Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting)
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateThursday 12th June 2025
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesMental Health Act 2025 View all Mental Health Act 2025 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 12 June 2025 - (12 Jun 2025)
divided: - Ayes: 10 / Noes: 6 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Vickers.
I turn to amendment 11, tabled by the hon. Member for Winchester. Under the Bill, English qualifying patients subject to the Mental Health Act 1983, including those on a community treatment order, will be covered by a new opt-out approach to advocacy. That means that the relevant hospital manager must provide the advocacy provider with information about the patient so that they can arrange for an advocate to interview them to determine whether they wish to use advocacy services. Requiring oral and written information about their right to an advocate would therefore be unnecessary. I hope that that is satisfactory, and I encourage the hon. Member for Guildford to withdraw the amendment.
Government amendment 30 would remove clause 6(3) from the Bill on the basis that it is unnecessary. The requirement in section 118(2D) of the Mental Health Act for decision makers to have regard to the code of practice already ensures that they must take it into account when making decisions in relation to community treatment orders. Imposing a maximum duration of 12 months on community treatment orders, with the option to renew them after a review every six months, is also unnecessary. That is because the Bill already requires community treatment orders to be reviewed before renewal after the initial six months, again after the next six months and then yearly. The responsible clinician can renew the CTO only if there is a risk of serious harm without it and a reasonable prospect of it having therapeutic benefit for the patient.
The Bill increases professional oversight by requiring the community clinician to be involved in all decision making relating to CTOs. That aligns with Lord Scriven’s amendment, but, rather than that person being a General Medical Council-registered psychiatrist, it is more appropriate that they be an approved clinician, meaning that they have specific training regarding the Mental Health Act and approval to make decisions under the Act.
We have also increased the frequency of tribunal reviews so that they will happen automatically at renewal periods following the initial six-month period, after a further six months and after any subsequent 12-month periods. We are already providing a new power for the tribunal to recommend that the responsible clinician reconsider whether a CTO condition is necessary. Clause 6(3) would duplicate that.
Anna Dixon
I am grateful to the Minister for outlining so clearly what safeguards will be in place to ensure that there are no unnecessary extensions to CTOs beyond the period during which the patient is benefiting therapeutically or meets the detention criteria, which are being updated by the Bill. The answers that the Minister has given assure me that there will be significant review points. Does he, like me, think that these provisions will, in time, reduce some of the unwarranted variation and some of the excessive lengths? As the Bill is implemented in practice, we will see changes in the pattern of use of CTOs.
Stephen Kinnock
I pay tribute to my hon. Friend for her expertise and am pleased to hear that she feels reassured by my remarks. It is absolutely the Government’s ambition to bring more consistency and clarity to this area. A number of hon. Members have raised issues around racial disparities; I plan to come on to that. That is a specific focus, I know, for her and other colleagues. More broadly, this is about ensuring that the CTO system is proportionate, well regulated and managed on the basis of a patient-centric system.
We therefore wish to remove clause 6(3), as we do not think that it is necessary. It duplicates some provisions in the Bill or, in the case of the review periods, conflicts with existing renewal periods, and under the current drafting it is not clear how the two would interact. Where there are differences, the current provisions are more appropriate, for example in requiring a community clinician to be involved in all decision making.
Let me move on to clause 6 in its entirety. CTOs allow individuals detained under the Mental Health Act to be discharged into the community, under specific conditions, to ensure continued treatment. CTOs aim to maintain contact with mental health services to provide support and prevent relapse. Patients on CTOs can be recalled to hospital under that Act in certain circumstances. The main purpose of introducing CTOs was to improve care for higher-risk patients and to enhance public safety. We believe that community treatment orders remain necessary in a small number of cases to ensure continued treatment and to protect both patients and the public.
However, the independent review rightly noted that considerably more people than expected were being put on a community treatment order—about 5,500 people a year—and that there were racial disparities in the use of CTOs. Clause 6 therefore amends the community treatment order risk criteria in line with the new detention criteria set out in clause 5. It is now the case that, to be put on a community treatment order, the patient must be at risk of serious harm and there must be a reasonable prospect of therapeutic benefit for the patient.
Josh Dean (Hertford and Stortford) (Lab)
We have touched already on the stark racial disparities in the use of CTOs and the Mental Health Act more generally, so I welcome these reforms. I appreciate that we will come to this point later in the Committee, but can the Minister set out what interaction the advance choice documents will have in reducing the number of CTOs, particularly for those groups that have seen them used disproport-ionately?
Stephen Kinnock
My hon. Friend raises a very valid point that, as he says, we will come on to in greater detail. Right across our health service, in every aspect, early intervention is always better than trying to pick up the pieces after a crisis. That is the same for both physical and mental health. We believe that the advance choice documents will be a helpful tool in building an earlier understanding of the challenges that a particular individual faces and, on the basis of that earlier understanding, enabling earlier intervention. Giving the opportunity to patients, while they are in a position to do so, to set out what their advance choices are will enhance their autonomy and enhance trust in the interaction between the patient and the system. That trust piece is so important to the entire picture.
David Burton-Sampson (Southend West and Leigh) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Vickers. I was interested to hear what the Minister has just said, but I think it goes much further. Can he give me assurances that we will take time to look at what is driving so many young black men in particular into these mental health crisis situations? We need to look much further back, at the start of the process, where something is pushing young black men into mental health crisis and they are ending up in a position where they have to be placed in a facility and go through a whole period of attempting to recover. Can the Minister give me his thoughts on what the Government are doing to prevent that from happening in the first place, particularly with this group of men?
Stephen Kinnock
My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and we could go into the question he has just raised in a profound way, because the social determinants of ill health are such an important part of the picture. Many people in our communities are dealing with all sorts of incredibly challenging and traumatic issues in their lives, often driven by a whole range of social determinants. We have to recognise that there is a need to build capacity in the system as well.
I am pleased that the Government reconfirmed in the spending review yesterday the 8,500 additional mental health specialists in the system, a mental health trained specialist in every school, 24/7 mental health hubs being opened around the country and £26 million being put into opening mental health crisis centres around the country. The fundamental drive of the Government is to move from sickness to prevention. We want to build a preventive state, and the mental health part of that is vital, for the reason my hon. Friend has just elucidated.
Dr Evans
The Minister makes an excellent point about the services that are required, but key to all this is the underlying research. Has research already been commissioned into this? If not, would he look at commissioning in the space of ethnic minorities, the impacts of CTOs and mental health? That might shine a light on what further services will be needed, the reasons, and preventive measures, which the Government rightly put at the front of the agenda.
Stephen Kinnock
We have piloted culturally appropriate advocacy models, which ran up to March 2025. An evaluation of the pilot will be published in the summer, and that will feed into the evidence base for the impact and deliverability of culturally appropriate advocacy at local level. We will use the learnings from our culturally appropriate advocacy pilots to inform our understanding of how to increase uptake of advocacy for community treatment order patients from black communities, who are disproportionately likely to be put on a CTO. A lot of that evaluation and investigation work is happening, and I am sure that hon. Members across this Committee will read the findings in the summer with great interest.
The change in the criteria for a CTO is intended to reduce the number of inappropriate community treatment orders being given, reducing restrictions on patients and helping to protect against the disproportionate use of coercion among racialised communities. Only those for whom there is a risk of serious harm and who will benefit therapeutically should be subject to a community treatment order, and it should be removed when it no longer provides benefit.
I want to touch on some of the questions that have been asked. The Opposition spokesman asked about the number of CTOs being overturned at tribunal. According to Care Quality Commission data from 2023-24, 129 discharges by tribunal took place following 4,438 applications against CTOs. I emphasise that people are often discharged without going to tribunal, so those numbers are not a full picture.
On evaluation, we are developing a monitoring and evaluation strategy for the Mental Health Act, as the Bill will become once—one hopes—it gets Royal Assent. It will be important to monitor new processes such as discharges and changes to CTOs to assess whether reforms are being delivered as intended and to monitor uptake among patients. There was also a question about racial equalities, but I think I have answered that. With those remarks, I hope that the Committee will support Government amendment 30 and that the hon. Member for Guildford will withdraw amendment 11.
Zöe Franklin (Guildford) (LD)
I thank the Minister for his comments on our amendment 11 and the clarification regarding the fact that the Bill covers a lot of the issues we raised in that amendment. I am therefore willing to withdraw our amendment.
On Government amendment 30, I am grateful to the hon. Members for Hinckley and Bosworth and for Farnham and Bordon for their comments on the Government’s request to remove subsection (3). It is good to have consensus on these Benches on the important issues included in it. While I do appreciate the comments from the Minister about how he believes that the Bill covers these issues, I do feel that the subsection needs to remain and I would therefore like to vote on the Government amendment. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Stephen Kinnock
Clause 7 will amend the grounds for discharge by the tribunal to align with the revised grounds for detention set out in clause 5. The tribunal must consider whether the patient continues to meet the criteria when deciding whether to discharge a patient.
These changes will provide decision-makers with a clear and consistent set of considerations when assessing whether a patient continues to meet the detention criteria, and therefore whether detention or a community treatment order continues to be justified. The tribunal must consider all elements of the detention criteria, including whether there is a reasonable prospect that the patient is receiving therapeutic benefit from treatment and whether there is a risk of serious harm. The detention criteria ensure public and patient protection, while also protecting patients from lengthy and unnecessary detentions when they no longer pose a risk to themselves or others. I therefore commend clause 7 to the Committee.
Dr Luke Evans
I rise to speak on an essential aspect of our mental health system: the role of mental health tribunals, and the proposed changes to the grounds upon which they can discharge individuals detained under the Mental Health Act 1983. Each year in England and Wales, about 20,000 people come before a mental health tribunal. These individuals are not criminals, but patients—often vulnerable, often voiceless—detained in hospital or living under community treatment orders, sometimes against their will.
The function of the tribunals is clear: to act as an independent safeguard, to scrutinise the legality of detention, to test whether the continued deprivation of liberty is justified, and to ensure that care is being given within the bounds of both clinical necessity and human rights. Each tribunal consists of a legal judge, a psychiatrist, and a specialist lay member. Together, they form a check on the powers granted by the state to detain and treat people on mental health grounds. Therefore, tribunals are independent bodies that review whether a person should remain detained under the Mental Health Act.
Historically, while an imperative, there have been concerns that modernisation is needed. The criteria they used were broad and inconsistent with modern principles of least restriction and patient rights. The 2018 independent review of the Act recommended aligning tribunal powers with clear risk-based criteria to ensure the detention is only maintained when absolutely necessary.
The clause seeks to change the criteria that these tribunals apply when making decisions about discharge. Specifically, it would align the discharge tests used by tribunals with the statutory conditions for detentions—those found in section 2(2) in the 1983 Act for assessment, section 20(4) for treatment and section 17A(5) for community treatment. On one level, this is pragmatic reform. It simplifies the legal framework and avoids confusion caused by duplicative or overlapping tests. It creates consistency between the reasons someone can be detained and the reasons their tribunal must use to determine whether they should remain so.
I would, however, caution the Committee not to treat simplification as neutral. While the administrative clarity is welcome, legal clarity can also narrow discretion. In tightening the grounds for discharge to mirror the detention criteria exactly, the clause may reduce the tribunal’s ability to consider the broader context, including, for example, the patient’s progress, their lived experience or the factors not strictly enumerated in statute. There is a risk that tribunals become passive reviewers of statutory boxes, rather than active assessors of individual liberty and clinical justification. Tribunals may ask whether the criteria are still met, rather than whether continued detention is truly necessary or proportionate.
Moreover, I believe—although the Minister may have to correct me—that the clause applies retrospectively, including to individuals detained under forensic sections or already living under CTOs. We must ask whether it is right to shift the legal test midway through someone’s treatment or tribunal process, potentially raising the bar for their discharge. I welcome the intent behind the clause to create coherence to improve the legal precision of our mental health law, but will the Minister reflect on its practical effects? Will it make discharges harder? Will it reduce the tribunal’s role to tick-boxing? Will it truly serve the interests of the patient?
Mental health tribunals are not merely administrative bodies; they are guardians of liberty for people who are often too unwell to speak for themselves. Any change that touches their powers must be approached with care, compassion and rigorous scrutiny. I ask the Minister to clarify how the clause will affect discharge rates in practice. Will tribunal members retain discretion to consider the individual circumstances of the patient beyond the bare statutory criteria? How will that be monitored? Has an impact assessment been carried out on the proposed change?
Finally, in the Minister’s speech on clause 6, he said that he expects more people to be automatically referred. How many more does he expect the Government to see? I believe in his answer he said that 129 out of 4,000 were overturned. Is there any work to be done to see how many more automatic referrals would come in, how many more would be challenged, and what the impact of that would be? We must be mindful that mental health law is about not only treatment, but trust, autonomy and justice, so let us ensure that these reforms reflect that.
Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers. I rise to speak briefly to clause 7, which in many ways is a tidying up of the other changes in the Bill to ensure alignment. In that sense, it is a necessary part of this legislation.
For too long, mental health tribunals, which have an important function, have been operating under criteria that are too broad. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth pointed out, that can lead to inconsistencies with modern clinical practice. It is therefore right that we move to clearer, more risk-based criteria to ensure that detention is maintained only where absolutely necessary. There are obvious reasons behind that, such as to ensure greater consistency in tribunal decision making and strong safeguards to ensure that patients are only detained or kept under community treatment orders when absolutely necessary.
I want to pick up some of the arguments my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth was developing around the demands on the tribunal service. The Minister will be well aware of the challenges facing the court and tribunal system in this country. If, as anticipated, this will lead to an increase in the number of hearings—both in first instance and potentially in appeal—what assessment has been made as to the number of not only judges, but wing members that will be required to facilitate this process?
What has been determined regarding the capacity of the resources of His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service—in terms of not only physical hard standing, but the vital role that clerks and tribunal staff play in ensuring that hearings are done in a timely manner and the paperwork is completed consistently? Thirdly, what is the expectation of the sustainability of that workload as the Bill comes into fruition? I pick up on that in particular, because, given the transition arrangements that appear to be within the legislation, this will be a retrospective as well as a prospective change. I would be grateful if the Minister in summing up could address those issues.
Stephen Kinnock
It is a little bit dangerous for us to get into a numbers game, because I do not think it is particularly useful or productive to say, “As a result of the changes that we are making, we think it will decrease by x number or increase by y number”, because, by definition, we do not have a crystal ball and we cannot be sure. However, the impact assessment for the Bill— I do not have a copy of that with me right now—includes a range of scenarios and some predictions of the impact and associated costs that go with that. Those are important considerations that led us to the conclusion that we need a 10-year implementation period. It is not just about capacity in the communities and the community mental health services; it is also about capacity in the court system, the number of judges and the whole additional capacity and workload required for that, which is an important part of those considerations.
Dr Evans
If the Minister will forgive me, I was not being facetious when asking for numbers; I was simply using it as an example. I am grateful to his officials for providing the numbers so quickly when I asked for them during the debate on clause 6. When he has the chance, could he write to Opposition Members setting out how that interaction works with the Ministry of Justice and what the numbers might look like? Forgive me if I have missed it, but I could not see it in the impact assessment. There is an implication not only for health, but for the justice side, which, as my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley said, makes a difference. My question was more to make sure that we are pragmatic in our approach, rather than getting into hardcore numbers at this stage.
Stephen Kinnock
The numbers that I gave the hon. Gentleman earlier were things that had happened, rather than gazing into the future and reading the tea leaves, but I will do as he asks, and I will ask officials to take him up on the point about the capacity of the legal and judicial system, in particular the tribunals.
On the questions the shadow Minister asked about retrospective application, we are supporting the tribunal to make decisions about whether a person should continue to be detained or subject to a community treatment order by providing clear and consistent criteria that focuses on the need for there to be a risk of serious harm and a reasonable prospect that the patient is benefiting from their detention in order justify continued detention for treatment under part 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
As has been said, that will apply to everybody who is currently detained. The key point is the balance of two things: harm to the patient him or herself and harm to others, and therapeutic benefit. Those will be the guiding lights of this entire process. I hope that I have managed to respond; I did not have a huge amount of time to take note of all the points, because there were not very many speakers on this clause. If there is anything I have not addressed, we can of course do so in writing.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8
Appropriate medical treatment: therapeutic benefit
Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers.
I rise to speak in support of amendments 44 and 45, which have been tabled by my hon. Friend the shadow Minister. These amendments seek to put patients at the centre of the Bill by promoting a safe therapeutic environment and recovery from any childhood trauma.
Clause 8 provides for a new definition of “appropriate medical treatment”, which requires that treatment to have
“a reasonable prospect of alleviating, or preventing the worsening of…a patient’s mental disorder.”
Amendment 44 would introduce an additional criterion to the definition of “appropriate medical treatment” by establishing that an appropriate medical treatment should not only address the individual’s immediate health needs, but be designed with the intent to reduce psychological distress and actively support an individual’s recovery from the effects of childhood trauma. This recognises the long-term impact that early, adverse experience can have on mental and emotional wellbeing and ensures that treatment approaches are trauma-informed, compassionate and conducive to long-term improvement.
People who present with serious mental health concerns need to know that they are receiving support and care in the right environment. They are at their most vulnerable, and having the confidence in their environment can make a world of difference. That is particularly pertinent for those who have suffered childhood trauma. It is important that we deal with the consequences of mental ill health, and adequately address the root causes. Among these, childhood trauma is one of the most serious and persistent factors contributing to long-term psychological conditions. By supporting this amendment, we would create a more resilient system that is equipped to respond to the reality and prevalence of childhood trauma in our society.
I recently met with Alison, who heads up a fantastic organisation called WeMindTheGap. It is based in Wrexham, but it is now moving and expanding to cover parts of my constituency, Chester South and Eddisbury. It does a fantastic job supporting young people who have struggled in the conventional education system, are absent from school or have dropped out of the system. We discussed childhood trauma and the rise in the number of young people not currently in any kind of education. One of the points that Alison made that resonated with me is that absence from school is linked not just to deprivation, but many contributing factors, including difficult domestic situations, isolation and rural isolation.
Many of these challenges are the most severe ones linked to childhood trauma, and although there are many wonderful organisations stepping in to support young people at an early stage, for some the impacts of childhood trauma continue to affect psychological wellbeing into adulthood. Sadly, childhood trauma is a societal issue that we face, and it is more common that we might imagine. Therefore, a step to embed trauma-informed care into the legal framework, specifically for childhood trauma, is a step in the right direction.
Childhood trauma can lead to self-destructive behaviour in adults. There is, as my hon. Friend pointed out, evidence to show that it is a causal factor. We must recognise the long-term impact of adverse childhood experiences on mental health. This amendment, by adding a new criterion to the definition of “appropriate medical treatment” to require that treatment to aim to minimise distress and to support recovery from childhood trauma, would embed trauma-informed care into the legal framework.
Amendment 45, by inserting the words
“seeks to minimise the patient’s distress and promote their psychological wellbeing and recovery from any childhood trauma”,
would reduce the risk of re-traumatisation. Responses to symptoms or behaviours must be supported; it is about helping people to move towards genuine recovery.
Childhood trauma is unique, and it presents symptoms that are different from other mental health illnesses. Therefore, having a dedicated, compassionate and person-centred approach to care is incredibly important. Setting the right culture to support patients, recognising the trauma that they carry and ensuring that there is adequate support and provisions in the legislation and the legal framework, is the right approach. I am therefore pleased to support these amendments, which would strengthen clause 8.
Stephen Kinnock
I will start by commenting on amendment 12, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Winchester. We do not consider the amendment necessary, as section 13(2) of the Mental Health Act 1983 already requires an “approved mental health professional” to consider all the “circumstances of the case” before making an application for admission, which could include the appropriateness of the setting.
Clause 8 embeds the principle of therapeutic benefit into the Bill by providing a new definition of “appropriate medical treatment”. That requires that there must be “a reasonable prospect” of therapeutic benefit to justify detention for treatment, and that medical must be “appropriate in a person’s case”. We would expect a setting in which someone is going to be detained to be considered as a part of those considerations. The code of practice already states that patients should be offered treatment and care in safe, supportive and therapeutic environments, so that also addresses that point.
I turn to amendments 44 and 45. We recognise the significant impact that childhood trauma can have on a person’s psychological wellbeing throughout their life. Mental disorder is defined in the 1983 Act as
“any disorder or disability of the mind”,
and that is already broad enough to include the impact of childhood trauma.
Clause 8 requires decision makers to take into account
“the nature and degree of the disorder”,
what is “appropriate” in the person’s case and “all other circumstances” when considering whether medical treatment has a reasonable prospect of therapeutic benefit. That could include consideration of childhood trauma. Although we recognise that childhood trauma may be a factor for many patients, it will not be a factor for all patients. It is critical that consideration of appropriate treatment is tailored to, and reflects, individual experiences and needs. All treatment interventions should include the aim of minimising distress and promoting psychological wellbeing. As well as legislative requirements, it is vital that all aspects of care in in-patient settings should be trauma-informed and that patients are always put at the heart of effective, compassionate care. That expectation is set out in NHS England’s “Culture of care standards for mental health inpatient services” and will be further emphasised in the revised Mental Health Act code of practice.
I turn to clause 8 stand part. The clause strengthens the concept of therapeutic benefit in the Mental Health Act to ensure that patients are detained for treatment or placed on a community treatment order only when there is a reasonable prospect they will benefit from their treatment. The current criteria for detentions under section 3 of the 1983 Act is that
“appropriate medical treatment is available”,
and the definition of medical treatment focuses only on the purpose of the treatment. In practice, that means that clinicians may not consider whether the treatment under section 3 will be effective. If we are going to deprive people of their liberty, it is vital that detention is of therapeutic benefit to them, regardless of whether the patient is detained for treatment under part II or part III of the Act, so the new therapeutic benefit criteria apply to both.
Under the Bill, for treatment to be considered appropriate, there will need to be a reasonable prospect that the patient will benefit from it. The therapeutic benefit criteria will apply at the point of detention and renewal to patients detained under section 3 in part II of the Act, patients on a community treatment order when they are first subject to the order and at the point of renewal, and all part III patients.
The clause also retains the definition of the purpose of “medical treatment” in the 1983 Act:
“to alleviate, or prevent a worsening of, the disorder or one or more of its symptoms or manifestations.”
A focus on therapeutic benefit will ensure that patients receive the care and treatment they need to support their recovery and enable discharge when it is safe for them to leave hospital.
Dr Evans
There are a few questions to be answered. Given the nature of acquired brain injury—for example, the capacity of someone who has had a stroke can fluctuate—it is very hard from a clinical position to know where the benefit of treatment starts or finishes. We must future-proof the Bill. We have an ageing population, so we will see more people with dementia, strokes and acquired brain injuries for various reasons. There is a natural tension there, but it is only going to get worse over the next 20 or 30 years. How do the Government plan to address that? It is a concern.
Stephen Kinnock
I was intending to come to the questions that the hon. Gentleman and others asked, but as he has asked that now, I can tell him that the revised detention criteria and definition of appropriate medical treatment do not exclude patients with uncertain treatment outcomes, as long as they have a psychiatric disorder. Treatment must offer a reasonable prospect of benefit, considering both its purpose and likely outcome. The introduction of the principle of therapeutic benefit is aimed at ensuring that care and treatment provided under the Act will promote recovery and facilitate patients to get better so that they can be discharged as soon as possible. That applies right across the board on the basis of the psychiatric disorder.
I will now turn to clause 9. Sections 50 to 53 of the 1983 Act provide for the remission of prisoners or other detainees with severe mental health needs back to their prison or other place of detention; or, where relevant, direct their release where no effective treatment for the mental disorder can be given. Those provisions differ slightly from the detention criteria in the Bill, because in practice this cohort of patients may refuse to engage with treatment or behave in a disruptive manner such that treatment cannot practically be given. Clause 9 standardises the type of treatment to “appropriate medical treatment” for consistency with the rest of the Act, which will allow the therapeutic benefit changes in clause 8 to flow through to transfer decisions. This change has no other practical or legal effect and is technical in nature.
Stephen Kinnock
In many ways, that is a question for clinicians, because they always have to make judgments in individual cases. In tragic cases such as eating disorders, at times it gets to the point where a person cannot be saved. If a patient is refusing to eat, it is notoriously challenging for clinicians to try to get that position reversed through talking therapies or other forms of treatment. Is about how we put in place legislation and a code of practice that give the system the best possible steer while recognising that clinicians make decisions on a daily basis in reacting to the circumstances that they face. I will take the hon. Gentleman’s point away and think about it, but I wonder whether there is a definitive answer to his question because of that interplay between the macro system and the micro challenges within that system.
My hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock raised several important points. She wisely said that the clause is about not just the principle of therapeutic benefit, but seeing the person as an individual and the principle of doing least harm. I thank her for those points, which are important for the Committee to take on board.
My hon. Friend asked about the impact of the therapeutic benefit provisions on the 1.5% of people with particularly complex needs. That is an important question, and to some extent touches on the intervention by the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth about what we do in those really challenging situations. Where hospital admission is needed, the fundamental principle is that we believe it must be therapeutic, the least restrictive option and for the shortest time possible. Section 131A of the Mental Health Act 1983 places a duty on hospital managers to ensure that the hospital environment suits the patient’s age and needs. Current efforts, including NHS England’s quality transformation programme, aim to address the root causes of poor in-patient care by working with patients, families and professionals.
That is a roundabout way of answering the question, but fundamentally, the hospital manager has a duty to ensure that the environment suits the patient’s needs. Those needs will range from the most complex and challenging 1.5% of cases that my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock mentioned through to the cases of others who may have milder disorders or challenges. Needs must be met across that landscape, and the duty is on the hospital manager to ensure that they are. My hon. Friend may also be interested to look at the quality transformation programme, which seeks to address some of the challenges that she mentioned.
In the light of those comments, I hope that hon. Members will not press their amendments. I commend clauses 8 and 9 to the Committee.
Dr Chambers
I appreciate the Minister’s considered reply to the amendments. I just spoke in a debate in the main Chamber about NHS infrastructure and buildings. Although I understand that that is not specifically in scope of the Bill, it is another good example of how the Bill is only as good as the system that it works within.
I will happily withdraw my amendment, but it is good to hear that the Minister understands the importance of hospital infrastructure. When substandard Victorian-era asylums are still being used for mental health care, not only is it inadequate for patients, but it affects the public perception of mental health and mental health treatment, which is an important aspect of the issue. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Stephen Kinnock
Under clause 10, a responsible clinician is an “approved clinician”, which refers to a mental health professional, usually a consultant psychiatrist, who is approved by or on behalf of the Secretary of State for the purposes of the Mental Health Act and has statutory roles and responsibilities. The responsible clinician has overall responsibility for a patient’s care under the Act. Only they can make certain decisions, such as renewing a patient’s detention or placing them on supervised community treatment.
The clause seeks simply to clarify the current position on how a responsible clinician is assigned overall responsibility for a patient’s care, and makes no practical change to the role of a responsible clinician or to how they are appointed. It is intended to make clear the distinction between the definition and role of the “responsible clinician” and the new definition of a “community clinician”, who will have an increased role in managing patients on community treatment orders.
The responsible clinician would retain overall responsibility for the patient’s care, including in hospital, while the community clinician would be responsible for the patient in the community. The community clinician is involved in decision making around community treatment orders, which we will discuss in greater detail in relation to clause 22, alongside the responsible clinician. It is therefore important to explain how a responsible clinician is nominated. I commend clause 10 to the Committee.
Dr Evans
I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to clause 10, which addresses the nomination of the responsible clinician under the Mental Health Act. As we have heard, the responsible clinician is a pivotal figure in the operation of the Act, holding substantial legal powers in relation to detention, treatment and discharge. The Government’s explanatory notes make it clear that the clause is intended as a clarification, rather than a reform, of how a responsible clinician is designated by formally acknowledging that they are nominated by managers of the relevant hospital. That may well reflect current practice, but in legislation as sensitive and consequential as this, particularly where it relates to rights and liberties of people with serious mental illnesses, even clarification warrants scrutiny.
I would like to raise a few points of constructive concern and seek reassurances from the Minister. First, although the clause is presented as technical, it alters the statutory language around who is responsible for nominating the RC from an implied clinical judgment to an explicit managerial nomination. Even if that reflects what already happens, there is still a de facto risk of blurring the lines between clinical decision making and administrative oversight. Can the Minister confirm that this change will not give hospital managers discretion to override clinical suitability in selecting the responsible clinician?
Secondly, the clause distinguishes the responsible clinician from the soon-to-be defined community clinician role, which the Minister touched on. Although that separation may be helpful, it might help to guard that from confusion. Will clear published guidance accompany this change to explain to professionals, patients and families how roles are differentiated and how nominations are made?
Thirdly, on the matter of transparency and accountability, will patients be informed when a responsible clinician is nominated for their care? Will there be a mechanism for a patient to raise concerns if they believe that their nominated clinician is not appropriate for their needs and, if necessary, to change them? If so, what will that mechanism be?
Finally, although I accept the Government’s assertion that the clause is primarily clarificatory, we should keep it in mind that the Mental Health Act should not be amended lightly. The responsible clinician is not merely an administrative figure; they are central to the person’s liberty, treatment and legal rights. Have the Government considered whether additional safeguards could be introduced, in either guidance or statute, to ensure that this clarification does not lead to unintended consequences or the dilution of clinical independence?
The clause may be a small piece of a much wider reform, but, as ever with mental health legislation, the details matter. They shape people’s experience of care and of coercion.
Stephen Kinnock
I thank the Opposition spokesman. The role and nomination of the responsible clinician are well established and represent current practice, and the clause seeks merely to clarify the current position in legislation in order to avoid confusion regarding the roles of the existing responsible clinician and the community clinician, who will have new roles under the reforms to community treatment orders. I therefore think that the answer to his question—whether the clause will somehow change the clinical role of hospital managers, or whether hospital managers will be able to move the goalposts in how the nomination process happens—is no. The measure is simply a continuation of a well-established practice.
I think that challenging the nominated clinician would be a role for the independent mental health advocate. If a patient wishes to challenge any aspect of his or her treatment, that would be the role of the IMHA, once they are in place.
The issue of unintended consequences brings us back to the code of practice. I emphasise the two tiers—or three tiers, really—of consultation that will happen. First, there will be consultation with a wide range of stakeholders, including approved mental health practitioners, psychiatrists, clinicians and all the representative bodies. That will bring us a very well-developed draft of the code of practice. We will then go to public consultation, which will be open to input from anyone who has a view, and then to Parliament. That will give us a fairly high degree of assurance that the code of practice will address any area where there is a risk of unintended consequences.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 11
Making treatment decisions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen Kinnock
Clause 11 will introduce a new clinical checklist that the patient’s responsible clinician must follow when making decisions about a patient’s treatment. This seeks to put the patient at the heart of clinical decision making. Specifically, the checklist will require that the clinician supports the patient to engage in decision making concerning their treatment. That could include nursing, psychological interventions, specialist care and medication. They must also consult with those close to the patient to consider the patient’s wishes, feelings, beliefs and values, including those expressed in advance, and avoid making decisions based solely on factors such as the patient’s age or condition.
Where the patient is too unwell and lacks the capacity or competence to make decisions concerning their treatment, the checklist will require the clinician to consider any wishes, feelings, views and beliefs that they think the patient might have had if they had had capacity. They might establish this by consulting with those close to the individual or looking at their advance choice document.
The checklist represents best practice, but sadly it does not represent standard practice. The independent review identified multiple incidents of patients feeling disempowered and unsupported to share their wishes and feelings, and unfairly ignored when they did. That can undermine the patient’s sense of self-worth, their recovery and their trust in mental health services.
We consider the checklist fundamental to delivering the guiding principle of patient choice and autonomy. We therefore consider it necessary to put the checklist on the face of the Bill. That was the approach taken with the best interests checklist under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which in many ways is analogous. That checklist has come to be widely recognised and highly regarded by practitioners. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Dr Evans
Clause 11 will introduce new section 56A into the Mental Health Act 1983. The clause represents an important reform to the framework for how treatment decisions are made to detain patients under part IV of the Act. The clause effectively establishes a statutory clinical checklist. It imposes a duty on the approved clinician in charge of treatment to consider a set of factors before giving medical treatment to the patient—whether or not the patient consents, lacks capacity or is refusing treatment. It applies to all treatments under part IV and to patients of all ages, including children.
As the Government’s explanatory notes set out, that duty includes considering alternative treatment options, taking steps to assist and encourage the patient’s participation in decisions, giving proper weight to the patient’s past and present wishes, feelings, beliefs and values, including advance statements, avoiding the reliance on discriminatory assumptions such as those based on a patient’s age or behaviour, and consulting others involved in the patient’s life, such as families, carers, nominated persons or advocates. Importantly, where a patient lacks capacity, the clinician is still required to consider what the patient would want if they had capacity. We welcome the fact that it reflects a commitment to person-centred care, even in the most complex clinical situations.
I recognise and welcome the intention behind the clause. The principle that patients should not be passive recipients of care but active participants in decisions about their treatment is well established in modern mental health practice. The clause gives that principle a stronger legal footing, aiming to embed it in everyday clinical decision making. The Government rightly acknowledge that many patients have felt, in the past, that their views and preferences have been overlooked. Proposed new section 56 is intended to prevent that and promote autonomy, dignity and respect, even where coercive treatment is being considered.
I note that clause 11 amends the existing provision on second opinions and treatment certification, such as sections 57 and 58 of the Mental Health Act. It would appear that clinicians must now confirm in writing that they have complied with new section 56A checklists. Could the Minister confirm that that is correct? If so, that is a welcome move towards accountability and transparency.
I want to raise a few areas where further clarification or strengthening might be needed. First, the clause still leaves substantial room for clinical discretion. Much of the checklist is qualified by what is “reasonably practicable” or “reasonably ascertainable”. That is understandable from a legal drafting perspective, but it raises questions about how robustly the duties will be applied in practice, particularly in under-resourced or overstretched services. Can the Minister confirm what support will be given to clinicians, such as the statutory guidance or training, to ensure that new section 56A is implemented meaningfully and consistently across the system?
Secondly, although clinicians must now record that the checklist has been completed, the patient or their family currently have no direct route to challenge non-compliance. There does not seem to be an appeal mechanism, so I wonder what or who might fulfil that role. It would be helpful if the Minister could set out the process. Is there a formal role for advocates in contesting whether the process was followed properly? If found wanting, are there sanctions for failing to comply? Is it perceived to be part of the integrated care board commissioning role, for example? Could the Minister say more about what resources are available to patients or carers who believe their views were not properly considered? Would the Government consider a statutory right to request a review where the checklist appears to have been bypassed?
Thirdly, I note that the clause applies only to patients treated under part IV of the Act. It does not apply to patients subject to community treatment orders, unless they are recalled to hospital, yet those patients may still face significant pressure to comply with treatment, often under the threat of recall. Forgive me if I am a little muddled, but I would welcome some clarification on the rationale for excluding CTO patients from these protections. Are the Government open to extending these duties to cover community settings, particularly as part of future of reform, especially as they did not accept the amendments tabled in the Lords?
Fourthly, the checklist applies to all ages, including children and young people. That raises important questions about how capacity, consent and participation will be judged in younger patients, and how the duty to consult parents or carers will be balanced with the rights of the child. Will specific guidance be issued to support clinicians applying this clause in cases involving children and adolescents?
Further still, while proposed new section 56A emphasises consultation and participation, the weight to be given to the views of others—whether an advocate, nominated person or family member—remains at the discretion of the clinician. That may be clinically appropriate, but it raises the question: how will clinicians be supported to navigate competing or conflicting views, and will they be required to provide reasons for how they have balanced those perspectives? I will not delve into it now, but when we come to nominated persons, there is a reason that this particular point is poignant. We need to understand how decisions are being made when there are challenges.
While I welcome the clear emphasis in clause 11 on patient voice, autonomy and dignity in treatment decisions, I must raise a matter of considerable concern and spend a little bit of time on it: the absence of any explicit reference to public safety or risk to others within the proposed new section 56A. It could be argued that this is not a minor omission. As legislators, we have a duty not only to protect the rights of the individuals in clinical care but to safeguard the wider public. While risk to the public is rightly a key consideration in detention decisions under sections 2, 3 and 20A of the Mental Health Act, it is not reflected at all in the new duties governing treatment decisions, even when the treatment may directly affect behaviour inciting compliance.
We sadly know that the stakes here are not hypothetical. When we were discussing clause 5, the Minister turned around and asked what the point was of over-embroidering the Bill, especially if such duties already exist in these cases. I will tread carefully here, because there are both legal and emotional sensitivities, but there are good examples of why this really matters. A deeply troubling case, and one that continues to resonate when we talk about risk, public safety and clinical decision making under the Mental Health Act, is that of Nicola Edgington and whether the Bill does enough to address it.
In 2011, Nicola Edgington, a woman with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, walked into a police station and an A&E department in south-east London. She told the staff that she was relapsing and desperately begged to be detained, warning them that she posed a danger to others. Despite her history—she had previously killed her mother during an earlier episode—she was allowed to leave hospital. Within hours, she murdered a complete stranger, 58-year-old Sally Hodkin, and seriously injured another woman. Serious incident reviews concluded that the risk she posed to the public was severely underestimated. Professionals focused on her current presentation, not the pattern of risk, and key warnings were missed. She asked to be sectioned; she was not, and someone died.
Since that case, there have been some important reforms, including stronger guidance on the risk assessment, improved information sharing between agencies, and enhanced care co-ordination through the care programme approach. Crucially, even today, there is still no statutory duty requiring clinicians to explicitly consider risk to the public when making treatment decisions under the Mental Health Act, including decisions about whether to detain or treat someone who is deteriorating.
That brings me to clause 11 and proposed new section 56A. The Government rightly propose a clinical checklist for treatment decisions—one that includes a patient’s wishes and beliefs, as well as views from family or advocates. These are welcome steps, but the checklist is silent on public protection. It recognises autonomy, but not risk to others. It includes past preferences, but not past violence. Should we not at this moment consider an explicit legal duty to assess and document the risk that a patient may pose to others when treatment decisions are made, especially for those with a serious history of violence or relapse?
Stephen Kinnock
May I say what a pleasure it is to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock? I found her contribution incredibly insightful. She is a tremendous asset to the Committee and indeed to the parliamentary Labour party, we are fortunate to have her with us on the Committee.
The Opposition spokesman mentioned a number of cases, including Nicola Edgington and Valdo Calocane, so I will take the opportunity to express my condolences to those who were so terribly affected by those tragic events. We are in ongoing engagement with the families of Barnaby Webber, Grace O’Malley-Kumar and Ian Coates, and it is appropriate that we take a moment as a Committee to reflect on the terrible tragedy they have gone through and to express our condolences to them.
The Opposition spokesman’s question was, broadly speaking, about risk and public safety. I will make a number of points on that. First, the clinical checklist does not bind clinicians to following the wishes of patients; it requires that clinicians consider them when deciding on the patient’s treatment, but, by definition, a checklist is not binding. If a preferred treatment is not clinically appropriate or feasible, clinicians must explain why and, where possible, discuss alternatives with the patient or their loved ones.
The purpose of the checklist is to ensure that the patient’s wishes play a more central role in clinical decision making, as we are aware that that is not always the case. However, the checklist does not bind the clinician to the patient’s wishes, nor does it prevent the use of compulsory treatment. We recognise that compulsory treatment is sometimes necessary to get a person well again, including by managing the potential risk that they might pose to themselves or others.
My other point is that there is not a binary choice between consulting and engaging with the patient, and enhancing and consolidating public safety; very often, the two go together. One of the learning points from the tragic Nottingham incident is that there was not enough consultation with Mr Calocane’s family. If there had been, there might have been opportunities to note his episodic behaviour and the fact that he was not always taking his medication. Had the family been better consulted, it would have enhanced public protection and safety. It is important that we do not say that family consultation and engagement with the patient are opposed to public protection—in fact, they are two sides of the same coin.
Dr Evans
The Minister makes an excellent point, and that is part of the reason why the Opposition did not want to spring this question on the Government in an amendment or a vote, but rather to have the conversation first, because this is an important clause to get right. The two sides can be worked on in parallel when considering public safety more widely. Regarding safeguarding issues, as a GP dealing with children it is very common to share information with social services to allow them to have that central point, so that things are not missed.
The principle of the checklist is to ask whether we are thinking about the individual patient. We have heard from patient testimony that that has to be paramount— No. 1—and that is the prima facie reason for having these provisions in the Bill. But, as we are considering this clause, given some of the cases and some of the holes, should we not consider asking clinicians, in statute, to think specifically about the risk, and wider risk, and what could be involved in the treatment?
As the Minister rightly pointed out, if it was considered that certain individuals were not conforming with their medication regimen, or that there was a risk of them not doing so, or that they had a violent tendency when they relapsed, and had not met a threshold because they had never actually gone to prison or been through a court, but were known to police services, that grey area might pick something up if it were simply added to the checklist. I cannot think of many things, bar the patient—who is No. 1—more important than public safety. I put that point to the Minister to consider further in the light of those cases. I do not want to go into specifics, because it is not right to do so and he will be much closer to details than I am, but there is a widening principle over what we can do in this space.
Stephen Kinnock
I can absolutely confirm that the Government’s understanding of the way in which the system must function is that, if any risk at all to public safety is perceived, that must be documented. The risk to others and self must be assessed and documented, and that then informs the care and treatment plan. It is a basic expectation of the professional management of a particular patient that any risk identified to public safety and protection must be in there. However, I take the hon. Gentleman’s point on whether or not it should be in the Bill. I will come back to him on that, because I would be rather surprised if it were not made very clear somewhere that that is a basic expectation; if it were not, that would obviously need to be looked at, but I am reasonably confident that it is.
The hon. Gentleman asked whether the second opinion doctor would confirm that the checklist had been complied with by the approved clinician: yes, and that must be documented in the second opinion doctor’s certificate. He also asked whether we will support clinicians with statutory guidance. Yes, we will provide guidance on the delivery of the checklist in the code of practice.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
I understand that the Government intend the Committee to sit until 7 o’clock. I therefore think that it would be appropriate to take a short break.
Stephen Kinnock
The clause will simply clarify existing legislation concerning the second opinion appointed doctor so that it more closely reflects current practice and terminology. It sets out the role of the regulatory authority in appointing a second opinion appointed doctor and the criteria that the second opinion appointed doctor must meet, and it updates terminology so that it is more in keeping with that used by practitioners. I therefore commend clause 12 to the Committee.
The Lord Commissioner of His Majesty’s Treasury (Taiwo Owatemi)
On a point of order, Mr Vickers. We did not actually cover clause 11. [Interruption.] Did we vote on clause 11?
Dr Evans
It is a relief that we have not dropped clause 11, an important clause. Equally important is clause 12, on the appointment of a doctor to provide a second opinion. The clause will introduce the new framework for appointing second opinion appointed doctors under the Mental Health Act, which is indeed important.
I begin by acknowledging the Government’s efforts to clarify and strengthen the role of these doctors, who play a vital part in safeguarding the rights and wellbeing of patients subject to compulsory treatment. The emphasis on the independence of the second opinion appointed doctor is a positive step. Ensuring that that doctor is not the patient’s responsible clinician or treating doctor reinforces impartiality. Furthermore, the clear responsibility for this doctor to assess therapeutic benefit and to verify that clinicians have followed the clinical checklist, considering patients’ wishes and preferences and treatment alternatives, reflects an encouraging commitment to embedding autonomy and choice in the clinical discussions.
Having said that, I would like to raise some constructive points and seek clarifications on certain operational aspects that I believe are critical to the clause’s effective implementation. First, the Bill requires the regulatory authority, namely the Care Quality Commission in England and Care Inspectorate Wales, to appoint the second opinion doctor
“as soon as reasonably practicable”.
The absence of a specific maximum timeframe could raise concerns about potential delays. Given the importance of timely second opinions in safeguarding patient rights, will the Minister clarify what safeguards are in place to prevent undue waiting times? Forgive me: I could not find it, but has any clear data been recorded on timings for second opinion appointed doctors? Has any consideration been given to whether a timescale should be implemented in legislation in order to ensure that there is no slipping through the cracks? That may be appear to be overkill; I defer to experts in the Department, but given the acute needs of some patients who will encounter the legislation, it is worth considering.
Secondly, the role of the regulatory authority is pivotal in the process. In England, that role falls to the Care Quality Commission, so it is worth spending a few moments reflecting on the CQC’s role not in general terms, but specifically in relation to mental health settings. Strangely, I speak today from a position of both continuity and change. Having been a Government Member during a period when there was reform of the CQC and it was under active discussion, I now speak for the Opposition, but with an equally strong commitment to ensuring that reforms are delivered and that people with mental health needs receive care that is not only safe, but dignified and therapeutic.
It is no secret that mental health services, particularly in-patient units, have faced significant challenges in recent years. Some high-profile failures in care, including abuse and neglect in mental health hospitals, have understandably shaken public confidence. As a regulator, the CQC has struggled at times to respond quickly or decisively enough. In some cases, failings persisted despite earlier inspections raising concerns. We need to be honest about the fact that the pace of regulatory response has not always matched the urgency of the risk, particularly for detained patients, who are among the most vulnerable people in our society and our care system.
Two recent independent reports—the Dash review, which began in May 2024 just before the election, and the follow-up work by Sir Mike Richards on its findings—have offered a candid but constructive diagnosis of what went wrong inside the CQC. They have identified serious weaknesses: a sharp reduction in inspection activity; delays in publishing reports; an overcentralised system that dilutes expertise in specialist areas such as mental health; and a lack of transparency that sometimes makes it difficult for families and professionals alike to understand how services are monitored.
Both reports were also forward-looking, however. They have informed a programme of reform, which began under the previous Government and is, I hope, continuing under this Government. What has changed? The CQC has started to take action. It now has a renewed commitment to sector-specific expertise, which should help mental health, with dedicated inspection teams for mental health returning. The backlog of unpublished reports has been significantly reduced and the CQC’s digital systems are starting to be overhauled. Perhaps most importantly, the regulator is beginning to work on increasing transparency in order to engage better with service users and staff in mental health settings.
These changes are welcome, but fragile. Reform takes time and momentum can easily be lost. Context matters when we are considering giving an organisation more work in primary legislation, which is why I have raised the issue and given a potted history.
The Bill gives us the opportunity to ensure that the rights and safety of people subject to detention or treatment under the Mental Health Act are properly safeguarded, but legislation alone will not guarantee good care. The role of the CQC as a proactive and trusted regulator is essential. That means ensuring that inspections are sufficiently frequent, especially in settings in which patients are detained and find it hard to raise concerns; ensuring that de-escalation, restraint and seclusion practices are being scrutinised not just in policy, but in practice; ensuring that the voices of patients and families are actively heard in regulatory processes; and ensuring that any concerns that are raised, whether by whistleblowers, staff or external professionals, are acted upon promptly.
I do not say all this to assign blame. Indeed, many of the problems that the CQC has faced have been years in the making, and I accept that some of them arose while I was on the Government Benches. However, I am saying this now because I believe that there is cross-party agreement that regulatory failure is not an option for mental health services. As we look ahead to implementing this legislation, I hope that the Committee will keep it in mind that a reformed Mental Health Act must be matched by a reformed regulatory framework that is resourced, responsive and rooted in the lived experience of those it is designed to protect.
We know that the CQC has undergone significant changes and is under new leadership after the concerns, complaints and issues. Do the Government have faith in the CQC? I ask the Minister to provide assurances that both the CQC and—
Stephen Kinnock
On the Opposition spokesman’s question about a specific timeframe, the wording of the clause—
“as soon as reasonably practicable”—
is a sufficient and fairly strong steer to the system that avoids the need to tie our hands with a specific timeframe.
Consistency, training and monitoring are going to be important elements of the code of practice. We need to ensure that those questions are answered and that those are put in place.
On the hon. Gentleman’s question about the CQC, we are grateful to Dr Penny Dash and Professor Mike Richards for their recommendations, which the CQC has accepted in full. We are greatly encouraged by the reforms it has made so far, and we particularly welcome the appointment of Dr Arun Chopra as the CQC’s first chief inspector of mental health, which will improve the voice of mental health patients and help to better uphold their rights. We are confident that those changes will ensure that the CQC is better placed to regulate mental services.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13
Medicine etc: treatment conflicting with a decision by or on behalf of a patient
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen Kinnock
The power to give compulsory treatment is sometimes necessary to get a person well again, but unfortunately some clinicians can too easily resort to this course of action without considering alternatives. Compulsory, and sometimes forced, treatment can cause distress and trauma to the patient, and some say that this has caused them to lose trust in mental health services.
One individual told us that she was forcibly treated with a medication, despite its having caused serious side effects in the past. Sadly, her appeal to staff to offer her an alternative that had previously proven effective was ignored, and she was forcibly treated without any explanation as to why. That situation might have been avoidable if staff had only stopped to listen to the individual and consider other options.
Clause 13 seeks to shift the culture around administering compulsory medication to patients under the Mental Health Act, while maintaining the power to do so. Under the clause, a “compelling reason” will be required to overrule a patient’s refusal of a medication, whether that refusal is made with capacity at the time, in advance or by a representative, for example through a lasting power of attorney. A clinician will be able to overrule a decision to refuse medication only if they cannot identify a clinically viable alternative or one that is acceptable to the patient.
The aim is to encourage clinicians to take the time to consider alternative medications, for example by speaking with the patient or those close to them, or consulting their advance choice document. That will potentially avoid the need for non-consensual medication. Many clinicians already care for patients in this way, but others do not.
Where the clinician thinks that there is a compelling reason to treat compulsorily, a second opinion doctor, appointed by the regulator, must confirm this, as well as other matters, before treatment can go ahead. This marks a significant shift away from the current system, in which compulsory treatment can last three months before a review by a second opinion doctor is required. We believe that the measure will help to cement the desired cultural change that we all aim to achieve. The clause is critical to making the patient’s voice more central to their treatment.
Clause 14 will ensure that where a person does not or cannot agree to their treatment under the Mental Health Act, they receive the safeguard of a second opinion doctor appointed by the regulator. Currently, if a patient lacks capacity or competence to consent, a second opinion appointed doctor is to assess whether their treatment is appropriate, three months after the treatment course began. Although that is an important safeguard, it happens too late in a patient’s treatment course.
Clause 14 will shorten the timeframe for that safeguard so that it occurs after two months, rather than three. The timeframe within which the patient’s responsible clinician must review and provide a certificate indicating that the patient is consenting to medication is also being shifted from three months to two months. By introducing scrutiny at an earlier point in the process, we will better protect those patient groups who may be very unwell and highly vulnerable. That is particularly true for patients who lack capacity to consent. For those reasons, I commend clauses 13 and 14 to the Committee.
Stephen Kinnock
Defining “compelling” will be an important part of the code of practice. We will include case studies and examples to help to put flesh on the bones of that and to illustrate it. But it is important to emphasise that a clinician would only be able to overrule a decision to refuse medication if they cannot identify a clinically viable alternative or one that is acceptable to the patient.
On training and the capacity in the system, it is important to note that we plan to switch on the new safeguards impacting the second opinion appointed doctor service only when we are confident that there is sufficient capacity in the system to deliver those safeguards.
On the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Southend West and Leigh made, we absolutely must ensure that the reviews are happening. That will be a really important part of the enforcement process.
The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon asked about legal recourse. The independent mental health advocate will be an important part of having recourse—for want of a better phrase, they will be somebody to really give back-up to the patient. There is then the legal process, if there is a tribunal or court. Ultimately, someone can go through the court system if there is a dispute about a particular issue. However, one would want to ensure that there had been an objective assessment, through routes such as the independent mental health advocate or through professionals in the system really looking at the issue. Of course, the second opinion appointed doctor plays a crucial role in that.
Dr Evans
I would be grateful if the Minister could comment on the certificates being combined. There is a concern, if we go from two certificates to one, that the reason why two certificates were chosen in the first place could be lost, especially if the certificates are competing. There could be an incumbent preponderance towards one decision, when there were actually two conflicting decisions in the first place. I understand that this is about trying to reduce the administrative burden and having all the information in one place. Equally, however, it does make clinicians think twice, especially when they are supposed to be independent, about what is happening and why.
Stephen Kinnock
The content of the Bill, in this context, has been produced on the basis of engagement with the second opinion appointed doctor service and clinical experts. That was partly around the decision to shorten the period to two months, as that allows time for medication to take effect, so that the appropriateness of the medication for the individual can be properly assessed. Is that what the hon. Member is talking about—that there might be confusion about whether or not medication should continue to be administered?
Dr Evans
I am frantically trying to find the exact point in the explanatory notes—I think it is in either paragraph 114 or paragraph 115—about where the second opinion comes together. There is a reference to having a combined certificate. That seems to be a practical solution, but I worry about the crossover relating to who may or may not be affected. If the Minister wrote to me on that point, it might be easier to move the Committee on.
Stephen Kinnock
I will do that.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 15
Electro-convulsive therapy etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 17 stand part.
Amendment 13, in clause 18, page 27, line 22, at end insert—
“(1A) Regulations under subsection (1) may only be made to provide for circumstances where—
(a) the treatment is immediately necessary to save the patient’s life,
(b) obtaining a second opinion would cause a delay that places the patient at a significant and imminent risk of death or serious physical harm, and
(c) the treatment is reversible.”
The amendment limits the power to dispense with a second medical opinion for urgent electro-convulsive therapy to exceptional, life-threatening cases, introduces periodic reviews of its use, and ensures transparency by prohibiting retrospective application.
Clause 18 stand part.
Stephen Kinnock
I will discuss a number of issues concerning the topic of urgent electroconvulsive treatment. Clause 15 makes a small practical change to the current protocol around administering electroconvulsive therapy. Currently, where the responsible clinician wishes to administer electroconvulsive therapy and the patient lacks capacity or competence to consent, the second opinion appointed doctor must certify, among other things, that it does not conflict with an advance refusal or the decision of an attorney or deputy.
We have heard from stakeholders that it would make much more practical sense and save the second opinion appointed doctor time if that was established before they were invited to assess the patient. Therefore, the clause makes it the role of the responsible clinician to ascertain if treatment is in conflict with an advance refusal or the decision of an attorney or deputy before they secure the second opinion appointed doctor. I commend the clause to the Committee. It improves the patient’s right to self-determination by minimising the circumstances under which urgent treatment can be given compulsorily under section 62 of the 1983 Act.
I turn to clause 17. Currently, section 62 of the 1983 Act sets out four main scenarios under which the normal treatment safeguards do not apply, allowing urgent compulsory treatment to be given without such safeguards. The clause removes from section 62 the power to give medication compulsorily where its purpose is to alleviate the patient’s serious suffering. The act of forcibly treating an individual can be a highly traumatising and distressing experience. The clause recognises that, where someone is well enough to make a capacitous or competent refusal to treatment, they are also well enough to decide the level of suffering that they are willing to undergo.
The clause is critical to improving the patient’s autonomy over their care and treatment. It does not affect the clinician’s ability to administer compulsory treatment where it is immediately necessary to prevent the patient from behaving violently or being a danger to themselves or others, to prevent their serious deterioration or to save their life.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Winchester for tabling amendment 13. Its intention is largely already met by the Bill—that is, a second opinion doctor’s certificate can be dispensed with only in the following limited circumstances: first, the regulator determines that there will be a delay in appointing a second opinion doctor due to exceptional circumstances; and secondly, urgent electroconvulsive therapy is immediately necessary to save the patient’s life. The Bill also requires that those exceptional cases are monitored and reported on by the regulator.
This process prevents the treating hospital retrospectively requesting a second opinion doctor after treatment has commenced. Although those policies are not achieved by the amendment, they appear to meet objectives outlined in the explanatory notes. This process was included in the Bill following a recommendation made by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, and an amendment was tabled in the other place. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Winchester not to press the amendment.
I turn to clause 18. Currently, a patient’s approved clinician can overrule a refusal of electroconvulsive therapy and administer it compulsorily, so long as that is considered urgent under the 1983 Act. The clause introduces the need for a second opinion doctor, appointed by the regulator, to certify electroconvulsive therapy before it can go ahead. The second opinion doctor must examine the patient to establish whether the circumstances are truly urgent. If feasible, they must also consult a nurse and the patient’s nominated person, drawing on the valuable perspectives that each brings. It is important that this new protocol occurs within a tight timeframe, to ensure the patient’s safety and to prevent unnecessary suffering. That is why there is the power to impose, by way of regulations, duties on specific bodies and professionals to ensure that treatment is certified by the second opinion doctor within a particular period.
Where exceptional circumstances result in a delay in appointing the second opinion doctor, the clause permits the patient’s approved clinician to certify the use of life-sustaining electroconvulsive therapy. The hospital must inform the regulator each time that happens, and efforts should continue to appoint a second opinion doctor as soon as possible. In recognition of the seriousness of the situation, the clause requires that those exceptional cases be monitored and reported on by the regulator.
This clause is another important shift towards increasing the power of the patient over their care and treatment, within parameters that still enable the use of compulsory treatment where that is absolutely necessary.
Dr Evans
I rise to speak to clauses 15, 17 and 18 and Liberal Democrat amendment 13.
Clause 15 will amend section 58A of the Mental Health Act 1983 in regard to ECT. It is worth understanding the law as it stands. At present, if a patient lacks capacity to consent to ECT, treatment may be administered only if a second opinion appointed doctor certifies that the treatment does not conflict with any valid advance decision, or a decision made by an attorney, a deputy or the Court of Protection. That acts as an important safeguard, ensuring independent scrutiny of patients’ prior wishes or of proxy decisions before such an invasive treatment can proceed.
This clause will shift the responsibility. Under the Bill, the initial determination about whether ECT would conflict with any advance decision or proxy decision is moved from the second opinion appointed doctor to the patient’s approved clinician. Only if the clinician finds no conflict would the SOAD then be involved to certify that the patient lacks capacity, that the treatment is appropriate and that the clinician’s decision aligns with proposed new section 56A safeguards. The Government’s explanatory notes clarify that that reflects the unique nature of ECT: if a valid refusal exists, treatment must be prevented outright. The clinician therefore acts as a gatekeeper before SOAD involvement. Clause 15 marks a significant shift in the role of the SOAD with respect to ECT. The whole point is to transfer the responsibility to ensure that treatment does not conflict with advance decisions or refusals.
That contrasts with the approach under proposed new section 57A, under which the SOAD must certify the presence of a valid decision before compulsory treatment. The rationale, as explained in the Government’s notes, is that for ECT, the mere presence of an advance refusal should prevent treatment, whereas in the case of other compulsory treatments, the content of the advance decision is integral to deciding whether treatment can proceed.
I recognise the rationale for the change and the introduction of a clinical checklist—I assume that we are talking about new section 56A—but I have some questions for the Minister. Does shifting the initial responsibility to the approved clinician risk reducing the independent oversight currently provided by the SOAD, especially given the invasive nature of ECT? How can we be confident that clinicians will rigorously check for and respect valid advance refusals or proxy decisions? What practical safeguards will be in place to ensure that clinicians have full and timely access to any relevant advance decisions or proxy appointments? Will there be a standard process for verifying those, especially where records may be fragmented?
The SOAD’s role is now more focused on assessing appropriateness of treatment and capacity but, it appears, without responsibility for confirming the absence of conflicts with advance refusals. Will the SOAD therefore be empowered with sufficient information to make the judgment confidently? How will the clinical checklist be implemented and monitored across services to ensure consistent application? Can we be assured that it will effectively embed the principles of therapeutic benefit and least restrictive option, especially when dealing with ECT? What mechanisms will be available to family members or advocates who believe that a patient’s prior wishes, or proxy decisions, are being overlooked? Will there be accessible avenues by which to raise concerns or seek timely review?
Gregory Stafford
I rise to speak to clauses 15, 17 and 18 and Liberal Democrat amendment 13 to clause 18. I note the hon. Member for Winchester is not here; I do not know whether he intends to push amendment 13 to a vote but, just in case he does, I shall speak to it.
As colleagues across the Committee have said, ECT is a very controversial treatment, particularly when administered without consent. Under current law, it can be given to patients who lack capacity, but concerns have been raised about insufficient safeguards, especially where the treatment may conflict with prior decisions or a legal representative’s view. Clause 15 responds to recommendations from the 2018 independent review of the Mental Health Act and aims to ensure that ECT is used only when absolutely necessary, with independent oversight and respect for patient autonomy—something that everyone in this House can agree with.
I have a couple of questions for the Minister on clause 15. Clearly, the Opposition support the intention of the clause, but I would like to ask him about the challenges in interpretation. For example, determining whether a decision conflicts with an advance directive may be complex, so has he or his Department given any thought to how we might deal with some of those potentially complex, conflicting points of view?
Likewise, clause 17 updates section 62 of the Mental Health Act, allowing for urgent treatment without consent in specific circumstances. Once again, I welcome this provision because it gives some new legal clarity, supports clinical judgment, safeguards capacity and, most importantly, protects life and health. However, without strict oversight, there is a risk that the urgent treatment exception could be overused. What discussions has the Minister had with both his Department and, more importantly, campaign groups and mental health professionals to ensure that the urgent treatment exemption is understood and put forward in a way that satisfies both those undertaking the treatment and those receiving it?
Clause 18 also changes section 62 of the Act, which I again support; I mention this clause only because I wish to talk briefly about Liberal Democrat amendment 13. Like other Members, I believe that this amendment is extraordinarily well intentioned, but I have some questions about its wording. Specifically, subsection (c) says “the treatment is reversible”, but I do not necessarily know what the legal or medical definition would be of a reversible treatment. I cannot think how ECT could in any way be reversible, so paragraph (c) of the amendment would potentially mean that nobody could receive ECT. I do not fully understand how it could ever possibly be reversible. I think I have made that point as strongly as I possibly can but, if the Liberal Democrats are going to move the amendment, I ask for some understanding of what definition—either legal or medical—is being used for paragraph (c).
Stephen Kinnock
On the point about situations in which just the approved clinician provides certification, because of potential delays in appointment of the SOAD, such certification by the approved clinician can only occur in a very narrow set of circumstances, when the regulator has determined
“that there will be a delay in appointing a second opinion doctor,”
and the treating clinician considers urgent and compulsory electroconvulsive therapy to be life-sustaining. Our intention is that certification will be documented in a statutory form, to be set out in regulations, to ensure that there is an administrative record of the decision. Each time ECT is administered under an approved clinician’s certificate, it must be reported to the regulator so that such instances can be closely monitored and reported on publicly. While an approved clinician can approve treatment in those limited circumstances, there is still a duty on the regulator to appoint a second opinion doctor. Once that occurs, the approved clinician certificate ceases to apply. My hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford made an important point about how these provisions highlight choice and autonomy, and I thank him for putting that front and centre.
On additional safeguards, with particular reference to nasogastric interventions, there are already regulation-making powers in the Mental Health Act to subject treatments such as the one he mentions to new safeguards. We have always intended to engage with stakeholders to determine which treatments should be subject to which safeguards. That is an ongoing and important piece of work.
The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon asked what happens when a decision conflicts with advance choice. There will be an important process of arbitration around that. The advance choice, as articulated by the patient, is vital and should in principle take primacy, but there are certain circumstances in which a compulsory treatment is necessary. Nothing in the Bill removes the ability to carry out those compulsory treatments, albeit subject to the safeguards that we have debated. Ensuring that the urgent treatment exemption is understood by everyone will be an important part of drafting the code of practice, as will ensuring that the code of practice addresses that important point about maximising and universalising awareness and understanding of the urgent treatment exemption.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16
Review of treatment
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen Kinnock
The purpose of clause 16 is twofold. First, it seeks to maintain the status quo around when the responsible clinician must report to the regulatory authority on the patient’s treatment and their condition. Currently, the Mental Health Act requires that the responsible clinician give a treatment report to the regulatory authority when they renew the patient’s detention. However, changes to clause 28 that increase the frequency at which the clinician must renew a patient’s detention would have unintentionally increased the frequency of treatment reports for patients under certain sections. Clause 16 will prevent that, thereby avoiding unnecessarily placing additional burden on clinicians or the regulator.
Secondly, the clause will give the regulatory authority the power to request a report on a patient’s treatment and their condition, where they are consenting to treatment. That will expand an important safeguard to individuals who are potentially vulnerable and may benefit from additional oversight. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.
Dr Evans
The clause will amend section 61 of the Mental Health Act 1983 on the review and treatment of detained patients. The 1983 Act requires approved clinicians to provide reports on the treatment and condition of detained patients, particularly where patients do not consent to treatment. Those reports are integral to the scrutiny and safeguarding of the patients’ rights. The Act sets out timing requirements for such reports, which generally coincide with detention renewals, helping regulatory authorities such as the CQC in England and the Healthcare Inspectorate Wales to oversee treatment appropriately. I imagine that you are expecting me to continue my speech on the CQC, Mr Vickers, but I will spare you; you are august in your understanding of the health inspectorates, so I will not put the Committee through that.
The clause updates the timing and scope of the reporting requirements, and we welcome the fact that it will introduce a more structured reporting schedule. It will require reports to be provided after six months, then every six months and then every 12 months, as well as for the reports to be provided within two months of those periods. The clause also explicitly includes part III patients—those under forensic orders—especially those transferred from guardianship or those whose community treatment orders have been revoked. Importantly, the clause grants regulatory authorities the power to require reports not only from non-consenting patients but where patients are found to be consenting under certain treatment sections. That enhances the regulator’s oversight role, allowing it to request additional information should concerns arise.
We acknowledge that the intent behind these changes—to align reporting practices across different patient groups and to strengthen regulatory oversight—could improve consistency in monitoring, ensure that concerns about treatment are promptly addressed and, ultimately, enhance patient safety and rights. However, several questions arise. How will the increased power for regulatory authorities to require reports, including from consenting patients, be balanced to avoid placing excessive administrative burdens on clinicians? Will the changes to the timings of reports, particularly the delay of the first report to three months for certain cohorts, risk any gaps in early detection of treatment issues? What safeguards or limits will exist to prevent potential overuse of the power to request additional reports? Could that put further strain on mental health services and regulatory bodies that are already stretched?
How clear and workable are the definitions distinguishing different patient groups, such as part III patients transferred from guardianship or those with revoked community treatment orders? Might that complexity lead to inconsistent application? The clause distinguishes those groups because it assigns them different reporting schedules and rules. For example, part III patients transferred from guardianship and CTO-revoked patients after 6 months have a specific reporting timetable—every 6 months, then 12 months. In contrast, CTO-revoked patients within six months of their hospital order and other part III patients retain their existing, presumably different, reporting periods. That layering risks creating complexity. The Bill uses technical terms, and references to a patient being transferred from guardianship under section 19 or to a community treatment order being revoked are not immediately clear and may not be uniformly interpreted by all clinicians and regulatory staff.
Why is that a potential problem? If these terms or categories are not clearly defined and communicated, or if the practical implications are not straightforward, there is a risk that clinicians might misclassify a patient’s status, leading to incorrect timings or absence; regulatory authorities might struggle to apply the rules consistently; and patients might inadvertently fall through gaps in reporting. For example, let us imagine a patient who was initially under guardianship, which means that someone was legally responsible for their care, but who was then transferred to a hospital order under part III of the 1983 Act. If the clinician or regulator is unclear whether the patient fits into the “transferred from guardianship” category for the revised six-month reporting cycle, they might apply the wrong schedule, and thereby delay important reviews or misunderstanding opportunities for intervention.
Concern about definitions is really about ensuring clarity and practicality and making sure that everyone involved in patient care and oversight understands precisely which patients fall under which reporting categories, so that the intended protections and reviews happen without there being confusing gaps.
Stephen Kinnock
The classification of which part III patients the clause applies to is at the heart of the shadow Minister’s question about ensuring that everything is co-ordinated and we do not have conflicting reports and timeframes. I think that that classification is clear, but to recap, the changes will apply to the following patients detained under part III of the Act: patients who have been transferred from guardianship to hospital, and patients whose community treatment order has been revoked and more than six months has passed since their original hospital order was made. That classification is important. It is also important to bear in mind that the clause is all about maintaining the current frequency. We are not really injecting a new reporting rhythm; it is about maintaining the current frequency, but having that clarity around the classification of patients, as I outlined.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 17 and 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19
Remote assessment for treatment
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen Kinnock
I will discuss the clause and review of treatment. Under the Act, the regulator, the CQC, is responsible for appointing individuals to provide independent second opinions on the administration of certain treatments. As part of that, the appointed person may visit, interview or examine the patient to make their determination of whether treatment is appropriate. The clause permits the use of remote interview and examination for the purpose of any second opinion functions, which relate to treatment under part IV or 4A of the Mental Health Act.
Allowing interviews or examinations to occur in person or remotely is expected to result in more timely involvement of second opinion appointed doctors, an important safeguard. In turn, patients will have access to a greater diversity of second opinion doctors, as opposed to only those in the local area.
We understand that remote interview or examination may not always be appropriate, compared with the in- person option. That is why the clause only permits the use of remote where it is considered appropriate by the second opinion appointed doctor, taking into account the patient’s preferences and other factors. We will provide specific guidance on the circumstances under which remote may be appropriate, and where we discourage its use, in the Mental Health Act code of practice. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Dr Evans
I welcome the Government’s recognition that modern technology can play a valuable role in improving care in the mental health system. The move to allow remote interviews and examinations for second opinion appointed doctors, through live audio or video links, reflects the realities of healthcare today and the potential for greater flexibility and efficiency. In particular, the so-called hybrid model, as set out in the explanatory note, could help speed up access to important second opinions and reduce delays in treatment decisions. That is especially welcome given the well documented pressures on mental health services and the vital role of second opinions in safeguarding patient rights.
While the intention is laudable, however, I have a number of concerns to go through, because I believe that the House must consider them carefully. First, the clause leaves the clinician significant discretion to decide whether a remote assessment is appropriate, but it does not set out clear criteria or safeguards for how that decision should be made. Given the serious nature of second opinion assessments, which often authorise treatment without consent, we must ensure that the discretion does not lead to inconsistent or inappropriate use of remote methods.
Secondly, mental health patients are a diverse group, and many face particular communication challenges. For example, a patient who has experienced a stroke may have speech impediments or difficulty understanding complex questions. Others may have conditions such as autism or dementia that make remote communication difficult or distressing.
This was a really big topic in the other place, particularly as there are several esteemed colleagues who are part of the speech and language therapy fraternity, so it warrants a bit of attention. For example, we need to look at access to speech and language therapists. We also think about how these important communications needs will be assessed and accommodated. Will there be a statutory requirement for a clinician to consider patients’ communications abilities and preferences before opting for a remote interview? I am concerned that, without such safeguards, patients may be subjected to assessments that do not fully capture their conditions or views, undermining the quality and fairness of the process. The Minister—I think—hinted that this may be covered in the code of practice. I hope it is.
Thirdly, the clause does not specify the role of patient consent or objection to remote access. Should patients have the right to request an in-person interview if they find remote contact unsuitable? This is not simply a matter of convenience; it is a question of whether we ensure the dignity, respect and meaningful participation in decisions about their own care. There is much debate in primary care about the role of video calls versus seeing a person face to face, and I would be interested to understand where the Government sit on that point.
The Bill lacks any specific provision for regulatory oversight or standards to govern the use of remote assessments. How will the regulator—presumably the CQC, but I would be grateful for clarification on that point—monitor whether remote assessments are being used appropriately, given the vulnerability of these types of patients? What mechanisms will patients or their advocates have to raise concerns or complaints if they feel remote assessment was not adequate or, even worse, harmful?
Finally, while technology can bring great benefits, it should never become a default substitute for face-to-face contact in mental health treatment decisions, especially where the stakes are so high. I assume the Minister appreciates that. Will this be set out clearly in the code of practice? Whose job is it to enforce that? Will there be a right to request an in-person interview, should the patient choose to? Has an equality impact assessment been undertaken to ensure that remote access does not disproportionately disadvantage those who suffer with communications difficulties or other vulnerabilities, or is that something that the Minister will implement in the code of practice? I would be grateful for some clarifications on those points, because it is really important to get it right when it comes to difficulties in communication, especially in this patient cohort.
Gregory Stafford
I want to pick up on a few points made by my gallant and learned hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley. He talked about people who, like many of us, have seen the benefits of assessments online. There could well be benefits from clause 19 for that. He also talked about how some people did not find that an appropriate way to have their assessment. My understanding is that if someone has a physical ailment, they might be pushed strongly down a route to have an online assessment for whatever reason, whether that be at a primary care setting or at a secondary care or acute setting, but that if they wanted to see a doctor—for example, a GP—physically to talk about their ailment, although it might take them a little bit of time, they had the right to do so.
My concern about the clause is the suggestion that in certain circumstances, some patients would not have the right to a face-to-face assessment. The Minister talked about where things will be taken into account, where it is appropriate and where “it would be discouraged”. “Discouraged” is not the same as “it will not happen”. We need clarification, either within the Bill or very strongly in the code of conduct, so that a patient has the right to a face-to-face consultation. I would be very keen to hear the Minister’s thoughts on that.
Stephen Kinnock
We are very much on the same page in looking to harness the power of technology wherever we possibly can to shift from analogue to digital, but recognising the importance of putting the patient’s needs and disposition first. Telemental health is welcomed by many service users and has become an established part of delivering mental health care in a range of settings and scenarios. We expect the use of a hybrid approach involving both in-person and remote interview and examination to improve the efficiency of the second opinion appointed doctor service, and therefore to be of benefit to all patients.
We understand that remote interview or examination may not always be appropriate compared with in-person options. That is why the clause permits the use of remote only where it is considered appropriate by the second opinion appointed doctor. We will provide specific guidance on the circumstances under which remote may be appropriate, and where we discourage its use. All of that will be in the Mental Health Act code of practice. Many of the answers to the questions asked by the shadow Minister and by the hon. Members for Solihull West and Shirley and for Farnham and Bordon asked are contained in that. We are going to develop detailed guidance in the Mental Health Act code of practice, which will clarify and specify very clearly where this should be implemented and where we would discourage it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 20
Capacity to consent to treatment
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 5—Report: statutory competency test for under-16s—
“Within 12 months of day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must undertake a review of whether a statutory competency test for under-16s in determining their ability to make a relevant decision would be expedient for the purposes of this Act or the Mental Health Act 1983.”
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to undertake a review of whether a statutory competency test for under-16s would be expedient for the purposes of this Bill and the Mental Health Act 1983.
Stephen Kinnock
Clause 20 will make changes to wording under the Mental Health Act regarding the patient’s capacity and competence to consent to treatment so that it reflects the terminology used as standard by clinicians. While this amendment is not expected to create a practical change, it ensures consistency with other sections of the Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act 2005.
As for new clause 5, it is our assessment that, were we to bring about legislative change which sought to introduce a statutory test of conscience for people under 16 in a single setting—that is, under the Mental Health Act—this could have unintended consequences for how competence is assessed, both in mental health settings and other linked areas of decision making. This could create additional confusion for clinicians and impact the ability of children to exercise choice and autonomy over their care and treatment in mental health and other settings, and cannot be justified. We therefore do not consider a statutory test under the Mental Health Act, or a review of that issue, to be necessary. We will consult on the guidance for assessing competence for under-16s in mental health settings in the revised code of practice, with the intention of providing further clarity to decision makers.
For those reasons, I commend clause 20 to the Committee and ask the hon. Members for Winchester and for Guildford not to press new clause 5.
Dr Evans
Clause 20 addresses a central principle in healthcare, ethics and law: the right of individuals to make informed decisions about their treatment, and the conditions under which that right can be overridden.
Let me begin by recognising the objective of clause 20 as both important and welcome. It replaces the outdated and potentially ambiguous language in the Mental Health Act 1983—language that speaks of whether a patient is
“capable of understanding the nature, purpose and likely effects”
of treatment—with a clearer legal standard based on whether a patient has capacity to consent, in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act 2005.
This reform aligns the Mental Health Act with how capacity is already understood and applied across health and social care, and it harmonises part IV of the Act with part 4A, which already uses that language in the context of community patients. So far, so sensible. However, as the Opposition, our role is not only to acknowledge the intention, but to ensure that the implementation matches the ambition, and that patients’ rights are not merely affirmed in law but upheld in practice.
What do these changes actually do? Under clause 20, we see a wholesale substitution of terminology. For example, in sections 57 and 58 of the Act, which deal with certain serious treatments such as neurosurgery and ECT, the language shifts from “capable of understanding” to having or lacking capacity to consent as defined in the Mental Health Act. It also explicitly incorporates advance decisions to refuse treatment under section 25 of the MCA, the role of a donee of lasting power of attorney, and the authority of a deputy appointed by the Court of Protection. This is a welcome acknowledgement of patients’ rights to plan ahead and to have their wishes respected, even when they later lose capacity.
While the Government’s explanatory notes suggest that this is not expected to create practical change, I think we should pause and ask: what if it does? We are told that clinicians interpret “capable of understanding” as meaning “having capacity” under the Mental Capacity Act. But the MCA test is precise: it requires the person to understand the information relevant to the decision, retain that information, use or weigh it as part of the decision-making process, and communicate their decision. So are clinicians routinely applying this test fully, or are they relying on informed judgment?
Can the Minister confirm, for example, whether NHS trusts have audited how consistently the MCA test is being applied in mental health settings? I was a clinician and am now an MP, so I understand the intent behind it, but the legal clarity—now with my MP hat on—is really important to ensure that we truly are interpreting the legislation we pass in this House for this country in the correct way when we are acting as clinicians.
When it comes to advance decisions in acute settings, clause 20 provides that an advance decision to refuse treatment must be both valid and applicable, as per section 25 of the Mental Capacity Act, but in the real world of psychiatric in-patient care, clinicians may encounter such decisions during a crisis, when patients are at serious risk of self-harm or suicide. How will the Government support clinicians in determining validity and application quickly, safely and lawfully? I assume— I think the Minister hinted at this—that that will be part of the code of practice.
On the power to override consent, perhaps most crucially the Mental Health Act allows for treatment without consent, even when the person has capacity, if they are detained under the Act. Again, we touched on this in relation to amendments discussed on the first day. That is a profound legal power. Does the clause change it in any way, or does it simply confirm that capacity is assessed, but not necessarily respected, under compulsion? If the Government intend the law to remain as it is—that patients with capacity can still be treated without their agreement—they may well need to specify and set that out. I urge Ministers to consider how we communicate that reality to patients, whose sense of agency and trust in the system may otherwise be undermined.
I turn to the matter of Gillick competence for children under 16. The clause clarifies that the standard for under-16s is Gillick competence, not capacity under the Mental Capacity Act. This reflects the long-standing legal test established in the 1986 case of Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority. Under Gillick, a child can consent to their own medical treatment if they have sufficient understanding and intelligence to comprehend what is proposed.
The Gillick test has advantages. It allows for a case-by-case assessment, not a rigid age threshold, and respects the emerging autonomy of young people. However, there are also risks: it can lead to inconsistency between clinicians and does not offer the same structured framework as the MCA. What safeguards will be put in place to ensure consistency and rigour in applying the Gillick test? Will the Government commit to updating the code of practice with guidance on assessing Gillick competence specifically in mental health contexts?
I turn to deputies, attorneys and verifying authority. The clause references lasting powers of attorney and deputies—that is right and proper—but we need to ask how a clinician will verify that a donee is acting within the scope of their authority. Will the Government consider a national standard protocol to support clinicians in checking LPAs and court orders, particularly in urgent situations? For example, could this be part of the checklist, which we have already discussed, or is it implied that it will be part of that in the first place?
Many of those concerns were shared in the other place. They were partly addressed in the letter for Baroness Merron, which is worth reviewing. It sought to clarify a number of concerns raised on Second Reading in the other place. I welcome the tone of the letter and the Minister’s stated willingness to listen. In particular, I acknowledge the recognition of the “challenges…to decision makers” that may be presented by
“the complex interface between the Mental Health Bill and the Mental Capacity Act”,
and I welcome the Government’s commitment to engage with clinicians and stakeholders during the revision of the code of practice. That is important.
However, the letter also raises some further issues that deserve scrutiny. First, the Minister says:
“Both Acts provide appropriate procedural safeguards to ensure that the individual’s Article 5 human right to liberty and security is protected during their detention. The nature of the safeguards provided under the two Acts are different”.
That is undeniably true, but therein lies the concern: where the safeguards differ, so too may the thresholds, the review mechanisms and the practical experience of those subject to detention. In cases in which a person might meet criteria under both Acts, what clear guidance will clinicians be given on how to decide which legal framework to apply and how to ensure that the individual receives the most appropriate and proportionate protection?
In the same letter, the Minister addresses the potential unintended consequences of reforms to section 3 of the Mental Health Act, namely that
“people with a learning disability and autistic people, who lack capacity, could, in certain circumstances, be detained under the Mental Capacity Act rather than the Mental Health Act”.
The Government’s stated intention is to prevent that outcome by strengthening community-based services. The letter states that
“the proposed changes to Part 2, section 3…will only be commenced when we are assured that there are strong community services in place.”
In the absence of clear statutory criteria, that could be seen as moving the target, so will the Government publish a set of benchmarks or a public readiness test? The Minister has said that the implementation will take place over 10 years, but a readiness test with criteria setting out how that will apply would help us to deal with a lot of the issues that we have talked about during the passage of the Bill.
Zöe Franklin
I rise to speak in favour of new clause 5, which would require the Secretary of State to undertake a review into whether the statutory competency test for under-16s would be expedited under the Mental Health Act. It has been great to hear so many contributions from colleagues on the Committee about the challenges that young people face when discussing their mental health and wellbeing and being involved in decision making around their health.
As my colleague Baroness Tyler noted in the Lords, and as the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth noted in his early comments, the consistency with which Gillick competency is interpreted in the case of young people is a bit of a grey area. That is the key reason why we have tabled this new clause. We want young people to be empowered to be involved with decisions around their mental health. It is not hard to imagine how traumatic it must be for an under-16 to refuse treatment when they fully understand and object to it, yet be overridden because no one is quite sure how to assess their competency robustly. We believe that, at the very least, we owe it to young people to ensure that our legal framework is coherent, fair and protective of their rights.
The new clause would allow the Government to lead that conversation in a measured and consultative way. A statutory review would bring much-needed evidence and direction to a complex but critical issue. I am disappointed that the Minister will not consider the new clause, but I will withdraw it for expediency. However, it has been good to hear the commitment from the Minister to consulting on and reviewing this issue. The Liberal Democrats look forward to hearing more detail on it in the future and to being part of that conversation.
Stephen Kinnock
One theme raised by hon. Members on both sides of the Committee is the need for clarity and safeguards so that clinicians are clear on how best to assess competence. The Mental Health Act code of practice already provides guidance on establishing competence in under-16s. We will consult on the guidance for assessing competence in mental health settings in the revised code of practice, with the intention of providing further clarity to decision makers. That will include engagement with key stakeholders and clinical decision makers with experience of assessing competence in children.
We think it is better to focus on improving the practical application of Gillick and assessment of competency rather than reinventing the wheel, with the risk that that might cause confusion. The Department will work with NHS England, Social Work England and other partners to develop appropriate training for staff on the reforms. Once the code of practice has been updated, professionals working under the Act will be required to undergo training to maintain their competence and awareness of the Act.
Dr Evans
I cannot resist the opportunity to probe the Minister on something so important. He said that NHS England will predominantly look at this, but changes are happening there. Will he ensure that Gillick competence and the assessment of capacity will be at the heart of this? It is unclear now, given that it will take two years for NHS England to be abolished, who will take that on. Will he ensure that that is given due attention, as we have with physical health?
Stephen Kinnock
Absolutely. We must ensure that we act rapidly as soon as the Bill gets Royal Assent by launching the consultation process on the code of practice. It will be vital that the question of the practical application of Gillick and the need for clarity is universalised right across the system.
The shadow Minister asked about the interface between the Bill and the Mental Capacity Act. We recognise the complex nature of that interface, which presents challenges for decision makers. We will continue to consider this interface as we implement our reforms, and we will engage with stakeholders to understand what support and guidance could help to improve application of the interface when we consult on the new code of practice.
My hon. Friend the Member for Croydon East made some powerful and important points about the risk of unintended consequences if we try to reinvent the wheel on this. She is absolutely right. She asked what we want to see in the consultation on the code of practice. For me, the two key areas would be clarity and ensuring practical application of Gillick, by understanding the case law and the complexity of the interface between the pieces of legislation. It is about ensuring that we get that clarity. We cannot do that in an ivory tower. We have to do it with Social Work England and a range of partners with practical, hands-on experience to ensure that the code of practice is the bible for addressing these important issues.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 21
Care and treatment plans
Zöe Franklin
I beg to move amendment 48, in clause 21, page 30, line 28, at end insert—
“(ab) containing steps to alleviate social and financial stressors contributing to the patient’s risk of requiring detention in future; and”.
This amendment would require social and financial stressors be addressed in care and treatment plans.
Dr Evans
Clause 21 will introduce a statutory duty to provide care and treatment plans for most patients detained under the Mental Health Act in England. It is, in the Government’s own words, a cornerstone of the reform package, so it warrants thorough scrutiny.
Under the current legal framework, there is no universal statutory requirement for a written care and treatment plan for detained patients. Although the care programme approach is widely used in England, and the Mental Health (Wales) Measure 2010 provides a statutory framework for care planning in Wales, provision in England is more variable. There is also the section 117 duty to provide aftercare for some patients, but there is no legal requirement to produce a personalised plan that spans care, treatment and discharge planning from the point of detention.
Clause 21 attempts to fill that gap. We welcome its aim of ensuring that all eligible detained patients in England have comprehensive, personalised and reviewable care and treatment plans in place. We particularly support the requirement for the plans to address both clinical and social needs such as housing and employment. The aim to embed transparency and collaboration will ensure that patients and those close to them are meaningfully consulted when it is practicable. The ambition to create a consistent national framework, which will improve the quality and equity of care, is also commendable, as is the recognition that restrictive interventions, including compulsory treatment, should be clearly justified in the plans.
Nevertheless, I have several important questions for the Minister. We have talked about the draft regulations; I assume that these plans will be encoded in them. Does the Minister have an idea of when the draft regulations are likely to be published? Given the interest in the plans, that is important. Much of the substance of what a plan must include, including how often it will be reviewed and how much information can be disclosed, is left to regulations. Without sight of it, how can Parliament be confident that the framework will be robust, enforceable and fit for purpose? I trust the Minister, but what if he is shuffled away and we get a different Minister? We may not know.
I turn to timeliness. Will the Government consider setting a clear deadline in regulations, for example within seven or 14 days of detention, for the creation of a care and treatment plan? The benefit of personalised planning can be realised only if plans are produced promptly.
That point leads me to enforcement and accountability. What happens if a care and treatment plan is not produced or is not updated appropriately? Will patients and their advocates have any legal recourse? What oversight mechanisms are being developed to ensure compliance?
Proposed new section 130ZA(6) of the Mental Health Act requires consultation with the patient and with their family or advocate, but only where practicable and appropriate. Can the Minister explain how that will be interpreted in practice? Would the Government consider strengthening the consultation duty to require a recorded justification when a consultation does not occur? It seems to me that in most cases it should happen, so providing a justification when it does not would allow accountability and ensure that it is being put in place.
How will the plans integrate within existing frameworks? Many detained patients already have a CPA plan, or a section 117 aftercare plan. How will the Government ensure that these new statutory plans complement existing requirements, rather than duplicating them?
On forensic patients and privacy, the clause allows for the inclusion of information about victim and public protection arrangements in plans for patients detained under part III of the Act. I completely understand why that is, but it raises a question: how will the Government balance the patient’s right to privacy, rehabilitation and focus with safety? We support the principle that everyone detained under the Act deserves a clear, person-centred plan that outlines not only why they are detained, but how they will move forward, recover and return to life in the community.
I turn briefly to the Liberal Democrat amendments. I assume that many of the points will be addressed in the regulations, so I will not go through all the individual applications, because I think that there is space there and the plan would be able to pick things up. However, I completely understand what the hon. Member for Guildford is trying to achieve. The thrust of all the amendments that the Liberal Democrats have tabled has been accountability and making sure that we consider all points. I just hope to make sure that the Bill is practicable, and I hope on behalf of His Majesty’s Opposition that we can strike a balance between accountability and practicability and ensure that we have both.
The Minister clearly has support from both sides of the Committee for getting this right. I look forward to hearing his answers and hearing about how Members can work together to ensure that.
Stephen Kinnock
I thank hon. Members for this useful and insightful debate on care and treatment plans. I will begin by discussing amendments 14, 15 and 48. I reassure Members that the scope of the new statutory care and treatment plan has been made purposefully broad, so that wider matters relevant to a person’s mental health recovery, such as financial support and social care needs, are captured. We recognise that they can play a significant part in a person’s mental illness and can increase the risk of people with mental illness, learning disabilities and autistic people experiencing crisis leading to detention under the Act. Consideration of those issues can be critical to providing a comprehensive and effective programme of care and support.
As was promised by Baroness Merron and referred to by the hon. Member for Guildford and my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley, the required contents of the care and treatment plan, which we publicly consulted on, will be set out in regulations. More information on what we intend to include in relation to financial matters, housing and accommodation needs, and other issues can be found in the relevant policy paper in the parliamentary Libraries.
We will provide guidance in the revised code of practice that will set out that in-patients receiving acute mental health care should be offered financial support, among other interventions, aimed at meeting the person’s holistic needs. To ensure that a person’s wider needs are identified as early as possible by mental health professionals, we intend to encourage individuals to include this information in their advance choice document.
I turn to housing and accommodation protection, which are referred to in amendment 15. Where a person is detained in hospital and is receiving housing benefit, or their housing is paid for via universal credit, there are provisions already in place that allow for them to be temporarily absent from their property for a limited duration. We will use the code of practice to set clear expectations on mental health staff around care planning, including consideration of accommodation and housing needs. We will also highlight existing provisions that protect a person’s living arrangements while they are in hospital.
I turn to amendment 23, which was tabled by the hon. Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire. Under the Bill, all patients will receive a statutory care and treatment plan, excluding those under short-term sections. The patient’s statutory care and treatment should be created by the clinician in consultation with the patient and those who care for them, such as family members and carers. The clinician is expected to make reasonable adjustments to meet any communication needs, so that they can participate as fully as possible in making the plan to ensure that their wishes and feelings are reflected.
It is already our intention for care and treatment plans to cover information relating to a patient’s communication or sensory needs, if it links to their mental health recovery. That includes their wishes and preferences, information pertaining to their family or carers, and arrangements relating to their safe and effective discharge, which may include crisis planning. We will of course provide detailed guidance in the code of practice to ensure effective care planning for people with learning disabilities and autistic people that takes into account their specific needs.
I turn to amendment 50. Last year, the Government issued statutory guidance under the National Health Service Act 2006 on discharge from all mental health and learning disability and autism in-patient settings. That guidance underlines best practice on discharge planning and multi-agency collaboration between NHS bodies and local authorities, in line with statutory duties to co-operate under the 2006 Act. We intend to make the discharge plan a required part of the patient’s statutory care and treatment plan, and that will be made explicit in regulations. The scope of the care and treatment plan is broad, allowing for consideration of the patient’s holistic needs as part of their discharge plan. Under the Bill, the plan should be prepared and reviewed in consultation with the patient and others, such as their advocate, carer or family members, where appropriate and practically achievable.
Statutory guidance on discharge planning sets out that it should start on admission of the person to hospital, if not before. All detained in-patients are supported by a multidisciplinary team responsible for their care and treatment. Discharge planning should involve input from other agencies and the community team responsible for the individual’s ongoing care and treatment once discharged. Where a person is eligible for section 117 aftercare, planning should involve commissioners and local authorities too—
Stephen Kinnock
I did not know that, Mr Vickers. Thank you for clarifying that point.
To promote a patient-centred approach to discharge planning, we would prefer to avoid mandating in law which professionals should be present at discharge planning meetings. To formalise best practice, the Bill requires that the responsible clinician consults with another professional who has been involved in the patient’s treatment before discharge can take place.
I turn to amendment 16. We agree that a young person turning 18 is at an important transition point in their care and treatment, which usually involves the young person being transferred to adult services. Under the Bill, the responsible clinician is already required to review a person’s care and treatment plan following any change in their condition or circumstances that they consider significant. The transition to adult services clearly represents a significant change in circumstances, which rightly instigates a review of the patient’s plan by the responsible clinician. We intend to make that expectation explicit in the code of practice. In line with existing care standards and guidelines, we will also underline the importance of planning in advance of a patient’s transition to adult services and of collaboration between clinical teams, as well as other measures that seek to minimise disruption to the young person’s care and treatment journey.
We support the intention of amendment 17. However, there are existing provisions, both within the Bill and across other legislation and guidance, that aim to safeguard children and young carers. For example, statutory guidance on working together to safeguard children already sets out the importance of health and social care professionals acting proactively and in collaboration with other agencies to identify and respond to children in need, including where a parent requires mental health support. There is also an existing statutory duty on local authorities to assess the support needs of young carers.
The Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill contains provisions that will strengthen multi-agency working with children and families, helping to ensure that local authorities deliver on their child protection duties. We also plan to reflect key requirements in the revised code of practice to ensure that children and young carers are safeguarded.
We understand that sometimes, when a person is detained, young carers are not appropriately identified. To address that, we plan to encourage individuals to use their advance choice document to ensure that the appropriate services are made aware. Under the Bill, carers should be consulted on the preparation and review of a patient’s care and treatment plan, where appropriate. We will include guidance in the code to ensure that young carers are appropriately involved and supported. We therefore believe that an additional duty would be unnecessary.
Clause 21 will introduce statutory care and treatment plans for all patients detained under the Mental Health Act, including patients under community treatment orders and those who are subject to guardianship. Only those who are subject to extremely short detention periods, such as those lasting a matter of days, are excluded.
The clause sets out in broad terms what the plans should cover, and provides the Secretary of State with the power to specify the contents in regulations. Setting out the requirements in primary legislation and further details in regulations will ensure that every patient’s care and treatment plan is comprehensive and that there is consistency across plans, which we know is not currently the case.
Under the clause, the clinician must prepare and review the plan with the patient and their close contacts, such as family members, carers or their nominated person. That helps to ensure that the patient’s wishes, feelings, beliefs and values shape the plan, thereby increasing the likelihood of their engagement with it. To help to ensure that the plan is kept up to date, the clause specifies important trigger points at which the patient’s clinician should review the plan with a view to potentially revising it.
Beyond providing a clear strategy for how the patient will be supported towards their recovery, it is envisaged that the plan will provide an important audit trail of key decisions made by the patient’s responsible clinician. To embed those new statutory requirements in practice, the clause will place requirements on the managers of a hospital, or the relevant authority, to monitor compliance with the duties. Sir Simon Wessely described statutory care and treatment plans as the cornerstone of the proposed reforms, delivering on each and every one of the guiding principles.
For the reasons that I have outlined, I hope that hon. Members will not press their amendments and will support clause 21.
Zöe Franklin
I thank the Minister for going in detail through the points raised in our amendments. It is good to hear how each of them is being addressed through the code of practice and in the Bill. I am reassured, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 21 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Taiwo Owatemi.)