Security Update: Official Secrets Act Case

Tuesday 14th October 2025 Lords Chamber

Statement

19:20

The following Statement was made in the House of Commons on Monday 13 October.

“With your permission, Mr Speaker, I want to update the House on the facts surrounding the collapse of the trial of Christopher Berry and Christopher Cash. However, following the Home Secretary’s Statement, I also want to take the opportunity to express my deepest sympathies for the victims and families of those affected by the abhorrent terror attack that occurred at Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation synagogue in Manchester on Yom Kippur. Tragically, two members of the UK’s Jewish community lost their lives. They remain in the thoughts of the whole House at this very difficult time.

I also express my gratitude for the rapid reactions of emergency responders, the security services and members of that local community. Two days later, a mosque in Peacehaven, East Sussex, was targeted in an arson attack. Fortunately, no one was injured. My thoughts, and I am sure the thoughts of the whole House, will be with members of that local community as well. We remain united in standing against hate in all its forms.

As I told the House in September, the Government remain extremely disappointed by the outcome of the Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry case. I understand the strength of feeling across the House and share the deep frustration at the fact that these individuals will not face trial. While the decision not to proceed was an independent one made by the Crown Prosecution Service, the Government remain gravely concerned about the security of our democratic institutions and are crystal clear that our Parliament must and will be protected from espionage. That is why I am today announcing that MI5’s National Protective Security Authority will be taking further steps to protect our democratic institutions from foreign interference. I will set out more details on that in a moment.

Since I addressed the House on 15 September, there has been correspondence between honourable Members, the Government and the Crown Prosecution Service. There has also been widespread—and, at times, wholly inaccurate—reporting in the media. I will address the details set out by the Crown Prosecution Service and the basis on which the Government provided evidence to support the case, but first let me underline a fundamental point that has too often been overlooked in recent days, including by the Conservative Party. The CPS brought these charges under the previous Government, and under the legislation that was in place at the time: the Official Secrets Act 1911—an antiquated law that is clearly no longer fit for purpose in addressing the complex and sophisticated nature of the state threats that we face today.

It has been clear for many years that the legislation has not kept pace with the modern state threats that we face today. It was evident that the Official Secrets Act was no longer fit for purpose as early as 2015— 10 years ago—when Conservative Ministers tasked the Law Commission with reviewing this antiquated legislation. In 2020, the Law Commission and the Intelligence and Security Committee of this House were both clear that the legislation, drafted before the First World War, needed to be updated as a matter of urgency. It referred to espionage as

‘any sketch, plan, model, article, or note, or other document or information … which … might be … useful to an enemy’.

Those terms are archaic in the modern threat landscape that we now face. That is why the Labour Party supported the passing of the National Security Act 2023 on a cross-party basis, closing the loopholes that have been exposed by this case.

The Director of Public Prosecutions has written to the chair of the Home Affairs Committee, the right honourable Member for Staffordshire Moorlands, Dame Karen Bradley, and the chair of the Justice Committee, my honourable friend the Member for Hammersmith and Chiswick, Andy Slaughter, about this case, and it is welcome that these facts have been set out. The DPP has made it clear that charges were brought in April 2024 based on the law as it stood at the time of the offences. The Deputy National Security Adviser—a senior official with very extensive experience in matters relating to national security—provided a witness statement in December 2023, under the previous Government. Further witness statements were requested and provided in February and July of this year.

All the evidence provided by the Deputy National Security Adviser was based on the law at the time of the offence and the policy position of the Conservative Government at the time of the offence. Every effort was made to provide evidence to support this case within those constraints. The decision on whether to proceed with the prosecution was ultimately taken by the Crown Prosecution Service, which was hamstrung by antiquated legislation that had not been updated by the previous Conservative Government.

Despite the evolving nature of the state threats that we face, the DPP has given his assurance that the CPS was not influenced by any external party, any member of this Government, or any senior civil servant or special adviser working within it. I want to be clear again today, as the Government have been before, that suggestions that the Government concealed evidence, withdrew witnesses or restricted the ability of witnesses to draw on particular bits of evidence are all untrue. The DNSA did not materially change his evidence and was under no pressure from anyone to do so.

What has changed is the CPS’s assessment of the case law. The DPP has explained that in a separate case—R v Roussev—the High Court ruled on the threshold for evidence needed to prosecute under the antiquated 1911 legislation. In the light of this new judgment, the CPS independently decided to seek further evidence. But the fact remains that it was not the policy of the Conservative Government to classify China as a threat to national security. As the right honourable Member for Braintree, Sir James Cleverly, said as Foreign Secretary, summing up China in one word as a threat was

‘impossible, impractical and—most importantly—unwise’.

I have listened with interest in recent days to advice from former Conservative Ministers on how the UK should now define our approach to China, but I must remind them and the House that what matters is what their policy was in government. The previous Government set out their position on China in the 2021 integrated review, in which they described China as a ‘systemic challenge’ to UK security. In the integrated review refresh of 2023, they described China as an ‘epoch-defining challenge’. As the Prime Minister has explained, the current Government’s policy position was immaterial to the assessment made by the CPS. Ministers cannot retrospectively change policy that existed under the Conservative Government and, as stated before, the CPS decision to drop the case was not influenced by any member of this Government, special adviser or senior official.

At this moment of profound global change and insecurity, these matters have led to discussion about this Government’s approach to China, so let me set that out for the House. We must tackle the threats that China poses, which range from cybersecurity attacks, foreign interference and espionage targeting our democratic institutions to the transnational repression of Hong Kongers in the UK. This Government are unequivocal that the first duty of government is to keep people safe. We fully recognise that China poses a series of threats to UK national security, yet we must also be alive to the fact that China presents us with opportunities. It is the world’s second-largest economy and, together with Hong Kong, the UK’s third-largest trading partner. The only way to act in the UK’s best interest is to take a long-term and strategic approach. That means working in close co-ordination with Five Eyes and wider allies to build collective resilience to the threats that China poses, investing in our intelligence services and being unequivocal about our position on human rights. It also means developing a consistent and pragmatic approach to economic engagement without compromising on our national security. Let me set out the recent actions that the Government have taken to strengthen UK security against state threats, including those posed by China.

MI5’s National Protective Security Authority has today launched new guidance to protect the UK’s democratic institutions from foreign interference. The guidance will help Members in this House and the other place, Members of the devolved legislatures, local councillors, mayors and elected representatives’ staff to better understand the nature of the threat. It also provides simple, effective steps for at-risk individuals to take to protect themselves, their teams and the integrity of our democratic processes. The guidance will kick-start a wider cross-government action plan that is being driven through the Defending Democracy Taskforce to reduce foreign interference and espionage threats to UK democratic institutions. It will be delivered in close co-ordination with the parliamentary security authorities. I urge all Members of this House to be alert and follow the guidance, and to take up the National Cyber Security Centre’s important opt-in service for Members of both Houses.

The Government also remain steadfast in our commitment to holding Chinese state-linked actors accountable for widescale cyberespionage. In September, the NCSC co-sealed a US-led technical advisory calling out Chinese state-sponsored cyberthreat actors targeting global networks, including in the UK. I can reassure the House that we continue to keep all tools under review and will act as necessary to reduce this threat.

The Government are also committed to legislating to further strengthen safeguards against foreign interference. Specifically, that includes a new elections Bill to strengthen safeguards against covert foreign political funding, and involves taking forward the recommendations from the independent reviewer for legislation on state threats.

Let me finish by reiterating this Government’s unwavering commitment to national security and to keeping our country safe. We will take all necessary action to deter those who seek to do us harm, and to ensure that the UK is best placed to tackle state threats, including those emanating from China. I commend the Statement to the House”.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, the matter before us today is a grave and serious one, and I am glad that we have another opportunity to discuss it, following my noble friend Lord True’s success in securing a PNQ on the matter yesterday. The collapse of the case against Mr Cash and Mr Berry goes to the very heart of this Parliament. What is at stake is nothing less than the dignity and security of Members of both Houses and of those who work within them.

In their handling of the matter, the Government have shown a grave failure of responsibility. The Statement issued by the Security Minister in the other place on Monday was woefully inadequate. This dispute turns on one simple question: why did the Government not give the Crown Prosecution Service the evidence it needed to pursue this case? In both his Statement and his replies, the Security Minister failed to clarify four central matters.

First, he proceeded on the false premise that the previous Government did not regard China as a national security threat. The record shows that they did. For example, the head of MI6 in 2021 said that China was one of the biggest four threats to the UK, alongside Russia, Iran and international terrorism.

Secondly, like the Prime Minister, the Security Minister seemed to argue that it was not open to the current Government to give the Crown Prosecution Service evidence that differed from the previous Government’s view of the threat from China. In other words, he seems to have assumed that the present Government could not form their own view of the threat during 2021 to 2023 or provide a statement to that effect. That was wrong. Nothing in law or practice stopped the Government from doing so.

Thirdly, he cited the Roussev judgment as though it had narrowed the 1911 Act. It did not. The Court of Appeal made it clear that “enemy” includes any state acting against the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, whether or not we are at war with it.

Fourthly, he assumed that only the Government can determine who falls within that definition. There is no such requirement. The question is one of fact, not fiat, and may properly be assessed by a jury on the evidence before it.

I might stress that noble Lords should not just take my word for it. The Minister’s and the Prime Minister’s argument has been refuted by no less than one former DPP, two former Cabinet Secretaries—one of whom was a National Security Adviser—two former heads of MI6 and a professor of public law at the University of Cambridge, who said this week that Ministers’ statements so far are “misleading” about the legal position. The experts are all clear that Mr Cash and Mr Berry could have been prosecuted under the old legislation. Are we to believe the Government’s position that they are all wrong and that they—the Government—are right?

This case is only one symptom of a deeper failure in the Government’s approach to China. Ministers are still intent on allowing the Chinese Communist Party to build its new embassy on the Royal Mint site, within sight of some of the most sensitive financial and communications infrastructure in the country. They have done so despite clear and repeated warnings from our allies in Washington and from our own intelligence agencies that the project poses a serious espionage risk. Those warnings have been brushed aside and key details redacted from public view.

The decision to transfer the Chagos Islands to Mauritius tells the same story. China’s ambassador there publicly welcomed the move, congratulating Mauritius and confirming its intention to join Beijing’s belt and road initiative. Now, even as evidence of Chinese interference has reached into Parliament itself, the Government’s response has remained slow, confused and complacent. This is not an isolated failure but a pattern of neglect—one that leaves the United Kingdom exposed at a moment when China’s ambitions are clearer and more aggressive than ever.

Before I conclude, I have several questions for the noble Baroness the Minister. It is not for Ministers or officials to determine what evidence meets the threshold for prosecution. That judgment belongs solely to the Crown Prosecution Service. The Government’s duty was to provide all relevant information to the CPS when asked. They did not. The question is: who decided that the Crown Prosecution Service would not be provided with further evidence? Was that decision taken by Ministers, officials or advisers?

Everyone in government knows that a matter of this kind would have gone to Ministers. To pretend otherwise is not credible; to blame a single official is wrong. Did the Deputy National Security Adviser act without ministerial oversight in determining the evidential basis of the case? If so, who authorised that arrangement? Were any Ministers or special advisers shown, did they clear or were they consulted on the Deputy National Security Adviser’s draft statement before it was sent to the CPS? When the CPS requested further material, were Ministers shown this request and did they clear the revised version? Will the Minister publish the internal guidance that allowed the Deputy National Security Adviser to act “without interference” from Ministers, as well as the correspondence between the Cabinet Office, the CPS and the Foreign Office concerning the drafting of his statements?

Furthermore, how many current investigations rely on the 1911 Act, and have any been paused following Roussev? What part of that judgment, which produced six convictions, prevented the CPS proceeding in this case? Did any official or Minister advise that Roussev made prosecution under the 1911 Act impossible, and will that advice be placed in the Library? Mr Justice Hilliard cited the evidence of Matthew Collins, the Deputy National Security Adviser, as authoritative in Roussev. Why is the same official’s evidence deemed unusable when applied to China?

Why is guidance to Members being launched only today, when MI5 and the National Protective Security Authority have been aware of active Chinese interference since at least 2022?

Finally, will the Minister confirm whether Sir Olly Robbins has been instructed to make clear to his counterparts that the United Kingdom regards China as a national security threat and to set out what discussions he is authorised to hold?

This is not about one prosecution that failed. It is about whether we still possess the will to defend the institutions that safeguard our liberty. It is about whether those charged with protecting this country still understand what it means to act in its defence. When foreign powers reach into our Parliament and Ministers look away, it is not only our security that is breached but our sense of who we are. A Government who will not face the truth invite their own humiliation. A nation that tolerates such weakness endangers itself.

Britain’s strength has never rested on wealth or size but on the courage to confront those who would test it. That courage is now being tested again. The Government must speak plainly, act decisively and show that this country will never be cowed, compromised or complacent in the face of the ambitions of China. I urge the noble Baroness to answer not with evasion but with candour, and to meet this moment with the seriousness our duty to the nation demands.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I do not think that I have followed the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, in the past and it is a great pleasure to do so. I am happy to say that there are still one or two things left to say.

This Statement is clearly an attempt to put to rest the issue of these botched prosecutions, or non-prosecutions. So far, however, it has not only failed in that ambition; at the same time, it has resurfaced other issues regarding China and our relationship that generate increasing concern. Regarding the prosecutions, and given the Minister’s Statement and the Government’s adamant view that they have not concealed evidence or suppressed anything, it would be easy for the Government to publish all the relevant documentation. They have nothing to hide; we know that—they have told us, and we trust them. Will the Government publish all the relevant documents, as set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the correspondence between all officials, politicians and advisers involved with the CPS?

It is time for the Government to properly protect the interests of our citizens so, working with the CPS, will the Government look at all legislative options to make sure that these two individuals have their time in the court, face a jury and are able to plead their case? These are the ways that the Government can push this issue to rest: by openness and actually seeking to prosecute.

More widely, this case has exposed appalling gaps in the Government’s willingness to challenge China’s considerable espionage efforts, but I am pleased that they recognise that we have a problem. The Statement is clear:

“We fully recognise that China poses a series of threats to UK national security”,


it says, but their actions fly in the face of that reality.

A former director-general of the Security Service has warned that Chinese espionage is being carried out on an industrial scale, including by seeking influence over Parliament, as well as in industry and education. This has been clear for some time. That was why we warned that exempting China from the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme under the National Security Act was a terrible mistake by this Government.

Will the Government now undertake to include all Chinese officials, Hong Kong special administrative region officials and Chinese Communist Party-linked organisations in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme? More than that, the Government, supported by the Conservatives, exempted government administration and public bodies in their entirety from the FIRS scheme. Will the Minister now undertake to listen to the intelligence community and include people performing in these activities in the enhanced layer of FIRS?

Finally, as we have heard, it is now time for the Government to come to their senses and block the planning application for the Chinese mega-embassy. We know that, through its embassy in the UK, China has been co-ordinating the transnational repression of people who are carrying out normal and legal activities in the United Kingdom. Will the Minister confirm that the intelligence agencies were not consulted before the Government approved China’s new super-embassy in London, and will the Government now take heed and halt that project until a full national security review is completed?

[Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)]

My Lords, that is a significant number of questions, which I have written down and now lost—thank you—and I will endeavour to answer all of them. I will also review Hansard and make sure that I correspond on anything that I am unsuccessful in responding to. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for their participation and genuine interest in this. Let us be very clear that matters of espionage, especially those that have seemingly been conducted within your Lordships’ House, but also within Parliament, are of the utmost seriousness.

I want to begin by reinforcing that this Government remain extremely disappointed by the collapse of the Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry trial. During yesterday’s PNQ, I committed to update your Lordships’ House on the facts surrounding the collapse of this trial, as well as government actions to counter state threats—as my honourable friend Dan Jarvis, the Security Minister, also made clear yesterday. The decision not to prosecute was made independently by the CPS. It is a bedrock principle of our democracy that decisions of the CPS are independent of Ministers and the Government.

The Director of Public Prosecutions has written to the chairs of the Home Affairs Committee and the Justice Committee, setting out that the CPS decision not to take this case to trial was because the evidential test was not met. As the Prime Minister—who, if we are citing former DPPs, I remind noble Lords is also a former DPP—has stated, the policy position of the current Government was “immaterial” to the CPS’s assessment.

The legal test required consideration of the Government’s policy at the time the alleged offences were committed—between December 2021 and February 2023—when Members opposite were in Government. At that time, the previous Conservative Government described China as a “systematic challenge” in the Integrated Review 2021 and an “epoch-defining challenge” in the Integrated Review Refresh 2023. They did not designate China as a threat or an enemy; that is at the crux of the issue.

I want to be clear, and I am genuinely horrified by the suggestion, that accusations that the Government concealed evidence, withdrew witnesses or in any way restricted the ability of witnesses to provide evidence are entirely untrue. The Director of Public Prosecutions has given his assurance that the CPS was not influenced by any external party, any member of this Government or any senior civil servant or special adviser. As the Security Minister set out in detail yesterday, evidence was provided to the CPS by the Deputy National Security Adviser, who is highly respected and has the full support of this Government. All the evidence provided by the Deputy National Security Adviser was based on the law at the time of the offences and the policy position of the Conservative Government at that time. The DNSA did not materially change his evidence and was under no pressure from anybody to do so.

On the question raised by both the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox—which was also raised yesterday by the noble Lord, Lord Gove—it is not for me to make decisions about the publication of evidence that may be used in further ongoing legal processes. To do so, or not, would likely affect witnesses in coming forward and hamper the interests of justice.

I understand that many noble Lords are also rightly interested in the opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny of the facts around the collapse of this case. The Government’s approach will always be to make as much information available as possible through the appropriate processes, given the national security considerations. I welcome that the National Security Adviser will be giving a private briefing to the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy next month.

On our approach to China, this Government are unequivocal. China poses a series of threats to UK national security, from cyberattacks and foreign interference to the transnational repression of Hong Kongers. This Government fully recognise the gravity of these threats. However, we must also recognise that China presents opportunities. It is the world’s second-largest economy. To act in the UK’s best interests, we must adopt a long-term strategic approach, as the last Government did. This means a consistent and pragmatic approach to economic engagement without compromising our national security.

On some of the other specifics that have been raised, I want to respond to a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, on the Chinese embassy. No such decision has been made. The noble Lord knows that, throughout the process, we have been clear that we have considered the breadth of national security considerations and have publicly outlined necessary security mitigations that we would need to see to support an application. National security has been our core priority throughout the process. A final decision will be made in due course by Ministers in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government in their quasi-judicial role, and we expect a decision imminently. We do not underestimate the impact of national security as part of that decision.

As I also said yesterday in response to the PNQ, no decision has been made on China regarding the FIRS scheme. We are talking about a scheme that has been undertaken for only three and a half months. No decision has yet been made to exempt or include China, but a decision will be brought forward to your Lordships’ House.

On the specific question of the 1911 Act, the legislation the CPS uses for arrests and prosecutions is a matter for that agency. I do not have access to that data; that would be for the CPS. To clarify for noble Lords, there is a reason why many hours were spent in your Lordships’ House debating the National Security Bill in 2023—which was supported by my colleagues too on a cross-party basis—to update the Official Secrets Act. It is unfortunate that the 1911 Act was the basis of this prosecution, but there is a reason why we had to update it, and that is because of the very definition of “espionage” and “enemy”. This is a piece of legislation that was written prior to World War I. The world has changed, the threat level has changed and how people undertake threats has significantly changed.

I think I have touched on all the evidence. The Deputy National Security Adviser operated within the confines and constraints of the policy direction of the previous Government. We are fully committed to his work. He can operate only within the confines of the situation of the moment and, on that basis, there is nothing more for him to answer.

I reiterate this Government’s unwavering commitment to our national security. Yesterday, MI5’s National Protective Security Authority launched new guidance, building on previous guidance—it was not brand new—to protect our democratic institutions from foreign interference. I urge all noble Lords to read this vital guidance. Furthermore, the Government continue to hold China state-linked actors accountable for cyber espionage. The National Cyber Security Centre recently co-sealed a US-led technical advisory calling out Chinese state-sponsored actors for targeting global networks, including in the UK. We will continue to take all necessary action to tackle state threats, including those from China. That is the primary responsibility of government.

19:40

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, that, as chair of the ISC, I do not recognise some of her comments about our security services concerning China.

This confuses me because, as I understand the situation, the prosecutor has taken the 1911 Act. It was the ISC that, in 2020, called for reform of the Official Secrets Act, and there is still undone business on the 1989 Act, for example. But the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Roussev did not raise but lowered the bar in terms of the definition of “enemy”, if I am reading it correctly. So, on the idea that the CPS should just rely on the Government’s input into this, I cannot understand why it could not, for example, have used the ISC’s 2023 China report, which outlined our concerns about the threats. It would be interesting to know why the CPS did not look at that judgment. If they were not satisfied with what the Government gave it, there was plenty of other evidence out there that it could have used.

I say to my noble friend that the ISC meets on Thursday, and we will discuss this, as she can imagine. If—as is likely—we ask for the intelligence on this, I ask that we are not hindered in receiving it.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend for his work as part of the ISC and his work in these areas for several decades. I would expect full co-operation with the committee in terms of what happens next. We want to be as open to scrutiny as possible but, given the issues, talking within the appropriate processes—the ISC is one of them—will be a matter for his committee and future conversations.

We need to remember that this was an independent decision made by the CPS. We genuinely believed that this case was going to proceed until we were informed by the CPS just before the embargo. We provided full co-operation with the CPS, I am reassured, within the constraints available to the Deputy National Security Adviser at that time, based on what had been said.

We need to remember—the noble Lord is absolutely right—that it was not until 2019 that the integrated review first mentioned China at all. Until that point, the previous Government did not consider China worthy even of mentioning in the security review. Importantly, at the point that we are discussing, the then Foreign Secretary, James Cleverly, when asked whether China was a threat, said it was

“impossible, impractical and—most importantly—unwise”

to sum up our relationship with China in one word. As I said yesterday, the Leader of the Opposition, when she was Trade Secretary, said:

“We certainly should not be describing China as a foe but we can describe it as a challenge”.


That is the constraint within which the Deputy NSA gave his evidence. We need to be very clear about what government policy was two years ago.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

May I ask the noble Baroness to clarify the answer she gave to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, on the important subject of transparency? He asked whether the Government will publish correspondence between officials, politicians and advisers involved with the CPS. The noble Baroness’s answer was exactly the same as that given yesterday by Mr Jarvis, the Minister in the Commons:

“it is not for me to make decisions about the publication of evidence that may be used in any further ongoing legal processes”.—[Official Report, Commons, 13/10/25; col. 70.]

My question is: what ongoing legal processes? This criminal prosecution has ended and it cannot be resurrected, and there is therefore no reason not to inform the public of all the details of this so that any concerns can be removed.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord for his question. Obviously, his level of expertise in our legal processes is much more significant than mine, but neither he nor I know what plans the CPS has for any future prosecution.