Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

Monday 31st October 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Jonathan Djanogly)]

I beg to move amendment 10, page 99, line 11, leave out from ‘where’ to first ‘for’ in line 13 and insert ‘—

(a) the services are provided to the individual, or

(b) the individual has died and the services are provided—

(i) to the individual’s personal representative, or

(ii) ’.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government amendment 11.

Amendment 91, page 103, line 3, after ‘family’, insert ‘or other intimate’.

Amendment 93, page 103, line 4, at end insert

‘or where an allegation is made that B has been abused by A or is at risk of being abused by A’.

Amendment 23, page 103, leave out lines 35 to 38 and insert—

‘“abuse” means any incident of threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) between adults who are or have been intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender or sexuality.’.

Amendment 92, page 103, line 35, leave out ‘physical or mental abuse’ and insert

‘any incident of threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (whether physical, mental, financial or emotional)’.

Amendment 74, page 104, line 23, at end insert—

‘(10) For the purposes of this paragraph, evidence that A has been abused by B or is at risk of being abused by B may consist of one or more of the following (without limitation)—

(a) a relevant court conviction or police caution;

(b) a relevant court order (including without notice, ex parte, interim or final orders) including a non-molestation order, occupation order, forced marriage protection order or other protective injunction;

(c) evidence of relevant criminal proceedings for an offence concerning domestic violence or a police report confirming attendance at an incident resulting from domestic violence;

(d) evidence that a victim has been referred to a Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (as a high-risk victim of domestic violence) and a plan has been put in place to protect that victim from violence by the other party;

(e) a finding of fact in the family courts of domestic violence by the other party giving rise to the risk of harm to the victim;

(f) a medical report from a doctor at a UK hospital confirming that the applicant has injuries consistent with being a victim of domestic violence, such injuries not being limited to physical injuries;

(g) a letter from a General Medical Council registered general practitioner confirming that he or she has examined the applicant and is satisfied that the applicant had injuries consistent with those of a victim of domestic violence;

(h) an undertaking given to a court that the perpetrator of the abuse will not approach the applicant who is the victim of the abuse;

(i) a letter from a social services department confirming its involvement in connection with domestic violence;

(j) a letter of support or a report from a domestic violence support organisation; or

(k) other well-founded documentary evidence of abuse (such as from a counsellor, midwife, school or witnesses).

(11) For the avoidance of doubt, no time limit shall operate in relation to any evidence supporting an application for civil legal services under paragraph 10.’.

Amendment 94, page 104, line 25, leave out ‘(“A”)’.

Amendment 95, page 104, line 27, leave out ‘other than A’.

Amendment 96, page 104, line 39, at end insert—

‘(1A) Civil legal services provided to an adult in relation to proceedings for financial relief in respect of a child who is the subject of an order or procedure mentioned in sub-paragraph (1).’.

Amendment 97, page 104, line 39, at end insert—

‘(1B) Civil legal services provided in relation to proceedings in which the court is considering giving a direction under section 37 of the Children Act 1989 (direction to authority, where care or supervision order may be appropriate, to investigate child’s circumstances).’.

Amendment 98, page 104, line 39, at end insert—

‘(1C) Civil legal services provided in relation to proceedings arising out of a family relationship involving a child in respect of whom a court has given a direction under section 37 of the Children Act 1989 (direction to authority, where care or supervision order may be appropriate, to investigate child’s circumstances); and “family relationship” has the same meaning for the purposes of this sub-paragraph as it has for the purposes of paragraph 10.’.

Amendment 99, page 105, line 42, leave out ‘to a child’.

Amendment 100, page 105, line 43, leave out first ‘the’ and insert ‘a’.

Amendment 101, page 106, line 1 , leave out first ‘the’ and insert ‘a’.

Amendment 102, page 106, line 3 , leave out first ‘the’ and insert ‘a’.

Amendment 83, page 108, line 44 , leave out sub-paragraphs (5), (6) and (7).

Government amendments 55 to 59.

Amendment 113, page 112, line 5 , at end insert—

‘Immigration: victims of domestic violence and indefinite leave to remain

24A (1) Civil legal services provided to an individual (“I”) in relation to an application by the individual for indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom or a claim by the individual to a right to reside in the United Kingdom, on the grounds that—

(a) I was given leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom for a limited period as the partner of another individual present and settled in the United Kingdom, or had the right to reside in the United Kingdom as the partner of another individual, and

(b) I’s relationship with the other individual broke down permanently as a result of the abuse of I by an associated person.

General exclusions

(2) Sub-paragraph (1) is subject to the exclusions in Parts 2 and 3 of this Schedule.

Specific exclusions

(3) The services described in sub-paragraph (1) do not include attendance at an interview conducted on behalf of the Secretary of State with a view to reaching a decision on an application.

Definitions

(4) For the purposes of this paragraph, one individual is a partner of another if—

(a) they are married to each other,

(b) they are civil partners of each other, or

(c) they are cohabitants.

(5) In this paragraph—

“abuse” means any incident of threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) between adults who are or have been intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender or sexuality.

“associated person”, in relation to an individual, means a person who is associated with the individual within the meaning of section 62 of the Family Law Act 1996;

“cohabitant” has the same meaning as in Part 4 of the Family Law Act 1996 (see section 62 of that Act);

“indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom” means leave to remain in the United Kingdom under the Immigration Act 1971 which is not limited as to duration;

“present and settled in the United Kingdom” has the same meaning as in the rules made under section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971;

“right to reside” means a right of residence established under Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and the Council 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC.’.

Government amendments 60 and 61.

Amendment 145, page 112, line 11, at end insert—

‘(1A) Civil legal services provided to an individual for a matter arising out of any rule laid down under section 1(4) of the Immigration Act 1971 making provision for family members to enter or remain in the United Kingdom as the family member of a refugee or beneficiary of humanitarian protection.’.

Government amendments 62, 13, 14, 63, and 15 to 18.

Amendment 103, page 7, line 35, at end insert—

‘(7) But the Director must determine that an individual qualifies for civil legal services where the services relate to a matter falling within paragraph 10 of Schedule 1 and—

(a) the individual has been admitted to a refuge for persons suffering from domestic abuse;

(b) the individual has obtained medical or other professional services relating to the consequences of domestic abuse, or

(c) an assessment for the purpose of possible mediation of a family dispute has concluded that the parties need not engage in mediation as a result of domestic abuse,

and in this subsection “domestic abuse” means abuse of the kind to which paragraph 10(1) of Schedule 1 relates’.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Djanogly]

This rather substantial group of Government and Opposition amendments concerns legal aid for family and immigration matters, including domestic violence issues, as well as certain technical amendments to the Bill. I shall begin with a group of technical Government amendments, before moving on to the family and immigration ones.

Government amendments 10, 11, 13 and 14 amend paragraphs 3 and 33 of part 1 of schedule 1 in order to ensure that funding can be granted to the personal representative of a deceased child, vulnerable adult or victim of a sexual offence who wishes to pursue a civil claim for the benefit of the estate. The amendments are necessary because the Bill, as currently drafted, would limit legal aid to the child, vulnerable adult or victim personally. Where that individual dies, it is clearly right that legal aid should remain available to that individual’s personal representative to pursue a relevant claim on behalf of their estate. It is not necessary to make equivalent changes to other paragraphs in part 1 because relevant paragraphs do not exclude claims being brought by a personal representative. For other paragraphs, the case would either fall away with the death of a claimant or there would be another party who would be equally able to bring the claim.

Government amendments 15 to 18 relate to vetting and barring under section 4 of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 and applications relating to disqualification orders under sections 31 and 34 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. The amendments are technical and seek to ensure that funding for advocacy is provided in the relevant tribunal or court for these types of cases. In our consultation paper, “Proposals for the Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales”, we announced our intention to retain civil legal services for section 4 of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act, which provides for a right of appeal to the upper tribunal against a decision to keep someone on a barred list from regulated activity relating to children or adults. The consultation paper provided that we would continue to fund those types of appeals to the upper tribunal on the basis that inclusion on a list would have a significant and lasting impact on the life and livelihood of an appellant who might have been included on the list in error.

[Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)]

Has the Minister made an assessment of the amendments’ impact on organisations in Coventry such as the citizens advice bureau and the law centre?

[Mr Djanogly]

I expect the amendments to be generally well received.

The Bill currently refers to funding for advocacy being available in the first tier tribunal, and amendments 17 and 18 correct that position by making available funding for advocacy for appeals to the upper tribunal. Amendments 15 and 16 serve a similar purpose but in relation to sections 31 and 34 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act. Appeals under section 31 are to the Court of Appeal, rather than the first tier tribunal, and funding for advocacy for such appeals is already covered by paragraph 2 of part 3 of schedule 1. Appeals under section 34 are to the High Court, and funding for advocacy for such appeals is already covered by paragraph 3 of part 3 of schedule 1.

I now turn to the family and domestic violence amendments, almost all of which have been debated in Committee already. I would like to reiterate why we are taking most private family law cases out of the scope of legal aid. The cost of legal aid, as it stands, is, we believe, simply unsustainable, and legal aid resources need to be focused on those cases where legal aid is most needed. Accordingly, for most divorces, child contact applications or ancillary applications to carve up family assets, legal aid will no longer be available. We believe that it is right to encourage families, where appropriate, to resolve their disputes without going to court. We want to prioritise mediation, which can be cheaper, quicker and less acrimonious than contested court proceedings. Legal aid will, therefore, remain available for mediation in private law family cases, and we estimate that we will spend an extra £10 million a year on mediation, taking the total to £25 million a year.

[Sheila Gilmore (Edinburgh East) (Lab)]

Does the Minister not accept that in many cases where people are separating or divorcing, there is an imbalance of power, whether financial or emotional, and that mediation is simply not suitable for many such cases?

[Mr Djanogly]

I certainly accept that there will sometimes be an imbalance, and in relation to court proceedings themselves, we are proposing other measures—the ability for a judge to give interim orders, for instance—aimed at redressing that imbalance. However, I also accept the hon. Lady’s suggestion that mediation might not be suitable in every case, such as those involving domestic violence. Legal aid will remain available for private family law cases where there is evidence of domestic violence or where a child is at risk of abuse.

[Joan Ruddock (Lewisham, Deptford) (Lab)]

I want briefly to read to the Minister what my constituent Lucy Abell has written to me:

“I work with single parents every day in my job…and know how desperately vulnerable a lot of people are when they are going through an acrimonious separation. The outcomes of children and families are very dependent on what happens during this time, and I find it incredible that the Government thinks these changes will save the government money in the long term.”

She works for Gingerbread and sees such people all the time. She is convinced that what the Government are doing will be terribly damaging for children of those single parents.

[Mr Djanogly]

I am not entirely sure whether the right hon. Lady is talking about all cases of divorce or partners separating, or just those where there is domestic violence. However, I can tell her that in 90% of cases where there is a separating of the ways, the couple will reach an agreement. We are therefore talking about the remaining 10%. What we are saying in terms of policy is that for basic divorce—if divorce can ever be basic—people should not rely on legal aid for carving up the family assets or settling contact issues. However, I want to make it clear that funding for victims of domestic violence who seek a protective order will remain available.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

Is it not also important to point out that the family courts have great difficulty dealing with contact issues, many of which are naturally unsuited to such treatment? Frankly, it is not very easy for a court to sort out arguments about whether a child can go to the scout group on a Friday night or whether they have to be with the other parent.

[Mr Djanogly]

My right hon. Friend makes an important point. I can tell him and other hon. Members that it has become clear to me, from my many meetings over the last year and a half with mediators and lobby groups such as those already mentioned, that in the vast majority of cases the parties are better off sorting out their problems together with the help of the mediator. For the most part, mediation is empowering. In most cases, the best way forward is for people to be able to sort out their own futures and those of their children without being told what to do by a judge, and that is what the Government support.

[Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)]

I want to ask the Minister about cases where domestic abuse or violence per se is not present, but where conflict between the parents none the less makes it simply impossible for mediation to work effectively. In the interests of children, will the Minister consider extending legal aid in those circumstances, so that where a mediator knows that mediation simply could not work, the parents will still receive advice?

[Mr Djanogly]

The Government have changed the law through a pre-action protocol. The position from this April has been that where a divorce application is made, the parties have to see whether mediation is appropriate, as has been the case with publicly funded divorce cases. That does not, I hasten to add, mean that the parties have to go to mediation; however, they have to be assessed to see whether mediation is appropriate. I can tell the hon. Lady that the initial findings are very positive indeed. We have adequate mediators, with more than 1,000 mediation units around the country, and all are reporting a significant upturn in business, which is a positive outcome.

[Kate Green]

I agree with the Minister about the desirability of mediation wherever it can work best for all the parties. We would all like appropriate mediation to be used as much as possible in such cases, but will he clarify what he just said? Where a couple is found unsuitable for mediation because of the conflict between them, but where violence or abuse is absent, will they be able to access legal aid?

[Mr Djanogly]

I am afraid that the hon. Lady misunderstands the nature of mediation. In normal circumstances, it is not for the mediator to sit in judgment on the individuals who turn up for mediation. That happens in the assessment. The mediator should explain to the individuals the purpose of mediation and it is for the individuals themselves to decide whether mediation is appropriate. If violence was involved, the mediator might suggest that, in those circumstances, mediation is not appropriate. If domestic violence is involved, the Government believe that legal aid should be provided.

[Mr Jim Cunningham]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Susan Elan Jones (Clwyd South) (Lab)]

rose—

[Mr Djanogly]

I shall give way one more time on this point—to the hon. Member for Coventry South (Mr Cunningham).

[Mr Cunningham]

I want to be helpful to the Minister. Can he clarify how the amendments on legal aid would apply, for example, to rape crisis centres such as the one we have in Coventry? I am not too clear about how that will be affected.

[Mr Djanogly]

The Government are supportive of crisis centres. We have increased our provision for them. The amendments do not in any way affect the issue one way or another. That is a separate policy item.

[Joan Ruddock]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Djanogly]

I really must make some headway. If the right hon. Lady will give me a few minutes, I might allow her to intervene again.

We will continue to provide civil legal aid where a person is applying for an order for protection against domestic violence, as with a non-molestation order or an occupation order. We will also continue to waive the financial eligibility limits in these cases. We will still spend an estimated £120 million a year on private family law, including on domestic violence, after our proposed changes. This includes funding for about a quarter of the private family law cases that currently receive legal aid to go to court. We expect to continue to fund them where domestic violence or child abuse results from those cases.

Amendments 92 and 23 would put parts of the definition of domestic violence used by the Association of Chief Police Officers on the face of the Bill in paragraph 10 of schedule 1 in place of the existing definition of abuse. Identical amendments were debated in Committee. The existing definition of abuse used in the Bill is a broad and comprehensive one, explicitly not limited to physical violence. It is used elsewhere in paragraph 3 of schedule 1, which provides for legal aid to be available in relation to abuse of a child or vulnerable adult, and paragraph 11, which provides for legal aid to be available for a person seeking an order to protect a child at risk of abuse. Any consideration of the definition in one paragraph should not be undertaken entirely in isolation from the others—lest confusion should result.

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

Will the Minister explain why a different definition is being used here from that used in other Home Office and Ministry of Justice documents? A lot of concern has arisen among women’s organisations that there is an agenda here; we would love to know what that agenda is.

[Mr Djanogly]

If the hon. Lady will allow me to get on, I will clarify precisely that.

The definition should also be seen in the light of the Bill’s structure and the purpose of the paragraph in which it appears. Paragraph 10 reflects the underlying policy of ensuring that a party to private law family proceedings who has been subjected to domestic violence by the other party and is likely to be intimidated or otherwise disadvantaged in presenting his or her case should, as a result, be able to have access to legal aid. It does not provide that any individual who has been the subject of, or who is at risk of being the subject of, abuse as defined in that paragraph will qualify regardless of what evidence of abuse might exist. Not every such individual will be intimidated or otherwise disadvantaged in the way the paragraph is intended to address. It establishes a description of legal services and whether an individual qualifies for those services in any specific case. It requires that an individual not only falls within the category in paragraph 10, but meets the criteria to be established in regulations made under clause 10.

[Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)]

We raised with the Government a couple of months ago the possibility of seeing the regulations in draft before reaching this Report stage. Many Members feel that that would have aided our consideration of these provisions. Why has the Minister not produced those regulations?

[Mr Djanogly]

Because the Bill and relevant clauses are still going through the House and still have to go through the other place. The regulations will be produced once the Bill comes into law.

Those criteria will set out the specific requirements on evidence of the fact of abuse or the risk of abuse. The definition of abuse itself is therefore only a preliminary part of the picture. In that sense, it might be argued that it makes little difference whether definition takes one form or another arguably rather similar form. However, we are still not convinced that the definition should be changed in the way suggested in the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mrs Helen Grant (Maidstone and The Weald) (Con)]

Does the Minister not accept that the fact that the definition is not specific has the potential to create some uncertainty, and that uncertainty, especially at the beginning of court proceedings, will create even more hardship for the victim, which may well lead to litigation in itself? Is it not possible to be more precise, so that people need not worry about what is and what is not acceptable?

[Mr Djanogly]

I shall be discussing that in a little more detail, but I would answer my hon. Friend’s more general point that the definition could make things harder for a court by saying that the court will in any event have to take a view at some point

[Mrs Grant]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Djanogly]

If my hon. Friend will let me finish, I will allow her to intervene again later.

The reference to “any incident”, for example, might be read as securing legal aid for any person who could point to some sort of incident regardless of whether it was serious or minor, such that the victim would not generally feel inhibited about pursuing litigation against the other party. That would not reflect the underlying intention, nor would it be the effect in practice if the regulations required certain forms of proof. The touchstone for whether a party obtains funding must be whether the abuse was such as to inhibit their ability to present their case against the other party. The circumstances that will be accepted as evidence of the abuse will turn on the application by courts, prosecutors and other agencies of their existing criteria. It is when the courts and others have determined that the level of the abusive conduct is such that protective action or prosecution is necessary that legal aid will be available.

[Joan Ruddock]

Given that the purpose of all this is to save money, I must assume that the definition in the Bill means that the Minister expects women, or occasionally men, who would formerly have pursued such domestic violence cases not to pursue them, and not to be eligible. Has he made an estimate of the likely reduction in legally funded cases?

[Mr Djanogly]

I am happy to confirm that this particular definition is not directly related to saving money. It is there because it is a definition that works.

Amendment 23 goes beyond amendment 92 in referring also to the relationship between those involved. It would cover

“intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender or sexuality.”

This part of the amendment is superfluous, because it duplicates sub-paragraph 7 of paragraph 10 of the schedule. The sub-paragraph relies on the definition of associated persons in the Family Law Act 1996, which is wide, and covers the relationships set out in the amendment and more.

Amendment 91 also concerns the relationship between those involved. The Bill provides for legal aid to be available to victims of domestic violence for matters

“arising out of a family relationship”.

The amendment would change the phrase “family relationship” to “family or other intimate relationship”. It is unnecessary for the same reason as amendment 23. Paragraph 10(7) of the schedule defines a family relationship as one between persons who are associated with each other. The definition of “associated persons” in the 1996 Act, on which that paragraph relies, includes two people who

“have or have had an intimate personal relationship with each other which is or was of significant duration”.

The wording of the amendment therefore appears to add nothing.

Amendments 103 and 74 both set out a range of forms of evidence that would be accepted as demonstrating domestic violence for the purpose of qualifying for legal aid in private family law cases. Very similar amendments were debated in Committee, and in this case I can say to the right hon. Member for Lewisham, Deptford (Joan Ruddock) that there would be economic consequences. We want genuine victims of domestic violence to have the benefit of legal aid in such cases, when they would be disadvantaged by facing their abuser as the other party. However, during consultation we have heard many concerns that the proposal in the amendments could lead to a rise in unfounded allegations, and we want to guard against that.

[Susan Elan Jones]

Organisations such as the National Federation of Women’s Institutes and Women’s Aid declare that they are very concerned about the Government’s proposals, so why does the Minister think he is right and they are wrong?

[Mr Djanogly]

Because I and the Government consulted at some length on the proposals and received a lot of positive responses. As a result of that consultation we broadened the definition concerned, so we have listened. Indeed, we have tabled a further amendment today in relation to immigrants to broaden it even further.

[Mr Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)]

I hope the Minister accepts that, although amendment 74 and other amendments would enlarge the evidential tests, they would still require a degree of evidence to be given. That evidence may not come from such limited places as he wants, but it may be from GPs or women’s refuges. Yet he is saying that he cannot accept such evidence, because it would be part of “unfounded allegations”. Is he suggesting that those organisations collude in false allegations?

[Mr Djanogly]

The hon. Gentleman makes a frankly ridiculous comment. He mentioned GPs, and of course a GP is qualified to tell whether someone has been subject to violence. However, they are not always well qualified to tell whether someone has been subject to domestic violence, because they may not have seen the circumstances in the home and may be looking only at the injury of the party coming to their surgery. The Government are looking for objective evidence.

[Mr Slaughter]

I would like the Minister to respond to my question. As the tests in question are evidential tests, not subjective or self-referred, does that support his point about false allegations? Evidence from GPs is commonly used to support cases in criminal trials, including sometimes when a woman is unwilling to give evidence herself because she is intimidated or in fear.

[Mr Djanogly]

The hon. Gentleman makes the exact point that I would have made in response to him. Evidence is used in a trial, but the GP does not make the decision, he gives evidence. We see the trial as being the objective evidence, and that is what we suggest in the Bill.

[Mr Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)]

My hon. Friend makes proper points about the need for courts to make findings of fact. Does he accept, however, that there is a potential problem with regard to undertakings? In proceedings in which undertakings could be a way of sorting out the problem satisfactorily, those advising the parties involved could prejudice their clients’ ability to obtain legal aid in future if domestic violence rears its ugly head again. Will he look again at how we can manage those circumstances so that people are not put in that potentially prejudicial situation?

[Mr Djanogly]

I am happy to consider the particular circumstances that my hon. Friend mentions on the subject of undertakings, but again we are talking about a situation that does not involve an objective test. It would be down to the word of the two people making the undertaking. In certain circumstances that may be correct, but in others it may not.

[Sandra Osborne (Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock) (Lab)]

I worked with Women’s Aid for 16 years, and the Minister is taking us back decades by perpetrating myths about domestic violence that we thought we had seen the end of 30 years ago. Does he not understand that women who are subjected to domestic violence are, by definition, captive victims and there is no one else in the room? To say that they are not going to be believed is taking us back decades. Will he look at this again?

[Mr Djanogly]

Everything the Government have said, and every action we have taken, shows that we take domestic violence extremely seriously. To some extent, the hon. Lady and other hon. Members are approaching this issue from the wrong direction in that they begin by addressing domestic violence, but that is not the right starting point. The starting point for the Government is that we are removing legal aid for private family law, but we are keeping it for domestic violence, as that is of the utmost concern to us. My point, however, is that we need to have objective evidence of domestic violence so that we target taxpayers’ money on genuine cases where the victim needs assistance because they are intimidated or otherwise disadvantaged by the fact of facing the abuser in the proceedings.

[Sheila Gilmore]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Djanogly]

I shall make a little more progress first.

The forms of evidence that will be accepted for this purpose are not set out in the Bill. Instead, they will be set out in regulations under clause 10. We believe it is appropriate to set out these detailed provisions in secondary, rather than primary, legislation as it can be amended to respond to particular issues that may arise during the operation of the scheme.

In the consultation, we suggested what might be the forms of evidence of domestic violence, and we listened to the views expressed on that in response. As a result, we have widened the range of forms of evidence, and, furthermore, only one of the forms of evidence would be needed. Legal aid will be available for victims of domestic violence in private family law cases where one of the following criteria is met: where a non-molestation order, occupation order, forced marriage protection order or other protective injunction against the other party is in place or has been made in the last 12 months; there is a criminal conviction for a domestic violence offence committed by the other party against the applicant for funding, unless the conviction is spent; there are ongoing criminal proceedings against the other party for a domestic violence offence by that party against the applicant for funding; the applicant for funding has been referred to a multi-agency risk assessment conference as a high-risk victim of domestic violence, and a plan has been put in place to protect them from violence by the other party; there has been a finding of fact in the family courts of domestic violence by the other party, giving rise to a risk of harm to the victim.

[Kate Green]

Will the fact that there is, for example, a non-molestation order be taken as evidence of suitability for legal aid in family proceedings, and will legal aid be available to enable a victim of domestic violence to get such an order?

[Mr Djanogly]

Yes, it will be. The hon. Lady makes a very important point, which has come up in consultation and has often been misconstrued. For such individuals, legal aid will be provided for the application for a non-molestation order, for example.

It might be helpful if I give an idea of the prevalence of these forms of evidence. About 24,100 domestic violence orders were made in 2010, about 74,000 domestic violence crimes were prosecuted in 2009-10 and there were 53,000 domestic violence convictions. Further, about 43,000 victims of domestic violence were referred to multi-agency risk assessment conferences in the 12 months to June 2010.

[Helen Goodman]

Surely the Minister can see that there is a 21,000 gap between the numbers of those prosecuted and those convicted? Surely he is also aware that the Crown Prosecution Service goes ahead with prosecutions only when there is a reasonable expectation of success in the case? Surely, therefore, he can see that we are not dancing on the head of a pin, as we are talking about 21,000 women every year?

[Mr Djanogly]

Those numbers may overlap to some extent; in other words, someone might not have been prosecuted as there may have been a civil injunction, or perhaps a multi-agency risk assessment conference made the decision.

The forms of evidence we intend to accept will meet a high standard of objectivity. We are concerned that many of the additional forms of evidence suggested in the amendments would rely on the word of those involved and would provide an incentive for allegations where none currently exists. Let me make it clear that I am not questioning the integrity of genuine victims. However, during the legal aid consultation many people were concerned about providing an incentive for unfounded allegations, and the Government share that concern.

[Mrs Grant]

Post-separation violence is very common in domestic violence cases. I am concerned that there is a 12-month time limit on the gateway criteria for family law matters, which means that if the violence occurs after that period many highly vulnerable women and children could fall through the net.

[Mr Djanogly]

That relates to amendment 74. I am going to deal with it and I am sure that my hon. Friend will be pleased with the answer I will give her.

Accepting self-reporting without objective evidence would prevent us from effectively focusing assistance on victims of domestic violence who were unable effectively to present their case against the other party because of the history or risk of abuse by that party. Both amendments refer to evidence from professionals in a variety of roles. I explained that we have widened our criteria so that legal aid will be available where the victim has been referred to a multi-agency risk-assessment conference as a high-risk victim of domestic violence and a plan has been put in place to protect them from violence by the other party. Such referrals can be made by a range of professionals. Furthermore, a finding of fact in the family courts that domestic violence has occurred will trigger legal aid, and a court will be able to assess any relevant evidence.

Amendment 74, to which my hon. Friend referred, would prevent a time limit from applying to any evidence. We have said that a 12-month period, where relevant, will apply. We consider that 12 months will be an appropriate period to protect victims and to enable them to deal with their private family law issues. However, if the criteria were to arise again—for instance, if a second protective injunction is made—the time period would start again. It is also important to remember that legal aid will remain available for exceptional out-of-scope cases where the failure to provide such funding would amount to the breach of an individual’s rights under the European convention on human rights, particularly article 6.

[Sheila Gilmore]

Will the Minister explain how the individual achieves the finding of fact in a family court in order to trigger legal aid if they cannot get legal aid to take proceedings in a family court?

[Mr Djanogly]

The answer is that they can get legal aid to take those proceedings.

Amendment 93 would provide for legal aid to be available for any party in a private family law case who has been the subject of allegations of domestic violence or the risk of domestic violence. We debated an identical amendment in Committee. In considering whether alleged perpetrators should receive legal aid in these cases it is important to remember that we are seeking to protect the most vulnerable in society. Alleged perpetrators would not necessarily fall into that category in the way a victim of abuse would. Furthermore, allegations would not meet the test of clear, objective evidence that would otherwise apply in these cases. Accepting such an amendment would be likely to cost tens of millions of pounds in savings, without achieving the objective of targeting legal aid on those most in need.

I turn to the other amendments relating to private law children cases, such as disputes about custody, where a child is at risk of abuse. These are amendments to paragraph 11 of schedule 1, which provides for legal aid to be available in such cases for the party seeking to protect the child, where there is objective evidence of the risk of abuse. Again, identical or near-identical versions of the amendments were discussed in Committee.

Amendment 96 would provide for applications for financial provision for children to be in scope for legal aid where the child is the subject of one or more of the measures listed in sub-paragraph 11 (1) of schedule 1. The list of orders in that sub-paragraph is intended to cover orders and procedures used to secure protection, and it includes orders under section 8 of the Children Act 1989, which may be used in that way, including contact and residence orders. The effect of amendment 96 would be that applications for maintenance or other financial provision for a child would be in scope whenever a contact or residence order has been made in relation to that child, regardless of any need for protection. The original legal aid proposals were silent on the issue of children at risk of abuse in private law children cases.

We have listened to the concerns raised during the consultation on this point. For example, one party might be seeking an order to bar an abuser from unsupervised contact with a child. We agree that child protection is of paramount importance and we recognise that it would be difficult for the protective party to act in person in cases of potential complexity and heightened risk to the child requiring prompt and clear action. This is a separate rationale to a situation in which the adult has been subject to abuse such that he or she cannot be expected to represent themselves against their abuser.

We do not consider that cases concerning financial provision are of equal priority and nor do they raise the same issues. Financial matters are of lower objective importance than child protection and we would not expect the protecting party to encounter the same level of complexity—still less risk—or need for urgent protective action in a case about financial provision. Furthermore, the person presenting the risk of abuse might not be the other party in the financial provision proceedings. Although protecting a child from abuse is clearly of high importance, it is not appropriate that in a case for financial provision, which is a separate matter from the consideration of protective measures, a distinction should be drawn between maintenance for children considered at risk of abuse and maintenance for other children.

Amendment 97 would bring into the scope of legal aid the entirety of any proceedings in which the court was considering whether to direct the local authority to investigate the circumstances of the child. Under section 37 of the Children Act 1989, the court may make such direction if it appears that it might be appropriate for a care or supervision order to be made. The amendment appears to be unnecessary and, in any event, goes too far. Under paragraph 1 of the schedule, legal aid will be available for public family law cases such as care and supervision proceedings, as at present. We believe that the state should ensure that families are able to challenge decisions made by public authorities about the provision of care for children.

Directions under section 37 of the 1989 Act are considered to be public family law matters for legal aid purposes because they relate to care and supervision orders under paragraph 1(1)(b) of schedule 1. Funding is therefore available in relation to section 37 issues. There is no reason, in principle, why a case could not be adjourned briefly in such a situation to allow the parties to seek a legal aid lawyer for the section 37 issue if that were warranted. Providers are able to use devolved powers to grant immediate funding in emergency situations, subject to means and merits-testing.

Amendment 98 also references section 37 directions and would bring into scope any private family law proceedings that involve a child in respect of whom a direction under section 37 of the 1989 Act had been given, regardless of the outcome of that section 37 investigation. That is a broad proposition that I do not think can be justified.

[Geraint Davies (Swansea West) (Lab/Co-op)]

May I ask why the Minister is discussing amendments that have not been selected by the Speaker? He seems to be referring to amendments 98 and 97.

[Mr Djanogly]

Amendments 94 to 102 have been selected.

Under amendment 98, a section 37 direction, regardless of the outcome of the investigation, would trigger funding for all parties in any private law family proceedings in which the child was involved. A section 37 order in itself does not mean that the child is at risk of abuse. The local authority staff could conclude, once they had completed their investigation, that the child was not at risk and that no further action was needed. If the local authority concluded that action was needed, it would put a child protection plan in place. As I have said, legal aid will be available in private law children cases in which a child is at risk of abuse for a party seeking to protect the child where there is objective evidence of the risk of abuse. A child protection plan will be accepted as objective evidence in criteria that will be set out in regulations under clause 10. That means that if a local authority put such a plan in place, that would trigger funding for the party seeking to protect the child.

Providing for legal aid to be available for any family proceedings involving the child, as amendment 98 would do, would mean that legal aid would not be targeted on proceedings about protection of the child, but could be available for proceedings that might not concern protection at all. For example, a case about financial relief for the parents could be covered if an application were made for financial relief for the child. Given that the words “involving a child” do not give much indication of how closely the child needs to be concerned, it might even be that a case between the parents about a matter that did not directly concern the child was included.

Amendment 98 would also provide for legal aid to be available for all parties to the proceedings. We intend to target funding on the protecting party. Where a party is not the person taking action to protect a child from abuse, the same level of importance and risk would not apply.

Amendments 94 and 95 would also widen the availability of legal aid under paragraph 11 beyond the parties seeking to protect the child. That would mean that legal aid would be available for the other party in private law children cases where a child is at risk of abuse. As I have explained, we decided to keep those cases in scope for the protecting party because protecting children from abuse is paramount. Where a party is not the person taking action to protect a child from abuse, the same level of importance and risk would not apply.

The tests we wish to use to determine the availability of legal aid in these cases are designed to be as objective as possible and to minimise the risk of false allegations. The tests are: where there is a criminal conviction or ongoing criminal proceedings for a child abuse offence; where a local authority has put a child protection plan in place to protect the child; or where there is a relevant finding of fact by the family courts that child abuse has occurred. They will provide clear and objective evidence of the risk of abuse. However, if the particular facts of an individual case mean that failure to provide legal aid for both parties would be likely to result in a breach of the individual’s rights under the Human Rights Act or European Union law, exceptional funding would be available.

I turn now to amendments 99 to 102, which seek to retain legal aid provision for all parties in private family cases where the court has made a child a party to proceedings. Identical amendments were debated in Committee. The Government intend to retain legal aid for a child who is a party in these circumstances. However, as we made clear in Committee, we do not accept that, where a child requires representation, adult family members should as a matter of routine also be given legal aid. There are a variety of reasons for a child to be a party, and not all will involve the complexity of a case. In cases where a child is represented, it does not follow that the case will necessarily be so complex or that the child’s involvement will render the case so complex or difficult as to require representation for all parties.

By their nature, some of the cases will be complex, and we recognise that in some circumstances people will be unable to represent themselves, but we think that those cases will be the exception. The exceptional funding arrangements will ensure that legal aid will be available where required. A failure to provide legal aid in cases where people genuinely could not represent themselves would be likely to breach an individual’s right to legal aid under the Human Rights Act or EU law.

I turn now to the immigration amendments, which include technical Government amendments, Government and Opposition amendments relating to domestic violence immigration cases and other amendments seeking to widen the scope of legal aid for refugee family reunion matters and immigration judicial review cases. Government amendments 61 and 62 will amend paragraph 25(1) of part 1 of schedule 1 to correct an omission in the meaning of asylum in the Bill. That will ensure that persons who make a claim to enter or remain in the UK based on the EU qualification directive are eligible for legal aid. Government amendment 60 will make a similar change to paragraph 25 to cover claims based on article 2 of the European convention on human rights, which sets out the right to life. Although most claims for asylum will be made on the basis of the 1951 refugee convention or article 3 of the European convention on human rights, the amendment will allow funding for cases involving execution and the death penalty; serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict; and unlawful killing.

Government amendments 55 to 58 clarify the wording of paragraph 17(7) of part 1 of schedule 1 with regard to the exceptions from scope to the exclusion of certain types of immigration judicial review proceedings. Amendments 55 and 56 will amend paragraph 17(7)(a) to clarify that the exception applies only to a judicial review of a negative decision in relation to an asylum application where there is no right of appeal to the first-tier tribunal against the decision. Amendments 57 and 58 will amend the exception in paragraph 17(7)(b) to add a reference to section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Section 94 allows the Secretary of State to issue a certificate on a number of different grounds, for example when an asylum claim is clearly unfounded. The certificate prevents an appeal to the first-tier tribunal being brought while an individual is in the UK. The amendments clarify the position and ensure that the policy is given effect.

Amendment 83 seeks to maintain within legal aid civil funding certain immigration judicial review cases that are very likely to be without merit. We debated an identical proposition in Committee. These are cases that either have already had a hearing on the same, or substantially the same, issue within a period of one year, or are judicial reviews of removal directions where there is less than one year between the giving of the direction and determination of the decision to remove. In response to our legal aid consultation, the Judges Council highlighted the large number of immigration judicial reviews that were without merit and, in effect, clog up the system. Only a minority of those would receive legal aid. As we made clear in Committee, the Government’s view is that it is wrong in principle for such cases to remain within the scope of funding.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Djanogly]

We do have figures, but I do not happen to have them with me. I will write to the hon. Gentleman with figures. Most judicial review cases are funded privately rather than through legal aid, however, and I say that because I have seen the figures, and one needs to know that to understand them.

Government amendment 59 would amend part 1 of schedule 1 to bring domestic violence immigration rule cases into the scope of legal aid, as I announced to the Public Bill Committee on 19 July.

Government amendment 63 would amend part 3 of schedule 1 to ensure that civil legal aid was available for the advocacy of such cases in the first-tier tribunal. Advocacy will also be available in the upper tribunal by virtue of paragraph 14 of part 3.

Under the domestic violence immigration rule, someone on a spousal visa, which is valid for a limited period of time, and whose relationship has permanently broken down as a result of domestic violence, can apply for indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom. As I said in Committee, we accept that these cases are very unusual and different from other immigration cases, given the real risk that without legal aid spouses will stay trapped in abusive relationships for fear of jeopardising their immigration status. The trauma that they may have suffered will often make it very difficult to cope with that type of application, and they are also under time pressure, because they have only limited access to public funds to avoid destitution, so for those reasons we seek to make these amendments to schedule 1.

Amendment 113 adopts the same wording as the Government amendment I have just discussed, but with two differences—one that I am happy to look at further, and one that I think is unnecessary. First, the amendment would include within the scope of funding, civil legal services provided to an individual in relation to a claim by the individual to a right to reside in the United Kingdom, as well as an application for indefinite leave, when their relationship had broken down permanently as a result of domestic violence. EEA nationals and their spouses or partners, if from a third country, have a long-term right to reside in the UK if they are economically active or able to support themselves without becoming an unreasonable burden on public funds.

The Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006 make provision for third country nationals in such relationships to remain in the UK—that is, their right to reside can continue—if their relationship breaks down as a result of domestic violence. The application is different for those people who apply under the domestic violence immigration rule for indefinite leave to remain. The rules that apply are different. However, I am sure that the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) will be pleased to hear that we are looking further at such cases.

Amendment 113 seeks to replace the definition of abuse adopted in the Government amendment and used elsewhere in part 1 of schedule 1 to the Bill with the definition of domestic violence used by the Association of Chief Police Officers. The existing definition of abuse used in the Bill is a broad and comprehensive one, explicitly not limited to physical violence, and it would cover mental as well as physical abuse, neglect, maltreatment and exploitation. Indeed, it would not exclude from scope any of the types of abuse covered by the definition used by ACPO. Furthermore, the proposed definition of abuse would cover intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender and sexuality. That part of the amendment is superfluous, as the proposed Government amendment relies on the definition of associated persons in the Family Law Act 1996, which is a wide one that would cover the relationships set out in the amendment, and more. The second change proposed in amendment 113 is therefore unnecessary, but we will look at the first. I hope that hon. Members will be reassured by that.

Amendment 145 seeks to bring family reunion cases back into the scope of legal aid, at a cost of about £5 million a year. Those cases involve a person who has been granted asylum or refugee status and who sponsors the applications of their immediate family to join them. They are immigration applications, rather than asylum ones, and they are generally straightforward. The UK Border Agency guidance on these cases sets out the presumption of the granting of an application if the relevant criteria are met. The evidence required, such as marriage and birth certificates, should not require legal assistance to collate. The entry clearance officer may, on occasion, ask for DNA testing to prove the family relationship, but that testing would be free of charge to the applicant. These cases should not require specialist legal advice, and it is not therefore necessary for them to remain within the scope of civil legal aid.

[Simon Hughes (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (LD)]

My office handles a lot of asylum and immigration cases, and of course some of them are entirely straightforward, as the Minister has suggested. Does he accept, however, that some family reunion cases are definitely not straightforward? They might involve a child being in a different country from the mother, or someone not having a passport. There could also be real issues involved in proving the relationship. Will he look again at the opportunity for some cases—I am not arguing for the generality—to be eligible for legal assistance?

[Mr Djanogly]

I certainly agree with my right hon. Friend that some immigration cases are complex, and I think that the point that he has raised is one for me to look at after today. I will do so, and I will come back to him on that.

On the basis of everything that I have just set out, I therefore urge the House to support Government amendments 10, 11, 13 to 18 and 55 to 63. I also hope that right hon. and hon. Members will be reassured by what I have said about the other amendments.

[Mr Slaughter]

I shall try to be a little briefer than the Minister—[Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”] I was about to say that I was going to make some preliminary remarks, but the last time I did that they went on for three hours. I shall address my comments almost exclusively to amendment 74, which stands in my name. The Opposition also fully support amendment 23, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), which deals with the related matter of domestic violence. I give notice that we hope to press amendment 74 to a vote later this evening.

The Minister was slightly dismissive when he said that a number of the amendments on domestic violence had been dealt with in similar terms in Committee. They were indeed, and they were dealt with in some of the Committee’s most heated sittings. He has again shown a rather dismissive manner today, although Labour Members gave him a very clear expression of what they think of the Government’s attitude in the Bill to domestic violence. Perhaps he needs to get out more to see what is happening in the real world.

At 1 o’clock today, for example, the Minister could have attended the launch in Committee Room 8 of “Legal Aid is a Lifeline”, in which women speak out on the legal aid reforms. This report on domestic violence was produced jointly by the National Federation of Women’s Institutes and Justice for All. He could have heard the stark, moving testimony of women such as Jenny Broomfield and Sam Taylor, who were—let us make no bones about it—the victims of attempted murder by violent partners who, in at least one case, continued to stalk and pursue them for many years. They find quite abhorrent the Government’s attempt to restrict the criteria to 12 months, which amendment 74 seeks to change, and to restrict the terms of domestic violence. Those women relied on legal aid, in its current form, to get residence for their children, to find a safe place to live and to obtain a separation from their violent partners. They believe that, without it, their plight today would be much worse than it is.

Earlier this afternoon, the Housing Minister launched a very good report by St Mungo’s entitled “Battered, broken, bereft”, one of the leading findings of which was that 35% of women who have slept rough left home to escape domestic violence. It shows double standards and hypocrisy for the Government to cut provisions to tackle domestic violence on the same day in the Commons Chamber. I urge the Minister to listen to voices such as that of the Mayor of London, whose briefing for this debate states:

“The Mayor would like assurances that women who have experienced domestic violence will not be barred from legal aid due to their having a lack of evidence.”

I would also like the Minister to listen to organisations such as Gingerbread, which states:

“Many individuals experiencing violence do not report that violence to the police or seek an injunction via the family courts. This is for a variety of reasons, including lack of faith in the justice system and fear that instigating proceedings would escalate violence. The evidential criteria in the Bill do not reflect the pathways that victims of domestic violence take to find help and support. The eligibility criteria must be broadened to include other forms of evidence such as evidence from a specialist domestic violence support organisation, health or social services.”

Those are the voices that the Minister should be listening to, as well as those that he hears in the Chamber today. So far, he has not done so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Helen Goodman]

As the Minister said, we debated this issue in general at some length in Committee. I shall speak in support of amendments 23, 74 and 96 to 98.

A central concern is the narrow and restrictive definition of “domestic violence” that the Minister is putting into the Bill. Once again, we have heard remarks from him that demonstrate his lack of understanding and his lack of sympathy for people in this situation. He said in Committee, and he said again today, that his criteria

“all avoid self-reporting and involve a significant level of state intervention.”

That is indeed the case. The problem is that in taking that approach, he is treating women as if they are not adults capable of self-reporting. That is why many Labour Members feel that he is taking us back 30 years. He said:

“We are concerned that to include admission to a refuge in the criteria would be to rely on self-reporting”.

He said that he is

“not persuaded that the medical professionals would be best placed to assess whether domestic violence has occurred”

even though

“they may witness injuries”.

He said that he does not believe that, in themselves, allegations of domestic violence are objective. He said, as he said again today, that the tests he wishes to use

“are designed…to minimise the risk of false allegations.”––[Official Report, Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Public Bill Committee, 6 September 2011; c. 359-64.]

That is a problem. If his objective is to minimise the risk of false allegations, then his objective is not to maximise the support that women need.

Following the extremely concerning debate that we had in Committee, on 8 September I wrote to the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green (Lynne Featherstone), who is responsible for issues relating to women and equalities. On 25 October, I finally received a reply, in which she says:

“You make the point that the definition of domestic violence used in the Bill is much narrower than the ACPO definition. My understanding is that the definition of “abuse” in the Bill is a broad one…We have been assured by the Ministry of Justice that the definition used would not exclude, for the purposes of legal aid and private family law cases, any of the types of abuse covered by the definition used by ACPO.”

This letter is quite extraordinary. She goes on to say:

“The Government is clear that objective evidence will be needed to ensure that legal aid in private family cases is focused on those who may be intimidated and unable to assert their rights as a result of domestic violence or the risk of harm by the other party to the proceedings”.

Her reliance on the assurances from the Ministry of Justice that its definition is the same as that used by ACPO leads me to ask two questions. First, what is the point of a Minister for Equalities who does not check with the rest of the world what is going on? Secondly, did the Minister tell her that his definition was the same as the ACPO one, when everybody knows that that is not the case?

The Minister for Equalities could easily have listened to the Bar Council—not, one would think, a wild group of left-wingers who are determined to promote a feminist picture of the world. One would think that she might have listened to it. It wrote to many Members this week.

[Mr Djanogly]

It is the case that the ACPO definition and the definition in the Bill are broadly similar.

[Helen Goodman]

Broadly, yes, but not precisely—that is the problem. About an hour and a half ago, the Minister accused hon. Members of dancing on pinheads. He is now the one who is doing that. We have demonstrated that under his definition, some 20,000 victims of domestic violence will not get legal aid each year who would get it currently. That is the problem.

I remind the Minister of what the Bar Council is saying:

“The narrow definition of domestic abuse, which is more restrictive than that used by the Home Office and the Association of Chief Police Officers and will limit legal aid to victims of certain ‘types’ of abuse”.

It states that there are:

“Excessively narrow referral mechanisms for victims of domestic abuse, who will not be eligible for civil legal aid if, for example, they have been admitted to a refuge but have chosen not to bring proceedings against their abusive partner”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ben Gummer]

Again, I regret what the shadow Minister has said. On several occasions, I have sat through three hours of speeches from him in Committee—

[Mr Djanogly]

One speech.

[Ben Gummer]

That was one speech. On several occasions, we had three-hour speeches where points were recycled and regurgitated without use to the legislative process. It is unfortunate that the hon. Gentleman claims that I am padding things out, as I hope that I am addressing points not yet raised in this Chamber. I am going to do so briefly. I feel I should do so, as although I am happy to admit that I am not someone from a legal background and that I do not have a previous interest in this area of domestic violence, I have the experience of sitting in the Public Bill Committee and understanding the arguments put both by the Opposition and the Government in this difficult area. I speak as a layman and I hope to offer my support to points made by Members on both sides of the House.

On amendment 113, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), we face a small issue about whether people from the European economic area are caught within this legislation. It will cover only a small handful of people, but the inevitable consequence of missing it out—if that happens—is that there will be some travesty and miscarriage of justice precisely in a case where someone falls through the gap. I hope that the Government will carefully examine that suggestion in the first half of the amendment.

I also fully support what my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon said about undertakings. I have heard much evidence from people practising in this field who give a reasonable argument that a counter-productive eventuality of this Bill is that, if undertakings are excluded, it could end up greatly prolonging cases, and not only to the detriment of litigants: it would also affect the costs of the court. I hope that his constructive and sensible suggestions, which come with considerable experience of sitting on the bench and acting as counsel, will be taken up by the Government as the fair-minded suggestions that they are.

More broadly, we have a problem on self-reporting. I hope that hon. Members, especially Labour Members, will bear me out on this. Anyone who has contact with the family courts and who talks to family judges will know about the impact that allegations of child abuse have had in private law cases. In the opinion of many counsel and judges, in the past few years, allegations of child abuse have increasingly been made far too readily when no substance is behind the claims. It would be unfortunate if, under the new regime, allegations of domestic abuse and domestic violence were made as a precept to gain legal aid, because that would devalue the claims other people make completely legitimately. That is what is happening in the courts at the moment with allegations of child abuse. Several judges have remarked to me that so often is it claimed that one party or another has committed child abuse, it is beginning to numb the senses of the judges hearing those cases. It would be wrong if a similar situation were to arise with this new regime. The Government must therefore phrase the definition of domestic violence very carefully.

I hope that the Government have heard the concerns of Opposition and Government Members, such as those of my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon, those that my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe has voiced on several occasions, and those raised today by my hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Mrs Grant). I can hear from the way in which the Minister has been replying that he understands that some sort of uniformity would be desirable across government and that some recognition of the problems of encapsulating a definition within the Bill will be made here or in another place.

The Opposition went into the last election saying that they would seek cuts to legal aid and that promise has been reiterated both by the Leader of the Opposition, in January, and the shadow Secretary of State, who is sitting on the Front Bench, on several occasions. However, in Committee, the shadow Minister tabled dozens of amendments, some of which were, by his own admission, contradictory and many of which were culled from the handouts given by lobbyists, which extended considerably the Committee’s deliberations when we could have been discussing the meat of the proposals as we have tried to do today. He came to the House with a new amendment having denied the Public Bill Committee the ability to consider properly many of the issues that we should have discussed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ben Gummer]

I am just coming to that if the hon. Gentleman will listen.

When they table amendments, the Opposition have a duty to explain how their changes would be paid for and what balances would be made elsewhere in the Bill, but so far we have had nothing to substantiate how they would do that, and neither do we have any idea how their changes would fit into the general pattern of the Bill. I cannot therefore vote for their amendment or that of the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion—amendment 113 —as neither is complete and nor have they been properly discussed.

In conclusion, I hope that we can continue our proceedings without trying to politicise the issue of domestic violence. I hope we can discuss the precise provisions in the Bill without throwing what I feel have been intemperate and sometimes misjudged accusations at one side purely because they happen to disagree with the assertions put by the other.

[Mr Djanogly]

First, let me confirm to my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) and other hon. Members that I have listened carefully to the debate, which has been informed and varied. A significant number of general and more specific issues have come up in our deliberations. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Ben Gummer) that the debate has, in some ways, become too polarised given the significant agreement and consensus among all hon. Members about the need to counter domestic violence.

Given the number of issues to address, it is hard to know where to start, but I shall begin with the definition of abuse, which was mentioned by the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd) and the hon. Members for Stretford and Urmston (Kate Green), for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) and for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman). The accusation is that the definition of abuse in the Bill narrows the scope of legal aid in comparison with ACPO’s definition. The right hon. Gentleman said that the Bill weakened the definition of abuse. I can confirm to the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion that the definition in the Bill does not require physical abuse. Both the ACPO definition and the Bill definition are very broad and embrace abuse that is not physical, and it is difficult to see what description of behaviour in the ACPO definition would not be covered by the broad description of physical or mental abuse used in the Bill.

The right hon. Gentleman suggested that I said in Committee that to widen the definition of domestic violence would induce self-reporting. As I think my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich was heading towards saying, that confuses the definition of abuse, which determines scope, and the criteria for an individual to qualify. The definition of abuse in the Bill is broad and it is difficult to see how it does not cover that which is covered by the ACPO definition. Neither definition says anything about how abuse is to be evidenced.

My hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon injected a sense of balance into the debate and I noted his condemnation of archaic and unacceptable language. I think we can all agree on that.

The right hon. Gentleman spoke about the Bill and ACPO definitions of domestic violence. To put an end to this issue, let me say that if any right hon. or hon. Member can write to me with a specific, concrete example of abuse that would be covered by the ACPO definition but not by the definition in the Bill I will give the issue serious consideration.

[Kate Green]

I am not going to give the Minister an example of that. If he is so sure that there is such an overlap, why not use the ACPO definition?

[Mr Djanogly]

I look forward to the hon. Lady providing her reasons why that should be the case.

The right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd made a significant number of points for his significant number of amendments, most of which I covered in my preliminary remarks, and I do not intend to go over them all again. However, he mentioned two particular points that I did not cover, so if he does not mind I will concentrate on those.

It is not clear that amendments 92 or 93 would widen the category of services described in paragraph 10 significantly or at all. The definition of abuse used in the Bill is intentionally broad and not limited to physical violence, but it embraces physical or mental abuse. Abuse is stated to include sexual abuse and abuse in the form of violence, neglect, maltreatment and exploitation, but it is not limited to those examples. Therefore, we believe that it is sufficiently flexible to cover cases of genuine abuse, as is the intention. Both amendments refer to physical and mental abuse, which are already explicitly referred to in the Bill’s definition. Additionally, they refer to threatening behaviour, violence and emotional abuse, which are clearly within the scope of physical and mental abuse and so are unnecessary and add nothing to the breadth of the category.

Further reference is made to financial abuse. It is not entirely clear what that would cover outside the context of serious cases where the treatment of one party by the other in relation to the family finances amounts to physical or, in particular, mental abuse, which would include neglect, maltreatment and exploitation in the Bill’s definition, where it is clearly within the definition of abuse in the Bill. Where the financial abuse does not amount to or form part of physical or mental abuse, it could be argued that the amendment would widen the gateway beyond what might be ordinarily understood as abusive behaviour, but in a way where the effect is unclear. For instance, there is no special reference to financial abuse in the provisions of the Family Law Act 1996 to protect against domestic violence or in case law, in contrast to emotional or psychological abuse, so it is questionable what it would add in this regard.

However, the amendment also stipulates that any incident of abuse would suffice to come within the category. On one construction, that would make no difference since the existing definition does not require a course of conduct, but on another construction it might be argued that the explicit reference to any incident could be read as a fetter on the power to define what would be accepted as sufficient evidence of abuse through secondary legislation. That is because the type of evidence acceptable will reflect a certain degree of seriousness. For instance, a family court will not generally make orders relating to minor, one-off incidents, although it will do so in appropriate circumstances, such as a course of conduct of trivial incidents adding up to something more serious.

It is not clear that any challenge to secondary legislation requiring forms of evidence that in themselves are unlikely to arise from minor, single incidents would have any prospect of success, but the risk cannot be entirely ruled out. Were it impossible to prescribe the forms of evidence proposed to date, we estimate that the consequent opening up of eligibility would at the very least double the cost of the domestic violence gateway to £130 million per annum.

The part of amendment 23 that refers to violence or abuse

“between adults who are or have been intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender or sexuality”

is superfluous, since it duplicates the effect of paragraph 10(7), which sets out that for the purposes of the paragraph there is a family relationship between two people if they are associated with each other. That “associated” has the same meaning as set out in part 4 of the 1996 Act, where it is defined very widely and covers a range of relationships no less wide, and in some instances wider, than the ACPO definition.

Amendment 93 would widen the domestic violence gateway so that legal aid would be available for the potential victim in private family law cases where there has been an as yet unproven allegation of abuse, or of the risk of abuse. It would make the gateway extremely wide and, in effect, would mean that self-reporting would have to be accepted as sufficient evidence of domestic violence, making any other evidentiary requirements redundant. It would be difficult to limit very far the forms of evidence of an allegation of abuse, or of the risk of abuse, that would be accepted. We estimate that that would at the very least double the cost of the domestic violence gateway to £130 million per annum.

The amendment refers to allegations that person B has been abused by person A. In paragraph 10 of schedule 1, it is person A who is the victim, and person B who is the abuser—the other way around. However, the amendment does not change the opening proposition, which is that the services are provided to person A. This appears to have the perverse consequence that if the proven abuser, person B, alleges that the proven victim, person A, was the abuser, person A would qualify more easily for legal aid as they would then have to give as evidence only an allegation by person B of abuse or the risk of abuse. That is almost certainly a drafting error, but if it is not, and the intention is instead to ensure that legal aid would be available where either party might be the victim of abuse, that would be unnecessary.

In relation to amendment 97, the intended effect is unnecessary because section 37 proceedings are public law matters and it would be possible, in private law proceedings, for a court that is considering a section 37 order to adjourn so that the parents, if they are not already represented, may have access to legal aid and representation under the public law heading. The actual effect is rather wider. However, the amendment would bring the whole of family proceedings, such as proceedings for residence and contact with children, into scope where the court considers making a section 37 direction, rather than simply consideration of that point. Again, this may be a matter of defective drafting, but if so the entire amendment would be superfluous.

The right hon. Gentleman also asked whether an adjournment would introduce a delay in protecting a child. We would expect a court to adjourn a hearing only if it considered it safe to do so. The only way to avoid the potential of being a section 37 direction being made at a hearing involving unrepresented parents would be by providing legal aid for all private law children cases, which we believe would be a disproportionate response. There is already the potential for section 37 directions to be made in cases involving litigants in person under the present system, but as I have said, legal aid is available and will be in future to challenge such a direction.

A significant number of comments were made in relation to amendment 74. The hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) indicated that he will want to press it to a Division, so I will spend some time on it. I agree that it is an important matter. He said that he understands our intent. Does he understand that we need to have savings in legal aid? I am not sure what he meant when he said that he understands our intent—[Interruption.] He says that he will address that in a later debate, but I think that it is quite an important issue. In contrast to what he said, his right hon. Friend the shadow Secretary of State recognised in an article published only this morning that

“cuts need to be made”.

Looking at the amendments tabled by Opposition Members, I cannot see where those cuts will be made. We have had a little look at what they are proposing. The estimated costs of the Opposition amendments are: £20 million in debt matters, £5 million in employment matters, £15 million in housing matters, £25 million in welfare benefits matters, £10 million in clinical negligence matters and £170 million in family law matters. The total is £245 million. The taxpayer deserves to know where the money for that will come from.

Let me address the actual effect of amendment 74. To set out in the Bill the circumstances as specified in the amendment that should be accepted as evidence of domestic violence for the purposes of legal aid for the victim in a private family law case would mean that those circumstances, but not those that the Government intend to accept as evidence of domestic violence, would be set out in primary legislation. The Government would therefore have no power at all to amend those circumstances through secondary legislation. They would be in addition to any circumstances set out in secondary legislation for providing appropriate evidence of abuse. We expect that significantly more cases would receive funding if the circumstances set out in either amendment were accepted as evidence. The hon. Member for Edinburgh East (Sheila Gilmore) and others mentioned their concern about the issue of incentives for false allegations of domestic violence, but we received a significant number of responses to the consultation that expressed concern that there might be a rise in unfounded allegations of domestic violence, and the respondents expressing such concerns included the Law Society and the Bar Council.

[Fiona Mactaggart]

The hon. Gentleman is concerned that there might be a rise in unfounded allegations of domestic violence, but does he accept that if his proposals go through there will be an increase in the number of women who are victims of domestic violence and unable to access legal aid?

[Mr Djanogly]

No. Our proposals are aimed at ensuring that those who are subjected to domestic violence are kept within the scope of legal aid.

Many hon. Members have said, “Shouldn’t any incident of abuse trigger legal aid?” Some have said that we should limit it, and the hon. Member for Hammersmith has put in certain but, given his amendment, not very many limitations. The hon. Member for Edinburgh East accused me of being obsessed with false claims. I am not, but we need to appreciate that such a provision would have serious financial consequences, as it would lead to funding in cases in which the abusive behaviour, although unacceptable, might be very marginal.

Clearly, a single incident of abuse can be very serious, but a single one-off incident of non-physical abuse, such as angry and upsetting words spoken during an argument, can be relatively minor, because they have no real effect on the victim’s ultimate ability to face the other party in proceedings.

On amendment 74, specifically, my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon, my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) and my hon. Friends the Members for Ipswich and for Maidstone and The Weald (Mrs Grant) asked whether we would accept undertakings given in civil proceedings as evidence of domestic violence, and I will look at that issue further. The Government’s current position is that a person can give an undertaking, for instance not to be violent towards family members, without admitting to domestic violence, meaning that undertakings may be given in cases where domestic violence has not taken place. We do not think that undertakings would provide sufficiently clear objective evidence that domestic violence has occurred, but we shall look into that further.

My hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone and The Weald also asked whether the fact that the definition of abuse is not specific will make its use more difficult in court, but the definition in the Bill will not be used in proceedings for domestic violence orders under the Family Law Act 1996. There is no definition at all of domestic violence in the 1996 Act, but the courts have experienced no difficulties, so neither the Bill’s definition nor the ACPO definition will be used in such proceedings.

The hon. Member for Hammersmith discussed a finding of fact in a family law court, and he asked how people would get legal aid in that context. They will not get legal aid to bring the case, as legal aid will be triggered only when the court has made a finding of fact, but an applicant will be able to submit written evidence of any abuse if relevant to proceedings, and a judge will be able to intervene to prevent inappropriate questioning.

Several hon. Members, including the hon. Gentleman, made a series of points about the specifics of amendment 74, so let me deal with those, including what would be accepted from various people as evidence in order to qualify for domestic violence. Accepting police cautions would be inconsistent with our proposal to include in the criteria “criminal convictions unless that conviction is spent”, as simple cautions are not convictions and become spent immediately.

A harassment warning is notice that a complaint has been received by the police; it is not considered to be proof that an offence has occurred, and police are not obliged to investigate the allegation. We therefore do not consider that harassment warnings would provide sufficiently clear objective evidence that domestic violence has occurred.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Beith]

What that 61% success rate on appeal demonstrates is a bad decision-making system. Ought not the Minister be more sympathetic to the Justice Committee’s view that Departments that make their decisions so badly that they generate large numbers of successful appeals should be penalised, perhaps even to the extent of contributing to a fund for the advice agencies that help the people who are affected?

[Mr Djanogly]

My right hon. Friend makes a good point. High levels of successful appeals perhaps show that too many cases are going before the tribunals in the first place. The other day, I saw a figure of about 80% for special educational needs tribunals, which was not very impressive either. I can also tell him that I am personally engaging with Ministers in the Home Office, the Department for Work and Pensions and the Department for Education with the specific intention of getting them to work with the Department of Justice to improve their initial decision making. I am pleased to say that they are all are working with us, and that they want to make the system better. This is a matter of significant concern to me, not least because I would like to see fewer appeals relating to my Department coming through the courts and tribunals.

The hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) talked about domestic violence, immigration and legal aid. She also talked about people who fall outside the domestic violence immigration rule, such as EEA nationals. As I mentioned earlier, we are looking at cases of EEA spouses who have suffered dramatic abuse. The right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd mentioned immigration judicial reviews. I think that he accused the Government of putting appellants into a Catch-22 situation because legal aid would not be available for immigration appeals or for some judicial reviews. I can tell him, however, that people will still be able to appeal immigration decisions themselves and, as is often the case at the moment, they will still be able to get legal aid for a subsequent judicial review, as long as it is not on exactly the same or substantially similar issues, or on a removal direction. As I said earlier, we are making various exceptions to the exclusions, which will include ensuring that, when there has been no possibility of an appeal, legal aid will remain for judicial review.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark raised various points about immigration, and I will write to him about those. He specifically mentioned children, as did other hon. Members, so I shall briefly address that point. In most immigration cases, a child’s interests are represented by their parent or guardian. Most cases in which a child is unaccompanied involve an asylum claim, and legal aid will remain for those cases as at present. Unaccompanied children with an asylum or immigration issue would have a social worker assigned to them, whose role would include helping the child to gain access to the same advice and support as a child who was permanently settled in the UK. They could also offer assistance with filling in forms and explaining terms, and give emotional support. Legal support in such immigration cases may be found, if needed, from law centres and from pro bono legal representation. The Refugee Council provides services for separated children, which can include litigation friends.

A number of hon. Members asked how we justified plans that could disproportionately affect women. That question has also been asked in relation to disabled people, ethnic minorities and people who live in rural areas. The equalities impact assessment, published alongside the Government’s response to consultation, sets out our analysis of how the reforms will affect people with protected characteristics as set out in the Equality Act 2010. We have identified the potential for the reforms to have a greater impact on some groups, but we believe that those impacts are proportionate, and justified by the need to meet our objectives, including the pressing need to make savings from legal aid. We are also keeping discrimination claims relating to a contravention of the Equality Act 2010 within the scope of legal aid, which we consider will make a significant contribution to the fulfilment of our public sector equality duty.

The hon. Member for Stretford and Urmston asked about the removal of legal aid in many family cases, which she said would remove access to justice from many people. She asked how that could be right. Legal aid will remain available for family mediation and private family law cases, including private law children and family proceedings and ancillary relief proceedings. We want to encourage more use of such mediation. In ancillary relief cases, courts will be able to make orders for payment against a third party or a party who has the means to fund the costs of representation for the other party. Removing costly and often unnecessary legal aid does not mean removing access to justice. Litigants in person already feature in the justice system. Judges and magistrates currently assist litigants in person without compromising their impartiality, and we expect that to continue.

Finally, I was asked whether we expect all cases to be resolved through mediation. As I said earlier, the answer is categorically no. Cases involving domestic violence and child abuse, and emergency cases will still not be required to go through mediation. In addition, exceptional funding will be available when necessary for the UK to meet its international and domestic legal obligations via a proposed scheme for excluded cases. On that note, I rest my case.

Amendment 10 agreed to.

[Mr Elfyn Llwyd]

I beg to move amendment 80, page 99, line 21, leave out ‘other than’ and insert ‘including’.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Buckland]

I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner), who speaks from professional and personal experience on these matters. I am profoundly grateful to him for his candour and passion. I am also grateful to the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd), a fellow practitioner from Wales, who has considerable experience of these matters.

I rise to reinforce some of the points that have been made about some aspects of the proposed reforms. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Minister will accept that it is difficult to define an exceptional case. By the very nature of the category that the Legal Services Commission uses to deal with exceptional cases, they are indefinable. I accept that he will therefore find it difficult to assure us categorically that all cases that cause proper concern—particularly the complex cases involving young children who have had difficulties at birth—will be covered by the Government’s proposals.

We are right to raise these concerns. Clinical negligence cases are somewhat unusual in that the expenditure is incurred at the beginning. The firms of solicitors dealing with such cases are often not the big firms that live in the City of London, but the firms of partners who have developed a degree of experience in such cases and who understand how to relate to the families of people who have suffered from alleged clinical negligence. However, such firms do not necessarily have the resources to enable them to spend lots of money on the preliminary medical investigations that are essential in preparing the ground in such cases.

I support the remarks made by my hon. Friend the Member for Hexham (Guy Opperman), who, in his excellent speech, raised the possibility of producing a joint report, at the beginning of each case, for the NHS—the defendant—and the claimant. That is a good point to make, but we are not in that position yet; we are still in an adversarial position. My deep worry is that a lot of cases will go without the necessary representation or help because those firms do not have the resources to dip into their pockets and to pay the thousands of pounds that are needed to prepare a case for making a claim.

I speak from experience, having served as a member of a funding review panel for some 10 years, and having dealt with appeals made by solicitors against the refusal or revocation of legal aid certificates in cases of clinical negligence. It would be wrong to say that a carte blanche exists at the moment. Even now, it is not easy for solicitors to satisfy the Legal Services Commission. I want to ask the Government to think carefully about the observations made by Members on both sides of the House, and to hesitate before seeking to implement the full thrust of these proposals.

There are several ways of dealing with this question. The first would be the full retention of legal aid for such cases. Another would be its retention for those aged 18 or under who are making claims against the NHS for clinical negligence. A further option would be to allow the provision of legal funding for initial advice and assistance in the preparation of reports before the commencement of any proceedings. Such an option would not cover representation, but it would deal with the preliminary stages. I ask the Government to consider those alternatives very carefully. I know that this matter will be hotly debated in another place, where I am sure full account will be taken not only of what we have said here tonight but of any observations that are made there.

[Mr Djanogly]

Let me first set out the scope of what we are talking about. Clinical negligence spend through legal aid in 2009-10 was about £17 million, consisting of around £1 million for legal help and around £16 million for representation. Closed-case volumes for legal representation in clinical negligence in 2009-10 were just over 2,300. It is estimated that removing clinical negligence from scope will save around £17 million per annum on legal help and representation, taking account of the exceptional funding regime and the estimated income from the supplementary legal aid scheme. Continued spend of £6 million through exceptional funding of the £16 million currently spent on representation in clinical negligence is foreseen. NHS figures for 2010-11 show that 82% of clinical negligence cases, where the funding method is known, were funded by means other than legal aid. That is the current situation.

The NHS Litigation Authority figures for 2010-11 show that of 2,002 legally aided claims, some 718 were claims for children, which represented 36% of claims funded through legal aid. Annexe B of the Government’s impact assessment on the reforms to conditional fee agreements sets out estimated savings of £50 million to the NHS Litigation Authority as a result of abolishing recoverability of success fees, and after-the-event insurance premiums.

[Amber Rudd (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

On the impact assessment, have the Government assessed how many children who would previously have qualified for clinical negligence aid will no longer qualify when the changes go through?

[Mr Djanogly]

That is hard to say, because it depends on the extent to which children will come within the scope of exceptional funding, but we believe that the figure for exceptional funding will be £6 million, and that a significant proportion of that would be related to children’s claims. I will return to that.

The figure does not account for the NHS Litigation Authority paying after-the-event insurance premiums for policies covering the cost of expert reports in some cases. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Stephen Phillips) made that point very well. Based on figures published by the compensation recovery unit on claims settled, clinical negligence cases made up just over 1% of personal injury claims in 2010-11.

While Opposition Members were speaking, a thought came to my mind. Clinical negligence forms about 1% of the wider personal injury market. The last Government ended legal aid for personal injury claims, except in relation to clinical negligence. I am looking for help from Opposition Members because it is bizarre to hear them defend their position with such vehemence and conviction when their party scrapped 99% of this category. Let me develop the point.

Labour Members seem to be saying that if a drunk driver hit someone and caused brain damage, the injured person would not get legal aid. But if the same victim were brain-damaged to the same extent by a negligent doctor, they seem to be saying that that person should get legal aid—[Interruption.] If I have missed something, I am all ears. The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner) may want to explain why I am wrong. The Opposition must find some consistency in their position.

[Mr Llwyd]

The difference between those two cases is that the person damaged by a drunk driver would undoubtedly claim against the Motor Insurers Bureau, and would be covered.

[Mr Djanogly]

The injured person could make a claim, but so could the person who suffered clinical negligence. The point is, as the hon. Gentleman knows, that the position is inconsistent.

We recognise that many clinical negligence cases involve serious issues, but for most a conditional fee agreement will be a suitable alternative to public funding. According to NHS figures for 2010-11, 82% of clinical negligence cases, where the funding method is known, were funded by means other than legal aid. That is the current position. We therefore consider that legal aid is not justified in such cases, and that our limited funding would be better targeted at other priority areas, such as those involving physical safety, liberty and homelessness. However, we have proposed an exceptional funding scheme to ensure that some individual clinical negligence cases will continue to receive legal aid when failure to do so would be likely to result in a breach of the individual’s right to legal aid under the Human Rights Act 1998 or European Union law.

In considering whether exceptional funding should be granted, we will take into account the client’s ability to present their own case, the complexity of the matter, the importance of the issues at stake, and all other relevant circumstances. As I said to my hon. Friend the Member for Hastings and Rye (Amber Rudd), our impact assessment estimates that we will continue to spend some £6 million of the £16 million that we currently spend on representation in clinical negligence cases.

[Sarah Newton (Truro and Falmouth) (Con)]

I understand the point that my hon. Friend is trying to make, but there is still great concern among my hon. Friends about what help will be available for vulnerable young children who have experienced harm as a result of medical negligence. Can he help us to understand that?

[Mr Djanogly]

As I have said before, we estimate that the vast majority of the £6 million will be for complex and lengthy cases that concern cerebral palsy, brain-damaged children or adult paralysis. We believe that no-win conditional fee agreements will still be available to fund these claims in the new regime. In addition, our reforms provide for a power allowing recoverability of after-the-event premiums in clinical negligence claims to help cover the cost of expert reports in complex clinical negligence cases. We have also announced plans to implement qualified one-way cost shifting in clinical negligence cases, which would mean that claimants would not be at risk of paying their opponents’ costs, as is the case with legal aid. Where CFAs are not available, the exceptional funding scheme will allow funding to be granted in individual excluded cases where the failure to provide funding would be likely to result in a breach of the individual’s human rights.

[Neil Carmichael]

CFAs are awarded in circumstances where the parents will be in a state of considerable grief, or at least have a huge amount of concern, about the well-being of their child, so will there be a sensitive enough arrangement for making the awards and assessing the circumstances?

[Mr Djanogly]

Indeed. As is currently the case, the solicitors awarding the CFA would have to look at the merits and decide whether they wanted to proceed with it. Obviously, the person has to want to instruct the solicitor and the solicitor has to want to take the case; it would cut both ways.

There have been a lot of comments about what assessment has been made of the effects on the NHS of removing clinical negligence from the scope of legal aid. In response to a parliamentary question, the Department of Health indicated that

“the potential effect on the national health service of removing clinical negligence from the scope of Legal Aid will be cost neutral.”—[Official Report, 14 September 2011; Vol. 532, c. 1231W.]

In annexe B of the impact assessment on the reforms, we estimate savings of £50 million to the NHS Litigation Authority as a result of the abolition. My officials are in ongoing consultations and discussions with the NHSLA and stakeholders about how the commissioning of expert reports can be improved so that, for instance, joint reports can be commissioned wherever possible. This, in turn, would help to encourage early notification of claims.

One particular aspect of clinical negligence cases is the significant up-front costs involved in obtaining expert reports. Following consultation, the Government are seeking a tightly drawn power in the Bill to allow the recoverability of after-the-event insurance premiums in clinical negligence cases. The details will be set out in regulations. My hon. Friend the Member for Hexham (Guy Opperman), who lent us the benefit of his considerable experience in the clinical negligence field, made some important points in this regard.

We have to make some difficult choices about legal aid, and we need to focus our limited resources on those who need it most.

[Claire Perry (Devizes) (Con)]

Will the Minister clarify whether eligibility will be income based or based on the child’s condition, vulnerability or need?

[Mr Djanogly]

My hon. Friend’s point goes back to children and their eligibility on the basis of income. A certificate is issued in the name of the minor or the patient and it is their resources that are assessed in the normal way, not those of the litigation friend, children’s guardian or guardian ad litem who is bringing or defending the proceedings on their behalf.

However, in family cases where the applicant for funding is a child, the resources of a parent, guardian or any other person who is responsible for maintaining him or her, or who usually contributes substantially to his or her maintenance, are required to be treated as his or her resources unless, having regard to all the circumstances, including the age and resources of the child and any conflict of interest, it appears inequitable to do so. The applying solicitor should submit appropriate means forms for the child and parents or others responsible for or contributing to his or her maintenance or, more usually in the first instance, explain in the application itself why non-aggregation of means would be appropriate in the circumstances of the particular case, having regard to the position of each of the parents or others on the issues in the case and the party status of the child.

Where children have sufficient understanding to decide that they want to seek an order in family proceedings for themselves and actually start proceedings, there may be no conflict with one or both parents and it may be reasonable to take the means of the parents, or one of them, into account. However, where a child is joined as a party in ongoing proceedings by an order of the court, the assessing officer is likely to accept that the party status of the child justifies non-aggregation.

I hope that that answers my hon. Friend’s point.

[Guy Opperman]

On the tricky issue of cerebral palsy among children, would the Minister consider persuading NHS trusts in all such cases, of which there are not many, to commission an independent report as a first step, before any application for legal aid is made?

[Mr Djanogly]

My response to that applies more broadly than to just cerebral palsy. We believe that the NHS Litigation Authority should more frequently take the initiative in the preparation of reports. Where possible, there should be joint reports, not least to help cases along more swiftly.

Our approach means that public funding will not be available for each and every claim involving a public authority, but it will be available for the most serious cases and to address serious abuses. Most claims for damages will be removed from the scope of legal aid because we have sought to focus our limited resources on cases where the client’s life, liberty, physical safety or home is at risk. Therefore, we do not consider that most claims seeking financial compensation from public authorities merit public funding. However, the Bill ensures that legal aid is available for the most serious damages claims that concern an abuse of position or power, or a significant breach of human rights by a public authority.

[Mr Desmond Swayne (New Forest West) (Con)]

That is the third time that my hon. Friend has referred to human rights. It is as if he was deliberately rubbing salt into the wounds. Members would prefer it, certainly those on the Conservative Benches, if money was available for medical negligence cases, rather than for human rights cases.

[Mr Djanogly]

I am referring to human rights mainly in relation to exceptional cases where the money would indeed go towards satisfying someone’s medical negligence claim.

Other claims will be excluded from scope and alternative sources of funding, such as conditional fee arrangements, may be available for meritorious claims. I confirm for my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) that we always have an open mind on these issues. I am happy to engage with him as the Bill progresses.

[Mr Slaughter]

It is good to hear the Minister talking about possible future concessions in this area. To be fair to him, he has always said that the Government’s aim is to protect the most vulnerable. How does he square that with the fact that he has orchestrated the talking out of the main group of amendments today, which affects many of the lowest-income and most vulnerable people in this country? Why are we not getting on to talking about other areas of social welfare law? Is it to protect the hon. Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland), whose law centre is losing all its funding? Is it to protect the Minister’s coalition allies from withdrawing—

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I think that we have got the gist of it.

[Mr Djanogly]

I say to the hon. Gentleman that I have enjoyed listening to my hon. Friends and to some of his hon. Friends this evening, in what has been a very informed debate. We have heard some expert contributions, not least from my hon. Friend the Member for Hexham, who started by saying that he had acted in 100 clinical negligence cases. I do not think that there has been any time wasting at all—not nearly as much time wasting as when the hon. Gentleman held a three-hour debate on the first group of amendments on the first day in Committee.

[Mr Slaughter]

We spent the first 10 minutes of this debate talking about the Minister’s declaration of interests, which was very substantially overdue. All I would say to him, as a last contribution, is that many people will be watching this debate tonight, particularly in another place. They will draw their own conclusions from his unwillingness to debate those issues.

[Mr Djanogly]

I hope those many people will be as unimpressed as I am by what the hon. Gentleman just said.

Let me address the interaction of legal aid and the Jackson proposals, which was mentioned by three or four hon. Members. In addition to reforming legal aid, the Government are introducing fundamental reform of no win, no fee conditional fee agreements, as recommended by Lord Justice Jackson. During the consultation on his recommendations, concerns were raised about the funding of expert reports in clinical negligence cases. Those reports can be expensive and we need to provide a means of funding them to ensure that meritorious claims can be brought by those who cannot readily afford to pay for them up front. That is why, in making changes to the CFA regime, we are making special arrangements for the funding of expert reports in clinical negligence claims.

The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East suggested that victims of clinical negligence who take their cases on CFAs will lose their damages in legal fees. As recommended by Lord Justice Jackson, we are reforming CFAs because of the high costs introduced by changes that were made by the previous Government in relation to the recoverability of success fees and after-the-event insurance. Lord Justice Jackson recommended that there should be a cap on damages in personal injury cases that can be taken in lawyer success fees—the cap should be 25% of the damages, not including damages for future care and loss. The Government have accepted that recommendation, so that victims of personal injury, including from clinical negligence, will have their damages protected under CFAs.

The Civil Justice Council is looking at some of the technical aspects of implementing the Jackson recommendations. I spoke with it on this issue only this morning, when I also attended a conference on issues such as how the 25% cap will work to protect damages.

The hon. Gentleman said that the proposal would be fairer if the Government were not introducing the Jackson reforms, and asked why we were implementing both at the same time. We are considering all those major changes together and in the round. At the same time as seeking to make savings from the legal aid budget, we are taking forward those priority measures that were recommended by Lord Justice Jackson, to address the disproportionate and unaffordable cost of civil litigation. It is essential that those proposals are considered at the same time. The current CFA regime, with its recoverable costs, causes a significant burden on, for example, the NHS. Withdrawing legal aid for clinical negligence without reforming CFAs could increase that burden significantly.

The hon. Gentleman said that claimants in severe injury cases are more likely to be disabled and frail and so forth, and being unable to bring proceedings—[Interruption.]

[Mr Speaker]

Order. The Minister is not quite enjoying the studious attention of the House that I feel sure his words warrant.

[Mr Djanogly]

The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East asked how such cases can be excluded from scope. We consider that CFAs are a viable alternative source of funding to legal aid. CFAs are more readily available in clinical negligence cases than in cases for other types of claim that are currently funded under legal aid. We therefore consider that legal aid is not justified in such cases, and that our limited funding will be better targeted at other priority areas.

It was also said that such claims are not just money claims, and that damages ensure quality of life for the claimant for the remainder of their lives, and hon. Members asked how it can therefore be right to exclude them. Legal aid is currently available to those who qualify financially and who have suffered negligent medical treatment to seek damages from any type of public or private medical practitioners. Although those are claims for monetary compensation, we consider that they often raise very serious issues, especially when the damages are required to meet future needs. Some litigants will be vulnerable because of disabilities that result from negligent treatment.

We were then asked how the Government could expect CFAs to make up the shortfall, given that they would not be available in a large number of cases, such as those involving long-term impairment. Our legal aid proposals would ensure that particular cases in which it might be difficult to secure a CFA continue to receive legal aid where the failure to provide such funding was likely to result in a breach of the individual’s rights.

--- Later in debate ---

22:01

Division 380

Ayes: 237

---

Labour: 223
Liberal Democrat: 8
Plaid Cymru: 2
Democratic Unionist Party: 2
Green Party: 1
Conservative: 1

Noes: 305

---

Conservative: 264
Liberal Democrat: 39

[Mr Speaker]

Order. When a Member is announcing the result of a vote, the House really must be calm and listen. That is only polite.

Amendment proposed: 74, page 104, line 23, at end insert—

‘(10) For the purposes of this paragraph, evidence that A has been abused by B or is at risk of being abused by B may consist of one or more of the following (without limitation)—

(a) a relevant court conviction or police caution;

(b) a relevant court order (including without notice, ex parte, interim or final orders) including a non-molestation order, occupation order, forced marriage protection order or other protective injunction;

(c) evidence of relevant criminal proceedings for an offence concerning domestic violence or a police report confirming attendance at an incident resulting from domestic violence;

(d) evidence that a victim has been referred to a Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (as a high-risk victim of domestic violence) and a plan has been put in place to protect that victim from violence by the other party;

(e) a finding of fact in the family courts of domestic violence by the other party giving rise to the risk of harm to the victim;

(f) a medical report from a doctor at a UK hospital confirming that the applicant has injuries consistent with being a victim of domestic violence, such injuries not being limited to physical injuries;

(g) a letter from a General Medical Council registered general practitioner confirming that he or she has examined the applicant and is satisfied that the applicant had injuries consistent with those of a victim of domestic violence;

(h) an undertaking given to a court that the perpetrator of the abuse will not approach the applicant who is the victim of the abuse;

(i) a letter from a social services department confirming its involvement in connection with domestic violence;

(j) a letter of support or a report from a domestic violence support organisation; or

(k) other well-founded documentary evidence of abuse (such as from a counsellor, midwife, school or witnesses).

(11) For the avoidance of doubt, no time limit shall operate in relation to any evidence supporting an application for civil legal services under paragraph 10.’.—(Mr Slaughter.)

The House proceeded to a Division.

--- Later in debate ---

22:16

Division 381

Ayes: 232

---

Labour: 222
Plaid Cymru: 3
Liberal Democrat: 3
Democratic Unionist Party: 2
Green Party: 1

Noes: 305

---

Conservative: 261
Liberal Democrat: 41
Labour: 1