Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill
Tuesday 14th October 2025
(1 day, 10 hours ago)
Lords ChamberDeprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill 2024-26 View all Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Committee of the whole House Amendments as at 14 July 2025 - (14 Jul 2025)
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
There is no more important task for any Government than to keep their citizens safe, and this Bill will form an important part of the Government’s ability to do just that. I remind noble Lords that the Bill is very narrow in its scope and intent: it contains just one substantive clause, which is focused solely on closing a specific loophole in the existing deprivation of citizenship process.
Noble Lords may recall its substantive provision, in Clause 1, which addresses a recent Supreme Court ruling: N3(ZA) v the Secretary of State for the Home Department. The effect of this ruling is that, if an appeal against a deprivation decision is successful, or if a deprivation of citizenship order is withdrawn, that initial order will have had no effect and the person will be considered as having continued to be British. This means that people who have been deprived of British citizenship will automatically regain that status before any further avenues of appeal have been exhausted.
The effect of this judgment creates two risks. The first is that someone who poses a significant threat to public safety could return to the UK before all onward appeals are determined. I am sure that is a situation that noble Lords would not wish to see. Secondly, it could allow a person who has been deprived of citizenship, on the ground that it is conducive to the public good, to undermine further deprivation action by renouncing their other nationality before all onward appeals are determined. This is because reinstatement of a deprivation order would then render them stateless. This Bill simply intends to maintain the status quo by closing these loopholes, which may arise in a very small number of deprivation appeals.
It is important to say at the outset that the scope of this Bill does not touch on any wider areas of the deprivation process. It is important to say that because this Bill does not amend the existing deprivation power, it does not extend its potential application to additional individuals, and it does not in any way widen the reasons for which a person could be deprived of their citizenship. It also does not change any existing right of appeal, and it does not place any new restrictions on individuals who are subject to a deprivation order.
It is self-evident that deprivation of citizenship is a significant power, and I know that many noble Lords have strong feelings on its use. However, Parliament has enacted the power and entrusted the Home Secretary with using it, including to protect the UK from those who mean us harm. The existence of this power is not, however, the matter before us today. Rather, in this Bill, it is the specific provision that relates only to the potential period between a successful appeal and a final determination on the case.
To explain why it is so important that this power remains effective, which is what the Bill seeks to achieve, I shall set out briefly the circumstances in which the power is used and therefore the types of threat that the Bill will help protect society from. Deprivation is an important part of the suite of tools available to the Government to maintain public safety and preserve national security. The use of deprivation where it is conducive to the public good is a decision to be taken personally by the Home Secretary. It is used against some of the most dangerous individuals who pose a threat to the United Kingdom, including terrorists, extremists and serious and organised criminals. Someone who has been deprived of their citizenship and is in the UK no longer has any immigration status. Steps may be taken to remove them from the UK; they may be held in immigration detention in the interim; if they are overseas when a deprivation decision is made, they would not be permitted to enter the UK. In these circumstances, this is clearly an effective way to disrupt the threat posed by dangerous individuals.
I know that noble Lords will be interested in the volumes of this power: it is a power used sparingly. From 2008 to 2023, the entire period of the last Government’s use of the power, 12 people a year on average were deprived of their citizenship when it was determined to be for the public good.
There will undoubtedly be interest in this debate in the safeguards within the system. As I have set out, the existing safeguards will not be affected by the Bill. Deprivation decisions are carefully considered and made in accordance with international law, following advice from officials and lawyers. Each deprivation case is assessed individually. Along with many other things we have been discussing this week, this regime complies with the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and always comes with a right of appeal.
On the specific provision in the Bill before the House today, I reassure noble Lords that there is indeed grit in the system to ensure that the Bill, once enacted, is not used for any spurious purpose. Rules of court set defined timescales within which any application by the Home Secretary to appeal must be made. In addition, the decision to grant permission for such an appeal lies solely with the courts and is contingent on the presence of a properly arguable point of law. This means that the Government cannot rely on the provisions of the Bill to maintain deprivation of a person’s citizenship following a successful appeal without proper legal grounds or justification.
Finally, noble Lords will be aware that the deprivation power can also be used where someone has obtained citizenship for which they were never entitled on a fraudulent basis—for example, by providing false documents. Indeed, the majority of the deprivation orders fall under this category, as from 2018 to 2022, there was an average of 151 cases in that category per year. However, I want to be clear up front that the Bill will not apply in such cases. This is because where citizenship has been obtained fraudulently, a deprivation order is made only once all avenues of appeal have been exhausted. Such cases will therefore not be impacted by the narrow scope of the Bill.
As I hope I have stated and illustrated to noble Lords, the Bill is extremely narrow—in fact, in my nearly 30 years in both Houses of Parliament, it is probably the smallest Bill I have had the pleasure to introduce—but it seeks to ensure, in its smallness, that the deprivation power remains effective by retaining the status quo.
It is important, in finishing, to place on record a tribute by the Home Office team and me to our world-class law enforcement and intelligence agencies. They work tirelessly to keep us safe, and we owe them tremendous gratitude for that. This Bill is another tool in our toolbox to ensure that we can preserve our national security. I hope that noble Lords will examine it in detail. It is a small Bill; I hope they will support it, and I look forward to discussing it with Members of this House today, in Committee and on Report at a later date. I beg to move.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, as always, it is a pleasure to follow the Minister in opening the Second Reading of this short but highly important Bill. There is a lot that we disagree on in this House—indeed, in politics in general, it would be fair to say that the Minister and I have differing views on a number of issues—but we all have the same end goal: we want to see this country thrive and, to do that, it must be as safe and secure as possible. To that end, I fully support the Bill.
The Minister has given a detailed account of the events that led the Government to seek this change to Section 40A of the British Nationality Act 1981. As he said, it arises out of a Supreme Court case earlier this year. In that ruling, the court held that were an appeal against a deprivation order successful, the order is considered to have had no effect. That means that while the Home Secretary’s further appeals are pending, the person would be able to enjoy their full rights of citizenship. The point here is that the power to deprive is used as a last resort. There was some talk in the other place that this power has not been used sparingly. That is not the case, because between 2010 and 2024, 222 orders were made on the grounds that deprivation was conducive to the public good—that is an average of 15.8 per year—and 858 orders were made for fraud. For context, there were 269,621 grants of British citizenship in 2024 alone, and since 2010, there have been at least 100,000 grants of citizenship every single year. We are therefore talking about a very small proportion of people who have their citizenship deprived when compared to the number of new citizenship grants that have been made. It is evident that the power is indeed used sparingly, in cases of the utmost seriousness.
Is it not wholly right, therefore, that in cases of such gravity the deprivation order should continue to have effect during the period of appeals? Of particular importance here is where a person whom the Home Secretary rightly deems to be a national security risk is currently abroad. The deprivation order would prevent that person returning to the United Kingdom. Under the Supreme Court’s new interpretation of the law, if that person were to successfully appeal in absentia, their right to enter the country unhindered would be reinstated automatically, with no regard to the potential risk they presented to the British public. That is surely an untenable situation.
This new interpretation is also legally inconsistent with asylum and immigration decisions. With asylum claims, a refusal continues to have effect until all legal processes are completed. Asylum status is not simply automatically granted by a court upon the first successful appeal. The process requires one to exhaust the full spectrum of legal challenges first.
This Bill is not about attempting to subvert judges or to amend the appeals process, nor does it make it easier to deprive a person of their citizenship. Rather, it is about reasserting the simple fact that it is for Parliament to decide what British citizenship means and the expectations we place on those who are granted it. Citizenship is a privilege, one that demonstrates a bond of trust. Those who violate that trust and openly threaten our society, or who utilise fraudulent means to gain it, should have that privilege revoked. The Government are right to ensure that deprivation can continue during the appeals process and are right to bring forward this Bill.
Lord German (LD)
My Lords, this legislation, while described by the Government as “small” and highly focused, carries constitutional significance and poses risks to fundamental rights, which is why it needs the rigorous scrutiny which this House can provide. The Government’s stated purpose for the Bill is clear: to safeguard the UK from individuals who pose a threat to national security or public safety. The Bill seeks to amend Section 40A of the British Nationality Act 1981 to ensure that if the Government strip a person of their British citizenship, the deprivation order remains in effect throughout the entire appeal process. This measure is a direct response to the Supreme Court judgment in N3(ZA) v the Secretary of State for the Home Department. That judgment established that when a person successfully appeals a deprivation order, their citizenship is automatically and retrospectively restored at that point.
The Government argue that this Bill is necessary to prevent high-harm individuals who are overseas from returning to the UK, and to stop persons seeking to undermine deprivation action by renouncing other nationalities in order to become stateless while an appeal remains ongoing. I understand the Government’s duty to keep the country safe, but we must question whether this measure is right, proportionate and the only tool available to achieve that goal. I will raise some of the contradictions that have been raised in the other place and look at some of the possible solutions to them. I will then pose questions to the Minister that I think will help to clarify the rightness and proportionality of the measure and whether it is indeed the only tool available to achieve that goal.
This Bill proposes to overturn the ordinary presumption that court orders take immediate effect. The legislation delays the restoration of citizenship until all governmental appeal rights are exhausted. That diminishes the only mechanism for scrutinising the Home Secretary’s decisions and thus could be viewed as an assault on the rule of law. The Bill grants the Government unwarranted power to ignore court rulings that find their actions unlawful. The Bill also applies retrospectively to appeals brought but not yet finally determined. This means that any individuals currently caught in the legal process will have the rules changed against them mid-appeal.
The principal concern relates to the severe consequences that this Bill poses, particularly for vulnerable individuals and potentially for British children. Under the current regime, the UK employs deprivation of citizenship orders more frequently than most other countries in Europe. The practice of citizenship-stripping disproportionately targets ethnic-minority communities. Some of those affected are stranded overseas and exposed to severe harms such as detention, cruel treatment and death, without consular protection or the ability to return home, even when courts rule in their favour.
The case of N3 (ZA) v Secretary of State for the Home Department is instructive. A child born in the UK to a British father whose citizenship was later ruled to have been unlawfully stripped was initially denied recognition as a British citizen. The Supreme Court ruled that the father should be treated as having retained his citizenship throughout the deprivation period. This Bill reverses that, meaning that future children in similar positions could be left without UK state protection until their parent’s final appeal is exhausted, which could be some years later.
We know that British children are already detained in inhumane conditions in places such as north-east Syria. Available information indicates that all British adults detained there have been stripped of their citizenship, leading to the creation of stateless, or effectively stateless, children. The Bill would expose those children to these extreme risks for a significantly longer period, even after a court has found that they have a valid claim to citizenship.
The Bill impairs an individual’s ability to participate meaningfully in legal proceedings. Individuals challenging deprivation from overseas face insurmountable barriers to accessing justice, making it difficult to instruct lawyers or access documents. The Bill prevents the individual, even after winning at the first instance, from returning to the UK to participate fully in the ongoing appeals process. UK courts have already acknowledged that appeals from those detained in north-east Syria would
“not be fair and effective”.
Forcing an individual to continue participating in this admittedly ineffective process compounds the unfairness.
I need to press the Minister on why the Government have chosen this blanket approach, rather than legislating for more targeted solutions, and why crucial safeguards have been either omitted or rejected. My questions to the Minister are as follows. First, the Government’s stated motivation is to maintain the ability to exclude individuals who pose a threat. Why was the alternative approach, suggested by Reprieve and others—of legislating to clarify the rules governing stays in the First-tier Tribunal and the SIAC, allowing the Government to apply for a stay of a successful order on a case-by-case basis where justified—rejected in favour of a blanket suspension?
Secondly, given that the duration of the appeals process could be considerable—potentially lasting years—and result in British children being stranded overseas, why have the Government resisted establishing an expedited appeals route to ensure unlawful deprivation orders do not continue to have effect for prolonged periods of time?
Thirdly, the Government have rejected judicial discretion to suspend the effect of a successful appeal, asserting that national security accountability rests with the democratically accountable Secretary of State. However, in the House of Commons, a proposed amendment—the so-called the Malthouse amendment—would have provided judicial discretion to prevent severe hardship, specifically if a person faced a real and substantial threat of serious harm, or if the continuation of the order would significantly prejudice their ability to mount an effective defence. Can the Minister confirm why the Government did not accept these basic judicial safeguards to protect against the most egregious cases of abuse and harm?
Fourthly, the current power to strip citizenship is already criticised for placing excessive power in the hands of a single Minister under the subjective test of being
“conducive to the public good”.
Will the Government commit to reforming the entire deprivation process—as called for by the Liberal Democrats—to require the Home Secretary to apply to a court for permission to make a deprivation order in the first instance, thereby ensuring judicial oversight before the power is exercised?
Finally, following concerns about transparency and oversight, will the Minister commit the Government to publishing annual reports detailing the use of deprivation of citizenship powers, and ensuring their regular review by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation?
The Bill grants greater authority to the Government in a context already marked by high levels of citizenship-stripping and minimal checks. It threatens to legislate away the authority of British courts. Your Lordships’ House has a constitutional role as the final check on government overreach to ensure that, if this Bill is to proceed, we can preserve judicial oversight and prevent British people, particularly children, being left at risk of serious harm.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
My Lords, I declare an interest as the author of a report, required by statute and published almost 10 years ago, on citizenship removal resulting in statelessness. It was a short report, since that power introduced by the Immigration Act 2014, which was always intended to be highly exceptional, had never been used at the time—there was therefore nothing to report on.
However, my crash course in citizenship deprivation—a concept with which this country seems notably more at ease than most of our European and North American neighbours, as the noble Lord, Lord German, said—prompted three reflections of a general nature that may still be relevant. First, the
“conducive to the public good”
threshold for citizenship deprivation—which, in 2006, replaced the previous threshold of
“seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom”—
is remarkably low. There is some comfort in the self-imposed guidance that governs the interpretation by government of this elastic and subjective phrase. However, that comfort may not survive the arrival of another Government less keen on self-imposed guidance. For my part, I hope that we will return someday to this threshold issue.
Secondly, as was pointed out by speakers as different as Kit Malthouse and Bell Ribeiro-Addy in Commons Committee, citizenship deprivation discriminates by its very nature against individuals and groups who have, or are entitled to, another citizenship. Jews and those born in Northern Ireland were mentioned, but of course there are also many others. The power to strip people of their citizenship, however sparingly used in practice, reminds naturalised citizens in particular that the citizenship that they went through so much to achieve is precarious in a way that my citizenship is not.
A few years back, in the Nationality and Borders Bill, the proposal to allow the removal of citizenship without notice was greeted with an outcry, including a petition signed by more than 300,000 people. That is a consequence not only of Clause 9 of that Bill but of the sense it conveyed to some people with dual heritage that they were second-class citizens. Thanks to your Lordships’ House, that outcry was channelled into the much-improved Section 10 of the Act.
Thirdly, there is a gap where review of citizenship deprivation should be. The Minister in the Commons pointed correctly to reviews by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration that were published in 2018 and 2024. But the purpose of those inspections was procedural, as it was described in the 2018 report, to examine
“the efficiency and effectiveness of the Home Office’s processes”.
Even that procedural exercise had its limits. The 2024 inspection looked only at the status review unit, which deals with deprivations prompted by fraud or related to serious organised crime. What were described as
“‘conducive’ cases where sensitive intelligence is relied upon to make a decision”
are handled by the special cases unit and were acknowledged by the independent chief inspector to be “out of scope”. Published figures are welcome, but do not answer all the pertinent questions. What was the intelligence case for the sudden surge of conducive deprivations from 14 in 2016 to 104 in the following year? What were the circumstances of those subjected to it, and why was deprivation used in preference to the many other tools in the counterterrorism and state threats armoury?
The reality is that deprivation of citizenship on conducive grounds is a power used for national security purposes. Like other such powers, its exercise should be reviewable by the security-cleared Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, as successive holders of that office, including me, have recommended.
Having got that off my chest, I turn to the Bill. It is one of a growing number of Bills that seek to change the law as it has recently been declared by the Supreme Court. Indeed, the next one will come along on Thursday: the Crime and Policing Bill. There is nothing constitutionally improper about that. The courts try to make sense of what we decide, which, in this field, has chopped and changed several times since 2002, as the Supreme Court’s judgment made clear.
It is also relevant, it seems to me, that both the High Court and the Court of Appeal, after consideration of all factors, including the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, declared the law to be as the Government now seek to clarify it by means of the Bill.
The Supreme Court took what it described as a “middle position”, under which the Secretary of State is bound by the result of a successful appeal for all purposes
“other than in respect of the validity of immigration enforcement action taken on the basis of the deprivation order up to the time the appeal against it is allowed”.
By doing so, the Supreme Court sought to banish the unwelcome spectre of damages claims in respect of past immigration enforcement action, while requiring the individual to be treated as having always been a British citizen for all other purposes, including in the hard case that was before it, by passing that citizenship to any child born during the currency of the deprivation order.
I am persuaded by the Minister, and I thank him for his time and that of the Bill team, that there are good reasons for preventing a person from regaining their British citizenship, even following a first-instance victory in SIAC until such time as the Home Office has exhausted its appeal rights. These are, in summary, the prospect of empowering a person who endangers national security to enter the United Kingdom, possibly forever; the risk that the tactical renunciation of other citizenships will render deprivation of British citizenship impossible; and the desirability of having immigration powers, such as detention and immigration bail, pending the resolution of appeal rights. Those are reasons enough for me to support the thrust of the Bill.
The Bill might be considered tough on infant children, such as ZA in the Supreme Court case. For that reason in particular, I see the case for a limited judicial discretion along the lines proposed by Kit Malthouse in the Commons and I will listen carefully to the debate if a similar or narrower amendment is tabled here. But I am not as struck by this as the noble Lord, Lord German. There is surely consolation in the fact that the appeal process is finite and can be expedited by the courts, and that the child’s citizenship will still be recognised if the Home Office is unsuccessful at the end of the day.
The Bill is retrospective in its operation, resembling in that respect court rulings, including the judgment of the Supreme Court that it seeks, in effect, to reverse. The Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, asked the Government why retrospectivity applied across the board and could not be limited to “conducive” cases. The Minister’s answer, that deprivation orders on other grounds are not made until the person has exhausted their rights to appeal, with the result that the Bill does not apply to them, sounds pretty conclusive to me.
Finally, I have in mind the fact that people may have their citizenship removed when inside as well as outside this country and that views on deportation, including in this country, appear to be hardening in some quarters quite alarmingly. I expressed to the Minister my concern that a Government less scrupulous than this one might take advantage of the Bill to remove a person’s citizenship on conducive grounds and then take advantage of their new status as a non-national to deport them, even after SIAC had declared the removal of citizenship to be unlawful. I was told that this fear was unfounded, in summary, as I understand it, because a deportation order does not come into force until in-country appeal rights, including on human rights grounds, have been exhausted, and because Section 78 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 prohibits such a person from being removed while any in-country appeal is pending.
On the face of it, that is reassuring, at least for as long as we have the Human Rights Act. But I would welcome the Minister putting his detailed explanation on the record, either from the Dispatch Box or in writing, so that it can be scrutinised by those more expert than me. This is not something that would have seemed worth worrying about 10 or even five years ago. But I am sure that your Lordships would not wish to pass a Bill that could facilitate the future use of unlawful citizenship deprivation as a means of effecting the arbitrary or large-scale deportation of British citizens who are objectionable or unwelcome to the Government of the day. Subject to that clarification, the Bill has my support.
Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who brings so much expertise and wisdom to this debate.
This is a short Bill, yes, on a narrow point, but it raises some important constitutional questions. It concerns the power of the Home Secretary under Section 40 of the British Nationality Act to deprive a person of British citizenship. As we know, under this provision the Home Secretary may deprive a person of citizenship in two cases: first, if she is satisfied that the deprivation will be conducive to the public good; and, secondly, if she is satisfied that citizenship was obtained by fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact. I do not have any problem with the second scenario; it is the first one which is intensely problematic.
There is a limit to the exercise of this power. A deprivation order may not be made if that person would be rendered stateless, and thus would result in a breach of our obligations under the statelessness convention. But this limit, however important, is insufficient. In practice, as has been mentioned before, people with two nationalities, such as me, are British citizens only for as long as the Home Secretary of the day is satisfied that depriving us of our citizenship would not be conducive to the public good. Under the law as it is, it is easier for me to be stripped of my British citizenship than of my barony. This rule is based on an idea of citizenship that is simply unfit for a modern liberal democracy. Yes, the power is used sparingly, as the Minister said, but we are, as the noble Lord, Lord German, pointed out, a country that, in Europe, uses this power to an exceptional degree. We strip citizenship at rates that are higher than those of almost any other country in the world, as was noted by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its recent report, Accountability for Daesh Crimes.
The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation observed that there is a sharp contrast between the high number of deprivation orders in these cases, which are usually national security cases, and the low number of prosecutions or temporary exclusion orders. To put these things in perspective, from 1972 to 2006 only 10 people were deprived of citizenship, whereas from 2010 to 2023 there were 1,080 deprivations of citizenship, and of those 222 were on the basis of the “conducive” test—104 of those deprivations were in one year alone, 2017.
As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said, we need to think of how this power would be used by a Home Secretary who comes to office with a rather different conception of the public good from that of his or her predecessors. We have to be very alive to those risks. There is little in the language of Section 40 to which we could point to invite restraint if faced with a Home Secretary determined to make even more extensive use of the power of deprivation than has been the case so far.
The problem with this Bill is that it makes a power that is already excessive even worse by reversing the decision of the Supreme Court in the N3(ZA) case. The Supreme Court ruled that a person deprived of British citizenship automatically and retrospectively regains their citizenship following a successful appeal. It is still possible, even after the Supreme Court ruling, for the deprivation order to be made and enforcement action pursuant to that order to be taken, despite the affected person bringing the appeal.
As a matter of principle, it seems to me that, given that the power of the Secretary of State is already so extensive, and in the light of the severe consequences that the exercise of that power has, it is wrong to allow deprivations which our courts have found to be unlawful to continue to have effect pending an appeal. It seems to me even more important for a power such as this that we should stick with the ordinary approach, which is that the decision of the court should take effect pending the appeal and, where circumstances justify, the Government could seek a stay—or, as the noble Lord, Lord German, explained, there could be some work around identifying the grounds on which such a stay should be granted.
Another problem with the Bill is that it creates an incentive for the Government to pursue every possible point in order to preserve the continuing effect of an order. On matters of such importance, if anything, the incentive should be the opposite.
Last but certainly not least, British children born during unlawful deprivation periods find themselves in an even worse limbo. Under the Supreme Court ruling in N3, children would acquire British citizenship if their parents’ appeal is successful, and they would do so immediately. Under the Bill, children would not acquire citizenship, even though the most authoritative determination of the law at that point would support their acquisition of citizenship. I appreciate that the consequence of the Supreme Court’s approach is that a child would be treated as a British citizen during the appeal period and that, if the Government are ultimately successful, that child would have to be regarded as never having acquired British citizenship. But, as a matter of principle, I would rather we erred by treating a non-citizen child as a citizen temporarily than by depriving a child who was a British citizen all along of the benefits of British citizenship.
I have two questions on this point which echo points raised by the noble Lord, Lord German. First, the national security reason, which is stated as the main justification for this Bill, does not apply to children. Being the child of an individual who may pose a threat to national security is not a national security concern. So what is the reason for extending the consequences of the measure to children? Secondly, would the Government be open to considering ways of mitigating the effects of the Bill on children, in the light of the fact that the consequences for them cannot be justified under the underlying justification for the Bill—namely, national security?
I do not have any objection in principle to Parliament taking the view that a law, as interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court, must be changed. It does not mean that the Supreme Court was wrong about the law. As lawmakers, we have a different perspective from that of judges. Our role is to make the law and sometimes change it, and that may at times require reversing a decision of the Supreme Court. In this case, however, I see no legislative reason and no reason of principle that justifies a fundamentally different conclusion from that reached by the Supreme Court. As for the position of the children of the persons who have been deprived of British citizenship, there is a strong reason for considering forms of mitigation.
It seems to me that by extending the powers in Section 40, as the Bill requires us to do, we are going in exactly the opposite direction of that which we should be taking, which is to restrict a power that has been on the statute books for a long time but that is way too illiberal and exorbitant.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow my noble friends who have just spoken, though I do not agree with them altogether. I had prepared a much longer speech, but I do not think it is necessary, so I will make just a few points.
First of all, my noble friends are much too pessimistic and are not actually exercising the role which we have today—I respectfully include an old friend of mine, the noble Lord, Lord German, in the same comment. My observation of the law relating to the deprivation of citizenship is that it is extremely valuable that the decision is made by the Home Secretary herself. She will be advised in a proper way and will ensure that the advice is properly given.
The decision we make is about the situation we are in today; it is not about some future in which a malign Home Secretary might come into existence. I do not think it is right for us as legislators to take that view of the future, unless there is hard evidence of imminence of such a person being appointed. We can rely on our courts and on the separation of powers to protect us from that kind of situation, and indeed on lawyers such as my noble friends to be part of that protection. The legal process by which these orders are tested through the court system is extremely rigorous. SIAC has the advantage of having special advocates who have access to all the relevant material upon which the case is decided. The appellate courts act likewise, and we can be confident that courts will provide protection.
On the essence of the Bill, it is extremely important that national security should protect us from those people who have been deprived of their citizenship. That is what the Bill is about in the here and now, and in broad terms at least I fully support that aim.
As to my noble friend Lord Anderson’s question about whether we should improve the test from “conducive to public good” to a more strict test, I would like to hear the Minister’s response to that. We might improve the law during the course of the Bill’s passage by such a change, if it can be drafted.
I agree that the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation should be inserted into this process. There are two of us here who have been Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, and I can see it being something that the independent reviewer could do easily.
My noble friend Lord Verdirame made some comments about the increase in the number of cases in which citizenship deprivation orders have been made. This is actually over the period when I was Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and the period since. That is nothing to do with me—it is just a consequence of the change in terrorism and the change in the cases that we have had to face up to. It is no surprise to me that there is a need for a greater number of deprivation orders in 2025 than there was in 2007. I am afraid that that is an evolution of the very unpleasant effects of terrorism.
As for the situation with children, I would like the Minister, if he would not mind, to explain to us again the protection that children have during the period when appeals are pending. In principle, I am afraid I can see no reason why we should change an old existing situation in which there is no birthright to British citizenship applicable to children who happen to be born there. Some countries have that birthright; some countries—I can name one in the European Union—have that birthright if the father was a citizen of that country but not if the mother was a citizen of that country. There are all sorts of laws dealing with the nationality of children. I see no reason to change our law, particularly under the particularity of this Bill.
Broadly, I support the Bill. We should get it through this House as quickly as possible, so we can ensure that the measure intrinsic in it is able to protect our citizens as quickly as possible and as well as can be done.
Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)
My Lords, I enter view with some hesitation after speeches by such a phalanx of Cross-Bench lawyers. I understand the reasoning behind the Bill, as set out by the Minister in introducing it. I understand, too, that it will put us on more or less the same footing as like-minded countries. Finally, I appreciate that the Bill has cross-party support.
However, I have two concerns. The first, as I have explained to the Minister—to whom I am very grateful for his letter responding to my concern—is the implications of the Bill for children, especially children born between a successful appeal and the final determination of the case. Here, I share the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord German, and my noble friend Lord Verdirame.
Consider a child born to a successful applicant, whether in Britain or abroad. Under the present draft Bill, the child, unless born in Britain with one parent with British citizenship, will be deprived of citizenship even though his or her parent has successfully appealed against deprivation of citizenship. If the next stage of the appeal were quick, this might be acceptable, but the gap between the successful appeal and the hearing of the Government’s counter-appeal may be five, six or seven years. During that period, the child will be deprived of all the benefits of British citizenship, and if the parent and child are abroad, the child may be in a far worse situation, subject—as we are seeing in north- east Syria, for example—to illness, separation from his or her parents, or terrorist attacks.
My second point is that the obvious way forward is to speed up the appeals process. The Minister said in his letter to me:
“Provisions already exist to enable the courts to expedite such appeals … and it remains within the judiciary’s discretion to determine the suitability of such measures”.
Indeed, but five, six or seven years is too long. I understand and fully support the independence of the judiciary, but I ask the Minister at least to give an assurance that the Government’s views of the desirability of a speeded-up appeals process will be made known to the judiciary.
Baroness D'Souza (CB)
My Lords, this is a small but very important Bill. Most of the important issues it raises have already been spoken to by noble Lords, but some of them bear repetition.
To my mind, this is yet another Bill that, depressingly, seeks to make indents in our constitutional, judicial and democratic rights. The Bill, as we have heard, overturns the presumption that court orders take immediate effect. Clause 1 gives the Government of the day the power to overrule the court’s decisions by ignoring court rulings that have found the Government’s actions to be unlawful.
In brief, the Bill will deny citizenship to individual cases which the courts have already ruled eligible for further appeal. This denial persists until the last of all possible appeals have been exhausted, and as again we have heard, in some cases this may amount to years. Individuals awaiting appeal, and especially their children, are vulnerable, in that, in whatever conditions they find themselves, they are precluded from consular or any other protections.
In effect, this clause renders individuals stateless, and their children open to all kinds of other abuse, including forcible recruitment to armed militias from the age of 12, and/or to compulsory training camps, as happens in northern Syria. UK citizens in northern Syrian camps, for example, have already languished awaiting a court decision, and in some cases face life-threatening conditions. The Bill, given its retrospective mandate, will add years to their detention and render their children, some as yet unborn, vulnerable for years to come.
The purpose and the outcome of the Bill, to quote from a recent Reprieve briefing, is
“to prevent individuals from exercising their rights as British citizens even after the courts have ruled their deprivation unlawful, purely to maintain the Home Secretary’s unchecked ability to exclude them from the UK—however grave the abuses to which they risk being exposed”.
As we know, again, there was an attempt in the other place to introduce an amendment by Kit Malthouse, which proposed, among other elements, that a judge would be able to determine that an order had no effect during the appeal period if the individual faced a substantial threat of harm due to the order. This might be because such an order would adversely affect their ability, for example, to mount an effective defence, and/or the duration of the appeal period was excessive due, perhaps, to actions or omissions by public authorities.
Current levels of deprivation of citizenship in the UK are already very high and— again depressingly—disproportionately affect those from ethnic communities. The Home Secretary’s authority is considerable, in being able to issue an order to deprive a person of his or her citizenship on the basis simply that a person’s presence as a citizen is not conducive to the public good. There is no requirement, as far as I can tell, for judicial oversight, nor is the targeted individual necessarily informed of such a decision. Challenge at this stage is virtually impossible, as decisions are made under secret proceedings. Moreover, the current appeals system is lengthy, complicated and expensive, and certainly not easily accessed by those outside the UK.
This Bill is unnecessary. I hope very much that the relevant clauses will be challenged in Committee to ensure a more equitable, democratic and transparent procedure.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I hope that the House will forgive a Front-Bench speech from the second Bench: it is for practical reasons and not out of disrespect. I knew that a one-clause Bill would not defeat the House in its determination to make varied, well-informed forensic points. For me, the phrase “deprivation of citizenship” brings back memories of my noble friend Lord Avebury—the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, is grinning. Eric was so forceful and so clear about statelessness not being used as a punishment. I have often thought of him as a role model to whom I have not been able to live up.
As we saw a couple of years ago with Bangladesh, our Government’s views about a person’s citizenship do not always, as a matter of practice, align with those of the other state involved. Of course, many argued at the time of the Begum appeal judgment that two-tiered citizenship had been created, downgrading citizenship for naturalised citizens and the children of immigrants.
I have to say that I am one of those who is troubled by the phrase “conducive to the public good”. It is not for us today, as the Minister reminded us at the start of the debate, to try to open up the 1981 Act, but the term requires a value judgment. It is capable of varying and wide interpretations, and it sets a low bar, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, described it. At one point during his speech he used the term “hard cases”. I was not sure whether we were being asked to think about bad law following on from that. Why not “threat to national security”? Indeed, Minister Jarvis in the Commons really seemed to use the terms interchangeably.
The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, suggested that we might be able to look at some change during the course of the Bill. The Long Title of the Bill is actually very short and very unhelpful in that sense, stating that the Bill is
“to make provision about the effect, during an appeal, of an order under section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981”.
I look forward to the noble Lord’s ingenuity in seeking to build on that.
Whatever the ground, as has been said, it is not only the subject of the order who is affected, and the consequences for a child may be extreme, as we know from recent and current history. The APPG on Trafficked Britons in Syria, of which I am a member, has pointed out the risks of statelessness and the concomitant risks of exploitation and extreme ill-treatment, so let us not lose sight of the best interests of the child.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights, under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, asked a number of specific questions—I have seen the Minister’s reply—one of which was about the national security point that I have made. The letter also argues against SIAC having powers to suspend the effect of a successful appeal. Not quite all cases, I think, are security matters—or perhaps they are. It seems to me that “conducive to the public good” might extend that. One of my concerns is about it being a little unclear. There should be consistent mechanisms for managing all cases. The JCHR also asked about expediting appeals and the Government have told us that determinations are for the democratically accountable Secretary of State. I do not think the JCHR was actually challenging that.
I have seen a paper prepared by ILPA, the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association, regarding seeking a stay while an appeal is pending or still possible and pointing out a number of procedural matters that I would have thought could be overcome. I assume that the Home Office has seen the briefing. If not, I wonder whether I might send it to the Minister. It raises points that are pretty technical, I think, and perhaps not appropriate for the subject of this debate. But, if I send it to the Minister, perhaps he could consider responding to it, via me if that is appropriate. It is not aggressive; it is pointing out problems.
Like other noble Lords, I thought that the Malthouse amendment had much to recommend it in the Commons. Kit Malthouse said that he hoped that the Minister would do the right thing. Well, if they could not, let us do so.
The Government maintain the position, not just in this situation, that it is possible, practicable and not disadvantageous to exercise legal rights from outside the UK. When I was in practice as a solicitor, from time to time I found it difficult enough to get a coherent picture from some clients with whom I was face to face—never this sort of situation. It takes time, trust, patience, skill and, of course, access, particularly with a person who has undergone, perhaps over a long period, some extreme experiences. Like others, I feel that our system, which operates on the basis that if a relevant court makes a finding in favour of an individual, that stands, unless it is stayed, until it is overturned, is the way we should continue to do things.
I have been told that the Home Secretary’s powers are used almost exclusively against individuals from ethnic minority backgrounds who hold or are perceived to hold dual nationality. I can see how that could come about. The Minister might like to comment on that because, in the current highly charged political atmosphere, we should be as clear as possible about the facts.
Apart from one point that strikes me as a very good basis for a possible amendment in Committee—my noble friend does not know this yet, because I did not know he was going to make the point, but we will discuss it afterwards—I remain with the basic principles: that no one should be made stateless; that the state’s response to allegations of threats to national security should be tried in the UK unless there are very good reasons to do otherwise; and that the best interests of the child are a priority. I use the term “a priority” as that is what is in other legislation; I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, about that—and it would be a great shame if his barony were challenged. Finally, I remain with the basic principle that the exercise of the power of deprivation should always be proportionate.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I begin by thanking the Minister for his clear exposition of the issue that is addressed in this Bill. I extend my thanks also to other noble Lords who have spoken this evening, albeit that some of the contributions would appear to me to go beyond the scope of the present Bill in seeking to address, for example, the amendment to Section 40 of the 1981 Act.
The Bill concerns one of the most significant powers available to the state: the ability to remove a person’s citizenship when it is deemed conducive to the public good. It is therefore appropriate that this Parliament should give the power the fullest scrutiny and that we should proceed with some caution and considerable care. However, this is not a new power. It is one that successive Administrations have exercised, albeit only in the most serious cases where individuals have posed a threat to our national security.
Some comment was made about the increasing number of instances in which deprivation has taken place but, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, observed, over the period since the provision came into force, we have seen an evolution of the terrorist threat that is faced by this country.
The right to determine the conditions of citizenship is a core attribute of sovereignty and clearly recognised under international law. Obviously, it must be exercised responsibly and in accordance with due process, but, following the recent Supreme Court judgment that has been referred to, this Bill seeks to restore the balance that was deemed to exist prior to that decision earlier this year.
The court’s ruling created a severe problem with respect to the effect of deprivation orders during an appeal process, with the result that there could be an undermining of public safety. Indeed, consequent upon the decision of the Supreme Court, where a tribunal overturned a deprivation order, that decision would take immediate effect even before the Government had exhausted their rights of appeal. I would indicate to the noble Lord, Lord Jay, that a right of appeal is not liable to take five to seven years. Albeit that we have considerable delays in the Crown Courts of this country, we have moved on from Jarndyce and Jarndyce.
Clearly, where the Supreme Court decision would have applied, it would have been open to an individual who was considered to be a serious security risk to this country to return to or enter this country during an appeal process. That would have been properly regarded as an unacceptable risk.
We agree with the Government that it is appropriate that this narrow and targeted measure should be taken. After all, the first duty of any Government is the security of the nation and the security of the people. We would champion, as do the Government, effective counterterrorism measures, including the reform proposed in this Bill.
I welcome the assurance from the Minister that the Bill does not alter the substantive grounds on which citizenship can be removed, nor diminish the right of appeal itself. It merely clarifies the issue following the Supreme Court decision. Of course, public confidence in this power depends not only on its necessity but on its consistent and judicious employment. The Government must continue to ensure that every deprivation decision is taken only after the most robust and rigorous assessment with appropriate safeguards in place. Those safeguards are in place through the application of Section 40 of the 1981 Act. I nevertheless ask the Minister to reassure us that the Home Office will continue to use deprivation powers carefully and only when there is the clearest justification in each individual case.
The Bill is not a sweeping reform but a measured correction to protect national security and uphold Parliament’s original intent with regard to these statutory provisions. It preserves our right to defend the nation state within the bounds of legality and due process. Therefore, we on these Benches support that aim. After all, the first duty of Government is to protect the nation state and the British people. There is always a balance to be achieved between liberty and security. It is never simple to achieve, but with this Bill we believe the Government have rightly struck the appropriate balance, and that is why we lend our support to it.
Finally, I merely observe that there is some constitutional significance to this Bill, inasmuch as it illustrates how our sovereign Parliament can move swiftly to reverse a decision of the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court when the public interest is perceived by Parliament to trump legal niceties.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to all noble Lords who have raised points in this Second Reading. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for their support from His Majesty’s loyal Opposition. I also welcome the broad support from the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile. I recognise that other noble Lords have made legitimate points, and I will try to respond to them.
I remind the House that the debate is about the very small amendment to the legislation. It is not about the principle or application of deprivation, or the numbers of people who have had their citizenship deprived. It is a response to the Supreme Court judgment and what that means in relation to individuals who could potentially return to or retain their status in the United Kingdom when the Government have, through the Home Secretary, determined, for whatever reason, that that individual needs to have their citizenship deprived. That is a very serious step for a Home Secretary to take. When the Supreme Court states, as it did in the recent case, that an individual can retain their citizenship during the appeal process, that means that the individual, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, just mentioned, will be free to remain a British citizen, with all the rights and privileges that brings, while the appeal is ongoing, unless this legislation is put in place.
The noble Lord, Lord German, in his introductory remarks, made a number of points about that. Essentially, I ask him whether he is willing to take the risk. That is the nub of the argument that we are putting to the House today—that the purpose of deprivation of citizenship being maintained during the course of the appeal procedure is so that the United Kingdom Government, the Home Secretary, accountable to the House of Commons, and me in this House, accountable for the Home Office, can take a decision and uphold it during the period of appeal. If the appeal is successful downstream then all bets are off and the individual’s citizenship is restored. For whatever reason it was originally removed, the Home Secretary’s decision has been overturned and the status quo for the individual remains. However, in the event of the individual remaining at the serious risk level that meant the Home Secretary brought forward the citizenship issue in the first place, that opens the United Kingdom to a risk until such time as the appeal is heard. This Bill deals solely with that issue. I heard what the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, and the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, said on this matter, but I put it to them and to the noble Lord, Lord German that the issue is about the management of risk by the UK Government in a limited circumstance, which I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, for raising.
This has been a fair debate about what we call the “Kit Malthouse amendments”, as a number of noble Lords have raised in their contributions. It is not appropriate to confer this discretion on the courts, because it is the Secretary of State who is accountable to this House and to Parliament, through the House of Commons, for matters of national security. As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, mentioned, deprivation of citizenship and national security are matters for the Home Secretary. The Supreme Court itself emphasised that in its discussion and judgment. The Bill will align the approach to asylum and human rights appeals and extend it to appeals to the Supreme Court.
Decisions to deprive are taken in accordance with our international obligations and with consideration as to whether to give deprivation will expose the person to a real risk of mistreatment, which would constitute a breach of Articles 2 or 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Home Secretary is the person responsible for that decision. I hear what noble Lords have said but that is the reason why my noble friend in the Commons, Minister Jarvis, rejected the Kit Malthouse approach, and the reason why I do so today.
Valid points have been raised. The noble Lords, Lord Jay, Lord German, Lord Anderson and Lord Verdirame, mentioned citizenship and the impact on the child. I pay great tribute to the private discussions —which are now public discussions because we have talked about them—that I had with the noble Lord, Lord Jay, because they raised an important issue. We have looked at that and reflected on it, and I hope I can give a satisfactory response to all noble Lords who have raised this question with me. It is simply this: the Bill does not alter the existing situation in relation to children born to deprived individuals, which is already established in law.
Where a child holds British citizenship, the deprivation of the parent’s citizenship has no effect on the child’s nationality status. Again, those points were mentioned across the House today. In cases where a child is born after the parent was deprived of British citizenship—another issue that the noble Lord, Lord Jay, has mentioned privately and in the Chamber today—their entitlement to British citizenship will depend on a number of factors, including the status of the other parent. The consequence of the Supreme Court’s decision in N3(ZA) is that if the child would have been British had their parent not been deprived then a successful appeal against deprivation by their parent means the child is automatically a British citizen. There are no changes in any of the principles that we have here, and I hope that reassures noble Lords on these points. Again, I am happy to reflect on that in due course.
The noble Lord, Lord Jay, made valid points on the question of the appeals procedure and the fast-track process that takes place. In answer to what I think was his pointed question to me, the Government are committed to supporting the expediting of these cases on a case-by-case basis, where appropriate, as quickly as possible. It is in no one’s interests to have long drawn-out appeals. What is the practical implication of that in relation to the courts determining the length of the appeal procedure where disagreements arise, now that courts have the power to order case management reviews to resolve issues? The current rules of court already permit the court to make directions to expedite cases if there are reasons for that to be done. The judiciary themselves are probably, dare I say it, better placed than the Home Secretary to determine and assess in each case how they can expedite those cases or not. All the factors that the noble Lord, Lord Jay, is concerned about are things that would potentially mean that a judge could determine, with “defence counsel”, that this needs to be done quickly. That is reasonable, and we want to see it over and done with as quickly as possible. We can look at the practical implications for the Government, but I hope I can reassure him on the principle.
Questions were asked about whether a person could be deported from the UK while they are appealing against the deprivation decision. In theory, it is possible for a person to be deprived of citizenship and deported before the deprivation appeal is resolved, but in practice that is going to be difficult because there will be the opportunity for people to make a human rights claim in response to the stage 1 deportation letter, and that means they would have an in-country right of appeal against the refusal of that claim if certified and a right of redress against the certification decision. It is a matter for the courts how those appeals are managed.
A number of other points were raised, including by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, about the role of the terrorism reviewer having oversight of these matters. The current situation is that the oversight for this aspect of public policy lies with the inspector of borders. They can determine their own inspection regime, if they wish to look at that. The terrorism reviewer does not currently have that role and responsibility—that is an argument the noble Lord might want to put down for debate. Should the inspector of borders wish to have an investigation on the performance of any matter to do with this—including the rights of the child, the length of the appeal procedure or the Home Secretary’s powers—they could do that, should they so wish, independently of government. So there is a sort of oversight there, but maybe not to the standard or type that the noble Lord wishes.
Ultimately, for this House—and, again, I am grateful for the support of His Majesty’s Opposition, in particular on this—it boils down to whether we are willing to take the risk. If the Home Secretary has taken advice from officials at a senior level and signed that order and taken the decision to deprive an individual of their citizenship, they have done that because there is a threat to the United Kingdom, in one form or another. If this Bill is not enacted, that threat will potentially materialise in another form as the individual will be able to restore their rights as a citizen when they appeal the original decision. This is the purpose of this Bill.
I recognise the range of points made by noble Lords from across the House on a range of issues, from the principle of deprivation in the first place to the numbers and so on, but that is the focus of the Bill and I put the question: are noble Lords willing to take that risk? I suggest that the Government are not and I am grateful to those Members who will support that position in this House today.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
I have a question for the Minister about the possibility that perhaps in the future the deprivation of citizenship would be used as a prelude to deportation, even in circumstances where the first-instance tribunal had decided that the deprivation of citizenship was unlawful. It would be very helpful if the noble Lord could write to me about that.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I thought I had answered that, but if I have not answered that to the extent that I thought, I will reflect on what we have said in Hansard and will ensure that, before the next stage of this Bill, which I think is scheduled for a week today, a piece of paper in electronic or physical form lands on the noble Lord’s desk. With that, I commend the Bill to the House.