Courts and Tribunals Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Yasmin Qureshi Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

New clause 4—Review of the Feasibility of Two Court Sittings per day—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 12 months beginning on the day on which this Act comes into force, lay before Parliament an independent report into the feasibility of conducting two trials per day in designated court rooms (‘the Scheme’).

(2) The scheme would allow for proceedings in a Crown Court to consist of—

(a) a morning session, commencing at 09:00 and concluding at 13:00; and

(b) an afternoon session, commencing at 14:00 and concluding at 18:00.

(3) A report under subsection (1) must assess the impact of the scheme—

(a) on the efficiency and timeliness of court proceedings;

(b) on the availability of judges, legal practitioners, and court staff;

(c) the potential impact on defendants, victims, and witnesses; and

(d) the cost and resource implications of the scheme.

(4) The Lord Chancellor must, within three months of the laying of the report under subsection (1), publish a response.

(5) The response must include proposals for a pilot scheme based on the findings of the report including the proposed scope and duration of any such pilot.”

This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to commission and lay before Parliament an independent report on the feasibility of introducing two court sittings per day in designated courtrooms, including an assessment of its impact on efficiency, resources, and court users, and to set out the Government’s intended next steps.

New clause 5—Targets for Backlog Reduction—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within six months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, set and publish annual targets for the reduction of the Crown Court backlog in England and Wales.

(2) There must be a target for the—

(a) overall reduction of the Crown Court backlog in England and Wales, and

(b) reduction of the backlog in each different HMCTS region.

(3) The Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament an annual report on progress against these targets.

(4) Any report under subsection (3) must include any steps taken to address the failure to meet the targets.”

This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to set and publish targets for reducing court backlogs and to report annually to Parliament on progress.

New clause 13—Report on the effect of the Act on public trust and participation in the criminal justice system—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must commission a report on the effect of the provisions of the Act on public trust and participation in the judicial system.

(2) A report under this section must—

(a) include consideration of the effect of the provisions of the Act on—

(i) witness participation;

(ii) the effect of these reforms on public confidence and trust in the criminal justice system;

(iii) the effect of these provisions on BAME engagement with and trust of the criminal justice system;

(b) contain recommendations for further provision, or changes to delivery of provision under this Act, to increase the levels of each criterion set out in subparagraphs (2)(a)(i) to (2)(a)(iii).

(3) Within twelve months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament—

(a) a copy of a report under this section,

(b) the Lord Chancellor’s response to recommendations made by that report.”

This new clause would require the Lord Chancellor to commission, lay, and respond to a report on the effect of the Bill on public trust in the criminal justice system.

New clause 17—Review of Efficiencies in the Criminal Justice System—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 24 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, conduct a review on the impact of the provisions of this Act on the efficiency of the criminal justice system.

(2) The review under subsection (1) must, in particular, consider the impact on the efficiency of the criminal justice system of—

(a) the provisions of this Act;

(b) The wider criminal justice system;

(c) the standard of delivery by court contract providers, including PECS contractors;

(d) the condition of the courts estate; and

(e) the use of technology.

(3) In considering ‘efficiency’, the review must consider the impact on—

(a) delays,

(b) backlogs, and

(c) the experience of victims and witnesses.

(4) The Secretary of State must lay a report on the review before Parliament.

(5) The report under subsection (4) must include recommendations for further legislative or administrative changes to improve the efficiency of the criminal justice system.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to review and report on whether the Act has improved the efficiency of the criminal justice system, including impacts on delays, backlogs, and the experience of victims and witnesses.

New clause 22—Remote Court Participation: Strategy—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backlog (‘the strategy’).

(2) The strategy must include—

(a) an assessment of the current use of remote proceedings;

(b) an evaluation of the impact of remote proceedings on the speed of case disposal and the overall reduction of the outstanding caseload;

(c) recommendations on how the principle of open justice can be upheld with the increased use of remote proceedings;

(d) criteria for determining the suitability of proceedings for different forms of remote participation; and

(e) provisions for the security, reliability, and resilience of digital systems used in remote proceedings.

(3) The Secretary of State must, at intervals of no more than 24 months following the laying of the strategy, lay before Parliament a report on progress made against the strategy.

(4) The progress report must consider—

(a) the extent to which the strategy has been implemented;

(b) the impact on the criminal case backlog, including any measures by which that impact has been assessed; and

(c) any further legislative or budgetary provisions to ensure the effectiveness of remote proceedings.

(5) For the purposes of this section, ‘remote proceedings’ means any proceedings in which one or more participants attend by way of live video or audio link.”

This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to publish a formal strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backload in the criminal justice system.

New clause 32—Commencement dependent on independent review of racial disproportionality—

“(1) This section applies in relation to the commencement of Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act.

(2) The provisions inserted by Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act may not be brought into force unless the conditions in subsections (3) to (6) have been met.

(3) The Secretary of State must commission an independent review into racial disproportionality arising from—

(a) the changes to jurisdiction powers and procedures in the Magistrates’ Courts under Part 1; and

(b) the operation of trial-allocation decisions under Part 1.

(4) As soon as reasonably practicable after completing a review under this section, the reviewer must send a report on its outcome to the Secretary of State.

(5) On receiving a report under subsection (4), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before both Houses of Parliament.

(6) As soon as reasonably practicable, the Secretary of State must—

(a) prepare and publish a strategy setting out the measures the Secretary of State intends to take in consequence of the review’s findings; and

(b) implement those measures in full before Clauses 1 to 7 may be brought into force.”

This new clause introduces a duty to commission an independent review into racial disproportionality arising from the changes to jurisdiction, powers and procedures in the magistrates’ courts, and from the operation of the new trial-allocation provisions in Clauses 1 to 7 of the Bill.

New clause 33—Commencement dependent on review of differential impact on classes of persons—

“(1) This section applies in relation to the commencement of Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act.

(2) The provisions inserted by Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act may not be brought into force unless the conditions in subsections (3) to (7) have been met.

(3) The Secretary of State must commission an independent review on whether, and the extent to which—

(a) the changes to jurisdiction powers and procedures in the Magistrates’ Courts under Part 1; and

(b) the operation of trial-allocation decisions under Part 1,

are likely to have a disproportionate impact on particular classes of persons.

(4) The review under subsection (3) must consider—

(a) the extent to which, as a result of the provisions in subsections (3)(a) and (b), defendants in criminal proceedings are eligible for legal aid;

(b) whether persons of limited financial means are likely to be affected differently from other defendants as a result of those provisions; and

(c) the projected number of defendants who, as a result of those provisions, are likely to be unrepresented.

(5) As soon as reasonably practicable after completing a review under this section, the reviewer must send a report on its findings to the Secretary of State.

(6) On receiving a report under subsection (5), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before both Houses of Parliament.

(7) As soon as reasonably practicable, the Secretary of State must—

(a) publish a strategy setting out the measures the Secretary of State intends to take in consequence of the review’s findings; and

(b) implement those measures in full before Clauses 1 to 7 may be brought into force.”

This new clause introduces a duty to conduct an independent review of whether Clause 1 to 7 of the Bill give rise to disproportionate impacts on particular classes of persons.

Amendment 15, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert

“, subject to the provisions of subsection (3A).

(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations under subsection (3) relating to the following sections until he has published a response to the recommendation of Part II of Independent Review of the Criminal Courts—

(a) Section 1 (Removal of right to elect trial on indictment);

(b) Section 2 (Written indication of guilty plea: removal of right to object to venue);

(c) Section 3 (Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation);

(d) Section 4 (Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases);

(e) Section 5 (Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4).

(f) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts)

(g) Section 7 (Appeals from magistrates’ courts)”.

This amendment would make the publication of the Government response to Part II of the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts a precondition of Clause 1 to 7 of this Bill coming into force.

Amendment 59, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert

“, subject to the provisions of subsection (3A).

(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations under subsection (3) relating to the sections set out under subsection (3B) until he has taken reasonable steps to increase Crown Court sitting capacity, including but not limited to—

(a) using buildings not currently in use as courts to hear cases where cells are not needed, and

(b) reducing lost sitting days as a result of late guilty pleas and prison transport delays.

(3B) The sections referenced in subsection (3A) are—

(a) Section 1 (Removal of right to elect trial on indictment);

(b) Section 2 (Written indication of guilty plea: removal of right to object to venue);

(c) Section 3 (Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation);

(d) Section 4 (Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases);

(e) Section 5 (Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4).

(f) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts)

(g) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts)”.

This amendment would ensure that sections 1 to 7 of the Act could not be commenced until the Lord Chancellor has used alternative means to increase Crown Court sitting capacity.

Amendment 35, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert—

“(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make a statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (3) bringing sections 1 to 7 into force until the conditions in subsection (3B) are met.

(3B) The conditions are that—

(a) the Lord Chancellor has provided funding for at least 130,000 sitting days in the Crown Court in the financial year following the coming into force of this Act,

(b) HM Courts and Tribunals Service has made an assessment that the Crown Court has, so far as possible, used the allocation of sitting days provided under subsection (3B)(a), and

(c) the Lord Chancellor has made a statement to the House of Commons that the funding provided under subsection (3B)(a) has not reduced the number of cases pending trial in the Crown Court compared to the start of the financial year.”

This amendment prevents the provisions in sections 1 to 7 from coming into force until the Lord Chancellor has provided funding for 130,000 sittings days in the Crown Court; HMCTS has assessed that the Crown Court has used its allocation of sitting days; and the Lord Chancellor has made a statement to the House that this has not reduced the backlog.

Amendment 36, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert—

“(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make a statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (3) bringing sections 1 to 7 into force until he has—

(a) undertaken a consultation on the potential benefits of introducing extended sitting hours in the Crown Court, and

(b) laid before Parliament a report on the outcome of the consultation.

(3B) The consultation under subsection (3A) must consider—

(a) potential rates of fees and renumeration for legal professionals and court staff working extended hours, and

(b) the availability of HM Courts and Tribunal Service staff.”

This amendment would ensure that sections 1 to 7 of the Act did not come into force until the Lord Chancellor had reviewed how to increase sitting hours in the Crown Court.

[Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq. New clauses 32 and 33 can be considered almost part and parcel of each other. Our earlier discussion of new clause 29 involved a similar issue, but these new clauses are much more specific.

New clause 32 would introduce a duty to commission an independent review of racial disproportionality arising from the changes to jurisdiction powers and procedures in the magistrates court, and from the operation of the new trial-allocation provisions in clauses 1 to 7. The Government’s equality impact assessment of the proposal to restrict access to jury trial refers many times to the lack of evidence that the proposals in the Bill have a racist or discriminatory outcome, but the impact assessment does not refer once the Secretary of State’s own 2017 review, which showed reduced racial disparities in jury trial outcomes. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

The new clause would mandate a full review of racial disproportionality before the changes are made. At a time when trust in the justice system among the black, Asian and minority ethnic community is already low, why rush through these changes before we have the full picture?

New clause 33 would introduce a duty to conduct an independent review of whether clauses 1 to 7 give rise to disproportionate impacts on particular classes of person. It is welcome that, in December last year, the Government announced a £92 million investment in criminal legal aid, after years of neglect. However, it will take a while for that investment to have an impact on the disproportionate outcomes across the criminal justice system for working-class defendants, young males and, in particular, vulnerable people.

Juries are hailed as the fairest component of the legal system, and are widely accepted as more likely to provide an equitable outcome than the judiciary, who are still overwhelmingly privately educated and from particular backgrounds. One of the big issues—this applies to new clause 32 as well as to new clause 33—is that joint enterprise is often used as a dragnet for marginalised and vulnerable communities, impacting not just black people but neurodivergent and working-class communities.

For those who may not be fully aware, a 2016 Supreme Court decision recognised that joint enterprise had been used wrongly for the past three decades. Despite that, little has changed. Very few appeals have been accepted, and there is significant evidence of the continued misuse of joint enterprise. This fills prisons with people of no risk to the public, who are labelled as murderers when they have not killed anyone—an expensive travesty of justice. They are often sent to jail or given longer sentences than they should have received on the basis of assisting or encouraging a crime. They are found guilty by association.

In our criminal justice system, joint enterprise essentially means that if someone has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the commission of an offence, they can be found guilty of an offence committed by someone else. However, the role they have played may vary, and the sentencing powers often reflect that. In reality, a lot of bystanders or people watching, or people who may have known one of the parties but did not take part in the crime, will also end up getting convicted. There has been an attempt to rectify that with a private Member’s Bill, but so far nothing has happened.

Some miscarriages of justice have been challenged, and some cases have received further examination. Dr Nisha Waller of the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies states that

“joint enterprise laws are vague and wide in scope, causing systemic injustice, including overcriminalisation, overpunishment, discriminatory outcomes, and convictions where there is no compelling evidence of intent”

or even

“a defendant’s physical contribution”.

Dr Waller’s research shows that the current law is flawed and that it

“encourages…the police and Crown Prosecution Service to charge suspects based on poor-quality evidence…highly speculative prosecution case theory to take precedence over…evidentiary foundations…the use of gang narratives and vague concepts such as ‘in it together’ to construct collective intent.”

She says it allows for a lot of young people to be stereotyped and criminalised, and recommends that

“the scope of secondary liability law needs to be narrowed in favour of a clearer and safer legal framework.”

One reason why it is important to address this issue, in conjunction with new clauses 32 and 33, is that the very people who would be affected by the new clauses are the people who are affected by the law on joint enterprise. I pay tribute to Joint Enterprise Not Guilty by Association, which has been doing tremendous work in this area for many years.

The most recent research by Appeal, which has been monitoring joint enterprise in court cases, concluded:

“There is a clear departure from what the law of complicity should be”

and that:

“Secondary liability is often diluted to little more than association, suspicion, and story.”

It says:

“Prosecution narrative strategy has replaced evidential clarity…meaning joint enterprise trials are often not a truth-seeking process.”

It concludes that the way joint enterprise laws are currently used is

“producing injustice at scale”

and that:

“Public money is being used to stage justice, rather than deliver it.”

Research by Becky Clarke and Patrick Williams at Manchester Metropolitan University shows that nearly £250 million is spent on prosecuting defendants in joint enterprise cases every year. The total future punishment of the 1,088 people convicted under joint enterprise cases each year costs the taxpayer £1.2 billion.

Finally, the report “In Their Own Words”, which is based on a series of family listening days organised by JENGbA, detailed the devastating impact of joint enterprise convictions on families and friends—

[The Chair]

Order. The Clerk advises me that you are going a little out of scope.

--- Later in debate ---

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I take your ruling and guidance, Dr Huq. I was trying to explain it because the disparities are important and the issue does affect people. I ask the Government to think about new clauses 32 and 33, because they will hopefully have an impact on joint enterprise. I will not press them to a vote.

[The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)]

This group contains a number of new clauses, and I want to make sure that I address all the principal themes.

New clause 5, tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester, relates to publishing targets for reducing court backlogs. It would require the Lord Chancellor to set and publish targets for reducing court backlogs, and to report annually to Parliament on progress. It is important to note that the Ministry of Justice and His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service are downstream Departments, by which I mean that we are subject to demand pressures that are not fully within our control as they are driven by additional arrests and charging decisions. We have published our central demand forecasts, on which the Department’s impact assessment and modelling is based, but the fluctuation and uncertainty in demand makes it particularly challenging for us to set a fixed, specific target.

In the absence of credible reforms, targets will not achieve much. I can tell the hon. Member for Chichester in general terms that we want to get back to a sustainable position. Some Members have referred to reverting to our position before the covid pandemic, which was when we saw the exponential rise in the backlogs. However, I do not want to put a figure on it, because that would simply not be achievable, and having targets that we know we cannot achieve is setting ourselves up to fail, and it lacks credibility.

In the independent review of the criminal courts, Sir Brian Leveson made a series of recommendations related to how performance management and accountability across the criminal justice system could be strengthened. We are looking carefully at those recommendations, particularly in respect of whether we ought to establish a performance oversight board, in addition to the governance forum that already exists. Sir Brian recommends that such a board should monitor and report on the performance of local criminal justice boards and publish a shared set of performance measures. As I have said, we will be publishing our response to the second part of Sir Brian’s review shortly.

Performance management, and monitoring our success in reducing the court backlogs, is essential. Within Parliament, we have the scrutiny provided not only by shadow Justice Ministers, as well as all parliamentarians, but by the Justice Committee, which provides rigorous scrutiny on a cross-party basis. Of course, we also have the regular, frequent publication of Crown court data. Although those targets are not specified, no one is pushing at them harder than the Ministry of Justice and myself, and that is what the Bill primarily targets. However, we do not think that it is necessary to publish specific targets in the legislation, and I ask the hon. Member for Chichester not to press new clause 5 to a vote.

New clause 17, and to some extent new clause 13, touches on efficiencies. It suggests that we ought to review efficiencies before we embark on reform. Indeed, the hon. Member for Reigate and others have made this argument during the debate: do the efficiency first, and see whether it works, before engaging in reform. I want to address that argument head on. We have been clear from the start that there is no silver bullet or simple panacea to the backlog. The insight of the independent review of the criminal courts is that we need investment, efficiencies and reform, and we are not ducking the need to drive efficiencies. One of the areas where I think we all agree is the fact that the system is incredibly inefficient, and the backlog itself compounds that inefficiency, but we are not waiting for legislation to drive at that efficiency reform.

A number of other Members and I have mentioned relevant measures, and I want to touch on a few. For example, the blitz courts have been in operation in London since April, and I am going to visit one in a couple of weeks. That highly effective model of very aggressive listing has had success in the past, and it is being used to drive down certain case types in the backlog, such as assault against an emergency worker. We also need a consistent and clear approach to national listing, such as using the AI listing assistant that I referred to earlier.

We are gripping the issue of prisoner delivery right across the country. Lord Timpson and I have established an oversight board, bringing together representatives of His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service, His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, and the prisoner escort and custody service. It is a year-long project—a sprint, as it were—to look at how we can drive improved performance under the existing contract, and how we can imbed digital solutions to make that run much more efficiently.

--- Later in debate ---

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause is, in some respects, fairly self-explanatory, in that it provides that cases should not go to the Crown court without being trial-ready. In essence, it is a safeguard —we could call it an oversight amendment—that is linked to the jury trial reforms in the Bill.

The rationale behind the new clause is to reflect concern that the Government are making significant changes by removing or restricting jury trials without strong evidence of impact. It aims to introduce caution, likely through a review, limits or accountability mechanisms. In that respect it is similar to the approach in new clause 27, about piloting, but it is more about ongoing scrutiny than delaying implementation.

We are trying to say to the Government: “If you are going to do this, please prove that it works and build in the safeguards.” That aligns with the position of the Bar Council and others in the light of the argument regarding jury trials. It fits with the fact that the Government are trying to make structural change, but we say that, before they do that structural change, they should look at all these things before cases are sent up to the Crown court. I will not be pressing the new clause to a vote.

[Sarah Sackman]

Our understanding is that the new clause seeks to improve efficiency by requiring cases to be trial-ready before they are sent to the Crown court. I will explain very briefly how a case is currently prepared for trial in the Crown court and why it is important that that preparation takes place before a judge in the Crown court, as early as possible.

All criminal cases begin in the magistrates court, and indictable offences such as murder must, by law, be sent to the Crown court at the first hearing, after the magistrates have dealt with matters such as identification and bail or remand. At the plea and trial preparation hearing in the Crown court, a professional judge examines the issues between the parties, such as evidence and disclosure issues, and sets a timeline for trial preparation, as well as the trial date. It is also at that point that a formal plea is entered in the Crown court.

There are clear statutory expectations on parties, set out in the criminal procedure rules, to be proactive in case management, and judges are experienced in managing timeliness through enforcement action. However, we recognise that there is always more that can be done, which is why we have effected the roll-out of case co-ordinators in our Crown court to drive case progression. Magistrates are not similarly trained in managing trials on indictment, and we do not think they would be an effective equivalent to a Crown court judge in determining these matters before they reach the Crown court. Requiring cases to be held back until they are considered “ready” prior to being sent to the Crown court would, we believe, risk introducing further delay for the most serious offences.

In addition, retaining such serious cases for longer in the magistrates court could have several unintended consequences, including additional pressures on custody time limits and delays in accessing special measures—measures that enable vulnerable and intimidated witnesses to give pre-recorded evidence at an early stage. Those protections are available across the Crown court but are not all available in the magistrates court, so delaying transfer to the Crown court would delay access to them for some victims and witnesses, potentially undermining the quality of their evidence. The new clause would, in practice, introduce delays into the court system and delay the progression of the most serious cases. For that reason, I urge my hon. Friend to withdraw it.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I thank the Minister for her response. I have made my points—throughout the Committee’s proceedings, I have been making points about the issue of jury trials—and I will not add anything further. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 22

Remote Court Participation: Strategy

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backlog (‘the strategy’).

(2) The strategy must include—

(a) an assessment of the current use of remote proceedings;

(b) an evaluation of the impact of remote proceedings on the speed of case disposal and the overall reduction of the outstanding caseload;

(c) recommendations on how the principle of open justice can be upheld with the increased use of remote proceedings;

(d) criteria for determining the suitability of proceedings for different forms of remote participation; and

(e) provisions for the security, reliability, and resilience of digital systems used in remote proceedings.

(3) The Secretary of State must, at intervals of no more than 24 months following the laying of the strategy, lay before Parliament a report on progress made against the strategy.

(4) The progress report must consider—

(a) the extent to which the strategy has been implemented;

(b) the impact on the criminal case backlog, including any measures by which that impact has been assessed; and

(c) any further legislative or budgetary provisions to ensure the effectiveness of remote proceedings.

(5) For the purposes of this section, ‘remote proceedings’ means any proceedings in which one or more participants attend by way of live video or audio link.”—(Jess Brown-Fuller.)

This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to publish a formal strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backload in the criminal justice system.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time