentleman asks how many British Council staff are still affected. I make it clear, as I did in my opening remarks, that all former British Council employees —in other words, British Council staff—who wished to resettle have arrived in the UK with their family members. British Council employees were prioritised both in Operation Pitting and in the immediate response to help those who were invited to take part in Operation Pitting but did not make it out, and they are among the 4,600 people who have since come out of Afghanistan.

The issue here is contractors. We have prioritised British Council contractors, GardaWorld contractors and Chevening alumni in the 1,500 places we have this year. They will be able to put in their expression of interest between now and 15 August. I must say—maybe this will also help my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron)—that if there are exceptional and compelling circumstances, for example a threat to life, they can set that out in their expression of interest and they will be considered for expediated action.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

The bigger picture is that we chose to abandon Afghanistan and hand it back to the very insurgents we went in to defeat. We make grand promises to help the people of Afghanistan, the 40 million people left behind who are struggling to survive. Is it not now time to unfreeze the $9 billion-worth of Afghan assets? They belong to the Afghan people. We are not going to change the Taliban’s behaviour. The people who are now suffering because of that are the Afghans themselves, not the Taliban.

Ukraine Update

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Thursday 16th June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

The rising price of food in this country and across Europe and beyond reminds us why Ukraine is the breadbasket of Europe. As the Foreign Secretary has said, the port of Odesa, which is ground zero when it comes to exporting grain, is closed. As a starting point, to get that port reopened, may I ask her to use our P5 status at the United Nations to bypass the Security Council and go directly to the General Assembly to look at securing a resolution granting the port of Odesa international safe haven status? We have shown leadership in Ukraine. Let us show leadership in Odesa now.

[Elizabeth Truss]

My right hon. Friend is right to highlight the very serious issues in Odesa. We are working with the Ukrainians on shore-to-ship weapons to help to protect the port. We are working with the United Nations, through the General Assembly and other mechanisms, to try to secure access to the port. However, it is also important to look at the coalitions of the willing that could take action, and the G7 is important in that; that is why I am having a video call with my G7 Foreign Minister counterparts. Turkey also has an important role to play, and we are also in talks with the Turks. We are doing all we can to get that grain out of Ukraine, because it is vital for the Ukrainian economy and to deal with the very real issue of world hunger.

Sanctions

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Monday 28th February 2022 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

Members of the Duma can and will be sanctioned. We are working through the list of members in the same way as we are working through our hit list of oligarchs. I will look into the issues surrounding Kazakhstan and other nations. We are already sanctioning Belarus, and we will shortly impose more sanctions on it for its complicity in this abhorrent invasion.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

It is indeed day five of the fighting, but the bells of St Michael’s in Kyiv continue to ring as the Ukrainians thwart the progress of the Russian Red Army. Good on them: Slava Ukraini to our friends in Ukraine. But sanctions, although they are so important, will not be enough. May I urge the Foreign Secretary to see how we can widen the sanctions package internationally? Any sanctions that we impose will be mopped up by Russia’s new long-term friend China. The United Nations General Assembly is sitting today; may I urge the UK to table a resolution on sanctions which means that China is obliged to follow them along with everyone else?

[Elizabeth Truss]

This sanctions package has been agreed across the G7, which represents more than 50% of the global economy. That is a significant hit on the Russian economy, and it will help to degrade the Russian economy over time. The key issue is reducing dependency on oil and gas, but, as my right hon. Friend says, we must also ensure that there is no sanctions leakage into other countries. I have spoken to my Chinese counterpart. The Chinese did not vote with the Russians at the UN Security Council. I am making very clear to China, and to other major nations, their responsibilities to protect the sovereignty and self-determination of Ukraine, and we continue to put pressure on them.

Afghanistan Humanitarian Crisis: UK Response

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Wednesday 9th February 2022 Commons Chamber

[Vicky Ford]

As I have already said, the funding the UK is putting in day by day and week by week already supports 4.47 million people in Afghanistan. We recognise that the UN has launched its largest-ever appeal and we are working to unlock the money at the World Bank. The date of that conference has been announced as 31 March and we will be supporting it; we are extremely supportive as it is. However, we are also doing a huge amount of international work, including encouraging Muslim majority countries to play a full role in seeking to influence the Taliban. For example, the Foreign Secretary visited Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Indonesia in October and November and met the gulf Foreign Ministers again in December to discuss that and other issues. The Prime Minister’s special representative, Nigel Casey, met the Taliban representatives in Oslo last month. We are pushing on all sides, first, to improve the aid that comes in, secondly, to get the aid to the people and, thirdly, to encourage other neighbours and countries to step up to the mark.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

Let us cut to the chase: no Minister has met the Taliban. I met them in November and they told me to my face that they could not cope. That is what is leading to extreme poverty, mass malnutrition and a million children close to starvation. It is so simple for us to blame the Taliban, but we chose to hand responsibility to this insurgency, knowing that the economy would then collapse. Now we compound the tragedy by freezing international funds. Does the Minister not agree that if we are to break the impasse and help the Afghan people whom we abandoned, it is now time to recognise the Taliban so that we can get that urgent funding into the country and save lives? That would be an example of leadership and an example of global Britain.

[Vicky Ford]

Our officials have very pragmatic engagement with the Taliban at official levels, especially pressing on human rights and humanitarian issues. For example, in October the PM’s special representative for the Afghan transition, Sir Simon Gass, and the chargé d’affaires for the UK mission to Afghanistan, Dr Martin Longden, travelled to Afghanistan, where they held talks with the Taliban. The Prime Minister’s special representative met Taliban representatives late last month and officials have continued to discuss the humanitarian situation. In terms of getting funding to where it is needed to ensure that the humanitarian aid can get there, it was the UK that worked with leadership to get the resolution at the UN giving a humanitarian exemption, meaning that funds can flow for humanitarian need despite the sanctions

Russia: Sanctions

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Monday 31st January 2022 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

We are reviewing the tier 1 visas that were granted before 5 April. I am sure the Home Secretary will have more to say about that in due course.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

I welcome the statement and the wider steps that the UK is taking to support Ukraine. My concern is that western tactical responses are playing into Putin’s strategy. Seeking meetings with him, for example, plays to his self-importance; any sanctions actioned will drive Russia ever closer to China, which is exactly what he wants; and sending NATO reinforcements around Ukraine, but not in it, is not the way to deter an attack.

I worry that we are missing the bigger picture. Putin is using the Ukraine crisis to realign Russia militarily, economically and geopolitically with China, which has massive security implications for the west. Does the Foreign Secretary agree that the only way to halt an invasion and check that dangerous trajectory is to support Ukraine militarily? This is our Cuban missile crisis. I encourage Britain to lead the call to deploy an offensive alliance and stand up to Putin’s aggression.

[Elizabeth Truss]

Our approach in dealing with the issue of Russian aggression is both deterrence and diplomacy. That is why the UK has been at the forefront in supplying defensive weapons to Ukraine, training up Ukrainian forces and working with our allies, many of whom are also supplying defensive support into Ukraine. But we have to be clear that there is a difference between a country that is a member of NATO, which has a security guarantee—Baltic states such as Estonia, where UK troops are in place—and the situation in Ukraine.

In my view, the best way of deterring Vladimir Putin from an invasion of Ukraine is by making it very clear, first, that that will not be simple or easy and is likely to result in a quagmire, as we saw in the Soviet-Afghan war or in Chechnya; and, secondly, that there will be severe economic consequences—and those are, of course, sanctions that target oligarchs and companies close to Vladimir Putin. Also, not going ahead with Nord Stream 2 is very important from the Russian point of view.

It is important that we talk to Russia and communicate these messages. We will not resile from our position on the protection of the open-door policy into NATO, but we will communicate directly with Russia so that it understands those messages.

Russia

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Thursday 6th January 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

I certainly welcome the statement, but on the bigger picture I do not believe the west has a coherent strategy to deal with Russia’s increasing aggression. Sanctions will not deter Russia and Ukraine remains hugely exposed. With the west looking ever timid, ever divided and ever risk-averse, and with the United States looking ever distracted because of domestic issues and NATO bruised after its retreat from Afghanistan, has there ever been a better time for Russia to invade Ukraine than the forthcoming new year of the Orthodox calendar?

[Elizabeth Truss]

We have been united with our partners not just in the west, but in the free world. The G7 put out a very strong statement after Liverpool, being clear that there would be severe costs and massive consequences in the event of military aggression against Ukraine. That was followed by an announcement at the December European Council meeting which also made the same points, so we have seen a united front from allies around the free world. Freedom, democracy and security within Europe is vital, but my right hon. Friend makes the right point that this situation will be watched by aggressors around the world. This is about not just Europe, important though that is, but the signal we send to the rest of the world about what we do in the face of aggression. That is why partners such as Japan have also signed up to that statement, and why we are working more broadly with partners across the world to challenge this aggression and to ensure there are no rewards for this type of aggressive behaviour.

Afghanistan: Inquiry

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Thursday 4th November 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the proposal for an inquiry into the UK’s involvement in the NATO-led mission to Afghanistan.

This could be a very short debate if the Minister intervened and said, “Yes, we are going to have an inquiry”; then we could all go home. However, I suspect we will have to work a little bit harder than that.

I thank the Backbench Business Committee for granting this important debate on Afghanistan. This was one of the longest military campaigns in modern history. Over 100,000 armed forces personnel were deployed to Afghanistan, and 435 did not return alive. Thousands did return, but with life-changing injuries, and over 3,500 personnel from other NATO forces were also killed. About 70,000 Afghans lost their lives, although I do not think the true number will ever be known.

The campaign cost the international community trillions, but after two decades we decided to exit before the job was done, handing back the country to the very insurgency we went in to defeat. The country is now run by the Taliban, but they are not in control. It is in freefall, and the freezing winter that is approaching is likely to cause the biggest humanitarian disaster in a generation. The list of challenges we faced, and the lessons to be learned, are huge, yet the Government stubbornly refuse to hold an independent inquiry. Do they think that there is nothing to learn, or—more importantly—to explain to those who served, and to the families of the bereaved? What was it all for?

It is clear that our world is getting more dangerous, and global insecurity is increasing. Our decision to leave Afghanistan added to that. If we have any aspiration, as spelled out in the integrated review, to be a problem-solving, burden-sharing nation, we need to understand how the most powerful military alliance ever formed could not complete its mission after 20 years. If we do not analyse, appreciate and learn from our mistakes, we are likely to repeat them. More critically, this House of Commons is—let us be honest—not so versed in the details, and it will have no confidence in voting to send our troops into harm’s way, fearful of a similar outcome. We will become more risk-averse, and we will end up steering clear of overseas engagements and having no appetite to intervene. Our competitors will enjoy our self-inflicted weakness.

The first rule of war is: know your enemy. That is a prerequisite for any engagement. On my various visits to Afghanistan over a decade, I was always taken aback by the limits of international forces’ local understanding. Yes, they knew their local mission, but how that fitted into the higher commander’s intent was not clear. There seemed to be a national plan to kill the enemy, but that did not knit together with any form of strategy relating to governance, or development programmes outside Kabul. Had we done our homework, checked the archives and visited that famous Foreign and Commonwealth Office map room, we would have reminded ourselves of what and who we were taking on. We would have been in a better position to advise our allies and offer alternative solutions to courses of action that it was, frankly, a schoolboy error to pursue.

Afghanistan gained its independence from Great Britain. We learned the hard way, through three separate engagements over a century, that it is a deeply tribal country, where local loyalty trumps alliances to the centre. Policy cannot be shaped from outside the country. Since Ahmad Shah Durrani founded modern-day Afghanistan in the 1700s, it has not been run from the centre. Warlords enjoyed federated power; tribes and sub-tribes enjoyed autonomy. Why on earth did we, with all our experience of Afghanistan, believe we knew better?

In 2001, in our haste to seek retribution for 9/11, we lost our way. We allowed other agendas to blinker both our historical experience and current military doctrine, and that made a tough mission all the tougher. We ignored Afghanistan’s history, which we helped to shape, and believed that we could once again impose a western model of governance from scratch. The objective of hunting down and destroying al-Qaeda after 9/11 was widely supported, and it triggered NATO’s article 5 for the first time. That morphed into taking on the Taliban, who harboured al-Qaeda. This brings us back to that first rule of war: know your enemy.

To understand the Taliban and its origins, we must understand the mujaheddin; to understand the mujaheddin, we must understand the Soviet occupation; and to understand that occupation, we must understand that it was US foreign policy to remove the Soviets in the 1980s. That is wisdom not from history books, but from events in our lifetime. The last king, Zahir, was overthrown in 1973, and that triggered a power struggle between two diametrically opposed movements: the Communist party and the Islamist movement—the mujaheddin. Both grew in strength, with the former gaining the upper hand, but radical socialist changes sparked significant unrest, which the Soviets eventually sent in troops to try to quash. That prompted the United States, along with Inter-Services Intelligence in Pakistan, with support from China and indeed the United Kingdom, to support the mujaheddin—Charlie Wilson’s war.

From 1980 to 1989, £3 billion of covert military assistance went into east Asia to back a radical insurgency based in the Pakistani mountains. It mobilised tens of thousands of holy warriors who were willing to die for their cause. Out of the disunity of the mujaheddin rose the Taliban. It was not some distant extremist group that we knew little about, but arguably a product of western making.

Of course, the obstacles to success in Afghanistan were daunting: widespread corruption, intense grievances, Pakistani meddling and deep-rooted Afghan resistance to any foreign occupation. However, there was the colossal blanket of NATO security, and a huge development budget often described as an international aid juggernaut; US spending alone peaked in one year at $110 billion. Sadly, however, opportunities to secure long-term stability were squandered, and the west, especially the US, became over-confident following early victories.

In simple terms, where did it go wrong? First, we created an over-centralised model of governance. Secondly, we denied the Taliban a seat at the table in December 2001 at the Bonn talks. How different life would have been had they been included. Thirdly, we made no real effort to start training an Afghan indigenous security force until 2006. Fourthly, we opened up another front in Iraq—an unnecessary and costly distraction. Fifthly, we had no real development strategy to improve livelihoods and leverage the country’s vast resources.

I recall a visit to Afghanistan in 2008, when Mark Carleton-Smith, the current Chief of the General Staff, was in charge of 16 Air Assault Brigade. They took a turbine from Helmand—from Camp Bastion—to the Kajaki dam. A decade later, I flew into Kabul, and I looked out of the window and saw the same turbine lying next to the dam in its bubble wrap. That was analogous to the problems in that country.

Finally, we lost our way. We forgot why we were fighting and who we were fighting for. How could we claim that our intervention was about defending and upholding international standards and the rule of law when we crafted methods to bypass international law, such as creating detention camps, including at Guantanamo Bay?

For the first four years, Afghanistan was deceptively peaceful, as the Taliban retreated across the Pakistani border, but that time was squandered; the Taliban retrained, regrouped and rearmed. Slowly but progressively, they began their attacks, and by August 2009, General McChrystal observed, in his 60-page analysis, that we did not understand the people,

“whose needs, identities and grievances”

can differ “from valley to valley”; that the international security assistance force was “poorly configured” for counter-insurgency operations, designed instead for conventional warfare; that we were killing the enemy but not shielding the people; and that not enough was being done to train indigenous forces.

By 2014, Afghan forces were finally taking on more responsibility, and most NATO combat operations had ended, but still no formal talks had begun with the Taliban. Negotiations began in earnest in 2018, but when a deal was finally signed in February 2020, the agreement was between the United States and the Taliban; this time, the Afghan Government were not at the table. However, a US election was fast approaching, and the President, Donald Trump, wanted an announcement: “Bring our troops home.” Candidate Biden did not disagree.

The deal was done; all the Taliban had to do was wait for US troops to depart. The decision to withdraw was made, and we did not even have the courtesy to inform the Afghan forces when we departed camps such as Bagram air base. As the US forces withdrew, they took with them their contractors, who supported the Afghan forces. Of course, without ammunition, the Afghan army and the Afghan police cannot do their work. It did not take long for the Taliban to exploit the void and rout the country.

It is now clear to see what an operational and strategic blunder it was to retreat at this time. The Taliban are not a Government in waiting; they are not a monolithic organisation, so local reprisal attacks are taking place, which the Taliban themselves cannot control. As societal norms are removed, the banking system collapses and international support flees the country, we are seeing a terrible humanitarian disaster unfold. Once again, Afghanistan is a potential breeding ground for terrorism.

I noticed when I met the Taliban in Doha a couple of weeks ago just how frail they are. They say that because they are not enforcing such a ruthless interpretation of sharia law, many of them are leaving the ranks of the Taliban to join ISIS-K. That is what we have left behind. The decision to withdraw was absolutely the wrong call.

I end by looking at the wider consequences of our departure. What is the US’s commitment and staying power to defend the international rule of law? What of NATO’s function, with or without US lead? Twenty years since 9/11, are we still no better at preventing the radicalisation of individuals who believe they will be rewarded if they kill westerners? What next for those 40 million Afghans that we left behind? How do we work with the Taliban to prevent a humanitarian crisis? Finally, after this humiliation and retreat by the west, should the UK seek to play a more active role on the international stage?

I hope that our departure from Afghanistan is not the high tide mark of western post-world war two liberalism. We are seeing the erosion of western influence, the loss of faith in the idea of a liberal world order, and the rise of a rival superpower, China, which is advancing a competing ideology that could see the world splinter into two competing spheres of influence.

I encourage the Government to see the bigger picture—how on the one hand our world is becoming increasingly unstable, but on the other, the west, including Britain, has become more risk averse. We are in for a dangerous decade, and Britain should have more confidence in itself, in what we stand for, what we believe in and what we are willing to defend. As the last century illustrated, it was once in our DNA to do just that. We have the means, the hard power, the connections to lead. What we require is the backbone, the courage, the leadership to step forward.

I say directly to the Minister that cutting the defence budget last week sent the wrong signal about our commitment and our resolve. This is not the time to cut back on our troop numbers, our tank numbers and our plane and ship numbers, but that is exactly the consequence of what is happening. We have some serious questions to ask about our place in the world and what global Britain means, and that should begin with an inquiry into Afghanistan.

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[Stewart Malcolm McDonald (Glasgow South) (SNP)]

I congratulate the right hon. Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), the Chair of the Defence Committee, on securing the debate, and commend him for the leadership he has shown in the weeks and months since the withdrawal was undertaken.

It would perhaps seem strange if we did not acknowledge the acres of empty Benches around us. Less than three months ago, this House was recalled from its summer recess to discuss the very issue we are discussing now, and today we have started the wind-up speeches only minutes after the Chair of the Select Committee got to his feet. That worries me and speaks to the reason why we need the inquiry that he has come here to ask the Government to instigate—a case he prosecuted forensically.

The SNP supports the right hon. Gentleman’s call for an inquiry. I think he is right that it is important to those who served. It is important to their families. In particular, it is important for those who went to Afghanistan and paid with their lives, whether they were UK armed forces or those who served alongside them. It was fashionable at the time of the initial withdrawal not to acknowledge the international coalition, but I think we should. Above all, we owe it to the people of Afghanistan, not just those who have lost their lives or been maimed or injured over the course of the west’s time there, but those who now face the long dark night of Taliban rule that stretches out before them. Yes, that includes in particular women and girls, minority groups, journalists and academics, but also all who tasted freedom over the past few years and have now had it rather abruptly snatched away.

It is notable that although there have been some other inquiries in different coalition countries, it is only the Norwegians who have set up a fully independent inquiry. That is something we need to do here. Yes, inquiries are expensive, necessarily so. Inquiries are slow, necessarily so. We have not had that many of them, necessarily so. But if the Government will not bring forward an inquiry on Afghanistan, then goodness knows what they will ever bring forward an inquiry on in future. They need to look at the long stretch of the mission, the motivation for why we went there in the first place, and the chaotic withdrawal, which we were recalled for less than three months ago.

I would like to put on record—the Minister and I exchanged on this last night—that I had actually thought this was a Ministry of Defence debate. As my party’s defence spokesperson, I wanted to put on record my thanks to the Defence Secretary for his conduct in the aftermath of the withdrawal. I do not think he and the Government got everything right, and the Foreign Secretary certainly did not, but I do not want to rehearse that this afternoon. It is important to acknowledge that the Defence Secretary seemed to be the only Minister who grasped the issue’s importance at the time—I will rephrase that: the only Cabinet Minister, because I do not want to be unfair on the Minister before us.

The right hon. Member for Bournemouth East touched on a broader point about political will and assessing exactly where we are with the implementation of our values. The Minister and I will disagree on much about defence and foreign policy, but fundamentally, our agreements are underwritten with the same kinds of values—on openness, tolerance and solving big issues in alliances with other countries.

I am a committed internationalist. Multilateral fora such as NATO and the European Union are, by a country mile, the best parts of the international architecture for advancing values of tolerance, liberal democracy and openness. If they did not exist, we would want to create them, and I would want Scotland to be in them and all the countries around us to be part of them. They are by the far the greatest vehicles for the kinds of values that we in this House all share. However, we must all reflect, and NATO at large must reflect, on this defeat—there is no other word for it. If there is a failure to do so and to have the kind of inquiry that the Chairman of the Defence Committee is asking the Government to initiate, those who want to overturn our values, as he mentioned, will take heart from that. Within hours, China was talking about the weakening of the west. Russia was in Kabul barely days after it had fallen, while we, in concert with others, were desperately scrambling—and failing in too many cases—to get people out quickly and alive.

Alongside an inquiry, the challenge is this: we must have a political discussion with other capitals that we are allied with about how we renew and reinvigorate the international architecture that underpins and drives the order that we have all benefited from and want to see us continue to benefit from. If we do not do that, who will benefit? It will be those who stand in opposition to our values. So the question is: what does Afghanistan and that withdrawal become? Does it become a low point for the liberal international order that we all believe in, or does it mark the point of no return? The Minister will have to answer that when he gets to his feet. If we do not have a full, independent inquiry, properly funded and properly prosecuted by a judge, with full powers of subpoena and all the rest of it, I fear that this will be a point of return, and I am sure that nobody in this House wants that.

The right hon. Gentleman has the full backing of my party for his proposal for an inquiry. Let us not shrug this off this afternoon. The debate will now, necessarily, be depressingly short; perhaps the acres of empty green Benches scream out that we need the inquiry that he asks for.

[Mr Ellwood]

I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s support. Is it worth his clarifying this point, which I did not? We have in our mind, as a yardstick, that an inquiry looks like Chilcot. Nobody is asking for Chilcot, but we are asking for something that I believe should be the norm: after every long-term military engagement, there is an assessment of what happened so that we can learn for the better. However, it does not need to take the legal approach that Chilcot was all about. That had a very different, complicated requirement.

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. I believe that the Defence Committee has started its investigation, and we on the Foreign Affairs Committee have started ours. Parliament has a role to play in doing its job and scrutinising what Government have and have not done, and making recommendations for the future. That is right and proper, but he rightly asks for something above that that can do the necessary job. I get entirely why Chilcot provides a rather unhelpful shadow over this discussion, but it cannot be used as an excuse to shrug off what the right hon. Gentleman asks us to do. This is up to the Government and up to us all. What we have shown through the lack of hon. Members’ presence in this debate is that Parliament cannot be left as the only institution to scrutinise the matter.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Ellwood]

I am grateful for all the contributions that have been made today on this important issue. I am also grateful to the Minister, who has worn the uniform and who I know takes these matters very seriously indeed. However, we have raised more questions than we have had answers to, which is exactly why we need an inquiry. I believe that there should be a default position that whenever this country goes to war or is involved in a long-term conflict, there should be some form of formal wash-up provided by the Government. If I had a private Member’s Bill opportunity, I would put one forward, but I would be worried that the Government would whip against it and that it would not get through. That is another matter, however.

The Minister talked about terrorist attacks from Afghanistan, and he was absolutely right, but we are no longer there so that threat is now very much back on the cards. The humanitarian assistance was significant, but it has been diminished because we have decided to depart. On NATO, he was right to say that there was an all in, all out approach, but that did not anticipate Donald Trump coming very close to taking the United States out of NATO. That was not the way forward that anybody imagined.

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Ellwood]

I am not sure. With the indulgence of the Deputy Speaker, I would be happy to give way. I seek her guidance.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

The right hon. Gentleman is winding up the debate.

[Mr Ellwood]

Okay, I will continue. I will conclude the debate, because I know another one is following this one.

I would argue that if there were a free vote on whether we should have an inquiry, many Members of this House—particularly Conservatives, but also Members from all parts of the House—would support it. It is the right thing to do. There is work to be done on the special relationship, and we need to show that we understand the world and that we can offer alternative points of view. We will be asked to do something similar in the future, potentially in Mali, Yemen, Lebanon or Afghanistan. A Kurdistan area could develop north of the Hindu Kush, because the Taliban are not in control of the whole country. The music has not stopped there, and resistance will build up in the next couple of years. We need to understand how we can do things better and understand the political decision making that went on.

My final words are to the brave people who served and to the bereaved who still miss the loved ones who did not return. They are scratching their heads—we know that because we have talked to them—and wondering what on earth it was all for. I spoke to the Taliban in Doha, and they know that the societal change that we introduced over 20 years is too much for them to reverse. The country has moved on, and it is too large. It is demanding too many new, modernised things for the Taliban to turn back. If there is a modicum of justice there, it is that we have advanced the country a long way forward. It has been handed over to the Taliban, but the spirit of what is now there in Afghanistan will be bigger than anything the Taliban can do to undo it and turn it back to what we saw in the 1990s. We can say thank you to our troops for achieving that.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered the proposal for an inquiry into the UK’s involvement in the NATO-led mission to Afghanistan.

Official Development Assistance and the British Council

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Wednesday 30th June 2021 Commons Chamber

[Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow my right hon. Friend the Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Karen Bradley) and to have watched her whip the Minister into submission even before he has given his speech, which I look forward to hearing because he is a most effective Minister.

From a right-wing point of view, the point that my right hon. Friend made was very effective. My constituents in Lincolnshire are absolutely grinding their teeth at what is happening at the channel and want the Home Office to be far more proactive. This is not the right place to talk about what the Home Office should be doing, but why are people coming here? These are not nasty people; they are desperate people fleeing the most appalling war, poverty and deprivation. The channel is proving completely ineffective. In the second world war, we held back the Nazi hordes with the RAF—we stopped them, but we cannot hold people back. We are one world. If there is dire misery and poverty in the world, it will wash up on our shores.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend says that comments about Dover are not applicable to this debate, but I argue that they absolutely are. We do not explain to the British people how this money can be spent and that it does affect them directly. If we did, we would have more support for confirming the 0.7% commitment, rather than old-fashioned views about where the money has been spent—and I agree that some of it has been spent badly in the past. My right hon. Friend is absolutely right to focus on this issue, because when international development money is spent correctly, it will be supported by the British people.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

I am sure that is right. I accept that if we took an opinion poll in the Gainsborough constituency, a majority—perhaps even a strong majority— would be in favour of these cuts. I accept that, but if for a moment the Government explained what the money is spent on, they would find that the British people are kind and humanitarian. People in Lincolnshire often say to me, “Why are we giving money to India? They have aircraft carriers and a space programme.” I shall leave aside the utter poverty of hundreds of millions of people in Uttar Pradesh; why are we living through this horrible lockdown? Why are we spying on Ministers with cameras and having a complete moral void? Because of the delta variant, which has come from where? India. Whether it is the pandemic or migrants, we cannot insulate ourselves from the world. That is why we have an overseas aid programme.

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[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

The Government would have us believe that the backdrop to this debate is the impact of covid, with the knock-on financial pressures requiring departmental budgets to be cut or correspondingly slimmed. There are indeed unprecedented financial pressures, but the overseas aid budget has a built-in mechanism to cater for any financial challenge, as we all know, because it reflects the GNI of the day. Yet here we are, the only G7 country to cut its aid budget, with dire consequences for programmes across the world and, as a P5 nation, a huge hit to our soft power credentials. We will be leaving vacuums to be filled by nations with very different agendas, or indeed by extremist groups exploiting the lack of governance.

The messaging has already been touched on, but I will just repeat the point that the Government should lead the narrative, not follow a populist and dated view of ODA spending. Let us explain to the British people what this is all about. This is what we are good at—we excel at it—and when we do well, other nations follow.

[Christian Wakeford]

Part of the problem with judging by a poll is the language used. If it asks, “Do you want a cut in international aid?”, people will say yes. However, if it asks, “Do you want to feed the world’s hungriest and support those most in need?”, I am sure that, being a generous and kind country, we would also say yes.

[Mr Ellwood]

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend, and indeed I would go further and say that not only is that what we do, but it is required.

I come to this debate today to add a defence and security perspective. Hard power and soft power cannot be seen in isolation; they are two sides of the same coin. If our failure in Afghanistan, where we are now essentially giving up and going home, should teach us anything, it is that we cannot build and maintain peace by military means alone.

[Mr Mitchell]

My right hon. Friend is making a brilliant speech on the link between defence and development. In the case of Yemen, we have a very complicated relationship, because of course we are part of the coalition that is bombing that country back to the stone age, but we are also trying to help those caught up in the conflict. Does he not think that the one thing we ought to be able to agree on is that we should not, at this stage, be taking food from starving people there?

[Mr Ellwood]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right, and I congratulate him on the work that he is doing. There is a great example of where British leadership can be seen on the international stage. Yemen requires leadership. We have been there for some time and have not utilised our relationship with the Saudis to prevent them from doing what they have been doing. We could have better harnessed our friendships and capabilities in order to bring a conclusion to that particular challenge.

I worked as a Minister in both the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as it then was—I was Minister for the Middle East and North Africa—and the Ministry of Defence, and I can confirm how siloed our Whitehall Departments still are. I concede that things are definitely getting better, but if global Britain is to have meaning, exhibiting increased resolve to play a role on the international stage, it will require greater cohesion between our internationalist-facing Departments, which even today remain too siloed.

I would go further than the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee and introduce the role of a Deputy Prime Minister, with the arc of responsibility to co-ordinate the MOD, DFID, FCO and trade initiatives, so that we can develop grand strategies to tackle some of the global hotspots that we are engaged in. We do need to expand our Whitehall bandwidth.

[Navendu Mishra]

Does the right hon. Gentleman share my view that abolishing DFID at the height of a global pandemic was a backward step, and that the role of development is far too serious to be left to the now much larger FCDO, and without a dedicated Minister at the top table?

[Mr Ellwood]

My biggest criticism about that is what is done in practice to the Department and the important voice at the Cabinet table and at the National Security Council. Now we have only the Foreign Secretary there, not another voice, and that is what we have lost.

We absolutely need to expand our Whitehall bandwidth to be able to recognise the current challenges to which we could provide solutions and also the looming ones that are coming over the horizon. This is the point I hope the Minister will listen to. The real backdrop to this debate that we must all recognise is where our complex and dangerous world is heading. If there was one welcome outcome of the G7 summit, it is the realisation that unless the west becomes less risk-averse, regroups and reunites, the next decade will get very bumpy indeed.

I have been consistent in my clear message to this House: over the next five years, the world is getting more dangerous, not less, and more complex, not less. Authoritarianism is on the rise, new power bases are emerging, and states are starting to rearm at an alarming rate. To compound matters, we now have the growing challenge of climate change, which is already having an impact on security and governance in some of the world’s most vulnerable regions. Storms, floods and droughts will affect agricultural productivity, damage economies and lead to mass migration, most notably from Africa to Europe. This goes back to the point about where the challenge is: it is not in Dover; it is actually in Africa. Simply put, global security in our ever complex and confusing world is on a worrying glide path, and right now there is no grand plan to alter the current trajectory. The threat picture is greater and more complex than during the cold war, and it requires addressing.

The political scientist Joe Nye introduced the term “soft power” a decade ago. It is the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes we want by attracting and co-opting their support. However, in the spirit of Sun Tzu, who said:

“The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting”,

I argue here today that a new global soft power war or soft war is already at play, but we in the west have yet to wake up to its reality.

China is weaponising its immense soft power to significantly advance its influence and reach, and to promote its own interpretation of the international rules-based order. We are seeing this gathering apace across Africa and Asia through its one belt, one road infrastructure programmes and its gifting of 5G networks and military support to ensnare dozens and dozens of countries into its sphere of influence. It is also securing senior leadership positions in international organisations such as the United Nations to neutralise any criticism of its errant behaviour, and is now contributing ever more significant Chinese military forces to UN peacekeeping missions. As we have heard today, it is using its Confucius centres—now over 600 across the globe—to advance its message.

This will be China’s century, as it eventually overshadows and overtakes America as the dominant military, economic and technological superpower, yet here we are in Britain still failing to put two and two together. For a nation that usually prides itself on its place and influence in the world and its grasp of global situational awareness, I am genuinely baffled to understand why it is not reading and responding to this bigger picture. China is offering a competing authoritarian ideology and is leveraging its colossal economic growth to undercut western competition. On this current glide path, the world will splinter into two spheres of competing influence. Now is not the time to cut our defence budgets or our aid budgets as these threats increase, yet here we are doing both.

There is a phenomenal opportunity for British leadership here, made all the easier with the new US Administration, to craft a post-Brexit international role at the very moment the west is required to regroup. I urge this Government to listen to the voices here today in this Parliament and see the bigger picture, recognise the scale of the threat we face, invest in the statecraft and the hard and soft power tools we need, and expand Whitehall’s international bandwidth, for the actions we the west choose to take over the next few years could have implications for how the next few decades play out.