Criminal Procedural Rights (Opt-in Decision)

William Cash Excerpts

Tuesday 18th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Chris Grayling]

That is a very valid point, and my right hon. Friend is right to raise it. As he knows, we have different perspectives on the European Court of Human Rights, but he has highlighted one of the incongruities that will exist if we simply hand over jurisdiction in such crucial areas to the European Court of Justice, because there are some clear contradictions between European measures and those set out in the convention. Whatever our different perspectives in the coalition, we share that view of the problems that may arise from such Europeanisation of law.

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

I am grateful for my right hon. Friend’s concluding remarks to the Chair of the Select Committee on Justice, the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith). The difference between the ECHR and the European Court is that according to section 3 of the European Communities Act 1972, when a decision has been taken under that section, it is binding on us. Our Supreme Court cannot change that law, and there is no opportunity to appeal. That raises the whole question of who governs the United Kingdom in that area.

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[Chris Grayling]

I will do my best.

Let me touch briefly on the three measures. The first relates to the presumption of innocence. The proposal does not flow directly from the road map; it stems from the invitation in the Stockholm work programme for the Commission to consider whether issues not explicitly included in the road map—such as the presumption of innocence—might have a bearing on the mutual trust between member states.

It is very much a matter of regret to me that, in response to an invitation to consider that matter, the Commission concluded that legislative action was necessary. Even if it had concluded that something had to be done—that is a matter for debate—there are alternatives to new legislation or common EU rules. I say this as there seems to be very little evidence of need for the proposal or for common EU rules in this area. That point seems to be acknowledged in the Commission’s own impact assessment, which notes that quantifiable evidence of any problem is scant. In the light of that, I wonder why it has still proposed common rules.

This has been a matter of particular interest to the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, in the context of the proposal’s compliance with the subsidiarity principle. I note that the Committee issued a reasoned opinion on the matter, and it is a shame that it did not manage to secure support from other Parliaments in doing so. I want to see the Commission paying a little more attention to the yellow card system than it has been doing recently.

[Mr Cash]

My right hon. Friend will recall that, on the question of the public prosecutor, the threshold was crossed but, even then, the European Commission decided that it would go ahead. Does he not regard that as an extraordinary situation? Does he agree that the yellow card system has been severely vitiated as a result?

[Chris Grayling]

I attended the Justice and Home Affairs Council at which this issue was discussed, and I have to say that there was extensive disquiet among member states. If the Commission wishes to be credible, it cannot simply ignore the system that was put in place by the Lisbon treaty in the way that it did in that particular case.

Let me turn to the second item on the list, which is the proposal on child defendants. By any assessment, I consider the UK arrangements for dealing with and helping children who become engaged with the law enforcement agencies and with criminal proceedings to be very good. There is a raft of specific provisions in place in the UK to assist children in those situations, and we wholeheartedly support the principle that children in those circumstances need to be treated differently from adults in some respects, given their particular vulnerabilities.

Beyond the general principle behind the proposal, however, and given that the UK’s current arrangements provide a significant degree of protection as good as that available anywhere else, the proposal presents significant difficulties. First, the definition of a child in the proposal is set at those under 18 years of age. In England and Wales, the procedural protections provided to suspects and defendants based on their age are varied to reflect the specific circumstances of their case. Article 1 of the United Nations convention on the rights of the child—to which the UK is a signatory, and to which the coalition Government undertook to give due consideration when making new policies and legislation—contains the same definition. In the context of the courts, prisons and the probation service, those under 18 years of age are treated as children and young people. However, there is a different approach for when the police deal with 17-year-olds under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, when, for practical reasons, 17-year-olds suspected of committing an offence are for some purposes treated as adults. Clearly, that would be an issue in regard to these proposals as well. The position in Scotland stands in even clearer contrast to the proposal, as it tends to treat younger people—that is, those aged 16 and above—as adults for these and other purposes.

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[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

As the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) said, the handling of this set of proposals has not been ideal, to put it mildly. The criticisms made by the European Scrutiny Committee have considerable weight. They also suggest that because of time constraints the Committee did not come to the Justice Committee for an opinion on proposals that fall pretty squarely within its remit. That would have been a much more desirable process to follow, and lessons ought to be learned from this.

[Mr Cash]

That process is exactly what we recommend in our report, which is currently awaiting the Government’s response. The right hon. Gentleman and I are in complete agreement about this. The more often it is possible, as in this case it was not, to go to one of the departmental Select Committees for its considered opinion, the better.

[Sir Alan Beith]

Perhaps unusually, my hon. Friend and I are indeed at one on this issue. As Chairman of the Liaison Committee, I give every encouragement to Select Committees to be ready to respond when the European Scrutiny Committee draws attention to matters and seeks opinions on them. That is how the process should work, so that we make the maximum uses of the resources of expertise among Members and, indeed, House staff, that we have built up over recent years.

Let me turn to some of the specific measures. On the presumption of innocence, the basis of the directive is that there might be significant difficulties in cross-border matters when identical standards have not been observed. However, no measurable evidence has been produced showing that cases under the European arrest warrant, for example, have frequently been obstructed over a lack of compliance with identical standards. Therefore, the whole basis on which the Commission is proceeding appears to be weak. The suggested measures would certainly adversely affect the UK provision that in certain circumstances inferences can be drawn from silence. The House has debated this at great length and with some care, and the courts have developed the operation of the system with some care. The caution administered to suspects reflects the fact that adverse inferences can be drawn from silence. These provisions would completely disrupt all those processes.

The biggest danger is one that I mentioned earlier in an intervention—that processes that have satisfied tests under the European convention on human rights would not necessarily pass the test of this directive. We would therefore end up with two alternative sources of challenge to English criminal law, leaving open the possibility of passing one and failing the other. That would be an undesirable state of affairs. It would cause confusion and, indeed, forum shopping, whereby someone could obtain their preferred outcome.

On the recommendation regarding legal aid and access to a lawyer, the jurisdiction both in England and Wales and in Scotland already satisfies the provision. My colleague and friend Sarah Ludford MEP has raised issues about the fact that, without the provision, there is no requirement for access to a lawyer in the state that issues the European arrest warrant. Problems can arise from that. Indeed, we have seen them in practice, whereby, had appropriate legal advice been available in the issuing state, an ill-founded arrest warrant might never have been issued in the first place. That factor needs to be considered in the future as the situation develops.

On procedural safeguards for children, a number of problems would arise if we were to adopt the Commission’s provisions, including with regard to the difference between ages, which has already been referred to, and the mandatory representation issue. As the Lord Chancellor has himself indicated, the United Nations convention on human rights is the most accepted international baseline for the protection of children in legal proceedings. It would be better if we proceeded with these matters through advocacy of that convention and used all the resources available to the European Commission to advocate and support adherence to it, rather than create complications between member states over issues that are not central to the protection of children’s rights.

I feel most strongly about an issue I addressed earlier. I do not want to see the role of the European convention on human rights as the primary European benchmark for human rights undermined by the creation of rival or alternative procedures. That is the danger we would run if we opted into the directives.

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[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

I am extremely glad to be able to commend the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice for his good decision on the directives. Inevitably, I am pleased that he has agreed with the European Scrutiny Committee. We spent a lot of time on the subject and gave our opinions, and I am glad that he has taken a similar view to ours. That has a consequence, of course, because although we hoped for a three-hour debate, there is no need for one when there is such a healthy degree of agreement between the parties, subject only to a few comments that we have just heard from the hon. Member for Swansea West (Geraint Davies).

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Is my hon. Friend struck by the fact that when the Conservative party is Eurosceptic, it is united?

[Mr Cash]

I am indeed. I must be careful in what I say, but I simply note that when the Lisbon treaty was going through the House, I tabled 150 or so amendments, and there was complete unanimity among me and my close friends of the Euro-realist type, who supported those amendments, and the Opposition as a whole. The Conservative party was completely united right the way through the proceedings, for the first time since 1972. My hon. Friend is completely right, and there is a strong lesson there.

Moving on to the substance of the matters in question, Lidington debates form part of a package of measures that were intended to

“significantly strengthen Parliament’s oversight of EU Justice and Home Affairs matters and make the Government more accountable for the decisions it makes in the EU.”—[Official Report, 20 January 2011; Vol. 521, c. 52WS.]

That was what the Minister for Europe said in his written statement in January 2011, and it is important that we put it on the record. It is therefore disappointing—this is the only caveat to my otherwise considerable appreciation of what the Justice Secretary has done today—that, yet again, the Government were unable to give the Committee adequate notice of their recommended approach to the opt-in decision. That is a great pity, because we would not have needed to request a three-hour debate. There would not have been any need for it, subject to the agreement of the Opposition Front Benchers. I suggest that it would be helpful to understand what steps the Government intend to take to improve the process for holding Lidington debates and how they will ensure that their internal decision-making procedures do not continue to hamper the timely provision of information to Members of Parliament.

I also wish to make a point about explanatory memorandums. In the Committee’s initial report, we stated that we were not satisfied with the quality of the memorandums relating to all three proposals that we are discussing today. We have said that before, but I wished to put it on record again. That is a matter of concern to us in relation to not just the Ministry of Justice but Departments in general. The explanatory memorandum is the most important information that can be made available—I do not mean when compared with everything else, but it is important in its own right. It is therefore extremely important, as we say in our European Scrutiny Committee report—for which we are awaiting the Government’s response—that explanatory memorandums are of sufficiently high quality, because that is the basis on which we hold the Government to account. When they explain in a memorandum the policy that underlies their decision, that should be the basis on which we are able to address the House, and be sure that the Government are answering the questions that we have put and are coming up with a policy that is coherent and makes sense.

The first of the three draft directives under consideration is that on the presumption of innocence. Its scope, which sets out certain rights that could be interpreted more widely than similar rights in the European Court of Human Rights by the Strasbourg Court, is a matter of great concern, and I am extremely grateful for the remarks of the Chair of the Justice Committee on that issue. I am also glad that the Lord Chancellor has made it clear that at no stage will that measure be opted back into, and I will give one or two reasons by way of amplification.

To take up the point made by the Chair of the Justice Committee, there would otherwise be different European Union and European Court of Human Rights procedural standards, which could cause legal uncertainty and confusion. That has now become an extremely topical question when applied to the judiciary. Members may have noted that, in their varying ways and without going into the detail, Lord Judge, Lord Sumption, Lord Mance and Lord Neuberger, the President of the Supreme Court, have all made incredibly important statements, in the most measured terms, about their concerns over the manner in which the Strasbourg Court approaches some of its judgments. This is not the time to go into all the detail, but I strongly recommend that their respective speeches are read by those who read these proceedings.

It is very important that people understand our concerns as members of the Conservative party—and indeed of other parties. Furthermore, some of the arguments that are presented as if we are just Eurosceptics who are out to be critical for the sake of it, are now increasingly supported—however discreetly—by some of the most eminent members of the judiciary in our analysis, which has taken a great deal of time and expertise to develop. It is important to remember that our arguments about the directive on the presumption of innocence are illustrative of the broader question of the methods of interpretation, for example, and the procedural standards in the two different Courts I have mentioned.

On procedural standards, in a nutshell, those based on European Union law override national law. As I said in an intervention, that means that the ability to draw adverse inferences from the silence of the accused, although compliant with the European Court of Human Rights, would become unlawful under European law if the United Kingdom participated in the proposal. That is dangerous, given that we have spent the best part of 600 years in the development of a common law on such matters, some of which—for those who watched it—were well illustrated in last night’s programme on the Plantagenets and Henry II. It was an interesting programme, much of which dealt with how we developed our common law.

The fact is that our courts have a system of appeal. The trouble with EU law in matters as important as the presumption of innocence, which is absolutely at the heart of Magna Carta and absolutely at the heart of our common law system, is that they would be eviscerated if the European Court of Justice were to apply the principles set out in this directive. The consequences would be for section 3 of the European Communities Act 1972, passed all those years ago, to be binding on our judicial system, with no right of appeal once the European Court of Justice has adjudicated. That is different from the European Court of Human Rights, which we can override much more easily. I contend that we can put in a provision in an Act of Parliament to rectify that, by saying that, notwithstanding the European Communities Act, we will not accept this particular piece of legislation and thereby preserve our sovereignty. It is this kind of matter that is under discussion on the basis of the European Scrutiny Committee report, to which I referred earlier and on which we await the Government’s response. It is that important: there is no appeal from the European Court of Justice.

I spent two days in Rome last week discussing the question of fundamental rights with some extremely eminent lawyers from throughout the European Union. The Prime Minister of Italy was there, as were a range of other people: Mr Prodi, who used to be the President of the European Commission, people from the Council of Europe and from the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and so on. I have to say that there was a great deal of disquiet at the manner in which the European Court of Justice operates in all cases. There are questions about the qualifications of the judges, the methods of interpretation and the issue of process. I will not go into those in detail, other than to put it on the record that the reason why the Government are right, why the European Scrutiny Committee is right and why it is right for this House to agree not to opt into these arrangements, is not just related to the question of the presumption of innocence in its own right, as important as that is. There is a much broader lesson to be learned on the manner in which the European Court functions and the whole question of the supremacy of Parliament. That lies at the heart of the Committee’s report and its recommendations that, if necessary, we should regain the right to veto legislation that we do not think is in the national interest, and to repeal unilaterally at Westminster legislation that is manifestly not in our national interest.

I will now move on to the directive on procedural safeguards for children. Members may want to note that the Committee’s report said that it would be disadvantageous for the Government to opt into this proposal, because the protection of a certain category of vulnerable defendant is best left to national policy and discretion. The differing approaches to the definition of the word “child” for the purposes of criminal procedural protection in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland demonstrate this point. There is a caveat to what the Lord Chancellor said in response to an intervention by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg). We want to be sure that this would never be opted into. I heard what he said: he clearly would not want it to be. I suspect there may be a bit of coalition politics behind this, so I will not go down that route now. I hope that that will be resolved and that we will effectively find that this directive does not apply at any time. The Government’s estimates of the costs of an opt-in decision to the police and criminal justice system, and the costs of changes in domestic legislation in the context of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, are also relevant considerations.

Finally, Members should be aware that the Committee has expressed the view that the Government should not opt into the proposal in the directive on legal aid for two reasons. First, article 5(2) is premised on the directive on access to a lawyer, into which the United Kingdom has not yet opted. Secondly, the proposal would impose both a financial and a regulatory burden on the United Kingdom.

My function in my capacity as Chairman of the Committee is to set out the parameters and, in some detail, the Committee’s reasons for reaching its conclusions. I cannot say how delighted we are that the Government agree with us. I think that everyone’s concerns have been dealt with, and I therefore have no more to say on the subject—at any rate, for the time being.

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[Chris Grayling]

We have told our European partners—and will do so again if the House approves the motion tonight—that we will not take part in negotiations on the first and third directives, on the presumption of innocence and on legal aid. We will say up front that we do not intend to opt in, either now or in the future. That is a decision that has been agreed across Government, and one that we do not intend to reverse. We will provide observers for the negotiations, but they will not participate in detailed negotiations. As I said, on the second directive involving children we do not intend to opt in; we will indicate that up front. We will participate in the negotiations in case, although it is unlikely, something emerges that this House may want to consider again, but it remains the Government’s position that we do not expect, nor want, to have to opt into the directive, but we will sit around the table while it is negotiated.

There is clearly a broader issue here about minimum standards measures. As my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) pointed out very articulately, what we must understand is that we have a different legal system from the rest of the European Union. The hon. Member for Hammersmith made the same point. If we accept minimum standards measures, step by step they take away the ability of this Parliament and of our courts to shape our justice system. If we decide on any occasion to opt into such a measure, it is of paramount importance that we understand the implications of doing so.

[Mr Cash]

To add to that point, the other member states by and large have written constitutions, while we operate by a process of precedent through the common law. In many respects that would change were we to move to a system that enveloped us within a framework of European Union law, which would change the nature of the decision-making process. As my right hon. Friend so accurately says, this is a huge change because it is about jurisdiction, interpretation and the rights of the individuals who are affected.