Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting)

Torsten Bell Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 11th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[David Pinto-Duschinsky]

As ever, my hon. Friend is absolutely right and his intervention goes to a third point: this also feels a bit premature.

As my hon. Friend mentioned, we are in the midst of the incredibly important advice and guidance boundary review. For many of the groups that we want to help, advice might not actually be the right solution, but guidance might be, and we are in the midst of re-tooling that. Similarly, we are in the midst of rolling out dashboards, which will transform the landscape but not fix the problems on their own; we may need to layer new policy initiatives on top. It seems that we are at risk of putting the cart before the horse.

I also add that when I read new clause 1 in detail, I saw that it refers to “advice”. On my reading, that would constrict potential policy responses and force the Government to go down the advice route, rather than provide other services that might be on offer through the advice and guidance boundary review.

The intention is good. I think there is huge consensus on the need to tackle the problem, but the right way to do it is through sophisticated and proper policy making, rather than the blunt instrument of amending primary legislation. For those reasons, I oppose this new clause.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)]

I thank the proposers of these new clauses. I will take them in the way they were intended—to spark debate.

We have had quite a wide debate and I think there is consensus on the subject, but I want to put a slightly different spin on the problem statement we are talking about. We have come at a lot of the discussion on the new clause as if there is too little advice. I would slightly reframe the question when it comes to pensions, which is that there is too much complexity, and too little advice or guidance. I think that is the right way to think about the problem that we are confronting with the system as a whole.

I will broadly outline our approach to try to tackle that problem statement. The task is to reduce the complexity as well as to increase the guidance and the advice that are available. Having watched the pensions debate over the past 15 years, I have observed that we have too often made pensions more complicated, and then said, “If we only had this advice, it would all be fine.” I do not think that is the right answer. That is a mistake about the nature of the system that we are delivering.

Our job is to reduce the complexity, or to reduce the consequences of it being difficult for people to deal with. That is obviously what a lot of the Bill is trying to do. With small pots, the aim is obviously to reduce complexity. That is what the value for money measures are designed to do. Seen through that lens, they are also aimed at reducing the costs of that complexity. The value for money regime is there to reduce the consequences of it being difficult to engage with and members not choosing their own provider.

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

The Minister raises an interesting point. We have talked about a lot of different bits and pieces with complexity and all the rest of it. We have not spoken about when we educate people about money.

In the olden days, when I was a newly elected MP, I was one of the chairs of the all-party parliamentary group for financial education for young people. That was about getting financial education into the curriculum. It is probably now more important than ever that we teach people of school age about the importance of financial planning, including pensions. Can the Minister assure the Committee that he will take up with his colleagues in the Department for Education the changes that could be made to bring this type of education into the curriculum for kids, who are all going to be adults soon?

[Torsten Bell]

I shall take that up directly with the new Economic Secretary to the Treasury, who I am sure will talk to her colleagues in the Department for Education. I can offer the hon. Member some entirely anecdotal optimism on that issue. Whenever I now do school events in Swansea, I am seeing very high levels of financial engagement. After I have given a very worthy speech, most of the questions are not about how to reduce inequality but instead are about personal financial advice. I think the youth of today are all over it—that is my lived experience.

I have mentioned small pots and value for money. I want to flag two other areas. Dashboards have been mentioned, and they are a very large part of how we provide support. The default pensions solutions are crucial to reducing complexity, and that is probably the biggest measure in the Bill. The need to provide more advice or guidance for people to access their defined-contribution pots is reduced significantly because of the existence of default solutions. We definitely still want people to have access to advice and the ability to opt out of those defaults, but default solutions help significantly. That is why the communication of those default pension solutions, which we discussed quite extensively, is so important for people. That is why that is in the Bill.

We have touched on making more support available. We have universal access for people of any age to free impartial support through MoneyHelper—that is what the Money and Pensions Service is providing—and we have a specific focus on support for over-50s in Pension Wise. Several hon. Members have said, absolutely rightly, that access to financial advice fell in the aftermath of the reforms over a decade ago, but there is some better news on Pension Wise. The 2024 Financial Lives survey showed that of those who accessed a defined-contribution pot within the last four years, 40% had accessed Pension Wise. I think that is probably more than most hon. Members in this debate would expect, though it may not be enough. However, those people had used Pension Wise when heading towards access; they had not used it as a mid-life MOT product, which is a different thing. That 40% was up from 34% in 2020, so some things have gone in the right direction. I am gently noting that, not claiming any credit for it because it predates the election. There is a lot of overlap between what those systems of advice are providing and the measures in new clause 1.

Regarding new clause 40, I absolutely agree on how we think about under-saved groups. The groups identified in the new clause are more or less the same groups of people experiencing financial wellbeing challenges whom MaPS targets, so that is a point of consensus, but I am absolutely open to suggestions of what more we can do to make sure that we are tackling that issue. The Pensions Commission is considering the wider question of adequacy, which is why we are looking at not just average adequacy but the fairness of the system.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

Will the Minister give a commitment that the commission will specifically look at groups that are less likely to have a sufficient pension, rather than just looking at an average and increasing that average?

[Torsten Bell]

I can absolutely give that guarantee, because that is in the terms of reference of the Pensions Commission. I will come back to the wider question of the commission in one second. I will not go into detail, but targeted support is a large part of providing more guidance, and we expect the roll-out of that early next year. There is more coming in that space; we are not relying solely on MaPS.

How should we think about the interaction of dashboards and bigger DC pots? At the moment, for lots of people entering their retirement, their DC pot may be a smaller part of their overall pension income, but as we move forward, it will become the large majority of their income. That will be very visible because of dashboards. One of the reasons MaPS has been reluctant —although I do not want to say “reluctant”—to promise to deliver the kind of automatic enrolment that is being discussed by the Committee is that a lot of planning work is under way to make sure that when dashboards come online, MaPS is ready and set up to deal with the significant increase in demand for help and in engagement that may come from that. The experience of some pension schemes in Australia is that as pension pots become bigger, there is much more demand for support and guidance. We should expect that demand to grow in the years ahead with or without dashboards, but definitely with dashboards and the other measures together.

[Kirsty Blackman]

When dashboards increase engagement, as we all expect they will, will the Minister report back to the House, or encourage someone to report back to the House, on how much engagement has increased by, so that we all have an awareness of it, rather than it being in stats kept in the background that we do not know about?

[Torsten Bell]

Absolutely. I think we will want to look at the impact across a range of measures of engagement. Do dashboards help consolidation of pots? Do they encourage people to save more? We also need to be aware of riskier behaviours that dashboards could trigger. We are currently engaged in significant user testing of the system to make sure that we have done what we can to make sure that when people have visibility of their pension pots, they do not adopt behaviours that we do not want.

On the question about the Pensions Commission from the angle of the advice and guidance sector, it is an independent commission so I cannot speak for it. However, I think the commission will have heard the focus of that question, and the length of this debate in Committee.

Turning to the specific question put by the hon. Member for Horsham on what he said was the purpose of this group of new clauses, I assure him that my mind has been entirely focused by him on this issue, and that I will continue to talk to MaPS about what further lessons there are to learn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

My understanding is that new clause 2 calls for a report. It addresses transparency. It is all well and good that stuff on competition regulations is published—I have no idea where it is published. We are asking for a report to the House, which we would all be able to access. I did not write the new clause, but it would be helpful if the Minister agreed to transparency and to review this in good time so that we can make better decisions on future legislation.

[Torsten Bell]

The first thing to say is that this is focused on scale. We appreciate that the Bill would lead to major changes to the pensions market—the hon. Member for Torbay is absolutely right—and we want to understand and monitor the consolidation and scale process over the coming years. To state the obvious, market changes such the scale measures we are talking about take time, and many of the measures in the Bill will not even be implemented within the 12 months. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not push the amendment to a vote.

I agree on the wider point about the Bill as a whole and the need for strong monitoring and evaluation. I would probably take a slightly different approach from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North. The Bill contains a large number of measures, and the right way to monitor their implementation will be different for different parts of the Bill. When it comes to the questions of scale, which are the focus of this amendment, the monitoring—[Interruption.] That is not the response I was looking for. The monitoring is slightly more visible because we are talking about the number of workplace schemes, or at least workplace defaults, that exist.

Let me lay out a bit of what we have in place to monitor. We will be able to monitor scale, charges and, because of the interaction with the value for money regime, returns and asset allocation. Lots of the key success metrics that are meant to come with the scale changes, as well as the delivery of scale itself, will be visible. My honest view is that it is on all of us—obviously, it is particularly on the Government—to pay attention to that as we go.

On the wider question of whether we will consider further, I have already committed to do that and to come back and reflect on Report on how we do that. I put on the record my view that that is a reasonable thing to do, and I will do it, but we need to think about it differently for different parts of the Bill.

[Steve Darling]

I thank the Minister for putting his thoughts on the record. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 5

Report on fiduciary duty and discretionary indexation of pre-1997 benefits

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on whether the fiduciary duties of trustees of occupational pension schemes should be amended to permit discretionary indexation of pre-1997 accrued rights, where scheme funding allows.

(2) The report must consider—

(a) the impact of current fiduciary obligations on trustees’ ability to award discretionary increases to pre-1997 pension benefits;

(b) the potential benefits of permitting such discretionary indexation for affected pensioners;

(c) the funding conditions and thresholds under which discretionary indexation could be considered sustainable;

(d) the appropriate level of regulatory oversight and guidance required to ensure that discretionary increases are granted in a fair, transparent, and financially responsible manner;

(e) international approaches to indexation of legacy pension benefits;

(f) the legal and actuarial implications of amending fiduciary duties in this context.

(3) In preparing the report, the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) the Pensions Regulator,

(b) the Financial Conduct Authority,

(c) representatives of pension scheme trustees, members, and sponsoring employers, and

(d) such other experts or bodies as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(4) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament.”—(Steve Darling.)

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to report on whether the fiduciary duties of trustees of occupational pension schemes should be amended to permit discretionary indexation of pre-1997 accrued rights, where scheme funding allows.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Garnier]

I want to follow on from the two powerful speeches by the Liberal Democrat and SNP spokespeople, the hon. Members for Torbay and for Aberdeen North, in highlighting the fact that this problem is—dare I say it—disappearing over time. This feels slightly similar to the ongoing contaminated blood debate, and it is a similar type of thing. The people who would be compensated for the contaminated blood are, for tragic reasons, disappearing. Indeed, I think there are now 86,000 pensioners who were caught up in this particular problem, and the longer this is kicked down the road, the smaller the problem will become, for obvious reasons.

The principle behind this is absolutely right. It is incredibly important that we as a country, society and community look after all these people. Where people have done the right thing and put money into their pension, but it has not followed through, that is a big problem.

One thing does bother me: I do not want to be too political, but the Government have dug themselves a freshly made £30 billion black hole in the last year. Although the SNP spokesperson is absolutely right that the £12 billion in the PPF is available to spend only on pensions, the problem is that because it appears on the country’s balance sheet, if the money to pay the price for this—I think it is £1.8 billion—came out of that, there would be a £1.8 billion increase on the country’s collective balance sheet. The argument would go that it would then reduce it. At some level, fiscal prudence has to come in to make sure we are not creating a deeper black hole. Because of the change of accounting at the back end of last year, this could turn the Government’s £30 billion fiscal black hole into a £32 billion one, even though that money is earmarked only for pensions.

I would like to hear from the Minister how the Government will resolve that. I would like him to make an undertaking that we will hear something about it on 26 November, and that there will be something in the Budget to resolve this fiscal conundrum. We need to know where the money will come from, and that the Government have set it aside. This is a perfect opportunity to deal with a problem that has been going on since 1997, and that becomes more profound every time the Office for National Statistics announces the rate of inflation. If the Minister gave us that assurance, I would trust him—being an honourable and decent man—that he could make his current boss get something done about this on 26 November.

[Torsten Bell]

Despite the hon. Member’s kind invitation, and as he well knows, I am not about to start commenting on the Budget—something I have heard him say himself many times over the years in his previous roles.

More seriously, the last 50 years tell us that the question of pension uprating is a big deal and very important. By “uprating”, I mean how pensions keep pace with earnings or prices. Obviously, on the state pension we tend to talk in terms of earnings. It is a big issue. The lesson of the 1980s and 1990s was about rising pensioner poverty at a time when the state pension was not earnings indexed but earnings were growing significantly. That is why we ended up with 30% or 40% pensioner poverty during those years. History tells us that those things are important. History aside, they are also obviously important for individuals, as we heard at the evidence session.

[Luke Murphy (Basingstoke) (Lab)]

I want to add my voice and the calls of my constituents for that issue to be addressed and tackled. I have been contacted by several constituents, one of whom has lost up to 70% of the value of their occupational pension. I add my voice to those calling for the Government to do what they can to address this issue, which I know the Minister recognises is having a huge impact on many people’s lives.

Roger Sainsbury, among others, raised the issue in the evidence session. He said that he had confidence that the Government would come up to the mark and find a way through the perceived difficulties. I seek reassurance from the Minister on behalf of my constituents that the Government will do all they can to ensure that that is the case.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank my hon. Friend for his questions. Let me come to the two halves; two different issues are actually being raised in these amendments and I want to make sure that we deal with them separately.

New clause 5 deals with discretionary increases for schemes that have not fallen into the PPF—those with solvent employers. Here, as I said in the surplus discussion, the changes on surplus provide a new route for trustees who do not have the power to make those discretionary increases off their own bat to discuss with employers discretionary increases on pre-1997 pension accruals. It is also clear that we need to understand this issue well. The Pensions Regulator has been engaging in surveys on this issue for exactly that reason and will continue to do so. Overall, my argument is that, for those schemes still operating, we are not going to be in the business of legislating to overwrite scheme rules when it comes to whether schemes had indexation in them pre-1997.

Questions of the PPF and FAS represent an important debate, as we heard last Tuesday—I answered questions about that then, and I will not pain everyone by repeating my answers.

New clauses 18 and 19 would not work. The new clauses as drafted would apply to subsets of the PPF population. Some pensioners would receive indexation, and some would not. The same flaws in the new clauses apply to FAS. We will definitely be opposing the new clauses, but that is without regard to the wider questions, which, as I said, I commented on last Tuesday.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Member for Torbay, who has just left us, for moving new clause 7. To clarify, it would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the police pension scheme on these particular issues. I know this will be a matter of cross-party consensus, but the most important thing is to stress the value placed on the contribution of police officers across the country. I see them every day, particularly in the centre of Swansea, and they play a really important role.

The rules providing for the cessation of survivor benefits, where a survivor remarries or cohabits, are typically features of legacy public service pension schemes, and we are discussing the 1987 police pension scheme in this case. Reformed public service pension schemes do not include these challenges, as we have moved away from a system with significant inheritable rights. The same also applies to the new state pension system introduced under the coalition Government, which does not include the same degree of inheritability as the basic state pension did.

I want to take a similar approach to the many issues that will be raised in such calls for reviews. It is really important for me to be clear about why we do not support reviews into these schemes—particularly in this case, where it closed 20 years ago—as I do not want to raise expectations that will not be met. That would be deeply unhelpful to people who have been campaigning on this issue for many years.

In this particular case, there is the principle that we will not retrospectively legislate to change the terms of pensions far in the past, around 20 years ago. I am saying this very gently, but the reality is that my position is shared by most parties in this House. If the coalition Government, made up of a Liberal Democrat Pensions Minister and other Conservative Ministers, had wanted to resolve these issues and take an approach different from the one I am setting out today, they would have done it in a previous Parliament.

The last thing I want to do is give false expectations to people who often face consequences from the terms of these pension schemes—terms I do not support, but that is why they have ceased to be part of modern pension schemes. I do not want to give false certainty that we will start reopening public service pension schemes from decades ago. That would lead to false expectations, and that is the last thing we should be doing.

On that basis, we will not be supporting the new clause, but I understand the case that people have made and why people are raising it in this place. As I say, that is our approach to this issue.

[John Milne]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 8

Independent review into pension losses incurred by former employees of AEA Technology

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, commission an independent review into the pension losses incurred by former employees of AEA Technology who—

(a) transferred their accrued pension benefits out of the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) public service scheme to AEA Technology (AEAT) on privatisation in 1996, and

(b) suffered financial losses when AEA Technology went into administration in 2012 and the pension scheme entered the Pension Protection Fund (PPF).

(2) The review must examine—

(a) the extent and causes of pension losses incurred by affected individuals,

(b) the role of Government policy and representations in the transfer of pensions during the privatisation of AEA Technology,

(c) the findings of the Public Accounts Committee and the Work and Pensions Select Committee,

(d) the adequacy of safeguards provided at the time of privatisation,

(e) potential mechanisms for redress or compensation, and

(f) the estimated financial cost of any such mechanisms.

(3) The review must be—

(a) conducted by an independent panel appointed by the Secretary of State, with relevant expertise in pensions, public policy, and administrative justice, and

(b) transparent and consultative, including engagement with affected pensioners and their representatives.

(4) The panel must report its findings and recommendations to the Secretary of State and lay a copy of its final report before Parliament within 12 months of its establishment.

(5) The Secretary of State must, within 6 months of the publication of the report under subsection (4), lay before both Houses of Parliament a statement setting out the Secretary of State’s response to that outcome.”—(John Milne.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the pension losses incurred by former employees of AEA Technology.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[John Milne]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into pension losses suffered by former employees of AEA Technology. It focuses on employees who transferred benefits from the UK Atomic Energy Authority to AEA on privatisation in 1996, and who later suffered losses when the company went into administration. Many former employees experienced significant losses due to circumstances beyond their control, and this review would ensure a transparent, evidence-based assessment of what went wrong. It would also hopefully provide a structured way to explore redress or compensation options for affected pensions.

To summarise, the new clause would ensure that lessons were learned and safeguards were strengthened for future privatisations and pension transfers. We move it in the hope that the Minister will put his thoughts on the record, so that campaigners can at least see them—like them or not, they will know where he stands.

[Torsten Bell]

I reiterate my overall approach to the issues being raised in relation to historical cases, but we all recognise the difficult position that members of this particular scheme found themselves in. Many scheme members who move into the PPF receive a lower pension than they were otherwise expecting, and I think we are all sympathetic.

The hon. Member will be aware that there have been many reviews of this case, including by the Public Accounts Committee, the Work and Pensions Committee and, obviously, the Pensions Ombudsman. The coalition did not act on this particular case, and I do not want to raise expectations that we are going to reopen it now, given the number of reviews that have already taken place.

However, I can offer slightly more reassurance to the hon. Member going forward. He will be aware of changes in policy that mean that, when there are privatisations of the kind that sits behind this challenging case, workers will remain in public service pension schemes. They would not be moved across into another scheme. That is obviously what sits behind anxieties about the transparency of the advice provided in this case. I hope that that offers the hon. Member the kind of reflection that he asked for, but we are not in a position to support the new clause.

[John Milne]

I thank the Minister for his observations, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 9

Independent review into state deduction in defined benefit pension schemes

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, commission an independent review into the application and impact of state deduction mechanisms in occupational defined benefit pension schemes.

(2) The review must consider—

(a) the origin, rationale and implementation of state deduction in the Midland Bank Staff Pension Scheme,

(b) the clarity and adequacy of member communications regarding state deduction from inception to present,

(c) the differential impact of state deduction on pensioners with varying salary histories, including an assessment of any disproportionate effects on—

(i) lower-paid staff, and

(ii) women,

(d) comparisons with other occupational pension schemes in the banking and public sectors, and

(e) the legal, administrative, and financial feasibility of modifying or removing state deduction provisions, including potential mechanisms for redress.

(3) The Secretary of State must ensure that the person or body appointed to conduct the review—

(a) is independent of HSBC Bank plc and its associated pension schemes;

(b) possesses relevant expertise in pensions law, occupational pension scheme administration, and equality and fairness in retirement income; and

(c) undertakes appropriate consultation with—

(i) affected scheme members,

(ii) employee representatives,

(iii) pension experts, and

(iv) stakeholder organisations.

(4) The person or body conducting the review must—

(a) submit a report on its findings to the Secretary of State within 12 months of the date the review is commissioned; and

(b) the Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before Parliament and publish the report in full.

(5) Within three months of laying the report before Parliament, the Secretary of State must publish a written response setting out the Government’s proposed actions, if any, in response to the report’s findings and recommendations.

(6) For the purposes of this section—

‘state deduction’ means any provision within a defined benefit occupational pension scheme that reduces pension entitlements by reference to the member reaching state pension age or by reference to any state pension entitlement;

‘defined benefit pension scheme’ has the meaning given in section 181 of the Pension Schemes Act 1993;

‘Midland Bank Staff Pension Scheme’ includes all associated legacy arrangements and any successor schemes administered by HSBC Bank Pension Trust (UK) Ltd.” —(John Milne.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into clawback provisions in occupational defined benefit pension schemes, in particular, the Midland Bank staff pension scheme.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[John Milne]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 9 would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the application and impact of state deduction mechanisms in occupational defined benefit pension schemes. It focuses specifically on clawback provisions in the Midland bank staff pension scheme and associated legacy arrangements.

We believe that a review is needed because state deduction provisions can reduce members’ pension entitlements, sometimes in ways that are complex or unclear. There are concerns about fairness, transparency and disproportionate impact, particularly on lower-paid staff and women. A review would ensure that members, regulators and Parliament had clarity about the origin, rationale and effect of such provisions.

The review would examine the history and rationale for the deductions, assess the clarity and adequacy of member communications over time, analyse differential impact on pensioners with varying salary histories, and compare state deduction practices with other occupational schemes in banking and the public sectors. It would also consider the legal, administrative and financial feasibility of modifying or removing state deduction provisions. Finally, it would be an independent and consultative process. The clause would ensure transparency and fairness, and it would provide Parliament and Members with clear, evidence-based guidance on the way forward.

[Torsten Bell]

I am conscious that there was a debate in the main Chamber on this issue before the summer recess, when we were able to go into the issue in much more depth. The debate related to integrated pensions, but in that context people are usually referring to the HSBC historical pension scheme in particular. Without rehearsing everything I have said about our not being in the business of promising to change pension scheme rules, schemes have wide discretion about the nature of their rules and the entitlements that scheme members accrue. It is not for the Government to change those.

The law is very clear that the Government require transparency, just as the hon. Member for Horsham called for, and that includes clear communication of what the entitlement from any given pension scheme is, including issues to do with what is referred to as integrated pensions or clawback pensions. People do have to have received communication that spells that out. The role of the Pensions Ombudsman is to check that that has happened. That is where people can go if they feel that they have not received clear communication about what their scheme entitlements were.

I think we can all understand that if anybody started to receive a pension and was shocked to see a deduction in it when they went over the state pension age, that would be very significant for them. It is the job of the Pension Ombudsman to investigate cases such as that.

[John Milne]

I thank the Minister and beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 10

Use of electronic mail for direct marketing purposes relating to pensions

“(1) Section 22(3) of the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 is deemed to apply to unsolicited electronic communications relating to pensions when the sender is—

(a) a firm authorised to provide Targeted Support under Article 55A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 issuing a Targeted Support communication, or

(b) a qualifying pension scheme, as defined in section 16(1) of the Pensions Act 2008.

(2) Subsection (1) applies when the recipient is—

(a) a customer of the firm under subsection (1)(a), or

(b) a member of the pension scheme under subsection (1)(b).” —(John Milne.)

This new clause would require that the provisions relating to the use of electronic mail for direct marketing purposes under the Privacy and Electronic Communications *(EC Directive) Regulations 2003 would apply to communications from firms providing targeted support on pensions or from qualifying pension schemes.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[John Milne]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 10 would require that provisions relating to the use of electronic mail for direct marketing purposes would apply to communications from firms providing targeted support on pensions or from qualifying pension schemes. That matters because pension savers deserve protection from unwanted or misleading marketing, especially when they may be vulnerable to scams. I used to work in direct marketing, so I feel a little bit guilty.

[Torsten Bell]

That is impressive honesty.

[John Milne]

Obviously, all mine were absolutely above board. Currently, the privacy and electronic communications regulations do not clearly cover pension-related marketing from schemes or targeted support firms. This new clause seeks to close that loophole. People should be able to trust that communications from their scheme or adviser are genuine and not just spam dressed up as guidance. We would position this as a balance, so that legitimate communications to scheme members remain possible, but only within clear safeguards. In summary, it is a simple consumer protection measure that would protect savers from nuisance emails and potential mis-selling.

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[Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)]

I have a query off the back of the comments of the hon. Member for Aberdeen North.

We heard in the evidence sessions that there is a danger that overdoing the requirements for marketing will get in the way of providing guidance. That came up directly in the response to some of our questions, I think specifically from Legal and General and Aviva. Companies are already in a position where, if they are not careful, offering guidance is considered marketing. Therefore, they do have their hands tied by existing legislation.

I am slightly intrigued why this new clause has been tabled, given that Liberal Democrat colleagues will have also heard that evidence. More work is needed on this issue than just adding a new clause to the Bill; I heard from the hon. Member for Hendon that there is a consultation.

Although I understand the point about protecting vulnerable customers from scamming, I feel the evidence we heard demonstrates that more work is needed, work that is not included in the Bill, to make sure that pension companies are able to advertise in such a way that they can play their part in the guidance process that we have debated at length, and in how people get that financial education.

I understand the premise of the new clause, but we have many more questions to answer on this. If anything, I think we need to be making it easier for pension companies, the legitimate people in the room, to be able to communicate. There could be unintended consequential issues; we are trying to deal with scammers, but we might inadvertently stop people accessing information that we are trying to help them to receive.

[Torsten Bell]

Let me attempt to offer some words of clarification and then come to what the Government are doing on this issue.

To clarify, pension schemes are covered by the rules on direct marketing already. I think the new clause as drafted would probably have the opposite effect to what the hon. Member for Horsham intends, by carving out pension schemes from the limitations on direct marketing. That would be a loosening of the direct marketing restrictions for pension schemes. There are people in the industry that have been calling for exactly that, so that may be where the new clause is coming from, but I clarify that they are covered; the direct marketing rules prevent pension schemes from behaving in those kinds of ways.

What is the context here? We are obviously aware of concerns that the existing direct marketing rules, which apply to pension schemes, may limit providers’ ability to deliver the new targeted support regime that is being developed by the Government, exactly as the hon. Member for South West Devon has just set out. Under targeted support, FCA-authorised firms will be able to proactively suggest appropriate products or courses of action to customers. That could help people to make decisions about access to their pension, but it obviously needs to be done in the right way.

We have heard the feedback from stakeholders on the interaction between that wish for targeted support and direct marketing rules, which is where most of the debate on this area has been. Because targeted support involves recommending specific courses of action, it could be considered direct marketing. That is the cause of the tension.

There are particular issues for pension providers who administer auto-enrolled members, where the individual has not chosen the pension scheme or engaged with them. As a result of that, they cannot generally satisfy the requirements of what is called the soft opt-in, because the provider has not collected the information from the individual at the point at which they were enrolled—it has gone through the employer.

What are we doing about that? We are examining quite a range of policy options at the moment. That includes legislative change, which can probably be done via secondary legislation. I think that is the right way for us to proceed. When we do that, we need to get the balance between enabling targeted support and making sure that we do not have inappropriate direct marketing within the pension space. I definitely would not want to see a carve-out from all direct marketing rules for the pension sector as a whole, as there are risks that come with that. I hope that gives Members some clarity and an explanation of what the Government are doing to take this issue forward.

[John Milne]

I thank the Minister for his clarification, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

[Kirsty Blackman]

On a point of order, Ms Lewell, I am aware that I cannot make a speech at this point, but will the Minister write to me on whether he is planning to do anything about pre-1997 indexation of the PPF and FAS? If he writes to me about that, I will be happy not to push new clause 18 to a vote.

[Torsten Bell]

I suspect that I have already written to the hon. Lady, because she has raised some constituency cases with me, but she can receive another one of those letters.

New Clause 33

Report of defined benefit schemes impact on productivity

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on the impact on corporate productivity of defined benefit schemes.

(2) The report must include an assessment of—

(a) investment strategies of defined benefit funds,

(b) the returns on investment of defined benefit funds, and

(c) the impact of investment strategies and returns on productivity.

(3) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament.”—(Mark Garnier.)

This new clause would require the Government to commission a report on the impact on corporate productivity of defined benefit schemes.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

In summary, the new clauses collectively seek to address concerns about the impact of DB pension scheme deficits on business and economic productivity. By requiring Government evaluation, revising accounting recognition rules and providing alternative disclosure methods, the new clauses aim to balance the protection of pension members’ interests with support for business investment and growth. I am sure that at the very least when we press new clause 33 to a vote, there will be enthusiasm to support it from the hon. Member for Hendon, because it absolutely responds to the point he made on Tuesday.

[Torsten Bell]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for tabling the new clauses, and for his impressive consistency; he has spoken to this issue many times not only in this Committee, but elsewhere, and I have heard him. I agree on some of the wider issues he is raising, particularly his reflections on some of the impacts of decisions taken in the late 1990s. Before I come to the more technical responses to the new clauses, the hon. Member’s objective is to see different investment approaches taken by defined-benefit schemes. Many issues that were historically the case have been removed by the passing of time, because they are now closed schemes whose investments are now changing for other reasons, not because of the questions of regulatory pressure in the 1990s and so on. I leave that as an aside.

To give the hon. Member a bit more optimism, based on the Bill, I already have schemes saying to me that they may take different approaches on investments because of the option of a surplus release. That gives a different incentive structure for employers about what they wish to see their pension schemes doing, and for trustees, if there is a sharing of the benefits of upside risk that comes with that. I have had several large employer’s pension schemes raising that issue with me in the recent past. That is to give him some case for optimism to set against the long-term pessimism.

I will turn to the details of the new clauses. New clause 33 would require the Government to produce and lay a report before both Houses of Parliament, with an assessment of the investment strategies of defined-benefit pension schemes and their impact on productivity.

There is already a requirement for defined-benefit schemes to produce much of that information in their triennial valuation and to submit key documents to the Pensions Regulator, including information on investments and changes in asset allocations over time, so the regulator has much of the information already. In addition, multiple reports are already produced annually on defined-benefit schemes and their investments. The purple book is the most obvious example; it is produced by the Pension Protection Fund. I know that everybody here will be an avid reader of it; I promise people that it is reasonably widely read, including in the City.

New clause 34 seeks to change the arrangements for reporting defined-benefit pension scheme liabilities in the employer’s accounts. I am impressed by the wish of the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for us to engage in a Brexit from international financial reporting standards, but he will be unsurprised to learn that the Government are not about to do that. These are globally recognised financial reporting frameworks that allow comparability, and we are not in the business of changing them.

New clause 35 would require the Secretary of State to introduce an alternative basis to disclose schemes’ funding deficits. The Pensions Act 2004 put in place the current regime for valuations. Our view is that that approach has taken some time to implement but it is now well understood and well established, so leaving it in place is by far the best thing that we can do, while also considering in more detail the consequences of other things that drive the choices of pension schemes. On that basis, I encourage the hon. Member for Wyre Forest to withdraw the new clause, and I certainly do not expect to see my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon support it.

[Mark Garnier]

I am partially reassured by the Minister’s comments, but it really comes down to the kindness of my heart—I would not want the hon. Member for Hendon to be pulled off the Committee and put in an awkward situation. It would be unfortunate to force him to fall out with the Whips so early in his parliamentary career, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 37

Review of impact of this Act

“(1) Within five years of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must carry out a review of the impact of the provisions of this Act on actual and projected retirement incomes.

(2) The review must consider—

(a) the impact of the provisions of this Act on actual and projected retirement incomes, and

(b) whether further measures are needed to ensure that pension scheme members receive an adequate income in retirement.

(3) The Secretary of State must prepare a report of the review and lay a copy of that report before Parliament.”—(Mark Garnier.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to prepare a report on the impact of this Act within 5 years of its passing.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Under new clause 37, the review of the impact of the Act would focus on pensions adequacy. The current Government plan to delay the comprehensive consideration of pensions adequacy to future phases of the pensions review. Any resulting reforms from those future evaluations are projected to take several years to develop and implement, and there is widespread concern that without a mandated regular review process, inadequate pension outcomes will persist. Millions of people in the UK therefore risk having insufficient retirement income, particularly lower earners, ethnic minorities, the self-employed and those with interrupted careers.

Automatic enrolment has expanded workplace pension participation and now covers over 88% of eligible employees, but significant savings shortfalls remain. Recent forecasts and analysis warn of a retirement crisis, with many future pensioners expected to have less income than today’s retirees unless action is taken. The Government’s renewed Pensions Commission is due to report in 2027, focusing on the adequacy, fairness and sustainability of the retirement framework, but that report will only come in 2027.

The new clause would create a statutory obligation for the Secretary of State to conduct a full review within five years of the Bill’s passage, focusing on its impact on actual and projected retirement incomes. It would require an assessment of whether current policies and contribution levels are sufficient to ensure adequate retirement incomes. The Secretary of State would have to report the findings to Parliament, increasing accountability and transparency. That would formalise an ongoing review cycle to monitor pension adequacy regularly, preventing the consideration of the issue being indefinitely postponed.

As we all know, pension adequacy is vital to preventing poverty in later life and to ensuring quality of life for retirees. Despite expanded coverage through auto-enrolment, however, many people are still on track to fail to meet retirement income targets. Financial resilience frameworks show disparities in adequacy among lower earners, women and other vulnerable groups, and current retirement income depends on a number of variables, including contribution, sufficiency, investment returns, longevity and state pension level.

The new clause would ensure that the Government take responsibility to monitor and report regularly on pension adequacy outcomes. It would mandate a formal review mechanism, enhancing policy responsiveness and parliamentary oversight. Ultimately, it aims to safeguard millions of future retirees from inadequate incomes, and support a sustainable and fair retirement system.

[Torsten Bell]

We have now had a few discussions about the case for monitoring and evaluating the Bill and what is going on in the pension landscape more generally. I do not want to repeat everything I have said previously, so I will just address whether this is the right approach or whether it should be done through the Pensions Commission that is under way and looking at most of these issues. My view is that the Pensions Commission is focused on the headline issues that the hon. Member for Wyre Forest has just mentioned. I do not want to confuse that work by having another process consider the same issues at the same time. It is also valuable to have the independence of the commission when doing that.

My main message is that we do not have to wait long, because the Pensions Commission will report in 2027, which is earlier than the five years that we would have to wait for the Secretary of State’s inevitably excellent report as a result of this new clause. We should have faith in Baroness Drake, Ian Cheshire and Nick Pearce to deliver that.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I am not as au fait with the terms of reference of the review as the Minister. Is it possible that it will say, “We recommend that another review is undertaken in five, 10 or 15 years?” Will it look at whether the review is all we need at this point in time or whether we will need another review in future?

[Torsten Bell]

I do not want to speak for the commissioners because that would be to prejudge their work. I can tell the hon. Lady what the terms of reference require and they definitely rule out long-grassing in that they require actual recommendations for change to deliver a fair, adequate and sustainable pension system. It would certainly be open to them to say, “Do these things, and we also think that monitoring should be x and y.” That would be for them to say, and as it is an independent commission, I do not want to prejudge that. It definitely cannot be just that; it would have to include recommendations for change.

[Mark Garnier]

We tabled new clause 37 partly to try to get some reassurance from the Minister. Two years is still quite a long time, as is five, but it is incredibly important that we are on top of what is going on in the pension industry, not least because we do not want any of our constituents to end up with miserable retirements. However, I am marginally reassured by the Minister’s comments. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 38

Guidance on the roles of the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator

“(1) The Secretary of State must establish a joint protocol outlining the roles and responsibilities of the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator regarding their regulatory responsibility of the pension industry.

(2) A protocol established under subsection (1) must include—

(a) an overview of the coordination mechanisms between the two bodies;

(b) a published framework for oversight of hybrid or work-based personal pension schemes;

(c) a requirement for regular joint communications from both bodies to clarify regulatory boundaries for industry stakeholders.”—(Mark Garnier.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

I asked questions earlier about the consultation processes that DWP and the FCA are undertaking and about ensuring consistency in that consultation. This is a similar issue. I like the way that the new clause has been written to ensure that there are protocols so that everybody knows what side of the line they fall on. That can be a particular issue for organisations that have responsibility for both trust-based and contract-based pensions. They may be trying to scale or make efficiencies through investing or having similar default products, even though we are talking about two different types of scheme.

It would be helpful if the Government would commit to ensuring that, where those issues arise, and people are having conversations with the FCA and the Pensions Regulator about what side of the divide they fall on, the Government are keeping a watching brief. If there is regular confusion, the Government should ensure that they clarify the guidance so that people know which side they fall on. Those schemes that are either hybrid or have some sort of umbrella that encapsulates both trust-based and contract-based regulation will then know which side they fall on. They will be able to comply with both regulators, if that is the requirement, or with one of them.

As we said earlier, it is incredibly important that scheme members—current pensioners and prospective pensioners—get an excellent level of service. The vast majority of people do not know, and do not care, whether they are in a trust-based or contract-based pension scheme; all they want is to get as good a pension as possible when they hit retirement. Anything that the Minister can do to ensure that companies have a huge amount of clarity about where they fall, and that scheme members get the best outcomes when they hit retirement, would be helpful.

[Torsten Bell]

We all agree that we want providers and, most importantly, consumers to operate in this landscape as easily as possible. Particularly in the case of consumers, we do not want them to know the difference between the two. I have been very clear with both regulators that that is the objective, and I have been very clear with both Departments that oversee them that that is what we are doing.

Delivering that in practice requires thinking about how we legislate, and that is what we have done with the Bill to make sure that we are providing exactly the same outcomes through both markets. It is about Government providing clarity to regulators—we are absolutely providing that—and then about how the regulators themselves behave.

I am very alive to the issue that is being raised. There is some good news about the existing arrangements, which need to continue, because they are examples of effective co-ordination between the FCA and TPR. I have seen that through joint working groups, consultations, shared strategies and guidance, and regular joint engagement with stakeholders. The value for money measures in the Bill are probably the most high-profile recent experience of entirely joint working between the FCA, TPR and DWP.

The wider collaboration is underpinned by what is called the joint regulatory strategy and a formal memorandum of understanding that sets out how the two regulators should co-operate, share information and manage areas of overlap. I think that that basically achieves the objectives that the hon. Member for Wyre Forest set out, even if it is provided not by the Secretary of State but by a memorandum of understanding between the two organisations. I can absolutely reassure him and the hon. Member for Aberdeen North that I am very focused on this issue.

[Mark Garnier]

I am highly reassured by the Minister’s words. The important point is to ensure that if the bodies are to work together and do this, we need to keep them held to account on it. The Financial Conduct Authority was set up as an independent regulator and reports back to such things as the Treasury Committee. Presumably, TPR reports back to the Work and Pensions Committee. Already we can see a potential problem there, because separate Select Committees are doing the investigation. That is an important point, but I am confident that the Minister and his civil servants are aware of the problem and will be resolutely super sharp-focused on this issue to ensure that we have regulatory clarity. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 39

Section 38: commencement

“(1) The provisions in section 38 shall not come into force except in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(2) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (1) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”—(John Milne.)

This new clause would require that the provisions in clause 38 could only be enacted once agreed through secondary legislation.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[John Milne]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Overall, this Bill has wide cross-party support, as evidenced by the fact that we have been rattling through it at such a pace. However, the power of mandation is undoubtedly the most controversial aspect. To be briefly Shakespearean: to mandate or not to mandate, that is the question.

The new clause would require that the provisions in clause 38—the mandation powers—be enacted only through secondary legislation. It is an attempt to square the circle between two competing views. The Liberal Democrats have concerns about the implications of mandation, frankly, as has much of the pensions industry. For example, Pensions UK, which is a signatory of the Mansion House accords, has stated:

“We believe that the best way of ensuring good returns for members is for investments to be undertaken on a voluntary, not a mandatory basis. We also note powers being taken to specify required investment capability for schemes, and to direct LGPS funds to merge with specific pools. All of these powers will require careful scrutiny.”

Similarly, the Society of Pension Professionals has said:

“The SPP does not support the reserve power to mandate investment in private market assets and recommends its removal from the legislation. The mandation power creates significant uncertainty, including questions about legal accountability for investment underperformance and how eligible assets will be defined. The threat of mandation risks distorting market pricing and could reduce public trust in pensions, as savers may fear that financial returns are no longer the top priority.”

The Minister has stated on a number of occasions that mandation should not be necessary, that he does not expect to have to use it and that the Mansion House accord demonstrates the industry’s willingness to act voluntarily. The obvious response is that if that really is the case, and that UK private markets truly offer the best option for pension savers while meeting the fiduciary duties, the industry should not need any prodding and mandation will not be required. The Minister’s response on previous occasions, and no doubt today, has been to observe the history and point out that thus far, the industry has been slow to make that change.

We recognise that the Minister is wholly committed to the path of giving himself mandation powers, whatever we or anyone else says. Indeed, he sees it as core to the legislation. For that reason, we have proposed the new clause as a halfway house. The power would be put on the books, but it would require secondary legislation to be enacted. It would give the Minister the ability to have access to mandation powers at short notice if he deemed it necessary, without needing primary legislation, but in the meantime, it does not hang over the industry like a sword of Damocles. It may seem just a psychological difference, but psychology matters, and there are other advantages.

Somewhat counterintuitively, sometimes having too much of a stick can be a problem in itself. The Minister would be under pressure to use the stick for the sake of consistency in every case where any company went slightly over the limit or was under the limit, even when he might prefer to take a softer, more conciliatory approach. We therefore see this new clause as a way to help the Minister exercise the powers he needs, but without stepping too heavily on industry’s toes. As he has said, he does not believe that he will ever need to exercise the power, so let us keep it at arm’s length.

[Torsten Bell]

I will resist the temptation to relitigate the entire argument about clause 38, which we discussed at some length on Tuesday. I entirely agree with the thrust of the new clause, which is that there should be scrutiny of the use of any such powers—that includes the scale measures, not just asset allocation.

I can offer the hon. Member for Horsham some reassurance, because the Bill already provides that all significant regulations made under clause 38, including the ones he is referring to, are always subject to the affirmative parliamentary procedure. That is the effect of the changes made to section 143 of the Pensions Act 2008 by clause 38(15). That should give him a lot of reassurance. It is true that the new clause could put a further vote in the system, but the effect is the same. I have bad news about Governments with majorities: whether they are asked to vote once or twice, the outcome will look quite similar.

For the sake of transparency, I should flag that there are some much less significant measures in clause 38 that are subject to the negative resolution procedure. I will spell them out: regulations made that require regulatory authorities to report information relating to asset allocation to the Secretary of State, regulations made in respect of new information provisions, and regulations made in respect of the regulator’s power to issue a risk notice. The negative procedure is never used for the major aspects of clause 38, which, as the hon. Gentleman set out, is a central part of the Bill. I hope that reassures him that Parliament would have to support any measures to bring in the regulations that will underpin clause 38. As I have said ad nauseam, we intend to bring into effect the scale parts of clause 38, but do not anticipate the need to use the reserve power elements.

[John Milne]

I thank the Minister for his clarification. I emphasise that the new clause is as much for industry’s comfort as Parliament’s; nevertheless, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 44

Administration levy

“(1) The Pensions Act 2004 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 116 (grants), leave out from ‘expenses’ to end of section.

(3) Omit section 117 (administration levy).

(4) In section 173(3) (Pension Protection Fund), before subsection (3)(a) insert—

‘(aa) any sums required to meet expenses incurred by the Board in connection with the operation or discontinuance of the Pension Protection Fund,’

(5) In section 188(3) (Fraud Compensation Fund), before subsection (3)(a) insert—

‘(aa) sums required to meet expenses incurred by the Board in connection with the operation or discontinuance of the Fraud Compensation Fund,’.” —(John Milne.)

This new clause abolishes the administration levy and provides for the expenses of the PPF and the FCF to be met out of their general funds. It would enable FCF expenses to be covered by the FCF levy.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for the new clause. I acknowledge the concerns surrounding the abolition of the Pension Protection Fund admin levy. This is not a new issue; it has obviously been raised significantly by parts of the industry. I broadly support the intent of the new clause. It provides for the expenses of the PPF board and the Fraud Compensation Fund to be met by the PPF levy and the Fraud Compensation Fund levy, instead of the PPF administrative levy. The amendment to section 116 of the Pensions Act 2004 is unworkable as it is currently drafted, but more importantly, I give the hon. Member our assurance that we intend to lay amendments at a later stage that will achieve the same aim. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Member will withdraw the new clause.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

I am grateful for this new clause, which was tabled by one of my neighbours in south Wales, the hon. Member for Caerfyrddin (Ann Davies). It is obviously an important issue for many ex-mineworkers and for families across Great Britain. It is basically straightforward: I want to reassure the Committee that the Government have been discussing the transfer with the scheme trustees for many months. Those discussions are actively under way. We expect to be able to make an announcement about the way forward in reasonably short order.

I am glad that the new clause will not be pushed to a vote—because if anything, it would risk slowing down the implementation of an agreed outcome—and I totally appreciate the point that the hon. Member for Aberdeen North has made. Any proposal for change will need to be consulted on with the scheme’s trustees on behalf of their members, but that will be coming forward. I hope that provides the Committee with the reassurance it is looking for.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I appreciate the reassurances that the Minister has given me. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 46

Trustees: independence

“(1) The Pensions Act 1995 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 29 (Persons disqualified for being trustees), after subsection (d) insert—

‘(da) he has a personal or financial interest in the pension scheme, except for member nominated trustees.’”—(John Milne.)

This new clause makes pension scheme trustees truly independent of the sponsoring companies so that they can protect scheme members’ interests without any conflict of interest.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[John Milne]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would have the effect of making pension scheme trustees truly independent of the sponsoring companies so that they can protect scheme members’ interests without any conflict of interest. Trustees should act solely in the best interests of their members, not those of the sponsoring employer.

Currently, conflicts of interest can arise where company-appointed trustees also have personal or financial ties to the scheme sponsor. The new clause seeks to strengthen independence, excluding conflicting trustees while still allowing member-nominated trustees. Members deserve trustees who are free to challenge employers and prioritise pensions over corporate interests. Having strong, independent trustees means stronger protection for savers’ retirement security.

[Torsten Bell]

I will remark briefly on the new clause. To state the obvious, the quality and independence of trustees is an integral part of our trust-based pensions system. It is very important, and it is right for the hon. Member to highlight it. Within those schemes, there are a range of trustee models. I would not want to put a blanket regime in place within the currently varied landscape. I want to give the hon. Member some different reassurance on this point. We are committed to strengthening scheme governance, including for some of the issues that he has raised. I have already announced my intention to consult later this autumn on measures to improve the governance of trust-based schemes. That work will consider again some of the exact issues that he raises. That is the right way forward, because there are lots of strengths to our current system. The quality of our trustees, their independence and everything they bring to their role are all valuable, but it is important that we maintain that as the best it can possibly be. I hope that the hon. Member will enjoy the consultation later this year.

[John Milne]

I thank the Minister for his encouragement. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 47

Report on Pension Scheme Eligibility and Access

“(1) The Secretary of State shall, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a report into the operation of occupational pension schemes where certain categories of employees have been excluded on the basis of job classification or employment start date.

(2) The report must examine the case of employees and former employees of Fife Joinery Manufacturing (a subsidiary of Velux), including—

(a) whether affected workers were provided with opportunity to join existing pension schemes,

(b) the adequacy of record-keeping and employer accountability, and

(c) potential remedies to ensure equal access to workplace pensions.”—(John Milne.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to report on the Velux Pensions case.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[John Milne]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would require the Secretary of State to report on the Velux pensions case. It would require him to report within 12 months on how occupational pension schemes exclude certain employees based on job classification or their start date. The report would specifically

“examine…employees and former employees of Fife Joinery Manufacturing (a subsidiary of Velux)”.

It would review whether affected workers were genuinely offered the chance to join the pension scheme. The report would assess

“the adequacy of record-keeping and employer accountability”

and explore possible

“remedies to ensure equal access to workplace pensions.”

The measure addresses concerns from shop-floor employees who joined before 1998 and were denied pension access despite repeatedly asking for it. The workers dispute claims that they declined pension membership and say they were told that they were not eligible. Attempts to engage Fife Joinery Manufacturing management have been unsuccessful. Workers have been advised to consider approaching the ombudsman, although none has done so yet. The new clause would hold the Government accountable to investigate and push for fairness and transparency. It is supported by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Fife and my Liberal Democrat colleagues.

To summarise, the new clause is a key step to ensure fairness and equality in workplace pension access and to prevent similar exclusions in the future.

[Torsten Bell]

I am grateful to the hon. Member, as always, for raising those specific issues in this debate. It has been a good opportunity to raise such cases, as he regularly does.

The hon. Member will be totally unsurprised that the Government cannot support the new clause, because it is the Pensions Regulator’s role to regulate occupational pension schemes and, as he mentioned, it is the Pensions Ombudsman’s job to investigate individual complaints from members. We do not want the Government to step over the top of those organisations. I encourage those who think that they have a case to approach the ombudsman, if they have not already—given the hon. Member’s remarks, it sounds like they have not done so. I should add that I am not aware of the details of that individual case.

To be clear, if individuals have concerns about their workplace pension scheme that relate to their employer and the running of the scheme, they should take the issue to the Pensions Regulator, which will investigate. Individuals who think that they should have been a member of a pension scheme can also go to the Pensions Ombudsman, if that makes sense. Depending on the nature of an individual’s complaint, two routes are available. I ask the hon. Member to withdraw his new clause.

[John Milne]

I thank the Minister for his words. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 98

Regulations: general

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause 99 stand part.

Government amendment 241.

Clause 100 stand part.

[Torsten Bell]

Clause 98 is a standard provision setting out how regulation-making powers in the Bill may be used. It confirms that all regulations will be made by statutory instrument and allows them to be tailored to different situations and scheme types. The clause ensures that the Bill can work effectively in practice.

Clause 99 sets out how regulations under the Bill will be scrutinised by Parliament, using either the affirmative or negative procedures—we were discussing a particular case relating to clause 38 just now. The clause also allows that regulations that would otherwise be subject to the negative procedure can be made as part of a joint package of regulations under the affirmative procedure.

Government amendment 241 is a technical amendment. The new provisions in chapter 1 of part 4 about changes to Northern Ireland salary-related, contracted-out pension schemes apply specifically to schemes in Northern Ireland. The rest of the provisions in chapter 1 apply to schemes in England, Wales and Scotland. Clause 100 is a standard legislative provision confirming the territorial extent of the measures in the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 98 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 99 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 100

Extent

Amendment made: 241, in clause 100, page 98, leave out line 10 and insert—

“( ) Subject as follows, this Act extends to England and Wales and Scotland only.

(1A) Sections (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) to (Powers to amend Chapter 1 etc : Northern Ireland) extend to Northern Ireland only.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment secures that the new clauses inserted by NC28 to NC30 extend to Northern Ireland only. Northern Ireland has its own pensions legislation, but in view of the retrospective provisions in those new Clauses it is considered appropriate to include material in the Bill for Northern Ireland corresponding to the new clauses inserted by NC23 to NC26.

Clause 100, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 101

Commencement

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to move amendment 255, in clause 101, page 98, line 22, leave out “Chapters 1 and 2” and insert “Chapter 1”.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Milne]

I feel I ought also to thank everyone, and the Minister especially for a superb performance. I think we can all agree that this is a very good Bill, with lots of really good things in it. I am particularly interested in the investment side of it, with the greater resources to invest in UK plc, which we certainly do need.

Sadly, I expect the Bill will not receive the publicity that many do—it has not been in the headlines so far—and that is a pity. Much more trivial and ephemeral stuff, frankly, gets all the headlines, while something that is interesting and dynamic, like the measures in this Bill, will probably be displaced by the latest resignation.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank all Opposition Members for those reflections. I will come to my own after I have dealt with the remaining clauses and amendments—we must finish the job.

On the Opposition amendments, I am grateful to the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for his words. I am firmly committed to writing to both him and my hon. Friend the Member for Tamworth, which I shall do before Report. I am glad that the hon. Member will not press his amendments on that basis.

Amendments 225, 227 and 228 address the timing of the implementation of the provisions introduced by clause 38. Amendments 225 and 227 make it clear that the relevant master trusts and GPPs will not have to comply with the scale requirement until 2030. That is a point of clarification. In response to industry concerns, elements of the provision, such as the transition pathway, can be commenced and become operable prior to the scale requirement itself being active. We are responding to those concerns, and the amendment achieves exactly that. Amendment 228 provides clarification on the asset allocation elements of clause 38 by making it clear that those requirements will fall away if not brought into force by the end of 2035. Amendment 226 provides for the commencement of new chapter 3A, which will be inserted by new clauses 12 to 17.

On amendment 263, we have just discussed the PPF admin levy question. Given what we have just discussed about new clause 44, I ask the hon. Member for Torbay not to press the amendment.

Government amendment 242 introduces a commencement provision for the new chapter 1 of part 4 of the Bill on the validity of certain alterations to salary-related contracted-out pension schemes for both Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This measure means that two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent, effective pension schemes will be able to use a confirmation from their actuary obtained under this part of the Bill to validate a previous change to benefits—this is the Virgin Media discussion we had earlier today. Two months after the Bill becomes law, a previous change to benefits under an effective pension scheme will be considered valid if the scheme actually confirms that it met the legal requirements at the time of the change. This measure means that this part of the Bill will come into force two months after the Act receives Royal Assent and is a necessary accompaniment to new clauses 23 to 30.

Turning to the clauses, clause 101 is a standard commencement provision that details the timetable for bringing the Bill’s measures into operation and allowing transitional and saving provisions to ensure orderly implementation. Clause 102 is crucial, because it gives the Bill its short title. I commend those clauses to the Committee.

I will finish by adding my support to the comments made by all hon. Members about the proceedings of this Committee. I thank all hon. Members from all parties for their support—broadly—and also for their scrutiny, which is an important part of everything we do in this place. The Bill is important, but the debate around it is also important, both so that the legislation can be improved and in its own right. Such debate makes sure that issues are brought to the attention of the House and are on the record. I also thank this Chair, as well as several others, including those who have stood in at short notice at various phases of the Bill’s consideration. I am particularly grateful to one individual, and I am also grateful to the Clerks for all their work.

Most of all, I put on record my thanks to all the civil servants in the Department for Work and Pensions, His Majesty’s Treasury, the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator. Many of them have been working on the content of this Bill for many years, far longer than I have been Pensions Minister and, as many hon. Members have kindly reminded me, far longer than I may end up being the Pensions Minister, given the high attrition rate over the past 15 years in modern British politics. I thank them for the warning, and will take it in the way it was hopefully intended.

To be slightly worthy at the end of my speech, it is probably true that pensions legislation does not get the attention it deserves, but looking back over the 20th century, nothing was more important to the progress that this country and others made in delivering leisure in retirement. That very big win was delivered not only by productivity growth, but by Government decisions and collective decisions made by unions and their employers. The Bill goes further in that regard and, on that basis, it deserves all the coverage it gets.

[Mark Garnier]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: 225, in clause 101, page 98, line 24, leave out “after 31 December 2029”.

This amendment, together with Amendment 227, means that relevant Master Trusts and group personal pensions will not have to comply with the scale requirement until after 2030, but that Chapter 3 of Part 2 (including provision relating to the scale requirement, such as the application can otherwise be brought into force at any time in accordance with regulations.

Amendment 226, in clause 101, page 98, line 25, at end insert—

“(ba) Chapter 3A comes into force on such day as the Secretary of State and the Treasury jointly may by regulations appoint;”.

This amendment provides for commencement by regulations of the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory statement to NC15.

Amendment 227, in clause 101, page 98, line 30, leave out subsection (5) and insert—

“(5) Regulations under subsection (4)(b) may not provide for the following to come into force before 1 January 2030—

(a) section 38(4), in respect of the insertion of Condition 1 in section 20(1A) of the Pensions Act 2008 (Master Trusts to be subject to scale requirement);

(b) section 38(8), in respect of the insertion of section 26(7A) of that Act (group personal pension schemes to be subject to scale requirement)

(but nothing in this subsection prevents section 38 from being brought into force before that date in respect of the insertion in that Act of other provision related to that mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b)).”

This amendment ensures that schemes will not be legally subject to the scale requirement before 1 January 2030. It allows, however, for provision relating to that requirement (e.g., provision around applications for approval) to be commenced before that date in anticipation of the requirement itself taking effect.

Amendment 228, in clause 101, page 98, line 34, at end insert—

“(5A) If section 38 has not been brought into force before the end of 2035 in respect of the insertion of—

(a) Condition 2 in section 20(1A) of the Pensions Act 2008 (asset allocation requirement: Master Trusts), and

(b) subsection (7B) in section 26 of the Pensions Act 2008 (asset allocation requirement: group personal pension schemes),

section 38 is repealed at the end of that year in respect of the insertion of those provisions.”

This amendment transposes and clarifies the provision currently in clause 38(16). It provides for the key provisions imposing the asset allocation requirement to fall away if they are not brought into force before the end of 2035.

Amendment 242, in clause 101, page 98, line 37, at beginning insert—

“( ) Chapter 1 of Part 4 comes into force at the end of the period of two months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.

( ) Chapter 2 of”.

This amendment provides for the commencement of the new Chapter relating to the consequences of the Virgin Media case .

Amendment 243, in clause 101, page 99, line 5, after “section 96” insert

“and (Information to be given to pension schemes by employers)”.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment provides for the commencement of NC20.

Clause 101, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 102 ordered to stand part of the Bill.