Security Update: Official Secrets Act Case

Lord Fox Excerpts

Tuesday 14th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, the matter before us today is a grave and serious one, and I am glad that we have another opportunity to discuss it, following my noble friend Lord True’s success in securing a PNQ on the matter yesterday. The collapse of the case against Mr Cash and Mr Berry goes to the very heart of this Parliament. What is at stake is nothing less than the dignity and security of Members of both Houses and of those who work within them.

In their handling of the matter, the Government have shown a grave failure of responsibility. The Statement issued by the Security Minister in the other place on Monday was woefully inadequate. This dispute turns on one simple question: why did the Government not give the Crown Prosecution Service the evidence it needed to pursue this case? In both his Statement and his replies, the Security Minister failed to clarify four central matters.

First, he proceeded on the false premise that the previous Government did not regard China as a national security threat. The record shows that they did. For example, the head of MI6 in 2021 said that China was one of the biggest four threats to the UK, alongside Russia, Iran and international terrorism.

Secondly, like the Prime Minister, the Security Minister seemed to argue that it was not open to the current Government to give the Crown Prosecution Service evidence that differed from the previous Government’s view of the threat from China. In other words, he seems to have assumed that the present Government could not form their own view of the threat during 2021 to 2023 or provide a statement to that effect. That was wrong. Nothing in law or practice stopped the Government from doing so.

Thirdly, he cited the Roussev judgment as though it had narrowed the 1911 Act. It did not. The Court of Appeal made it clear that “enemy” includes any state acting against the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, whether or not we are at war with it.

Fourthly, he assumed that only the Government can determine who falls within that definition. There is no such requirement. The question is one of fact, not fiat, and may properly be assessed by a jury on the evidence before it.

I might stress that noble Lords should not just take my word for it. The Minister’s and the Prime Minister’s argument has been refuted by no less than one former DPP, two former Cabinet Secretaries—one of whom was a National Security Adviser—two former heads of MI6 and a professor of public law at the University of Cambridge, who said this week that Ministers’ statements so far are “misleading” about the legal position. The experts are all clear that Mr Cash and Mr Berry could have been prosecuted under the old legislation. Are we to believe the Government’s position that they are all wrong and that they—the Government—are right?

This case is only one symptom of a deeper failure in the Government’s approach to China. Ministers are still intent on allowing the Chinese Communist Party to build its new embassy on the Royal Mint site, within sight of some of the most sensitive financial and communications infrastructure in the country. They have done so despite clear and repeated warnings from our allies in Washington and from our own intelligence agencies that the project poses a serious espionage risk. Those warnings have been brushed aside and key details redacted from public view.

The decision to transfer the Chagos Islands to Mauritius tells the same story. China’s ambassador there publicly welcomed the move, congratulating Mauritius and confirming its intention to join Beijing’s belt and road initiative. Now, even as evidence of Chinese interference has reached into Parliament itself, the Government’s response has remained slow, confused and complacent. This is not an isolated failure but a pattern of neglect—one that leaves the United Kingdom exposed at a moment when China’s ambitions are clearer and more aggressive than ever.

Before I conclude, I have several questions for the noble Baroness the Minister. It is not for Ministers or officials to determine what evidence meets the threshold for prosecution. That judgment belongs solely to the Crown Prosecution Service. The Government’s duty was to provide all relevant information to the CPS when asked. They did not. The question is: who decided that the Crown Prosecution Service would not be provided with further evidence? Was that decision taken by Ministers, officials or advisers?

Everyone in government knows that a matter of this kind would have gone to Ministers. To pretend otherwise is not credible; to blame a single official is wrong. Did the Deputy National Security Adviser act without ministerial oversight in determining the evidential basis of the case? If so, who authorised that arrangement? Were any Ministers or special advisers shown, did they clear or were they consulted on the Deputy National Security Adviser’s draft statement before it was sent to the CPS? When the CPS requested further material, were Ministers shown this request and did they clear the revised version? Will the Minister publish the internal guidance that allowed the Deputy National Security Adviser to act “without interference” from Ministers, as well as the correspondence between the Cabinet Office, the CPS and the Foreign Office concerning the drafting of his statements?

Furthermore, how many current investigations rely on the 1911 Act, and have any been paused following Roussev? What part of that judgment, which produced six convictions, prevented the CPS proceeding in this case? Did any official or Minister advise that Roussev made prosecution under the 1911 Act impossible, and will that advice be placed in the Library? Mr Justice Hilliard cited the evidence of Matthew Collins, the Deputy National Security Adviser, as authoritative in Roussev. Why is the same official’s evidence deemed unusable when applied to China?

Why is guidance to Members being launched only today, when MI5 and the National Protective Security Authority have been aware of active Chinese interference since at least 2022?

Finally, will the Minister confirm whether Sir Olly Robbins has been instructed to make clear to his counterparts that the United Kingdom regards China as a national security threat and to set out what discussions he is authorised to hold?

This is not about one prosecution that failed. It is about whether we still possess the will to defend the institutions that safeguard our liberty. It is about whether those charged with protecting this country still understand what it means to act in its defence. When foreign powers reach into our Parliament and Ministers look away, it is not only our security that is breached but our sense of who we are. A Government who will not face the truth invite their own humiliation. A nation that tolerates such weakness endangers itself.

Britain’s strength has never rested on wealth or size but on the courage to confront those who would test it. That courage is now being tested again. The Government must speak plainly, act decisively and show that this country will never be cowed, compromised or complacent in the face of the ambitions of China. I urge the noble Baroness to answer not with evasion but with candour, and to meet this moment with the seriousness our duty to the nation demands.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I do not think that I have followed the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, in the past and it is a great pleasure to do so. I am happy to say that there are still one or two things left to say.

This Statement is clearly an attempt to put to rest the issue of these botched prosecutions, or non-prosecutions. So far, however, it has not only failed in that ambition; at the same time, it has resurfaced other issues regarding China and our relationship that generate increasing concern. Regarding the prosecutions, and given the Minister’s Statement and the Government’s adamant view that they have not concealed evidence or suppressed anything, it would be easy for the Government to publish all the relevant documentation. They have nothing to hide; we know that—they have told us, and we trust them. Will the Government publish all the relevant documents, as set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the correspondence between all officials, politicians and advisers involved with the CPS?

It is time for the Government to properly protect the interests of our citizens so, working with the CPS, will the Government look at all legislative options to make sure that these two individuals have their time in the court, face a jury and are able to plead their case? These are the ways that the Government can push this issue to rest: by openness and actually seeking to prosecute.

More widely, this case has exposed appalling gaps in the Government’s willingness to challenge China’s considerable espionage efforts, but I am pleased that they recognise that we have a problem. The Statement is clear:

“We fully recognise that China poses a series of threats to UK national security”,


it says, but their actions fly in the face of that reality.

A former director-general of the Security Service has warned that Chinese espionage is being carried out on an industrial scale, including by seeking influence over Parliament, as well as in industry and education. This has been clear for some time. That was why we warned that exempting China from the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme under the National Security Act was a terrible mistake by this Government.

Will the Government now undertake to include all Chinese officials, Hong Kong special administrative region officials and Chinese Communist Party-linked organisations in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme? More than that, the Government, supported by the Conservatives, exempted government administration and public bodies in their entirety from the FIRS scheme. Will the Minister now undertake to listen to the intelligence community and include people performing in these activities in the enhanced layer of FIRS?

Finally, as we have heard, it is now time for the Government to come to their senses and block the planning application for the Chinese mega-embassy. We know that, through its embassy in the UK, China has been co-ordinating the transnational repression of people who are carrying out normal and legal activities in the United Kingdom. Will the Minister confirm that the intelligence agencies were not consulted before the Government approved China’s new super-embassy in London, and will the Government now take heed and halt that project until a full national security review is completed?

[Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)]

My Lords, that is a significant number of questions, which I have written down and now lost—thank you—and I will endeavour to answer all of them. I will also review Hansard and make sure that I correspond on anything that I am unsuccessful in responding to. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for their participation and genuine interest in this. Let us be very clear that matters of espionage, especially those that have seemingly been conducted within your Lordships’ House, but also within Parliament, are of the utmost seriousness.

I want to begin by reinforcing that this Government remain extremely disappointed by the collapse of the Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry trial. During yesterday’s PNQ, I committed to update your Lordships’ House on the facts surrounding the collapse of this trial, as well as government actions to counter state threats—as my honourable friend Dan Jarvis, the Security Minister, also made clear yesterday. The decision not to prosecute was made independently by the CPS. It is a bedrock principle of our democracy that decisions of the CPS are independent of Ministers and the Government.

The Director of Public Prosecutions has written to the chairs of the Home Affairs Committee and the Justice Committee, setting out that the CPS decision not to take this case to trial was because the evidential test was not met. As the Prime Minister—who, if we are citing former DPPs, I remind noble Lords is also a former DPP—has stated, the policy position of the current Government was “immaterial” to the CPS’s assessment.

The legal test required consideration of the Government’s policy at the time the alleged offences were committed—between December 2021 and February 2023—when Members opposite were in Government. At that time, the previous Conservative Government described China as a “systematic challenge” in the Integrated Review 2021 and an “epoch-defining challenge” in the Integrated Review Refresh 2023. They did not designate China as a threat or an enemy; that is at the crux of the issue.

I want to be clear, and I am genuinely horrified by the suggestion, that accusations that the Government concealed evidence, withdrew witnesses or in any way restricted the ability of witnesses to provide evidence are entirely untrue. The Director of Public Prosecutions has given his assurance that the CPS was not influenced by any external party, any member of this Government or any senior civil servant or special adviser. As the Security Minister set out in detail yesterday, evidence was provided to the CPS by the Deputy National Security Adviser, who is highly respected and has the full support of this Government. All the evidence provided by the Deputy National Security Adviser was based on the law at the time of the offences and the policy position of the Conservative Government at that time. The DNSA did not materially change his evidence and was under no pressure from anybody to do so.

On the question raised by both the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox—which was also raised yesterday by the noble Lord, Lord Gove—it is not for me to make decisions about the publication of evidence that may be used in further ongoing legal processes. To do so, or not, would likely affect witnesses in coming forward and hamper the interests of justice.

I understand that many noble Lords are also rightly interested in the opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny of the facts around the collapse of this case. The Government’s approach will always be to make as much information available as possible through the appropriate processes, given the national security considerations. I welcome that the National Security Adviser will be giving a private briefing to the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy next month.

On our approach to China, this Government are unequivocal. China poses a series of threats to UK national security, from cyberattacks and foreign interference to the transnational repression of Hong Kongers. This Government fully recognise the gravity of these threats. However, we must also recognise that China presents opportunities. It is the world’s second-largest economy. To act in the UK’s best interests, we must adopt a long-term strategic approach, as the last Government did. This means a consistent and pragmatic approach to economic engagement without compromising our national security.

On some of the other specifics that have been raised, I want to respond to a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, on the Chinese embassy. No such decision has been made. The noble Lord knows that, throughout the process, we have been clear that we have considered the breadth of national security considerations and have publicly outlined necessary security mitigations that we would need to see to support an application. National security has been our core priority throughout the process. A final decision will be made in due course by Ministers in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government in their quasi-judicial role, and we expect a decision imminently. We do not underestimate the impact of national security as part of that decision.

As I also said yesterday in response to the PNQ, no decision has been made on China regarding the FIRS scheme. We are talking about a scheme that has been undertaken for only three and a half months. No decision has yet been made to exempt or include China, but a decision will be brought forward to your Lordships’ House.

On the specific question of the 1911 Act, the legislation the CPS uses for arrests and prosecutions is a matter for that agency. I do not have access to that data; that would be for the CPS. To clarify for noble Lords, there is a reason why many hours were spent in your Lordships’ House debating the National Security Bill in 2023—which was supported by my colleagues too on a cross-party basis—to update the Official Secrets Act. It is unfortunate that the 1911 Act was the basis of this prosecution, but there is a reason why we had to update it, and that is because of the very definition of “espionage” and “enemy”. This is a piece of legislation that was written prior to World War I. The world has changed, the threat level has changed and how people undertake threats has significantly changed.

I think I have touched on all the evidence. The Deputy National Security Adviser operated within the confines and constraints of the policy direction of the previous Government. We are fully committed to his work. He can operate only within the confines of the situation of the moment and, on that basis, there is nothing more for him to answer.

I reiterate this Government’s unwavering commitment to our national security. Yesterday, MI5’s National Protective Security Authority launched new guidance, building on previous guidance—it was not brand new—to protect our democratic institutions from foreign interference. I urge all noble Lords to read this vital guidance. Furthermore, the Government continue to hold China state-linked actors accountable for cyber espionage. The National Cyber Security Centre recently co-sealed a US-led technical advisory calling out Chinese state-sponsored actors for targeting global networks, including in the UK. We will continue to take all necessary action to tackle state threats, including those from China. That is the primary responsibility of government.