Crime and Policing Bill (Thirteenth sitting)
Thursday 8th May 2025
(2 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCrime and Policing Bill 2024-26 View all Crime and Policing Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 8 May 2025 - (8 May 2025)
The Chair
Before we continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill, I have a few preliminary reminders for the Committee—I am sure Members are aware of these. Please switch electronic devices to vibrate or silent. No food or drink is permitted during Committee sittings, except for water, unless you have a particular health need—obviously, speak to me, and I am sure that will be fine. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if Members email their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk, or alternatively pass their written speaking notes to the Hansard colleague in the room. Very importantly, Members are reminded to bob and catch my eye if they wish to speak in any debate. We will have a two-minute silence at 12 noon.
New Clause 21
Terrorism offences excepted from defence for slavery or trafficking victims
“(1) Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (offences to which defence in section 45 does not apply) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 29 (offences under the Terrorism Act 2000)—
(a) before the entry for section 54 insert—
‘section 11 (membership of a proscribed organisation)
section 12 (support of a proscribed organisation)
section 15 (fund-raising for terrorism)
section 16 (use and possession of property for terrorism)
section 17 (funding arrangements)
section 17A (insurance against payments made in response to terrorist demands)
section 18 (money laundering)
section 19 (disclosure of information: duty)
section 21A (failure to disclose: regulated sector)
section 38B (information about acts of terrorism)
section 39 (disclosure of information prejudicial to investigation)’;
(b) after the entry for section 57 insert—
‘section 58 (collection of information)
section 58A (eliciting, publishing or communicating information about members of armed forces etc)
section 58B (entering or remaining in a designated area)’.
(3) In paragraph 31 (offences under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001), after the entry for section 50 insert—
‘section 67 (security of pathogens and toxins)
section 79 (disclosures relating to nuclear security)’.
(4) In paragraph 35 (offences under the Terrorism Act 2006)—
(a) before the entry for section 5 insert—
‘section 1 (encouragement of terrorism)
section 2 (dissemination of terrorist publications)’;
(b) after the entry for section 6 insert—
‘section 8 (attendance at a place used for terrorist training)’.
(5) After paragraph 35 insert—
‘Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (c.28)
35ZA An offence under section 54 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (offences relating to notification).
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (c. 23)
35ZB An offence under section 23 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (contravention of terrorism prevention and investigation measures notice).
Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (c. 6)
35ZC An offence under section 10 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (breach of temporary exclusion order or notice).’
(6) The amendments made by this section do not apply in relation to an offence committed before this section comes into force.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause excepts the listed terrorism offences from the defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 61
Notification requirements
“(1) This section applies where a youth diversion order requires the respondent to comply with this section.
(2) Before the end of the period of three days beginning with the day on which a youth diversion order requiring the respondent to comply with this section is first served, the respondent must notify to the police—
(a) the respondent’s name and, where the respondent uses one or more other names, each of those names,
(b) the respondent’s home address, and
(c) the name and address of any educational establishment the respondent normally attends.
(3) If, while the respondent is required to comply with this section, the respondent—
(a) uses a name which has not been notified under the order,
(b) changes home address, or
(c) begins to attend an educational establishment the name and address of which have not been notified under the order,
the respondent must notify, to the police, the new name, the new home address or the name and address of the new educational establishment.
(4) A notification under subsection (3) must be given before the end of the period of three days beginning with the day on which the respondent uses the name, changes home address or first attends the educational establishment.
(5) A notification under this section is given by—
(a) attending at a police station in the police area in which the home address, or the court which made the order, is situated, and
(b) giving an oral notification to a constable, or to a person authorised for the purpose by the officer in charge of the station.
(6) A notification under this section must be acknowledged in writing.
(7) In this section ‘home address’ means—
(a) the address of the respondent’s sole or main residence in the United Kingdom, or
(b) where the respondent has no such residence, the address or location of a place in the United Kingdom where the respondent can regularly be found and, if there is more than one such place, such one of those places as the respondent may select.
(8) In determining the period of three days mentioned in subsection (2) or (4), no account is to be taken of any time when the respondent is—
(a) in police detention within the meaning of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (see section 118(2) of that Act);
(b) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court or kept in service custody,
(c) serving a sentence of imprisonment or a term of service detention,
(d) detained in a hospital, or
(e) outside the United Kingdom.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause enables a youth diversion order to require the respondent to notify to the police their name and address and the name and address of any educational establishment they normally attend.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 62
Electronic monitoring of compliance with order: England and Wales
“(1) A youth diversion order made by a court in England and Wales may impose on the respondent a requirement (an ‘electronic monitoring requirement’) to submit to electronic monitoring of the respondent’s compliance with prohibitions or requirements imposed by the order. This is subject to section (Conditions for imposing electronic monitoring requirement: England and Wales).
(2) A youth diversion order that includes an electronic monitoring requirement must specify the person who is to be responsible for the monitoring.
(3) The person specified under subsection (2) (‘the responsible person’) must be of a description specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State by statutory instrument.
(4) Where a youth diversion order imposes an electronic monitoring requirement, the respondent must (among other things)—
(a) submit, as required from time to time by the responsible person, to—
(i) being fitted with, or the installation of, any necessary apparatus, and
(ii) the inspection or repair of any apparatus fitted or installed for the purposes of the monitoring;
(b) not interfere with, or with the working of, any apparatus fitted or installed for the purposes of the monitoring;
(c) take any steps required by the responsible person for the purpose of keeping in working order any apparatus fitted or installed for the purposes of the monitoring.
These obligations have effect as requirements of the order.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause enables a youth diversion order to require the respondent to submit to electronic monitoring of their compliance with the prohibitions or requirements of the order (if the conditions set out in NC63) are met.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 63
Conditions for imposing electronic monitoring requirement: England and Wales
“(1) This section applies for the purpose of determining whether a court in England and Wales may impose an electronic monitoring requirement under section (Electronic monitoring of compliance with order: England and Wales).
(2) An electronic monitoring requirement may not be imposed in the respondent’s absence.
(3) If there is a person (other than the respondent) without whose co-operation it would be impracticable to secure the monitoring in question, the requirement may not be imposed without that person’s consent.
(4) A court may impose the requirement in relation to a relevant police area only if—
(a) the Secretary of State has given notification that electronic monitoring arrangements are available in the area, and
(b) it is satisfied that the necessary provision can be made under the arrangements currently available.
(5) For this purpose ‘relevant police area’ means—
(a) in any case, the police area in England and Wales in which it appears to the court that the respondent resides or will reside, or
(b) in a case where it is proposed to include in the order—
(i) a requirement that the respondent remains, for specified periods, at a specified place in England and Wales, or
(ii) provision prohibiting the respondent from entering a specified place or area in England and Wales,
the police area in which the place or area proposed to be specified is situated.
(6) In subsection (5) ‘specified’ means specified in the youth diversion order.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause sets out the conditions for imposing an electronic monitoring requirement under NC62.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 64
Data from electronic monitoring in England and Wales: code of practice
“The Secretary of State must issue a code of practice relating to the processing of data gathered in the course of electronic monitoring of persons under electronic monitoring requirements (within the meaning of section (Electronic monitoring of compliance with order: England and Wales)) imposed by youth diversion orders in England and Wales.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice relating to the processing of data gathered under electronic monitoring requirements imposed under NC62.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 65
Reviews of operation of this Chapter
“In the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, in section 44(2) (provisions the operation of which the person appointed under section 36(1) of the Terrorism Act 2006 is also responsible for reviewing), after paragraph (e) insert—
‘(f) Chapter 1 of Part 14 of the Crime and Policing Act 2025.’” —(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This amendment provides for the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to report on the operation of Chapter 1 of Part 14 of the Bill (youth diversion orders).
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 66
Remote sales of knives etc
“(1) Section 141B of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (remote sales of knives) is amended as follows.
(2) For subsection (4) substitute—
‘(4) Condition A is that, before the sale—
(a) the seller obtained from the buyer—
(i) a copy of an identity document issued to the buyer, and
(ii) a photograph of the buyer, and
(b) on the basis of the things obtained under paragraph (a), a reasonable person would have been satisfied that the buyer was aged 18 or over.
(4A) For the purposes of subsection (4) an “identity document” means—
(a) a United Kingdom passport (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971);
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation;
(c) a licence to drive a motor vehicle granted under Part 3 of the Road Traffic 1988 or under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1));
(d) any other document specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.’
(3) In subsection (5)(b), for ‘a person aged 18 or over’ substitute ‘the buyer’.
(4) In subsection (6), for ‘a person aged 18 or over’ substitute ‘the buyer’.
(5) In subsection (8), omit ‘or a person acting on behalf of the buyer’ in both places it occurs.
(6) After subsection (9) insert—
‘(10) Regulations made by the Secretary of State under this section are to be made by statutory instrument.
(11) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause makes changes to the defences available to a person who sells knives etc to under 18s, in contravention of section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, where the sale is made remotely (e.g. online).
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 67—Delivery of knives etc.
Government new clause 68—Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales.
Government new clause 69—Remote sale and letting of crossbows.
Government new clause 70—Delivery of crossbows.
Government new clause 71—Sale and delivery of crossbows: supplementary provision.
Government new clause 72—“Relevant user-to-user services”, “relevant search services” and “service providers”.
Government new clause 73—Coordinating officer.
Government new clause 74—Notice requiring appointment of content manager.
Government new clause 75—Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances.
Government new clause 76—Replacement of content manager.
Government new clause 77—Duty to notify changes in required information.
Government new clause 78—Failure to comply with content manager requirements: civil penalty.
Government new clause 79—Unlawful weapons content.
Government new clause 80—Content removal notices.
Government new clause 81—Content removal notices: review.
Government new clause 82—Decision notices requiring removal of unlawful weapons content.
Government new clause 83—Failure to comply with content removal notice or decision notice: civil penalties.
Government new clause 84—Guidance.
Government new clause 85—Notices.
Government new clause 86—Interpretation of Chapter.
Government new schedule 1—Civil penalties for service providers and content managers.
Government amendments 80 and 81.
Dame Diana Johnson
It is nice to see you back in the Chair, Mr Pritchard. This group of new clauses makes extensive and timely changes to the law around the sale and marketing of offensive weapons, particularly knives and crossbows. These measures form part of the steps that we are taking to tackle knife crime. They will implement recommendations from the police’s independent end-to-end review of online knife sales, undertaken by Commander Stephen Clayman at the request of the Home Secretary, and will deliver on our manifesto commitment to hold to account senior managers who flout the rules on online sales.
New clauses 66 and 67 introduce new, stricter age verification at the point of sale and on delivery for knives bought online. New clauses 69 and 70 make the same changes in respect of crossbows. Commander Clayman’s review highlighted that existing age-verification methods for online sales are insufficient. Buyers can provide false birth dates and parcels can be left with neighbours so that there is no age check of the buyer. Existing legislation, as contained in the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, already requires age checks for the sale and delivery of knives. We are introducing two key changes to the existing requirements.
First, the checks at the point of sale will have to include photographic identity documents, plus a current photograph to demonstrate that the identity documents belong to the buyer. Secondly, on delivery, couriers will be required to check photographic identification provided by the person receiving the package. There will also be a new offence of handing the knife to someone other than the buyer. That will mean that knives cannot be left on doorsteps or with neighbours with no checks of the intended recipient.
David Burton-Sampson (Southend West and Leigh) (Lab)
The Minister will remember me mentioning Julie Taylor, who has campaigned locally on this issue after the death of her grandson Liam. She welcomes these new clauses. She said to me that she welcomes anything that helps get rid of this awful crime, and that she thanks the Government for introducing them. Does the Minister agree that these measures give an even greater level of protection and prevention so that we can start to drive down the awful offence of knife crime?
Dame Diana Johnson
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that contribution. It is heartening to know that Julie supports these new clauses and recognises the important role that they can play in tackling knife crime. Again, I extend my condolences to Julie and her family on the death of Liam.
These clauses also have the support of the coalition to tackle knife crime, which involves many families, campaigners and victims of knife crime helping the Government to develop policy. They will make sure that we are held to account for our promise to halve knife crime over the next decade, including through the strengthened requirements in the new clauses, which aim to ensure that under-18s cannot easily evade checks when buying knives online, as they have sadly in the past.
Like knives, crossbows are an age-restricted item and cannot be sold or hired to anyone under the age of 18. Legislation for crossbows was brought in through the Crossbows Act 1987, but in contrast to knives, there has been little change to that legislation since. These new clauses seek to introduce the same age-verification requirements for the online sale, hire and delivery of crossbows as are being brought in, or are already in place, for knives.
New clause 69 amends the 1987 Act to introduce equivalent age-verification methods for crossbows to those in section 141B of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which provides limitations on the defence to the offence of selling a knife. For crossbows, where the seller or seller’s agent is not in the presence of the buyer, the seller will not be regarded as having taken
“all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence”
unless all the conditions are met.
Condition 1 is that the seller obtained a copy of an identity document and a photograph of the buyer. Condition 2 is that the package containing the article was clearly marked by the seller to say that it contained a crossbow or crossbow part and that it should be delivered only into the hands of a person aged 18 or over. Condition 3 is that the seller took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that it would be delivered into the hands of the buyer. Condition 4 is that the seller did not deliver the package, or arrange for its delivery, to a locker.
As with bladed articles, before the dispatch of the crossbow or part of a crossbow, the seller must receive from the buyer a copy of an identity document issued to the buyer and a photograph of the buyer, and confirm that they are aged 18 or over. New clause 70 amends the Crossbows Act 1987 to create a new offence on the part of the seller if they deliver or arrange for delivery to residential premises in respect of the sale or letting of a crossbow or part of a crossbow, similar to equivalent defences to those in section 39A of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 for knives.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
I thank the Minister for setting out in detail the provisions for where crossbows are sold and the seller is not in the presence of the buyer. On providing identity documents and photographic evidence, is she concerned that the wording that she used is vague and that there is scope for providing false documents? Perhaps she could reassure me that, in some cases, copies would certified by a solicitor or someone of sufficient standing in the community—whatever the wording might be. I am concerned that false documents could be provided, but perhaps there is provision to stop that.
Dame Diana Johnson
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that point, and it is of concern to me as the Minister. We are introducing this new procedure because we think that the current legislation around buying and delivering is not strong enough. I take his point and I will reflect on it. It may be—I do need to think about it—that it would be onerous to have certified copies. We want to get this right, however, and ensure that accurate legal documents are used, so I will come back to that point.
I will return to the new clauses, so that the Committee is clear about what they will do. New clause 70 also provides for a new offence on the part of the courier or the person delivering on their behalf, equivalent to the new offence that I have described for the delivery of a knife. The courier or person delivering on behalf of the courier must provide the crossbow or parts of crossbows only into the hands of the actual buyer, and only at the address that the buyer provided at the outset. If the courier or person delivering on behalf of the courier fails to do that, they will commit a summary offence attracting a maximum penalty of an unlimited fine.
It will be a defence, however, for the courier or person delivering on behalf of the courier to show that they have checked an official identity document, and that the ID has the name of the person indicated by the seller, that it shows that the holder is over 18, and that as far as they can tell, the picture in the identity document is of the person at the doorstep. Where businesses hire out or let crossbows for corporate events or entertainment—something that I did not know happened, but apparently does—and do so online, the age-verification measures will apply to the hire and delivery of the crossbows where the hirer is an individual. New clause 71 also provides a power for the Secretary of State to issue statutory guidance on the new offence under the Crossbows Act 1987.
Turning to the reportable sale of knives, new clause 68 introduces a requirement to report all sales of knives where they are made remotely, including online sales. That will help the police to tackle what is called the grey market—the resale of knives on social media. The police tell us that grey market sellers act irresponsibly. For example, they promote knives as weapons, which is unlawful, and they do not conduct age-verification checks. The new clause will give the police information that will enable them to act. Sellers who do not comply will be liable to a fine.
Sales are reportable where six knives or more, or two or more qualifying sets of knives such as a block of knives, or one or more qualifying set together with five or more knives, are sold remotely in one sale and are to be delivered to the same residential address in England or Wales. The reporting requirement is also triggered when multiple sales meeting those limits are made to the same person or the same residential address in England or Wales within a 30-day period.
Matt Bishop (Forest of Dean) (Lab)
I welcome the new clauses—thinking back to my policing days, they are extremely welcome. Is there a risk that if we do not add these clauses to restrict such sales, knife crime and crossbow crime could become more prevalent over the coming years?
Dame Diana Johnson
These new clauses on bulk and suspicious sales come directly from the police—from Commander Clayman’s report and his concern about the grey market. The police clearly believe that these new measures are necessary for them to use this intelligence to tackle our problems with knife crime. Obviously, that fits with the Government’s manifesto commitment to halve knife crime over the next 10 years.
That information and intelligence will be sent to a central unit in the first instance. We will provide guidance to the police on the use of that information. We expect that the information that is not connected to other relevant intelligence linking it to criminality will be deleted and not subject to further investigation.
I turn now to the sanctions on online executives. Government new clauses 72 to 86 and new schedule 1 introduce civil penalties for online companies and their senior managers should they fail to take down illegal knife and offensive weapons content when notified of it by the police. Knives and weapons that are illegally marketed to encourage violence or to promote their suitability for use in violent attacks are commonly sold online and then used in senseless attacks. We know that the boys who murdered Ronan Kanda did so using weapons that had been illegally sold online. Many of those types of knives are marketed on social media and other platforms, meaning that those companies indirectly profit from their sale.
Commander Clayman’s review set out the extent of the problem related to the online sale of knives and offensive weapons, particularly where it relates to knives illegally being made available to young people. That report recommended that social media platforms be required to remove such prohibited material within 48 hours of police notification. These new clauses deliver on that recommendation.
The Home Office consulted widely on these measures. We engaged directly with tech companies and also held a public consultation. Tech companies and associations, charities, councils and members of the public responded to the consultation, and our response to that was published recently.
Collectively, the new clauses will grant the police the power to issue content removal notices to online marketplaces, social media platforms and search engines. The notices will require them to take down specified illegal content relating to knives or offensive weapons. If the specified content is not taken down within 48 hours, the company and an executive designated as their content manager would be liable to civil penalty notices of up to £60,000 and £10,000 respectively. Additionally, should a company fail to designate an appropriate UK-based executive when required to do so by the police, it would be liable for a civil penalty notice of up to £60,000.
These measures provide important safeguards. Both online companies and their designated executives will have the opportunity to request that the content removal notice be reviewed. The police must comply with such requests. Should online companies not have an executive who meets the criteria to be designated as their content manager, they will have the opportunity to inform the police as such. Prior to the issuing of a civil penalty notice, the company and the content manager will have the opportunity to make representations to the police. Finally, penalty notices may of course be challenged in the courts.
I fully expect online companies to act responsibly and take down harmful illegal content when made aware of it. The measures will be used in the rare cases where reckless companies choose to continue hosting such content. Taken together, this is a comprehensive package of measures that will further help to restrict the supply of weapons, particularly to children, and to keep our communities safe. I commend the new clauses to the Committee.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. The Opposition welcome the measures that aim to restrict the sale of knives in a wider bid to tackle knife crime. The unregulated purchase of dangerous items such as knives or crossbows presents a serious and growing threat to public safety. Without proper controls the weapons can be easily acquired by individuals with harmful intent, including gang members, violent offenders and young people at risk of exploitation. The availability of such items online without age verification, purchase limits or traceability undermines efforts to reduce knife crime and protect communities. It also places law enforcement in a reactive position, forced to respond to violence that could have been prevented through stronger regulation and control. Ensuring proper safeguards around the sale and distribution of knives is not about restricting legitimate use: it is about closing loopholes that are currently exploited to devastating effect.
Government new clause 66 strengthens the legal framework around the remote sale of knives by tightening the requirement for verifying the age of the buyer. Under the proposed changes to section 141B of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, sellers must obtain both a copy of a valid identity document and a photograph of the buyer before the sale is made. A reasonable person would need to be satisfied that the buyer is 18 or over, based on the evidence. By increasing the burden of proof on the seller and clarifying acceptable forms of ID, the measure aims to reduce the availability of knives to young people and close key loopholes in online transactions, contributing to broader efforts to curb knife crime.
Government new clause 68 introduces a legal duty for sellers in England and Wales to report bulk remote sales of knives and other bladed articles, marking a significant step forward in tackling the online flow of potentially dangerous weapons. The measure is aimed at identifying suspicious buying patterns that might indicate stockpiling for criminal use or illicit resale, helping enforcement bodies to monitor and disrupt supply chains. Notably, the duty applies to individuals and businesses unless the buyer can prove they are a VAT-registered business or incorporated company. Failure to report such sales will rightly be a criminal offence, although sellers will have a due-diligence defence if they can demonstrate they took reasonable steps to comply. The clause bolsters the UK’s strategy to reduce knife crime by increasing accountability in the remote sales sector and closing gaps that criminals may exploit.
Government new clauses 69 to 71 amend the Crossbows Act 1987 to tighten the rules on remote sale and delivery of crossbows, preventing sales to under-18s. Government new clause 69 requires sellers to verify the buyer’s age with identity documents and photographs, ensuring marked packages are delivered only to the buyer, and not to lockers. Government new clause 70 creates offences for delivering crossbows to residential premises or lockers. Government new clause 71 defines terms, allows regulations for additional offences and extends guidance to cover crossbow offences. This aligns with the Bill’s aims to enhance public safety. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell the Committee how the Government will support businesses in complying with the new verification requirements. What resources will ensure effective enforcement of delivery restrictions?
Government new clauses 72 to 83 establish a framework for regulating online service providers by requiring the appointment of content managers to oversee compliance with a new chapter of the Bill. Government new clause 73 mandates the Secretary of State to designate a co-ordinating officer from a police force or the National Crime Agency to manage functions, with authority to delegate tasks. Government new clause 74 empowers the co-ordinating officer to issue an appointment notice requiring service providers to appoint a UK resident content manager within seven days or confirm that no suitable candidate exists, and provide contact details.
Government new clause 75 requires providers to appoint a content manager within seven days if a suitable candidate emerges within two years after they reported them non-existing. Government new clause 76 allows providers to replace content managers and mandates notification within seven days if a manager no longer meets eligibility criteria, requiring a new appointment or confirmation that there is no candidate. Government new clause 77 obliges providers to notify the co-ordinating officer of any changes in required information within seven days, and Government new clause 78 authorises penalties of up to £60,000 for non-compliance, including failure to appoint a manager, provide accurate information or correct any false statements. Government new clause 80 empowers authorised officers to issue content removal notices to providers and content managers, requiring removal of unlawful weapons content within 48 hours.
Government new clause 81 allows recipients to request a review of removal notices within 48 hours, with a senior officer reviewing and confirming, modifying or withdrawing the notice. Government new clause 82 requires decision notices post-review to enforce content removal within 24 hours or the remaining 48-hour period. Will the Government do anything to support service providers—especially smaller platforms—in meeting content manager appointment requirements and ensuring that there is appropriate guidance or training available? How will the co-ordinating officer ensure consistent enforcement of these obligations across diverse online services?
Dame Diana Johnson
I thank the shadow Minister for the general tone of his response on this group of Government new clauses, which come directly from the review that Commander Clayman set out, as well the manifesto commitment we made, particularly around tech executives and holding them to account.
There has been a great deal of consultation, particularly around the tech executives, how it would work and engagement with tech companies. I take the shadow Minister’s point about smaller platforms, but there has been that engagement. On the issue around training and enforcement in terms of the new clauses relating to sale and delivery, it is clear that all courier and delivery companies will have to ensure that their staff are trained on these new legal requirements. To be clear, if the person who is delivering the package has taken all steps to make sure that they have checked the information that is being provided and the identification document, and they are acting reasonably, that is a defence, but there will be a need for training and for people to know what their legal obligations are, particularly when they are delivering, because we know that has been a particular issue. The engagement, particularly with tech executives, that I talked about has also happened with courier firms and delivery businesses, and will continue.
I want to go back to the point that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East raised about identity checks, just so everybody is clear.
The Chair
Order. We will now stand for the national two-minute silence to commemorate VE Day.
The Committee observed a two-minute silence.
Dame Diana Johnson
Thank you, Mr Pritchard. I wanted to make it clear that the documents that are being talked about in relation to proving identity are passports and driving licences. I take the point that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East raised with me in his intervention, but those are the two documents that will be looked at and provided. We will want to make sure that this works, and in the future, other documents may well need to be added to that list. However, just to be clear, it is those two documents.
As I have also said, we would expect that a person who is delivering would look at those documents. I do not really want to get into how those documents can be forged, because that is obviously an issue that is on the hon. Gentleman’s mind, but at the moment those are the two documents, and we would expect them to be examined by a delivery driver or courier when the items are delivered.
Joe Robertson
I thank the Minister; that is helpful. Those documents are obviously very hard to forge, so I was not suggesting that they might be forged. My question was about was the possibility—I may simply be wrong here—of someone else presenting those documents. They are not forgeries; they are simply not the passport or driving licence of the buyer. Clearly, if the buyer has to be present when they present those documents to the person making the delivery, there is plainly not an issue, so I welcome that.
Dame Diana Johnson
I am glad that the hon. Gentleman is clear. As we have said, photographic identity has to be provided at the beginning of the process—at the point of sale—as well as the identity document, to ensure it matches up. ‘RTA section 27A Causing death by dangerous cycling. On indictment. Imprisonment for life. RTA section 27B Causing serious injury by dangerous cycling. (a) Summarily. (b) On indictment. (a) On conviction in England and Wales: the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine or both. On conviction in Scotland: 12 months or the statutory maximum or both. (b) 5 years or a fine or both.’ ‘RTA section 28B Causing death by careless or inconsiderate cycling. (a) Summarily. (b) On indictment. (a) On conviction in England and Wales: the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine or both. On conviction in Scotland: 12 months or the statutory maximum or both. (b) 5 years or a fine or both. RTA section 28C Causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate cycling (a) Summarily. (b) On indictment. (a) On conviction in England and Wales: the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine or both. On conviction in Scotland: 12 months or the statutory maximum or both. (b) 2 years or a fine or both.’” —(Alex Davies-Jones.)
With that, I commend these measures to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 66 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 67
Delivery of knives etc
“(1) The Offensive Weapons Act 2019 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 39 insert—
‘39A Defences to offence under section 38: England and Wales
(1) It is a defence for a person charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 38(2) of delivering a bladed product to residential premises to show that the delivery conditions were met.
(2) It is a defence for a person (“the seller”) charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 38(2) of arranging for the delivery of a bladed product to residential premises to show that—
(a) the arrangement required the person with whom it was made not to finally deliver the bladed product unless the delivery conditions were met, and
(b) the seller took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that the product would not be finally delivered unless the delivery conditions were met.
(3) It is a defence for a person charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 38(3) to show that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid commission of the offence.
(4) The delivery conditions are that—
(a) the person (“P”) into whose hands the bladed product was finally delivered showed the person delivering it an identity document issued to P, and
(b) on the basis of that document a reasonable person would have been satisfied—
(i) that P was over 18, and
(ii) if the buyer was an individual, that P was the buyer.
(5) In subsection (4) “identity document” means—
(a) a United Kingdom passport (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971);
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation;
(c) a licence to drive a motor vehicle granted under Part 3 of the Road Traffic 1988 or under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1));
(d) any other document specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(6) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this section if—
(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and
(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 38.’
(3) After section 40 insert—
‘40A Delivery of bladed products sold by UK seller to residential premises: England and Wales
(1) This section applies if—
(a) a person (“the seller”) sells a bladed product to another person (“the buyer”),
(b) the seller and the buyer are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale and the seller is within the United Kingdom at that time,
(c) before the sale the seller entered into an arrangement with a person (“the courier”) by which the courier agreed to deliver bladed products for the seller,
(d) the courier was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of bladed products, and
(e) pursuant to the arrangement, the courier finally delivers the bladed product to residential premises in England or Wales.
(2) The courier commits an offence if, when they finally deliver the bladed product to residential premises in England and Wales, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—
(a) is aged 18 or over, and
(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.
(3) A person finally delivering the bladed product to residential premises in England and Wales on behalf of the courier commits an offence if, when they deliver it, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—
(a) is aged 18 or over, and
(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.
(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (2) to show that the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 39A(4)) were met.
(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to show that—
(a) the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 39A(4)) were met, or
(b) the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the person was delivering a bladed product.
(6) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this section if—
(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and
(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.
(8) Section 39(2) to (5) applies for the purposes of subsection (1)(b) and (e) as it applies for the purposes of section 39(1)(b) and (e).
(9) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged with an offence under this section.’
(4) After section 42 insert—
‘42A Delivery of bladed articles sold by non-UK seller to premises: England and Wales
(1) This section applies if—
(a) a person (“the seller”) sells a bladed article to another person (“the buyer”),
(b) the seller and the buyer are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale and the seller is outside the United Kingdom at that time,
(c) before the sale the seller entered into an arrangement with a person (“the courier”) by which the courier agreed to deliver bladed articles for the seller,
(d) the courier was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of bladed articles, and
(e) pursuant to the arrangement, the courier finally delivers the bladed article to premises in England or Wales.
(2) The courier commits an offence if, when they finally deliver the bladed article, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—
(a) is aged 18 or over, and
(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.
(3) A person finally delivering the bladed article on behalf of the courier commits an offence if, when they deliver the bladed article, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—
(a) is aged 18 or over, and
(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.
(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (2) to show that the delivery conditions were met.
(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to show that—
(a) the delivery conditions were met, or
(b) the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the person was delivering a bladed article.
(6) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this section if—
(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and
(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.
(8) Section 42(2) and (3) applies for the purposes of subsection (1)(b) as it applies for the purposes of section 42(1)(b).
(9) In this section—
“bladed article” means an article to which section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies (as that section has effect in relation to England and Wales);
“delivery conditions” has the meaning given by section 39A(4), but reading the reference in that section to a bladed product as a reference to a bladed article.’
(5) In section 38(10) (offences) for “section” substitute “sections 39A and”.
(6) In section 39 (delivery of bladed products to persons under 18)—
(a) in the heading, at the end insert “: Scotland and Northern Ireland”;
(b) in subsection (1)(e) after “premises” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;
(c) in subsection (7) omit paragraph (a).
(7) In section 40 (defences to delivery offences under sections 38 and 39)—
(a) in the heading, after “39” insert “: Scotland and Northern Ireland”;
(b) in subsection (1) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;
(c) in subsection (2) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;
(d) in subsection (3) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;
(e) in subsection (4) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;
(f) in subsection (5) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;
(g) in subsection (6) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;
(h) in subsection (7), omit “England and Wales or”;
(i) in subsection (14), in the definition of “appropriate national authority” omit paragraph (a).
(8) In section 41 (meaning of “bladed product” in sections 38 to 40)—
(a) in the heading, for “40” substitute “40A”;
(b) in subsection (1) for “40” substitute “40A”;
(c) in subsection (2) for “40” substitute “40A”.
(9) In section 42 (delivery of knives etc pursuant to arrangement with seller outside UK)—
(a) in the heading, at the end insert “: Scotland and Northern Ireland”;
(b) in subsection (1)(e), after “article” insert “to premises in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;
(c) in subsection (5) omit “England and Wales or”;
(d) omit subsection (10)(a);
(e) omit subsection (11)(a).
(10) In section 66(1)(j) (guidance on offences relating to offensive weapons etc) for “42” substitute “42A”.
(11) In section 68 (regulations and orders)—
(a) in subsection (2) after “State” insert, “, except for regulations under section 39A(5)(d),”;
(b) after subsection (2) insert—
“(2A) A statutory instrument containing regulations under section 39A(5)(d) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause makes changes to the offences and defences relating to delivery of knives to premises in England and Wales following a remote sale.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 68
Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales
“(1) In the Criminal Justice Act 1988, after section 141C insert—
‘141D Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales
(1) A person (“the seller”) must, in accordance with requirements specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State by statutory instrument, report to the person specified in the regulations any reportable sales the seller makes of bladed articles.
(2) A reportable sale of bladed articles occurs where the seller, in any of the ways set out in subsection (4), sells—
(a) six or more bladed articles, none of which form a qualifying set of bladed articles;
(b) two or more qualifying sets of bladed articles;
(c) one or more qualifying sets of bladed articles and five or more bladed articles that do not form a qualifying set.
(3) “Qualifying set of bladed articles” means three or more bladed articles packaged together for sale as a single item, where each bladed article is a different size or shape from the others.
(4) The ways are—
(a) in a single remote sale where the bladed articles are to be delivered to an address in England and Wales, or
(b) in two or more remote sales in any period of 30 days—
(i) to one person, where the bladed articles are to be delivered to one or more addresses in England and Wales, or
(ii) to two or more persons, where the bladed articles are to be delivered to the same residential premises in England and Wales.
(5) A sale of bladed articles is “remote” if the seller and the person to whom the bladed article is sold are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale.
(6) For the purposes of subsection (5) a person (“A”) is not in the presence of another person (“B”) at any time if—
(a) where A is an individual, A or a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time;
(b) where A is not an individual, a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time.
(7) A sale is not reportable if the person to whom the articles are sold (“the buyer”)—
(a) informs the seller that the buyer is carrying on a business, and
(b) is—
(i) registered for value added tax under the Value Added Tax Act 1994, or
(ii) registered as a company under the Companies Act 2006.
(8) A person who fails to comply with subsection (1) commits an offence.
(9) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (8) to show that the person took all reasonable precautions, and exercised all due diligence, to avoid commission of the offence.
(10) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this section if—
(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and
(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(11) A person who commits an offence under subsection (8) is liable on summary conviction to a fine.
(12) In this section—
“bladed article” means an article to which section 141A applies (as that section has effect in relation to England and Wales), other than a knife which does not have a sharp point and is designed for eating food;
“residential premises” means premises used for residential purposes (whether or not also used for other purposes).
(13) Regulations made by the Secretary of State under subsection (1) may in particular include requirements about—
(a) how reports are to be made,
(b) when reports to be made, and
(c) the information reports must include.
(14) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (1) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
(15) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument amend—
(a) the number of bladed articles specified in subsection (2)(a);
(b) the number of qualifying sets specified in subsection (2)(b);
(c) the number of qualifying sets specified in subsection (2)(c);
(d) the number of bladed articles specified in subsection (2)(c);
(e) the period specified in subsection (4)(b).
(16) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (15) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.’
(2) In the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, in section 66(1) (guidance on offences relating to offensive weapons etc) after paragraph (g) insert—
‘(ga) section 141D of that Act (duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales),’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause imposes a requirement on sellers of bladed articles to report bulk sales to a person specified in regulations.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 69
Remote sale and letting of crossbows
“(1) The Crossbows Act 1987 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 1 omit ‘unless he believes him to be eighteen years or older and has reasonable grounds for the belief’.
(3) After section 1A insert—
‘1B Defences to offence under section 1: England and Wales
(1) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1 to show that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence.
(2) Subsection (3) applies if—
(a) a person (“A”) is charged with an offence under section 1, and
(b) A was not in the presence of the person (“B”) to whom the crossbow or part of a crossbow was sold or let on hire at the time of the sale or letting on hire.
(3) A is not to be regarded as having shown that A took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence unless, as a minimum, A shows that the following conditions are met.
(4) Condition 1 is that, before the sale or letting on hire—
(a) A obtained from B—
(i) a copy of an identity document issued to B, and
(ii) a photograph of B, and
(b) on the basis of the things obtained under paragraph (a), a reasonable person would have been satisfied that B was aged 18 or over.
(5) For the purposes of subsection (4) an “identity document” means—
(a) a United Kingdom passport (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971);
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation;
(c) a licence to drive a motor vehicle granted under Part 3 of the Road Traffic 1988 or under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1));
(d) any other document specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(6) Condition 2 is that when the package containing the crossbow or part of the crossbow was dispatched by A, it was clearly marked to indicate—
(a) that it contained a crossbow or part of a crossbow, and
(b) that, when finally delivered, it should only be delivered into the hands of B.
(7) Condition 3 is that A took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that, when finally delivered, the package would be delivered into the hands of B.
(8) Condition 4 is that A did not deliver the package, or arrange for its delivery, to a locker.
(9) Where the crossbow or part of a crossbow was dispatched by A to a place from which it was to be collected by B, references in subsections (6) and (7) to its final delivery are to be read as its supply to B from that place.
(10) In subsection (8) “locker” means a lockable container to which the package is delivered with a view to its collection by B, or a person acting on behalf of B, in accordance with arrangements made between A and B.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause makes changes to the defences available to a person who sells crossbows etc to under 18s, in contravention of section 1 of the Crossbows Act 1987, where the sale is made remotely (e.g. online).
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 70
Delivery of crossbows
“In the Crossbows Act 1987, after section 1B (inserted by section (Remote sale and letting of crossbows)) insert—
‘1C Offence of seller delivering crossbows or parts of crossbows to residential premises in England or Wales
(1) This section applies if—
(a) a person (“A”) sells or lets on hire a crossbow or part of a crossbow to another person (“B”), and
(b) A and B are not in each other's presence at the time of the sale.
(2) A commits an offence if, for the purposes of supplying the crossbow or part of a crossbow to B, A—
(a) delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises in England or Wales, or
(b) arranges for its delivery to residential premises in England or Wales.
(3) A commits an offence if, for the purposes of supplying the crossbow or part of a crossbow to B, A—
(a) delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to a locker in England or Wales, or
(b) arranges for its delivery to a locker in England or Wales.
(4) In subsection (3) “locker” means a lockable container to which the crossbow or part of a crossbow is delivered with a view to its collection by B, or a person acting on behalf of B, in accordance with arrangements made between A and B.
(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).
(6) The “maximum term for summary offences”, in relation to an offence, means—
(a) if the offence is committed before the time when section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 comes into force, six months;
(b) if the offence is committed after that time, 51 weeks.
1D Defences to offences under section 1C
(1) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1C(2)(a) to show that the delivery conditions were met.
(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1C(2)(b) to show that—
(a) the arrangement required the person with whom it was made not to finally deliver the crossbow or part of a crossbow unless the delivery conditions were met, and
(b) the person charged with the offence took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that the crossbow or part of a crossbow would not be finally delivered unless the delivery conditions were met.
(3) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1C(3) to show that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence.
(4) For the purposes of this section the delivery conditions are that—
(a) the person (“P”) into whose hands the crossbow or part of a crossbow was finally delivered showed the person delivering it an identity document issued to P, and
(b) on the basis of that document a reasonable person would have been satisfied—
(i) that P was over 18, and
(ii) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire was an individual, that P was that individual.
(5) “Identity document” has the same meaning as in section 1B(5).
(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged with an offence under section 1C.
1E Offence of delivery business delivering crossbows or parts of crossbows to residential premises in England and Wales on behalf of UK seller
(1) This section applies if—
(a) a person (“A”) sells or lets for hire a crossbow or part of a crossbow to another person (“B”),
(b) A and B are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale or letting on hire and A is within the United Kingdom at that time,
(c) before the sale or letting on hire A entered into an arrangement with a person (“C”) by which C agreed to deliver crossbows or parts of crossbows for A,
(d) C was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of crossbows or parts of crossbows, and
(e) pursuant to the arrangement, C finally delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises in England or Wales.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) a person other than an individual is within the United Kingdom at any time if the person carries on a business of selling articles of any kind from premises in any part of the United Kingdom at that time.
(3) C commits an offence if, when they finally deliver the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises in England or Wales, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—
(a) is aged 18 or over, and
(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.
(4) A person finally delivering the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises in England or Wales on behalf of C commits an offence if, when they deliver it, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—
(a) is aged 18 or over, and
(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.
(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to show that the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 1D(4)) were met.
(6) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (4) to show that—
(a) the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 1D(4)) were met, or
(b) the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the person was delivering a crossbow or part of a crossbow.
(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged with an offence under this section.
(8) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.
1F Offence of delivery business delivering crossbows or parts of crossbows to premises in England and Wales on behalf of non-UK seller
(1) This section applies if—
(a) a person (“A”) sells or lets for hire a crossbow or part of a crossbow to another person (“B”),
(b) A and B are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale or letting on hire and A is outside the United Kingdom at that time,
(c) before the sale or letting on hire A entered into an arrangement with a person (“C”) by which C agreed to deliver crossbows or parts of crossbows for A,
(d) C was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of crossbows or parts of crossbows, and
(e) pursuant to the arrangement, C finally delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to premises in England and Wales.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) a person other than an individual is outside the United Kingdom at any time if the person does not carry on a business of selling articles of any kind from premises in any part of the United Kingdom at that time.
(3) C commits an offence if, when they finally deliver the crossbow or part of a crossbow to premises in England or Wales, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—
(a) is aged 18 or over, and
(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.
(4) Any person finally delivering the crossbow or part of a crossbow to premises in England or Wales on behalf of C commits an offence if, when they deliver it, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—
(a) is aged 18 or over, and
(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.
(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.
(6) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to show that the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 1D(4)) were met.
(7) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (4) to show that—
(a) the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 1D(4)) were met, or
(b) the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the person was delivering a crossbow or part of a crossbow.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause creates offences relating to delivery of crossbows to premises following a remote sale equivalent to the offences relating to knives in sections 38 to 42 of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 71
Sale and delivery of crossbows: supplementary provision
“(1) After section 1F of the Crossbows Act 1987 (inserted by section (Delivery of crossbows)) insert—
‘1G Interpretation of sections 1B to 1F
(1) This section applies for the interpretation of sections 1B to 1F.
(2) A person (“A”) is not in the presence of another person (“B”) at any time if—
(a) where A is an individual, A or a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time;
(b) where A is not an individual, a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time.
(3) “Residential premises” means premises used solely for residential purposes.
(4) The circumstances where premises are not residential premises include, in particular, where a person carries on a business from the premises.
(5) A person charged with an offence is taken to have shown a matter if—
(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and
(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.’
(2) After section 6 of the Crossbows Act 1987 insert—
‘6A Regulations
(1) Regulations made by the Secretary of State under this Act are to be made by statutory instrument.
(2) The Secretary of State may not make a statutory instrument containing (alone or with other provision) regulations under section 1D(6) or 1E(7) unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.
(3) Any other statutory instrument containing regulations made by the Secretary of State under this Act is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
(3) In section 66(1) of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 (guidance on offences relating to offensive weapons etc), after paragraph (ga) (inserted by section (Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales) insert—
“(gb) any of sections 1 to 3 of the Crossbows Act 1987 (sale etc of crossbows) as they have effect in relation to England and Wales,”.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause makes provision about the interpretation of the new sections added to the Crossbows Act 1987 by NC69 and NC70 and extends the guidance-making power in the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 to cover offences under the Crossbows Act 1987.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 72
“Relevant user-to-user services”, “relevant search services” and “service providers”
“(1) For the purposes of this Chapter—
(a) a ‘relevant search service’ is a search service other than an exempt service;
(b) a ‘relevant user-to-user service’ is a user-to-user service other than an exempt service.
(2) In subsection (1), ‘search service’ and ‘user-to-user service’ have the same meanings as in the Online Safety Act 2023 (the ‘2023 Act’) (see, in particular, section 3 of that Act).
(3) The following are exempt services for the purposes of subsection (1)—
(a) a service of a kind that is described in any of the following paragraphs of Schedule 1 to the 2023 Act (certain services exempt from regulation under that Act)—
(i) paragraph 1 or 2 (email, SMS and MMS services);
(ii) paragraph 3 (services offering one-to-one live aural communications);
(iii) paragraph 4 (limited functionality services);
(iv) paragraph 5 (services which enable combinations of user-generated content);
(v) paragraph 7 or 8 (internal business services);
(vi) paragraph 9 (services provided by public bodies);
(vii) paragraph 10 (services provided by persons providing education or childcare), or
(b) a service of a kind that is described in Schedule 2 to the 2023 Act (services that include regulated provider pornographic content).
(4) This Chapter does not apply in relation to a part of a relevant search service, or a part of a relevant user-to-user service, if the 2023 Act does not apply to that part of the service by virtue of section 5(1) or (2) of that Act.
(5) In this Chapter, ‘service provider’ means a provider of a relevant user-to-user service or a provider of a relevant search service.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause, which together with NC73, NC74, NC75, NC76, NC77, NC78, NC79, NC80, NC81, NC82, NC83, NC84, NC85, NC86 and NS1 are expected to form a new Chapter of Part 2 of the Bill, defines key terms used in the new Chapter.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 73
Coordinating officer
“(1) The Secretary of State must designate a member of a relevant police force or a National Crime Agency officer as the coordinating officer for the purposes of this Chapter.
(2) The coordinating officer may delegate any of the officer’s functions under this Chapter (to such extent as the officer may determine) to another member of a relevant police force or National Crime Agency officer.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to designate a “coordinating officer” to perform the functions conferred on that officer under the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory note for NC72.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 74
Notice requiring appointment of content manager
“(1) The coordinating officer may give a service provider a notice (an ‘appointment notice’) requiring the provider—
(a) either to—
(i) appoint an individual who meets the conditions in subsection (2) as the provider’s content manager for the purposes of this Chapter, or
(ii) if there is no such individual, confirm that is the case to the coordinating officer, and
(b) to provide the coordinating officer with the required information.
(2) The conditions are that the individual—
(a) plays a significant role in—
(i) the making of decisions about how a whole or substantial part of the service provider’s activities are to be managed or organised, or
(ii) the actual managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part of those activities, and
(b) is habitually resident in the United Kingdom.
(3) ‘Required information’ means—
(a) the contact details of any content manager appointed;
(b) an email address, or details of another means of contacting the service provider rapidly which is readily available, that may be used for the purpose of giving the provider a notice under this Chapter;
(c) information identifying the relevant user-to-user services, or (as the case may be) the relevant search services, provided by the provider.
(4) An appointment notice must—
(a) specify the period before the end of which the service provider must comply with the notice, and
(b) explain the potential consequences of the service provider failing to do so (see section (Failure to comply with content manager requirements: civil penalty)).
(5) The period specified under subsection (4)(a) must be at least seven days beginning with the day on which the notice is given.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause confers a power on the coordinating officer to require a service provider to appoint a senior executive as their “content manager” for the purposes of the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory note for NC72 or to confirm that there is no-one who meets the appointment conditions.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 75
Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances
“(1) This section applies where—
(a) the coordinating officer has given a service provider an appointment notice,
(b) the provider has confirmed to the officer (in accordance with the appointment notice or under section (Replacement of content manager)(5)(b)), that there is no individual who meets the conditions in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(2), and
(c) at any time within the period of two years beginning with the day on which that confirmation was given, there is an individual who meets those conditions.
(2) The service provider must, before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the first day on which there is an individual who meets those conditions—
(a) appoint such an individual as the provider’s content manager for the purposes of this Chapter, and
(b) provide the coordinating officer with the content manager’s contact details.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause requires a service provider that at any time could not appoint a senior executive as its content manager when required to do so (because there was no-one who met the appointment conditions) to make an appointment if, following a change in circumstances within 2 years, there is someone who meets the conditions.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 76
Replacement of content manager
“(1) This section applies where a service provider has appointed an individual as the provider’s content manager (whether in accordance with an appointment notice or under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances) or this section).
(2) The service provider may replace the provider’s content manager by appointing another individual who meets the conditions in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(2) as the provider’s new content manager for the purposes of this Chapter.
(3) The service provider must, before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the day on which an appointment is made under subsection (2), provide the coordinating officer with the new content manager’s contact details.
(4) If the individual appointed as a service provider’s content manager ceases to meet any of the conditions in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(2), the appointment ceases to have effect.
(5) The service provider must, before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the day on which an appointment ceases to have effect under subsection (4)—
(a) either—
(i) appoint another individual who meets the conditions in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(2) as the provider’s content manager for the purposes of this Chapter, and
(ii) provide the coordinating officer with the new content manager’s contact details, or
(b) if there is no longer such an individual, confirm that is the case to the coordinating officer.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause makes provision for the appointment by a service provider of a replacement content manager, including in a case where the original content manager ceases to meet the appointment conditions (and so that appointment ceases to have effect).
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 77
Duty to notify changes in required information
“(1) This section applies where a service provider has, in accordance with an appointment notice or under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances)(2)(b) or (Replacement of content manager)(5)(a)(ii)provided the coordinating officer with required information.
(2) The service provider must give notice to the coordinating officer of any change in the required information.
(3) The notice must specify the date on which the change occurred.
(4) The notice must be given before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the day on which the change occurred.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause requires a service provider that has given the coordinating officer required information (as defined in NC74) to inform the officer of any changes in that information.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 78
Failure to comply with content manager requirements: civil penalty
“(1) This section applies if the coordinating officer has given a service provider an appointment notice and—
(a) the period specified in the notice as mentioned in (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(4)(a) has expired without the provider having complied with the notice,
(b) the provider has failed to comply with a requirement under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances), (Replacement of content manager) or (Duty to notify changes in required information),
(c) the provider, in purported compliance with a requirement to provide, or give notice of a change in, required information (whether in accordance with an appointment notice or under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances)(2)(b), (Replacement of content manager) or (Duty to notify changes in required information)(2)) makes a statement that is false in a material particular, or
(d) the provider makes a statement that is false in giving the confirmation mentioned in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(1)(a)(ii) or (Replacement of content manager)(5)(b).
(2) The coordinating officer may give the service provider a notice (a ‘penalty notice’) requiring the provider to pay a penalty of an amount not exceeding £60,000.
(3) In order to take account of changes in the value of money the Secretary of State may by regulations substitute another sum for the sum for the time being specified in subsection (2).
(4) Schedule (Civil penalties for service providers and content managers) makes further provision in connection with penalty notices given under this Chapter.” —(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause confers a power on the coordinating officer to impose a monetary penalty of up to £60,000 on a service provider that fails to comply with various requirements imposed by an appointment notice or under NC75, NC76 and NC77.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 79
Unlawful weapons content
“(1) For the purposes of this Chapter, content is ‘unlawful weapons content’ in England and Wales if it is content that constitutes—
(a) an offence under section 1(1) of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 (offering to sell, hire, loan or give away etc a dangerous weapon),
(b) an offence under section 1 or 2 of the Knives Act 1997 (marketing of knives as suitable for combat etc and related publications), or
(c) an offence under section 141(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 under the law of England and Wales (offering to sell, hire, loan or give away etc an offensive weapon).
(2) For the purposes of this Chapter, content is ‘unlawful weapons content’ in Scotland if it is content that constitutes—
(a) an offence within subsection (1)(a) or (b), or
(b) an offence under section 141(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 under the law of Scotland.
(3) For the purposes of this Chapter, content is ‘unlawful weapons content’ in Northern Ireland if it is content that constitutes—
(a) an offence under Article 53 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (S.I. 1996/3160) (N.I. 24) (offering to sell, hire, loan or give away etc certain knives),
(b) an offence within subsection (1)(b), or
(c) an offence under section 141(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 under the law of Northern Ireland.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause defines “unlawful weapons content” for the purposes of the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory note for NC72.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 80
Content removal notices
“(1) This section applies where an authorised officer is satisfied that content—
(a) present on a relevant user-to-user service, or
(b) which may be encountered in or via search results of a relevant search service;
is unlawful weapons content in a relevant part of the United Kingdom.
(2) The authorised officer may give a content removal notice to—
(a) the provider of the relevant user-to-user service, or
(b) the provider of the relevant search service.
(3) If the authorised officer gives a content removal notice to a service provider in a case where the coordinating officer has the contact details of the provider’s content manager, the authorised officer may also give the notice to that manager.
(4) A content removal notice is a notice requiring the service provider and (if applicable) the provider’s content manager (each a ‘recipient’) to secure that—
(a) the content to which it relates is removed (see section (Interpretation of Chapter)(2)), and
(b) confirmation of that fact is given to the authorised officer.
(5) A content removal notice must—
(a) identify the content to which it relates;
(b) explain the authorised officer’s reasons for considering that the content is unlawful weapons content in the relevant part (or parts) of the United Kingdom;
(c) explain that the notice must be complied with before the end of the period of 48 hours beginning with the time the notice is given;
(d) explain that each recipient has the right to request a review of the decision to give the notice and how a request is to be made (see section (Content removal notices: review));
(e) set out the potential consequences of failure to comply with the notice;
(f) contain the authorised officer’s contact details;
(g) be in such form, and contain such further information, as the Secretary of State may by regulations prescribe.
(6) The authorised officer may withdraw a content removal notice from a recipient by notifying the recipient to that effect (but withdrawal of a notice does not prevent a further content removal notice from being given under this section, whether or not in relation to the same content as the withdrawn notice).
(7) In this section—
‘authorised officer’ means—
(a) a member of a relevant police force who is authorised for the purposes of this section by the chief officer of the force, or
(b) a National Crime Agency officer who is authorised for the purposes of this section by the Director General of the National Crime Agency;
‘relevant part of the United Kingdom’ means—
(a) where the authorised officer is a member of a relevant police force in England and Wales, England and Wales;
(b) where the authorised officer is a member of the Police Service of Scotland, Scotland;
(c) where the authorised officer is a member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland;
(d) where the authorised officer is a member of the Ministry of Defence Police or a National Crime Agency officer, any part of the United Kingdom.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause confers power on the police or an officer of the National Crime Agency to give a service provider and (if there is one) the provider’s content manager a notice requiring them to remove unlawful weapons content from the services they provide.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 81
Content removal notices: review
“(1) A person who is given a content removal notice (a ‘recipient’) may, before the end of the initial 48-hour period, request a review of the decision to give the notice.
(2) A request under subsection (1) is to be made by the recipient giving—
(a) a notice (a ‘review notice’) to the authorised officer, and
(b) a copy of the review notice to the other recipient (if applicable).
(3) The grounds on which a recipient may request a review include, in particular, that—
(a) content to which the notice relates is not unlawful weapons content;
(b) content to which the notice relates is insufficiently identified for the recipient to be able to take the action required by the notice;
(c) the provider that received the notice is not, in fact, the provider of the relevant user-to-user service or relevant search service to which the notice relates;
(d) the individual who received the notice as the service provider’s content manager is not, in fact, that provider’s content manager;
(e) the notice was otherwise not given in accordance with this Chapter.
(4) On receipt of a review notice, a review of the decision to give the content removal notice must be carried out—
(a) if the authorised officer is a member of a relevant police force, by another member of that force who is of a higher rank;
(b) if the authorised officer is a National Crime Agency officer, by another officer who holds a more senior position in the Agency.
The individual carrying out the review is referred to in this section as ‘the reviewing officer’.
(6) On completing the review or (in a case where two review notices are given) both reviews the reviewing officer must, in respect of each recipient, either—
(a) confirm in full the decision to give the content removal notice,
(b) confirm the decision to give the notice, but in relation to only some of the content to which it relates, or
(c) withdraw the notice.
(7) The reviewing officer must give each recipient a notice (a ‘decision notice’)—
(a) setting out the outcome of the review or reviews, and
(b) giving reasons.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause makes provision for the police or the NCA to review the decision to give a service provider or their content manager a content removal notice under NC80 where the recipient of the notice requests a review.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 82
Decision notices requiring removal of unlawful weapons content
“(1) This section applies where the reviewing officer—
(a) has carried out a review or reviews under section (Content removal notices: review), and
(b) confirms the decision to give the content removal notice to the service provider, the provider’s content manager or both of them (in each case whether as mentioned in subsection (6)(a) or (b) of that section).
(2) If the reviewing officer confirms in full the decision to give the content removal notice, the decision notice must require its recipient to secure that—
(a) the content to which the content removal notice relates is removed, and
(b) confirmation of that fact is given to the authorised officer.
(3) If the officer confirms the decision to give the content removal notice but in relation to only some of the content to which it relates, the decision notice must—
(a) identify the content to which the confirmation relates (the ‘confirmed content’), and
(b) require its recipient to secure that—
(i) the confirmed content is removed, and
(ii) confirmation of that fact is given to the authorised officer.
(4) A decision notice within subsection (2) or (3) must specify the period before the end of which the notice must be complied with, and that period must be whichever of the following is the longest—
(a) the period of 24 hours beginning with the time the decision notice is given;
(b) the period—
(i) beginning with the time the review notice or, if there was more than one, the first review notice, was given under section (Content removal notices: review), and
(ii) ending with the end of the initial 48-hour period.
(5) In this section, ‘reviewing officer’ has the same meaning as in section (Content removal notices: review).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause provides for the police or NCA, following a review under NC81 which confirms (in full or in part) the decision to give a content removal notice, to give the service provider or content manager a decision notice requiring the removal of the unlawful weapons content concerned.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 83
Failure to comply with content removal notice or decision notice: civil penalties
“(1) Subsection (2) applies where—
(a) a content removal notice has been given to a service provider, or to both a service provider and the provider’s content manager, in accordance with section (Content removal notices), and
(b) the initial 48-hour period has expired without the notice having been complied with or a review notice having been given.
(2) A senior authorised officer of the issuing force may give a penalty notice—
(a) to the service provider, or
(b) if the provider’s content manager also received the content removal notice, to the content manager or to both of them.
(3) Subsection (4) applies where, following a review or reviews under section (Content removal notices: review)—
(a) a decision notice has been given to the service provider or to both the provider and the provider’s content manager in accordance with section (Decision notices requiring removal of unlawful weapons content)(2) or (3) confirming the decision to give the content removal notice, and
(b) the period specified in the decision notice under subsection (4) of that section has expired without that notice having been complied with.
(4) A senior authorised officer of the issuing force may give a penalty notice—
(a) to the service provider, or
(b) if the provider’s content manager also received the decision notice, to the content manager or to both of them.
(5) In this section a ‘penalty notice’ means a notice requiring its recipient to pay a penalty—
(a) where the recipient is a service provider, of an amount not exceeding £60,000;
(b) where the recipient is a service provider’s content manager, of an amount not exceeding £10,000.
(6) In order to take account of changes in the value of money the Secretary of State may by regulations substitute another sum for a sum for the time being specified in subsection (5).
(7) See Schedule (Civil penalties for service providers and content managers) for further provision in connection with penalty notices given under this section.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause confers a power on the police or NCA to impose a monetary penalty of up to £60,000 on a service provider or up to £10,000 on a content manager if they have failed to comply with a content removal notice or a decision notice.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 84
Guidance
“(1) The Secretary of State may issue guidance to the persons mentioned in subsection (2) about the exercise of their functions under this Chapter.
(2) The persons are—
(a) the chief officer, and any other member, of a relevant police force;
(b) the Director General of the National Crime Agency and any other officer of the Agency.
(3) The Secretary of State may revise any guidance issued under this section.
(4) The Secretary of State must publish any guidance or revisions issued under this section.
(5) A person mentioned in subsection (2) must have regard to any guidance issued under this section when exercising a function under this Chapter.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause confers power on the Secretary of State to issue guidance to the police and the National Crime Agency about the exercise of their functions under the new Chapter mentioned in the explanatory statement to NC72.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 85
Notices
“(1) This section applies in relation to any notice that must or may be given to a person under this Chapter.
(2) A notice may be given to a person by—
(a) delivering it by hand to the person,
(b) leaving it at the person’s proper address,
(c) sending it by post to the person at that address, or
(d) sending it by email to the person’s email address.
(3) A notice to a body corporate may be given to any officer of that body.
(4) A notice to a partnership may be given to any partner or to a person who has the control or management of the partnership business.
(5) A notice sent by first class post to an address in the United Kingdom, is treated as given at noon on the second working day after the day of posting, unless the contrary is proved.
(6) A notice sent by email is treated as given at the time it is sent unless the contrary is proved.
(7) In this section—
‘director’ includes any person occupying the position of a director, by whatever name called;
‘email address’, in relation to a person, means—
(a) an email address provided by that person for the purposes of this Chapter, or
(b) any email address published for the time being by that person as an address for contacting that person;
‘officer’, in relation to an entity, includes a director, a manager, a partner, the secretary or, where the affairs of the entity are managed by its members, a member;
‘proper address’ means—
(a) in the case of an entity, the address of the entity’s registered office or principal office;
(b) in any other case, the person’s last known address;
‘working day’ means any day other than—
(a) a Saturday or Sunday, or
(b) a day that is a bank holiday in any part of the United Kingdom under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971.
(8) In the case of an entity registered or carrying on business outside the United Kingdom, or with offices outside the United Kingdom, the reference in subsection (7), in the definition of ‘proper address’, to the entity’s principal office includes—
(a) its principal office in the United Kingdom, or
(b) if the entity has no office in the United Kingdom, any place in the United Kingdom at which the person giving the notice believes, on reasonable grounds, that the notice will come to the attention of any director or other officer of that entity.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause makes provision about the ways in which a notice can be given, and the time at which a notice is to be treated as given, under the new Chapter mentioned in the explanatory statement to NC72.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 86
Interpretation of Chapter
“(1) In this Chapter—
‘appointment notice’ has the meaning given by section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(1);
‘authorised officer’ in relation to a content removal notice, means the member of a relevant police force, or officer of the National Crime Agency, who gave the notice;
‘chief officer’—
(a) in relation to a police force in England and Wales, means the chief officer of police of the force;
(b) in relation to any other relevant police force, means the chief constable of that force;
‘contact details’, in relation to an individual, means the individual’s—
(a) full name;
(b) telephone number;
(c) email address;
(d) residential address, or other service address, in the United Kingdom;
‘content’ has the same meaning as in the Online Safety Act 2023 (see section 236(1) of that Act);
‘content manager’, in relation to a service provider, means the individual for the time being appointed as the content manager of the provider (whether in accordance with an appointment notice or under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances) or (Replacement of content manager));
‘content removal notice’ has the meaning given by section (Content removal notices)(4);
‘coordinating officer’ means the individual designated as such under section (Coordinating officer)(1);
‘decision notice’ means a notice given under section (Content removal notices: review)(7);
‘encounter’, in relation to content, has the same meaning as in the Online Safety Act 2023 (see section 236(1) of that Act);
‘entity’ has the same meaning as in that Act (see section 236(1) of that Act);
‘initial 48-hour period’, in relation to a content removal notice, means the 48-hour period specified in the notice as mentioned in section (Content removal notices)(5)(c);
‘issuing force’—
(a) in relation to a content removal notice given by a member of a relevant police force, means that force;
(b) in relation to a content removal notice given by a National Crime Agency officer, means the National Crime Agency;
‘relevant police force’—
(a) in relation to England and Wales, means—
(i) a police force in England and Wales, or
(ii) the Ministry of Defence Police;
(b) in relation to Scotland, means—
(i) the Police Service of Scotland, or
(ii) the Ministry of Defence Police;
(c) in relation to Northern Ireland, means—
(i) the Police Service of Northern Ireland, or
(ii) the Ministry of Defence Police;
‘relevant search service’ and
‘relevant user-to-user service’ have the meanings given by section (‘Relevant user-to-user services’, ‘relevant search services’ and ‘service providers’);
‘required information’ has the meaning given by section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(3);
‘review notice’ has the meaning given by section (Content removal notices: review)(2)(a);
‘search content’ and ‘search results’ have the meanings given by section 57 of the Online Safety Act 2023;
‘senior authorised officer’, in relation to a relevant police force, means—
(a) the chief officer of the relevant police force, or
(b) a member of the relevant police force of at least the rank of inspector authorised for the purposes of this Chapter by the chief officer;
‘senior authorised officer’, in relation to the National Crime Agency, means—
(a) the Director General of the National Crime Agency, or
(b) an officer of the Agency who—
(i) holds a position in the Agency the seniority of which is at least equivalent to that of the rank of inspector in a relevant police force, and
(ii) is authorised for the purposes of this Chapter by the Director General;
‘service address’ has the same meaning as in the Companies Acts (see section 1141 of the Companies Act 2006);
‘service provider’ has the meaning given by section (‘Relevant user-to-user services’, ‘relevant search services’ and ‘service providers’).
(2) For the purposes of this Chapter, a reference to ‘removing’ content—
(a) in relation to content present on a relevant user-to-user service, is a reference to any action that results in the content being removed from the service, or being permanently hidden, so users of the service in any part of the United Kingdom in which the content is unlawful weapons content cannot encounter it;
(b) in relation to content which may be encountered in or via search results of a relevant search service, is a reference to taking measures designed to secure, so far as possible, that the content is no longer included in the search content of the service that is available in any part of the United Kingdom in which the content is unlawful weapons content;
and related expressions are to be read accordingly.
(3) The following provisions of the Online Safety Act 2023 apply for the purposes of this Chapter as they apply for the purposes of that Act—
(a) section 226 (determining who is the provider of a particular user-to-user service or search service);
(b) section 236(5) and (6) (references to content being present).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause contains definitions of terms used in the new Chapter mentioned in the explanatory statement to NC72.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 87
Dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling
“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as set out in subsections (2) to (6).
(2) Before section 28 (dangerous cycling) insert—
‘27A Causing death by dangerous cycling
A person who causes the death of another person by riding a cycle dangerously on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.
27B Causing serious injury by dangerous cycling
(1) A person who causes serious injury to another person by riding a cycle dangerously on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.
(2) In this section “serious injury” means—
(a) in England and Wales, physical harm which amounts to grievous bodily harm for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, and
(b) in Scotland, severe physical injury.’
(3) In section 28—
(a) in subsection (1) for ‘on a road dangerously’ substitute ‘dangerously on a road or other public place’;
(b) omit subsections (2) and (3).
(4) After section 28 insert—
‘28A Meaning of “dangerous cycling”
(1) This section applies for the purposes of sections 27A, 27B and 28.
(2) A person is to be regarded as riding dangerously if (and only if) the condition in subsection (3) or (4) is met.
(3) The condition in this subsection is met if—
(a) the way that the person rides falls far below what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist, and
(b) it would be obvious to a competent and careful cyclist that riding in that way would be dangerous.
(4) The condition in this subsection is met if it would be obvious to a competent and careful cyclist that riding the cycle in its current state would be dangerous.
(5) In determining the state of a cycle for the purposes of subsection (4), regard may be had (among other things) to—
(a) whether the cycle is equipped and maintained in accordance with regulations under section 81 (regulation of brakes, bells etc, on pedal cycles);
(b) anything attached to or carried on the cycle and the manner in which it is attached or carried.
(6) In determining what would be expected of, or obvious to, a competent and careful cyclist in a particular case, regard is to be had both to—
(a) the circumstances of which the person could be expected to be aware (taking account of, if relevant to the case, the age of the accused), and
(b) the circumstances shown to have been within the knowledge of the accused.
(7) References in this section to something being “dangerous” are references to it resulting in danger of—
(a) injury to any person, or
(b) serious damage to property.
28B Causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling
A person who causes the death of another person by riding a cycle on a road or other public place without due care and attention, or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road or place, is guilty of an offence.
28C Causing serious injury by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling
(1) A person who causes serious injury to another person by riding a cycle on a road or other public place without due care and attention, or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road or place, is guilty of an offence.
(2) In this section ‘serious injury’ means—
(a) in England and Wales, physical harm which amounts to grievous bodily harm for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, and
(b) in Scotland, severe physical injury.’
(5) In section 29 (careless, and inconsiderate, cycling)—
(a) after ‘a road’ insert ‘or other public place’;
(b) after ‘the road’ insert ‘or place’.
(6) After section 29 insert—
‘29A Meaning of careless, or inconsiderate, cycling
(1) This section applies for the purposes of sections 28B, 28C and 29.
(2) A person is to be regarded as cycling without due care and attention if (and only if) the way the person cycles falls below what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist.
(3) In determining what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist in a particular case, regard is to be had both to—
(a) the circumstances of which the person could be expected to be aware (taking account of, if relevant to the case, the age of the accused), and
(b) the circumstances shown to have been within the knowledge of the accused.
(4) A person (A) is to be regarded as cycling without reasonable consideration for other persons only if those persons are inconvenienced by A’s cycling.’
(7) The table in Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (prosecution and punishment of offences) is amended as follows.
(8) After the entry relating to ‘RTA section 27’ insert in columns 1 to 4—
(9) After the entry relating to ‘RTA section 28’ insert in columns 1 to 4—
This new clause creates new offences of causing death or serious injury by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling with penalties corresponding to the penalties applicable to the existing offences for causing death or serious injury by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate driving. It also extends the existing offences of dangerous, and careless or inconsiderate, cycling so as to apply to cycling that takes place on public places that are not roads.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Alex Davies-Jones
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Pritchard. No pedestrian or other road user should ever feel unsafe. Their safety is a priority for this Government and I know that such sentiments will be shared across the House. Like all other road users, cyclists are required to comply with road traffic law in the interests of the safety of other road users, and that is reflected in the highway code. There are already existing offences within the Road Traffic Act 1988 to prohibit dangerous and careless cycling, which carry a maximum penalty of £2,500 and a £1,000 fine respectively.
In rare, tragic cases that have occurred in recent years, where there has been a death or serious injury caused by a cyclist, the drawbacks of relying on the current offences—notably, the Offences against the Person Act 1861—have been clear. Unlike the penalties available for motoring offences that have the same tragic outcome, that offence carries a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment. The Government do not believe that those current penalties are appropriate in cases where a cyclist’s behaviour is dangerous or careless and results in the death or serious injury of another person.
Therefore, new clause 87 introduces new offences of causing death or serious injury by dangerous or careless cycling, making our streets safer for pedestrians and other road users. Those causing death by dangerous cycling or careless cycling will face a maximum penalty of life imprisonment or five years’ imprisonment respectively. Those who cause serious injury will face a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment or two years’ imprisonment respectively. Government amendment 82 extends these new offences to England, Wales and Scotland.
These penalties ensure that there is parity across the existing framework of motoring-related offences. All road users, whether they are drivers or cyclists, whose behaviour results in the death or serious injury of another road user will face the same penalties. To be clear, it is not our intention to discourage cycling; it is one of this Government’s broader objectives to promote cycling for its health, economic and environmental benefits. However, while the majority of cyclists are responsible and cycle safely, there are rare instances where victims have been seriously or fatally injured by irresponsible and dangerous cyclist behaviour. As a result, these offences will ensure that people who cause serious or fatal harm because of their reckless cycling behaviour are subject to appropriate punishment.
Before commending these measures to the Committee, I pay personal tribute to the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), and to Matthew Briggs, who have campaigned tirelessly for these changes. I had the privilege of meeting Matthew Briggs. We discussed the need for this new offence, and how the devastating impact of the death of his wife Kim in 2016, due to a reckless cyclist, shows the need to create these new offences. For that reason, I commend these measures to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
The devastating consequences of road traffic collisions caused by reckless or dangerous behaviour are not limited to motor vehicles. In recent years, a small but significant number of cases have emerged where pedestrians and other vulnerable road users have been seriously injured or even killed as a result of dangerous or careless cycling. This new clause rightly recognises that, while the majority of cyclists are law-abiding and responsible, the law must be equipped to deal appropriately with the minority who behave recklessly and put others at grave risk.
Currently, there is a glaring gap in the legal framework: while motorists who cause death or serious injury through dangerous or careless driving face severe legal consequences, no equivalent provision exists for cyclists. This clause introduces parity in accountability, ensuring that victims and their families are not left feeling that justice is denied simply because the vehicle involved was a bicycle rather than a car.
New clause 87, alongside Government amendment 82, ensures that the legal definitions of dangerous and careless cycling reflect the realities of modern shared road and path usage, including in public places beyond traditional roadways. With the increase in cycling on footpaths, shared spaces and pedestrianised zones, it is vital that the law keeps pace and applies wherever the public might be put at risk.
Importantly, the introduction of these offences does not criminalise cycling itself; it targets only those rare but serious cases where a cyclist’s conduct falls far below that which would be expected of competent and considerate road users. It draws on the well-established legal test from dangerous and careless driving legislation, helping to ensure that the proposed offences are proportionate, fair and clearly understood.
As Members will be aware, my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green has long campaigned for a change to the law regarding responsible cycling, and I pay tribute to his work to deliver this improvement to public safety. The last Government confirmed that they would adopt an amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill that would have resulted in a change comparable to the one we see today.
Much of this would not have been possible without the sustained efforts of people such as Matthew Briggs, who, in 2016, tragically lost his wife Kim Briggs, aged just 44, after she was hit by a cyclist riding a fixed-gear bike with no front brakes. She sustained catastrophic head injuries and sadly died a week later. Unfortunately, Kim is just one of many victims, and Matthew’s is just one of many families harmed by these situations, but he has campaigned for this change in the law after tragically losing a loved one. I pay tribute to Matt and his campaign for justice, and hope that this change effectively bridges the gap in the law that so many have highlighted.
Finally, this measure sends a strong message that all road users, regardless of their mode of transport, are responsible for the safety of others. It underlines the seriousness with which Parliament treats the loss of life or serious injuries, promotes responsible cycling, and contributes to safer public spaces for everyone.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 87 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 88
Places of worship: restriction on protests
“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 12(1) (imposing conditions on public processions)—
(a) at the end of paragraph (ab) omit ‘or’;
(b) at the end of paragraph (b) insert ‘or
(c) in the case of a procession in England and Wales, the procession is in the vicinity of a place of worship and may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness with the result that those persons are deterred from—
(i) accessing that place of worship for the purpose of carrying out religious activities, or
(ii) carrying out religious activities at that place of worship,’.
(3) In section 14(1) (imposing conditions on public assemblies)—
(a) at the end of paragraph (ab) omit ‘or’;
(b) at the end of paragraph (b) insert ‘or
(c) in the case of an assembly in England and Wales, the assembly is in the vicinity of a place of worship and may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness with the result that those persons are deterred from—
(i) accessing that place of worship for the purpose of carrying out religious activities, or
(ii) carrying out religious activities at that place of worship.’
(4) In section 14ZA(1) (imposing conditions on one-person protests)—
(a) at the end of paragraph (a) omit ‘or’;
(b) at the end of paragraph (b) insert ‘or
(c) the protest is in the vicinity of a place of worship and may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness with the result that those persons are deterred from—
(i) accessing that place of worship for the purpose of carrying out religious activities, or
(ii) carrying out religious activities at that place of worship.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause gives the police power to impose conditions on public processions, public assemblies and one-person protests that may intimidate people and deter those people from accessing a place of worship for carrying out religious activities or from carrying out religious activities there. It does not provide power to impose conditions where those who may be intimidated are using a place of worship for other purposes.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 89—Powers of senior officers to impose conditions on protests.
Government new clause 90—Amendments relating to British Transport Police and Ministry of Defence Police.
Dame Diana Johnson
New clauses 88 to 90 further update our public order legislation to reflect operational experience. It is important that the legislation keeps pace with the operational realities faced by police on the ground.
In the wake of the events in Israel and Gaza on 7 October 2023, we have seen a wave of large-scale protests across the United Kingdom. Although the right to protest is of course a cornerstone of our democracy and the majority of demonstrations have been peaceful, we cannot ignore the very real impact that some of the gatherings have had on religious communities. We have heard troubling reports of people of all faiths feeling too intimidated to attend places of worship, and of services being cancelled due to the proximity and nature of the protests.
New clause 88 therefore seeks to provide religious communities with better protection from intimidation caused by protests within the vicinity of their place of worship. The police have powers under the Public Order Act 1986 to manage protests where there is serious disruption to the life of the community or intentional intimidation. However, the powers often do not capture the types of harm currently being experienced by religious communities, especially where the intimidation is not deliberate, but is none the less very real for those affected.
The intention of the new clause is to strengthen the police’s powers to manage intimidatory public processions, public assemblies or one-person protests near places of worship, specifically by allowing police to impose conditions where they reasonably believe that the procession, assembly or protest may result in the intimidation of and deter those seeking to access places of worship.
New clause 88 achieves that by creating a new threshold in sections 12, 14 and 14ZA of the 1986 Act, under which the police can impose conditions on public processions, public assemblies and one-person protests. To be clear, it does not ban protests outright, but it enables the police to use this threshold to consider the appropriate time, location or routing that a protest should have in order to avoid intimidating those wishing to practise their faith at their place of worship.
The new clause will allow the police to assess whether a protest may create an intimidating atmosphere that could deter people from accessing places of worship to carry out religious activities or from conducting religious activities there, regardless of whether the organisers of the protest themselves intended for the protest to have that effect.
I turn to new clause 89. In managing recent protests, the police have relied on their powers under sections 12 and 14 of the 1986 Act to impose those conditions, for example where there is a risk of serious public disorder or serious disruption to the life of the community. However, under the current law, only the most senior officers physically at the scene can impose these conditions on live protests or where people are assembling with a view to take part. That can cause delays, particularly when strategic or tactical commanders, known as the gold and silver commanders, who are often based in off-site control rooms, have better access to intelligence but are unable to impose conditions directly. That can also lead to inconsistencies in how similar protests are managed across different locations, especially when multiple events occur at once.
Policing stakeholders have made it clear that allowing gold and silver commanders to impose conditions remotely, where the statutory thresholds are met, would improve the timeliness, consistency and effectiveness of public order policing. Those commanders typically have the best oversight of unfolding events and are well placed to make informed decisions. New clause 89 therefore amends the 1986 Act to enable gold and silver commanders to exercise powers to impose conditions under sections 12(1) and 14(1) in relation to public processions and assemblies.
Finally, new clause 90 addresses two operational issues raised by the Department for Transport and the Ministry of Defence to ensure that public order powers can be used effectively by the British Transport police and the Ministry of Defence police. First, it amends the definitions in the Public Order Act 1986 to allow the BTP to impose conditions on public assemblies taking place at railway stations. Currently, the law restricts the use of these powers to open-air locations, which limits the BTP’s ability to manage protests in enclosed but high-risk public spaces such as major stations. This change will ensure that the BTP can act appropriately within its jurisdiction across England, Wales and Scotland.
Secondly, the new clause corrects a legislative error made in 2004 that unintentionally prevented the BTP from using section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, the existing power to require individuals to remove face coverings. This amendment restores that power. It also empowers the MDP to issue authorisations under section 60AA and section 60 of the 1994 Act to enable MDP officers to exercise powers under these provisions within its jurisdiction, in the same way as territorial police forces.
These are technical but important amendments. They do not expand thresholds or the scope of the powers themselves, but simply ensure that the BTP and MDP can apply them, where appropriate, to keep people safe, particularly in transport hubs and around defence infrastructure. The proposals reflect direct feedback from operational policing and will bring clarity and consistency to the use of public order legislation. I commend the new clauses to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
New clause 88 rightly seeks to strengthen protections for the freedom of religion and belief by ensuring that individuals are not deterred or intimidated from attending or participating in religious worship due to protests taking place in the vicinity of places of worship. It balances the right to peaceful protest with the fundamental right of individuals to practise their faith without fear or obstruction. Places of worship are not just buildings; they are sanctuaries for reflection, community and faith. When people are intimidated from entering these spaces or carrying out religious observance because of aggressive or targeted protests, it undermines not only their personal freedoms, but the broader principle of religious tolerance.
This new clause helps to ensure that those attending religious services can do so without being subject to harassment or psychological pressure. The provision is not a ban on protests: it enables the police to impose conditions, not prohibitions, on processions, assemblies and even one-person protests that occur in the vicinity of a place of worship, where such demonstrations risk intimidating individuals of reasonable firmness and deterring from participating in religious activities. The threshold is carefully defined to target behaviour that causes harm, while still protecting legitimate expression of opinion.
While some may easily dismiss this new clause, it is important to recognise that there are real-world examples where people believe that protests are being used to undermine the ability to worship. For example, recently in Westcliff-on-Sea, a protest organised by Action for Palestine, which the Palestinian Solidarity Campaign described as “not constructive”, took place on Shabbat during the final week of Pesach, in a Jewish neighbourhood where many residents would be travelling to and from the synagogue. The local rabbi said:
“There were quite a few people in the community who were so intimidated that they decided to go to their parents’ in London for the weekend, to get away completely.”
Others decided to attend one of the other orthodox synagogues in the area, such as the Westcliff Charedi synagogue, and ending up having to walk a mile to make Saturday’s two services. While I would not expect the Minister to comment on the specifics of whether that protest would constitute a breach of the new clause in question, it highlights how people practising their religion have felt targeted by particular protests.
Given the rise in targeted demonstrations, whether based on religion, race or identity, this new clause ensures that the law is responsive to the realities of contemporary protest dynamics. It draws on the existing powers under the Public Order Act 1986, applying them specifically in a context where dignity, privacy and religious freedom deserve particular safeguarding. Ultimately, this new clause is a proportionate and necessary step to preserve the peaceful co-existence of rights: the right to worship freely and the right to protest responsibly. It affirms that places of worship must remain accessible and free from intimidation for all communities.
I would be grateful if the Minister could answer the following questions. How will she ensure that new clause 88 strikes the right balance between protecting freedom of religion and upholding the right to protest under articles 9, 10 and 11 of the European convention on human rights? What guidance will be provided to the police to assess whether a protest
“may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness”?
How will subjectivity be mitigated to avoid arbitrary enforcement? Has the Home Office identified particular recent incidents that demonstrate a pressing need for the power? How frequently does the Minister expect it to be used?
David Burton-Sampson
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Pritchard. Like my right hon. Friend the Minister, I will always defend the right to protest, but it must be appropriate. Having one’s voice heard must not come at the expense of intimidating those who are peacefully worshipping.
As the hon. Member for Stockton West mentioned, only recently in Southend my constituents were affected by a march that was purposely routed past a place of worship at the time when people were due to be leaving that place of worship. We have heard similar evidence of that happening across the country. Let us be clear: it is not acceptable that people should be intimidated while they go to or from, or are in, their place of worship, whatever their religion. I welcome the new clauses.
Dame Diana Johnson
I am grateful for the short speech that my hon. Friend the Member for Southend West and Leigh just made. He has spoken to me about the events in Westcliff-on-Sea and their impact on that community. I was also grateful to the shadow Minister for referencing that incident, because it sets out clearly why the provision in new clause 88 is necessary. I welcome that.
The shadow Minister asked whether we will stop legitimate protests, and somehow put the right to religious worship above the right to protest. I want to make it clear that the new clause does not place the freedom of religion above the right to protest. I think we all agree that the right to protest is an important part of our democracy. The new clause seeks to balance those rights by ensuring that protesters do not unduly intimidate or prevent individuals from accessing places of worship.
Although the right to protest remains key and fundamental, the provisions in the new clause clarify police powers to manage those protests near places of worship, ensuring that the freedom of religion is protected without imposing a blanket restriction on demonstrations. The intent is not to curtail protest rights, but to prevent situations where protests create a hostile environment that discourages religious observance. It is important to note that it applies equally to all faiths and all places of worship, not just, as we started off talking about, a specific religious group.
The shadow Minister raised the resource implications for BTP and MDP. The request to bring forward the provisions was because of the operational needs of those police forces. I am expect that they will be able to deal with any costs arising from new clause 90 from their existing budget. The shadow Minister also mentioned training and making sure that police officers understood the introduction of these provisions. I am sure he agrees that there is extensive training of police officers. With public order in particular, we know that there is a very well-worn path of how officers are trained at the right level, depending on the situation.
I recently had the pleasure of meeting Metropolitan police officers, who do a lot of public order work, down at Gravesend to see that training first hand, and I saw the amount of resource that goes in to ensuring that those officers are equipped and know their rights and how most effectively to use them. The new provisions will be part of the continuation of that training for police officers, alongside the work of the College of Policing. On that basis, I commend them to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 88 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 89
Powers of senior officers to impose conditions on protests
“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 12 (imposing conditions on public processions)—
(a) in subsection (1), for ‘the’, in the first place it occurs, substitute ‘a’;
(b) in subsection (2)—
(i) in the words before paragraph (a) omit ‘the’;
(ii) in paragraph (a) for the words from ‘, the most’ to the end substitute ‘—
(i) the most senior in rank of the police officers present at the scene, or
(ii) in the case of a procession in England and Wales, a police officer authorised by a chief officer of police for the purposes of this subsection, and’.
(3) In section 14 (imposing conditions on public assemblies)—
(a) in subsection (1), for ‘the’, in the first place it occurs, substitute ‘a’;
(b) in subsection (2)—
(i) in the words before paragraph (a) omit ‘the’;
(ii) in paragraph (a) for the words from ‘, the most” to the end substitute ‘—
(i) the most senior in rank of the police officers present at the scene, or
(ii) in the case of an assembly in England and Wales, a police officer authorised by a chief officer of police for the purposes of this subsection, and’;
(c) in subsection (2ZB), for ‘reference in subsection (2)(b) to a chief officer of police includes’, substitute ‘references in subsection (2) to a chief officer of police include’.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause allows the powers in sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 to impose conditions on public processions and public assemblies to be exercised by a police officer authorised to do so by a chief officer of police.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 90
Amendments relating to British Transport Police and Ministry of Defence Police
“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).
(2) In section 14A(9) (prohibiting trespassory assemblies), in the definition of ‘land’, after ‘“land”’ insert ‘, except in subsections (4A) to (4C) of this section,’.
(3) In section 16 (interpretation), in the definition of ‘public assembly’, for the words from ‘wholly’ to the end substitute ‘—
(a) wholly or partly open to the air, or
(b) within any of paragraphs (a) to (f) of section 31(1) of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003;’.
(4) The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 is amended in accordance with subsections (5) and (6).
(5) In section 60 (powers to stop and search in anticipation of or after violence), after subsection (9A) insert—
‘(9B) So far as they relate to an authorisation by a member of the Ministry of Defence Police—
(a) subsections (1) and (9) have effect as if the references to a locality in a police area were references to a place in England and Wales among those specified in section 2(2) of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987, and
(b) subsection (1)(aa)(i) has effect as if the reference to a police area were a reference to the places in England and Wales specified in section 2(2) of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987.’
(6) In section 60AA (powers to require removal of disguises)—
(a) for subsection (8) substitute—
‘(8) So far as subsections (1), (3) and (6) relate to an authorisation by a member of the British Transport Police Force, those subsections have effect as if the references to a locality or a locality in a a police area were references to a place in England and Wales among those specified in section 31(1)(a) to (f) of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003.
(8A) So far as subsections (1), (3) and (6) relate to an authorisation by a member of the Ministry of Defence Police, those subsections have effect as if the references to a locality or a locality in a police area were references to a place in England and Wales among those specified in section 2(2) of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987.’;
(b) in subsection (9) omit ‘and “policed premises” each’.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This new clause extends certain powers under Part 2 of the Public Order Act 1986 to land which is not open to the air; allows Ministry of Defence Police to issue authorisations under section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994; and allows British Transport Police and Ministry of Defence Police to issue authorisations under section 60AA of that Act.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 91
Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences
“(1) This section applies where in criminal proceedings in a court in England and Wales, or in proceedings (anywhere) before a service court, a person (‘D’) is charged with a qualifying offence.
(2) An offence is a ‘qualifying offence’ if—
(a) it is alleged to have been committed by D acting in the exercise of functions as an authorised firearms officer,
(b) the conduct alleged to constitute the offence involved the use by D of a lethal barrelled weapon to discharge a conventional round, and
(c) D was, at the time of the alleged offence, authorised by the relevant authority to use that weapon with that round.
(3) The court must—
(a) cause the following information to be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court, in each case unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so—
(i) D’s name;
(ii) D’s address;
(iii) D’s date of birth;
(b) give a reporting direction (see section (Authorised firearms officers: reporting directions)) in respect of D (if one does not already have effect), unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so.
(4) The court may, if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so, make an anonymity order (see section (Authorised firearms officers: anonymity orders)) in respect of D.
(5) If D is convicted of the offence—
(a) subsections (3) and (4) cease to apply in respect of D, and
(b) any restriction put in place under subsection (3)(a) and any reporting direction given, or anonymity order made, under this section in respect of D cease to have effect at the time D is sentenced for the offence.
(6) In subsection (1), ‘authorised firearms officer’ means—
(a) a member of a relevant police force who is authorised by the relevant chief officer to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round in the exercise of functions as a constable,
(b) a National Crime Agency officer who is authorised by the Director General of the National Crime Agency to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round in the exercise of functions as a National Crime Agency officer,
(c) a member of the Police Service of Scotland or the Police Service of Northern Ireland who—
(i) is provided under section 98 of the Police Act 1996 for the assistance of a police force in England and Wales, and
(ii) is authorised by the relevant authority to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round in the exercise of functions as a constable, or
(d) a member of the armed forces who—
(i) is deployed in support of a relevant police force or the National Crime Agency, and
(ii) is authorised by the Secretary of State to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round for the purposes of that deployment.
(7) In this section—
‘conventional round’ means any shot, bullet or other missile other than one designed to be used without its use giving rise to a substantial risk of causing death or serious injury;
‘lethal barrelled weapon’ has the meaning given by section 57(1B) of the Firearms Act 1968;
‘member of the armed forces’ means a person who is subject to service law (see section 367 of the Armed Forces Act 2006);
‘relevant authority’ means—
(a) in relation to a member of a relevant police force, the relevant chief officer;
(b) in relation to a National Crime Agency officer, the Director General of the National Crime Agency;
(c) in relation to a member of the Police Service of Scotland, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland;
(d) in relation to a member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland;
(e) in relation to a member of the armed forces, the Secretary of State;
‘relevant chief officer’ means—
(a) in relation to a police force in England and Wales, the chief officer of police of that police force;
(b) in relation to the British Transport Police Force, the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force;
(c) in relation to the Ministry of Defence Police, the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police;
(d) in relation to the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the Chief Constable of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary;
‘relevant police force’ means—
(a) a police force in England and Wales,
(b) the British Transport Police Force,
(c) the Ministry of Defence Police, or
(d) the Civil Nuclear Constabulary;
‘service court’ means—
(a) the Court Martial, or
(b) the Court Martial Appeal Court.
(8) This section does not apply in relation to proceedings begun before the coming into force of this section.”.—(Alex Davies-Jones.)
This new clause provides for a presumption of anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with (but not convicted of) an offence relating to the discharge of their firearm in the course of their duties
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 92—Anonymity for authorised firearms officers appealing convictions for qualifying offences.
Government new clause 93—Authorised firearms officers: reporting directions.
Government new clause 94—Authorised firearms officers: anonymity orders.
Government amendment 83.
Alex Davies-Jones
Currently, in criminal courts, adult defendants do not have a general right to anonymity, which reflects the principle of open justice. However, judges may impose reporting restrictions where the disclosure of identifying information could hinder the administration of justice, or impact fair trial rights. Armed police officers perform a unique and dangerous role. They are trained to use lethal force on behalf of the state to protect the lives of our citizens. Their work requires them to confront situations that demand split-second decisions that can have profound legal and personal ramifications. They respond to major crimes involving high-risk individuals, often linked to organised crime groups. That inherently dangerous role naturally increases the risk of retribution for both officers and their families, which was a risk highlighted by the police accountability review.
The Government’s plan to introduce the measures set out in new clauses 91 to 94 was originally announced to the House by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary on 23 October. The proposed new clauses address specific concerns raised during the police accountability review, and following the trial of Sergeant Martyn Blake. They will help deliver our commitment to rebuild the confidence of police officers in their vital work to keep the public safe.
Proposed new clause 91 creates a presumption of anonymity for firearms officers who are charged with offences related to the discharge of their weapon during their official duties. That presumption does not extend to other police officers who use force in their duties or to firearms officers if force is used in the line of duty that does not involve discharging a firearm. The starting point for the court will be that anonymity should be granted in these cases, and that such anonymity will remain in place until the defendant is sentenced.
New clause 91 requires that the court must withhold identifying details from the public during proceedings and give a “reporting direction”. The terms of the reporting direction are set out in new clause 93 and prevent the publication of any material that may lead to the identification of the defendant. New clause 91 also gives the courts statutory powers to ensure that the defendant’s identity is protected in the courtroom, if it is
“in the interests of justice to do so”.
New clause 94 sets out the types of measures that can be used, such as screens or voice modulation. It will be for the court to decide whether these are required.
Judicial discretion is preserved under the new provisions, which enable courts to disclose identifying details or lift reporting restrictions, where considered necessary, taking into account the specific circumstances of the case and the overall interests of justice.
New clause 92 provides courts with the statutory authority to extend in-court anonymity measures and reporting restrictions beyond sentencing, should the defendant wish to appeal their conviction. However, it does not establish a presumption, nor does it apply if a firearms officer convicted of an offence seeks only to appeal their sentence. When a firearms officer is convicted, their right to anonymity ceases at the point of sentencing. However, the court may order that anonymity continues pending the outcome of an appeal. If the conviction is upheld on appeal, the right to anonymity will cease upon the finalisation of that appeal.
Conversely, when an officer is exonerated, their right to anonymity will continue, allowing them to resume their professional and personal lives without fear of stigma or threats to their safety. Ensuring national safety and security is a top priority for this Government and the role of firearms officers is essential to achieving that. They serve in their difficult and demanding role voluntarily and we cannot expect them to perform their duties effectively without providing adequate safeguards to protect them and their families. Amendment 83 provides for the new clauses to come into force two months after the Bill is passed. I commend the new clauses, and the amendment, to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
Government new clauses 91 to 94 provide anonymity protections for authorised firearms officers in legal proceedings involving qualifying offences. New clause 91 ensures that officers charged with offences related to their authorised use of lethal weapons discharging a conventional round will have their personal details withheld and reporting directions issued, unless contrary to justice. Such measures would protect them from public scrutiny and potential threats during sensitive investigations. They would foster officers’ confidence in performing high-risk duties because they would be shielded from premature exposure before conviction.
Government new clause 92 extends the protections to convicted officers, pending appeals. That would allow courts to maintain anonymity if necessary for justice, and would support fair appeal processes by preventing irreversible reputational damage if convictions are overturned.
Government new clauses 93 and 94 provide clear mechanisms for reporting directions and anonymity orders to enforce the protections, while ensuring that judges and juries retain access to the officer’s identity. That balances transparency with safety. As the Minister has said, Members will be all too aware of the case of Sergeant Martyn Blake, who was acquitted in October 2024 of murdering Chris Kaba after a 2022 shooting in London. Blake faced death threats, including a £10,000 bounty, forcing him into hiding and highlighting the need for anonymity to protect officers and their families from retribution during trials.
These measures will help to ensure that officers who act in good faith under dangerous circumstances are protected from such vindictive attacks while the judicial process is under way—as well as ensuring recruitment and retention in firearms roles, and public safety—while also allowing the courts to lift protections when justice demands. Will the Minister comment further on how the Government will ensure that courts balance anonymity protections with the public interest in transparent justice? In particular, what guidance will be provided to courts to assess when anonymity is contrary to the interests of justice?
Alex Davies-Jones
I welcome the tone in which the Opposition spokesperson has presented his comments and the fact that he shares our concern about the need for these new measures. Judges will of course have all relevant information in balancing the need for open justice with the need to protect firearms officers in these specific instances. The measures recognise the exceptional circumstances of defendants in such cases and create a presumption of anonymity. The starting point for the courts will be that anonymity should be granted in such cases, unless it is contrary to justice to do so.
Let me add that open justice and the freedom of the press to report on these cases continue to be important principles of our justice system, and this legislation will respect those key principles. A court may already order anonymity measures or reporting restrictions in a case where it judges that disclosure of a defendant’s identity would give rise to a real and immediate risk to life. The measure is being introduced in recognition of the unique responsibilities that firearms officers have, as I have said, and the potential risks associated with their identification during court proceedings. It is really important that judges and the courts get the balance right here, but this measure is absolutely necessary.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 91 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 92
Anonymity for authorised firearms officers appealing convictions for qualifying offences
“(1) This section applies where a person (‘D’) is convicted of a qualifying offence in proceedings in a court in England and Wales, or proceedings (anywhere) before a service court.
(2) The court by or before which D is convicted may, if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so—
(a) cause any or all of the information mentioned in section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(3)(a)(i) to (iii) to be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court;
(b) give a reporting direction in respect of D (see section (Authorised firearms officers: reporting directions));
(c) make an anonymity order in respect of D (see (Authorised firearms officers: anonymity orders)).
(3) Any reporting direction given, or anonymity order made, under subsection (2) ceases to have effect at the end of the appeal period unless, before the end of that period, D brings an appeal against the conviction.
(4) Where, before the end of the appeal period, D brings an appeal against the conviction, the court dealing with the appeal may, if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so—
(a) cause any or all of the information mentioned in section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(3)(a)(i) to (iii) to be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court;
(b) give a reporting direction in respect of D;
(c) make an anonymity order in respect of D.
(5) The court dealing with the appeal must at the earliest opportunity determine the issue of whether to exercise any or all of the powers under subsection (4).
(6) Any reporting direction given, or anonymity order made, under subsection (2) ceases to have effect upon the making of the determination mentioned in subsection (5) (whether or not the court dealing with the appeal gives a direction or makes an order).
(7) Any reporting direction given, or anonymity order made, under subsection (4) ceases to have effect if the appeal against conviction is abandoned or dismissed.
(8) In this section—
‘appeal period’ in relation to a person convicted of a qualifying offence, means the period allowed for bringing an appeal against that conviction, disregarding the possibility of an appeal out of time with permission;
‘qualifying offence’ has the meaning given by section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(2).
(9) This section does not apply where the proceedings in which D was convicted were begun before the coming into force of section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences).”—(Alex Davies-Jones.)
This new clause, which is related to NC91, provides courts with a power to preserve the anonymity of authorised firearms officers convicted of an offence relating to the discharge of their firearm in the course of their duties, pending any appeal against that conviction.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 93
Authorised firearms officers: reporting directions
“(1) A reporting direction, in relation to a person (‘D’) charged with (or convicted of) a qualifying offence, is a direction that no matter relating to D may be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify D as a person who is, or was, alleged to have committed (or who has been convicted of) the offence.
(2) The matters relating to D in relation to which the restrictions imposed by a reporting direction apply (if their inclusion in any publication is likely to have the result mentioned in subsection (1)) include in particular—
(a) D’s name,
(b) D’s address,
(c) the identity of any place at which D works, and
(d) any still or moving image of D.
(3) A relevant court may by direction (‘an excepting direction’) dispense, to any extent specified in the excepting direction, with the restrictions imposed by a reporting direction if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.
(4) An excepting direction—
(a) may be given at the time the reporting direction is given or subsequently;
(b) may be varied or revoked by a relevant court.
(5) A reporting direction has effect—
(a) for a fixed period specified in the direction, or
(b) indefinitely,
but this is subject to subsection (5)(b) of section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences) and subsections (3), (6) and (7) of section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers appealing convictions for qualifying offences).
(6) A reporting direction may be revoked if a relevant court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.
(7) In this section—
‘publication’ has the same meaning as in Part 2 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (see section 63 of that Act);
‘qualifying offence’ has the meaning given by section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(2);
‘relevant court’, in relation to a reporting direction, means—
(a) the court that gave the direction,
(b) the court (if different) that is currently dealing, or that last dealt, with the proceedings in which the direction was given, or
(c) any court dealing with an appeal (including an appeal by way of case stated) arising out of the proceedings in which the direction was given or with any further appeal.”—(Alex Davies-Jones.)
This new clause, which supplements NC91 and NC92, makes provision about reporting directions that may be given under either of those new clauses.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 94
Authorised firearms officers: anonymity orders
“(1) An anonymity order, in relation to a person (‘D’) charged with (or convicted of) a qualifying offence, is an order made by a court that requires specified measures to be taken in relation to D to ensure that the identity of D is withheld from the public in proceedings before the court.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the kinds of measures that may be required to be taken in relation to D include measures for securing one or more of the following—
(a) that identifying details relating to D be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court;
(b) that D is screened to any specified extent;
(c) that D’s voice is subjected to modulation to any specified extent.
(3) An anonymity order may not require—
(a) D to be screened to such an extent that D cannot be seen by—
(i) the judge or other members of the court (if any), or
(ii) the jury (if there is one);
(b) D’s voice to be modulated to such an extent that D’s natural voice cannot be heard by any persons within paragraph (a)(i) or (ii).
(4) The court that made an anonymity order may vary or discharge the order if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.
(5) In this section—
‘qualifying offence’ has the meaning given by section (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences)(2);
‘specified’ means specified in the anonymity order concerned.” —(Alex Davies-Jones.)
This new clause, which supplements NC91 and NC92, makes provision about anonymity orders that may be made under either of those new clauses.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 5
Pornographic content: online harmful content
“(1) A person commits an offence if they publish or allow or facilitate the publishing of pornographic content online which meets the criteria for harmful material under section 368E(3)(a) and section 368E(3)(b) of the Communications Act 2003.
(2) An individual guilty of an offence is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine or both.
(3) A person who is a UK national commits an offence under this section regardless of where the offence takes place.
(4) A person who is not a UK national commits an offence under this section if any part of the offence takes place in the UK.
(5) The platform on which material that violates the provisions in this section is published can be fined up to £18 million or 10 percent of their qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is greater.
(6) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the Act receiving Royal Assent, make regulations appointing one or more public bodies (the appointed body) to monitor and enforce compliance by online platforms with this section.
(7) Regulations made under subsection 6 may provide the appointed body appointed by the Secretary of State with the powers, contained in sections 144 and 146 of the Online Safety Act 2023, to apply to the court for a Service Restriction Order or Access Restriction Order (or both).
(8) The appointed body must, within six months of being appointed by the Secretary of State, lay before Parliament a strategy for monitoring, and enforcing, compliance with the provisions in this section.
(9) The appointed body must lay before Parliament an annual report, outlining the enforcement activity undertaken in relation to this section.”—(Matt Vickers.)
This new clause extends safeguarding requirements for pornography distributed offline to pornography distributed online, making it an offence to publish online harmful material under section 368E(3)(a) and section 368E(3)(b) of the Communications Act 2003.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 6—Pornographic content: duty to verify age—
“(1) A person (A) commits an offence if they publish or allow or facilitate the publishing of pornographic content online where it has not been verified that—
(a) every individual featuring in pornographic content on the platform has given their consent for the content in which they feature to be published or made available by the service; and/or
(b) every individual featuring in pornographic content on the platform has been verified as an adult, and that age verification completed before the content was created and before it was published on the service; and/or
(c) every individual featured in pornographic content on the platform, that had already published on the service when this Act is passed, is an adult.
(2) It is irrelevant under (1a) whether the individual featured in pornographic material has previously given their consent to the relevant content being published, if they have subsequently withdrawn that consent in writing either directly or via an appointed legal representative to—
(a) the platform, or
(b) the relevant regulator where a contact address was not provided by the platform to receive external communications.
(3) If withdrawal of consent under (2) has been communicated in writing to an address issued by the platform or to the relevant public body, the relevant material must be removed by the platform within 24 hours of the communication being sent.
(4) An individual guilty of an offence is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine (or both).
(5) A person who is a UK national commits an offence under this section regardless of where the offence takes place.
(6) A person who is not a UK national commits an offence under this section if any part of the offence takes place in the UK.
(7) The platform on which material that violates the provisions in this section is published can be fined up to £18 million or 10 percent of their qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is greater.
(8) The Secretary of State will appoint one or more public bodies to monitor and enforce compliance by online platforms with this section, with the relevant public body—
(a) granted powers to impose business disruption measures on non-compliant online platforms, including but not limited to service restriction (imposing requirements on one or more persons who provide an ancillary service, whether from within or outside the United Kingdom, in relation to a regulated service); and access restriction (imposing requirements on one or more persons who provide an access facility, whether from within or outside the United Kingdom, in relation to a regulated service).
(b) required to act in accordance with regulations relating to monitoring and enforcement of this section issued by the Secretary of State, including but not limited to providing the Secretary of State with a plan for monitoring and enforcement of the provisions in this section within six months of the bill entering into force, and publishing annual updates on enforcement activity relating to this section.
(9) Internet services hosting pornographic content must make and keep a written record outlining their compliance with the provisions of this section. Such a record must be made summarised in a publicly available statement alongside the publishing requirements in section 81(4) and (5) of the Online Safety Act.”
This new clause makes it a requirement for pornography websites to verify the age and permission of everyone featured on their site, and enable withdrawal of consent at any time.
New clause 7—Pornographic Content: Duty to safeguard against illegal content—
“(1) The Online Safety Act is amended as follows.
(2) In section 80(1), after ‘service’ insert ‘and the illegal content duties outlined in Part 3 of this Act.’”
This new clause extends the illegal content duties in Part 3 of the Act to all internet services which are subject to the regulated provider pornographic content duties in Part 5 of the Act.
New clause 51—Amendment of Possession of extreme pornographic images—
“(1) Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (possession of extreme pornographic images) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (7) after paragraph (a) insert—
‘(aa) an act which affects a person’s ability to breath and constitutes battery of that person.’”
This new clause would extend the legal definition of the extreme pornography to include the depiction of non-fatal strangulation.
Matt Vickers
New clause 6 would introduce a safeguard to ensure that all individuals featured in pornographic content online were verified as adults. By requiring verification before content was created and before it was published, the new clause would strengthen protections against the inclusion of minors, whether through coercion, deception or manipulation, and ensure that no content involving under-age individuals was ever legally uploaded in the first place. This is a clear and necessary step to combat child sexual exploitation online, and one that aligns with wider public expectations about safety and decency on digital platforms.
My hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Rebecca Paul) has raised this issue in the House on multiple occasions, reflecting deep concern over the ease with which harmful and unlawful content can slip through the cracks of unregulated online platforms. The new clause takes that concern seriously and would place a firm legal duty on content hosts to verify the age and consent of all individuals involved. It would shift the burden on to platforms—where it rightly belongs—to adopt robust age verification measures and uphold basic standards of safety and legality. The new clause would not only protect children from exploitation, but help to rebuild public trust in the digital environment by demonstrating that the law was keeping pace with technology.
The new clause’s suggestion that pornographic content can be uploaded without the age of the individuals involved being verified is very disturbing. I would be grateful if the Minister could comment on that and why she feels that the new clause might not be necessary. What is in place to prevent content featuring minors from being uploaded?
The pornography review led by Baroness Bertin has recommended that individuals who feature in pornography should have the right at any time to withdraw their consent to the continued publication of that content. The review states:
“Even if a performer or creator has provided consent for the initial recording and sharing of pornographic content, they should have every right to withdraw consent at a later point…and have that content removed.”
I am keen to hear the Minister’s view and, in particular, why she thinks that that recommendation is wrong.
New clause 51 seeks to update section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 by expanding the definition of extreme pornographic material to include depictions of non-fatal strangulation where it constitutes an act of battery and affects a person’s ability to breathe. The purpose of the new clause is to reflect growing concern from victims’ groups, criminal justice professionals and law enforcement about the increasing normalisation and distribution of such harmful content. Depictions of strangulation, even when simulated, have been linked to increased risk of real-world violence, especially against women. It has been suggested that strangulation is a strong predictor of future domestic homicide and normalising its portrayal in pornography risks reinforcing abusive behaviour.
Currently, the law prohibits extreme pornography that portrays serious injury or life-threatening acts. However, non-fatal strangulation, although deeply dangerous and traumatic, is not consistently covered by the existing legal framework. The new clause would close that gap by providing clarity to police and prosecutors and sending a clear message that depictions of life-threatening violence for sexual gratification are unacceptable. By targeting depictions in which the act affects a person’s ability to breathe and amounts to battery, the new clause is narrowly focused to avoid capturing consensual and legal adult activity while still addressing that which represents serious harm. It would bring the law into line with recent legislative steps such as the introduction of the offence of non-fatal strangulation in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, acknowledging the real risk and impact of that conduct. Ultimately, this change would strengthen protections for the public and uphold standards of decency, particularly in safeguarding against material that eroticises violence and coercion.
I do not wish to divide the Committee on new clause 6, but would like us to divide on new clause 51, which I understand will be decided on later.
Alex Davies-Jones
I want to make it very clear to hon. Members that I have immense sympathy for the sentiments behind all the new clauses in this group. All of us in the House wish to make society a safer place for women and girls. Indeed, this Government were elected with a commitment to halving violence against women and girls. I am sure we all agree that the fight against the proliferation of extreme pornography and access to harmful material is one step to achieving that goal, so before I respond to new clauses 5 to 7 and 51, I want to share a few thanks.
First, I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft (Jess Asato) for tabling new clauses 5 to 7 and for tirelessly campaigning to raise awareness of online harm. I also thank the hon. Member for Stockton West for tabling new clause 51. Importantly, I thank Baroness Bertin, whose independent report on pornography provides us with invaluable insight into pornography and online harm, which the Government continue to consider carefully. All the new clauses shed light on serious issues, and I welcome their being brought to the fore today.
New clause 5 aims to equalise the treatment of pornography regulation online and offline, by making legal but harmful content prohibited online. It seeks to give effect to a recommendation made by Baroness Bertin in her review, which makes the case for parity in the regulation of pornography online and offline. She recommends achieving that through either a new pornography code under the Online Safety Act 2023, or a publication offence, which would render illegal a variety of currently legal pornography content. That approach is similar to what new clause 5 aims to do.
Before I respond to the new clause, I will set out the current legislative framework. Both online and offline pornography is subject to criminal and regulatory legislation and enforcement. The Video Recordings Act 1984 makes it an offence to distribute pornography in a physical media format that has not been classified by the British Board of Film Classification. The BBFC will not classify any content in breach of criminal law or certain other types of pornography. Section 368E of the Communications Act 2003 builds on that framework by prohibiting on-demand programme services, such as ITVX or Prime Video, from showing “prohibited material”, which includes any video that has been refused classification certification by the BBFC and any material that would be refused a classification certificate if it were considered by the BBFC. That is enforced by Ofcom as a regulatory matter.
In addition, the Online Safety Act treats certain pornography or related material offences as priority offences, which means that user-to-user services must take proactive measures to remove extreme pornography, intimate image abuse and child sex abuse material from their platforms. The Act also places a duty on user-to-user service providers to take steps to prevent such material from appearing online in the first place. Those provisions apply to services even if the companies providing them are outside the UK, if they have links to the UK.
The criminal law also prohibits the possession of extreme pornography and the publication of obscene material, either online or offline. The Obscene Publications Act 1959 extends to the publication of obscene material other than pornography. The Video Recordings Act 1984, the Licensing Act 2003 and section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 criminalise the simple possession of extreme pornographic images.
New clause 5 would make the publication, or facilitation of publication, of such content online a criminal offence, with regulatory enforcement of the new criminal regime where the person publishing the content is an online platform. The criminal offence created by the new clause would rely on the definition in section 368E of the Communications Act 2003, which requires a judgment to be made about whether the BBFC would classify content that has not been subject to the classification process. Creating this style of criminal offence would require a clearer and more certain definition of such content, as any individual would need to be able to clearly understand what conduct may result in their conviction. Extensive further work would be needed to consider and define what currently legal online pornography cannot be published with sufficient certainty to ensure that any offence was enforceable and workable as intended.
New clause 6 also attempts to give effect to the recommendations made by Baroness Bertin in her review of pornography. It seeks to create additional requirements for websites hosting pornographic material to verify that all individuals featured were over 18 before the content was created, consented to the publication of the material, and are able to withdraw that consent at any time. It would further regulate the online pornography sector and create a new criminal offence for individuals who publish or facilitate the publishing of content online, where the age and valid consent of the individuals featured have not been verified. The underlying conduct depicted if a person is under 18 or non-consenting would include child sexual abuse, sexual assault, non-consensual intimate image abuse and potentially modern slavery offences.
The existing criminal law prohibits the creation, distribution and possession of child sexual abuse material, and the possession of extreme pornographic material, which includes non-consensual penetrative sexual acts. The law on the distribution of indecent images of children is very clear. Under the Protection of Children Act 1978, the UK has a strict prohibition on the taking, making, circulation and possession with a view to distribution of any indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph of a child under 18, and these offences carry a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment. Section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 also makes the simple possession of indecent photographs or pseudo-photographs of children an offence, which carries a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment. In addition, all published material is subject to the Obscene Publications Act 1959.
Crime and Policing Bill (Fourteenth sitting)
Thursday 8th May 2025
(2 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCrime and Policing Bill 2024-26 View all Crime and Policing Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 8 May 2025 - (8 May 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
New clause 6—Pornographic content: duty to verify age—
“(1) A person (A) commits an offence if they publish or allow or facilitate the publishing of pornographic content online where it has not been verified that—
(a) every individual featuring in pornographic content on the platform has given their consent for the content in which they feature to be published or made available by the service; and/or
(b) every individual featuring in pornographic content on the platform has been verified as an adult, and that age verification completed before the content was created and before it was published on the service; and/or
(c) every individual featured in pornographic content on the platform, that had already published on the service when this Act is passed, is an adult.
(2) It is irrelevant under (1a) whether the individual featured in pornographic material has previously given their consent to the relevant content being published, if they have subsequently withdrawn that consent in writing either directly or via an appointed legal representative to—
(a) the platform, or
(b) the relevant regulator where a contact address was not provided by the platform to receive external communications.
(3) If withdrawal of consent under (2) has been communicated in writing to an address issued by the platform or to the relevant public body, the relevant material must be removed by the platform within 24 hours of the communication being sent.
(4) An individual guilty of an offence is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine (or both).
(5) A person who is a UK national commits an offence under this section regardless of where the offence takes place.
(6) A person who is not a UK national commits an offence under this section if any part of the offence takes place in the UK.
(7) The platform on which material that violates the provisions in this section is published can be fined up to £18 million or 10 percent of their qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is greater.
(8) The Secretary of State will appoint one or more public bodies to monitor and enforce compliance by online platforms with this section, with the relevant public body—
(a) granted powers to impose business disruption measures on non-compliant online platforms, including but not limited to service restriction (imposing requirements on one or more persons who provide an ancillary service, whether from within or outside the United Kingdom, in relation to a regulated service); and access restriction (imposing requirements on one or more persons who provide an access facility, whether from within or outside the United Kingdom, in relation to a regulated service).
(b) required to act in accordance with regulations relating to monitoring and enforcement of this section issued by the Secretary of State, including but not limited to providing the Secretary of State with a plan for monitoring and enforcement of the provisions in this section within six months of the bill entering into force, and publishing annual updates on enforcement activity relating to this section.
(9) Internet services hosting pornographic content must make and keep a written record outlining their compliance with the provisions of this section. Such a record must be made summarised in a publicly available statement alongside the publishing requirements in section 81(4) and (5) of the Online Safety Act.”
This new clause makes it a requirement for pornography websites to verify the age and permission of everyone featured on their site, and enable withdrawal of consent at any time.
New clause 7—Pornographic Content: Duty to safeguard against illegal content—
“(1) The Online Safety Act is amended as follows.
(2) In section 80(1), after ‘service’ insert ‘and the illegal content duties outlined in Part 3 of this Act.’”
This new clause extends the illegal content duties in Part 3 of the Act to all internet services which are subject to the regulated provider pornographic content duties in Part 5 of the Act.
New clause 51—Amendment of Possession of extreme pornographic images—
“(1) Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (possession of extreme pornographic images) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (7) after paragraph (a) insert—
‘(aa) an act which affects a person’s ability to breath and constitutes battery of that person.’”
This new clause would extend the legal definition of the extreme pornography to include the depiction of non-fatal strangulation.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 9
CCTV on railway network
“(1) It is a legal requirement for CCTV cameras across the railway network in England and Wales to be capable of enabling immediate access by the British Transport Police and relevant Police Forces.
(2) All footage retained by CCTV cameras on the railway network must remain accessible to the British Transport Police and relevant Police Forces for the entirety of the retention period.
(3) The retention period specified in subsection (2) is 30 calendar days.
(4) Further to subsection (1), the Secretary of State must publish a report, within three months of the passing of this Act, specifying a compatibility standard that will facilitate CCTV access for the British Transport Police and any Police Force in England and Wales.”—(Luke Taylor.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I rise to speak in support of new clause 9, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper). We seek a simple but critical improvement to public safety: the interoperability of CCTV systems across our railway network. Currently, rail operators maintain CCTV systems that are not integrated with British Transport police or the local territorial forces in the areas they serve. This technological gap is not just a logistical inconvenience, but an active barrier to justice and public protection.
This issue came to light in a very practical context. My hon. Friend became aware of a spike in bike thefts at St Albans City station. Despite the presence of cameras at the station, the police faced severe limitations on their access to the footage they needed, which delayed investigations and reduced the chance of recovering the stolen property. At the other end of the Thameslink line, at Sutton station, I have had an expensive e-bike stolen and two other bikes dismantled—the theft of a saddle made my ride home from work one night particularly uncomfortable.
This is not just about my cycling challenges, but about broader criminal activity on our railways, including antisocial behaviour, assaults and, most gravely, threats to the safety of women and vulnerable people using our public transport. When someone is attacked or harassed on a platform or in a train carriage, time is of the essence, and having the ability to quickly retrieve and share CCTV footage can make the difference between justice and impunity. New clause 9 would fix this problem by requiring rail operators to ensure that their CCTV systems are compatible with law enforcement systems, enabling faster, more co-ordinated responses when incidents occur. In an age when we expect smart, connected infrastructure, this is a common-sense step that aligns with public expectations and operational necessity. In the age of Great British Railways, it would be an opportunity to streamline and standardise the systems used by our currently fragmented rail system into a single, interoperable system that improves the experience and safety of riders.
I urge the Committee to support the new clause not because it would improve security on paper, but because it would make a tangible difference to the safety and confidence of passengers across the rail network.
Matt Vickers
Requiring CCTV on the rail network to meet police access and retention standards could bring important benefits for public safety and criminal justice. Ensuring footage is readily accessible to the police would help to deter crime, enable faster investigations and support prosecutions with reliable evidence.
Victims and witnesses benefit when their accounts can quickly be corroborated, and cases are more likely to be resolved effectively. Standardising CCTV systems across train operators would also reduce inefficiencies, removing delays that can occur due to incompatible formats or outdated technology. In high-risk areas or busy urban transport hubs, this kind of clarity and consistency could make a real difference to public confidence and police capability.
No doubt some will argue that increased surveillance on public transport raises questions about privacy and civil liberties, particularly if passengers feel that they are being constantly monitored. Also, rail operators may face high financial and logistical burdens if they are required to overhaul existing CCTV infrastructure to meet new standards. For smaller operators in particular, the cost of compliance could be significant, potentially impacting service provision or ticket prices.
I would be grateful if the Liberal Democrats told us whether this requirement would apply to all train operating companies, including heritage railways and smaller, regional operators. What specific technical or operational standards would CCTV systems be expected to meet, and how would those be determined or updated over time? Have they reviewed how many operators already meet or fall short of the proposed standards, and what level of upgrade would typically be required? Have they assessed the financial implications for train operators, and would they expect any Government funding or support to assist implementation?
The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)
New clause 9 would introduce a requirement that all CCTV camera images on the railway be made immediately accessible to the British Transport police and the relevant local Home Office police force. I am sympathetic to the cases that the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam, who speaks for the Liberal Democrats, shared with the Committee. I particularly sympathise with his plight and predicament when his saddle was stolen; having to cycle home without a saddle must have been incredibly painful, so I fully welcome the aims of this new clause. We know that lack of immediate access to railway CCTV camera images has been a significant issue for the British Transport police, as it may reduce their ability to investigate crime as quickly as possible. However, I do not believe that legislation is necessary to address the issue. Let me explain why.
My colleagues at the Department for Transport are looking to implement a system that will provide remote, immediate access for the BTP, Home Office forces and the railway industry where relevant. As I said, that does not need legislation. What is needed is a technological solution and the resources to provide for that. I am sure that the hon. Member will continue to press the case with the Department for Transport, and for updates on the progress of the work, but for now, I invite him to withdraw his new clause.
Luke Taylor
In response to the specific comments from the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Stockton West, this measure relates entirely to existing footage and would allow access to existing footage. I thank the Minister for addressing the points made. At this point, are happy to withdraw the new clause. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 12
Domestic abuse aggravated offences
“(1) Any criminal offence committed within England and Wales is domestic abuse aggravated, if—
(a) the offender and the victim are personally connected to each other, and
(b) the offence involves behaviour which constitutes domestic abuse.
(2) In this section—
(a) ‘domestic abuse’ has the meaning given by section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, and
(b) ‘personally connected’ has the meaning given by section 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021.”—(Luke Taylor.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Luke Taylor
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
As things stand, there is no specific criminal offence of domestic abuse in England and Wales. Instead, such cases are prosecuted under a patchwork of broader offences: common assault, actual bodily harm and coercive control. While those charges may reflect elements of abuse, they too often fail to capture the sustained pattern nature of domestic violence.
The legal ambiguity has far-reaching consequences. Under the Government’s own SDS40—standard determinate sentences 40%—scheme, high-risk offenders, especially those who pose a continued threat to public safety, should be exempt from early release, but owing to the lack of specific domestic abuse offences, perpetrators charged under more general categories, such as common assault, remain eligible for early release. In effect, abusers walk free while their victims live in fear. That is not a technical oversight; it is a systemic failure, and it has rightly been challenged by Women’s Aid, Refuge, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner and other voices we cannot afford to ignore.
That is why I welcome both the proposed amendment to the SDS40 scheme and the Domestic Abuse (Aggravated Offences) Bill, brought forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Eastbourne (Josh Babarinde). That Bill would create a defined set of domestic abuse aggravated offences, recognising the context of abuse and making such offences clearly identifiable in the criminal justice system. If adopted, the reform would not only enhance the visibility of domestic abuse, but close the dangerous loopholes in relation to early release. It would bring the law into alignment with the lived experiences of victims and send a clear message: domestic abuse is not a private matter; it is a public crime and will be treated as such.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)
I personally thank the hon. Member for Eastbourne for his tireless commitment to, and campaigning on, tackling domestic abuse. He is right to highlight the need to identify and track domestic offenders better in our justice system. It is a crucial issue. I welcome this important discussion and the many conversations that I have had with him in my ministerial office about how best to collaborate to achieve this.
New clause 12 seeks to introduce a new label, “domestic abuse aggravated”, which will apply to any offence where the offender and victim are personally connected and both aged 16 or over. Offences ranging from assault to fraud would be designated as domestic abuse aggravated where they met the statutory definition of domestic abuse. We recognise the intent behind the new clause and are deeply sympathetic to it; we agree that better categorisation and management of domestic abuse offenders is crucial. However, there are a number of important considerations that need to be carefully worked through to ensure that any new approach is effective and workable, and that it will actually help victims.
There are significant questions that need to be answered if we are to ensure that any reform strengthens, rather than complicates, our response to domestic abuse. While the new clause introduces a new label, it does not set out a clear mechanism for how the designation would be applied in practice. As proposed, it creates a category of domestic abuse offender by virtue of their offence, but does not set out legal or operational implications for charging or sentencing. Without clarity about its function, there is a risk that the provision will introduce unnecessary complexity in the legal framework, in particular through how it operates alongside the Sentencing Council’s existing guidelines, in which domestic abuse is already recognised as an aggravating factor. Courts therefore already consider imposing tougher sentences when an offence occurs in a domestic setting.
Despite those concerns, the hon. Gentleman raises an important issue, and one that I have discussed at length with the hon. Member for Eastbourne. I assure both hon. Members that work is under way across Government on how we can better identify domestic abuse offenders. This is a complex issue, and it is right that we take the time to ensure that any changes are robust and deliver meaningful improvements, but we are on the case.
The hon. Member for Eastbourne can rest assured that the Government are actively considering the issue. I would be glad to work with him—I extend that invitation to any Member of the House—on identifying the most effective way forward. While we do not believe the new clause is the right solution at this time, we welcome ongoing discussions on how best to improve the categorisation and tracking of domestic abuse offenders within the justice system. For those reasons, I ask that new clause 12 be withdrawn.
Luke Taylor
We would like to press the new clause to a vote, please.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Anna Sabine (Frome and East Somerset) (LD)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 27—Fines for sale of stolen equipment—
“(1) The Equipment Theft Act 2023 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 3 (Enforcement), subsection (2) at end insert ‘equal to—
(a) the replacement cost of the equipment,
(b) the cost of repairing any damage caused during the theft, and
(c) the trading losses incurred by the offended party.’”
This new clause would ensure the fine charged to a person convicted of equipment theft would reflect the cost to a tradesman of replacing their equipment, repairing any damage to their equipment or property, and any business they’ve lost as a result.
New clause 32—Theft from farms—
“(1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.
(2) In Chapter 3, Aggravating Factors, after section 72 insert—
‘(72A) Theft from farms
(1) This section applies where the court is considering the seriousness of an offence specified in section 7 of The Theft Act 1968.
(2) If the theft was of high value farming equipment, the court—
(a) must treat that fact as an aggravating factor, and
(b) must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.
(3) For the purposes of this section—
“high value farming equipment” is machinery and tools used in agricultural operations to enhance productivity and efficiency, with a value of at least £10,000.’”
This new clause makes theft of high value farming equipment an aggravating factor on sentencing.
New clause 96—Theft of tools from tradesmen—
“(1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.
(2) In Chapter 3, Aggravating Factors, after section 72 insert—
‘72A Theft of tools from tradesmen
(1) This section applies where the court is considering the seriousness of an offence specified in section 7 of the Theft Act 1968.
(2) If the theft was of tools from a tradesman, the court—
(a) must treat that fact as an aggravating factor, and
(b) must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.’”
This new clause would make the theft of tools from a tradesman an aggravating factor.
New clause 98—Enforcement plan for sale of stolen equipment at car boot sales—
“(1) The Equipment Theft Act 2023 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 3 (Enforcement), after subsection (3) insert—
‘(3A) An enforcement authority must put in place an enforcement plan to enforce regulations made under section 1 at temporary markets in their area.’”
This new clause would require local councils or local trading standards organisations to put in place an enforcement plan for the sale of stolen equipment at temporary markets, which includes car boot sales.
Anna Sabine
I rise to speak to new clause 13, but the Liberal Democrats also support Opposition new clauses 27, 32, 96 and 98, which are grouped with it.
We want to amend the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 specifically to include the theft of global positioning system or GPS equipment. That may sound like a technical issue, but for farmers across the country, such as those in my Frome and East Somerset constituency, it is an urgent and deeply practical one. GPS units are no longer optional extras—they are essential tools for modern farming, guiding tractors and combine harvesters with precision, improving productivity and ensuring that key agricultural work happens on time. Yet these high-tech units, typically costing over £10,000 each, have become a prime target for increasingly organised criminal gangs. In 2023 alone, NFU Mutual reported that claims for GPS theft soared by 137%, reaching an estimated £4.2 million. These are not isolated incidents: intelligence shows that gangs often target multiple farms in one night, stealing with precision and frequently returning weeks later to take the newly installed replacements.
Matt Vickers
New clauses 27, 96 and 98 seek to tackle the real and growing problem of tool theft from tradesmen. At this point, I declare an interest as the son of a builder. This country is built on the back of tradesmen. They are the small businesses that make a huge contribution to our economy and build the world around us. I have seen at first hand the nightmare that occurs when guys or girls in the trade get up at daft o’clock to go to work and earn a living, only to find that their van or lock-up has been broken into and their equipment stolen. They lose the equipment, their vehicle gets damaged and they lose a day’s work. In fact, they can lose days or weeks of work, and the nature of their employment often means that that is a real financial loss.
Not only do these hard-working people suffer that loss, but they know that little is done to stop this ever-increasing problem. I have spoken to tradesmen and key campaigners on this issue, such as Shoaib Awan and the team at Fix Radio, who have been standing up for tradesmen across the country, organising a rally in Westminster and ensuring that their voice is heard. Many people will have seen my good friend the shadow Justice Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick), raising this issue on GB News and talking about the failure of agencies to tackle it.
Shoaib has highlighted the fact that not only do people wake up to the consequences and costs of such thefts, but all too often, they go to a car boot sale at the weekend to see the thieves selling the stolen goods in broad daylight with little, if any, action from the police and trading standards. I ask anyone who does not think that these amendments are necessary to listen to Shoaib or watch the coverage on GB News, should they so wish. As more thieves get away with and profit from this crime, so its prevalence continues to increase. Since Sadiq Khan became mayor, tool theft in London has gone up by 60%. I hope Members will consider these amendments.
New clause 27 strengthens the deterrent effect of the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 by aligning financial penalties with the real-world losses experienced by tradespeople and small businesses when their tools or equipment are stolen. The current enforcement provisions may result in fines that are disconnected from the actual harm caused, particularly to self-employed individuals or small and medium-sized enterprises, where the loss of equipment can be financially devastating. The new clause introduces a fairer and more effective approach by unequivocally requiring courts to impose fines that reflect the full replacement cost of the stolen equipment, the cost of repairing any damage done during the theft and the trading loss incurred while the equipment was unavailable, whether it be cancelled jobs, lost contracts or reputational harm.
Tool theft has reached crisis levels in the UK, with one in 10 tradespeople expected to experience tool theft this year alone. Many of the victims have already endured multiple incidents and, alarmingly, self-employed tradespeople are 38% more likely than their employed counterparts to fall victim to this type of crime. Yet, despite the prevalence of this crime, only 1% of stolen tools are ever recovered.
The consequences of tool theft go far beyond the immediate loss of equipment. Victims face an average cost of £2,730 to replace stolen tools, £1,320 in vehicle or property repairs and £1,900 in lost work and business disruption—a combined blow of nearly £6,000. More than four in five victims report a negative impact on mental health, with over one third describing it as “major”. That is no small issue, especially in an industry already suffering one of the UK’s highest suicide rates. More than 40% of victims say the theft has damaged their business reputation, and one in 10 say the reputational impact was significant. Frustration with the police and the legal response is widespread. Nearly one quarter of tradespeople—22.7%—do not even bother reporting tool theft to authorities, citing poor outcomes and a lack of follow-up.
According to figures from CrimeRate, Bristol has the highest rates of general crime, with 106 crimes per 1,000 residents, followed by West Yorkshire, Tyne and Wear and West Midlands. Those rates correlate with high levels of tool theft. The persistent threat of crime means that, for 68% of tradespeople, worrying about such theft is a daily reality. The new clause would not only ensure that victims are properly compensated, but send a strong message to offenders that equipment theft is not a low-risk crime. For many tradespeople, a single incident can lead to thousands of pounds in losses and days or weeks of missed work. The clause reflects a growing recognition that crimes affecting livelihoods must be met with penalties that match the seriousness and consequences of the offence. It supports victims, reinforces respect for the law and helps to protect the economic wellbeing of skilled workers across the country.
New clause 96 seeks to amend the Sentencing Act 2020 to make the theft of tools from a tradesman an explicit aggravating factor when courts are considering the seriousness of a theft offence under section 7 of the Theft Act 1968. The intention is to recognise the disproportionate harm caused when essential work tools are stolen from skilled tradespeople, many of whom rely entirely on their tools to earn a living. By requiring courts to treat such thefts more seriously and state that fact in open court, the clause ensures that sentencing properly reflects the real-world impact of those crimes. It improves public confidence in the justice system and sends a clear message that targeting workers in such a way will not be tolerated.
The UK’s skilled trade sector is essential to infrastructure, housing and national economic recovery, yet, when they are targeted by thieves, many tradespeople feel unprotected and underserved by the criminal justice system. By introducing this aggravating factor, Parliament would send a clear message that these crimes are taken seriously and that the justice system stands on the side of workers who keep our country running. The provision would also help to restore public confidence in sentencing, ensuring that punishment better reflects the real impact on victims.
New clause 96 would also bring greater consistency and transparency in sentencing by obliging courts to state in open court when a theft is aggravated by the fact that tools were stolen from a tradesman. The system reinforces public accountability and the principle that sentencing should consider not only the value of items stolen, but the importance to the victim’s life and work.
New clause 98 addresses a growing concern about the sale of stolen tradespeople’s tools at car boot sales and other temporary markets. Requiring local councils or trading standards authorities to implement an enforcement plan would ensure a more proactive and consistent approach to tackling the issue. Car boot sales and temporary markets, although important parts of local economies and communities, have become a common outlet for the sale of stolen tradesmen’s tools. These informal settings often have minimal regulatory oversight, making them attractive to criminals seeking to quickly offload high value items. Requiring councils to create enforcement plans would close this enforcement gap, helping to dismantle a key part of the stolen goods supply chain.
Tradespeople, many of whom are self-employed, are among those most affected by tool theft. Their tools are not just possessions; they are the means by which individuals earn a living. Stolen tools being resold at car boot sales with little oversight reinforces the cycle of crime and undermines legitimate business. A local enforcement plan will support hard-working tradespeople by increasing the risk for those attempting to profit from their misfortune.
Any Member who has taken the time to speak to affected tradespeople will have heard their overwhelming frustration at the lack of the lack of action at car boot sales, watching tools stolen from them being sold in front of their face in broad daylight with no action from the agencies. This new clause seeks to put that right. By requiring councils to plan enforcement at temporary markets, it would encourage more responsible behaviour among market organisers and set a baseline for due diligence, including vendor checks, co-operation with law enforcement and public awareness initiatives. Such expectations could help to preserve the integrity and trustworthiness of community markets without disrupting legitimate trade.
This is a common-sense, low-cost policy that leverages existing local authority structures. Many councils already have trading standards and enforcement teams in place able to take this on. This measure simply ensures that they will turn their attention to this persistent and growing problem. Enforcement plans could include scheduled inspections, information sharing with police and targeted education for both vendors and shoppers. This preventive approach could reduce the frequency of thefts by making it more difficult for criminals to profit.
The Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 set an important precedent in efforts to crack down on the theft of high-value tools and equipment. However, legislation is only effective when matched by local enforcement. This clause bridges the gap between law and local action, giving councils a clear duty and direction to enforce the law where the illicit trade is happening on the ground.
Local residents and small business owners often feel powerless in the face of persistent tool theft. Seeing their local councils take meaningful and visible action, such as regular enforcement of markets, could help to build trust in the system, sending a message that this type of crime is taken seriously and that steps are being taken at every level to protect those most vulnerable to its effect.
The new clause would help deter the resale of stolen goods, protect legitimate tradespeople from further victimisation and send a clear message that theft and resale will be actively policed at all levels. This targeted local action complements broader sentencing reforms and supports efforts to reduce tool theft across the UK.
New clause 32 seeks to amend the Sentencing Act 2020 and specifically targets the growing issue of rural crime by making the theft of high-value farming equipment a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing decisions. Under the proposed provision, when a court is considering the seriousness of a theft offence under section 7 of the Theft Act 1968, and the theft involves farming machinery or tools valued at £10,000 or more, it must treat the value and nature of the stolen property as an aggravating factor.
The theft of high-value farm equipment has a profound and often devastating impact on rural communities and agricultural businesses. These machines, such as tractors, GPS systems, harvesters and other specialised tools, are not only expensive to replace, but also critical to daily operations. When they are stolen, the immediate financial loss can exceed £10,000, but the broader consequences go much further. Farmers face significant disruption to their work, delayed harvesting or planting and reduced productivity, which can affect the entire food supply chain.
Many rural businesses operate on tight margins and such thefts can push them into financial instability or force them to cease operations temporarily. Beyond economics, these crimes erode confidence in rural policing and leave victims feeling vulnerable and targeted, especially in remote areas where support and security may already be limited.
The new clause would also require courts to explicitly state in open court that the offence has been aggravated by this factor. The intent is to reflect the serious disruption and financial harm caused by the theft of vital agricultural machinery such as tractors, GPS units or harvesters, which are essential for productivity and food security in rural communities. By making that an aggravating factor, the new clause aims to ensure that sentencing reflects the full impact on victims and serves as a more effective deterrent. I hope that the Government will consider backing our farmers and backing this new clause.
My hon. Friend the Member for Mid Buckinghamshire (Greg Smith) has undertaken a significant amount of work to help tackle tool and equipment theft, including the introduction of the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 as a private Member’s Bill, to address the escalating issue of equipment and tool theft affecting tradespeople, farmers and rural businesses across England and Wales.
The 2023 Act empowers the Secretary of State to mandate that all new all-terrain vehicles such as quad bikes come equipped with immobilisers and forensic marking before sale. The measures aim to make stolen equipment less attractive to thieves and easier to trace. The Act could make a real and meaningful difference to the issues we are debating here. It received Royal Assent and is designed to deter theft and facilitate the recovery of stolen equipment. I would be grateful if the Minister could comment on the progress of enacting the measures set out in that Act.
Alex Davies-Jones
I would be happy to do so, but first I must say how grateful I am to the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset and to the hon. Member for Stockton West for setting out the rationale behind these new clauses.
New clause 13 seeks to extend the scope of the 2023 Act to include the theft of GPS equipment. Such equipment is often used in agricultural and commercial settings. We know the significant impact of thefts of agricultural machinery, in particular all-terrain vehicles, on individuals and businesses in rural areas, and the disruption to essential farming when these thefts occur. That is why we are committed to implementing the 2023 Act to help prevent the theft and resale of high-value equipment. We intend to introduce the necessary secondary legislation later this year, and we will be publishing the Government’s response to the call for evidence soon to confirm the scope of that legislation.
Luke Taylor
The premise of the Minister’s point is effectively that sufficient legislation is already in place to combat these crimes. The response to an freedom of information request that I submitted to the Met police showed that in London, in the last five years, nine in 10 tool thefts went unsolved. The fact that that failure has been allowed to continue under the existing legislation suggests that legislation is not sufficient. I support the proposed new clauses because something needs to change to stop these incredibly damaging crimes, which are affecting not just the livelihoods, but the mental health of our valuable, essential tradespeople and their families.
Alex Davies-Jones
I welcome that comment from the Liberal Democrat spokesperson. I and this Government recognise that theft is a crime, and that victims are immensely impacted by it—we heard earlier about the hon. Member’s own circumstances—but the legislation is adequate. As I have already said, we have robust legislation to tackle these crimes. What has been apparent over the last 14 years is a decimation of our public services, including our policing, which has meant that police do not have the resources that they need to investigate these crimes effectively. I am glad to say that this Government are changing that by recruiting and funding more police officers, including for the Met police, to ensure that we have the police to go after these criminals.
Luke Taylor
The Minister has set me up nicely with that point, and I will come back to it later. The Met police are going to reduce their staff—including officers and police community support officers—by 1,700 next year. The Government are attempting to present a case that the legislation is sufficient at present, and that they are providing more officers and resources to police forces to combat the increase in these crimes. Whoever’s fault it was—and we all make points about the cause, the cuts, when the cuts started, and what conditions were prior to them—if the Met police will suffer the loss of 1,700 officers next year due to the funding situation, and the legislation is currently letting down tradespeople, I would gently push back that either the measures in the legislation or the resources are insufficient to solve an issue that we all generally agree exists today.
Alex Davies-Jones
The Policing Minister assures me that that figure for the number of cuts being made by the Met police is not correct. We are happy to debate that. I and this Government are still sufficiently certain that the legislation is robust in this area. We can debate the means that we have to tackle that but, as I have stated, this Government are funding more police resources to ensure that those who commit these crimes are being sought. In an earlier sitting of the Committee, we debated why it is so important to clarify and get right provisions for shop theft, so that the police have adequate equipment and resources to go after the perpetrators. These thefts are illegal but, for whatever reason, the crimes are not being pursued. We are determined to ensure, through our safer streets mission, that that problem is tackled, but the legislation that we have in place is robust.
Regarding the courts and the justice system, the Government do consider that the courts are already considering the impacts of such crimes when sentencing. The addition of the measures in the proposed new clauses would add unnecessary complications to the sentencing framework. Moreover, sentencing in individual cases should as far as possible be at the discretion of our independent judiciary, to ensure that sentences are fair, impartial and proportionate.
Finally, as I have already set out, any changes to the sentencing framework should take into account the sentencing review’s recommendations, which are due to be published shortly.
On new clause 98, I understand the frustration that many individuals feel when they see stolen equipment being sold at car boot sales and other informal markets. I reassure the shadow Minister that the Government take this issue seriously. However, we cannot support the clause in the absence of further policy work and engagement with relevant authorities to explore the best way to ensure that stolen equipment is not sold in informal market settings or at car boot sales.
Overall, I am sympathetic to the spirit of the new clauses, but I do not believe them to be necessary at this time. I reassure the Committee that this Government are fully committed to implementing the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 to tackle the theft and resale of equipment.
Matt Vickers
Can I take it that there is a commitment to doing something to clamp down on the situation with temporary markets and car boot sales? Also, will the Minister meet with Shoaib Awan, the gas fitter who has been campaigning on the issue, to discuss what that might look like and to hear the sector’s frustrations?
Alex Davies-Jones
Yes, we are happy to meet with Shoaib Awan to discuss this, and yes, we have a commitment to looking at the situation more widely and at the issue directly. As someone who loves a car boot sale, I am keen to explore the question further.
I ask the shadow Minister to be patient for a little while longer as we finalise our plans for the implementation of the 2023 Act, and as we look into the issues in more detail to get the policy work right. On that basis, I ask hon. Members not to press their new clauses.
Anna Sabine
I seek a quick clarification from the Minister. Was she saying that under the plans to implement the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act, there may be scope within some secondary legislation to look at GPS thefts specifically? Did I understand that correctly?
Luke Taylor
I rise to speak in support of new clause 13, as well as Conservative new clauses 27, 96 and 98. We had a long discussion on this issue, but it is worth repeating as often as possible that tool theft is a devastating crime that cost tradespeople more than £94 million last year.
Research from NFU Mutual shows that one in three tradespeople now live in constant fear of violent thieves. Some have been attacked with crowbars and other weapons just for trying to protect their tools from being ripped out of their vans. At the February rally in Parliament Square organised by Trades United, I heard from campaigners about tradespeople not letting their vehicles out of their sight, and about thieves cutting off the roofs of their vans to steal tools. It was heartbreaking. We hear about the impact on those tradespeople and their families, including suicides and mental health problems.
Despite the back and forth, I think we should make it absolutely clear that this issue needs to be addressed, and that powers must be given to the police and courts to treat it with the seriousness that it deserves. Tool theft is more than just standard assault or theft; it is an assault on tradespeople’s hard work and their livelihoods. It is time to acknowledge that danger to their entire livelihoods and lifestyles.
Anna Sabine
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 14
Rural Crime Prevention Strategy
“(1) A day after this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Secretary of State must establish a rural crime prevention task force to develop proposals for tackling rural crime.
(2) The task force should be tasked with a remit that includes, but is not confined to, examining—
(a) The particular types of crime that occur in rural areas;
(b) Crime rates in rural communities across England and Wales;
(c) The current levels of police resources and funding in rural communities;
(d) Whether specific training in how to respond to rural crime call-outs should be undertaken by police control room operators;
(e) The operational case, and the funding implications, of appointing rural crime specialists in Police Forces across England and Wales which serve areas that include a significant rural population; and
(f) Whether a National Rural Crime Coordinator should be established.
(3) The task force established under subsection (1) must submit a rural crime prevention strategy to the Secretary of State within six months of its appointment.
(4) The Secretary of State must, within a month of receiving the report made by the task force, lay before both Houses of Parliament a written response to the task force’s recommendations.
(5) The Secretary of State must, within a month of laying their response to the task force’s report, ensure that an amendable motion on the subject of the rural crime task force’s recommendations is laid, and moved, before both Houses of Parliament.”—(Anna Sabine.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to establish a task force to produce a strategy for tackling rural crime, makes provision for specific aspects of the task force’s remit, and requires the Secretary of State to bring forward a substantive motion before both Houses of Parliament on the task force’s recommendations.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Anna Sabine
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would require the Secretary of State to establish a rural crime taskforce, which is a long overdue step in recognising and addressing the growing threat of rural crime across England and Wales. In 2023 alone, the total cost of rural crime surged to a staggering £52.8 million—a 22% increase since 2020. Behind that figure lie the lives and livelihoods of farmers, landowners and rural communities who are increasingly under siege from organised criminal gangs. These are not petty thefts, but targeted cross-border operations involving the theft of high-value machinery, vehicles and GPS units, often facilitated by networks that are deliberately structured to evade detection by working across multiple police force boundaries. I have spoken to my many farmers in my constituency of Frome and East Somerset, and many of these rural crimes end in terrifying physical altercations between farmers and criminals, and even threats being made against farmers’ families.
Yet, while the threat has grown, the policing response has not. Fewer than 1% of officers in England and Wales are dedicated to rural crime. Many forces lack even the basic tools, such as drone kits and mobile automatic number plate recognition cameras, to respond effectively. It is no wonder that 49% of rural residents feel that police do not take rural crime seriously, and two thirds believe reporting it is a waste of time. This new clause would change that. It mandates the creation of a taskforce with a clear and comprehensive remit to assess crime levels, review police resources, consider rural-specific training, explore the case for rural crime specialists and evaluate whether a national rural crime co-ordinator should be established.
Importantly, the new clause is not just about a report gathering dust. It requires the Secretary of State to respond to the taskforce’s strategy in writing, and to bring an amendable motion before both Houses. That would ensure that Parliament is not just informed, but actively involved in shaping the solution to rural crime. Rural crime is not a niche issue; it is a national issue. Rural communities deserve to know that they are seen, heard and protected by the laws of this land. The taskforce is not a symbolic gesture; it is a practical, focused and long overdue step towards restoring confidence, strengthening policing and securing justice for rural Britain.
Matt Vickers
Rural communities deserve the same protection, visibility and voice as those in urban areas, yet too often rural crime goes under-reported, under-resourced and underestimated. From equipment theft and fly-tipping to wildlife crime and antisocial behaviour, the challenges facing rural areas are distinct and growing. Having rural crime recognised in police structures and developing a specific taskforce could send a strong signal that rural communities matter, that their concerns are heard and that they will not be left behind when it comes to public safety.
However, although the new clause is clearly well-intentioned I would like to put some operational questions to those who tabled it, to ensure greater clarity. What assessment has been made of the additional resources that police forces might need to implement such a strategy effectively, particularly in already stretched rural areas? The new clause refers to the creation of new roles. The National Police Chiefs’ Council already has a rural crime lead and many police forces across the country already appoint rural crime co-ordinators. How would the suggested additional roles be different?
How does the new clause balance the need for a national strategy with the operational independence and local decision making of police and crime commissioners? Is there a clear definition of what constitutes a rural area for the purposes of this strategy? How will this be applied consistently across the country? I am interested to hear the answers, but would be minded to support the new clause if it was pressed to a Division.
Dame Diana Johnson
As the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset set out, new clause 14 would require the Government to establish a rural crime prevention taskforce. Let me first say that the Government take the issue of rural crime extremely seriously, and that rural communities matter. I want to outline some of the work going on in this area.
I take the opportunity to acknowledge the vital role that the national rural crime unit and the national wildlife crime unit play in tackling crimes affecting our rural areas, as well as helping police across the UK to tackle organised theft and disrupt serious and organised crime. Those units have delivered a range of incredible successes. The national rural crime unit co-ordinated the operational response of several forces to the theft of GPS units across the UK, which resulted in multiple arrests and the disruption of two organised crime groups. The unit has recovered over £10 million in stolen property, including agricultural machinery and vehicles, in the past 18 months alone.
The national wildlife crime unit helped disrupt nine organised crime groups, with a further nine archived as no longer active, as well as assisting in the recovery of £4.2 million in financial penalties. It also oversees the police national response to hare coursing, which has resulted in a 40% reduction in offences.
I am delighted to say that the national rural crime unit and the national wildlife crime unit will, combined, receive over £800,000 in Home Office funding this financial year to continue their work tackling rural and wildlife crime, which can pose a unique challenge for policing given the scale and isolation of rural areas. The funding for the national rural crime unit will enable it to continue to increase collaboration across police forces and harness the latest technology and data to target the serious organised crime groups involved in crimes such as equipment theft from farms. The national wildlife crime unit will strengthen its ability to disrupt criminal networks exploiting endangered species both in the UK and internationally with enhanced data analysis and financial investigation, helping the unit to track illegal wildlife profits and to ensure that offenders face justice.
The funding comes as we work together with the National Police Chiefs’ Council to deliver the new NPCC-led rural and wildlife crime strategy to ensure that the entire weight of Government is put behind tackling rural crime. That new strategy is expected to be launched by the summer. We want to ensure that the Government’s safer streets mission benefits everyone, no matter where they live, including those in rural communities. This joined-up approach between the Home Office, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and policing, as well as the confirmed funding for the national rural crime unit and the national wildlife crime unit, will help to ensure that the weight of Government is put behind tackling rural crimes such as the theft of high-value farm equipment, fly-tipping and livestock theft.
Given the work already ongoing in this area, I believe that the Liberal Democrat new clause is unnecessary, and I urge the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset to withdraw it.
Anna Sabine
I want to come back on some of the questions asked by the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Stockton West. He asked about the resources that would be required to implement the strategy. Having spoken to the rural police force in my area, my understanding is that the issue is not necessarily one of rural officers being under-resourced, although more resource clearly would be helpful; it is actually to do with how those officers are allocated. For example, in Frome we have a rural crime team, but because of a lack of neighbourhood policing, if there is an incident in Frome on an evening—a fight outside a pub, for example—rural officers are deployed to go and deal with that rather than fighting rural crime. One of the challenges for those officers is that they are not actually allowed to do the job they are trained for, because they are covering for other areas.
The hon. Gentleman asked why the strategy was necessary when we already have various regional rural crime leads. The reason is that we need to ensure that rural crime is seen to be significant nationally—we need to have a national push and develop some strategies to tackle it. I welcome what the Minister said about that.
The shadow Minister’s third question was about defining rural areas. We are quite good at defining them now, so I am not sure why we could not continue to define rural crime areas in the way that constabularies do currently, but we could look at that.
I welcome the Minister’s comments on what is clearly a growing Government drive to take rural crime seriously. I do not doubt any of her figures about the reduction of crimes such as hare coursing. All I would say is that farmers in my constituency are really not reporting crimes, and I worry that crime figures are dropping simply because crime is not being reported, not because it is not occurring. The longer rural crime is not taken seriously, the more those numbers will drop.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 16—Neighbourhood Policing—
“(1) The Secretary of State must ensure that every local authority area in England and Wales has a neighbourhood policing team must be assigned exclusively to community-based duties, including:
(a) High-visibility foot patrols;
(b) Community engagement and intelligence gathering;
(c) Crime prevention initiatives; and
(d) Solving crime.
(2) The Home Office must publish proposals detailing the additional funding that will be required to ensure that police forces can meet these requirements without reducing officer numbers in other frontline policing roles.
(3) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report detailing:
(a) The number of officers and PCSOs deployed in neighbourhood policing roles;
(b) The total cost of maintaining the required levels; and
(c) The impact on crime reduction and public confidence in policing.
(4) If a police force fails to meet the minimum staffing levels required under subsection (1), the Home Office must intervene and provide emergency funding to ensure compliance within six months.”
Anna Sabine
New clauses 15 and 16 are vital in ensuring robust neighbourhood policing across England and Wales. New clause 15 mandates the Government to publish proposals within six months to maintain neighbourhood policing teams at levels necessary for effective community engagement and crime prevention. That includes designating a proportion of funds recovered under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 for neighbourhood policing initiatives and ringfencing 20% of total funds in future police grant reports specifically for neighbourhood policing.
New clause 16 would require the Government to ensure that every local authority area has a dedicated neighbourhood policing team assigned exclusively to community-based duties such as high-visibility foot patrols, community engagement, crime prevention initiatives and solving crime. The Home Office must also publish proposals detailing the additional funding needed to meet these requirements without reducing officer numbers in other frontline roles.
The rationale for the new clauses is clear. Home Office figures reveal that the number of neighbourhood police officers in England and Wales as of March 2024 was 20% lower than previously thought. Across the country, there were 6,210 fewer neighbourhood police officers than earlier official figures suggested. In my constituency of Frome and East Somerset the situation is particularly concerning. The latest data shows that crime rates have been rising, with 269 crimes reported in Frome in March 2024 alone. That highlights the urgent need for more neighbourhood police officers to ensure community safety and effective crime prevention. Furthermore, the number of PCSOs has been drastically reduced, with 235 taken off the streets of England and Wales in just one year. My local force, Avon and Somerset, saw PCSO numbers fall from 315 to 255 since September ’23—a loss of nearly 20% and the biggest in any force in England.
The new clauses are essential for reversing those trends and restoring public confidence in our policing. By ensuring minimum levels of neighbourhood policing and dedicated community-based duties, we can enhance public safety, improve community relations and effectively tackle crime. I urge my fellow members of the Committee to support new clauses 15 and 16. Let us take decisive action to strengthen neighbourhood policing and ensure that every community in England and Wales is adequately protected.
Matt Vickers
Neighbourhood policing is the foundation of public trust in our police forces. When officers are visible, engaged and embedded in the communities they serve, crime is deterred, information flows more freely and residents feel safer and more connected. New clause 15 recognises the role of neighbourhood policing in preventing crime and promoting community confidence. Having officers who know the patch and who are known by local residents is invaluable in early intervention, tackling antisocial behaviour and protecting the vulnerable.
I should be grateful for further comments and clarity on how new clauses 15 and 16 will ensure that forces and directly elected police commissioners will have the flexibility to deploy resources based on local need, rather than being constrained by rigid top-down targets. What criteria or metrics will be used to define whether neighbourhood policing levels are sufficient to ensure effective community engagement and crime prevention, and who decides what is effective? Further to that, what role will local communities have under this proposal in shaping what neighbourhood policing will look like in their area?
Luke Taylor
This year, the Met police will cut more than 1,700 officers, PCSOs and staff. I invite the Minister to intervene and correct me on that if necessary, as it would seem to suggest that there was an error in the figure given earlier. A correction cometh not.
That figure will include the loss of the parks police team and of officers placed in schools, who have been so critical in maintaining early intervention in those settings and diverting young people away from a life of crime. They have also improved relationships between young people and the police, ensuring that young people can trust the police when they have information that might lead to crimes being prevented or solved. Those officers are dearly needed today.
The £260 million shortfall below the required budget in London will also create a 10% cut to the forensics teams, which includes the investigation of offences such as tool theft, sexual offences and many other crimes. There will be an 11% cut to historic crime teams and a 25% cut to mounted police, who police festivals, sporting events and the protests we see happening so much more regularly in central London. There will also be a 7% cut to the dog teams that provide support to officers going into dangerous and challenging situations, leaving them unsupported and potentially at risk. There will also be reduced front counter operating hours, and there are even hints about taking firearms off the flying squad.
One might ask, “Why are these cuts relevant to this new clause?” The cuts throughout the Met police will inevitably lead to more abstractions from outer London police forces. In particular, the cuts to mounted police and dog teams will pull officers from outer London, including from Sutton and Cheam, which will leave our high streets less safe, our residents more fearful of being victims of crime and more crimes going unsolved.
That demonstrates the absolute necessity of community policing, as well as the need for guarantees to be put in place so that those cuts do not happen, which will affect my residents and residents across London. New clause 16 would also require an annual report that would give clear and transparent information on officer numbers, PCSO numbers, costs and the real-world impact on crime and public confidence. I urge Members to support this new clause.
Dame Diana Johnson
I will respond directly to the points that have just been made about the Metropolitan police. It is worth reminding ourselves that the Metropolitan police are the best-funded part of policing in England and Wales. They constitute around 25% of policing, and this year they are receiving up to £3.8 billion to provide policing in London—it is worth reflecting on that. They have also received, as has every other police force, additional money to fund neighbourhood policing. I have had reassurance from the Met that the money will actually go into neighbourhood policing, which I think is worth saying.
While I fully appreciate what the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam is concerned about for his constituents, it has to be made clear that we have just come out of 14 years, many of which were years of austerity. I do not wish to labour the point, but the hon. Gentleman’s party was involved in the first five years of austerity, when cuts to the public services were most acute and severe. We are now at the end of that period and this Labour Government are trying to put money back into policing. I have been very clear that more money is going into the Metropolitan police and into every other police force, to build up neighbourhood policing in particular. A little bit of humility on the part of the Liberal Democrats might be helpful.
Luke Taylor
Again, I invite the Minister to respond to the specific point about the 1,700 fewer officers in London. Whatever the circumstances, people today are concerned about crime, including tool theft and sexual offences. We can argue back and forth about the note from the right hon. Member for Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North (Liam Byrne), which said that there was no money left, about austerity or about how long memories go back. If there are to be cuts to the number officers next year in my constituency of Sutton and Cheam, and across London, let us address the issues at hand about how we mitigate the impact on our residents tomorrow.
Dame Diana Johnson
I hear the hon. Gentleman’s point loud and clear. All members of this Committee are concerned about crime and want to ensure that crime goes down, that victims are supported and that the police are properly funded. We can probably all agree on that in this Committee. On the particular point about the Metropolitan police, I dispute the numbers that he has given. He is right that there will be a loss of PCSOs and police officers in ’24-25, but my understanding is that it is around 1,000, not 1,700. Subject to what happens in the spending review, we will have to look at what happens in future years.
The Metropolitan police have not had the necessary funding for years, which is why they are having to make some really tough decisions. Nobody wants to see a reduction in police officer numbers—I certainly do not, as the Policing Minister. The Home Secretary and I are working to do everything that we can to support police forces and not see reductions in PCSOs and police officers.
New clauses 15 and 16 seek to legislate for minimum levels of neighbourhood policing. I certainly agree with what the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset said about the need to address the lamentable decline in neighbourhood policing since 2010, which we can all see, but legislating in the way that she proposes is unnecessarily prescriptive and risks imposing a straitjacket on the Home Office, police and crime commissioners and chief officers.
The Government are already delivering on our commitment to restore neighbourhood policing. We have already announced that police forces will be supported to deliver a 13,000 increase in neighbourhood policing by the end of this Parliament. By April ’26, there will be 3,000 more officers and PCSOs working in neighbourhood policing than there are today. This is backed up by an additional £200 million in the current financial year, as part of the total funding for police forces of £17.6 billion, which is an increase of £1.2 billion compared with the ’24-25 police funding settlement.
Additionally, the neighbourhood policing guarantee announced by the Prime Minister on 10 April sets out our wider commitment to the public. As part of that guarantee, every neighbourhood in England and Wales will have dedicated teams spending their time on the beat, with guaranteed police patrols in town centres and other hotspot areas at peak times, such as a Friday and Saturday night. Communities will also have a named, contactable officer to tackle the issues facing their communities. There will be a dedicated antisocial behaviour lead in every force, working with residents and businesses to develop tailored action plans to tackle antisocial behaviour, which we all know has blighted communities.
Those measures will be in place from July this year, in addition to the new neighbourhood officers, whom I have already mentioned, who will all be in their roles by next April. Finally, through the Government’s new police standards and performance improvement unit, we will ensure that police performance is consistently and accurately measured. The work of the unit will reinforce our commitment to transparency through the regular reporting of workforce data and the annual police grant report.
I wholeheartedly support the sentiment behind the new clauses. We absolutely need to bolster neighbourhood policing, reverse the cuts and set clear minimum standards of policing in local communities. Working closely with the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the policing inspectorate, the College of Policing and others, we have the levers to do that. Although the new clauses are well intentioned, I do not believe that they are necessary, so I invite the hon. Member to withdraw the motion.
Anna Sabine
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West, made a couple of points. The first related to who would set the levels of neighbourhood policing under the new clause. Our proposal is that it would be the Home Office, in discussion with local police forces and local councils—the people who know their area best. I can easily see that there would be a way of doing community engagement through councils as part of that discussion, which is another point that he made.
Of course it is important for local police and crime commissioners to have flexibility, but there is a problem with the lack of structure around the numbers for neighbourhood policing. In my constituency, if a big issue, event or activity happens in Bristol, a lot of the local police get taken off there, and we lose our neighbourhood policing. It is similar point to the one that was made earlier.
I welcome the Minister’s response, which was thoughtful as always, and I appreciate the commitment that the Government are making to neighbourhood policing. I hear all of that, but we will still press both new clauses in the group to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 18—Senior manager liability for failure to meet pollution performance commitment levels—
“(1) A person (‘P’) commits an offence where—
(a) P is a senior manager of a water or water and sewerage company (‘C’),
(b) C commits an offence under section [Offence of failing to meet pollution performance commitment levels], and
(c) P has failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent that offence being committed by C.
(2) For the purposes of this section—
‘senior manager’ means an individual who plays a significant role in—
(a) the making of decisions about how C’s relevant activities are to be managed or organised, or
(b) the actual managing or organising of C’s relevant activities;
‘water or water and sewerage company’ has the meaning given in section [Offence of failing to meet pollution performance commitment levels].
(3) Where P is charged with an offence under this section, it is a defence for P to show that P was a senior manager of C for such a short time during the relevant period that P could not reasonably have been expected to take steps to prevent that offence being committed by C.
(4) Where P is guilty of an offence under this section, P is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine.”
This new clause creates senior manager liability for failure to meet pollution performance commitment levels.
Anna Sabine
New clause 17 addresses the critical issue of pollution performance by water and sewerage companies, and is essential to ensuring accountability and protecting our environment. The new clause would make it an offence for a water or sewerage company to fail to meet its pollution performance commitment levels for three consecutive years. It would also be an offence if the company experiences an increase in total pollution incidents per 10,000 sq km or serious pollution incidents for three consecutive years.
In my constituency, there are two amazing local groups, Friends of the River Frome and Frome Families for the Future, that monitor pollution levels and encourage the community to get engaged in their river. However, like many other groups across the country, they are working in a context of insufficient regulation. The new clause is designed to hold companies accountable for their environmental impact. By imposing fines on those who fail to meet these standards, we would send a clear message that pollution and environmental negligence will not be tolerated. Supporting the new clause means safeguarding our natural resources and ensuring that companies take their environmental responsibilities seriously.
New clause 18 addresses the critical issue of senior manager liability for failure to meet pollution performance commitment levels. It would make it an offence for the senior managers of water and sewerage companies to fail to take all reasonable steps to prevent their companies from committing pollution offences. By holding senior managers accountable, we ensure that those in positions of power are responsible for the environmental impact of their decisions. The data is clear: last year, sewage was pumped into waterways for more than 3.6 million hours. That is unacceptable, and highlights the urgent need for stronger enforcement and accountability.
Supporting these clauses means taking a firm stand against environmental negligence and ensuring that our water companies are managed responsibly. I commend them to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
No one disputes the need for stronger accountability on water pollution, but these new clauses take a headline-grabbing, punitive approach that risks being legally unsound, practically unworkable and counterproductive.
The last Conservative Government took decisive action to tackle water pollution, including announcing the “Plan for Water”, which outlined a comprehensive strategy to enhance water quality and ensure sustainable water resources across England. This initiative addressed pollution, infrastructure and regulatory challenges through co-ordinated efforts involving Government bodies, regulators, water companies, farmers and the public. The strategy committed to water companies speeding up their infrastructure upgrades, bringing forward £1.6 billion for work to start between ’23 and ’25. The plan also ensured that fines from water companies would be reinvested into a new water restoration fund—making polluters pay for any damage they cause to the environment.
On new clause 17, why is the threshold three consecutive years? That seems arbitrary. Water companies are already subject to significant civil penalties, enforcement orders and licence reviews by Ofwat and the Environment Agency. Is the clause necessary, or does it simply duplicate existing mechanisms with a more punitive spin? More widely, what evidence is there that these measures will improve water quality outcomes, rather than just increase legal costs and drive defensive behaviour within companies?
Dame Diana Johnson
I thank the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset for explaining the intention behind new clauses 17 and 18. The Government have been clear that water companies must accelerate action to reduce pollution to the environment. Ofwat, as the independent economic regulator of the water industry, sets water companies’ performance commitments, including those on pollution incidents, in the five-yearly price review process.
Where those performance commitments are not met, companies can incur financial penalties, which are returned to customers through lower bills in the next financial year. As a result of underperformance in the 2023-24 financial year, Ofwat is requiring companies to return £165.2 million to customers. Ofwat has just expanded those performance commitments further for the 2025-2030 period to include storm overflow spills and serious pollution incidents. That means that the regulator is already punishing water companies for failing to meet their pollution commitments.
Furthermore, the Water (Special Measures) Act 2025, which received Royal Assent earlier this year, significantly strengthens the power of the regulators and delivers on the Government’s commitment to put failing water companies in special measures. The Act introduced automatic penalties on polluters, and will ban bonuses for water company executives if they fail to meet adequate standards. Before introducing secondary legislation to implement automatic penalties, the Government will consult on the specific offences that will be in scope, and on the value of the penalties.
On the subject of senior management liability, the Water (Special Measures) Act creates a statutory requirement for all water companies to publish annual pollution incident reduction plans. The plans will require companies to set out clear actions and timelines to meaningfully reduce the frequency and seriousness of pollution incidents. Both the company and the chief executive will be personally liable for ensuring a compliant plan and report is published each year. In addition, measures from the Act, which came into force on 25 April, introduce stricter penalties, including imprisonment, where senior executives in water companies obstruct investigations by the Environment Agency and the Drinking Water Inspectorate.
The new clauses would cut across the recently strengthened regulatory regime, with enhanced penalties for the water companies that fail to live up to their obligations and increased powers for the regulator. Given that, the new clauses are unnecessary; indeed, they would add complexity and uncertainty in the regulatory process. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw the motion.
Anna Sabine
I enjoyed the new clauses being called headline grabbing. They are certainly headline grabbing; the whole issue of sewage in our waters has been massively headline grabbing, because the public feel incredibly strongly that our waterways, and the rivers that we use and want to swim in, should not be full of sewage pumped out by private water companies. I think many members of the public would welcome a slightly more punitive approach than we saw under the last Government.
In terms of being unworkable, I think the new clauses are very practical and measurable—I am not sure in what way they are unworkable. Turning to the Minister’s comments, the Lib Dems have said that we welcome many of the directions taken in the Water (Special Measures) Act 2025, but we do not feel it goes far enough. Banning bosses’ bonuses is not the same as making them criminally responsible for some of the actions they are taking in terms of environmental negligence. Again, we will press both new clauses in the group to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Luke Taylor
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
There can be no denying that we are entering a new world with the advent of new technologies that fundamentally reshape the relationship between citizens and the state. There is probably no more vivid an example of that than live facial recognition technology, which is rightly causing great concern among people across London and throughout the UK.
I am, for instance, concerned about the installation of permanent cameras in Croydon, just next door to my community in Sutton and Cheam. In Sutton itself, the use of roaming facial recognition cameras has already caused anxiety among local people, not least the thousands of Hongkongers who call Sutton home, many of whom escaped exactly this kind of potentially abusable surveillance from the Chinese Government, only to find it trying to take root in Britain. That anxiety has often been met with the unfair and often disproven riposte that if someone has done something wrong, they have nothing to worry about.
It is undeniable that without proper safeguards, this technology can be a negative force, through either human malpractice or, perhaps just as worryingly, technological shortcomings. Research from the US has shown that the technology can be racially biased, struggling to distinguish between non-white people, because it was trained on white faces. Research from the Alan Turing Institute has shown that a version of the technology developed by Microsoft has a 0% error rate in identifying white men, but a 21% error rate in identifying dark-skinned women. Those would be worrying facts in their own right, but we are talking about liberty and justice—the two cornerstones of our democracy. We must be very careful about adopting technology that undermines that, and any sensible legislator would want safeguards in place.
Anything that further erodes minority communities’ trust in the police must be resisted and avoided. Our neighbours in the EU have done just that, limiting the use of this technology unless it is absolutely necessary for security or rescue, and requiring judicial oversight or an independent administrative authority to facilitate its safe use even in that case. New clause 19 would see us follow our European neighbours in making sure that the technology is deployed only in limited circumstances and with the maximum oversight.
Our proposed measures—including a new oversight body and new powers for the Information Commissioner’s Office to monitor the use of this tech—present a path forward that we urge the Government to take. If we do not, we will continue to languish without a proper legal framework while permanent cameras are installed. For the technology to be embedded before safeguards have been properly considered would be a democratic and civil liberties tragedy and would put us on a path to a creeping digital authoritarianism. To put it another way, it would be unfair even on those who have to use the technology.
Currently, police services across the country seem to set their own rules on usage, without the proper guidance. To protect them from bad intelligence leading to awful miscarriages of justice, they deserve clarity, just as much as the public do, on the right way to make use of this tech. Nobody seriously doubts that this sort of technology and other major advancements in fighting crime will continue to arrive on our shores. The question is how we wield the new powers that they afford us in a judicious manner. That has always been the task for legislators and enforcers. Forgive the trite idiom, but it remains true that with great power comes great responsibility. How we protect privacy and liberty while keeping ourselves safe in the hyper-digital age is a central question of our times.
Matt Vickers
When deployed responsibly and with appropriate safeguards, facial recognition technology is an incredibly valuable tool in modern policing and public protection. It is already being used to identify serious offenders wanted for violent crime, terrorism and child exploitation; to locate vulnerable individuals, including missing children at risk; and to enhance safety in high-risk environments such as transport hubs, major events and public demonstrations. It enables rapid real-time identification without the need for physical contact—something that traditional methods, such as fingerprinting and ID checks, cannot provide in fast-moving situations. It can accelerate investigations, reduce resource demand and ultimately make public spaces safer.
The technology is improving in accuracy, especially when governed by transparent oversight, independent auditing and clear operational boundaries. I would be grateful for further comments on whether the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam and the Government feel that this proposed regulation of this crucial technology could limit the ability of law enforcement to respond swiftly to emerging threats or intelligence-led operations.
Dame Diana Johnson
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam for setting out the case for introducing new safeguards for the use of live facial recognition. I agree there need to be appropriate safeguards, but the issue requires careful consideration and I do not think that it can be shoehorned into this Bill.
I say strongly to the hon. Member that live facial recognition is a valuable policing tool that helps keep communities safe. If I may say so, I think that some of his information is a little out of date. Despite what he implied, the use of facial recognition technology is already subject to safeguards, including, among others, the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Data Protection Act 2008.
I fully accept, however, that there is a need to consider whether a bespoke legislative framework governing the use of live facial recognition technology for law enforcement purposes is needed. We need to get this right and balance the need to protect communities from crime and disorder while safeguarding individual rights. To that end, I have been listening to stakeholders and have already held a series of meetings about facial recognition, including with policing, regulators, research institutions, civil society groups and industry, to fully understand the concerns and what more can be done to improve the use of the technology.
I will outline our plans for facial recognition in the coming months. In the meantime, I hope that the hon. Member, having had this opportunity to air this important issue, will be content to withdraw his new clause.
Luke Taylor
Based on the comments and reassurances, I will be happy to withdraw the new clause. I would be interested in being involved in any discussions and updates as they come forward. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 22
Duty to follow strategic priorities of police and crime plan
“(1) The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 8(1) (Duty to have regard to police and crime plan), for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.
(3) In section 8(2) for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.
(4) In section 8(3) for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.
(5) In section 8(4) for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.”—(Matt Vickers.)
This new clause would require Police and Crime Commissioners to follow the strategic priorities of the police and crime plan rather than have regard to it.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Matt Vickers
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 requires police and crime commissioners and others to “have regard to” the police and crime plan. The new clause would replace that language with a firmer obligation to “follow the strategic priorities of” the plan. The change would apply consistently across subsections (1) to (4) of section 8.
The primary rationale for the amendment is to strengthen democratic accountability. PCCs are directly elected by the public to represent local views and set the strategic direction for policing. Their police and crime plans are developed following consultation and are expected to reflect community priorities. However, under the current “have regard to” standard, there is only a weak legal duty to consider the plan, and no binding requirement to act in accordance with it. The new clause would address that gap by ensuring that PCCs and, by extension, police forces must follow the strategic priorities that they have set and communicated to the public.
Dame Diana Johnson
I thank the shadow Minister for tabling the new clause. As hon. Members will be aware, those vested with responsibility for providing democratic oversight of police forces—whether PCCs or mayors with PCC functions—have an important role in policing across England and Wales. They are responsible for holding their chief constable to account for the performance of their force and for setting, through their police and crime plan, their strategic objectives for the area. In setting police and crime plans, PCCs must consult their chief constable, the public and victims of crime in their area, as well as their local police and crime panel. As the directly elected representatives for policing in their area, PCCs have a choice as to how they implement their plan and the weight they give to each priority.
The new clause would have the effect of placing an inflexible duty on PCCs to follow their own priorities, with no ability to adapt to and reflect changing circumstances. The new clause would also encroach on the operational independence of chief constables. It risks constraining chief constables and the officers under their command, limiting their ability to balance local priorities as set out in the police and crime plan with their own assessment of threat, risk and harm.
In setting their police and crime plan, PCCs and chief constables must also have regard to the strategic policing requirement. If the amendments to the 2011 Act set out in the new clause were made, they would also have the effect of creating an inconsistency, making local police and crime plans the most important instrument for PCCs and others to follow, potentially at the expense of national priorities. The Home Secretary and I have been clear that the Government will work with PCCs and chief constables to set clear expectations for policing on performance and standards, and to ensure that our communities have an effective and efficient police force within their force area.
Through our forthcoming police reform White Paper, we are working closely with policing to explore and develop specific proposals to deliver effective and efficient police forces and to address the challenges faced by policing. That includes ensuring that policing is responsive to national and regional priorities, as well as to local needs. The Home Secretary will set out a road map for police reform in a White Paper to be published later this year, which will consider proposals to strengthen the relationship between PCCs and chief constables in a revised policing protocol. For those reasons, I invite the shadow Minister to withdraw his new clause.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 35—Stop and search—
“(1) The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 60(1)(a) and (aa) leave out ‘serious.’.”
This new clause lowers the threshold for stop and search to “violence” rather than “serious violence.”
Matt Vickers
New clause 29 would introduce a statutory requirement for the Secretary of State to publish an annual report on specific police activities in areas experiencing high levels of serious crime. It would mandate the inclusion of data from police forces in England and Wales, identifying the areas with the highest rates of serious offences and reporting on three key areas: police presence, the use of stop-and-search powers, and the deployment of live facial recognition technology. The first report would be required within six months of the Act’s passage, with subsequent reports published annually.
The primary objective of the new clause is to improve transparency and accountability in policing where serious crime is most acute. In communities disproportionately affected by violence, organised crime or persistent public disorder, trust in policing is often strained. By requiring detailed public reporting, the new clause would ensure that policing tactics and resourcing in those areas are subject to regular scrutiny by Parliament and the public. It would allow for an informed debate about whether interventions are effective, proportionate and fair.
In particular, the inclusion of data on police officer deployment would ensure a clearer understanding of how police resources are distributed. That is especially important in communities where concerns about under-policing or over-policing are frequently raised. Having a publicly available record of officer presence would allow stakeholders to assess whether high-crime areas are receiving adequate attention and whether local policing strategies are matched to the severity of criminal activity.
The new clause also includes reporting on the use of stop and search powers under section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Stop and search remains a contentious, yet extremely powerful tool in combating serious crime. Home Office statistics show that in the year ending 31 March 2023, there were 529,474 stop and searches in England and Wales. A recent study published in the Journal of Quantitative Criminology analysed London-wide stop-and-search patterns and concluded that if searches had been maintained at the 2008 to 2011 level, approximately 30 fewer knife murders might have occurred each year. By requiring annual data on its use in high-crime data, this new clause promotes responsible policing and ensures the use of the powers is evidence-led, not arbitrary, and open to challenge where necessary. It enables patterns of disproportionality or inefficiency to be identified and addressed through public oversight.
Dame Diana Johnson
I thank the hon. Member for his suggestions about the police response to violence and other serious offending. However, I believe that the changes contained in the proposed new clauses are unnecessary.
Regarding proposed new clause 29, I agree that transparency is important. That is why the Home Office already annually publishes extensive data on police recorded crime and the use of police powers. That data includes the number of stop and searches conducted, broken down by individual community safety partnership and police force areas. In addition, members of the public have access to detailed crime and stop and search maps on police.uk, which use monthly data directly provided by police forces. Police forces also publish detailed information on deployments of live facial recognition.
Turning to proposed new clause 35, I note that stop and search is a vital tool for tackling crime, particularly knife crime, but it must be used in a fair and effective way. That is particularly true of section 60 powers, which are the focus of the proposed new clause. Such powers may be authorised under certain conditions in response to, or anticipation of, serious violence, and allow officers to search individuals without the normal requirement for reasonable suspicion. The powers are rightly subject to strict constraints.
In practical terms, changing the threshold from “serious violence” to “violence” would not represent a meaningful change. Section 60 provides powers to search for offensive weapons or dangerous implements, and any use of such items is, by definition, serious violence. In the year to March 2024, the latest for which data is available, 5,145 stop and searches were undertaken in England and Wales under section 60 powers. They resulted in 71 people being found carrying offensive weapons and 212 arrests made on suspicion of a range of offences. I therefore urge the hon. Member to withdraw his proposed new clause.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Matt Vickers
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 33 seeks to amend section 5(3) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, which currently states:
“For the purposes of this section it is immaterial whether a belief is justified or not if it is honestly held.”
New clause 33 would replace that with:
“For the purposes of this section, a belief must be both honestly held and reasonable.”
The change would modify the legal standard for the lawful excuse defence under section 5(2)(a) of the Criminal Damage Act, which allows a defendant to claim they believe the property owner consented to the damage. Under the current law, the belief needs only to be honest, regardless of its reasonableness. The new clause would require that the belief also be reasonable, introducing an objective standard alongside the subjective one.
In various areas of criminal law, defences based on belief require that it be honest and reasonable. For instance, in self-defence cases, the defendant’s belief in the necessity of force must be reasonable. Aligning the standard in criminal damage cases with those principles promotes consistency and fairness across the legal system. Public confidence in the legal system can be undermined when defendants are acquitted based on defences that appear unreasonable or disconnected from common sense. By introducing an objective standard, the proposed new clause would reinforce the integrity of the justice system, and ensure that legal defences are applied in a manner that aligns with societal expectations.
The proposed amendment to section 5(3) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 would introduce a necessary, objective standard to the lawful excuse defence by requiring that beliefs about owner consent be both honest and reasonable. The change would promote consistency with other areas of law, prevent potential abuses of the defence, balance the right to protest with property rights and seek to enhance public confidence in the justice system.
Alex Davies-Jones
I thank the hon. Member for Stockton West for tabling new clause 33.
It might be helpful for hon. Members if I briefly explain how the Criminal Damage Act 1971 works. The Act criminalises a range of activities, but the offence we are focused on today is the act of destroying or damaging property belonging to another without lawful excuse. “Lawful excuse” is not defined. However, section 5(2)(a) makes it clear that if the defendant honestly believes that the person who was entitled to consent to the destruction or damage has given consent, or would have consented if they knew of the circumstances, the defendant has a lawful excuse. For example, it could be said that someone has a lawful excuse if the owner of a car would have consented to their damaging it to help a person who was trapped in it to get out.
Additionally, under section 5(2)(b) of the 1971 Act, if the defendant damages property to protect their own or someone else’s property, and they honestly believe both that the property needs immediate protection and that their actions are reasonable, they have a lawful excuse. Section 5(3), to which the new clause relates, specifies that it does not matter whether a person’s belief is reasonable or justified. It just needs to be honest, even if it is an honest belief induced by intoxication, stupidity or forgetfulness.
The new clause seeks to change the law so that where a defendant seeks to rely on belief in consent, or belief in the necessity of protecting property as a lawful excuse for criminal damage, their belief must be “reasonable” as well as honest. This would narrow the application of the defence, and we consider doing so unnecessary. The law is already designed to strike the right balance and ensure that a wide variety of factors are taken into account, without widening the law too far.
For example, if a defendant tries to argue that a person would have consented to the damage of their property if they had known the circumstances, they need to demonstrate how that relates specifically to the damage caused. Some assessment of the wider context will be necessary to determine whether someone has a lawful excuse.
Recent cases involving damage to property following protests have also interpreted the operation of this defence narrowly. For example, acting in furtherance of a protest cannot be used as a lawful excuse where the damage caused is more than minimal for public property. We cannot see any evidence or rationale that suggests that the defence is being used in spurious contexts or abused in any way. Of course, if the hon. Member has specific evidence or examples, we would, of course, consider them. Until then, there is no justification or need to restrict the operation of the defence further. For that reason, I urge him to withdraw the new clause.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Matt Vickers
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would mandate that the Secretary of State, through regulations, grant police access to His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs’ tobacco track and trace system. Such access would enable law enforcement to determine the provenance of tobacco products sold by retailers, specifically to identify whether those products were stolen. According to HMRC, the illicit market in tobacco duty and related VAT was £2.8 billion in 2021-22, preying on the most disadvantaged of communities. In 2023, about 6.7 billion counterfeit and contraband cigarettes were consumed, representing one in four cigarettes, thus undermining progress towards a smoke-free England by 2030.
With the negative impact that the illicit tobacco market has on communities and with UK revenue in mind, it is paramount that our police forces be provided with the resources required to counter the organised crime groups that dominate the illicit tobacco market. The sale of illicit tobacco on the black market also poses significant risks to public health, with illegal tobacco often containing five times the standard level of cadmium, six times as much lead, 1.6 times more tar and 1.3 times more carbon monoxide than regulated cigarettes and rolling tobacco.
The illicit tobacco market poses significant challenges, including revenue loss for the Government and health risks for consumers. Professor Emmeline Taylor’s report, “Lighting Up”, emphasises the potential of TT&T in identifying and prosecuting offenders involved in the illegal tobacco trade. Granting police access to TT&T would strengthen efforts to dismantle organised crime networks profiting from counterfeit tobacco sales.
Giving the police access to TT&T technology has the potential to disrupt the illicit tobacco trade and has been highlighted by the National Business Crime Centre, which argues that police utilisation of TT&T would allow them to routinely check tobacco sold by local retailers to ensure legitimacy, thus shrinking the pool of buyers for criminal gangs and lowering demand for stolen tobacco, helping police to tackle organised crime and safeguard legitimate business.
As a signatory to the World Health Organisation’s framework convention on tobacco control, the UK is obligated to implement measures that curb illicit tobacco trade. Providing police with TT&T access aligns with those commitments by enhancing the traceability and accountability of tobacco products throughout the supply chain. Illicit tobacco sales undermine legitimate retailers who comply with regulations and pay due taxes. Empowering police to identify and act against illegal tobacco products helps to level the playing field, ensuring that law-abiding businesses are not disadvantaged by competitors engaging in unlawful practices.
With that in mind, the Opposition believe that new clause 38, which would grant police access to the UK TT&T system to help determine whether a retailer has obtained stolen or counterfeit tobacco illegally, is necessary to facilitate the police in carrying out their duty in delivering the current plans for smoke-free England 2030. It will help to claim back revenue currently lost to the black market trade of tobacco and protect public health by disrupting the trade in these bogus products.
Dame Diana Johnson
New clause 38 seeks to grant the police access to the tobacco track and trace system, as we have just heard. The scourge of the illicit tobacco trade threatens the health of UK citizens, robs the public purse of billions of pounds and funds the wider activities of organised crime. All businesses in the tobacco supply chain are required to register within the track and trace system, and individual tobacco products are tracked from the point of manufacture up to the point of retail. The track and trace system includes a reporting platform that enables nominated authorities to access registry data, traceability data for individual products and UK-wide tobacco market data.
I understand the intention behind the shadow Minister’s new clause, and I know that we both share the same goal of working with our law enforcement agencies to tackle illicit tobacco. The principle of maximising the use of traceability data in these efforts to tackle illicit tobacco is sound. Existing legislation strictly limits who can access traceability and the purposes for which it may be used. At the moment, only HMRC and trading standards may access this data.
I reassure the Opposition that engagement is already under way between the police and HMRC to investigate opportunities for extending access for the police to traceability data. When that engagement is complete, the Government will consider whether it is appropriate to bring forward any necessary legislative changes. However, I do not wish, at this stage, to pre-empt the outcome of that engagement through legislation. In the light of those reassurances, I ask the shadow Minister to withdraw the motion.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Matt Vickers
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would introduce a new statutory offence of soliciting prostitution in exchange for rent by inserting proposed new section 52A into the Sexual Offences Act 2003. It would criminalise the act of causing, inciting or attempting to cause or incite someone to engage in prostitution in return for free accommodation or discounted rent. The clause makes this a hybrid offence: on summary conviction, the penalty is up to six months’ imprisonment or a fine; on indictment, it is up to seven years’ imprisonment. It would also allow for a banning order under the Housing and Planning Act 2016, preventing convicted offenders from acting as landlords.
The “sex for rent” arrangement—where landlords exchange accommodation for free or at a discount in return for sexual relations with tenants—is a problem that has become increasingly common for house hunters in England, particularly in London. In response to this emerging issue, the last Government launched a call for evidence, which closed in the summer of 2023. It sought views on relevant characteristics, circumstances and any additional protective or preventive measures that respondents considered necessary. Given the seriousness of the issue, it would be helpful to know whether the Government intend to publish the findings from this call for evidence, as some of the data could inform debates such as this one.
According to research by polling company YouGov carried out on behalf of the housing charity Shelter, nearly one in 50 women in England have been propositioned for sex for rent in the last five years, with 30,000 women offered such housing arrangements between March 2020 and January 2021. Many victims of sex-for-rent schemes feel trapped, ashamed or powerless to report the abuse due to their dependency on accommodation. By clearly defining this as a criminal offence and providing real consequences for offenders, including banning orders, this clause sends a strong message: exploitation through coercive housing arrangements will not be tolerated.
The charity National Ugly Mugs, an organisation that works towards ending all violence towards sex workers, gave the case study of a tenant who, during the pandemic facing financial hardship, was approached by her landlord with a proposal to reduce her rent and utility costs in exchange for sexual acts and explicit images. Unable to afford alternative accommodation at the time, she felt she had little choice but to agree. Since then, the landlord has regularly turned up at the property uninvited and intoxicated, demanding sex and refusing to leave. She has lived under the constant threat of eviction and homelessness if she does not comply with his demands. The new clause represents a crucial advance in safeguarding vulnerable individuals from exploitation within the housing sector. By explicitly criminalising the act of soliciting sexual services in exchange for accommodation, it addresses a significant gap in the current legal framework.
The new clause would not only reinforce the seriousness of such offences through stringent penalties, but would empower authorities to impose banning orders, thereby preventing convicted individuals from further exploiting their position as landlords. This measure would send a clear and unequivocal message that leveraging housing and security for sexual gain is a reprehensible abuse of power that will not be tolerated. It would underscore a commitment to protecting the dignity and rights of tenants, ensuring that all individuals have access to safe and respectful living conditions.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Jess Phillips)
New clause 41, tabled by the hon. Member for Stockton West, would make it an offence to provide free or discounted rent in exchange for sex. I reassure the hon. Member that the Government firmly believe that the exploitation and abuse that can occur through so-called sex-for-rent arrangements has no place in our society. However, we have existing offences that can and have been used to prosecute this practice, including causing or controlling prostitution for gain.
I know the hon. Member will appreciate that this is a complex issue. I reassure the Committee that the Government will continue working closely with the voluntary and community sector, the police and others to ensure that the safeguarding of women remains at the heart of our approach. We are carefully considering these issues as part of our wider work on violence against women and girls. We are working to publish the new cross-government violence against women and girls strategy later this year. We will be considering all forms of adult sexual exploitation and the findings from the previous Government’s consultation on sex for rent as part of that.
Given that commitment, I hope the hon. Member will be content to withdraw the new clause, although I very much doubt that he will. On that note, I have tabled many Opposition amendments, but I very rarely pushed them to a vote. On this new clause, as on any others, the hon. Member or any other Members of his party are very welcome to approach us for a meeting, or to come and talk to any of us about how to progress this or any issue. I do not wish to school them on opposition, but that is a much more likely way of achieving the ultimate aim. In this instance, his aim is the same as mine—protecting people who are sexually exploited. To date, no approaches have been made, but they are always welcome.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
Before we adjourn, I want to let the Committee know that I will not be chairing the next sitting—it will be a more esteemed Chair than myself. I thank all right hon. and hon. Members for today’s contributions and their attention to the Bill, all our fantastic Clerks, the Doorkeepers, Hansard, the hidden but wonderful broadcasting team, and of course the hard-working officials from the Home Office. Thank you all very much indeed.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Keir Mather.)