English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Third sitting)
Tuesday 14th October 2025
(1 day, 17 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesEnglish Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill 2024-26 View all English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 14 October 2025 - (14 Oct 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
As we begin consideration in Committee of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill, I have a few housekeeping points to make.
Phones should be switched off. I have just switched mine off, as I do not want to set a bad example. I do not really like gentlemen to remove their jackets; I never remove mine, unless I am in my home or garden, or on holiday. I notice someone getting their tie on quickly.
We will power through this, but we will also give the Bill full consideration. I have made it clear to the Government Whip, as I now make it clear to others, that we are not going to delay unduly; equally, we will not hurry through without proper scrutiny. Getting that balance right will be my job.
Everyone is entitled to speak, and they should let me know that they wish to do so in the normal way. Anyone who wants to press an amendment to a vote needs to notify me, or make it clear in their speech that they will press for a vote—unless, of course, the Minister satisfies them, possibly by conceding the amendment, in which case a vote will not be needed. We will see about that as we go. Let us have a good Committee, with everyone enjoying it and participating, so that we have good scrutiny of legislation.
We are sitting in public and proceedings are being broadcast. I emphasise, no tea and coffee—it states that in my script, by the way, but I guess you knew it anyway—but you may refresh yourselves with water.
We now begin line-by-line consideration. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. It shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. There has been a bit of a change, because a Member withdrew their amendments late on, so we will be getting an up-to-date version of that.
The Member who has put their name to a lead amendment in a group is called to speak first. For debates on clause stand part, the Minister will be called first. Other Members are then free to indicate that they wish to speak by bobbing. If we have had a full debate on a clause through discussion of the amendments, I will probably not allow a separate stand part debate. If we have not had full consideration, we will have a stand part debate on that clause. I will gauge that as we go, mindful that we need to make progress, but have proper scrutiny, as I said.
At the end of a group of amendments and new clauses, I will call the Member who moved the lead amendment or new clause again. If any Member wishes to press to a vote any other amendment, which includes grouped new clauses, that is at the Chair’s discretion. The Member must inform the Chair in advance if they wish to press an amendment. My fellow Chairs and I will use our discretion to decide whether to allow separate stand part debates. I hope that is helpful.
Clause 1
Strategic authorities
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider new clause 35—Standardisation of definitions—
“(1) Within six months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must by regulations standardise the definition in legislation of—
(a) ‘national’,
(b) ‘strategic’,
(c) ‘local’ and
(d) ‘community’
for the purposes of ensuring each refers consistently to the appropriate level of local government across all legislation.
(2) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.
(3) In exercising this power, the Secretary of State must have due regard to the need to ensure consistent use of the words listed in subsection (1), to facilitate public understanding of devolution.
(4) Within six months of a statutory instrument under subsection (2) being made, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report setting out how the power under this section has been used this power, including any reasons for failure to exercise it where there is inconsistent usage of the words listed in subsection (1).”
This new clause would ensure that words like “strategic” and “local”, where they relate to a level of government, have consistent meaning across statute.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (Miatta Fahnbulleh)
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Sir John. Before I speak to the first group of amendments, I put on the record my thanks to the witnesses who gave up their time in September to give evidence to the Committee. Their comments were insightful and will inform our scrutiny over the remainder of Committee stage.
The English devolution White Paper committed to introduce in law the concept of strategic authorities, which sits at the heart of our new devolution architecture for England. The clause makes good on that commitment and establishes a more consistent and simple model of devolution. The clause sets out the three levels of strategic authority: the single foundational strategic authority, the combined foundational strategic authority and the mayoral strategic authority. Each category will have access to a consistent set of devolved powers and functions.
Mayoral strategic authorities that meet specified eligibility criteria may be designated by secondary legislation as established mayoral strategic authorities, unlocking further devolution. We believe that that will deliver a permanent shift in power from Whitehall to all parts of the country, with consistent powers at the right level across all of England, so that empowered mayors can drive growth, unlock house building and infrastructure, and deliver the change that our communities want.
David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)
I echo the Minister’s welcome, Sir John. It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair.
We will refer to a good deal of evidence on all parts of the Bill, but it is important to set out briefly—in terms equivalent to those used by the Minister—the concerns that the Opposition continue to have about the significant democratic deficit that arises from the measures in the Bill; the risk of losing the efficiency and local insight that come from many of our local government structures; and, in the context of a country that already has fewer elected representatives per voter than any other developed democracy in the world, the impact of stripping out, by some estimates, up to 90% of elected representation. I therefore echo your comments, Sir John, on the importance of scrutiny of the Bill. Local authorities are the means by which our voters, our residents, exercise control over what happens in their neighbourhoods and communities. It is critical that the legislation gets that right.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
We absolutely recognise the hon. Member’s point about democracy. Directly elected mayors can play a powerful strategic role. They are a key new part of the devolution architecture that we have seen work well across the country. I point to Greater Manchester, which has delivered the fastest growth of any local economy. They sit alongside strong democratic structures that we will have in local government. The Bill is complementary to that and does not cut across or undermine those structures.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. This is not my first Public Bill Committee, but I have had the whole summer to forget how these things work, so I look forward to being firmly guided by you if I stray from good practice.
I will speak to new clause 35. In that context, I emphasise how friendly, constructive and helpful the new clause is intended to be as a way of getting the Committee started on a good note. I ask Ministers to take the need for it on board, although I will not press it to a vote. I tabled the new clause to ensure that, more broadly, words such as “strategic” and “local”, where they relate to a level of government or a level of area of policy, have a consistent meaning for strategic authorities, constituent authorities and community-level groups.
I will give some examples of possible confusion growing in the areas cited in new clause 35. We have a strategic road network, which is in fact a national network managed by National Highways. We have new strategic authorities, which will have to manage a key route network, analogous to the Transport for London route network. We also have local roads managed by local authorities. In the Bill, however, we have strategic authorities being asked to make a local transport plan. That could be more helpfully named a strategic transport plan.
Another area of policy I am very familiar with is the community infrastructure levy. In later clauses, we will discuss new applications of the mayoral community infrastructure levies. I have experience of how, more locally, spending on what most local councils call strategic community infrastructure levies is done by local authorities. Decisions on local CIL spending, which is what councils normally call is, are made closer to the community, often by ward councillors or neighbourhood forums.
We are slightly better off in planning, where there is a national basis for decisions on nationally significant infrastructure, and where strategic planning applications may be called in by regional strategic level mayors under current or new structures. However I do think that we lack rigour, sometimes logic, and often clarity in all these terms now. More thought about making things more standardised and easier to understand would be very welcome. I am not proposing a vote on this new clause, but what I would like to hear from the Minister today is that she will take this away, ask for at least a report on the current range of terminology we have ended up with in different areas of policy, and consider potential further amendments and the fuller review the new clause calls for.
The Chair
As a point of advice, if people want to contribute after I have called the Minister to sum up then just let me know in advance and I will call the Minister at the end, so she can respond to a variety of points that have been made. I do not want the Minister to have to keep getting up and responding to every speech. I know people are new to Committee, but it helps the Minister be able to sum up her consideration of all the points that have been made.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I am sympathetic to the intentions behind the new clause, and the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion makes a good point regarding the tapestry of terms that we have in a very complicated local government structure; however, the Bill already includes defined terms relevant to interpreting local government structures. For example, clause 1 defines exactly what strategic authorities are. My concern is that taking a one-size-fits-all approach might have unintended consequences by altering existing definitions that have been deliberately tailored to work in specific legislative contexts. My view is that as we go through this process of standardising the new structure, with strategic authorities now established in legislation working alongside local government and community structures, the roles and the definitions of different structures of government will become much clearer. I hope the hon. Member will not press the new clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
Functions of Strategic Authorities and Mayors
Siân Berry
I beg to move amendment 261, in clause 2, page 2, line 21, after “economic development”, insert “, poverty and socio-economic inequality,”
This amendment would make poverty and socio-economic inequality an area of competence for devolved authorities, ensuring they can take action to address the root causes of disadvantage in their areas.
Siân Berry
The amendment relates to the fact that the new strategic authorities simply must be tasked with reducing inequality as well as creating growth. We know that growth for growth’s sake does not trickle down or help everyone equally. The strategic authorities must be tasked with understanding, measuring and reducing socioeconomic inequality. The socioeconomic duty in the Equality Act 2010 is not yet commenced for England, but if it were the amendment would have to be made.
The amendment would make poverty and socioeconomic inequality an area of competence for devolved authorities, ensuring they can take action to address the root causes of disadvantage in their areas. As co-chair of the all-party parliamentary group on poverty and inequality, this is an issue close to my heart. In July, the officers and I sent a letter to the Secretary of State for Education and the Minister for Women and Equalities to ask about the urgency of commencing the socioeconomic duty. We said,
“The urgent need for the duty could not be clearer. Rising child destitution, increasing reliance on foodbanks and untimely excess deaths attributable to austerity policies all highlight the imperative for a legal tool to reduce socio-economic inequalities”.
We also said,
“Activation of the Socio-Economic Duty marks an important shift from piecemeal responses to rising poverty and widening inequalities, to a proactive systemic approach, embedded across all policy areas”.
The Bill is an opportunity to embed those principles.
I do not believe that these two actions—the commencement of the duty and the writing of this Bill—are mutually exclusive in achieving these goals. I cannot see why, given the Government’s promise to enact the duty, the new bodies should not be set up with it in place and in mind. I know that organisations including many local authorities are already preparing to comply with it in England. Towards the end of last year, one of my Green party colleagues on the London Assembly questioned the Mayor of London with some urgency about the work that he is doing with local authorities and agencies across London to prepare for this. We are now approaching the end of this year and it is still not in place. I believe that the Bill is the right place to start putting this into legislation.
I do not plan to push the amendment to a vote, but I would like to hear more from the Minister about when the Labour Government plan to bring the duty into force, and what plans Ministers have to use a statutory instrument to apply it to strategic authorities and mayors. Even if they will not accept the amendment, I would appreciate anything on the record asking those bodies to get ready for the duty, so that when they are set up, they can hit the ground running on addressing poverty and inequality in their areas.
David Simmonds
The Opposition have some sympathy with the amendment, but we spent time reflecting on its implications and appropriateness for the Bill. I suspect that, to a degree, the Minister and I agree on this point. If we reflect on the legislative framework around our local authorities from their earliest origins, the relief of poverty and addressing inequalities—the duties that the amendment refers to—have been enshrined. It goes back as far as the Poor Laws, but in more recent years the National Assistance Act 1948 compelled all local authorities to support those destitute in their areas, and the Localism Act 2011 gives scope for local authorities to use their economic powers through activities such as procurement in ways that specifically benefit the local area.
The Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023, which was much debated and broadly had cross-party support, is reflected in a lot of this Bill. It was specifically about local authorities using their powers to support the economy of their local area. Just a short time ago, some of the members of the Committee were in this room debating the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, in which the Government set out a vision—contested to some extent—about how those measures affecting local authorities will address persistent issues of inequality. We recognise that sometimes that is about legislation, but sometimes it is about Government action.
Mention has been made of food banks, which were rolled out under the last Labour Government as a means of addressing persistent issues of poverty. I remember them being opened during my time as a local authority councillor, and Gordon Brown visiting and saying, “This is an example of how we expect local authorities to address some of these persistent issues.” Local authorities already have these duties at both the strategic and the micro level. I question whether it is necessary to add an amendment that, in essence, reflects existing duties throughout all the different tiers of local government in England.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I shall start by setting out the purpose of clause 2, then turn to amendment 261. The clause provides some broad thematic policy areas under which functions and powers of strategic authorities are arranged in the Bill. Defining those areas on the face of the Bill will bring clarity and purpose to the role of strategic authorities, which all parties agree we need to do. We want to empower mayors, who know who their areas best, to respond to local needs, so they can be the ones driving change and improvements in economic prospects and living standards and poverty. These thematic policy areas are deliberately broad, to allow for a wide range of activities.
I have a lot of sympathy with the intention behind amendment 261. Alleviation of poverty and tackling socioeconomic inequality should be a core part of what we do and a core metric of economic success. However, as the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner set out, those duties are already baked into the very function and purpose of local authorities and, critically, they cut across all the thematic areas that we have set out.
Siân Berry
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Single foundation strategic authorities
Vikki Slade (Mid Dorset and North Poole) (LD)
I beg to move amendment 4, in clause 3, page 2, line 27, leave out subsections (1) to (3) and insert—
“(1) A unitary district council or a county council may submit a proposal to the Secretary of State for designation as a single foundation strategic authority.
(2) A proposal under subsection (1) must be prepared in such form and contain such information as the Secretary of State may by regulations prescribe.
(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations designate a unitary district council as a single foundation strategic authority if—
(a) a proposal has been submitted in accordance with subsection (1), and
(b) the Secretary of State is satisfied that the designation is appropriate having regard to the need to secure effective and convenient local government in relation to the areas of competence.”
This amendment would restrict the Secretary of State's power to designate a single foundation Strategic Authority. Instead, a local authority would initiate the request by submitting a proposal to the Secretary of State.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 28, in schedule 1, page 87, leave out lines 1 to 29.
This amendment would remove the Bill’s provision for the Secretary of State to have powers to prepare a proposal for there to be a mayor for the area of an existing combined authority.
Amendment 29, in schedule 1, page 95, leave out paragraph 33 and 34.
This amendment would remove the Bill’s provision for the Secretary of State to have powers to prepare a proposal for the establishment of a CCA without a public consultation.
Vikki Slade
Amendments 4, 28 and 29 seek to ensure that this is a genuinely community-led devolution—I am sure that we will repeat that many times throughout the morning. Fundamentally, the Bill seeks to move decision making closer to home, which we welcome. However, closer to home needs to start at home, and we want it to be councils that take the initiative to establish a single foundation authority, not the Secretary of State. We also believe that the public should play a role, and therefore this process should involve consultation, which we believe these amendments will provide.
This is a really important issue for us; we think it is fundamental to the whole concept of devolution. As a result, my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon will speak to these amendments in more detail, and we will push amendment 4 to a vote.
David Simmonds
We know there will be quite a degree of debate on this in due course. We sympathise with the objectives of the amendment, and we all share the concern that local people should be the ones who initiate change in the structures that govern their local areas, not the Secretary of State or the man in Whitehall who knows best. Therefore we have sympathy with the objective, and we shall return to that debate later on with some of the amendments around the structures.
Manuela Perteghella (Stratford-on-Avon) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. Amendments 4, 28 and 29 would make English devolution genuinely local by ensuring that local consent and public consultation come first. Amendment 4 would change clause 3 so that local authorities must apply to the Secretary of State themselves to become a single foundation strategic authority, rather than Whitehall imposing devolution on local councils. Amendments 28 and 29 would remove the parts of schedule 1 that would allow the Secretary of State to prepare a proposal for there to be a mayor in an existing combined authority area, and for the establishment of a combined county authority, without public consultation.
One of the greatest criticisms of the Bill is that it proposes a top-down, Whitehall-led devolution, which is not really devolution at all. In my county of Warwickshire, the choice of which strategic authority we create, form or join must come from local elected representatives who are closer to their communities and understand better the needs of our constituents. Such an important shaping of future governance must have grassroots support and should not end up being imposed by central Government, especially if we want to decentralise powers to tackle socioeconomic inequalities, address regional disparities and promote real autonomy.
Without the amendment, local people will lose the right to decide their own governance arrangements. Whitehall will be able to impose devolved powers, force mayoral models on to areas that have not asked for them, and redraw local governance boundaries behind closed doors. Community involvement and local consent are essential to ensure transparency and accountability in devolution decision making.
Amendment 4 reaches the heart of the issue at hand. It would ensure that devolution is locally led, not imposed. It would ensure that a council that wishes to become a single foundation strategic authority must initiate the process itself, rather than wait for the Secretary of State to decree it. If devolution is to have legitimacy, it must be built on local consent, local ambition and local accountability. Without that, we risk the Bill becoming an exercise in central control and a top-down approach dressed up as devolution. We would like to push amendment 4 to a vote.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
Both the policy intent and the practice with places going through the devolution process are locally led. The impetus is coming from local leaders and local authorities that are working with their communities to drive the process.
On amendment 4, the Government have been clear that we will consider non-mayoral devolution arrangements for single local authorities on an exceptional basis where certain criteria are met. Designation is not intended as the end point; it is a stepping stone towards deeper devolution, which is what we hope will be the journey for all parts of the country. It is therefore most appropriate for the process to be initiated by the Secretary of State rather than the local authority. However, to be clear, the Secretary of State will not be able to designate a council as a foundation strategic authority unless the council itself consents to that designation. That is a robust safeguard that will protect the interests of the single local authority concerned. I agree with the sentiment behind the amendment to ensure that the Secretary of State has regard to the need to secure effective and convenient local government. I am pleased that those criteria are already embedded in the Bill when conferring functions on a single foundation strategic authority.
Amendment 28 seeks to remove the Secretary of State’s proposed power to direct for there to be a mayor for an existing combined authority without local consent. The Government have been clear about the benefits of mayoral devolution; we are seeing it across the country. For example, South Yorkshire mayoral combined authority brought the Supertram network back into public control after 27 years, and there are already drops in fare evasion, increases in usage, ticketing apps and improved clearing. Greater Manchester authority has taken control of its bus service, resulting in increased punctuality and ridership and cheaper fares. The North East combined authority has secured a £450 million development for one of the largest film studios in Europe, with the potential to create over 8,000 jobs.
We know the impact of this devolution model. We are seeing it across the country and we want to see it in more areas. We are clear that mayors with skin in the game are best placed to drive forward growth, reform public services and deliver the change that their communities want. Every resident in England should be able to benefit from deeper mayoral devolution in their area.
David Simmonds
There is, perhaps, a risk of the Committee being inadvertently misled, in that all these points are being described as locally led. The Committee needs to be clear: local authorities were told that they needed to submit the proposals or the Government would take powers to direct them to do it. It was a gun to their heads. It was not the case that local authorities came forward proactively. During the 14-year era under the previous Government, it was clear that proposals that did come forward for reorganisation would be entertained by Government, and a number of those were taken forward, but compulsion was not the case. It is only since the Government told local authorities that they either had to come forward or would be directed to do so that we have seen the proposals, so it is not the case that they are locally led. The Committee needs to be clear on that.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I completely disagree. I have been having conversations, for example, with our strategic combined authorities that are going through the process. The difference between this Government and the last is that we have created a clear sense of the powers and the economic opportunities that areas can take forward. Take, for example, our current devolution priority area. I am the new Minister, and I am having the first set of conversations with them. Every single one is excited and enthusiastic about the prospect. At the moment, the demand for devolution deals is outstripping our ability to respond, because we have attached to them clear powers, access to funding and the ability to drive the change that we want to see in those areas. So I completely reject the premise that places are being driven to do this.
Paul Holmes (Hamble Valley) (Con)
There is a risk here that we are conflating what is actually happening on the ground. The Minister is absolutely right, and no one can argue that this Government have not been clear about the structures that they want to put forward. However, to say that there is a demand from local authorities requesting devolution is stretching it a bit, because it is quite clear out there—particularly in my area, in Hampshire and the Solent—that this Government have said to them, “You have to do this; otherwise we are going to force it on you.” That is not locally led, is it?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I spoke to the leaders of Hampshire and the Solent just last week, and they were unanimously enthusiastic about what was being proposed, because they could see the opportunity. I am pleased that it is being voted on, and ultimately it is for places to come forward. What we have said to them is, “If you go through this journey, there are powers that you can draw down that will allow you to drive change in your areas.” The strategic authorities, combined authorities and constituent authorities can see the economic prospect. They see what is happening in Greater Manchester, the Liverpool city region and the west midlands, and they want that for their residents. That is absolutely right, and what we are doing is enabling and supporting that.
Let me talk about the backstop power provided here. We do not expect to use it, which is why it does not come into force at Royal Assent; it is there if we need to draw on it. The only reason it is there—because we think the demand and the momentum created by devolution will do the job for us—is in the instance where there are blockages. That means when constituent authorities that want to move forward are being resisted by a particular authority, we give ourselves the ability to intervene. The reason we are doing that is because we do not want any residents to be left out. We do not want areas to be devolution deserts, not being able to benefit from the economic opportunities and prospects provided.
Vikki Slade
The reality is that the only reason they are queuing at the Minister’s door to access devolution is that they are being denied access to funding if they do not. Let me give the example of Wessex: Somerset, Dorset and Wiltshire have all been unitarised over the past 10 years. They should have been in the ideal position, but they were overlooked for the first wave of devolution. They were apparently not ready, and I accept that fact, but they have missed out this financial year on more than £300 million—£159.29 for every single household in that area—compared with other areas. They have no real choice but to devolve to a single authority, because why would their residents think it is acceptable for them to miss out on £300 million? So it is not fair, or it is disingenuous, to suggest that this is not compulsion. The other point I want to make—
Miatta Fahnbulleh
It is absolutely right that we say that, in order to drive economic success in particular areas, there are powers that relate to economic drivers and levers that we want, and there is an investment fund that can be deployed at that functional level. I will not resile from that; it is absolutely the right thing to do. We are clear with places that we think a strategic authority operating at a functional geography is the way to unlock their economic potential, and we are building powers alongside that. Places that want to take it up absolutely can. At the moment they are queuing up to do so, and I am incredibly happy about that.
I am very disappointed in the hon. Member for Hamble Valley for not getting on in support of his area, which is enthusiastic for this and moving forward. Ultimately, there is momentum around devolution because the benefits of it are being seen already. It is not theoretical; it is not on paper. We are seeing it in our areas, and I want it for every part of the country, not just the ones that have gone through the journey.
Paul Holmes
The Minister should be very careful about attributing motives to myself that are not there. I am very supportive of the fact that Hampshire and the Solent and will have a mayor. Hopefully, it will be a Conservative mayor, as that will drive the economy going forward. I want to press the point that we can see how divisive this is in the fact that three different versions of local government reform are being proposed. Hampshire and the Isle of Wight were told, in this Government policy, that if they did not go ahead and embrace devolution, it would be forced on them in a way they may not like. That is not locally led; it is compulsion, is it not?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I will not press this point. All I can say is that I sat down with the leaders last week as a new Minister—the newbie—and I asked them how it was going. They told me, “we are enthusiastic and there is momentum around this because we can see the value that it will provide for our communities, so we are driving forward. What we need is for Government to get out of the way and for the Government to support and enable us.” I take that as a ringing endorsement of what we are trying to do. I can only go by the conversations I have had with local leaders. At the moment, I am seeing momentum and support for this, and rightly so because we are seeing the impacts of this on the ground and the Bill will extend that across the country.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Vikki Slade
I beg to move amendment 30, in clause 3, page 2, line 32, at end insert—
“(3A) Before making a designation under this section, the Secretary of State must consult town and parish councils within the area of the proposed single foundation strategic authority.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult town and parish councils prior to the unitary district council or county council within which they are situated being designated as a single foundation strategic authority.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 266, in schedule 1, page 79, line 15, leave out subparagraph (b).
This amendment, and Amendments 267 to 273, remove the ability of the Secretary of State to create, or make certain changes to the governance or composition of, combined authorities without consent of the councils involved.
Amendment 267, in schedule 1, page 79, line 33, leave out subparagraph (b).
See explanatory statement for Amendment 266.
Amendment 268, in schedule 1, page 80, line 18, leave out “subsections (3) to (5)” and insert “subsection (3)”.
See explanatory statement for Amendment 266.
Amendment 269, in schedule 1, page 80, line 20, leave out paragraph 6.
See explanatory statement for Amendment 266.
Amendment 270, in schedule 1, page 80, line 21, leave out paragraph 7.
See explanatory statement for Amendment 266.
Amendment 271, in schedule 1, page 82, line 11, leave out paragraph 14.
See explanatory statement for Amendment 266.
Amendment 31, in schedule 1, page 83, line 3, at end insert—
“(6A) The Secretary of State must consult town and parish councils within the proposed new combined authority area.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult town and parish councils prior to proposing a new combined authority in the area in which they are situated.
Amendment 272, in schedule 1, page 85, line 31, leave out paragraph 17
See explanatory statement for Amendment 266.
Amendment 27, in schedule 1, page 85, line 37, at end insert—
“(2A) The Secretary of State has obtained consent for the proposal from any affected local government area.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to obtain consent from all affected areas in preparing a proposal to add a local government area to an existing area of a combined county authority.
Amendment 32, in schedule 1, page 86, line 20, after “to” insert “and thereafter consult with”.
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult with any of the relevant councils and persons given notice that an area is being proposed to be added to an existing combined authority.
Amendment 33, in schedule 1, page 86, line 27, at end insert—
“(da) any town and parish councils whose area would be added to the area of the combined authority, and.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult local councils prior to proposing the area in which they are situated is added to an existing combined authority.
Amendment 273, in schedule 1, page 87, line 30, leave out paragraph 18.
See explanatory statement for Amendment 266.
Amendment 274, in schedule 1, page 92, line 12, leave out subparagraph (b).
This amendment, and Amendments 275 to 280, remove the ability of the Secretary of State to create, or make certain changes to the governance or composition of, combined county authorities without the consent of the councils involved.
Amendment 275, in schedule 1, page 92, line 35, leave out subparagraph (b).
See explanatory statement for Amendment 274.
Amendment 276, in schedule 1, page 93, line 40, leave out paragraph 29.
See explanatory statement for Amendment 274.
Amendment 277, in schedule 1, page 94, line 1, leave out paragraph 30.
See explanatory statement for Amendment 274.
Amendment 278, in schedule 1, page 95, line 23, leave out paragraph 34.
See explanatory statement for Amendment 274.
Amendment 279, in schedule 1, page 99, line 5, leave out paragraph 37.
See explanatory statement for Amendment 274.
Amendment 280, in schedule 1, page 101, line 1, leave out paragraph 38.
See explanatory statement for Amendment 274.
New clause 23—Consent for local government restructuring—
(1) The Secretary of State may only make an order or regulations to create, change, or dissolve a strategic authority with the consent of all the constituent councils.
(2) The “constituent councils” are any county council, district council, town council or parish council.”
Vikki Slade
We rehearsed the conversation about the level of consultation, but this is really about the role of town and parish councils. We have seen, since the devolution announcements were made, areas around the country rush to form town and parish councils where they do not already exist, and to protect services through town and parish councils where they already do.
However, we have heard that town and parish councillors have been completely ignored throughout the entire process. There has been no formal consultation with them and they have barely been mentioned. In fact, in the whole of the Bill, the title “parish councillor” is mentioned just four times, and in relation only to community assets. They are the true local councils; they are the people who know what is going on in their communities. The suggestion that there is no formal role for them to play in something as important as the creation of a huge council that will move things further away from them is hugely problematic.
We had local reorganisation in the Dorset area back in 2019. I have visited a number of the parish councils, and they have said to me that, since they lost their district council, the unitary council that they now have to work with is distant; things do not get done. In some of the areas being proposed, the new unitary authorities might be 50 or 60 miles away—they are going to be dealing with half a million people. Their main role is going to be in those really statutory, strategic functions. Yet our town and parish councils will be the ones that have to pick up the pieces, so their voices have to be heard. Of course, they will not be the ones making the decision—we know that—but they are simply invisible. We feel strongly that they should be part of that conversation; they should be consultees in this. Things should not be able to happen without their voices being heard.
Paul Holmes
I have great sympathy with the point that the hon. Lady is making. Would she agree that town and parish councils are already being asked to take on more services? We are seeing potential districts being abolished, handing down—or essentially getting rid of—assets to town and parish councils. Meanwhile, the town and parish councils are not being consulted on the wider reorganisation going forward. I wholeheartedly endorse the hon. Lady’s view that parish and town councils need to be consulted. Could she elaborate on why she thinks the Government are so reluctant to do so?
Vikki Slade
I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. I am not in the mind of the Government; I cannot understand why they would not want to embrace the incredible hard work of these volunteers in our communities who are already doing so much. But we are seeing, in every community, services handed down or at risk of closure, which are then only saved by the incredible work of the parish councils. It just strikes me as odd that we would not embrace the role of those parish councils.
Mike Reader (Northampton South) (Lab)
I would just point out—I will say this multiple times in this Bill Committee—that, as someone in an area that has become unitary, no one is ever saying, “We want more district, borough and county councils, rather than fewer.” We have to be careful not to suggest that there will be less engagement with the council because we are going to unitaries.
Could the hon. Lady set out what legal change to parish councils she is concerned about? What powers are they losing? I cannot see any change in a parish councils’ powers under the Bill.
Vikki Slade
No power is being lost, because parish councils have few powers in the first place. What we are suggesting—what we feel should be at the heart of devolution—is about consent: actually consulting those local organisations that have a role. They are tax-raising and grant-giving organisations. They are, in reality, taking on a lot of those services yet their voice is silent. We are not asking for their powers to be changed; we are asking for their voices to be heard. That is all that the amendment requires.
Andrew Cooper (Mid Cheshire) (Lab)
I was a town councillor for a good decade and a half before I became an MP. We went through unitarisation in Cheshire in 2008, so I recognise a lot of what the hon. Lady is saying about town and parish councils being asked to take on more services—I saw it under the last Conservative Government as funding was taken away from Cheshire West and Chester council.
The reason why I am mystified is that my experience of town and parish councils is that they are not shy about expressing themselves. I am not sure what the hon. Lady is looking to achieve with the amendment, because town and parish councils are perfectly free to express their view in the consultations that already happen when these authorities are set up. Is she suggesting that town and parish councils should have a veto? From the way her amendment is worded, that seems like an entirely different proposition. Could she clarify that?
Vikki Slade
Nobody is suggesting a veto; we are suggesting a voice. There is a big difference. We have already heard that district councils felt that they were pushed around by the county councils, and the experiences of town and parish councils are simply an acceleration of that; when these proposals were being put forward by the Minister earlier this year, there was absolutely no role for those councils. We are simply saying that there are layers of local accountability that we believe should be on the list of people who are consulted.
This is a simple amendment that says, “You are already consulting other organisations in the chain of command. You should also include the town parish councils in that chain.” That is why we believe that amendment 33 is critical, as it
“would require the Secretary of State to consult local councils prior to proposing the area in which they are situated is added to an existing combined authority”,
and why we will push it to a vote.
David Simmonds
I shall speak to the amendments standing in my name. There is a degree of overlap between the points made so far and the subject matter of my amendments: all of them revolve around the issue of localism and consent. As has been clearly expressed, I have a degree of sympathy for the points that have just been made, particularly those about the role of parish and district councils in agreeing to and steering this devolution process.
When we had our witness session just a few weeks ago, we heard from Councillor Sam Chapman-Allen of the District Councils’ Network and from Justin Griggs, the head of policy and communications at the National Association of Local Councils, which represents the parish councils and parish meetings of England. Both of them emphasised in their evidence the need for and the importance of that local voice. I reflect on legislation passed recently—particularly the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, which strengthened the powers that our communities sought for local authorities to deal with unauthorised encampments. One of the things we missed was the opportunity to enable parish councils and parish meetings to use those powers. That is a really concrete example of where our constituents would have benefited.
We know there are both sins of omission and sins of commission. I suspect it is a sin of omission that the Government have failed to use the opportunity of this legislation to complete the devolution work that they talk about, and to ask, “What role will those elected bodies at the town and parish level be able to play in the context of this new devolved world?” It speaks to something that I know the Opposition have real concern about: a form of institutionalised disrespect for local leaders that is built into this process. There is wholesale abolition of the local voice at scale, and proposals that the Secretary of State will direct, rather than consent.
Sir John, you will perhaps call to mind Lord Porter, formerly Gary Porter of South Holland, as one of those many local leaders whose approach and insight really shaped the nature of that local community. Reflecting on my time in local government, I had the opportunity to serve with people with very senior public and private sector leadership experience who steered the strategy of the local authority to deliver for local residents. To be told that the Government’s view is that they are to be mere community convenors, and they are not to have a role in that strategic leadership, is frankly insulting to the work that so many of our local leaders do.
The value of that was spelled out very clearly in our evidence session. I was particularly struck by Councillor Bev Craig, the Labour group lead and LGA vice-chair at the Local Government Association, who talked about how the Greater Manchester model worked because of that local leadership and the power of those individuals to come to the table and drive forward devolution, efficiency and service quality.
The amendments broadly fall into two categories that I have made today. The bulk of them are entirely about removing the ability of the Secretary of State to dictate to local areas—as was threatened by the Government when this devolution process started—what that devolution arrangement would look like, without the consent of those local areas. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hamble Valley has spelled out, of the many proposals that have come forward, we have not seen a single one embracing what the Government have set out, but a number of rival proposals for that reorganisation.
It is very clear that there is not any significant degree of local consent. There is a threat, and there is some money on the table to bail local authorities out, but they can have it only if they do what the Government want. If local authorities do not do it now, the Government will take powers to make them do it to their own agenda later on. That is the very opposite of localism. When we put the Localism Act 2011 through Parliament, it was broadly supported by all local leaders and Members of Parliament, and that was because we recognised the value it added at all levels. This process, however—the centralising element of the Bill—says that it will be a man or woman in Whitehall who decides: they will tell us what is in the interest of our community.
Sean Woodcock (Banbury) (Lab)
The hon. Member is talking about localism and the importance of things being done with communities, not to them. I was a Cherwell district councillor when we were involved in joint working with South Northamptonshire. I remember clearly that the leaders of South Northants district council were distinctly unimpressed by the level of consent that they were given when the Conservative Government told them that Northamptonshire county council, which the Conservatives bankrupted, was being disbanded and that joint unitary authorities were to be created in Northamptonshire. Was he so exercised about local consent at that point?
David Simmonds
The short answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question is yes. I have spent a good deal of my time in local government. One of the key issues that we learned from the process, and one of the reasons why former Secretary of State Eric Pickles said that he had a pearl-handled revolver in his desk—for anyone who came to him to suggest forcing local government reorganisation on England—was the need to get things right with local consent.
There are times, which I think we can all see in the local government landscape at the moment, when, because of geography or failure of leadership, we know it is necessary for Government to intervene, and Governments of all parties have done so. Northamptonshire was an example of such a place. Individual local authorities within it had not failed, but there had been a collective failure of the public service in that area. The Government therefore felt compelled to intervene to remedy that, as opposed to imposing an alternative vision for how they thought the local area should be governed.
New clause 23 stands in my name. It seeks to enshrine in the legislation the principle of consent. We have the very opposite of what we have been told as a Committee, that this is all locally led. Clearly, the Government are already using the levers in their power to compel local authorities down a certain route. Under the force of such compulsion, local authorities feel that that is what they have to do, because it is the only way to address some of their reasonable and justifiable concerns. The timetable, the process and all those things come at the same time as a wholesale reorganisation of planning and infrastructure, which is stripping away the local powers and voices that are so critical to ensuring that the infrastructure and new housing that we all want are delivered.
The view of the Opposition, therefore, is that we need to enshrine in this legislation not powers for Whitehall but powers for people—powers for people to shape through their local leaders the community structures of service that deliver for them and the taxes that they pay. People are represented to exercise such powers. Enshrining the consent of local authorities is a small step in that direction.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I will respond to amendments 30, 31 and 33 first, and then amendments to 266 to 280. I appreciate the intention of the Liberal Democrat amendments, and I reiterate that I think we are completely aligned in this Committee in our desire not just to push power down, but do so in a locally driven way. On the specifics of the lead amendment, the principal body affected by the designation that we are seeking will be the unitary council or the county council. The Bill already provides that no designation can be made without the consent of the relevant councils.
On amendment 31, the Secretary of State must already notify the proposed constituent councils, and any other persons that the Secretary of State considers appropriate, about a proposal to direct the establishment of a combined authority. The Secretary of State must consider the representations of that body. As my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Cheshire said, there is no shortage of representation and voice from individual town and parish councils. We think that the process of engagement is already there and that to impose additional requirements to consult every town and parish council in the proposed areas would be disproportionate and also risks conflating the distinct roles of town and parish councils, which, as I said at the evidence stage, we absolutely see having a role to play in the new architecture of strategic authorities.
Strategic authorities have been created to tackle regional issues and to capitalise on the opportunities that exist over a significant economic geography, such as pursuing, for example, integrated transport. Town and parish councils, meanwhile, will continue to represent their local communities, managing neighbourhood services and supporting initiatives that improve the day-to-day lives of their residents. Each tier of local government will be accountable to their local communities and should continue to represent their interests and to work in alignment.
Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)
When areas go through this process—and they are being made to go through it—will the Minister consider making it easier for areas that are unparished to create town and parish councils? Otherwise she will create large unitary authorities and some areas will have town and parish councils and others will not. Will she make it easier to set up town and parish councils where there are not any?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
We will discuss neighbourhood governance and neighbourhood boards later in the Bill. When it comes to areas that do not have town and parish councils, we recognise there is an opportunity for us to create structures so that there is stronger community representation and a stronger community voice. There is an opportunity for us to design something that works in areas where town and parish councils do not exist or may not be appropriate. We want to create flexibility so that local areas can find the right structures for them, so that neighbourhoods and communities have the voice and representation that we want to see across the country.
I turn to amendments 266 to 280. As I have said before, we have been accused of compulsion, and all I can do as a new Minister is point to the feedback that I get from the local areas that we speak to. Our engagement to date suggests there is genuine enthusiasm and momentum, because areas can see the economic opportunity and what a strong Mayor can do for their area. The Government have been clear in our aims: we want to get universal coverage of strategic authorities across England, because we can see the benefits that places like Greater Manchester and Liverpool are experiencing. We want that for every single resident across the area.
David Simmonds
During the evidence sessions, we heard senior local government leaders describe “inconsistent and…unhelpful messaging” on the building blocks of the new authorities—I quote what I wrote down. When we heard from those who are intended to be part of the investment agenda, they described no “meaningful consultation” from the Government on the proposals. How does the Minister square that with the idea that this is strategic and locally led?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
That is not the feedback that I heard in that evidence session. At the moment the places in our devolution priority areas are going through a process of consultation. They are talking to their constituent councils, voting it through the council chamber and taking it to their residents to make the case.
What we are seeing is positivity and momentum. Our job as a Government is to build on that and support and enable that. I come back to the point that there is a backstop power that we do not expect to use. But in the instances where we have got a blockage, we want to be able to help create a strategic authority so that we do not have devolution deserts and parts of the country left behind. We are very clear that the powers will commence only at the point that they are needed, rather than on Royal Assent.
Finally, new clause 23 would impose disproportionate consent requirements for these processes, requiring strategic authorities to seek the consent of all district, parish and town councils in their area. As I have said, there are already provisions in place to ensure a level of consultation. A primary aim for us in this Bill is to make the process simpler, more streamlined, more effective and less expensive. That is the feedback that we have had from places that have gone through the process and the feedback that we are getting from places going through the process.
My worry is that the proposed amendments would undermine the principle of having a process of devolution that is far more streamlined and far easier for places. Again, the feedback we are getting from conversations is that there is enthusiasm, appetite and commitment to do this. We want to make it as easy as possible for places, which is why I hope that hon. Members will not press the amendments.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Vikki Slade
I beg to move amendment 38, in clause 3, page 2, line 32, at end insert—
“(3A) The Secretary of State must make provision to ensure councils designated as a single foundation strategic authority receives adequate funding to facilitate their transition.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to ensure that councils designated as a single foundation strategic authority receive funding to facilitate their transition.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 39, in schedule 1, page 84, line 13, at end insert—
“(9A) The Secretary of State must make provision to ensure the combined authority receives adequate funding to facilitate its establishment.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to ensure that combined authorities receive adequate funding to facilitate their establishment.
Amendment 361, in clause 19, page 22, line 32, at end insert—
“(f) funding which has been allocated to support the establishment of new strategic authorities.”
This amendment would require the annual report on devolution to include an account of funding provided to support the establishment of new strategic authorities.
Vikki Slade
Our councils are struggling to make ends meet. With so many on the edge of a precipice, I can see why they would be queuing up to create a strategic authority, which come with millions of pounds. There is, however, huge concern in councils that the cost to set up and run these organisations is oblique, and that there is a risk that the cost of running them will be passed to local people through additional precepting. I can tell the Committee from experience that the tens of millions of pounds that it is said will be saved by creating strategic authorities generally are not saved, and that if they are saved, they are replaced with other costs and take 10 years to materialise. Many councils do not have 10 years before they will go bust.
I am acutely aware that some funding was put aside for those organisations in the devolution priority phase, but when I asked the previous Minister what was happening with funding for future phases, I was met by stony silence. He explained to me that in order to progress there would need to be money in the settlement, but at the same time he talked about having already made a three-year settlement. That suggested to me that those organisations that are not already funded perhaps will not be funded within a three-year period, because there is no money. Given that those organisations are already telling us that they are £300 million short this year because they are not in the programme, but the Minister has no money set aside for next year to continue the programme, where is the money coming from?
Our amendments 38, 39 and 361 would require the Secretary of State to ensure that authorities receive adequate funding at least to facilitate their establishment, if not their continuation. It is crucial that local leaders—and local people, when they vote to make this progress—do not tie themselves down to additional costs that they cannot afford. That is why we feel it is important to press amendment 39 to a vote. My hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon will elaborate further.
David Simmonds
I had the privilege of spending 24 years in local government, divided equally across the previous Labour, Conservative and coalition Governments. I do not think that local government felt at any point in those 24 years that it was well funded and there was plenty of money to go around. In every single one of those years, irrespective of who was in government, our starting point when setting council tax was, “How are we going to meet a very substantial savings target?”
Manuela Perteghella
It is pointless to establish a strategic authority without appropriate financial support. Without support to build structurally, hire staff, co-ordinate partners and begin delivering on their devolved powers, new combined and strategic authorities risk becoming bodies with responsibilities but no real capacity to act. As the Minister will know, local authorities have been starved of funding by consecutive Governments. We need to ensure that these new unitaries—these new beginnings—have the best start in life, and that begins with fair funding so that devolution can be effective.
Amendment 39 is complemented by amendment 361, which would require the Government’s annual devolution report to include details of funding given to support new strategic authorities. Each year, when the Government report to Parliament on devolution, they would be required to explain how and why money has been spent to help to establish new devolved authorities.
As it stands, the Bill risks becoming a Trojan horse for centralisation, concentrating power in Whitehall rather than genuinely devolving it to local communities as promised. Amendment 361 would support true, locally led devolution by ensuring financial transparency and holding Ministers accountable for supporting local government reform. That is why we intend to divide the Committee on amendment 39, which is essential to ensure that new combined authorities and new strategic unitaries can operate effectively from the outset and deliver the powers and services they are intended to provide. Without adequate funding, the whole exercise of devolving powers and establishing new authorities will be meaningless.
For too long, my constituents, like so many across the country, have faced the consequences of under-resourced local authorities, with promises to their families and communities left unfulfilled. Our amendments would provide the vital financial support that this new era of local government requires, enabling us to deliver on the ambitions of devolution and achieve real, tangible results.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I thank the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner for highlighting the deep cuts that were imposed on local authorities during a decade and a half of Conservative government, which fundamentally weakened our civic infrastructure. We should never forget that. We absolutely appreciate that, as a result, local government is operating in a difficult context. I welcome the intent behind the amendments: it will be important for strategic authorities to ensure that they have the capacity funding so that they are established.
Amendment 38 concerns single foundation authorities. We do not anticipate that there will be transition costs for such authorities. When a unitary or county council is designated as a single foundation strategic authority, it will retain its existing voting and governance arrangements. The designation will sit alongside its status as a local authority. In other words, there will be no transition involved, so transitional funding is unnecessary.
We recognise that the mayoral strategic authorities that we are creating will need funding to support the transition and build capacity. All Members across the House want to see strong, capable authorities in their area, with the tools and capacity to deliver for their local communities. That is why in the English devolution White Paper we committed to provide new strategic authorities with capacity funding to kick-start their organisation. I am pleased to confirm that all areas on our devolution priority programme will receive £1 million in mayoral capacity funding this year to help establish new institutions, once the legislation has been laid before Parliament. They will also receive capacity funding in future years, so that they are ready and prepared to deliver the benefits that we believe devolution will unlock. As the Government are committed to providing funding for establishment expenses through the mechanism of mayoral capacity funding, we do not believe that amendment 39 is necessary, but we recognise the intent behind it, which is why are we are taking action.
Amendment 361 would require the Government to report on funding allocated to support the establishment of new strategic authorities. I am pleased to say that that is already established practice. Clause 19 amends the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016 to ensure that all funding devolved to strategic authorities is reported. That will include any funds to support their establishment. Again, therefore, we agree with the intent behind the amendment but we do not believe that it is required.
Vikki Slade
Will funding be made available for areas that are not yet in a programme on the same footing as the areas that are already in one? It would be completely inappropriate if that funding was not committed to. I want to get that on record.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
We have established a principle that there should be mayoral capacity funding. We have established a principle that for places that are going through the transition, to ensure that any mayor that is created is able to hit the ground running, capacity building needs to be a core part of that. That applies to the places that are going through the devolution priority programme at the moment, but the same principle invariably will apply across the piece.
Vikki Slade
We were seeking to divide only on amendment 39, but given that we have had that assurance, I am happy not to do so. I beg to ask to leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4
Combined authorities and CCAs: establishment, expansion and functions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
Clause 4 introduces schedule 1, which will streamline and simplify existing processes for establishing new combined authorities and combined county authorities, and for changing the arrangements of existing authorities. The Government have been clear that their goal is to achieve universal coverage of strategic authorities. We are therefore confident that clear and tangible benefits of devolution will be experienced across the country. We have also been clear that we want to create mechanisms that will ensure that the process is streamlined—that it is fast, and effective and efficient locally—and allows representation, but fundamentally allow us to move through the process that we see appetite and demand for across the country.
The powers introduced by the clause will be used as a backstop. They will be deployed only where we have devolution deserts and we want to work with areas to remove blockages, to the benefit of residents.
David Simmonds
We return to the theme that areas can have devolution provided it is in the form that Whitehall dictates. It remains a significant concern to the Opposition that we are proceeding in this manner, but that point is made and I suggest that we move on.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1
Establishment, expansion and functions of combined authorities and CCAs
Amendment proposed: 266, in schedule 1, page 79, line 15, leave out subparagraph (b).—(David Simmonds.)
This amendment, and Amendments 267 to 273, remove the ability of the Secretary of State to create, or make certain changes to the governance or composition of, combined authorities without consent of the councils involved.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I beg to move amendment 62, in schedule 1, page 80, line 19, at end insert—
“5A After section 105B insert—
‘105C Non-mayoral combined authority: consent to budget
(1) A non-mayoral combined authority may only exercise the following functions with the consent of each constituent council—
(a) adopt or amend the authority’s budget;
(b) where it is not part of the budget, approve the total sum of the transport levy.
(2) In this section a reference to the “transport levy” is a reference to any levy issued by the combined authority relating to the exercise of its functions relating to transport in accordance with any regulations made from time to time under section 74(2) of the Local Government Finance Act 1988.”’
This requires that a non-mayoral combined authority must have consent from its constituent councils to the approval and amendment of the budget and to the approval of the transport levy (if separate).
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I will begin by talking to Government amendments 63 and 65. The Government recognise that the creation of a combined authority or combined county authority can cause some concern in prospective constituent councils. One of the main worries is that the new institution could create new financial burdens on existing councils.
Many existing combined authorities and combined county authorities already include provisions in their constitutions that enable constituent councils to veto decisions that could create a financial liability on them. We recognise that those provisions have helped to soothe concerns about establishing new combined authorities and combined county authorities. That is why the amendments will create a standardised requirement for non-mayoral combined authorities and non-mayoral combined county authorities to obtain the consent of affected constituent councils before exercising their functions in a way that could create a financial liability on these councils. That will ensure that any future non-mayoral combined authorities or non-mayoral combined county authorities will need to comply with this requirement without the constituent councils needing to secure agreement to its inclusion in the individual authority’s constitution.
I turn to Government amendments 62 and 64. In the English devolution White Paper, the Government set out that in combined authorities and combined county authorities without a mayor, most decisions would require a simple majority vote. That is provided for in clause 6. However, in the White Paper, we also said that key strategic decisions would require unanimity in non-mayoral authorities. The budget for the authority is one of those decisions.
Similarly to amendments 63 and 65, amendments 62 and 64 introduce a standardised requirement for non-mayoral combined authorities and non-mayoral combined county authorities to obtain the consent of all their constituent councils when adopting or amending their budget. That includes the direct contribution of those councils to transport expenditure.
Government amendments 66 and 67 are minor, technical amendments. They amend the terminology used in schedule 1 so that references to secondary legislation within the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 use the term “regulations” rather than “orders”.
David Simmonds
I have a couple of questions for the Minister. It feels as though these amendments are intended to bring some welcome consistency and clarity.
The Committee will know that local government finance is largely regulated by the Local Government Finance Act 1992, but that older legislation on council tax fixing and budget setting all essentially states that a local authority’s budget must balance in-year. A local authority is not the same as central Government—it cannot borrow to fund its day-to-day expenditure.
However, one implication of the Secretary of State’s allocation of all these new powers to mayors or combined authorities is that they may choose to incur expenditure that imposes a liability on an individual local authority without seeking that authority’s consent. For example, there would be a legislative conflict if the mayoral combined authority decided to increase spending, or to increase rights to services for social care, which a local authority has to pay for, without giving the local authority the opportunity to include that in its budget.
Will the Minister give us clarity, first, on accounting standards? The legislation mentions that local authorities should refer to guidance from the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy. CIPFA is not the only accepted accounting standard in the public sector, although it is generally a reliable one. Given our previous discussions and the evidence we have heard about access to local audit and financial advice, can the Minister confirm that accounting standards other than CIPFA will be accepted, if a local authority relies on them? Or will they have to be reframed within CIPFA? That will let the Committee and member authorities know exactly where they stand.
Secondly, while this is a fairly catch-all provision, there will be areas—we have seen this in Greater Manchester most recently—where central Government fund the investment and set-up of a new transport network but the ongoing running costs must be met by trading that service to local residents, and a large deficit emerges; essentially, the service runs at a significant loss. Especially if the underlying authority is a transport authority that issues freedom passes, that can have a significant financial impact. Essentially, council tax payers of one authority subsidise the costs of service delivery by a mayor.
We see significant elements of that in London under Mayor Khan. I think that was one reason why the Labour leader of Manchester city council spoke about how Manchester works and London does not. It would be helpful to have clarity—if necessary, in writing to the Committee—about how those trade-offs will be managed effectively, so that the capital costs of mayoral projects are not subsidised by the revenue or capital budgets of individual local authorities. Particularly with larger projects, mayoral authorities do not always have to meet the same tight financial requirements, especially in respect of things like education. It would be useful to know how that will be managed so that local authorities do not suddenly go bust because something emerges from the financial accounting arrangements between the new structures.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I thank the hon. Member for his detailed, complicated questions. We will write in response, particularly on the public accounting standards.
We have set what we think is a good baseline. There will obviously be some flexibility for constituent authorities. The hon. Member will remember from the evidence session that the accountability and financial framework across local government is a current challenge, so we are looking to drive improved standards across the piece. That will apply to strategic authorities as much as to local authorities, but we will write fully in response.
On the wider question about the balance and the trade-off, our judgment is that for non-mayoral combined authorities, where constituent authorities operate together, we should put in those safeguards. In essence, constituent authorities act in concert, collectively, to make decisions. Whether it is a question of financial liabilities or transport budgets, it is right that all the constituent authorities provide consent. In the case of the mayor, however, our view is that because the mayor has his or her own democratic mandate and the ability to direct, that is separate from what we see in non-mayoral combined authorities.
Inevitably, there will be safeguards. In the evidence session, we heard really powerful evidence that the mayoral model works well when the mayor works in lockstep with constituent authorities and the two are aligned, with a strategy that they work around. We have seen examples of where the model does not work well, and we have had to go in and support and remediate the process when the mayor works without their individual local authorities. The model drives that. However, we think that there is something specific in the mayor’s democratic mandate; we have a model where there is a majority vote, with the mayor on the side of the majority, in order to drive through big strategic decisions.
David Simmonds
I am grateful to the Minister for undertaking to provide that clarity in writing. She said that there are differences between a mayoral authority and a combined authority without a mayor. We have seen a good case study in the Mayor of London’s decision that he wished to be seen to fund free school meals in primary schools, but the budget that is provided is less than the cost. School budgets, which are determined by the Department for Education, are subsidising the shortfall in the money provided by the mayor. We see posters on the tube saying that the mayor is funding this, but in fact the amount he provides is less than the cost. Probably all London MPs have had representations from schools that have said, “We are having to make staff redundant because of this shortfall. It’s a significant burden. It is causing a real cost.”
That is an example of where accounting and legal decision making sit across several different authorities. Although it is not the only ringfenced local authority grant, it would be helpful to have clarity about how the dedicated schools grant will be managed in a mayoral combined authority, so that we do not see a repeat of what happened in London with school budgets being raided to cover up a shortfall in a mayoral policy proposal.
The Chair
The Minister has courteously and helpfully said that she will write regarding those specific questions. May I ask that that is done within the period in which we are considering the Bill, and made available to all Committee members?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
Yes.
Amendment 62 agreed to.
Amendment made: 63, in schedule 1, page 80, line 19, at end insert—
“5A After section 105B insert—
‘105C Non-mayoral combined authority: functions imposing financial liability
(1) This section applies where a non-mayoral combined authority considers that the exercise of a function by the authority may result in a financial liability being incurred by one or more constituent council (each such council being a “relevant constituent council”).
(2) The function may only be exercised with the consent of each relevant constituent council.
(3) When deciding whether subsection (1) applies, the authority must have regard to the “Code of Practice on Local Authority Accounting in the United Kingdom” published by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, as amended or reissued from time to time.’”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)
This restricts a non-mayoral combined authority from exercising a function that might impose a financial liability on any of its constituent councils unless those councils have given their consent.
Amendment proposed: 269, in schedule 1, page 80, line 20, leave out paragraph 6.—(David Simmonds.)
See explanatory statement for Amendment 266.
Manuela Perteghella
I beg to move amendment 25, in schedule 1, page 83, line 3, at end insert—
“(6A) After preparing a proposal the Secretary of State must publish a statement demonstrating how the physical geography, community identity, and the boundaries of other public services in the area would be affected by the proposal.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to make a statement about how the physical geography, community identity, and the boundaries of other public service structures in the area would be affected by the proposal for a new combined authority.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 305, in schedule 1, page 83, line 32, at end insert—
“(5A) The Secretary of State may not make an order under this section that has the effect of placing Cornwall in a combined authority with any other authority.”
This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from making an order establishing a combined authority which would include Cornwall and any other area east of the Tamar in the same combined authority.
Amendment 43, in schedule 1, page 84, line 13, at end insert—
“(9A) If the order establishes a combined authority which contains the Isle of Wight, the authority’s name must include ‘the Isle of Wight.’”
Amendment 306, in schedule 1, page 86, line 18, at end insert—
“(5A) Neither the added local government area nor the existing area of a combined authority in the order includes Cornwall.”
This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from adding a local government area to an existing area of a combined authority if either area includes Cornwall.
Amendment 44, in schedule 1, page 86, line 32, at end insert—
“(7A) If the proposal establishes a combined authority which contains the Isle of Wight, the authority’s name must include ‘the Isle of Wight.’”
Manuela Perteghella
This Government’s plans for devolution involve folding existing local government structures into larger combined authorities. From a central Government perspective, the benefits are clear. Each region has a single point of contact, accountability and new structures through which to work. However, devolution should deliver benefits in both directions and be truly community-led.
If proposals are prepared by the Secretary of State and the Department rather than being locally-led, we believe that a basic requirement should be that each new authority is appropriately sized, and that physical geography and cultural identities within the authority—especially community identities—are looked at. We need to look at the boundaries of other public service structures in the area that could be affected by the new combined authority, such as fire and rescue services, police forces and integrated care boards. In my area, we have local government reorganisation and the ICBs are being reorganised as part of NHS England reform or abolition, so both are changing at the same time. In geographical local areas, we have not just NHS commissioners but other NHS services, such as local NHS trusts.
Looking beyond size—I hope that the Government are flexible about size, because of all the other important considerations with any new authority—authorities should be shaped carefully to reflect economic zones, as well as physical geography. Crucially, there must be careful thought about how the proposals will align with public services. I have already talked about the organisation of ICBs, but there are also, for example, existing transport hubs and established boundaries for fire and rescue services.
A less tangible but no less important requirement is respect for distinct community identities. For example, my area is in the county of Warwickshire. South Warwickshire is very rural, with hundreds of parish and town councils, while north Warwickshire has different economic areas and is more populous and urban. Proximal areas may not be well-suited partners in new combined authorities, so what kind of flexibility will there be to think about services and the shared history of local communities so that such areas do not have a false cohesion?
We would like regional and sub-regional cultures to be taken into consideration, because those are what brings communities together. This goes back to the role of parish and town councils as the first tier of government: they know their communities best, which is why they should have a say in any consultation. They know their boundaries; they know which bus services should be improved so that residents can go to hospital and so on.
Practically, we are asking the Government to consider all these areas, boundaries and services, because if combined authorities backfire, governance structures could fail and might not deliver at all for areas that are already struggling. Requiring the Secretary of State to make a statement accompanying each proposal for a new combined authority, covering its impact on the shared areas that I have mentioned, would improve the quality of combined authority proposals.
David Simmonds
The Opposition have listened attentively to the points made by the hon. Member for Camborne and Redruth and by my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East (Joe Robertson). My hon. Friend the Member for Hamble Valley may speak later to the amendments in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East, but they both relate to the need to recognise in local government structures the heritage of the parts of England that are affected.
From all the evidence that we have heard, and from many Members’ contributions, we know just how important it is that people feel that the name of their local authority area—that most basic of things—has a connection to them. On top of that are layers of geographical and economic considerations, as well as the trouble of learning it, all of which have an impact. That is why we and others are so keen to support measures to ensure that historical names are not lost in any of the Government’s proposed devolution measures, and that that heritage is fully recognised in any structures that follow.
Paul Holmes
I will briefly elaborate on what my hon. Friend the shadow Minister has said about amendments 43 and 44. I do so on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East, who has been a tireless and fierce campaigner for his constituents, and not only at Prime Minister’s questions.
I represent a Hampshire constituency whose southern parishes look out on the Isle of Wight. If I take a walk down Hill Head beach or somewhere in Hamble, I always see it. In Hampshire, the Isle of Wight is a constant. It is a constant presence on the coast of southern England, but it is also a vital part of our county. It has a proud set of people who have a booming economy that contributes so much to the county of Hampshire, and which is a major part of the county’s identity.
The Minister has talked about wanting local views and localism to be at the heart of the devolution agenda. I believe her. We had a brief interaction earlier, and although we can disagree about whether that devolution has been forced or voluntary, I absolutely believe that the Minister intends to make sure that if devolution happens, the regions involved have an identity and the right to an economic injection that delivers for people locally.
It would be very easy for the Government to accept amendments 43 and 44, because they would do nothing to change the mechanics or principles of the Bill. They would merely ensure that a region of very proud people is included within the description of the mayoralty that is proposed for Hampshire.
Vikki Slade
I used to live on the Isle of Wight. I got married there and my parents met there, so I have a fond connection to it. Does the hon. Member agree that if “Isle of Wight” is not included within the authority name of “Hampshire and the Isle of Wight”, it might disappear from all the other organisations in which it features, such as fire authorities or health authorities? Suddenly, the Isle of Wight’s unique identity would be completely subsumed into an amorphous Hampshire.
Paul Holmes
As the hon. Lady knows from when we were on the BBC’s “Politics South” programme some weeks ago, I rarely agree with Liberal Democrats, but I suspect that she and I agree on this point. I know that she stands for her area and, as a former council leader, for the wider area, and that she knows a lot about the Isle of Wight. I did not know that she got married there, but I am sure it was a lovely wedding, because the Isle of Wight is a beautiful place steeped in history. She is absolutely right that while Hampshire and the Isle of Wight have been together geographically, they have also been together in the way organisations have worked, over hundreds of years. I see the Solent as the water motorway connecting the mainland to the Isle of Wight. We could not interact without having it there. “Hampshire and the Solent” is the wrong name for the proposed mayoralty, because it leaves out the distinct identity of a proud people on the Isle of Wight.
Siân Berry
I want to express my sympathy with the amendments related to the Isle of Wight. It is not miles away from the area that I represent, Brighton Pavilion. I know many people there who are similarly proud of their distinct identity. I note that the name for the new combined authority that will envelop Brighton is “Sussex and Brighton”. If it is good enough for us, it is good enough for the Isle of Wight.
Paul Holmes
I agree. I have had many a night out in Brighton, and I know that it is a very vibrant city. If it is good enough for Brighton to be named within that county, I do not see why the population of an island in this United Kingdom should not be named as part of its mayoral authority.
I say to the Minister, in the same spirit of co-operation in which I know she will respond, that if there is no movement in the decision on the name, that risks wider implications for the Bill. Many other areas will then start to think about why we went through the parliamentary boundary commissions’ changes to the names of our seats. That was a very difficult thing; people were not recognised.
The Isle of Wight has a precedent for being treated differently. It has always received special dispensation in the boundary discussions that we have had before. It would therefore be perfectly sensible for the proud and great people of the Isle of Wight to be recognised and have their name in a proud county name, if this devolution goes forward.
Perran Moon (Camborne and Redruth) (Lab)
Meur ras—thank you, Sir John. The Bill places me in an invidious situation. For thousands of years, the people of Cornwall have been considered different from the rest of the country. Indeed, the word Cornwall means “land of foreigners”. We call it Kernow—the people of the promontory.
David Simmonds
I know that the hon. Gentleman is not the only person with an interest, and that there are other amendments on the same topic. He mentions that he is satisfied with the Government’s assurances. We have not directly sought those assurances; would he be willing to set out for the Committee the nature of them, so that we can all understand what has been committed to and can be well informed when we come to make voting decisions later on?
Perran Moon
I have had no commitments; I have had discussions with Ministers. We have had discussions about the difficulties with the proposals made here, with the potential for the Bill to become a hybrid Bill and the complications that that would bring. I am happy to keep talking to the Government in a spirit of openness, reflecting the views of every political party in Cornwall bar one. On that basis, I am content to keep talking. I cannot support the amendments because of the negative change that I think they would make to the nature of the Bill, so I will be voting against them.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I put on record my thanks to hon. Members who are championing specific areas that have a unique identity, which the Government completely recognise. On amendments 43 and 44, I pay tribute to the hon. Members who have been championing the Isle of Wight and its proud history. The Government understand and support the intent behind the amendments, but we will not be taking them forward. Let me explain why.
Earlier this year, Isle of Wight council, Hampshire county council, Portsmouth city council and Southampton city council submitted a joint expression of interest in the Government’s devolution priority programme. They went through a consultation process, based on the proposed name of Hampshire and the Solent. This was not imposed by the Government; it came as a proposal from the local area, and on that basis a public consultation was conducted.
It is worth saying that of the 6,000 responses we received, only a small minority commented specifically on the name of the proposed combined authority area. The Government’s response to that consultation is online, if hon. Members want to look at it. It is important to say that once it is established, it is completely open to any combined authority or combined county authority to change its name by resolution, with the consent of its members and using existing powers. That is already in the Bill. The Liverpool city region combined authority and the South Yorkshire mayoral combined authority have both changed their names in the same way. There was no constraint from Government; the powers are there. It is within the gift of local areas to go ahead and do that.
Lewis Cocking
The Minister mentions that 6,000 people replied to the consultation on Hampshire and the Isle of Wight, but that only a small number of respondents actually mentioned the name. How many people from the Isle of Wight responded to that consultation, and how many of them mentioned the name?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I do not have those figures, but we can write to the hon. Member with them. However, the principle remains that the power is there. It is within the gift of constituent authorities; it is not being imposed by Government. If there is a name change that the combined authority wants to take forward, it can take it forward. We have seen that in Liverpool and South Yorkshire. There is no constraint from us. It is a determination for, and with the consent of, the constituent authorities. It is within the gift of Hampshire and the Solent to make that change.
Paul Holmes
The Minister says that it is not the Government who are making sure that it happens. I accept that. However, having been in her position for only a short time—that is not her fault, as the fickle finger of fate has rested it on her shoulders—she may not know that the negotiation process that has taken place among the local authorities in Hampshire has not been smooth. There has been an overarching view that the county council, which has rushed towards accepting this devolution notwithstanding the impacts of the Government’s decision to push it forward, has not worked collaboratively. There is a wish for devolution, but in the minutiae it has been a very county council-dominated process.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne says, the reason that there has not been a huge uptake in response to the consultation is the flawed nature of the decision-making process. I ask the Minister not to rest on the consultation responses, because as my hon. Friend says, a number of people on the Isle of Wight simply did not bother to respond. It is not about the make-up of a geographical devolution settlement; it is about a name. I ask her to listen to the elected representatives on the Isle of Wight who serve in this House, who have asked for it, and to consider it again.
Mike Reader
I declare that I am Hampshire born and bred, being from Romsey. I just ask: why are we so disrespectful of a place like Brownsea island? If it is called “Hampshire and the Isle of Wight”, what about the great Brownsea island, the home of our native red squirrels? Surely “Solent” is more inclusive for all the other islanders who live in the area beyond the Isle of Wight.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I say gently to hon. Members that we absolutely recognise the desire. I have had multiple conversations with the leader of Isle of Wight council, who was enthusiastic about this devolution deal. It is within the gift of constituent authorities to change their name; it is not for Government to impose. I hope that there is now a constructive conversation and relationship among the leaders of all the different parties. The leader is an independent politician, and I hope that in that spirit they will move forward.
I recognise the uniqueness of the name, but what really matters is what devolution will deliver for residents and constituent authorities. I hope that as much energy and time will be put into the nuts and bolts, the bread and butter, and the impact of what we are trying to do through devolution as will be put into the name. However, I recognise the particular sensitivities in relation to the Isle of Wight.
My hon. Friend the Member for Camborne and Redruth spoke about the issue of Cornwall. He has been a long-standing champion of Cornwall and its distinct identity. He has prosecuted the case incredibly effectively, not just in the context of this debate but across the piece. He is a proud Cornishman and I know that he wants the best for his constituents. I have put it on record in Committee, and I do so again, that we recognise the uniqueness of Cornwall. We are keen to continue engaging not just with my hon. Friend, but with other Cornish MPs, to ensure that we recognise that uniqueness and status and, critically, that we are doing a set of things that can enable local leaders to respond to the challenges—
English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting)
Tuesday 14th October 2025
(1 day, 17 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesEnglish Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill 2024-26 View all English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 14 October 2025 - (14 Oct 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
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The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 11 / Noes: 3 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 11 / Noes: 3 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 1 / Noes: 13 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 10 / Noes: 3 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 11 / Noes: 4 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Chair
Before I ask the Minister to continue her wind-up for the debate on amendment 25 to schedule 1—I say that for those who have had a long lunch and lost their place; I had to be reminded—I want to let the Committee know that I asked for heaters to be brought in. I have one here, and there is one over there. I thought it was intolerable this morning. In many places of work, industrial action would have followed, were we in a private business. I speak as a strong trade unionist, by the way. I hope the heaters will warm the room up during the course of our proceedings.
Schedule 1
Establishment, expansion and functions of combined authorities and CCAs
Amendment proposed (this day): 25, in schedule 1, page 83, line 3, at end insert—
“(6A) After preparing a proposal the Secretary of State must publish a statement demonstrating how the physical geography, community identity, and the boundaries of other public services in the area would be affected by the proposal.”—(Manuela Perteghella.)
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to make a statement about how the physical geography, community identity, and the boundaries of other public service structures in the area would be affected by the proposal for a new combined authority.
Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Amendment 305, in schedule 1, page 83, line 32, at end insert—
“(5A) The Secretary of State may not make an order under this section that has the effect of placing Cornwall in a combined authority with any other authority.”
This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from making an order establishing a combined authority which would include Cornwall and any other area east of the Tamar in the same combined authority.
Amendment 43, in schedule 1, page 84, line 13, at end insert—
“(9A) If the order establishes a combined authority which contains the Isle of Wight, the authority’s name must include ‘the Isle of Wight.’”
Amendment 306, in schedule 1, page 86, line 18, at end insert—
“(5A) Neither the added local government area nor the existing area of a combined authority in the order includes Cornwall.”
This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from adding a local government area to an existing area of a combined authority if either area includes Cornwall.
Amendment 44, in schedule 1, page 86, line 32, at end insert—
“(7A) If the proposal establishes a combined authority which contains the Isle of Wight, the authority’s name must include ‘the Isle of Wight.’”
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (Miatta Fahnbulleh)
The amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish a statement when directing the establishment of a new combined authority, setting out how the proposed combined authority would affect the physical geography, community identity and boundaries of other public services in the local area. I have no doubt that the intention of the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon is absolutely right and that such matters are important; as I have said, the examples of the Isle of Wight and Cornwall highlight that. In practice, however, such matters will already have been considered through the process set out in the Bill.
In deciding whether to establish a new combined authority, the Secretary of State will already be required to have regard to the likely effect on the exercise of functions in neighbouring local government areas. In addition, the Secretary of State is already subject to the statutory tests requiring them to have regard to the need to secure effective and convenient local government in relation to areas of competence. The proposal itself can be expected to cover those issues. There is therefore no need for a separate statement, and so I hope that the hon. Member will withdraw the amendment.
David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)
In our consideration of the issue, the Minister is asking the Committee to give a great deal of weight to the meetings she has described having had with various local leaders and Members with particular concerns about the impact on their local areas in terms of national identity, heritage and geography. Will she share with the Committee a little more detail on the substance of those discussions, so that before we vote we can understand what exact assurances may have been given to local leaders and what their understanding of them is, so that we are all completely clear?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
On Hampshire and Solent, for example, our conversation was very candid. The leaders were clear about some of the debates that they had had within the council; as the Minister, I said what opportunities would be open to them, and I expressed the fact that in the context of the Isle of Wight, the name was completely down to the constituent authorities. We support constituent authorities working together collaboratively to ensure that all the constituent parts are happy with the deal and the proposal.
On Cornwall, I believe that the Secretary of State, my boss, had those conversations, but I have also had some with MPs. We absolutely recognise the uniqueness of Cornwall and its identity. There are clear things that we know Cornish MPs and the council want, such as protection for the Cornish language, which we are in discussion about. There are clearly opportunities to build on the existing devolution deal. The previous Government provided a devolution deal for Cornwall in recognition of that exception. Another issue might be housing, which is big in Cornwall, for example, and the area is especially exercised about that, in particular in the context of the impact of tourism. We are happy to have a conversation about continuing to support the local authority to make inroads on some of those issues.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Perran Moon (Camborne and Redruth) (Lab)
On a point of order, Sir John. Can we ask the Clerk to speak a little louder? We are struggling to hear at the back.
The Chair
That is a perfectly reasonable point of order. Speak louder! When you think you are bellowing, you are getting it right. Thanks very much; I am very grateful. But I need my Clerk. Don’t upset him; I cannot operate without my Clerk.
Amendment proposed: 277, in schedule 1, page 94, line 1, leave out paragraph 30. —(David Simmonds.)
See explanatory statement for Amendment 274.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
Once the Bill comes into force, there will be various ways in which functions can be conferred on a combined authority or combined county authority that will be operating as strategic authorities. The clause makes the necessary amendment to existing legislation to clarify these wider options. It is a small but important clause that will ensure our new devolution framework can operate effectively.
David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)
I thank the Minister for that introduction. It is the implementation of this that is the subject of political contention, but a great deal has been said, and a vote has been taken. There is nothing further we can do on those issues at this stage, but I expect they will be the subject of great debate in the remaining stages of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Combined authorities and CCAs: decision-making and validity of proceedings
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Schedule 2 stand part.
New clause 48—Greater London Authority: decision-making—
“(1) The Greater London Authority Act 1999 is amended in accordance with this section.
(2) In section 42B (Assembly’s power to reject draft strategies), in subsection (5)(b), leave out “at least two-thirds” and insert “a simple majority”.
(3) In schedule 4A (Confirmation hearings etc)—
(a) in paragraph 10(5) leave out “at least two-thirds” and insert “a simple majority”;
(b) in paragraph 11(5) leave out “at least two-thirds” and insert “a simple majority”.
(4) In schedule 6 (Procedure for determining the authority’s consolidated council tax requirement)—
(a) in paragraph 8(4) leave out “at least two-thirds” and insert “a simple majority”;
(b) In paragraph 8C(4) leave out “at least two-thirds” and insert “a simple majority”.
(5) In schedule 7 (Procedure for making of substitute calculations by the authority), in paragraph 7(4), leave out “at least two thirds and insert “a simple majority”.”
Miatta Fahnbulleh
Moving from devolution by deal to devolution by default is at the heart of the Bill. Clause 6 and schedule 2 are essential to achieving that. The Bill ensures that strategic authorities have a consistent set of functions, and these provisions standardise how they exercise those functions. Many existing strategic authorities have complex and varied arrangements for agreeing fundamentals such as budgets and transport plans. That makes it hard for the public to understand how decisions are made and, therefore, to hold the strategic authority to account.
The provisions in clause 6 and schedule 2 would create a transparent and consistent default voting arrangement—a simple majority. It would unblock decision making to ensure that the right decision, even if it is difficult, can be made. In mayoral strategic authorities, the mayor must be in the majority for a vote to pass. Mayors are directly accountable to all voters in their area, so it is right that decisions cannot be made if they disagree. The Government expect mayors and other strategic authority members to continue to work together to build consensus. We heard time and time again in the evidence sessions that the model works well when the mayor works in partnership with its constituent authorities, but it is important that one member cannot get in the way of the right decisions being made for the entire area. It is therefore imperative that clause 6 and schedule 2 remain within the Bill to ensure that mayoral strategic authorities can operate effectively, and to provide the public with clarity on how decisions are made, so they can hold these institutions to account.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I rise to speak to new clause 48, tabled in my name. I also want to raise another issue for consideration by the Minister at a future stage.
In clause 6, the new rules for mayoral combined authorities give simple majority voting for relevant decisions by bodies to adopt budgets or policies, such as spatial development strategies, local transport plans and other strategies set out elsewhere in the Bill. For example, schedule 2 outlines that
“a resolution to adopt the strategy is to be made by a simple majority of the constituent members present and voting”.
There are other rules to do with a tied vote.
I think that the Bill should also amend the Greater London Authority Act 1999 to give simple majority voting for decisions by the London Assembly on the budget and mayoral strategies of the Mayor of London. That is for consistency of decision making across the different authorities and bodies, and for fairness to London’s democracy. Along with many Opposition Members, this is something that I have wanted for some time now, as I was a member of the London Assembly in my previous job. In these Committee debates I will frequently bring up examples from my long experience of being part of an effective scrutiny body in a devolved authority at the strategic level—I feel that I have a good handle on how it works.
Using “a simple majority” is the right way to go about this. The Minister has talked about building consensus and working in partnership. I really value it when cross-party working can result in genuine dialogue, with mayors that will listen and make changes, and bodies scrutinising or working with them to put forward their own ideas and have them taken up. Those are all really healthy things for our democracy. New clause 48 would simply amend the parts of the 1999 Act that outline how the Assembly votes. Currently, the Act requires at least a two-thirds majority for any changes to be made, and the new clause would instead insert the words “a simple majority”. It is a very simple change, which the Minister should consider.
The second issue I want to raise relates to forward plans, which are incredibly useful for the general public, or anyone who wants to influence mayoral decisions and the decisions of combined authorities or local authorities. At the moment, only local authorities have this particular requirement written into law, under the Local Authorities (Executive Arrangements) (Meetings and Access to Information) (England) Regulations 2012, which clearly set out how key decisions are to be included in forward plans. I am not talking about planning decisions but key decisions, as set out in the schemes of delegation. Those forward plans are required to be published in advance, so that people who want to influence or scrutinise those decisions can bid to change them, or for things to be taken into account at the appropriate time.
Again, this certainly comes out of my experience in the London Assembly. It unanimously passed a motion in 2022 that was put forward by one of the Liberal Democrat members and me, which said that the Mayor of London should publish a forward plan. However, he did not agree to do that, as he said that he was complying with everything in legislation; so the answer seems to be for legislation to require both the Mayor of London and these new combined authority mayors to publish a forward plan along the same lines. Looking at the 2012 regulations, it would be very simple to change the current wording, “local authorities”, to “strategic and local authorities”, if the Minister wanted.
I also point the Committee to the excellent report published last month by the GLA oversight committee, a cross-party committee currently chaired by a Labour member of the London Assembly. It makes exactly the same request: for a forward plan of key mayoral decisions to be put into the 1999 Act. Because of the complexities of the different regulations, I have not tabled an amendment for such a change, but I hope the Minister would consider the question of effective scrutiny of these new bodies and the ability to influence them. I hope she could potentially come forward with a new clause at a later stage for us.
David Simmonds
The Opposition support the amendment; the principle of having a simple majority is sound. In oral evidence, we heard about why Manchester works and London does not, and there is a logic to implementing those measures consistently across the country. We support introducing that consistency.
There is a broader question, however. I understand what the Minister and the Government are trying to achieve; it would clearly be frustrating if one authority was effectively acting as a blocker. However, I asked the Minister earlier to give us some assurances about the treatment applied when financial impacts occur that affect one or more of the constituent authorities in a combined authority area. There will be cases—we have seen them in planning, for example—where an authority argues that to deliver its housing target, a site in another local authority’s area must be developed, because it does not have sufficient developable land to hit the target that it has been given; legally, it is not that authority’s decision. There will be other examples.
I am mindful of some of the Government’s amendments that introduce a lot more scope into this Bill for mayors and combined authorities to undertake their housing responsibilities. One of the main routes for funding is through borrowing against the housing revenue account, which is ringfenced. Each individual local authority has a legal duty to balance that account and the power to borrow against it; it also holds all of the legal housing duties and responsibilities. The purpose of the measures is to make mayors the vehicle for the delivery of asylum accommodation, as opposed to asylum hotels, as is the case now to some degree. Yesterday, on the Floor of the House, another Minister in the Department alluded to this in his response to a question about asylum accommodation.
Those decisions will have a significant impact on the legal obligations of the authorities that sit beneath the mayoral authority. There is a risk that being outvoted in a decision made at combined authority level would put an individual constituent authority in breach of its legal obligations to balance its dedicated schools grant, its housing revenue account or some other element of its council tax account. Will the Minister, either now or in writing, set out what arrangements will apply in the likely situation of a conflict between the legal obligations on a constituent authority to balance the budget and the strategic decisions put forward by the combined authority? How will the conflict be resolved without undue detriment to the constituent authority in particular, which is the one that will find itself in court?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I will respond to the amendment to clause 48, and then I will pick up the specific questions from the hon. Member. The GLA has a different and long-established governance model. In London, the mayor is elected by the people of London to make decisions; the Assembly’s role is to scrutinise those decisions. As a London MP, I think that model has worked well for London for well over 25 years. It is tested and it strikes the right balance between the executive authority of the mayor and the scrutiny of the Assembly.
Siân Berry
It is notable that recently the London Assembly has, on a number of occasions, made constructive changes to the mayor’s budget at stage one of budget setting, which have simply been overturned at the second stage. This tendency, I think, is part of the growing need for a change in the threshold.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
We think that the model works well. We have heard representations from constituents, local authorities, Assembly members, and the mayor himself. Any model needs to evolve; as we think about how we expand the powers of the mayor, which we want to, we will also be thinking about reforming the GLA to make it fit for purpose in the 21st century. We will take into consideration some of the points that have been made in this Committee.
On the specific question about decisions at the strategic authority level putting an individual local authority in breach of its legal obligations or jeopardising its financial viability, all our experience of combined authorities is that they always operate within the legal duties of constituent authorities. I struggle to think of an example where constituent authorities have been put in such a position by their mayor and the decisions of the collective. There are sufficient safeguards in place to mitigate that risk.
I hope that majority working will benefit the collective area. This Government will make sure that clear legal obligations on constituent authorities are not breached. I am happy to write to the hon. Member to provide further reassurance on that point. I think we agree that we want clear and effective decision making with a democratic mandate, that will not jeopardise individual authorities by forcing them to breach their legal requirements and/or putting them in financial distress.
David Simmonds
Let me give a concrete example: the long-standing proposal for Heathrow expansion airport. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has set out her absolute determination to ensure that happens, because it is part of her Government’s growth agenda. It is likely to be directed under these powers and in the purview of the Mayor of London, who will ultimately have some planning role in the decision making. However, as well as being the planning authority, the London borough of Hillingdon, within which Heathrow sits entirely, has legal duties in respect of air quality. It is already breaching those duties, which it has no means of fulfilling, simply because of that external factor.
If the Treasury and the Mayor of London were say to the combined authority, “In pursuit of the growth agenda with which we have been tasked, we are determined to see this expansion take place,” immediately that local authority would be put in significant legal jeopardy. To give an indication of the scale, when the Localism Act 2011 was debated and there was also interaction with European Union standards, it equated to an annual fine of £150 million to be paid by the legally responsible local authority. That is a significant jeopardy, and it is by no means the only one—in the case of special educational needs and disabilities obligations, for example, there are significant duties to pay compensation in the event of failure.
We can all envisage situations where a mayor decides that, for the good of everybody, they want an individual place to take a hit, but through the judicial review process that places that individual local authority at significant moral and financial risk. If the Minister sets out how those very significant and real risks will be addressed, I will be grateful.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I thank the hon. Member for that very detailed and specific example. The concerns he raised have been heard and noted. Both in practice and principle, ensuring that no constituent authority is put in either financial or legal jeopardy underwrites all of this. I will take the hon. Member’s points away and write to provide the relevant reassurances.
The Chair
As I said this morning, Minister, if you are going to write to the Member, I would be grateful if you did so in a timely fashion and made that correspondence available to all members of the Committee for consideration.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2 agreed to.
Clause 7
Combined authorities and CCAs: powers not limited by other provision or
powers
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
Clause 7 is a small but important clause that supports the wiring of our new devolution framework. As hon. Members will know, the Bill introduces a systemic approach, ending one-off deals and creating a standardised devolution framework in which strategic authorities and mayors are given a clear and coherent set of functions. However, the Government recognise that it may, on very rare occasions, be necessary to tailor the exercise of specific functions to reflect local circumstances and to preserve the smooth running of public services. Clause 7 provides that existing powers that allow Ministers to modify how a function is exercised by an individual combined authority or county combined authority can continue. Exceptions will be rare, but this flexibility, where appropriate and necessary and where it reflects local circumstances, will be essential to ensure the smooth running of public services.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8
Combined authorities and CCAs: designation as established mayoral strategic authorities
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
The devolution White Paper set out our commitment to introduce a new category of established mayoral strategic authority, representing the highest level of devolution in England. The clause delivers on that commitment. It enables a mayoral strategic authority that meets the eligibility criteria set out in the English devolution White Paper to submit a written proposal to the Secretary of State for designation as an established mayoral strategic authority. Designation will provide a strategic authority with access to the highest level of powers and functions in the devolution framework, as well as the right to request additional devolved functions and eligibility to receive an integrated funding settlement.
In the event that a Secretary of State decided not to designate an authority as an established mayoral strategic authority, they would be required to notify the authority in writing of the reasons for their decision. It would remain open to the authority to submit a fresh request at some future point. Importantly, once an authority has been designated as an established mayoral strategic authority, it will not be possible for Ministers to remove its status through secondary legislation. In that way, we will hardwire the powers and functions of established mayoral strategic authorities into our system of government, future-proofing arrangements against unnecessary change and ensuring permanent and enduring devolution.
David Simmonds
I draw the Committee’s attention to a topic to which we will return throughout our proceedings: the extent to which the devolution legislation is about the powers of the Secretary of State to designate this or direct that. Ironically, we are embarked on a course of action that started with us hearing about how it was going to be locally led, despite all evidence to the contrary, yet as we proceed, we have clause after clause and paragraph after paragraph referring to new powers for the Government to make local authorities do this or to direct them to do that. It is clearly not in the spirit of devolution.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
The clause does two things. The proposal to become an established mayoral strategic authority will come up from the locality. The power is about the ability of the Secretary of State to designate it as such at its request; it is not about the Secretary of State imposing the status on any area. Critically, it will lock in the established mayoral authority for good, and will, in fact, contain and curtail the power of future Secretaries of State to decide that they will change the status of an established mayoral authority, therefore locking in devolution for the long term.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Appointment of commissioners by mayors
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I beg to move amendment 68, in clause 9, page 11, line 19, leave out from “function” to “, or” in line 20.
This would omit this wording is because of its replacement by the new section 30A(2) of LURA 2023 (see Amendment 220).
Miatta Fahnbulleh
Government amendments 68 and 69 are consequential to Government amendment 220, which we will discuss later. Government amendment 220 will ensure that responsibility for fire and rescue functions sits directly with the elected mayor, who can delegate them only to a public safety commissioner and not to deputies or officers, thereby strengthening accountability. Government amendments 68 and 69 simply remove wording that will be superseded should Government amendment 220 be accepted.
Amendment 68 agreed to.
Amendment made: 69, in clause 9, page 12, line 7, leave out from “function” to “, or” in line 8.—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)
This would omit this wording is because of its replacement by the new section 107DZA(2) of LDEDCA 2009 (see Amendment 220).
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 2—Policy delivery in areas of competence—
“(1) Any function of a mayoral combined authority or mayoral combined county authority which—
(a) relates to an area of competence, and
(b) is not a mayoral function exercisable solely by the mayor
must be exercised by or under the direct authority of the constituent members of that authority.
(2) No person may be appointed to exercise any function that relates to making or delivering policy relating to an area of competence unless that person is an elected member of—
(a) the relevant strategic authority, or
(b) a constituent council within the relevant strategic authority.
(3) Nothing in this section is to be taking as preventing the appointment of staff by the strategic authority or its elected members for the purposes of administrative, advisory or technical support for the exercise of its functions.
(4) For the purposes of this section, ‘constituent members’ means any elected representative who is—
(a) appointed by a constituent council to be a member of the mayoral combined authority or mayoral combined county authority;
(b) any person acting in the place of a person appointed under paragraph (a).”
This new clause provides that any policy delivery or development relating to an area of competence in a strategic authority is carried out by an elected representative.
New clause 21—Power to provide for an elected mayor to appoint a deputy mayor—
“(1) The Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 (section 107C) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1), leave out ‘one of the members of the authority to be the mayor’s deputy’ and substitute ‘a deputy mayor’.
(3) In subsection (3)(c), leave out ‘the person ceases to be a member of the combined authority’ and insert ‘the person ceases to be a councillor of a constituent council of the authority’
(4) In subsection (4), leave out ‘another member of the combined authority’ and substitute ‘another councillor of a constituent council’.”
This new clause would amend section 107C of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 so that a mayor is no longer restricted to appointing a deputy mayor from among the leaders of the constituent local authority members of the Combined Authority.
New clause 22—Mayoral special advisers—
“(1) The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (section 15) is amended as follows.
(2) After section 15 (Definition of ‘special adviser’ insert—
‘15A Mayoral special advisers
(1) A mayor may appoint one mayoral special adviser.
(2) A mayoral special adviser is a person who holds a position within a mayoral strategic authority and whose appointment to that position meets the requirements in subsection (3).
(3) The requirements are—
(a) the mayoral special adviser is appointed to assist the Mayor after being selected by the Mayor personally;
(b) the appointment will end not later than—
(i) the day on which the Mayor ceases to hold office, or
(ii) if earlier, the end of the day after the day of the poll at the election following the appointment.
(4) The Secretary of State must publish a code of conduct for mayoral special advisers (“the code”).
(5) Before publishing the code (or any revision of it) the Secretary of State must consult the Council of Nations and Regions.
(6) The code must provide that a mayoral special adviser may not—
(a) authorise the expenditure of public funds; or
(b) exercise any power in relation to the management of any part of the mayoral or strategic authority.
(7) The code must provide that a mayoral special adviser may—
(a) engage in political activity; and
(b) provide party-political advice to the Mayor.
(8) The code must form part of the terms and conditions of service of any mayoral special adviser.
(9) A person appointed under this section is not to be regarded, for the purposes of Part I of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 (political restriction of officers and staff), as holding a politically restricted post under a local authority.’”
This new clause would insert a new section into the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 to establish a statutory framework for the appointment of “mayoral special advisers”. It makes provision about appointment, function, code of conduct, and exemption from political restrictions.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
The public rightly expect that mayoral strategic authorities will have access to the expertise they need, that they will work with businesses and other stakeholders, and that mayors will work full time to deliver for their communities. Mayoral strategic authorities will undertake critical new functions, including a stronger set of planning, transport and skills powers and, increasingly, police, fire and public health duties. The authorities will also represent their region in engagement with national bodies, and undertake joint working with partners. It is simply not realistic to expect a single mayor to do all that on their own.
The appointment of commissioners will be a local decision and no additional funding will be provided. I will gladly take Members’ questions now, but when we discuss schedule 3 in four groups’ time, I will expand on some of the checks and balances we are introducing to ensure that commissioners add real value to local decision making. I commend clause 9 to the Committee.
Vikki Slade (Mid Dorset and North Poole) (LD)
The name of the Bill promises devolution and community empowerment, yet a number of its clauses cause the Liberal Democrats some concern, and this is one. A key principle of democracy, local or national, is to have elected people—Ministers, Members of Parliament or councillors—delivering for the people who elect them. It makes little sense that a mayor of a combined county authority or combined authority, with dozens or scores of skilled constituent councillors and council leaders beneath them, might instead choose to appoint a commissioner to such an important role.
We heard in oral evidence from Councillor Bev Craig about the model used in Manchester, where the leaders of the constituent councils perform one of the portfolios. That strikes me as much more appropriate in a large strategic authority, where each of those individuals has skin in the game. There is no reason why a mayoral authority should not operate in the same way as large unitary authorities do. Mine represents more than 400,000 people and does not require a commissioner to look at planning, although it does have a head of planning—a paid member of staff. Policy decisions have in the English system traditionally been made by politicians, so I struggle to see why creating a new layer of authorities, further away from people, should take away the principle that such decisions should be made by elected people.
Some have suggested that there are not enough constituent council leaders in some areas—perhaps areas that have only three or four council leaders. There are some incredible deputy leaders and portfolio holders. There may be a case for drawing from a broader pool, but suggesting that those people are not sufficiently qualified in understanding their area or area of expertise could damage the respect that council leaders have in their area, as well as the connection between a constituent council and the strategic authority that sits above it. If we want constituent councils to drive better strategic decisions and better strategic outcomes for all residents, it would be much more sensible to give those individuals a real role in the authority. Given the way that additional responsibility allowances are scheduled, that can be a lot cheaper, because the Bill does not provide for people to have the double allowances that we already have in other parts of the system.
If we bring in external individuals as commissioners, there will be few checks and balances; they are not democratically accountable. The mayor may well be able to remove them, as is detailed in the Bill, but the public cannot remove them. Fundamentally, the people who are making policy decisions should be able to be removed by the public. They should also be held to the standards regime, as well as the other elements of conflicts of interest and financial declarations that councillors must follow.
I think that is all I want to say, but I feel really strongly that a model is there, such as the one in Manchester. We have heard about London evolving over time, but we have some great models running in the country. To me, it seems a sensible way forward to look at what they are doing in Greater Manchester, which is already incredibly successful.
Andrew Cooper (Mid Cheshire) (Lab)
As the hon. Lady refers to Greater Manchester, I am minded of the role that Chris Boardman has played in Greater Manchester in rolling out active travel. He is unelected, and I think it would be a shame if we could not take advantage of such a person’s expertise. Does she accept that is a risk with what she proposes?
Vikki Slade
There is a role for experts, but the role of the commissioners, as they are seen through this lens or this organisation, is far better suited to people who are elected. Councils around the country, including Manchester, can appoint individuals to do specific roles for a specific period of time, but the role of commissioner lies in those strategic decision-making pieces that are integral to their shape, and they ensure that an individual cannot independently run a fiefdom. I think it is really important that there are local people who are accountable. There is nothing to stop an organisation from appointing an individual expert, as they do all over the country, but they do not need to be called “commissioners”.
Sam Carling (North West Cambridgeshire) (Lab)
With your permission, Sir John, I will make some references to schedule 3 as well as clause 9, just to do it all in the same place. I will start by responding to some of the hon. Lady’s points. She raises some valid concerns. I will just give the perspective of someone who lives in quite a fractious combined authority area. I think my combined authority board currently has two Conservatives, two Lib Dems and two Labour—that is not enough people, so it must be 3:3:2, but I cannot remember which way around.
We also have the Manchester system at the moment, whereby different people hold different portfolios, which has led to a lot of politicisation. We have a Conservative mayor now, and we previously had a Labour mayor, but under both there was a lot of game-playing going on and a lot of difficulty, so I think it would be helpful for the mayor to be able to appoint commissioners just to get on with delivering their strategy. They are directly elected, and although I disagree with my mayor on a lot of things, I accept his mandate. It may well be helpful for mayors across the country to be able to deliver the strategy that they have stood on.
My concern relates to the relative sizes of combined authorities in a uniform approach to commissioners, and whether we can look at how to deal with that. To give an example, Greater Manchester has 3 million residents; Cambridgeshire and Peterborough has around 1 million. Similarly, the Greater Manchester combined authority has 3,500 staff—or 4,600 if you include Transport for Greater Manchester—while Cambridgeshire and Peterborough combined authority has 139 employees, according to a freedom of information request from March 2024. The difference in scale is significant, and obviously the amount of work for commissioners to oversee is therefore significant.
I do not want to put the Minister on the spot now, but could she write to me at some point to give context on whether the Government have considered modifying the number of commissioners that a combined authority mayor can appoint with respect to that variance in size, or perhaps the allowance payable to those commissioners, so they would be more part time in smaller authorities? I note that amendment 293, which we will discuss later, relates to allowances, and I can imagine that the Government want to allow flexibility so that local areas can do what is best for them, which makes perfect sense.
Within my area, if commissioners were paid at director level, that could cost well over £1 million. Senior officers can earn in excess of £100,000, which is a significant sum, and it is more than mayors themselves or many Government Ministers earn. That may well be appropriate in London, where it works and seems to be doing a great job, but London is a lot bigger than some other authorities. I thank the Committee for listening to those thoughts, and if the Minister could give some clarity on how we can deal with some of those issues, I would be really grateful.
David Simmonds
The Opposition have some sympathy with the points that have been made in the debate. It is an area in which there is scope to move towards a degree of consensus. I think that we all recognise that part of the underlying thinking behind the mayoral combined authority is that it brings a new element of leadership, and from those models where they are established, such as in London, we can identify some of the issues. As we heard at the start of the Committee, there is clear evidence about accountability.
One of the issues that persists in London is that there are a number of advisers—whether they are commissioners or not is a moot point—who undertake sometimes quite highly paid roles on behalf of the mayor, but they are not visibly accountable to the GLA, the boroughs or anybody else. That begins to undermine public confidence, and it clearly creates a sense of distance between those who are elected and those who they are there to serve.
While I agree that there is no reason why somebody who is elected should not occupy those roles, one of the issues with the proposed amendment is that there is clearly a risk of constraining them—in particular, in relation to the wording of the proposed amendment. When we consider some of the statutory roles that might be occupied—directors of children’s services, statutory directors of social care, monitoring officers, section 151 officers and others who have legal duties—there is a risk that by defining it as narrowly as the amendment does, we create some concerns about the interaction between those who are part of the professional officer corps that serves local government and those who are political appointees. I do not think that that is intentional; it is simply a risk that arises from the way in which it is drafted.
We will not be supporting the amendment, but I am mindful of the comments that have been made by those on the Government Benches about the need to ensure that those who occupy the roles are fit to do so, and that they are publicly accountable, because they will be public servants and they need to be answerable to effective scrutiny measures for the work that they do.
Siân Berry
I want to participate in this debate, despite having not tabled any amendments. I am grateful to the Members who have done so. The issue of commissioners is interesting. It is also interesting that the Government have chosen this model to codify in the Bill. From my experience, I believe that the London model of how this is done is far ahead of other combined or strategic authorities that already exist, and of the Government’s imagination in terms of the Bill. London Assembly members are used to having the equivalent of commissioners—deputy mayors—to scrutinise. The Assembly members do that effectively, not only by asking the deputy mayors questions and making them accountable, but also by providing them with evidence and new ideas, and by highlighting problems across the strategic area. Many effective changes have been brought through in that way.
However, to have those kinds of commissioners without that level of scrutiny is a mistake. In that respect, I am not in favour, and I am not convinced by the argument from my Liberal Democrat colleagues that people who are separately responsible for running services—many of them statutory services—and who have a lot of other responsibilities and duties in the constituent part of the strategic area are the right people to be given those kinds of roles. It is a really interesting question.
I have also found that, aside from a very short period when a Green deputy mayor was appointed to serve under an independent mayor in London, most mayors seem to be allergic to appointing anyone from an opposition party to any of those roles. There are examples of independently minded, effective, delivery-focused people. Chris Boardman, in Manchester, was mentioned. However, there does seem to be a party political element to the appointment of the roles, if the Minister and the Chair were to look at the record.
In conclusion on this clause—and it will come up in relation to other parts of the Bill—we collectively need a wider discussion about scrutiny and governance of the new roles. Some of the comments earlier from the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner suggested that if we all got together in a room, we might be able to come up with a better idea than what is being proposed. I very much agree with that. There are things that we should be discussing.
It was pointed out to us in evidence that we will lose something like 90% of our elected representation in certain areas. In certain parts of the country, people will end up with somewhat of a deficit of overall elected representatives—people to come to with casework. More should be looked at on whether or not a model more like the London Assembly could be adopted, where people are separately elected with strategic responsibilities. In London, there are constituency Assembly members, and Assembly members who are London-wide and take a more strategic view. Those are good models that have worked, and the Government and others should look at that. It is not up for debate today, but my new clause 15 proposes a review of scrutiny, which I will argue for later. When the Government come to look at this in review, which inevitably they will have to do, I hope they will look again at potentially having more directly elected—
David Simmonds
I am listening attentively to what the hon. Lady described. We heard in evidence from Councillor Sam Chapman-Allen of the District Councils’ Network that under these proposals, shire England stands to lose 90% of its elected representation, which the hon. Lady referred to. There is not anything really concrete in the Bill that sets out what scrutiny should look like—what those minimum standards should be. There are elements about conduct and things like that, but that is very basic. Does the hon. Lady have a view about what a good model should look like, so that local residents can exercise their control over what happens in their neighbourhood effectively?
Siân Berry
I am attempting in my speech not to be too biased towards what I am used to, because that is a failing as well. We should discuss this in a very open way. Other new clauses I have tabled contain proposals for things such as a citizens assembly. We should look at international examples as well. When there are proposals to spend a significant amount of money on the commissioners, there is value in spending an appropriate amount on decent scrutiny and elected representatives. Again, I am biased—I am an elected representative. I think we are good value, but that is a case to be made.
Finally, I cannot find any mention in schedule 3 about guidance that the Secretary of State may issue to commissioners about conduct, standards and transparency. I would like some reassurance from the Minister about guidance on those aspects of the job. Even if they are not elected, they are accountable to the public and must be given a process and regime of standards, and potentially be brought into existing standards systems. Without scrutiny, standards and regulations to govern their behaviour, I worry about this in the same way as several other Members today have.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
Commissioners can and will support mayors in getting the job done for their communities. They are not compulsory. There is no obligation on a mayor to appoint commissioners, but it gives the mayor the option of increasing capacity and expertise to do that. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion talked about the example of Greater Manchester, where they have council leaders who are portfolio leads. It is worth pointing out that Manchester also uses commissioners—for example, on active travel—so it can be complementary or can supplement. It is just giving them an additional set of levers in order to respond.
It is also worth pointing out that there will be some roles that the mayor has accountability for that they simply cannot delegate to councillors—for example, strategic planning powers, where direct delegation to a commissioner might expand the mayor’s capacity to dispense with that responsibility. However, to the point about checks and balances, which has been made time and again, it is important to be clear that we completely agree on the need for accountability for commissioners. They will be accountable to the mayor for their performance, who has the power to terminate their appointment, and the combined authority or combined county authority must also agree before any non-mayoral functions are delegated to the commissioner. Critically, the combined authority or combined county authority overview and scrutiny committee will also have the power to recommend the termination of commissioners if they think the commissioner is not performing or delivering. A two-thirds majority of members of the authority is required to accept that recommendation.
Siân Berry
Does the Minister believe that the people who are able to recommend that the commissioner be terminated have sufficient ways to discover whether or not they should be?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
The hon. Member made the point about the scrutiny of commissioners, which is a fair and valid point, and my hon. Friend the Member for North West Cambridgeshire made the point about flexibility in different contexts, particularly for smaller strategic authorities. We have come at this in such a way as to allow local areas as much flexibility as possible, but these are valid points about making sure that the model is flexible enough to respond to specific contexts. We will provide further detail in statutory guidance on the selection and appointment of commissioners, as well as other operational matters that the combined authority or combined county authority will need to consider, and we will take some of the points that have been raised as we do that in due course.
Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)
The Minister talks about our scrutiny committees being able to recommend the termination of commissioners. Has she given any thought to their involvement in the appointment of commissioners? For example, currently, those appointed as deputy police and crime commissioners have to appear before the police and crime panel, which makes a recommendation to the police and crime commissioner about their suitability for the role. Has the Minister given any thought to how scrutiny committees can get involved before someone takes on the commissioner role, rather than waiting to see if they are good or not and then making a recommendation to the mayor?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
We have done this through the constituent members of the combined authority, so that before an appointment can be made, the full combined authority will need to agree to that appointment. We think that provides sufficient safeguards and the ability to scrutinise; however, the point about how we ensure ongoing scrutiny of the work being done and the performance by more than the mayor and the combined authority is a fair point, and we will take it away.
Manuela Perteghella (Stratford-on-Avon) (LD)
The commissioners are not accountable to the public; they are accountable to the mayor, who will of course be elected. The Minister talks about scrutiny, but what about holding them to account on public standards? What kind of framework is there to ensure trust in these commissioners?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
All holders of public office have to adhere to public standards; that is as true for national Government as it is for regional and local government. We expect those standards to apply, and the safeguards we are putting in place by enabling the mayor to terminate based on performance or poor conduct will ensure that they are upheld.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3
Commissioners
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I beg to move amendment 70, in schedule 3, page 111, line 33, at end insert—
“(d) excepted fire and rescue functions.”
This would prevent a commissioner appointed by the mayor of a CCA from exercising “excepted fire and rescue functions” (defined in Amendment 71).
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 71, 73 and 74.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
The amendments will prevent a commissioner from exercising certain fire and rescue functions that should be reserved as functions of the mayor, as head of the fire and rescue authority in the area. The effective delegation of fire and rescue functions to a commissioner can ease capacity constraints on the mayor, by ensuring that there is a dedicated individual with the time and expertise to focus on executing those functions. Fire and rescue functions are already delegated successfully to deputy mayors for policing and crime in Greater Manchester and in York and North Yorkshire. The ability to delegate to a commissioner, without the need for secondary legislation, simplifies that process. If they wish, mayors will be able to make an existing deputy mayor for policing and crime the public safety commissioner, meaning that individual could lead on both policing and fire.
However, certain functions should be the sole responsibility of an elected mayor, as head of the fire and rescue authority. The retained functions are those with the most significant bearing on the strategic direction of the fire service, such as its budget, its risk plan, and the appointment or dismissal of the chief fire officer. It is important that these decisions are taken right at the top, and that the person taking them is accountable at the ballot box.
These amendments provide for the effective delegation of fire and rescue functions. They ensure that decisions are taken at the right level and support the Government’s commitment to ensure that our communities are safe.
Amendment 70 agreed to.
Amendment made: 71, in schedule 3, page 112, line 3, at end insert—
“(6) In this paragraph “excepted fire and rescue functions” means—
(a) functions under the following provisions of the FRSA 2004—
(i) section 13 (reinforcement schemes);
(ii) section 15 (arrangements with other employers of fire-fighters);
(iii) section 16 (arrangements for discharge of functions by others);
(b) the functions of—
(i) appointing, suspending or dismissing the chief fire officer;
(ii) approving the terms of appointment of the chief fire officer;
(iii) holding the chief fire officer to account for managing the fire and rescue service;
(c) approving—
(i) the community risk management plan;
(ii) the fire and rescue declaration;
(d) approving plans, modifications to plans and additions to plans for the purpose of ensuring that—
(i) as far as reasonably practicable, the CCA is able to perform its fire and rescue functions if an emergency occurs, and
(ii) the CCA is able to perform its functions so far as is necessary or desirable for the purpose of preventing an emergency or reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of an emergency, or taking other action in connection with it;
(e) approving any arrangements for the co-operation of the CCA in relation to its fire and rescue functions with other Category 1 responders and Category 2 responders in respect of—
(i) the performance of the CCA’s duty as a fire and rescue authority under section 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (duty to assess, plan and advise);
(ii) any duties under subordinate legislation made in exercise of powers under that Act.
(7) In sub-paragraph (6) and this sub-paragraph—
“Category 1 responder” and “Category 2 responder” have the meanings given in section 3 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (section 2: supplemental);
“chief fire officer” means the person with responsibility for managing the fire and rescue service;
“community risk management plan” means a plan which—
(a) is prepared and published by the combined authority in accordance with the Fire and Rescue National Framework, and
(b) sets out for the period covered by the document in accordance with the requirements of the Framework—
(i) the combined authority’s priorities and objectives, and
(ii) an assessment of all foreseeable fire and rescue related risks that could affect its community, in accordance with the discharge of the combined authority’s fire and rescue functions;
“emergency” has the meaning given in section 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (meaning of “emergency”);
“fire and rescue authority” means a fire and rescue authority under the FRSA 2004;
“fire and rescue declaration” means a document which—
(a) is prepared and published by the combined authority in accordance with the Fire and Rescue National Framework, and
(b) contains a statement of the way in which the combined authority has had regard, in the period covered by the document, to the Framework and to any community risk management plan prepared by the combined authority for that period;
“fire and rescue functions” means—
(a) functions of a fire and rescue authority which the combined authority has by virtue of an order under section 105A, or
(b) functions which the combined authority has as a fire and rescue authority by virtue of section 1(2)(f) or (g) of the FRSA 2004;
“Fire and Rescue National Framework” means the document prepared by the Secretary of State under section 21 of the FRSA 2004;
“fire and rescue service” means the personnel, services and equipment secured for the purposes of carrying out the functions of a fire and rescue authority under—
(a) section 6 of the FRSA 2004 (fire safety);
(b) section 7 of the FRSA 2004 (fire-fighting);
(c) section 8 of the FRSA 2004 (road traffic accidents);
(d) any applicable order under section 9 of the FRSA 2004 Act (emergencies);
(e) section 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (duty to assess, plan and advise) and any applicable subordinate legislation made under that Act;
(f) any other provision of, or made under, an enactment which confers functions on a fire and rescue authority;
“FRSA 2004” means the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)
This would define the “excepted fire and rescue functions” which a commissioner appointed by the mayor of a CCA would be prevented from exercising by Amendment 70.
David Simmonds
I beg to move amendment 293, in schedule 3, page 112, line 16, at end insert—
“(2A) The relevant remuneration panel may not recommend allowances which exceed the amount paid in salary to a person employed at director level within the relevant authority.”.
This amendment ensures that Commissioners cannot be paid more than Directors working for the authority.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 292, in schedule 3, page 112, line 22, at end insert—
“(5) The relevant remuneration panel must consider, and make recommendations about, whether commissioners appointed by the mayor, and councillors in the constituent areas, should be eligible for the local government pension scheme.
(6) Recommendations of the relevant remuneration panel relating to the local government pension scheme must have the aim of achieving value for money.”.
This amendment requires remuneration panels to consider whether mayoral commissioners should be eligible for the LGPS and justify those findings.
David Simmonds
These amendments concern the remuneration of commissioners and have two purposes.
There is a long-established principle within the arrangements for the remuneration of elected officials in local government that an independent panel, which is able to take evidence from the public and other good sources in the local area, will make a recommendation to the local authority about what the scheme of allowances payable should be. That brings a degree of transparency. Councils are currently required to consider the recommendations and to update their scheme from time to time, including voting to renew it each year. That has certain elements. One is whether commissioners—in this case, those who are appointed and are part of a mayoral combined authority—should be eligible for the local government pension scheme.
We heard an announcement from the Secretary of State on this issue, and it is the view of the shadow team that it is a sensible step. Changing the local government pension scheme from a final salary scheme to an average salary scheme was led by councillors, and it was instrumental in convincing a very large body of appointed officials to move over to that scheme, saving the taxpayer millions of pounds. However, it is also important that those appointed as commissioners are considered for eligibility and that each mayor is transparent about the recommendations and advice they have undertaken around that.
The second point to consider is around remuneration. We often hear it cited that there are people in the civil service, the NHS and local government who are paid more than the Prime Minister, which is used as a benchmark for excessive pay. Whether or not we agree with that—personally, I do not, as I recognise that there is a professional salary structure for these roles, in which those people will participate for the whole of their careers, that is very different from the context for politicians—it is none the less important to recognise that those who are appointed into mayoral roles should be subject to some degree of constraint.
As is the case with local government, it seems reasonable that we do not see elected officials appointed on a very significantly higher salary than senior professionals who are advising in the same field. The amendments aim to bring a degree of transparency and rigour to that, and to ensure that, in the potential circumstance where a mayor chooses to stretch the limits of their powers of appointment, shall we say, there is some degree of constraint so that the public can see that the taxpayer pound is being carefully husbanded.
Sam Carling
We have just heard the Minister speak about having statutory guidance on this issue. Does the hon. Member agree that one way of making this change, rather than through these amendments, would be for the guidance to include some clear indications to the remuneration panels about what roles they should consider comparable for mayoral commissioners. That might be council leaders or cabinet members rather than senior officers; or it may be senior officers, where appropriate.
David Simmonds
I understand the issue that the hon. Member is highlighting. One thing that emerged from the debate about councillor pensions was that they were essentially taken away by a decision of Parliament, without the process of legislation. One of the risks here is that statutory guidance, robust as it can be and coming with a duty to “have regard”, can be changed quite quickly. Therefore, if this is not clearly set out on the face of the Bill, the ability of this Parliament and of local communities, as we are observing, to exercise the degree of accountability and scrutiny that they might wish is undermined. That is why we have proposed these amendments.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I thank the hon. Member for his thoughtful contribution on this critical question of how to ensure value for money in the remuneration of commissioners. It is important that allowances paid to commissioners accurately reflect the work they do but also represent value for money. We completely agree with that principle. That is why the Bill, as drafted, has a clear process for setting the allowances of commissioners. The relevant authority must consider a report by a relevant remuneration panel, and payments cannot exceed the amount specified in that report.
Ultimately, what commissioners are paid is a local decision, and we have crafted the measures for that, but it is a decision that needs to be made in alignment with recommendations, as is the practice across local government. Adding a further requirement that commissioners cannot be paid more than directors would reduce local autonomy in decision making and would pre-emptively undermine the relevant remuneration panel. The Bill is about empowering places, but what we can and will consider is how we set up statutory guidance to provide clarity about what is possible and to deal with some of the potential pitfalls that the hon. Member has raised.
Amendment 292 seeks to place a duty on remuneration panels to consider and make recommendations about the local government pension scheme. Again, I understand the intent behind the amendment and the importance of ensuring that public officials in local government are properly remunerated and incentivised. However, I do not believe the amendment necessarily advances that.
We value the work that remuneration panels do to make considered recommendations about allowances that should be paid locally. However, overall access and eligibility to the local government pension scheme is dealt with at national level. It is therefore not clear what value the amendment would add, which is why I ask the shadow Minister to withdraw it.
David Simmonds
I have listened intently to what the Minister has said. I think the risk is that, if things are delegated to statutory guidance, what emerges later on will not meet the expectations set out in the debate. I will therefore push for a vote on these amendments.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I beg to move amendment 72, in schedule 3, page 112, line 23, leave out from beginning to end of line 27 and insert—
“Ending of appointment
8A The appointment of a person as a commissioner ends if—
(a) the appointment ceases to have effect in accordance with paragraph 2(2), 4(3) or 5,
(b) the appointment ends—
(i) in accordance with the terms and conditions included by virtue of paragraph 6(1), or
(ii) in accordance with paragraph 6(2),
(c) the appointment is terminated in accordance with its terms and conditions—
(i) by the mayor for the area of the CCA (whether that is the person who made the appointment or a successor), or
(ii) by the commissioner,
(d) the appointment ceases to have effect in accordance with paragraph 10(4), or
(e) the commissioner dies.”
This would state the ways in which the appointment of a commissioner can end.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
Simply, these amendments set out the ways in which a commissioner’s appointment can end. Specifically, it can end if the appointment is invalid, if the person becomes ineligible, if the term of the appointment ends, if the appointment is terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions, if a recommendation to terminate the commissioner’s appointment is accepted, or if the commissioner passes away.
We have talked about the accountability mechanisms that we are putting in place to ensure that commissioners play the role they should play, but they are accountable to the mayor. We have also talked about the role of the scrutiny committee in providing oversight and recommendations about termination.
Amendment 72 agreed to.
Amendments made: 73, in schedule 3, page 116, line 40, at end insert—
“(d) excepted fire and rescue functions.”
This would prevent a commissioner appointed by the mayor of a combined authority from exercising “excepted fire and rescue functions” (defined in Amendment 74).
Amendment 74, in schedule 3, page 117, line 10, at end insert—
“(6) In this paragraph ‘excepted fire and rescue functions’ means—
(a) functions under the following provisions of the FRSA 2004—
(i) section 13 (reinforcement schemes);
(ii) section 15 (arrangements with other employers of fire-fighters);
(iii) section 16 (arrangements for discharge of functions by others);
(b) the functions of—
(i) appointing, suspending or dismissing the chief fire officer;
(ii) approving the terms of appointment of the chief fire officer;
(iii) holding the chief fire officer to account for managing the fire and rescue service;
(c) approving—
(i) the community risk management plan;
(ii) the fire and rescue declaration;
(d) approving plans, modifications to plans and additions to plans for the purpose of ensuring that—
(i) as far as reasonably practicable, the CCA is able to perform its fire and rescue functions if an emergency occurs, and
(ii) the CCA is able to perform its functions so far as is necessary or desirable for the purpose of preventing an emergency or reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of an emergency, or taking other action in connection with it;
(e) approving any arrangements for the co-operation of the CCA in relation to its fire and rescue functions with other Category 1 responders and Category 2 responders in respect of—
(i) the performance of the CCA’s duty as a fire and rescue authority under section 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (duty to assess, plan and advise);
(ii) any duties under subordinate legislation made in exercise of powers under that Act.
(7) In sub-paragraph (6) and this sub-paragraph—
‘Category 1 responder’ and ‘Category 2 responder’ have the meanings given in section 3 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (section 2: supplemental);
‘chief fire officer’ means the person with responsibility for managing the fire and rescue service;
‘community risk management plan’ means a plan which—
(a) is prepared and published by the combined authority in accordance with the Fire and Rescue National Framework, and
(b) sets out for the period covered by the document in accordance with the requirements of the Framework—
(i) the CCA’s priorities and objectives, and
(ii) an assessment of all foreseeable fire and rescue related risks that could affect its community, in accordance with the discharge of the CCA’s fire and rescue functions;
‘emergency’ has the meaning given in section 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (meaning of ‘emergency’);
‘fire and rescue authority’ means a fire and rescue authority under the FRSA 2004;
‘fire and rescue declaration’ means a document which—
(a) is prepared and published by the CCA in accordance with the Fire and Rescue National Framework, and
(b) contains a statement of the way in which the CCA has had regard, in the period covered by the document, to the Framework and to any community risk management plan prepared by the CCA for that period;
‘fire and rescue functions’ means—
(a) functions of a fire and rescue authority which the CCA has by virtue of regulations under section 19, or
(b) functions which the CCA has as a fire and rescue authority by virtue of section 1(2)(f) or (g) of the FRSA 2004;
‘Fire and Rescue National Framework’ means the document prepared by the Secretary of State under section 21 of the FRSA 2004;
‘fire and rescue service’ means the personnel, services and equipment secured for the purposes of carrying out the functions of a fire and rescue authority under—
(a) section 6 of the FRSA 2004 (fire safety);
(b) section 7 of the FRSA 2004 (fire-fighting);
(c) section 8 of the FRSA 2004 (road traffic accidents);
(d) any applicable order under section 9 of the FRSA 2004 Act (emergencies);
(e) section 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (duty to assess, plan and advise) and any applicable subordinate legislation made under that Act;
(f) any other provision of, or made under, an enactment which confers functions on a fire and rescue authority;
‘FRSA 2004’ means the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004.”
This would define the “excepted fire and rescue functions” which a commissioner appointed by the mayor of a combined authority would be prevented from exercising by Amendment 73.
Amendment 75, in schedule 3, page 117, line 31, leave out from beginning to end of line 36 and insert—
“Ending of appointment
8A The appointment of a person as a commissioner ends if—
(a) the appointment ceases to have effect in accordance with paragraph 2(2), 4(3) or 5,
(b) the appointment ends—
(i) in accordance with the terms and conditions included by virtue of paragraph 6(1), or
(ii) in accordance with paragraph 6(2),
(c) the appointment is terminated in accordance with its terms and conditions—
(i) by the mayor for the area of the combined authority (whether that is the person who made the appointment or a successor), or
(ii) by the commissioner,
(d) the appointment ceases to have effect in accordance with paragraph 10(4), or
(e) the commissioner dies.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)
This would state the ways in which the appointment of a commissioner can end.
Schedule 3, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 10
Combined authorities and CCAs: allowances for members with special responsibilities
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
The clause will ensure that all combined authorities and combined county authorities can pay their members an allowance where they take on special responsibility for the combined authority or the combined county authority. Constituent council members regularly take on important additional responsibilities, particularly leading on policy portfolios such as housing or transport. We heard from the leader of Manchester city council about the important role she plays for that combined authority. They are crucial in driving forward local policy, ensuring that it meets the needs and aspirations of our communities. Indeed, their role will grow in importance as we increase the powers and functions available to combined authorities and combined county authorities.
However, currently, constituent council members can be paid for such special responsibilities only by their council, not the combined authority or combined county authority. This simply is not right; members should not be expected to do important work for free, and constituent councils should not foot the bill for work done in service of another body. Ensuring that the combined authority or combined county authority can pay its members creates a fairer system, allowing areas to recognise and reward hard work that delivers for communities. To ensure transparency and accountability, pay will be determined following a report by an independent remuneration panel.
David Simmonds
I draw the Minister’s attention to the existing arrangements for independent remuneration panels. She has referenced the proposals for how this kind of situation will be handled. However, we can envisage circumstances such as those that we heard about in Greater Manchester, where the mayoral commissioners are effectively drawn from the leadership of those local authorities.
There is a degree of ambiguity in proposed new sections 52A(6) and 113E(6), which refer to allowances paid
“in respect of the same special responsibilities”.
For example, I think of a situation where someone is a cabinet member with responsibility for transport in a constituent authority and also undertakes a strategic transport role as part of the combined authority. We as politicians would recognise that those are two different things, in the same way that a Minister undertaking duties in the Government is paid separately from their role as a Member of Parliament because those two things are distinct.
Transparency and clarity are important to retaining public confidence. Clearly, we do not want to create a situation where there is a degree of dispute, such as where a mayoral combined authority expects the constituent council to pay, or vice versa, and where an individual who wishes to take up those duties is inhibited from doing so. It would be helpful if the Minister could set out how the statutory guidance will address that issue so the Committee can be confident that we will not see this act as a barrier to participation in the governance of these new authorities.
Sam Carling
I have some more thrilling financial commentary, so I hope the Committee will forgive me. First, I welcome what the Minister has just said. Exactly this situation happened in Cambridgeshire and Peterborough, where our mayor went on medical leave for some time. His deputy, Councillor Anna Smith, who is a good friend of mine, ended up taking on the deputy mayoral role, so she had to drop hours at work and faced a significant loss of income. Our council took the decision to pay her as essentially a cabinet member, but it was not ideal. Clause 10 will resolve so many issues.
I want to highlight a discrepancy in that, at present, there is usually no allowance for members who sit on the combined authority board. A lot of the time, it is the leader of the council who does so, and it is often considered to be part of their portfolio, but it is not always leaders who sit on the board. That can lead to people taking on a very significant commitment without any financial support, despite potentially having to reduce hours at work and the like, if the councillor in question has a job, as many do. That is not conducive to having a diverse range of elected representatives to do these jobs.
Following local government reorganisation, if we have fewer leaders on boards and more holders of other portfolios and councillors, we may see this problem increase. I encourage the Minister to consider either altering the clause or making other provisions as the Bill progresses to allow combined authorities, if they wish, to pay an allowance to their board members for that role.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I understand the concerns expressed by the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner and the context in which that could arise. Our judgment is that if the independent remuneration committee does its job, we can mitigate around that. There is always a balance. We are trying to live the spirit of the Bill and to create as much autonomy, space and power for the mayor and constituent authorities to make such decisions, rather than us specifying nationally. As we get representations from strategic authorities going through the process, we will reflect that in statutory guidance, but we think we have the right balance. The important role that the remuneration committee will play will help to mitigate some of the risks the hon. Member mentioned.
On the specific example raised by my hon. Friend the Member for North West Cambridgeshire, we are not prohibiting elected members from sitting on the combined authority. It is within the gift of the combined authority. Again, we are giving as much flexibility as possible for an authority to come up with measures that work for a particular local area.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 11
Mayoral combined authorities and CCAs: precepts
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I beg to move amendment 82, in clause 11, page 14, leave out from line 35 to line 13 on page 15 and insert—
“(a) omit subsection (11)(a);
(b) in subsection (11)(b), for ‘that section’ substitute ‘section 107G of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009’;
(c) omit subsection (12)(a);
(d) in subection 12(b), for ‘that section’ substitute ‘section 41 of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023’.”
This removes the restriction on mayoral combined authorities and mayoral CCAs only being able to issue a precept in connection with mayoral functions.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
The amendment updates the clause to ensure that mayors have the power to precept across all their functions. It replaces the provisions added to the Local Government Finance Act 1992 by the Bill, which needed clarification. The amendment will mean that, by virtue of being major precepting authorities, combined authorities and combined county authorities will have the power to precept across all their functions. It repeals provisions that previously restricted that precepting power to specific functions. The amendment more effectively meets the policy intention to allow mayors to precept for everything that they are required to do. That will give mayors more flexibility in how to fund mayoral priorities to create growth and improve local services.
Government amendments 76 and 79 provide that the issuing of precepts under the Local Government Finance Act is a function exercisable only by the mayor, and that that is the case for mayoral and non-mayoral functions. By removing restrictions from the existing legislation, the amendments will establish that precepting is a function of the mayor for expenditure relating to mayoral and non-mayoral functions, meeting the original policy intention. It has always been the intention of the Government that issuing a mayoral council tax precept should be a function of the mayor alone. The amendments will ensure that that will be the case and will ensure that mayors can precept across all their functions.
David Simmonds
The Opposition have significant concerns about the import of amendments 82, 76 and 79. We have made a number of references to some interactions with different elements of local government finance, but clearly the measures will open the door to very substantial tax rises through the vehicle of the mayoral precept. Worse than that, they open it up to being used for any purpose, in effect.
In the sometimes tense relationship between central and local government, there are disputes about who should pick up the tab—for example, the ongoing debate about asylum costs. That is very much having an effect in my local authority, which has the highest number of asylum seekers per capita of any in the country. Such individuals are only a cost to the local authority, as a result of central Government policy. The Bill opens up the scope for mayors to directly tax people for the purposes of environmental legislation, or social care, which consumes around 70% of the budgets of local authorities, or any other function that authorities may choose to undertake—making Manchester a nuclear-free zone, or whatever it may be—despite the fact that those are not functions that mayors undertake by statute. I am sure we all agree that there should be an opportunity for politicians to speak up, but there needs to be some limit on it.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I would just point out to the hon. Gentleman that the mayoral precept was introduced in 2017 by a Conservative Government, and that mayors are directly elected. Like Members of Parliament, mayors are not immune to political pressures around tax rises, and examples across the country show that mayors are as thoughtful about the right balance between investing in their services and managing tax increases as national politicians—in fact, when we think about the record of the last Government, perhaps more so.
David Simmonds
That was a fairly shameless political pitch, but we should just reflect on the debates that took place across the Dispatch Boxes yesterday during Housing, Communities and Local Government questions, when it was highlighted that we have a Mayor of London who is quite happy to issue precepts to indulge his personal political priorities but is an abject failure in discharging his mayoral functions around housing. Thousands of people are unable to find homes in the capital because the mayor is failing to build out more than 300,000 planning permissions that have already been granted by the local authorities. That is an injustice that is being inflicted on the citizens of our capital, and this provision, as envisaged by this Labour Government, potentially inflicts the same, or an even greater, injustice on other areas of the country. For those reasons, we remain deeply concerned about it.
Particularly in an environment where, as we heard earlier, local authorities were left £1.5 billion worse off—net—by the Government’s decision to introduce additional taxes on their employees, the temptation will be for the mayoral precept to be seen as the catch-all or safety valve through which additional taxes can be extracted to meet whatever demand central Government choose to impose, without central Government being accountable for it. That is why we oppose the measures.
Siân Berry
I had not previously heard the Conservatives’ argument on this issue, and I have to say that I disagree. The Minister said that the original intention of the policy was to allow for a wide range of precepting, and if there is one thing that directly elected mayors are really accountable for, it is the level of precept that they set.
I am in favour of creativity in conversations with the electorate about what initiatives, appropriate to the local area, might be funded by precept on a short-term basis or just in the local area. The way that the provision is set up allows mayors to be properly accountable for that. I worry less about it resulting in huge tax rises without consent, because consent is built in at election time.
I appreciate the concerns about austerity continuing in councils that are underneath and part of the combined authority if mayors are taking up available taxpaying powers. In every debate in this Committee, I would love to bring up the fact that all this reorganisation is happening in the absence of an end to austerity. The Government need to provide more funding to local councils so that this is not all being taken in council tax, which is a very unfair tax.
Vikki Slade
I have no principled objection to the mayor setting a precept. I found it confusing when I heard Mayor Houchen explain how he had a zero precept. How does anything get done? Where does the money come from? [Interruption.] I am sure he has a salary, and I am sure he has an extensive office that is paid for by someone. I accept that the principle of a precept is, in some respects, self-limiting, but what bothers me is that the combined authority mayors have no referendum cap, unlike upper-tier, lower-tier, police and crime or fire authorities.
It is fire authorities I particularly want to speak to, because although some Government amendments have been tabled on the role of the mayor in terms of fire and rescue, there is almost silence in the Bill about the role of the fire and rescue service, while embracing it completely and almost making the whole service disappear. I am really concerned that fire authorities are already desperately under-resourced. Dorset and Wiltshire Fire and Rescue Service gets £1.76 a week per household. It has desperately been trying to get a 20p per week increase, but has been told, “No, you can’t have that.” There is nothing in the Bill that protects and ringfences any money for fire services, whereas there is more talk about police services. I am looking for some reassurance and commitment about how fire services funding will be properly resourced and ringfenced to make sure that no area suffers as when we had those horrendous wildfires, where fire services had to beg, borrow and steal equipment.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
We are all hugely sympathetic to the funding of fire and rescue—as we see climate change, the imperative of fire and rescue services is key—but it is outside the scope of the Bill. We believe that we have the balance right between allowing precepting powers for mayors and allowing democratic accountability by which the electorate can hold any mayor and politician to account.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I beg to move amendment 77, in clause 11, page 15, line 15, at end insert—
“(b) in subsection (4)(a), for the words from “consists” to the end of that paragraph substitute “includes a separate component in respect of the mayor’s PCC functions,”.”
This provides for flexibility where the mayor of a mayoral combined authority has PCC functions as to how the components of the authority’s council tax calculation which relate to the authority’s other functions (both mayoral and non-mayoral) are to be set out.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 78, 80 and 81.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
The amendment relates to where a mayor has police and crime commissioner functions: secondary legislation about the arrangements for setting the precept must provide that the police and crime commissioner component is ringfenced. Where a mayor has police and crime functions for more than one police and crime commissioner area, secondary legislation must provide that there is a separate police and crime component for each area. The legislation currently provides that there must be separate components for police and crime administrative functions and for mayoral general functions.
The amendments mean that Ministers have the flexibility to provide for either one component for non-police and crime functions, or multiple separate components for different types of non-police and crime functions. I hope Members are following. This gives Ministers the option to direct how precept spending on non-police and crime functions is accounted for, by setting this out clearly in secondary legislation. In doing so, they will be able to ensure that the precept is accounted for in ways that best reflect how the precept should be spent—whether that means allowing for full flexibility across the non-police and crime component, or ringfencing money to be used for certain functions.
Amendments 78 and 81 will give the Secretary of State the ability to make an order about the preparation of budgets for all an authority’s functions. The provision in the Bill currently only provides that power in relation to the mayor’s general functions. This needs to be updated to align with the expanded mayoral precepting powers introduced by the Bill. This allows Ministers to set out the procedures that should be followed in the preparation and calculation of a budget.
By enabling Ministers to set clear direction on the preparation of budgets and the calculation of precepts, these amendments allow for consistent processes to be set across the sector, to give full effect to the expanded precepting powers.
David Simmonds
I have two questions for the Minister. First, given that these budgets, and the precepts that the amendments relate to, will sit within that bit of the Local Government Finance Act 1992, will the requirement for budgets to be balanced in-year apply to all the accounts that the Secretary of State will be giving direction to?
The second question—the Minister may wish to write to the Committee on this—is, will the consistency that she referred to be introduced by giving the Secretary of State individual, and in effect case-by-case, power to issue these directions for different authorities? Clearly, our concern is that if the door has been opened to, in effect, unlimited precept rises, and these were to be used by the Secretary of State to bail out a significant amount of debt in one of these reorganised local authorities—which I know is a significant concern of many of the local authorities that are proposing reorganisation—that would not apply everywhere.
There are certain parts of the country where there are very high levels of debt, and others where those levels of debt do not exist at all. It would be, in effect, a condition of those constituent authorities’ doing the devolution at all that they were not asked to bear that cost. Yet this Bill introduces a back-door power for the Secretary of State to direct that they would go down that route. How do the Government propose to ensure that that is forestalled, so that they can have the assurances that they would need as a necessary minimum?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
There are two processes that I, as the Minister for devolution, as opposed to the Minister for local government reorganisation, am constantly keen to emphasise. There is a devolution process and there is a local government reorganisation process, which my colleague the Minister for Local Government and Homelessness, my hon. Friend the Member for Birkenhead (Alison McGovern), is taking forward. We know that some authorities are in a difficult financial position as part of that, and we are having a conversation with those authorities in the context of the proposals they are putting forward. That is still very distinct from what we are trying to do through the devolution process, and it is important that colleagues do not conflate the two.
What I would say on the wider questions that the hon. Gentleman raised is that there is nothing that we are proposing to do through the Bill that denudes or undermines the standards for financial prudence and financial accountability that sit across the local government landscape.
David Simmonds
Turning to the question of how a mayoral precept will be used under this group of amendments that the Government have tabled, if we think of the reorganisation in Thurrock or Surrey, both those local authority areas contain a single authority that has a very high level of capital borrowing, or a high level of debt. Those authorities have been assured that there will be three years’ worth of revenue support; in effect, there will be a Government grant to cover the revenue cost of the borrowing for three years. However, the borrowing cost is extended over 40 or 50 years, so there will be a very long period of time where, as things currently stand, that local authority will be expected to meet that cost, when it comes into being.
Clearly, one way of doing that is for the Secretary to State to say, “You will raise your precept, and that is how we will deal with the debt,” but that runs contrary to the proposals for devolution where those authorities have said, “We will do this, but it is simply not fair or ethical for us to accept those debts on to our books.” I am just seeking an assurance from the Minister that either the existing provisions that require the in-year balancing will apply, in which case the Government will deal with this prior to the devolution arrangement coming into existence, or the provisions will not apply, in which case those authorities need to be mindful that the likely consequence of devolution will be a massive increase in the precept levy purely for the purpose of paying off someone else’s debt.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
To answer the specific question, yes, in-year balancing will apply. The purpose of the precepting function is to allow the mayor to invest in key things that will drive the economic prosperity of the area and the core functions that we have set out in the Bill. It would be a very brave mayor who chose to raise the precept not to deliver on that. In the end, they are democratically elected, and it will be for their residents and constituents to show them the consequences of that at the ballot box.
Amendment 77 agreed to.
Amendments made: 78, in clause 11, page 15, line 15, at end insert—
“(b) in subsection (5)(b), after ‘functions,’ insert ‘or the other functions of the authority (other than any PCC functions that are exercisable by the mayor), or both’.”
This enables the Secretary of State to require the mayor of a combined authority to prepare an annual budget in relation to the authority’s functions, excluding any mayoral PCC functions, either separately to or in combination with the budget relating to the mayor’s general functions.
Amendment 79, in clause 11, page 15, line 17, at end insert—
“(b) in subsection (2), omit ‘in respect of mayoral functions’.”
This provides that the issuing of precepts under the Local Government Finance Act 1992 in respect of expenditure relating to the functions of a mayoral CCA is a function exercisable by the mayor acting on behalf of the CCA.
Amendment 80, in clause 11, page 15, line 17, at end insert—
“(b) in subsection (4)(a), for the words from ‘consists’ to the end of that paragraph substitute ‘includes a separate component in respect of the mayor’s PCC functions,’.”
This provides for flexibility where the mayor of a mayoral CCA has PCC functions as to how the components of the CCA’s council tax calculation which relate to the CCA’s other functions (both mayoral and non-mayoral) are to be set out.
Amendment 81, in clause 11, page 15, line 17, at end insert—
“(b) in subsection (5)(b), after ‘functions,’ insert ‘or the other functions of the CCA (other than any PCC functions that are exercisable by the mayor), or both’.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)
This enables the Secretary of State to require the mayor of a CCA to prepare an annual budget in relation to the CCA functions, excluding any mayoral PCC functions, either separately to or in combination with the budget relating to the mayor’s general functions.
Clause 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Power to borrow
Manuela Perteghella
I beg to move amendment 20, in clause 12, page 16, line 24, at end insert—
“(9AA) A combined authority or CCA must provide a report to the Secretary of State to lay before both Houses of Parliament a report detailing the reasons for which they are seeking consent to exercise the power conferred by section 1.”
This amendment would require the combined authority or CCA to lay a report before Parliament detailing the reasons for which they are seeking the Secretary of State’s consent for exercise of the powers conferred by section 1 on mayoral combined authority or mayoral CCA.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 83
Clause stand part.
Manuela Perteghella
The amendment would require any combined authority seeking new devolved powers to lay a formal report before Parliament, explaining why it is seeking those powers and how it intends to use them. It is of absolute importance that any devolution of powers is set within a framework of transparency and visibility on the reasoning, evidence base or expected outcomes for local people. The amendment would bring the process out of the shadows and make it open, transparent and accountable to the people whom local authorities are meant to serve.
The powers devolved under the Bill are significant. They constitute major transfers of authority over transport, housing, strategic planning, education and skills, health and more. Such decisions must be backed by clear reasoning and, above all, a public mandate. The devolution of powers should be clearly justified and democratically accountable, and must not be imposed on communities or done for political convenience. Local residents must understand why an authority is seeking certain powers and what benefits they can expect them to deliver. MPs and peers—our Parliament—must be given the opportunity to assess whether devolution requests are handled consistently and fairly across regions. I therefore urge the Minister to consider our amendment.
Paul Holmes
I thank the hon. Lady for giving way at what I think was the end of her speech. I just wondered whether she or her party had done any analysis of the extra cost that her amendment would put on mayoral authorities. I feel that the Liberal Democrats in Committee are having their cake and eating it—they have said that they want absolute devolution to local people, but now they want accountability to this Parliament on how the devolved mayor spends their money. We have no extra or special democratic right to do that, rather than the mayors who are being proposed. Has she looked at the cost that her proposal might put on the mayors?
Manuela Perteghella
We have not looked at the costs, but we need to understand that the Bill devolves significant powers, possibly to one person. My local authority is a three-tier one at the moment, and we are very happy with that, but now the district councils will be abolished and possibly the county council, and we will have to be part of a unitary authority and then a strategic authority. It is important that we as MPs are here to stand up for our communities and residents. We need to ensure that anyone who gains more powers comes to them through Parliament.
Sean Woodcock (Banbury) (Lab)
The hon. Lady and her party seem to be proposing that every single potential devolution should come before this House for scrutiny. That would take up a considerable amount of the time of the House, as well as incur the costs picked up on by the hon. Member for Hamble Valley. Is her amendment just about kicking devolution into the long grass, rather than being serious?
Manuela Perteghella
No, the amendment is not kicking anything into the long grass. We have to get the Bill—this devolution—right. It is all about accountability, as I said when we were discussing the commissioners. This is a big change. Some of the Committee will already have unitary authorities and I will talk later about devolved Administrations, but for my constituency, that will be new. We need to get it right. Going back to the cost, that will be smaller compared with the cost of what could go wrong.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I will speak to clause stand part and amendment 83 before responding directly to amendment 20. On the clause, all existing mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities have powers to borrow for all their functions. That allows them to invest in economically productive infrastructure. Unlike for local authorities, the existing process for confirming the power to borrow money on mayoral combined and mayoral combined county authorities is by making a bespoke statutory instrument after an institution has been established. To confirm such powers by bespoke statutory instrument is highly inefficient and slow. The clause streamlines the process by giving the power to borrow to mayoral combined authorities and county authorities for purposes relevant to all their functions. It preserves existing safeguards by requiring them to obtain the Secretary of State’s consent before they exercise the power for the first time in respect of functions other than transport, policing, and fire and rescue. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Government amendment 83 is minor and technical. It simply clarifies that the reference to section 12 coming into force relates to clause 12 of the Bill. Amendment 20 would require a combined authority or combined county authority to produce a report, to be laid before the House by the Secretary of State, detailing the reasons for which they are seeking consent to exercise borrowing powers. As my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury and Opposition Members have pointed out, this would be an onerous, costly and time-consuming process. The amendment is well-intentioned, but we do not think it necessary.
Like the rest of local government, combined authorities and combined county authorities must operate within the prudential framework, which comprises statutory duties and codes that are intended to ensure that all borrowing and investment is prudent, affordable and sustainable. The framework already provides robust mechanisms of oversight and accountability. In addition, the exercise of borrowing powers by mayoral combined authorities and county authorities to date has not raised issues. Amendment 20 also contradicts the Bill’s aim of furthering devolution and increasing financial autonomy for these authorities. For this reason, I hope that the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon will withdraw it.
David Simmonds
I want to make sure that I can reconcile the Minister’s observations and the import of the amendments with her reply to me earlier, when she said that the requirement to balance in-year will apply. Clearly, the provisions essentially state that the Secretary of State can give consent for a substantial degree of borrowing, but it is not at all clear in the clause or the amendments what the purpose of the borrowing would be.
Manchester’s improvements to its transport system are fantastic, but they were funded by central Government as part of the devolution deal, and they are now creating a significant ongoing deficit in the mayoral budget, which has to be covered, essentially, through precepting—by levying those in the local area to cover the cost. There is clearly a concern with that. If the borrowing is for capital purposes there is a clear strategy for its repayment, and it must be for the purposes of capital investment. However, if borrowing is undertaken to cover shortfalls between revenue and the mayor’s expenditure on day-to-day costs, this House would have significant concerns about it in relation to our national accounts. Can the Minister tell the Committee how that decision making will sufficiently constrain a mayor or combined authority from undertaking borrowing that is for the purposes of day-to-day revenue expenditure, so that we do not find a large debt bubble growing underneath these new bodies?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
Yes, I will answer that question. There is a contradiction in the hon. Member’s position. He has spent much of today talking about the need for us to take a more local approach and to give local leaders and communities control, yet he is talking about restricting that very power. Everything that the strategic authority and mayoral combined authority will do will have to operate within the prudential framework. There are robust mechanisms to ensure that all their financial mechanisms adhere to the standards that we expect across local government and national Government.
The shadow Minister gave the example of Greater Manchester. That was a combination of a grant—a lot of devolved areas have an investment fund—borrowing and precepting. That is what we would expect for big capital projects. My experience suggests that mayors across the country have the aptitude and ability to make the right economic decisions on how they balance investment in things that will unlock the economic potential of their areas. We should trust them to do so, as the hon. Member has been saying all day.
Manuela Perteghella
As I said, the amendment would give Parliament the opportunity to assess whether devolution requests are handled with consistency and fairness across the regions, because at the moment they are not. I therefore wish to press it to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
We have a number of clauses on which I feel we can make some progress. My proposal is that we get to either the end of clause 19 or 5 pm, whichever comes first. I will not sit here in the cold for much longer than that.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
As the local transport authority, combined authorities and combined county authorities deliver a range of local transport functions across their area. Each combined authority or combined county authority agrees its own transport budget for the year and, in many cases, constituent councils contribute to this through a transport levy. This is because constituent councils receive funding for some transport functions directly from Government.
The clause standardises the power for combined authorities and combined county authorities to levy such funding from their constituent councils to cover the cost of their transport functions, where they are not otherwise met. This power has proved effective in supporting transport delivery in local areas. For example, each of the seven councils of the West Midlands combined authority pays a levy based on its population figures, which goes on to fund a range of functions from subsidised bus services to the English national concessionary travel scheme, which provides free bus travel for eligible older and disabled people.
This power complements clause 39, which provides combined authorities and combined county authorities with the power to pay grants to constituent councils. Together, these powers support partnership working between combined authorities and combined county authorities and their constituent members.
David Simmonds
Again, I seek a point of clarification from the Minister. I understand the purpose of the clause, but clearly there is a distinction between a levy, where it is the constituent authority that is required to pay, and a precept, where it is the taxpayer who is paying for it through their council tax bill. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify, if necessary in writing, how it will work where there is a dispute about the payment.
If we take London as an example, we have a London-wide concessionary travel scheme, but it is has very different application in different boroughs. It is easy to foresee a situation where, particularly if the purpose of the overall transport levy does not benefit the whole of the mayoral combined authority area, there will be a dispute about whether that is an appropriate way forward. Particularly if the levy is large, it would have a significant impact on the budget of the constituent local authority. Can the Minister set out how that type of process will be addressed in practice?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I have agreed that I will write on the specifics; I think this question comes back to the same theme of how we mitigate collective decision making and agreement across constituent authorities that put at risk their financial viability, or cut across the legal obligation of a particular constituent authority, and I will capture that in writing. However, I would say that we cannot legislate for every eventuality. Indeed, I do not think that is the purpose of legislation. What we can draw on is the practice that we see across the country. Broadly, it is not in the interests of a mayor, who has been democratically elected by the residents and constituents of any of their constituent authorities, to make decisions that will be fundamentally detrimental to those constituents.
The Chair
I am grateful to the Minister for saying that she will include that in her correspondence, which we look forward to with enthusiasm.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 14
Combined authorities and CCAs: minor amendments
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
Committee members will recall that clause 1 introduced the established mayoral strategic authority as a specific type of strategic authority. It drew a distinction between combined authorities and combined county authorities led by a mayor, and those operating without one. Clause 14 inserts the formal definitions of an established mayoral strategic authority, a non-mayoral combined authority and a non-mayoral combined county authority into the relevant existing legislation. These are minor but necessary provisions intended to give clear meaning to the existing legislation.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 15
Additional functions of the GLA
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
It is vital that the devolution framework works for the unique circumstances of London’s governance, which we have talked about in this Committee. That is why the Bill will enable Government to confer functions on the Mayor of London, the Greater London Authority and its functional bodies. Previously, the Government could change the powers of the Greater London Authority only via primary legislation. This clause brings London into line with other strategic authorities by enabling the Government to change its powers via secondary legislation. This will ensure that the Greater London Authority benefits from the devolution framework and can deepen its powers over time.
David Simmonds
Again, I have a question of clarification; can the Minister tell the Committee whether these powers apply to a transfer of functions, as opposed to the conferral of functions? We know there have been situations, and we can certainly envisage some within the overall package of the Bill, where the statutory duties of the constituent authorities could be transferred over to the mayor, either en bloc or in part. Indeed, there might be times when it might be a sensible approach; if there is an example of a significant failure in one authority, that could be looked after by the mayoral office while the situation is turned around—that goes to the point raised about South Northamptonshire. However, can the Minister clarify whether this refers solely to new powers that are conferred, or opens up the door to the transfer of functions that are currently statutory duties of constituent authorities?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
This clause relates to functions and powers that sit underneath the devolution framework that we have talked about and are putting on the face of the Bill, and the seven areas of competencies that this measure applies to.
We currently have a situation where, for example, certain powers will go to Greater Manchester that currently would not necessarily go to the Mayor of London and the GLA, and that does not feel right. Clause 15 allows a mechanism and a process to make sure that there is consistency across the piece, and that we can achieve that without having to go through primary legislation.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16
Members of legislatures disqualified for being a mayor of a strategic authority
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
Clause 16 will prevent individuals from being a Member of Parliament, or of the devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland, and a mayor of a strategic authority at the same time.
The Government are clear that mayors are central to delivering the growth, economic prosperity and change that local communities want. Already, the impact of our mayors, from West Yorkshire to the North East, from Greater London to the West Midlands, is being felt clearly. However, their responsibilities will only increase once this Bill is in law.
It is right that the role of mayor receives the officeholder’s full time and attention. Both MPs and mayors have a duty to represent the constituents that elected them. Fulfilling two different democratic roles could lead to conflicts of interest, given the differences in public expectations for each role and the differing responsibilities of a mayor and an MP. Clause 16 prevents that conflict and will ensure that regions benefit from their mayor’s full time and attention.
Siân Berry
I agree with the principle of not having too many people able to do double-hatting, but it is a fact that there have been overlapping periods when mayors of different combined authorities and London have also been MPs, either at the beginning or end of their term. That has been dealt with in a pragmatic way, with nobody overextending those kinds of double-hatted jobs.
As I understand it, and I would like the Minister to clarify this, writing this rule into statute would mean that, while nobody would be prevented from campaigning to be a mayor or an MP while in either of these jobs, at the moment they are elected, the situation then becomes illegal. An instant resignation takes place on that day. There would be immense disruption across a wide area—perhaps not so much for one constituency, as we have got used to having by-elections for various reasons, but in holding a mayoral by-election.
I wanted to check whether the Government’s intentions here, in making that resignation statutory and instant, are not a bit too much, when these issues have been previously worked out. Does there need to be more detail in the clause to allow for a transition period?
David Simmonds
The Opposition have a high degree of sympathy with the points made by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. It is very striking when we compare our local and regional democracy with those of other countries: in our nearest neighbour, France, with the cumul des mandats, there is almost an expectation enshrined in their politics that, for someone to become Member of the national Parliament, they will have represented their area as a mayor. Indeed, when President Chirac cast around to find someone who was eminently qualified to become Prime Minister of that country, he took the view that there was nobody within the National Assembly who could possibly meet that standard; it needed to be somebody from local or regional government. He lighted on Alain Juppé, the well-reputed mayor of Bordeaux, who served with great distinction as Prime Minister. If we begin to introduce restrictions of this nature, it will significantly constrain the ability of our politics to rise to the challenges that our communities and our areas face.
Paul Holmes
I am not sure that I can beat the excellent oratory of my hon. Friend the shadow Minister, but I want to add some context in my own style on why this clause is a bit of a sledgehammer to crack a nut.
The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion has adequately and expertly addressed why there may be need for overlap in different local situations. She is absolutely correct to say that there have been instances where that overlap has been dealt with in an orderly manner and has been sorted within the usual confines of the democratic mechanisms we currently have.
All the way through the Bill, which I think has admirable aims, the Minister and the Government have said, “Let local people decide.” Now, local people presumably have elected those mayors or those MPs who now might want to be a mayor; I declare an interest here, as this clause will stop me running for the Hampshire and the Solent mayoralty. I will not cry in front of the Minister, but it will mean that my hon. Friends here would have to listen to some of my more mundane speeches for the next three or four years.
Local people have elected their MPs and they should have the right to determine whether those MPs are the people they want to be the mayors. The hon. Member for Barnsley North (Dan Jarvis), served as a mayor from 2018 to 2022. At no point did anybody on the Labour side of the House say that he was not good enough to do both jobs at the same time. Ken Livingstone was a mayor and a Member of Parliament from 2000 to 2001. I do not think anybody who was on the Labour side of the House at the time—I grant that many of the Members on that side of the Committee Room were not in the House at the time—was saying that he could not do two jobs at the same time.
This clause just seems very restrictive. If an election is going ahead and a city or region says, “Actually, we do not want you to be our mayor—we want you to remain an MP”, that person will not win the election. The Minister has said many times today that, on elections and democracy, local people should have their say. I find it strange that we seem to be taking quite a restrictive measure on who can and cannot stand in a democratic event, decided democratically by local people, for candidates who, presumably, are local too. I have some concern that this is overreach.
I also think that MPs are generally sensible—I do not want to create breaking news here, but they are generally sensible and, as the Minister said in the context of mayors setting council tax precepts, they are also not immune to the moods and feelings of the local people that they serve. If a local MP wants to stand for election as mayor, they have the right to say that to their constituents. If they get a massive kickback from their constituents, they either will not win the mayoralty or they will not stand.
Local MPs should have the right to make that decision. Local people in that constituency or that region should have the right to say that they do not want that person; or that they might want that person, and allow that person to stand down from Parliament at a time of their choosing, if they are allowed to stand for the mayoralty, and resist the cost of a sudden burst of by-elections to this House. Let local people decide. Let local politicians be local. If they are not wanted, they will not be voted in.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I thank hon. Members for their comments, and I have some sympathy with the arguments made. However, in a world where we are giving greater powers to mayors, which is the process we are going through with this devolution Bill, the idea that someone can exercise those functions to the best of their ability alongside the very important role we all do as MPs is a stretch. It is right for residents and constituents that we say, “If you are elected as a mayor, you ought to be doing that job full time.”
Several hon. Members rose—
Miatta Fahnbulleh
If I may finish, I will give way to hon. Members. The point about transition is a fair one. To clarify, we are setting out in legislation that, at the point someone is elected as a mayor, they resign as an MP, and vice versa. It is at the point of gaining office that this comes into effect. In response to the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion’s example of the transition period when campaigning, there are flexibilities within that.
Siân Berry
I appreciate that, but these are two things in different directions. A sitting mayor who becomes an MP would need to resign as mayor that day, given what the Minister has just outlined for us. A mayoral by-election across a large area is a much bigger thing than a parliamentary by-election, and I am not sure that making it instantly statutorily illegal has been properly thought through.
David Simmonds
I ask the Minister to reflect that it used to be the practice of this House that any MP appointed as a Minister had to resign and fight a by-election, because they were undertaking a function different from that for which their constituents had originally elected them. That practice was abandoned because of the extent of the disruption it caused to the work of government and of the House, as well as the cost of those by-elections, so I ask the Government to reflect. We have learned from experience, cross-party, that having these types of requirements is not conducive to good democracy. Perhaps the Minister will undertake to reflect on that.
Paul Holmes
Yes. I thank the Minister for involuntarily giving way to me—Sir John, your rule as Chair is a very happy time for me. The Minister may now think I am being facetious, but I assure her that I am not; I have genuine agreements with her vision for devolution. On her response, however, to the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion about someone not being able to fulfil two jobs to the best of their ability, can the same argument not be made for Members of this House who are elected while councillors? I am speaking particularly of the Liberal Democrats, but also of some within the Conservative party, such as my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne, who is sitting behind me. Does the Minister stand by her view that someone cannot do those two roles at the same time? Why is it acceptable for that role, or even for her role as a Minister while she is an MP, as my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner mentioned, but the roles of the mayoralty and the MP seem to be different?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
We are trying to create empowered mayors with huge responsibility over transport, housing, infrastructure and skills. That is a full-time job—bigger even, candidly, than that of an individual Minister. It is absolutely right that they should, if elected to do that job, be doing that job. Hon. Members have made important points about how we get the transition right in order not to have disruption. I thank the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner for his encyclopaedic knowledge of the history of local and national government and the precedent that Ministers used to resign their seats. We will reflect on that and think about how we get the transition right.
Paul Holmes
My intervention will be very brief. I am slightly burnt by my experience on the Planning and Infrastructure Bill Committee, where the Minister constantly said that they would reflect, and we never heard back from them until after the Committee had finished. May I seek assurance from the Minister—she does not need to give an answer today—that, on the point of the immediacy of the vacation of the office, she will come back to us in writing to give us the steer of her reflections and what actions she will take in regard to these concerns, if any? Will she commit to doing that before the Committee rises?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I am happy to make that commitment.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
Clauses 17 and 18 make technical but necessary changes to existing legislation. As hon. Members will know, some functions conferred on combined authorities or combined county authorities are exercisable only by a mayor acting on behalf of the authority.
Clause 17 clarifies that, where a function is conferred on a mayor, it should be taken to be a function of the underlying authority that is exercisable only by the mayor acting on behalf of the combined authority or combined county authority. This is because mayors of strategic authorities are not corporate entities in themselves; therefore, all functions must be conferred on the underlying authority.
Clause 18 clarifies the meaning and extent of the “general functions” of mayors in combined authorities and combined county authorities. The term “general functions” here refers to non-police and crime functions. It is appropriate for the mayor alone to be able to exercise their judgment in certain cases, and to be held fully accountable for those decisions and ultimately to the public. I commend these clauses to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19
Report under section 1 of the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016
The Chair
We now come to amendment 361 in the name of Manuela Perteghella. Do you wish to press this to a vote?
Paul Holmes
On a point of order, Sir John. Forgive me, I may be ignorant on this, but on the selection list I do not see amendment 361 in the running order. If you could give me some clarification, I would be very grateful.
Manuela Perteghella
I beg to move amendment 363, in clause 19, page 22, line 32, at end insert—
“(f) progress with the implementation of the strategy provided for in section [Duty to publish and implement a Forward Devolution Strategy].”.
This amendment is consequential on NC46.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 46—Duty to publish and implement a Forward Devolution Strategy—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within two years beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, prepare and publish a forward devolution strategy (“the strategy”).
(2) The purpose of the strategy is to set out the proposed timeline for the establishment of new strategic authorities, or the expansion of existing strategic authorities, in areas of England that are not currently within the area of an established mayoral strategic authority.
(3) The timeline set out in the strategy must include a period within which the Secretary of State intends to issue invitations or directions for proposals for the establishment or expansion of such new strategic authorities for those identified areas.
(4) Any annual report required under section 1 of the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016 (inserted by section 19 of this Act) must include a statement on the progress made in implementing the strategy, including information on any revision of or replacement for the strategy.
(5) Before preparing, publishing, or revising the strategy, the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the mayors for the areas of established mayoral strategic authorities; and
(b) the constituent councils of combined authorities and combined county authorities.”
This new clause would introduce a commitment to publish a strategy and timeline for further devolution.
Manuela Perteghella
The amendment and new clause 46 are about giving devolution in England a clear direction and fair footing, and replacing uncertainty with a proper plan and accountability. It will create a clear road map for devolution.
The Bill already includes a requirement for an annual devolution report to be published, but there are currently no plans to include any forward-looking strategy. Why is a commitment to publish a strategy and timeline for further devolution important and necessary? The local authorities that were left out of the devolution priority programme are facing a cliff edge in terms of funding streams that are now being redirected to mayoral strategic authorities.
Right now, devolution is happening, but unevenly. Cumbria, Cheshire, Warrington, Greater Essex, Hampshire and the Solent, Norfolk and Suffolk, and Sussex and Brighton are all in the devolution priority programme, putting them on a fast track towards improved transport opportunities, housing and economic growth. Regions such as Kent and Wessex, which were left out of the devolution priority programme, are left not only without the benefits of funding and the regional voice of an elected mayor, should they want one, but without the knowledge of when they can expect those things. The amendment would require the Government to report annually to Parliament on progress made. This transparency will prevent future Ministers from delaying or cherry-picking which regions get devolution next.
The amendments, which require a forward devolution strategy to be published, are therefore important to give councils like those in my area, which are at the beginning of their devolution journey, reassurance that plans are being progressed for devolution in their areas if they are not in tier 1. It is important that councils know not only their current financial situation, but how and when finance and governance are likely to change. The amendment would give local authorities certainty as councils could plan ahead, invest and prepare for new responsibilities. As I said earlier in the debate, devolution must be equitable and consistent, not a patchwork of deals and negotiations.
David Simmonds
The Opposition have sympathy with the points the hon. Member made. We can rarely have too much transparency, but we are conscious that these new bodies and devolution arrangements will be subject to a degree of political oversight. There will be manifestos, on which the public will have a vote. There will be the element of scrutiny, which we have not heard enough about yet but which we would like to think will be built into the new arrangements for these authorities. There will also be a regular process of elections, which will determine who provides the necessary level of leadership. Layered over that, there will be both the political priorities of the devolved authority and those things that are more part of the administrative function. Local authorities have historically had council plans and forward plans that set out decision making, all of which are part of this arrangement. Although the points have been well made, the Opposition are therefore not convinced that what the amendment would add is sufficient to justify its inclusion in the Bill.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I will respond to amendment 363 and new clause 46 before discussing clause 19.
In the English devolution White Paper, the Government set out clearly our ambition to have universal coverage of strategic authorities in England. That direction of travel is clear. It is also important that the process is led locally, and that areas can submit proposals for devolution that reflect their unique circumstances at a time that makes sense for them. A centrally mandated strategy would cut across that principle, requiring areas to work to a timeline set by Government. That would not only be challenging, but go against the grain of what we are trying to do. The new clause is therefore not necessary. We have set the ambition, and we will work with areas to enable them to come forward with proposals at the appropriate time.
Clause 19 amends existing requirements for the annual report on devolution to ensure that it reflects the introduction of strategic authorities as a category in law. To indicate how the report will look should the Bill receive Royal Assent in its current form, this year’s report was laid before this House and the other place earlier today, so Members can spend their evening reading the report with a glass of wine if they wish. It covers strategic authorities that were established and details of the new devolution framework as set out in the English devolution White Paper.
I commend the clause to the Committee, and ask the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon to withdraw the amendment and not to press the new clause.
Manuela Perteghella
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Deidre Costigan.)