Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 14th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by thanking the Minister for his clear exposition of the issue that is addressed in this Bill. I extend my thanks also to other noble Lords who have spoken this evening, albeit that some of the contributions would appear to me to go beyond the scope of the present Bill in seeking to address, for example, the amendment to Section 40 of the 1981 Act.

The Bill concerns one of the most significant powers available to the state: the ability to remove a person’s citizenship when it is deemed conducive to the public good. It is therefore appropriate that this Parliament should give the power the fullest scrutiny and that we should proceed with some caution and considerable care. However, this is not a new power. It is one that successive Administrations have exercised, albeit only in the most serious cases where individuals have posed a threat to our national security.

Some comment was made about the increasing number of instances in which deprivation has taken place but, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, observed, over the period since the provision came into force, we have seen an evolution of the terrorist threat that is faced by this country.

The right to determine the conditions of citizenship is a core attribute of sovereignty and clearly recognised under international law. Obviously, it must be exercised responsibly and in accordance with due process, but, following the recent Supreme Court judgment that has been referred to, this Bill seeks to restore the balance that was deemed to exist prior to that decision earlier this year.

The court’s ruling created a severe problem with respect to the effect of deprivation orders during an appeal process, with the result that there could be an undermining of public safety. Indeed, consequent upon the decision of the Supreme Court, where a tribunal overturned a deprivation order, that decision would take immediate effect even before the Government had exhausted their rights of appeal. I would indicate to the noble Lord, Lord Jay, that a right of appeal is not liable to take five to seven years. Albeit that we have considerable delays in the Crown Courts of this country, we have moved on from Jarndyce and Jarndyce.

Clearly, where the Supreme Court decision would have applied, it would have been open to an individual who was considered to be a serious security risk to this country to return to or enter this country during an appeal process. That would have been properly regarded as an unacceptable risk.

We agree with the Government that it is appropriate that this narrow and targeted measure should be taken. After all, the first duty of any Government is the security of the nation and the security of the people. We would champion, as do the Government, effective counterterrorism measures, including the reform proposed in this Bill.

I welcome the assurance from the Minister that the Bill does not alter the substantive grounds on which citizenship can be removed, nor diminish the right of appeal itself. It merely clarifies the issue following the Supreme Court decision. Of course, public confidence in this power depends not only on its necessity but on its consistent and judicious employment. The Government must continue to ensure that every deprivation decision is taken only after the most robust and rigorous assessment with appropriate safeguards in place. Those safeguards are in place through the application of Section 40 of the 1981 Act. I nevertheless ask the Minister to reassure us that the Home Office will continue to use deprivation powers carefully and only when there is the clearest justification in each individual case.

The Bill is not a sweeping reform but a measured correction to protect national security and uphold Parliament’s original intent with regard to these statutory provisions. It preserves our right to defend the nation state within the bounds of legality and due process. Therefore, we on these Benches support that aim. After all, the first duty of Government is to protect the nation state and the British people. There is always a balance to be achieved between liberty and security. It is never simple to achieve, but with this Bill we believe the Government have rightly struck the appropriate balance, and that is why we lend our support to it.

Finally, I merely observe that there is some constitutional significance to this Bill, inasmuch as it illustrates how our sovereign Parliament can move swiftly to reverse a decision of the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court when the public interest is perceived by Parliament to trump legal niceties.