Representation of the People Bill (Second sitting)
(1 day, 9 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Chair
We will now hear evidence from the Electoral Office for Northern Ireland and the Electoral Commission Northern Ireland. We have until 2.25 pm for this panel. Will the witnesses introduce themselves for the record?
David Marshall: Thank you very much for the invitation to brief the Committee. I am Dr David Marshall, the chief electoral officer for Northern Ireland. I am responsible in law for all returning officers for all elections and referendums in Northern Ireland, and I am also the registration officer for all of Northern Ireland.
Cahir Hughes: Good afternoon. My name is Cahir Hughes. I am head of the Electoral Commission in Northern Ireland, and I am responsible for ensuring the delivery of the commission’s work in Northern Ireland.
Paul Holmes (Hamble Valley) (Con)
Q
I have two general questions. You obviously have a unique set of experiences in running elections in Northern Ireland. In some ways, in Northern Ireland you have had, for a long time, some regulatory changes that the Government would say we are only just catching up with, and I think that is a fair assessment. Starting with Mr Hughes, given your experience of running elections with voter identification in Northern Ireland, what is your view of the proposal to add bank cards to the list of accepted identification in the rest of the United Kingdom? Are you concerned that it will create a divergence from the elections that you run and your current guidelines?
Cahir Hughes: It is fair to say that the system of photographic ID at polling stations in Northern Ireland is very well established. It has been running for almost 25 years, and voters are very well aware of the need to bring photographic ID with them to the polling station. Research that we have done shows that the percentage of people who know they need to do so is in the high 90s, and they also know what form of ID—most commonly driving licence and passport. It is an established part of polling day at our elections that people know to bring ID with them.
The bank card proposal has not been introduced in Northern Ireland. There is the issue that there is no date of birth on a bank card, which is what you need for photographic ID in Northern Ireland. With divergence there is always an element of risk. We experienced it in 2024 at the UK parliamentary election, when there were different forms of ID used in Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Through our public awareness campaigns and partnership work, we put a lot of focus on ensuring that the right messaging gets to voters in Northern Ireland. As I say, that did not materialise as an issue in 2024. It is something that we will consider as part of our campaigns at future elections from 2029, if the Bill follows the path it is set out to do.
David Marshall: I will say at the start that I have a large enough job as returning officer and registration officer for elections in Northern Ireland before I try to comment on policy matters in Great Britain, but I will give just a wee bit of background. Northern Ireland has had official photo ID for well over 20 years. It came in after widespread public concern about the safety and challenges of running elections back in the 1980s and 1990s. Since then, as Cahir has said, it has by and large worked and been accepted, and there are high levels of public support and confidence in elections here. That is not to say that our system is perfect. We could absolutely include other forms of ID that are currently available in Great Britain. I know the Government are on record as saying the UK veteran card could be included, and there may well be other forms of ID as well. All of this needs to be future-proofed into what digital ID might bring.
In conclusion, only time will tell whether the Government’s plans for bank cards in Great Britain will work. If I was asked in Northern Ireland, I would say, “Expand the list of photo ID rather than go to bank cards at this stage.”
Paul Holmes
Q
I also want to ask about your experiences. There is a contention among many parties in the UK House of Commons that photographic ID means many people turned away from polling stations and being stopped voting, and that it is, as they would say, anti-democratic. Could you give a brief outline of the experience of you guys in Northern Ireland and the speed at which people got used to having to show photo ID? I think you mentioned, Mr Hughes, that over 90% of people are aware that they need to carry photo ID, but can you briefly talk about your experience of the numbers in recent elections who are turned away from voting in Northern Ireland, and do you think it is a large-scale issue?
Cahir Hughes: At the onset of today, it is not a large-scale issue. It is not something that voters or candidates express concerns about to us. Again, I will say that it has been in for 25 years. After the Electoral Fraud (Northern Ireland) Act 2002 was introduced, photographic ID came into effect in 2003. We ran a lot of public awareness campaigns to highlight the need for photographic ID and the correct forms of ID. We did a lot of post-poll research over the years and the percentage was in those high 80s and 90s. We do not ask that question any more because it is just part and parcel of the electoral process on polling day. We know that voters are very familiar with it.
In the last research that we did, somewhere in the region of 97% or 98% of people were aware that they needed to bring an accepted form of photographic ID. In my experience of observing at polling stations on polling day, when voters do show up without a form of ID, it is just because they genuinely forgot it. There have been no statements of feeling disenfranchised or not being able to participate on polling day, and presiding officers tend to report back to us that voters do come back with a form of ID, be it by returning home or nipping out to the car.
Paul Holmes
Q
David Marshall: Nothing substantial—just that I think the younger community here in Northern Ireland get it and accept it. The older community have been through that transition and that change, as Cahir said, 20 or 25 years ago and they accept it as well. That is not to say there is not the occasional issue in polling stations, but nothing substantial.
Paul Holmes
Q
Cahir Hughes: The list of forms of ID that are available to voters in Northern Ireland is significantly shorter than the list in Great Britain. Again, it is so well established here that people are familiar with it. Nevertheless, we need to move with the times; David touched on the impact of digital ID, and the veteran card is included in the Bill. It is right that it is kept under review, but if it was continually added to over and over again in Northern Ireland, that would risk further divergence from Great Britain and the confusion that we touched on previously.
It is right that it is kept under review, but as I say, there are high levels of public awareness of the need for photographic ID. David will correct me if I am wrong, but I think most voters are very familiar with the fact that they need to bring their driving licence or passport with them, and if they cannot get that, they can get an electoral identity card from the Electoral Office.
Paul Holmes
Mr Marshall, don’t feel you need to, but if you want to add something, you are more than entitled to.
David Marshall: I have nothing further to add.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (Samantha Dixon)
Q
David Marshall: I manage a relatively small team in Belfast who run elections here. It is not the equivalent of Great Britain, where there are teams in local councils. There is an Electoral Office that covers all 11 councils here in Northern Ireland. We are tasked with running two sets of elections in May 2027—both the Northern Ireland Assembly and the local council elections—so most of my work and thinking is around that.
The Bill has a commitment to review the canvass law in Northern Ireland, which is very welcome indeed. The canvass law in Northern Ireland has not kept pace with changes in Great Britain, and it really needs to. That is an important step forward. In terms of the nomination process, the requirement for candidates to show a form of ID is a really sensible step forward, given the problems in Great Britain in 2024, and it would be relatively straightforward to implement. We think that is a great idea, as well as the timelines. As I understand it, the Bill brings forward a 12 noon timeline for the last day of nominations, which will help in terms of ballot paper proofing and then getting postal votes out to voters that bit earlier, which will obviously make it easier for them to take part in the election.
There are a whole host of other changes to postal vote deadlines for Great Britain, which in this instance aligns Great Britain to Northern Ireland. I am all for alignment if it changes Great Britain to be the same as Northern Ireland. That is really helpful. Lastly, from an electoral administrator’s perspective, the new penalties for intimidatory behaviour towards staff are critical, and it is really important that those are brought in. It is a really good step forward.
Samantha Dixon
Q
David Marshall: They are very welcome indeed.
Cahir Hughes: To echo what David said, canvass reform is essential in Northern Ireland, so that measure is welcome. Automatic registration will also play a significant part in improving access to electoral services in Northern Ireland, and we are working closely with David on the practicalities of that.
David touched on the electoral administrative side of the Bill, as you would expect, but I want to highlight something in relation to the political finance side. The rules on political donations for registered political parties are slightly different in Northern Ireland, in that parties can accept donations from permissible Irish sources. The Bill says that that will continue, and that principle was enshrined in an agreement between the British and Irish Governments back in 2006, to allow Irish donors to give to parties here, in line with the Good Friday/Belfast agreement. Obviously, the secondary legislation will provide the detail on how this will operate in practice, but we can already see some difficulties in checking the permissibility of donations. For example, with company donations from a UK company, we can go on to Companies House and check the donation, as can the treasurer of a political party or the elected representative who is taking the donation.
Company registration in Ireland is very different, and it would therefore not be as straightforward to verify the true nature of a donation, if it comes from a company. Not only would that put the treasurer of a party in a difficult situation, but we as the regulator are also required to check 50% of the donations that are reported to us in Northern Ireland, so that will make compliance tricky for us. We wait to see the secondary legislation, but that is a concern for us in relation to the political finance aspects of the Bill.
Lisa Smart (Hazel Grove) (LD)
Q
David Marshall: This is one of those changes that should probably have been brought in when photographic voter ID was introduced in Northern Ireland in 2002 But frankly, whenever it was brought in, calling out in polling stations was removed in Great Britain as part of the introduction of voter ID there. The Government have seen fit to make it equivalent across Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which I very much welcome. We have a system for personation called “photographic ID”, and we do not need another secondary system. If necessary, we can manage any issues or concerns in polling stations by talking to polling agents at that point.
Cahir Hughes: Historically, the link was made with polling agents. When photographic ID was introduced, polling agents thought that it was very important that they still had a role to identify personation. I suspect that the legacy issues in Northern Ireland and distrust between parties and communities may have played a part in that. However, as we have discussed, photographic ID is very well established in Northern Ireland, so people are familiar with it. It provides the level of security that you would expect in polling stations. Of course, polling agents will continue to be allowed in the polling station.
Katrina Murray (Cumbernauld and Kirkintilloch) (Lab)
Q
Cahir Hughes: We made the need for canvass reform very clear to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, as it is essential. We think that a significant amount of money is spent removing 1.4 million electors off the electoral register, only for them to ask to be put back on again. Canvass reform is essential for that not to happen in 2030, and we welcome that being addressed in the Bill, including by the provisions on automatic registration, which should make things easier for voters as well. I am sure that David will touch on this, but he has a rich source of data available to him to manage the electoral register and to get people on the register, which is very welcome.
The one thing not in the Bill—frankly, I was not expecting it to be—is the issue of co-option, which we flagged to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee. That is where elected Members in the Northern Ireland Assembly or those in a local council can be replaced through the co-option system when a vacancy arises. The Bill does not address that issue, but it is something that we will monitor ahead of the combined polls next year. If need be, we will report on it, as we statutorily have to after every election.
David Marshall: On canvass reform, one important step will be that we take cognisance of the possibility of automatic registration in the context of how it is implemented. As Cahir indicated, we have a rich source of data, and every year we write to all 16 and 17-year-olds who are not currently on the register but could come on to it, but only about 30% then go ahead and register to vote.
When we hold that high-quality public sector data—national insurance data, health registration data—we would like the ability to write to those people, turn it the other way and say, “We are going to register you to vote unless you tell us otherwise.” That ought to be part of the reform of the canvass in Northern Ireland: including some element of automatic registration.
Warinder Juss (Wolverhampton West) (Lab)
Q
David Marshall: We take that extremely seriously in our current work, where we identify people who are on the register and ask them to come forward to register to vote. For example, when we write out to a household, we tend to write out to the householder rather than to the child and say, “A 16, 17 or 18-year-old lives this household. You may wish to register them to vote”—the idea being that we are not disclosing anything specific to that individual. We absolutely take that extremely seriously, and it is something that you will have to consider. I know that pilots were run in Wales to look at this, and they did not raise too significant a concern or issue at that point, but it is obviously important that we keep that issue in mind when we implement these proposals.
Cahir Hughes: All I would add is that in Northern Ireland David has the benefit of a centralised register, so all the data for all of Northern Ireland is coming to him. That reduces the risks. The data is rich as well, particularly in terms of the business support organisation, which is all the health data. That is reliable data on people who are accessing public services, and that is being passed on to him. I suppose it is a simpler process in Northern Ireland than in GB, where so many local authorities are involved.
The Chair
There seem to be no further questions, so I thank both witnesses for their evidence, and we will move on to our next panel. Thank you, gentlemen.
Examination of Witnesses
Harriet Andrews and Andy Mycock gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from The Politics Project and the Yorkshire and Humber Policy Engagement and Research Network. We have until 2.50 pm for this panel. Can the witnesses briefly introduce themselves for the record?
Harriet Andrews: Hi, I am Harriet Andrews, and I am the director of The Politics Project, which is a democratic education and engagement organisation that specialises in working with young people on elections and democracy.
Andy Mycock: I am Dr Andy Mycock, and I am a public policy specialist. I sat on the UK Government’s Youth Citizenship Commission in 2008 and 2009, and was a witness at the House of Lords Select Committee on Citizenship and Civic Engagement.
Paul Holmes
Q
My question is on votes at 16 and your daily experiences of engaging with young people on it. I have had some experience of this in my constituency on Fridays. Granted, I am probably not the best person to sell the argument for votes at 16, although I still like to think that I can be at one with the kids in the schools—just the fact I said that shows I am not. Without giving my view, I have asked young people at my secondary schools to put their hands up to show whether they are for or against votes at 16, and the overwhelming majority are against. I found that really interesting, and I wonder whether it is in line with the general perception or engagement feedback you have seen?
Aside from votes at 16, could you outline to the Committee what methods, if this proposal goes through, the Government, mainstream political parties and, indeed, all parties should take on board, because we all have a stake in this and need to go further to engage younger people?
Harriet Andrews: There are different polls on what young people think about votes at 16, and the results are mixed—it often depends on how you ask the question. Young people are split on whether they want votes at 16, which suggests that they are not a monolith and that we should not talk about them as a single blob, because they have different views and opinions.
When you dig down into that polling, a lot of young people are saying, “I am not sure I have the skills and confidence to be voting and engaging.” To me, that suggests they are in a really good place to be thinking about voting, because they are taking the responsibility incredibly seriously. When you ask whether they could be supported by schools or adults to learn about this, or on their first vote, they are much keener to engage and take part in democracy from 16. So we do engage with that question a lot and talk to a lot of young people about it, and when we dig down, the reason is normally that they want a bit more support.
I love the question about what parties can do, because I think it is missing a bit from the debate at the moment. A really important thing for parties to think about is the voter information space. If I ask a young person right now, “What does X party think on Y issue?”, the absolute mess they have to wade through to work out what parties think and what their views are on particular issues is really difficult. It is difficult for any voter, and we could take votes at 16 as an opportunity to do a bit better on it.
We will talk a lot about misinformation and disinformation—it is a big topic—but the other side of it is where the good sources of information are that young people can go to for up-to-date factual information about the different political parties. That is one of my pleas: what are you doing to communicate that information to young people more effectively?
Paul Holmes
I am sure many of us around the table will be looking daily at how to do that if the Bill goes through.
Andy Mycock: May I correct the record? I am not an advocate for votes at 16; I am an academic researcher who has been looking at the evidence around the debates for more than 20 years.
We have tracked public opinion, both for young people under the age of 18 and for those over 18, and Hattie is absolutely correct: it is probably about 50/50 among young people. There are those who are very enthusiastic and those who are somewhat nervous. There are lots of reasons why some are more sceptical and nervous. It is often down to family background, the culture of their family and the communities they live in in terms of political engagement.
On the broader issue of public opinion, there has been no evidence of a majority of the general public supporting the measure. That is very different to when the voting age was lowered in 1969 to 18, when you had both political and public consensus over the age of enfranchisement and the age of majority.
In terms of the way political parties might engage better with young people, the research we have done suggests there are a number of issues. First, political parties rarely design policies with or for young people that attract them to vote, so regardless of whether the voting age is 16 or 18, most young people do not vote. Often, the representatives who are selected to represent them are over the age of 50. In all the Parliaments across the United Kingdom, the average age remains over 50, so young people do not see themselves in those people.
On the issues Hattie raised about political communication and the way electoral campaigning is undertaken, those are still clearly problematic; we have a very much 20th-century approach to a 21st-century electorate. People do not feel that politicians speak their language, come to the places where they aggregate or engage with them in ways that fit their lifestyle.
The question you ask is really important, because there is a supply and demand aspect to votes at 16, whether you support or oppose it. UK democracy is in some form of crisis. If you look at the evidence, there is huge distrust of political parties and politicians. More recently we are picking up that there is a systems fatalism: a sense that the electorate, particularly young people who are growing up at this point, feel that whoever is in power—the institutions that shape their lives and govern them—is not going to have a positive effect on them.
Whether you support or oppose votes at 16, this is a once-in-a-generation moment to reflect on not just the composition of the franchise but how you, as parties and politicians, think about the health of our democracy. This is a critical question of democratic resilience. I am doing work in Australia at the moment with the Australian federal Government, and this is a common challenge across western democracies. The UK has an opportunity to take leadership and address these challenges honestly, without getting lost in debates over votes at 16.
Paul Holmes
Q
So my question to you, in connection to that point, is whether you believe there is a missed opportunity in the Bill, in that somebody can vote in elections at 16 but not participate as a candidate, or do the Government have the right balance?
Andy Mycock: Again, I would go back to 1969. There has been very little policy learning about what happened there. It is interesting that the age of enfranchisement and the age of majority were brought together, but the age of candidature was not; in fact, it was not until 2006 that the Electoral Commission finally lowered it. At this point, there is no need to say that that is a barrier to or a support for lowering the voting age; it is an issue to think about.
I do feel there is a need for this House to review the age of majority; that is not to change it, but the conditions of the 20th and 21st centuries are very different. In the law, adulthood is now shaped at the age of 18, which is the legal age of citizenship, and yet you can get a national insurance number or a passport or undertake elective surgery—you can do a huge number of things—under the age of 18. At the same time, those traditional indicators of adulthood, such as owning a house, getting married, having children and having a full-time job, are being realised much later in life.
Our research indicates strongly that young people do not see 18 as a particularly significant once-in-a-lifetime moment when they become adults. Adulthood is much more complex, as is maturity and the sense of how young people fit into society. Our research indicates strongly that young people, if they are enfranchised universally across the UK at the age of 16, want to be treated as young people in the electorate and not to be seen as adults.
Paul Holmes
Q
Harriet Andrews: The main opportunity we see from votes at 16 is that it provides an opportunity to effectively support people to vote while they are still in education, or in work or training; 18 is actually a terrible time of your life to suddenly take on this new opportunity.
It allows us to deal with things like inequalities caused by the way your parents vote and engage determining how you vote and engage. The opportunity for schools to play much more of a role, and for there to be a more systematic approach to supporting young people, is the real opportunity with votes at 16.
Our main interest is also about what we are putting around votes at 16: where is the education, engagement and support for young people so that they can engage in democracy really effectively?
Samantha Dixon
Q
Harriet Andrews: We have a really great split screen on this because we work in England and in Wales, in particular. At the moment, we are preparing loads of young people for the Senedd election. We are running 16 youth hustings for young people at the moment in Wales, so we have a lot of on-the-ground experience of this. I would say that supporting young people at 16 and supporting young people at 18 are not particularly different; it is the same process of preparing them to engage and vote.
From our experience in Wales, I can say that young people are taking it really seriously. They are thinking about the responsibility and are really excited to vote. The work that we are doing with young people is a positive experience, and they are engaging really well. If there are any worries about harm being done to young people aged 16, our on-the-ground experience suggests that that is absolutely not the case.
The one thing that we see in Wales is that votes at 16 needs to come alongside support—particularly democratic education and engagement in schools—so that young people know how to vote. Just changing the voting age in itself will not lead to a mass change in the way young people engage with politics and democracy. The lack of support in Wales has meant that there is not loads and loads of engagement at 16, so the surrounding support is really important, regardless of the voting age.
Andy Mycock: I have been involved in the evaluations of both the Scottish and the Welsh lowering of the voting age, and I have advised both Governments on that work. The first thing is that the lessons from 1969 were not learned in either of those cases. Simply lowering the voting age on its own does not have a mercurial effect in encouraging young people to engage and vote. The big problem is that there is a need to have a significant framework of support for young people as they grow up, before they vote, whatever the voting age is.
At present, in Scotland, Wales and the rest of the United Kingdom, there is a disconnection between the different stages of school—between primary, secondary, and further and higher education. The 50% of young people who do not go to university are dropped completely in terms of their support. It is a huge issue, and I urge you to look at it. What happens in schools and outside schools is very poorly connected, and what happens online is almost unregulated. There is a huge opportunity to think about media, information and political literacy at this point.
I urge you to think about what the House of Lords called a civic journey—the ability to connect all those different interventions and policies from Governments at different levels to a set of clear policy ambitions. At the moment, votes at 16 has very little in terms of a clear agenda for success, beyond the idea that young people might vote a little more over their lifetime. In Scotland and Wales, that has not happened.
In the independence referendum of 2014, 75% of 16 and 17-year-olds voted. It was seen as a huge success, until you look at the average turnout, which was 85%. Young people aged 16 and 17 in Scotland, although they vote more than their 18 to 24-year-old peers, continue to vote at considerably lower rates than the average turnout. That is because neither Government thought at the time they lowered the voting age about significant, consistent support for every young person as they grow up. They need to be heard, listened to and engaged with, not just in their lessons but in their communities. They need to meet you and local and other elected representatives regularly so that they feel they are part of the democracy, regardless of whether they are enfranchised or not.
The other thing that did not happen in 1969 was any evidence-based approach to finding out what the effect of lowering the voting age was. Lowering the voting age to 18 in 1969 was a policy failure. In every election after that until the late 1990s, turnout among 18 to 24-year-olds fell. This is likely to be a similar situation. Votes at 16 needs to learn to adopt an evidence-informed approach. We need a longitudinal study of the effects of what is happening. It is remarkable that this country does not have a centre for research around democracy. We have one on electoral studies, but we do not aggregate what is happening out there in the democracy.
As I said at the start, we are in a moment of huge precarity in terms of the future strength of British democratic resilience. I urge this Committee to think about how Government, Parliament, academia, and wonderful organisations such as the one Hattie represents and the Electoral Commission can come together and think about how we start to build an evidence base that starts to learn from the policy interventions that we invest in. We must start to think about the future health of British democracy.
Samantha Dixon
What you are saying is very interesting, and I will reflect on it. As we go through the Bill process, I think it will become clear that the Government have considered some of the points that you have raised, but thank you for raising them.
Lisa Smart
Q
I strongly agree that we are in a moment of crisis for our democracy. An awful lot of things that I would have liked to see in the Bill are not there. You talked about the opportunity that this presents. Particularly looking through the lens of trust in politics and participation in our elections, what does your organisation, or you as an academic, believe could have been in the Bill that would have had a positive impact on trust in politics?
Harriet Andrews: The biggest thing in terms of trust in democratic institutions is the way that democratic institutions engage with the public, and with young people specifically. We specialise in connecting young people and politicians. We have evidence that we can systematically improve democratic trust, which is a fantastic thing to be able to do—not many people can do that—but that is done through loads and loads of conversations between young people and politicians, and there is not really a substitute for that kind of work. I do not know whether that is the role of this Bill, but it is definitely the role of every Member of Parliament. We also need to think about investment in places such as schools and youth groups, and ask whether they are being supported to engage with democratic institutions.
The other thing to mention is that a lot of people are really uncertain at the moment about whether they are allowed to engage with democratic institutions as part of their youth work or as schools, because they are worried about issues around impartiality. I would focus on really clear guidance on impartiality, partly so that people feel a lot more comfortable about what they can do. They can do a lot, but lots of people are scared about engaging with their local council or councillor on a local issue because they are worried about political bias. More training and support around that is needed.
Andy Mycock: I fully agree with everything that Hattie said. Contact—building a relationship at a very early age—is a critical part of this. By the time you get to secondary school, a lot of that good work is already past its time of efficacy. Primary school, when young people are socialising and their brains are growing, is proving to be, in all different aspects of growing up, the most important time. There is a stark lack of focus on primary school interventions. Much of what happens focuses on secondary school, when young people are overloaded; they are going through significant change in their lives—biologically, socially and educationally. Stretch the civic journey. Give it time to mature over time. Think about how you support young people after the age of enfranchisement, whether it is 16 or 18.
To go back to the Minister’s question, our work in Wales highlighted another thing—the voter journey. In Wales we found a lot of focus, in Government and other programmes, on getting young people to get on the electoral register and to know how to vote, but that did not get them to the ballot box. The principal reason was that they were not educated about political parties—what those parties stood for. This is not to open up the old debate about indoctrination, but young people simply did not know what the political parties stood for—they did not know how to read the manifestos, so they stayed at home.
I urge all the parties to move beyond this idea of the fears of indoctrination. The internet age has changed things. You cannot protect young people from political discourse on the internet. Our survey data is already starting to pick up that young people, particularly young men, are increasingly prone to misinformation and to populist ideas. If you do not socialise young people, so that they understand politics before they become enfranchised—whatever the age—it is likely that they will socialise themselves, or will socialise themselves in peer groups that may not be the healthiest in terms of democracy.
I would think strongly about the idea of the voter journey, and about things like automatic voter registration, or giving young people voter authority certificates at the age of 16. If they have a national insurance number, why not give them that certificate so that they have the document and do not have to look for it? Walk them through polling booths: get them used to the idea that these are not alien places. For those who come from middle-class families, it is likely that their parents will take them there the first time to vote. For those coming from maybe disadvantaged or disengaged families, it is highly likely that they will not.
Lastly, learn from other places. Australia has a wonderful celebration around elections where they have a democracy sausage, which you will have heard of now increasingly. We might not be a nation of sausages, but we are a nation of cakes. Why not think about the democracy bake? Have civil society organisations outside polling stations—turn voting into a celebratory act, so that young people feel that that first experience is positive, and that it is not a threatening environment for them to go to again.
Warinder Juss
Q
My assessment from all this has been that if those young people were allowed to vote at 16 they would be very competent in contributing to democracy, and that it would be a great idea for them to be engaged earlier in politics, and to have had those conversations earlier. A witness in the previous panel said that the earlier somebody votes, the more likely they are to carry on voting. I have two questions. First, do you think my assessment is correct? Secondly, do you think that the ability to vote early is one important step we can take to make sure that we have that engagement, and bring democracy into play?
Harriet Andrews: Yes, I do think your assessment is correct. I think young people are really keen to engage in all sorts of social and political issues. They want to have a voice—they want to be heard, right? They are just like everybody else, and they have lots to say. They are exploring the world; they have not heard something for the fifth or sixth time, they have heard it for the first time, so it is more exciting. That is something that we find a lot.
There are some hopeful reforms potentially coming in the curriculum assessment review. They have talked about making citizenship compulsory in primary schools, which really plays into that idea of starting early. The more that you do earlier, and the more you can build these skills over time and make them part of what is happening, the less of a mad rush you have to get everybody ready at a certain point. That is really positive.
One of the things missing in that education reform is, particularly, teacher training. This stuff is complicated, and teachers need support. When they have been surveyed, teachers have said that they feel really underprepared to do this work; they really want to do the work, but they want that support. That is one thing that really needs some attention. The other is the role of Ofsted—asking, “Is Ofsted taking this work seriously? Does it have a home, and does it have a place?” I know that that is not the role of this Committee, but some of the levers to make votes at 16 a real success sit with both DCMS and the DfE.
Dr Ellie Chowns (North Herefordshire) (Green)
Q
Harriet Andrews: For me, part of that democratic education piece would include support for young people to engage with disinformation. A really important part of preparing them is preparing them to engage with that work on disinformation. Also, as I said at the very beginning, we need to think about where the sources of information for young people are. I worry that if we focus too much on just, “We need young people to be educated about how to engage with disinformation,” and we do not try to create places they can go to that are trusted sources of information, we are putting a huge amount of pressure on young people to deal with a really complicated information landscape.
The Chair
You have 20 seconds, Dr Mycock.
Andy Mycock: I would think very strongly about how political parties can play their role in terms of connecting with young people. Young people’s membership of political parties is at an all-time low, as it is in trade unions and other organisations. The fact that you are engaging is commendable, but political parties need to do much more.
Those who are opposed to votes at 16 need to think about the unequal situation where young people in Scotland and Wales now have voting rights that young people in England and Northern Ireland do not. If the argument is about citizenship, there is an inequality with the voting age being 18 for the majority, but not for others. Moreover, there is a need for—
The Chair
Order. I have to cut you off there, I am afraid, because of the requirements of the procedure motion that has been passed. That brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank you both for your evidence this afternoon.
Examination of Witnesses
Professor Toby James and Professor Paul Bernal gave evidence.
The Chair
We have until 3.15 pm for this panel. Could both professors briefly introduce themselves for the record?
Professor James: My name is Toby James. I am a professor of politics and public policy at the University of East Anglia. I am also the co-director of the Electoral Integrity Project.
Professor Bernal: Hello, I am Professor Paul Bernal. I am professor of information technology law at the UEA law school. I am a specialist in data and in privacy, and I have been working with Toby on electoral data since around 2020.
Paul Holmes
Q
You suggested that an amendment could be introduced to establish statutory requirements for electoral registration officers to publish data on parliamentary and local elections in England and Northern Ireland. I thought it was general practice and already a statutory requirement for returning officers to publish things such as the names of candidates, polling stations and the results of elections. Could you explain where you have come from on that, and what the difference is with the current system?
Professor James: This maybe reflects the different ages in which electoral laws were first designed, many of which were designed in the Victorian age. We have a very decentralised system, whereby electoral registration officers and returning officers publish data on candidates, results and so on, but not necessarily in an electronic format—to qualify that—and not in a uniform fashion. Many electoral authorities around the world, for example, would receive results and names of candidates at a local level, and therefore it would be really easy to publish all that in one central data source. That is not the case for UK parliamentary elections or for local elections. Not so much myself but other colleagues—colleagues at the University of Exeter, for example—collect this data and publish it instead. I think that it should be a central function of the state to provide electors with data on who the candidates are and what the results are.
Paul Holmes
Q
This may be slightly out of the scope of both of your expertise, but there is an amendment tabled to the Bill about a digital election leaflet repository for digital communications. It would introduce a duty for, after 72 hours, paid-for digital election campaigning materials to be stored in a central repository. It is not our amendment, but I think the argument is that people would then be able to see—and hold to account—the promises made by various parties in the United Kingdom. Do you have a view on whether that would be a good thing? Is that something that you support?
Professor James: My areas of expertise are probably elsewhere in the Bill, but I would generally be in favour of greater transparency. Collecting in a central location information about the promises that are being made to the electorate by parties only enhances transparency.
Professor Bernal: There is another side to it, which is whether such a requirement would mean that the electoral communications had to be in some kind of standardised form. For this sort of depository to be useful, it would have to be sortable, searchable and so on, and that would require some kind of standardised form. Would that be a good thing? I think it probably would, because we want as coherent a set of information as possible. Would parties like it, given that it would constrict which bits of information they gave and did not give? I am rather cynical about that possibility.
Paul Holmes
Q
Professor James: The Bill covers many of the foundations that you would need to have to enable electoral registration to be increasingly automated. As many other witnesses have said, the devil is in the detail, and the detail is due to come in secondary legislation. That is what is really important: which data sources will be used and which are the best data sources to be used?
In many ways, it makes sense to refer to secondary legislation for that, because obviously the best data sources for improving the quality and accuracy of the electoral register will change as data changes over time, so some flexibility for Ministers is relevant and important. At the same time, that is a lot of detail in secondary legislation. Obviously we are here and you are scrutinising the Bill. It will be important that the secondary legislation is scrutinised by parliamentarians, and that there is an opportunity for civil society groups, and those groups representing individuals who are less likely to be on the electoral register, to be included in those discussions.
The decisions that are being made at the moment—important decisions—by Government Departments, electoral officials and the Electoral Commission have a lot of detail in them. Making those discussions as inclusive, open and transparent as possible is something that Parliament might want to consider promoting.
Paul Holmes
Q
Professor Bernal: I have one thing to add, and it is a very simple one: I would like the open register to be abolished—straightforwardly abolished. As a privacy expert, it seems to me that it creates more risks. In the age that we are in at the moment, we need to reduce the risks as much as possible.
Samantha Dixon
Q
Professor James: You can think of two basic, broad clusters of countries that have automatic voter registration in one form or the other. In one set of countries, you have a central single record for every single citizen: what might be called a civil population register. Those are countries such as Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands or Germany. That is where automatic voter registration is simpler to implement because, in practice, what happens is that, in short, there is a copy and paste of that register ahead of election day.
In other countries, including in Canada and Australia, there is not a single record for every single individual. What those countries have done recently—I say “recently”; it has been over the course of the last 20 years—is move towards automatic voter registration by automatically enrolling groups of people using specific pieces of data at points when they know the data is accurate and reliable. In the UK context, Canada and Australia are probably the most relevant examples.
Samantha Dixon
Q
Professor Bernal: No, I have nothing to add to that.
Samantha Dixon
Q
Professor Bernal: I would like to scrap it. Going from opt-out to opt-in is great for the new people coming in, particularly with automatic voter registration and the votes at 16. However, there are millions of people who did not realise what they were opting in to—or what they would have opted out of—who are still on the register. If this is going to be retrospective, and you are going to say to everybody, “Do you want to be in after all?”, maybe that would help, but it would be simpler and better just to get rid of it.
We have to think very carefully about why the open register exists in the first place, and what use it is actually being put to. The uses are primarily commercial. In the current era, so many other forms of data are available to anyone wanting commercial use of data—we should leave it to them. What we need is as clear and simple a database as possible, with a single function to support our elections. That way, we get more security and privacy, and people will be more likely to trust it.
Lisa Smart
Q
My question is about automatic voter registration and some of the civil liberties and privacy issues that we should considering as we look at this legislation. Can you help us think through some of the really important questions we should be asking, bearing in mind that, as you rightly say, a lot of the detail will be worked through in secondary legislation? What things should we be thinking about to make sure that we protect the population’s civil liberties and keep privacy where it should be?
Professor Bernal: I should outline my perspective from the beginning. When Toby asked me to come into this project, my initial thought was, “I don’t want this, because of the privacy things—I’m a data privacy specialist and that’s what I work on.” However, when I was talking to him, I began to be persuaded by thinking about this as a way to get greater integrity in the database. Privacy is not about hiding information but making sure that the right people get the right information at the right time, and with appropriate permissions and consents.
As a result, the first thing we should think about is: what will the database on which people are registered be used for? What functions will it be put to? Who is going to have access to it? What are they going to be able to do with that data? That is something that we should be doing anyway, regardless of whether we are bringing in automatic voter registration. We should be thinking about those things, particularly in an era when electoral interference is a known factor and happens in lots of different ways, and we should be working out the way to make things secure. As I see it, automatic voter registration actually gives us an opportunity to do that, because it means that we need to think about having a properly coherent and secured database. As we do so, we will think, “Who’s going to have access to this? What are they going to be able to do with it?”
One issue is that political parties will want access to this data, but they should have to produce a report on what they have done with this data and how, including who they have given it to. We need only think back to Peter Mandelson and what he was doing with his data—giving it to people who he perhaps should not have—to see that we really need to keep a proper grip on what is happening to the data. That would solve most of the civil liberties questions about this. If we make sure that we know exactly what is happening to the data, and if we have a good set of controls over who manages and runs it, and who has access to it, you do not have the problem.
The only civil liberties question left is a rather separate one: should people be able to not be registered to vote? However, that is a rather different question beyond the scope of what we are talking about here, because we have decided in this country generally that people should reply to electoral requests and so on. That is the only one, and I do not think that is a question that automatic voter registration is a problem for.
Professor James: I would draw the Committee’s attention to what happens to the electoral register at the moment in terms of, as Paul has set out, the issue of the open register potentially being a security risk, but also who has access to the marked and full registers. There is currently no requirement, as I understand it, for electoral registration officers to keep a record of who requests and uses those records. That could be introduced. The Electoral Commission could then provide a report on exactly who is accessing those registers and for what purposes.
Political parties, for example, are entitled—and this is correct—to have access to electoral registers so they can reach out to voters, but how parties themselves use the registers is an important question.
The Chair
If Members have no further questions, I thank both witnesses for their evidence and we will prepare for the next panel.
Examination of Witnesses
Harry Busz, Councillor Peter Golds and Richard Mawrey KC gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Harry Busz: My name is Harry Busz. I am the deputy director of policy at Democracy Volunteers. We are the UK’s largest non-partisan election observation group. We have been assessing election integrity across the UK since 2016, as well as in a number of other countries across Europe and north America.
Councillor Golds: My name is Peter Golds. I am a councillor in the London borough of Tower Hamlets; I have also served as a councillor in the London borough of Brent. I am a member of the Local Government Association safer and stronger communities board, and have had a lot of experience in trying to protect people and integrity in elections, safety in elections, and addressing the intimidation of councillors. I have been involved in elections for many years as a candidate, agent and Lord knows what, and have a long-standing interest in electoral malpractice.
The Chair
I am sure we will be exploring the “Lord knows what” as we go along.
Richard Mawrey: My name is Richard Mawrey. I am a King’s counsel and a practising barrister, and have acted as election judge—or election commissioner, technically—in most of the serious electoral fraud cases of the last 20-plus years, so I have considerable judicial experience of electoral fraud and other malpractice in all its guises.
Paul Holmes
Q
Given that in 2015 a Tower Hamlets election court judgment found that personation was one of the interlinked types of “corrupt and illegal practices” that took place, where people’s votes were literally stolen, are the proposals within the legislation good or bad for voter security?
Councillor Golds: I think the list produced by the Electoral Commission was somewhat restrictive; it should have been expanded. We had the situation where service personnel, nurses and so on were arriving with their photocards, but could not be permitted to vote. I am not sure that a bank card is a good idea, because anybody can hand a bank card to somebody else. Voter ID is popular with the public and causes very few problems. People believe it adds security to the electoral process.
Paul Holmes
Q
Richard Mawrey: Yes. As a means of identification at polling stations, I am easy either way on bank cards. Clearly, anyone can obtain a bank card and create an account in a particular name, so fraud would be very easy. The reason why I am relaxed about it at polling stations is that personation at polling stations is a very rare bird indeed, these days.
Most personation occurs with postal voting simply because personation at polling stations is difficult and extremely labour intensive. You have to find bodies prepared to go there and do the personating, and they are personally running the risk that somebody says, “You’re not Mr Jones”—and along comes a large constable and there is big trouble; normally, with personation, you are looking at a spell inside. It is an extremely risky business and you can do it only in penny packets: half a dozen here and half a dozen there.
If you want to influence an election, even a local election, personation at a polling station is a waste of time and effort, so on that issue I am fine. However, I would counsel very strongly against using bank cards as a means of identification for registering voters or for postal votes, because the possibilities for fraud are obvious.
Paul Holmes
Q
Harry Busz: I would add that, as an organisation, we have collected data on the number of turn-aways at the polling-station level, since the policy of photographic identification came in a few years ago. We tend to find significantly higher numbers of people being turned away at the polling-station level than we see in some of the data that has been collected by the Electoral Commission, primarily because of the different stages at which people can be turned away in the process, whether that is signage, party political tellers who are overextending their role or meeters and greeters.
It is an issue because there are particular groups who struggle to either have the ID or to bring the ID with them on the day. From our perspective, looking at different ways to bring in other forms of photo identification, whether that is the digitisation of the voter authority certificate or other forms of digital ID, is welcome. I agree to a large extent with the councillor about reducing the existing level of security when bringing in non-photographic identification.
Paul Holmes
Q
There is nothing in the Bill about family voting, but do you believe it should be amended in that regard? Do you or Democracy Volunteers perceive that family voting is a serious enough issue, and such a prevalent issue, that we need legislation to strengthen the security of that element, Harry?
Harry Busz: Let me be clear about the data that we have collected. With family voting, we collect instances of somebody’s right to a secret ballot being denied to them because of oversight, direction or collusion inside polling booths. As an organisation, we have collected and published data on that for 10 years now. At the latest general election, we saw it in 116 of the 204 constituencies that we observed in. It is a widespread problem all across the country.
Family voting can take different forms. When ballot secrecy is broken, we do not know the relationships between the people who are involved, or whether there is coercive control, so we very much believe that it should not be allowed in any democracy. Everybody’s vote should be theirs and theirs alone. The data that we collected led to the Ballot Secrecy Act 2023, which is an important piece of legislation that specifies that trying to influence somebody in the polling booth is an offence. We think that there are ways in which that could go even further.
To clarify, oversight should not be allowed. A lot of the legislation is in place. One of the challenges is election administrators on the ground, with the infrastructure they have, being able to prevent that from taking place.
Paul Holmes
Q
Harry Busz: Yes. For example, the types of polling booths we use here in the UK are a sort of cross-section. The selling points of those polling booths are that they are easy to store and quick to put up, but there is no reference to ballot security, whereas lots of other countries have individual polling booths that can aid staff in preventing family voting before it has started. By the time it has started, it tends to be too late.
Paul Holmes
Q
Councillor Golds: My experience goes well beyond Tower Hamlets. I have been an election agent for parliamentary elections in five different London boroughs and in Hertfordshire, and I have been an election agent in seven different London boroughs for local elections. I have campaigned. I have seen this far too often, in far too many places. It crosses communities. Let us be absolutely clear that we are not talking of any individual community here. It is a situation we could possibly call patriarchal, in which groups of men believe they can tell women what to do. In many places, that will include aggressive, angry white men. Let us put that on the record. I have seen it, and I have tried to stop it.
When we first got involved in this campaign, Lord Hayward, who I believe is here today, steered the Ballot Secrecy Bill through the House of Lords. That strengthened the protections. When we were campaigning against family voting, some bizarre instructions were going around, including one sent by a former official of the Electoral Commission to the police. I mention this because I shall relate it to Gorton and Denton. The police said:
“We have checked with the Electoral Commission and have been informed that just because the voter process was not followed, in terms of secrecy…it might not necessarily relate…to an offence.”
Here it comes:
“The onus is on the individual who casts their vote to claim that secrecy has been breached or that they have been unduly influenced.”
We got the Bill through, and the Act sits there. It is illegal to interfere with somebody. I seriously wonder whether that email is still sitting in an inbox somewhere in a police station or council office.
The Chair
Q
Councillor Golds: I am sorry Chair, but it concerns family voting, doesn’t it? This is the secrecy of the ballot I am talking about, where somebody is interfering with it. The onus is on the individual who casts their vote. This is what it is. That is why the Ballot Secrecy Act, which Lord Hayward and former MP Paul Bristow brought through the House of Commons, was passed with support across the Floor; every party supported it. It went through, as I think colleagues would say, on the nod. It absolutely clarified the law that, if you vote, you vote in secrecy. My concern has always been that it is not being enforced. The law is the law, but where is the spirit?
Paul Holmes
I agree.
Richard Mawrey: The problem—which I have found in all the cases I have tried, and not simply those to do with family voting, but almost any electoral offence—is that there is no point in having rules or statutes, however good and however well drafted, if nobody is prepared to enforce them.
That was particularly the case in Tower Hamlets, where there were multiple breaches of almost every prohibition in the Representation of the People Act 1983. I have never seen that many different offences, most of which were proved to the hilt. What happened there was that they were drawn to the attention of the Electoral Commission, which said, “No problem there; nothing to look at”, and to the police, who said, “Oh, we’re not interfering”, knowing the type of allegations that would be made against them if they did interfere.
Exactly the same happened about 20 years before in Birmingham. The evidence of widespread postal fraud was put in the hands of West Midlands police, and they got a nice little folder, wrote on the outside “Operation Gripe”, put it in a bottom drawer and forgot about it. That was their own evidence in the matter; they were simply unwilling to act.
It is not a question of resources. In many cases, the police were presented with what might be termed an oven-ready case, and they said, “Oh, no, we’re not touching this with a bargepole.” I am afraid that is the problem. Another problem, I am sorry to say, is that the Electoral Commission’s view is that electoral fraud is not happening. Indeed, that has been its view since I delivered Birmingham, hence my comment at the time about banana republics. Therefore, there is no impetus for the people who should be enforcing it actually to enforce the law.
I would say that, on family voting, or indeed any of the matters that are proposed, the law at the moment is fine but, if you do not enforce it, you might just as well put the thing in a bottom drawer marked “Operation Gripe”.
Paul Holmes
Q
Do you think that is a good thing for democracy? Do you think it is needed, given some of the campaigning tactics we have seen? Or do you not think it would not make a difference in general to some of the problems we have seen in by-elections—but also in local and national elections—in the country?
Harry Busz: As an organisation, we do not necessarily have a viewpoint on the issue you are referring to. As well as ballot secrecy and a lot of the other issues that we look at in polling stations, we are very aware of the accessibility of elections and understanding the campaigns going on being important to increasing turnout and getting more people involved in democracy. We do not have a specific policy towards the new clause.
Councillor Golds: I have been an agent for many years. Many years ago, in Brent, I remember issuing leaflets in Gujarati. I think that this is something that needs balance. We need to understand—I sent this back to the regulators—that it is one thing to have a leaflet on both sides having, “Do come and vote for party X, my party. I am a great candidate and my party is wonderful”, if what is printed in another language that might be familiar to people also says, “Please vote for me. I am a great candidate. My party is wonderful.” However, if in English the leaflet says, “Please vote for me. I am a great candidate. My party is wonderful”, but we turn it over and the other language says, “The other people are”—lord knows what—or this, that and everything else, then that is when we get to the problem.
In my view, this has to go back to the regulators. I am sorry to say that. In a country such as ours, with a multiplicity of languages, I want people to get involved. In my current borough, the big thing is Sylheti. If people understand Sylheti and we can put stuff out in Sylheti, all well and good, as long as when something is put in Sylheti, it says the same as for an English-speaking voter. If an English-speaking voter says, “I do not understand this”, and someone can turn around to say, “It is exactly the same”, all well and good, but if it is different, we have trouble.
Richard Mawrey: It would be perfectly acceptable if there were some sort of insistence, as Peter Golds says, for the texts to be comparable, but that is unfortunately not the case—or certainly was not the case in Tower Hamlets, as I discovered. Quite anodyne stuff in English—“Vote for me. I am a good chap”—came out much longer in Sylheti, couched in really quite extreme religious terms. The two sides of the document did not match.
It would clearly be desirable for the two sides of the document to match, so that, in a sense, you could monitor it, particularly if the one that was in a non-English language contained material that ought not to be there in the first place. That can occur, not simply with Asian languages, but with all other languages. You could say something that, you hope, no one outside your language group will understand. It is essential, I think, to monitor that so there is some equality between the obverse and reverse of the same coin.
Paul Holmes
I appreciate that. We will go away to look at how that new clause can be tailored to your feedback, all three of you. The new clause came out of some of the campaigning in the Gorton by-election, so we will go away and look at it again.
Samantha Dixon
Q
Councillor Golds: I am a great believer in election law needing more. At some point, there needs to be a stop and a proper consolidated Bill that brings UK election law into the 21st century. When we did the ballot Bill, we suddenly discovered it needed umpteen pages of amendments, because to deal with the ballot for everything—from a Member of Parliament to a parish council representative in East Grinstead—every single one needed a separate statutory instrument. That is one of the problems.
In 1950, 82% of the electorate voted. At a time when people could not use petrol, there was no social media and postal voting was incredibly restricted, 82% of the people voted, because they wanted to vote. I have the view that you are trying to lead a horse to water and not make them drink. I believe that it is up to the politicians in Government to make sure that people wish to vote for and against Government. That is what will increase the turnout.
I am slightly concerned about many things that I have looked at here, and some things that are missing. For example, in the London borough of Tower Hamlets in May, we will go into the polling stations and the electoral papers will be computerised—I give my name, it goes, “boop doop doop”, and out comes the ballot paper. There are three polling districts in my ward, so why on earth could you not go into any one of the three—now that they are computerised—give your name and vote? Why could you not do that in a parliamentary election? That is what they do in Australia: you go into any polling station in the constituency and they will issue the ballot paper.
Richard Mawrey indicated dissent.
Councillor Golds: Commissioner Mawrey says otherwise.
Richard Mawrey: In answer to that, fraud is absolutely rife in Australia, and it is undetectable because they do not have numbered ballot papers. They can tell that fraud has taken place, but they do not know who the fraudulent votes are for, and those votes count. Quite frankly, an intelligent 10-year-old could game an election in Australia—and they probably do! That is a road down which I would invite the Committee not even to take the first step.
The Chair
Obviously, you are expressing your own view there.
Richard Mawrey: I have investigated the Australians, at their invitation. I am with Peter Golds on the point that modernising the law ought to take a consolidating statute. We do that with a lot of things, like the companies Acts and so on. It would be a new consolidating statute, as the last one was in 1983 and we are now 43 years on. That opportunity should be taken, first, to rationalise all forms of malpractice that are offences and corrupt practices; and secondly, to set up a coherent system for trying electoral disputes, because the present system is hopeless. Various proposals on how to do that have been put forward.
This is not the Bill in which to do it, but this Bill should not be saying, “Well, we have done that. We can park that for the next 10 years.” It ought to be a staging post in thinking, “Right, let us sit down and produce a coherent statute that modernises not simply electoral offences, but how we deal with them.” That is what I would counter. I agree that this Bill is not the one in which to do it, but it should not be treated as the end of the road for 10 years.
Harry Busz: As an organisation, we believe there are lots of positive steps forward in the Bill. Certain aspects around automatic voter registration, and improving the performance and accuracy of the register, are really important. For administrators, such like the extension of the postal vote deadlines will enable people to return their postal votes in a timely fashion. We also think that the issue of protecting staff and including them, as well as campaigners, is really important. Since the voter ID regulations came in, there has been a bit of a shift in the way the public views presiding officers and poll clerks in polling stations, as they now have the role of gatekeeper, having to essentially turn someone away from voting if they do not believe there is a likeness with their ID or similar.
There are areas that could go further, particularly around voter ID. At this moment in time, there is an issue where if somebody does not have a form of ID on the day, unlike in other countries, we have no off-ramp, whether through attestation or vouching, so that the person is still able to participate in the election on the day. The question we see as the most challenging is how these procedures will be done on the ground, particularly inside polling stations and for administrators. As long as there is the ability to increase funding and support for the council departments running the elections on the ground, there are lots of positive steps.
Lisa Smart
Q
I have a question for all three of our witnesses. It pulls on a thread all of you have raised: the inconsistency around enforcement—whether that is local authorities, returning officers, presiding officers or different police forces enforcing things in different ways, or election law finally making it through to court should something need to be tried. I accept that this might not be the piece of legislation to address those inconsistencies, but can you say more about measures you think would be helpful to ensure that election law is applied fairly to all elections across the whole country?
Harry Busz: I would start by taking the family voting point that you specifically addressed. As I mentioned at the beginning, this is something that we saw across more than 100 constituencies at the last general election, and it is something which, as Councillor Golds said, affects all communities. It is a really important issue for lots of different people that we ensure they have the right to a secret ballot.
In terms of those inconsistencies, the areas in which we see a really positive response when family voting might be going on are those where presiding officers and poll clerks can actively step in and prevent it if they are in a less busy polling station— which obviously becomes a bit of a postcode lottery. It also depends on whether the council has the funding and the staff to have a meet-and-greet or a third person in the polling station whose job is specifically to do that work.
Different pieces of election infrastructure are used from council to council, and where polling stations can be set up so that polling booths are separate, that is very helpful in preventing some of these issues. Whether it is that or around accessibility, with all of these aspects, the really important thing we have found is that when the council feels supported—both financially and with the infrastructure they need to run elections inside polling stations—you get much better outcomes.
All staff really want to do their job well and want to step in and prevent these kinds of things, but if they do not have the funding to have a third member in there, or if they do not have the correct equipment, it becomes a lot more difficult.
Councillor Golds: I have a big thing about protecting people, safety and security—and that is everybody. That includes candidates, election staff and the voters themselves. First, I am interested in the nomination process. My belief is that if you are nominated as a candidate, you are nominated as a candidate. The address issue is something from 50 years ago—the 1973 Act, which requires your address to be public.
I spoke about this on the security of councillors, and had an email exchange with a delightful lady in Leicestershire who had heard me on Leicestershire radio. She had expressed concern for years that she gets a bus to go to work, and at her bus stop were her three local councillors’ names, addresses and phone numbers. She thought this was wrong. This is still part of the Act. When we tried to get security for councillors to protect our addresses, we were told it was very difficult. It should not be that, if you are standing for election, your address has to be public. I think it would be terribly easy to change.
I am intrigued by the issue of candidates standing and withdrawing a nomination. One of my ideas—and I think about this very carefully—is that if a candidate is standing for a political party and they withdraw their nomination, then on nomination day the proposer and seconder, or the registered political party, should have the right to substitute another candidate, so that you do not have somebody trying anything ridiculous. We also have to look at expenditure. There are too many stories that live on the internet of extraordinary issues. You are quite right to look at it, and it needs to be tightened. We have spoken about the secrecy of the ballot.
We then come to enforcement and intimidation. I do not know how we protect people. Eighteen months ago, I had an extraordinary day at the Home Office where a group of councillors went. I was the only male councillor there. We were promised an hour and a half to discuss problems. Three and a half hours later, Home Office officials asked, “Do you want to continue?” because of what women of all political parties were saying to them. This included a female councillor whose husband had given her a purple coat, and she had appeared on television wearing it. A local nutcase said that her husband was a member of the Illuminati and a paedophile, and had gone through her address on Companies House, and published his company address and the fact that he was a school governor. This is a fact of life that can be found. If you look, every council cycle I have ever been involved in—Rallings and Thrasher always talk about this—we get women elected who serve one term, not lots. This persecution must stop.
Finally, you have to do something about the intimidation of people going to vote and crowds at polling stations—that is growing and growing. Everybody has the right to walk quietly down a street and into a polling street, and then to pass their vote as they do. I have seen observers from the European Union and the Commonwealth look at British elections, and they are staggered to see mobs of people standing outside polling stations, pushing and shoving. Those are simple things that you could look at, and I believe you would help voters, candidates and, ultimately, yourselves.
Richard Mawrey: We are back to the problem of enforcement. In quite a lot of countries, every polling station is attended by at least one burly constable who keeps an eye on things and acts as a sort of enforcer, and the great thing is that they do not have any connection with the local authority.
The problem with staff at polling stations is that they are all necessarily connected with the local authority, and it is very easy for people to convince themselves that the ruling group—so to speak—on the local authority is conniving so that voters are likely to vote for them. In most cases, it is complete and utter nonsense, but it would greatly strengthen confidence in the voting process to have somebody independent—it does not matter whether it is a policeman or anyone else—at a polling station who is prepared to call out intimidation, family voting or whatever it is.
At the moment, people are not confident because they perceive—rightly or wrongly—that the rules exist, but that the rules are being broken and nobody cares. As Peter Golds said, it does not require much imagination to see how any of that can be blown up in social media to a result that is very unfortunate for the electoral process.
Interestingly, most of the arguments being put forward today are the same as those that would have been put forward in the Public Bill Committee on the Ballot Act 1872, when the secret ballot was introduced. It was introduced to stop all the sort of abuses of the electoral process that had been occurring up to that time. Some 150 years on, we are still trying to deal with it.
Sam Rushworth (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)
Q
Mr Mawrey, I am wondering about the degree to which personation takes place, and how much of that is a problem. We are hearing other people express doubts about the use of ID and whether this is robust enough. To what extent is that a real issue?
Harry Busz: On the data that we have collected, we will always have two observers inside polling stations who are observing together, because they will have more time to see whether people come in, see a sign, turn around and go out, or whether somebody is stopped by a teller or an extra member of staff who might be directing them to the polling desk. We see a number of people who are turned away from voting initially, but we do not collect data on whether those people come back in the same way that the Electoral Commission does.
At the general election in 2024, we saw that 1.37% of all voters were initially turned away, compared with the Electoral Commission’s figure of 0.25%. We believe the main reason for that difference is that we are seeing other voters who do not get to the actual presiding officer’s desk. The Electoral Commission’s data was collected from the ballot paper refusal list, which the presiding officer has to sit down and sign when a voter has that situation.
Sam Rushworth
Q
Richard Mawrey: At polling stations, it is very little, and it has historically been very little. If you look back over the election cases, there are very few successful challenges arising out of personation at polling booths. I cannot speak on Northern Ireland, because historically it has always been more of a problem in Ireland—both before and after partition 100 years ago. In England and Wales, and possibly in Scotland, it is not a noticeable problem.
The problem of personation is with postal voting, because that is where it can be done on a level that will affect the result of the election. Unless you can guarantee a knife edge, where three votes either way is going to ensure that “X” is elected as councillor—which none of us can guarantee—then telling people to risk, in effect, their freedom by going along and casting one vote is penny packet stuff. You would not bother. If you wanted to rig an election, you would not go down that route.
Sam Rushworth
Q
Richard Mawrey: Yes, that is a different problem. People being turned away is a different problem. It does not involve an electoral offence, but it is none the less serious.
Zöe Franklin (Guildford) (LD)
Q
Richard Mawrey: You bowled this one at me somewhat outside the wicket. There is provision in the 1983 Act for assisting people with certain levels of disability—for example, helping those who are blind. I think that there are provisions—this is entirely off the top of my head, because I was not expecting this—for people with learning difficulties.
There are certainly provisions for people who are physically incapable. If you require someone to push a wheelchair into the polling booth, you can do that. That is perfectly above board. The rules might be looked at there, but they exist. We have never said, “You are a blind man. You have to work out how to vote. You’re on your own.” You would never actually say that. That is provided for by the Act and has been, basically, for 100 years.
Zöe Franklin
Q
Councillor Golds: I have witnessed this several times in my life. I remember, after ’83, taking a blind woman to vote and watching the presiding officer do the process. He said, “I am clearing this area,” and he took the lady over and discussed it with her. He said, “Mr Jones, the Labour party candidate. Mr Smith, the Conservative party candidate. Mr Brown, the Liberal Democrat party candidate.” Then he asked, “Who do you wish to vote for?” She said so quietly and he marked the ballot paper. It was done incredibly professionally. I have seen it done with people with disabilities, where sometimes they are taken into a side room. What we are talking about goes straight back to where we began—it is the case that people do not know. The facility is there, you just need to get people to know.
Harry Busz: From our observations back in 2024, we found that there are two separate issues. One is the polling station building and whether that is accessible—importantly, independently accessible—for somebody to get to the presiding officer’s desk and a polling booth. Second is the type of aids that are there for them to be able to vote independently. It is very difficult to find the correct buildings and buildings that are accessible. Councils struggle, election to election, to go, “We have this much time. We need to find these spaces.” Over the last few years, we have seen a real improvement in the type of aids that are given to people. We have gone from just having a tactile voting device and maybe a pencil grip to a lot more councils having things like lighting and QR codes with audio lists of candidates on, which is really encouraging.
There are lots of countries around the world where we observe far greater levels of accessibility aids. I remember once seeing somebody in the USA, who was paralysed from the neck down, being able to vote independently by blowing through a straw—I did not really understand how that worked.
There are ways that we can improve. Obviously, it all costs a lot of money. Some of the opportunities to make elections more accessible for people could be through advanced voting, and having voting hubs and specialised pieces of equipment in a single polling station, which anybody could use if they were voting in advance of the election.
Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)
Q
Harry, earlier you mentioned a percentage of people in your data who get turned away at polling stations. Was that all because they did not have the appropriate ID? I have seen people get turned away from polling stations simply because they have turned up to the wrong one. Do those people get included in your data, or is it just people who fail to bring the appropriate ID?
Harry Busz: That figure is just for people who fail to bring ID. We do see people who are turned away because they may not be registered or they may be at the wrong polling station, but they are not included in those statistics.
Lewis Cocking
Q
Richard Mawrey: We have not really touched on automatic registration. I can see the thinking behind it. My view is that it is going to be almost impossible to achieve in practice, because you can only register people automatically if you are satisfied that they are entitled to vote.
By the time that you have ascertained that they are entitled to vote, you have had to have carried out some form of inquiry—possibly even a house-to-house inquiry —on who is living where and whether they are entitled to vote. Assuming you have people living in a house, you go and knock on the door and say, “Do you live here? Are you entitled to vote?” If they say yes, do you then go further and say, “On what basis can you show that you are a relevant Commonwealth citizen?”, or whatever it happens to be.
It may be a marvellous idea, but in practice, it will turn out to be unworkable. I suspect that it will also turn out to be an opportunity for gaming the system. People will be automatically registered who have no right to be, because the registration office has been in good faith, so to speak, set up by fraudsters to do that.
By all means enact it, but I suspect that when push comes to shove, registration officers are going to start saying, “How do we do this?”, and they do not have the money, staff and resources. I think that it will turn out to be rather a damp squib. I am not saying it is a bad idea; I am just saying it is an idea that ain’t going to work.
The Chair
If there are no further questions from Members, I thank the witnesses for their evidence. We will move on to the next panel, and hear oral evidence from the Henry Jackson Society. We have until 4.10 pm for that panel. There will be a vote called during it, and I will suspend the Committee for 15 minutes at that point.
Examination of Witness
Alexander Browder gave evidence.
The Chair
Mr Browder, can you introduce yourself? I do not know if you heard me say that there is likely to be a vote during the course of your evidence. I will suspend the Committee for 15 minutes. The MPs present will vote, but we will come back to hear the remainder of your evidence.
Alexander Browder: Good afternoon, I am Alexander Browder. I am the founder of the global cryptocurrency laundering database—the first and largest open-source database on cryptocurrency laundering. I am the author of the report, “Confronting the Illicit Finance Hydra in the Crypto Markets: Protecting Retail Investors and Disrupting Hostile Government Exploitation”. I will be pleased to answer any questions that you have regarding how the UK could see cryptocurrency interfering in our elections. I have seen a number of bad actors using cryptocurrency to influence politics elsewhere, so I am happy to provide some examples.
Paul Holmes
Q
Alexander Browder: You cannot have crypto donations without a proper regulatory framework, and there is not going to be a whole regulatory framework for all of cryptocurrency until at least late 2027. You cannot have the wild west of cryptocurrency without proper guardrails. You need to be able to establish that those guardrails are effective in stopping foreign and criminal interference in our elections. If cryptocurrency is deemed to be permissible, we need, firstly, to be able to disclose the wallet addresses of the political donations.
There should not be any limit to the reporting requirements for cryptocurrency donations; at present, it is above £500. All cryptocurrency should be stored in institutions that are registered with the UK Financial Conduct Authority. Furthermore, the Electoral Commission needs more power to be able to investigate cryptocurrency donations. At present, they cannot access cryptocurrency wallets or investigate cryptocurrency exchanges, which leaves a whole gap open to foreign interference.
Paul Holmes
Q
Alexander Browder: Bad actors are continually evolving, and within cryptocurrency there are a number of different tactics that they use to conceal their funds. One that is particularly relevant to this issue is something called smurfing. That is where donations are split across cryptocurrency wallets to stay under the £500 reporting threshold.
There is also something called a mixer, which allows a user to send funds in and receive a whole different address. That means it is impossible to trace for an investigator who wants to try and see if a criminal has donated. At present, the Electoral Commission does not have any power to investigate. Political parties are not proper investigative bodies and do not have the skills to investigate this complex situation. More power needs to be established for this.
Samantha Dixon
Q
Alexander Browder: It has been used throughout the west by bad actors to interfere in political elections, particularly by Russia. I want to highlight three notable examples. The first is a European political scandal linked to a bitcoin donation that almost toppled the Czech Government in the summer of 2025. The Czech Justice Minister, Pavel Blažek, accepted a Bitcoin donation worth $45 million. It turned out to come from Tomáš Jiřikovský, a convicted drugs and arms trafficker who spent three years in prison for operating a dark net drug marketplace.
It was particularly interesting that the donation and the connection to the drug trafficker was discovered by the public only after the Czech had auctioned it off. Blažek’s successor at the Ministry of Justice commissioned an external audit that concluded that the donation should have been refused due to the significant risk that it came from the proceeds of crime. In that case, it was discovered only with a significant delay from when the donation was made.
The second example took place during the Moldovan parliamentary elections, where authorities found that illegal funds from Russia were moved through crypto-currency accounts, laundered through illicit cryptocurrency exchanges and then distributed by couriers to buy votes for pro-Russian political groups and to make donations in cryptocurrency. Moldovan investigators blocked $107 million that was destined for pro-Russian political groups. There were also reports that connected crypto flows directly to interference campaigns that used apps to pay activists, conduct illicit polling and directly pay people. That was paid for with the largest stablecoin in the world, USDT, which is operated by Tether.
Finally, in the 2016 US elections Russian hackers used cryptocurrency to buy infrastructure that targeted US individuals involved in the presidential election. [Interruption.]
The Chair
Order. I reconvene the sitting. You had completed a sentence, Mr Browder, but had you completed your full answer?
Alexander Browder: I have one more thing to say. There have been reports of Russian state actors engaging in malign activity targeting the UK. One such example is an arson case, where Russians paid individuals here in the UK to set fire to warehouses supplying Ukrainian aid. How were they paid? Through cryptocurrency. More recently, in another case, just last year, Russians paid a Lithuanian national to deliver bombs using DHL packages destined for London. The payment was through cryptocurrency. This is an existential threat to the UK and the democratic process. Something must be done.
Zöe Franklin
Q
Alexander Browder: Overall, there should be more strict and rigorous requirements for crypto donations, if those are permissible. Specifically, political parties should be required to release the cryptocurrency wallets they receive donations from; they should be required to store the cryptocurrency in UK Financial Conduct Authority-registered companies; and any amount should be reportable.
Not only that, but donations involving something called privacy coins should be stopped. A privacy coin is a recent development within the cryptocurrency space and is completely untrackable. One such example is Monero. Privacy coins should not be in the democratic process, because you are not able to verify the donor. Furthermore, laundering services like some I mentioned before—mixers—should not be allowed to be used for political donations, because they make it much harder for the Electoral Commission and political parties to investigate.
Zöe Franklin
Q
Alexander Browder: I saw that report, which was very good. As I mentioned, cryptocurrency as a whole may only be properly regulated, at best, by the end of 2027. It needs to be established that cryptocurrency can be regulated, and that that can be enforced properly, to stop bad actors like Russia from entering our elections. What also needs to be established is that the people who are donating are not foreign entities like Russia, but are UK citizens. This is a big issue; due to the inherent nature of cryptocurrency, you are not able to verify properly the source of funds.
Lloyd Hatton (South Dorset) (Lab)
Q
Alexander Browder: There need to be stricter “know your donor” requirements. Not only that, but the enforcement on parties should be greater. If they do not respect the political process, there should be higher fines and stricter policies.
On your last point, through my investigations I have found that Companies House has been abused by cryptocurrency exchanges. In one particularly egregious case, two IRGC-linked companies managed to register here in the UK under false names. They were operating for four years, while registered here in the UK, processing billions for the IRGC. That raises the question whether some foreign actor or criminal could set up a UK-registered company and donate through that? That definitely has to be looked at.
The Chair
I am afraid we are out of time for this witness panel, but thank you, Mr Browder, for your evidence this afternoon.
Examination of witnesses
Colin Blackwell, Imogen Tyreman, Richard Williams, Jenny Shorten and Tom McAdam gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Jenny Shorten: Good afternoon. My name is Jenny Shorten, and I am the chair of Liberal Democrats Abroad, living in France. I was an election agent and campaign organiser for 40-plus years in Wiltshire.
Tom McAdam: Hi, I am Tom McAdam. I am a member of the Liberal Democrats Abroad steering committee, and I live in Zurich, in Switzerland.
The Chair
Excellent. We also have three witnesses in the room. There is always a bit of choreography when we are rotating between online and in-situ witnesses. Could the witnesses in the Committee Room introduce themselves too, please?
Colin Blackwell: I am Colin Blackwell, and I am deputy chairman of Conservatives Abroad.
Imogen Tyreman: I am Imogen Tyreman, and I am the chair of the Labour International constituency Labour party.
Richard Williams: My name is Richard Williams, and I am Labour International’s representative on Labour’s national policy forum.
Paul Holmes
Q
Colin Blackwell: Thank you, Paul. The simple answer is no, it does not. A survey about voter participation among overseas electors in the OECD has shown that the UK is a significant statistical outlier, with the lowest effective participation rate. Only around 1.3% of the more than 5 million people in that potential electorate are thought to have successfully cast a ballot at the last UK election. This Bill, of course, does not overtly address overseas electors, but one of its objectives is to increase voter participation.
In line with the Electoral Commission’s recommendations, Conservatives Abroad believes that technological advances now make it possible for a secure and verifiable online facility to be introduced to allow overseas electors to download and self-print their ballot paper and return envelope for one-way return posting. New Zealand and Singapore are two English-speaking Westminster democracies that have implemented downloadable ballot papers, and they use a biometric identification app to verify overseas electors downloading ballot papers against the voter registration ID credentials that were provided at the time of voter registration.
Unlike at the time of the Elections Act 2022, when Conservatives Abroad first recommended this approach, the UK now has this technology. In the last few weeks, we have seen the launch of the Government Digital Service’s One Login app for gov.uk services, and it is now available. That was previously not a technological possibility, but now it absolutely is. New Zealand and Singapore are the gold standards for downloadable ballots for their diaspora.
Paul Holmes
Q
Imogen Tyreman: In the proposal itself, there are some elements that will help overseas voters to get on the register and exercise their vote and that go further than the current situation, such as the extension of the postal vote and requiring earlier registration. There are also things such as automatic registration, looking at passports and some of the pilot projects. However, I think that more can still be done, particularly on postal votes. That is often what people use, because there is not really enough information about proxy voting, and electoral registration officers do not know how it can operate. That feels like a barrier.
To take the example of postal voting, there is a return rate of 70% or so if ballots are sent out early. But of the postal ballots that were sent out later during the last election—around 27 June—only 2% were returned. Looking at specific countries, there was only a 6% return rate for Australia. There was a higher return rate for France, at 75%. In Spain, which is also a European country, only 32% of ballots were returned. Royal Mail itself has said that it takes six to seven days for standard letters to reach the rest of the world, so if the postal vote deadline is 14 days, I do not know how we are expecting ballots to reach voters and get returned in time. For us, having downloadable ballots is one option, as well as looking at the potential for online voting, and at the use of embassies and consulates as voting hubs or places where we can return ballots. They could potentially go back by diplomatic mail, which is much quicker.
Paul Holmes
Q
Imogen Tyreman: Yes.
Paul Holmes
I was just checking—I was not trying to catch you out.
Richard Williams: Perhaps I can just add to that last point while it is top of mind. Something that came up in discussions among members of Labour International was what could be viable alternatives to the current system. Of course, we are not the first country to talk about electronic voting.
Other European nations have successfully introduced electronic voting, with Estonia probably being the best example. In its last election, over 51% of votes were cast via an electronic system. A number of measures are built into that system to avoid things like voting coercion, whereby multiple votes can be cast and only the very last one is actually counted, and physical voting always takes precedence when both electronic votes and physical votes are received.
Having said that, to come back to the original point on whether Britons abroad are adequately addressed as a voter group, I think the numbers that Colin rightly spoke about are telling. Of the 5 million Britons living abroad, only just under 200,000 are on the electoral register, which speaks for itself.
There are really three main reasons for that. One, beyond looking at processes, is simply awareness: many Britons are not aware that they have the right to vote if they are not living in the country. There is no proactive communication on the side of the Government. It is very much left to the individual themselves to find out what their rights are and then to go through the process of contacting the local authority where they used to live in the UK—I did it in Ashford, Mr Joseph’s constituency. It is relatively easy, but there is then the additional process of having to register for a postal vote, which happens afterwards. Those things are all addressed in the Bill, and I think there are some improvements there, but the awareness is the first hurdle.
Then there are the processes themselves. And the third point, in some cases, is probably apathy: if you do not have an MP representing your interests as somebody living abroad, you do not care about the potholes in the local high street as much.
Paul Holmes
Q
Jenny Shorten: We don’t disagree with any of what has been said, but I will pick up on a couple of points. On the last point you made, about contact with MPs, I conducted a survey across all parties to look into exactly that. The answer to the question, “Do overseas voters think they are represented?” is no, because things like the automated replies say, “I can only help you if you live in the constituency.” It is no wonder they feel invisible, and that is a word that has regularly cropped up in our surveys with people who get in touch with us; they say, “I feel like I’m not there and not being taken notice of.”
The other thing I wanted to direct our thinking towards is whether the processes and systems set us up to fail or to succeed. As a former election agent, I would say that the election timetable is not fit for purpose; it does not make sense. It went wrong for UK electors last time round, but particularly for those overseas. As I think Imogen remarked, you cannot get it done. With the current options, you have to wait until 19 days before polling day to know who the candidates are, so that is the earliest you can prepare ballot papers. People can still register up to 11 working days before. It is not going to work, however hard and however assiduously the people who administer it actually try.
On behalf of all of us, I think, I would like to say thank you to the Electoral Commission for finally collating the figures on how many postal votes got back in time; it is the first time we have seen them. I am sure the Committee is shocked by the fact that it is less than half. We need to look at the process, but it is also a significant matter of culture.
Paul Holmes
Q
Tom McAdam: I would just like to touch on the opportunity here. When we look at France, at the last legislative elections, it had a 37% turnout of overseas citizens. We can compare that with the turnout of British citizens overseas at the last general election, which was 5%. There is a huge opportunity. It is not one measure that will help that, but a package of measures.
The apathy point is really important. Without a dedicated overseas Member of Parliament talking about the interests of overseas citizens, it is easy to feel that we do not have representation in Parliament. Given the problems with actual voting, people do not feel incentivised to attempt to vote. I do not think that any one measure will really move the needle but, if we take everything as a whole, we might be able to move towards the numbers seen in France.
Paul Holmes
If the Minister decides to make me the MP for overseas voters, I am more than happy to do surgeries across the world.
Samantha Dixon
Q
As an aside to Paul’s point, I do receive correspondence from constituents who live overseas, usually in respect of their pension arrangements. However, to tackle the point about apathy or disengagement, the Bill includes powers to pilot automatic voter registration. Do you think that that would be a valuable tool for overseas voters?
Colin Blackwell: As others have touched on, awareness is everything. Conservatives Abroad believes that what is vital above all else is raising awareness of the right to vote and encouraging overseas citizens to register, which is now done online.
Historically, the civil service has always said, “Oh, we can’t contact Brits overseas because we don’t keep a register. We don’t know where they live. We don’t know who they are.” That raises the question of how this part of the electorate would be suitable for automatic registration.
Today’s Government services are delivered digitally and electronically in a way that was not done before. Many Departments now interact digitally with millions of British citizens living overseas. The most obvious one is the Passport Office: half a million passports from overseas are renewed every year—over 10 years, that is 5 million. The international pension centre at the Department for Work and Pensions deals with more than a million overseas pensions. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office keeps registers of Brits in individual countries. Lastly, the first place people go when they move overseas is His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs to change their address. Millions of British people living overseas still pay British taxes in one form or another or make voluntary NI contributions.
What I am saying is that, if all these digital interactions between Government and overseas Brits were brought together, and a link to the online voter registration page were automatically provided in those interactions, you would overnight reach potentially millions of this invisible electorate with the exact place they need to go to register to vote. That is the approach that Conservatives Abroad would suggest you look at.
Imogen Tyreman: Automatic voter registration pilots are a great thing to look into, especially for overseas voters. I agree that we should look at how registering for a passport could link to registering to vote. Yes, it might miss some Brits, but unfortunately we do not keep a record of emigration, so it is the best opportunity we have. However, there needs to be a package of other measures or that will not necessarily affect turnout.
We see lower turnout in countries that have passive registration, so there must be accompanying measures, even if it is through the Electoral Commission, to help us to contact voters abroad to inform them. That could be something like a free post or an opt-in registration. Such options need to be explored, and the timeline for renewal also needs to be considered to make sure that people stay on the register.
Richard Williams: I agree with all the points that have just been made. There is one group of people who have emigrated who might fall through the cracks if you look just at the HMRC records of people who have emigrated: those born to British parents overseas. These people may have a right to citizenship but have never lived in the country. They have specific difficulties even getting on to the electoral register. In many cases, they need to provide evidence of their parents’ birth certificate and their own birth certificate, and then there is a question of where their vote should be assigned. This topic came up in discussions with other Labour International members.
Beyond that, if we speak about the choice architecture, we certainly echo the sentiment that we are in favour of trialling automatic and automated voter registration. One topic that came up in discussion with our members, which is perhaps a way to look at doing this, was the idea of automatic reminders upon passport renewal, which is an interaction that many Brits abroad will have. If you structured that in such a way that people would then have the choice—ticking a box to say, “Yes, I want to be on the register,” or “No, I do not want to be on the register”—it would simplify and consolidate the process for many people.
There is then the question of whether there is an opt-in or opt-out approach. In the notes accompanying the Bill from the House of Commons Library, there was a reference to the Sheffield University case study in which 75% of students were enrolled on the electoral register through a process whereby they were prompted upon their annual enrolment for university. That figure compares with 13% for other universities. If that system were explored in a pilot for voters abroad, we might expect to see similar results just by structuring the choice in such a way that people have this prompt, and we could then ask whether it should be an opt-in or an opt-out choice.
The Chair
We will come to you, Ms Shorten.
Jenny Shorten: May I cede the floor to Tom?
Tom McAdam: We are in favour of AVR. A YouGov poll at the last election showed that only 26% of Brits abroad understood their rights, so automatic registration, using the touch points that were previously mentioned, is something that we would support. On Imogen’s point about the free post, voters abroad should be making informed decisions and receiving literature from candidates in the same way as domestic voters, so we would support anything that enables, say, one free post or an electronic communication from candidates to citizens abroad so that they are able to make an informed decision.
Jenny Shorten: May I just add one other thing to the last point about the free post? If you look at the Select Committee report, it suggested a review of the general election process. It suggested that a good first step would be to centralise the records of overseas electors and have them all on one register. You could then start to have the target group effectively in one place. Informally, I chatted with electoral registration officers in the run up to the last elections Bill, and they were saying that we deal with pretty much everybody overseas—though not entirely everybody—by email, so our records hold that data. If you put together a centralised register and the fact that the councils already know where to find these people, you have the means by which to inform them.
It must be right that you can have the basic data flowing about who the candidates are. It is not about their vote, which is their choice—I am sure we will discuss digital in a moment—but about what their choice is. In this day and age, I do not think there is any excuse for why I am expected to vote for people I have never even heard of and who have not approached me.
Zöe Franklin
Q
Colin Blackwell: Yes, in one word. That is really precisely what I was trying to say in my previous answer. I renewed a passport from overseas. I provided a local mobile phone number and an email, and there is a healthy two-way interaction: they tell me that my passport has been printed, that it is on its way and so on. There are plenty of opportunities within that interaction to mention it to the overseas citizen. They are already sending me something to ask whether I want to donate my organs, so why can’t they also send something that says, “Do you want to be on the electoral register? This is the link to do it”? Other Government Departments can also follow that.
Whether to register or not is ultimately someone’s choice, but they should have the facts, they should have the link, and they should have the knowledge that they have the right to vote.
Imogen Tyreman: I also agree. I think being prompted is very important generally, even in conversations with us. Everyone here is giving oral evidence as a member of a political party. We are aware that our right to vote came back, but speaking to our communities of Brits abroad and reaching out to friends and family, not everyone was aware. Some people were not aware that they had regained the right to vote. Renewing your passport is a basic starting point. I would not say it is the end goal, but it is the starting point for getting people back on the electoral register and able to exercise their democratic right in this country that they were given.
Richard Williams: I echo all that. The only thing I would say is: why not take things a step further and design an automatic opt-in? There have been studies of automatic opt-ins for organ donation, and you get a much higher acceptance rate if the default is set to opt-in and people are manually asked whether they do not want to let their organs be donated. Why not do the same thing for being on the electoral register? Assume people do want to be on it, unless they do not. Of course, you can then differentiate between the limited and open register and the full register, but I think, at least for the limited one that stays confidential, this could be looked at to make things even easier.
Jenny Shorten: Can I echo the point that was just made? If it is right that eligible voters in the UK automatically go on the register, why is it not right for British citizens eligible overseas to be treated in the same way? I think it is a very straightforward answer. It might have to be done by a different method, but the principle should be exactly the same.
Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)
Q
Colin Blackwell: Each constituency has a separate overseas register, and we political parties get this. We get all the overseas register data. I am not exactly sure what benefit a central register brings, other than maybe convenience, but I do think it is potentially a slippery slope for then saying, “Oh, well, let’s have overseas constituencies just for overseas Brits,” which we do not think is a good idea. We think it is counterintuitive and has the potential to severely reduce overseas electors’ representation, not enhance it.
At the last election, in our manifesto, the Conservative party saw the solution as appointing a Minister for Brits abroad—a representative in government battling for Brits abroad, and effectively, with civil service support, answering the questions that MPs get from their overseas electors. I do not necessarily see the benefit of unifying the existing separate overseas registers into a single one.
The Chair
You have had the last word of this panel, Mr Blackwell. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witnesses in the Boothroyd Room and online for their evidence.
Examination of Witnesses
Azzurra Moores and Chris Morris gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from Demos and Full Fact. We have until 5.20 pm for this panel in our revised timescale. Will our witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record?
Azzurra Moores: Hi, my name is Azzurra Moores. I am the associate director of information ecosystems at Demos, the UK’s cross-party think tank.
Chris Morris: Hello, I am Chris Morris, the chief executive of Full Fact. We are a charity and we do fact-checking. We also have a technology team and a policy team to try to tackle issues of misinformation.
Paul Holmes
Q
Clearly, in the election strategy announced before Christmas, the Government said that our
“democracy is being threatened by misinformation”.
Both your organisations have come up with fairly similar recommendations, including, in the Demos report on electoral online harms, the recommendation for a political digital repository. I think that is quite a good idea. Can you outline to the Committee, on behalf of your organisations, where you think that the Bill is deficient in tackling such threats, particularly those from digital communications?
Azzurra Moores: I should clarify that our recommendations are so similar because Demos, Full Fact and other civil society partners have been working together.
Paul Holmes
I would never have guessed.
Azzurra Moores: We are working together partly because there is a real feeling among civil society that the Bill is much too narrow in scope and does not go far enough to tackle some of the major threats to elections that we are seeing. Part of the reason we came together is the quote that you referenced, Paul: the Prime Minister himself said that misinformation is a huge problem, and actually we are seeing such threats to elections.
We have come together to think about some of the recommendations. We have come up with a number of recommendations on a range of issues, including online harassment of candidates, given that the Bill focuses a lot on in-person harassment of candidates. We have also looked at deepfakes, and at how digital advertising needs to be modernised. We really feel that the Bill is, at the moment, a bit of a missed opportunity to tackle something that is—this is the consensus among civil society—a huge threat to democracy.
If we do not tackle some of these issues now, we do not know when we are going to tackle them to prepare ourselves for the next election. We were quite lucky in the last election that we did not see major threats to democracy or huge amounts of interference. But we have seen examples globally, including across Europe and in Canada, and we have seen examples outside election periods. We feel that that is why the Bill needs to be amended to provide for some of the bigger threats that elections face.
Chris Morris: To back that up, part of our fear is that a lot of what is in the Bill has been locked in for so long that these really important aspects of misinformation and disinformation are missing. As you suggested, we are in a situation where technology is moving at warp speed.
We recognise that legislating at a fixed point when the technology is moving so quickly is not easy, yet the Bill falls significantly short of its original aims, which included restoring trust and strengthening the integrity of our democracy. If you are going to hold an election, the information environment in which it is held is absolutely central to the public perception—I think I am going to use the word “transparency” a lot during this session—that the system is working in their favour and can be trusted.
People are sceptical—we like scepticism; scepticism is good. The danger is that it tips over into outright cynicism. The more transparent the measures in the Bill can be, and the clearer it is that people understand they can trust the system—and that they can trust that political parties and candidates, when standing for office, are held to high standards—the better it will be. The concern is that the technology is outweighing the ability of Committees like this one and legislation like this Bill to do the job they set out to do.
Paul Holmes
Q
These quotes are from your briefing, Chris, if I may plagiarise and read them out. A former Minister said that more needs to be done to deal with hostile actors. My boss, James Cleverly, has said that the Conservatives would support
“sensible, proportionate measures to ensure that AI-generated political material is clearly labelled and subject to transparency as a requirement”.—[Official Report, 2 March 2026; Vol. 781, c. 635.]
Zöe Franklin, who serves on this Committee, said that section 106 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 needs to be updated to
“explicitly criminalise the use of AI and deepfakes”.—[Official Report, 2 March 2026; Vol. 781, c. 651.]
Your briefing also mentions what Martin Wrigley and Alex Barros-Curtis said. Emily Darlington, with her two excellent amendments, has tried to tackle this issue.
What interactions have you both had with officials in the Department to see how far you can get in probing and trying to get these issues included in the Bill in the first place? What would you say to the Committee about Emily Darlington’s new clauses 22 and 24?
Chris Morris: Overall, both our organisations are talking to officials all the time, so the doors are open, which is good. Part of the problem with the debate about deepfakes is that, in my opinion, some people want to go too far. It is worth exploring the idea of criminalising deepfakes as essentially identity theft, but I would have a lot of caution around that.
It is good to explore those policy options, but we are much more in favour of transparency of labelling. We have suggested an amendment that is very specific about the way that political deepfakes can be labelled. If you go down the road of criminalisation, you come to a very difficult line about where satire suddenly becomes criminal. Nobody wants to factcheck satire, and nobody wants to make satire illegal.
Again, we have to start looking at some of these things in a slightly different way to take account of the way that technology has made it incredibly easy for anyone to create new information just like that. That is the world in which we are living. Trying to criminalise some of those things would be a dangerous path to go down, but clear labelling—transparency of source—is absolutely key.
Azzurra Moores: I would echo Chris’s point. We are incredibly grateful to the officials we have spent many months talking to. They have been incredibly constructive and open to hearing these recommendations. We are sitting in front of you because all those recommendations have not made it into the Bill.
Part of the reason Emily has put forward so many amendments is because these issues deserve to be debated by parliamentarians, but they also deserve to be debated by the people they are impacting. A lot of the things we are looking at here will impact every Member around this table, and it is for you to decide how you tackle them.
You have mentioned a couple of Emily Darlington’s amendments, and I want to turn to new clause 10. You mentioned section 106 of the Representation of the People Act 1983, and I thought it might be worth clarifying that, while this measure is something she has put forward, with Demos and Full Fact support, it is actually a recommendation that came long before. It came out of the Speaker’s Conference, which I know many members of the Committee were part of, and it is something to which the Government have now responded by saying, “We understand that this is important.”
New clause 10, if anything, is just a vehicle for the Government to action something they have already said could be really valuable. It would not create new law or new bounds to discuss free speech; all it would do is say that deepfakes exist as a medium through which you must not make false statements about another candidate. It is a very simple amendment that asks the Government to publish legal guidance, so that there is no uncertainty among officials, regulators or the police. It is quite a simple approach, and that is what we have felt is the most important way forward. These things have been discussed for a long time, and the amendments are allowing them to be discussed within the scope of the Bill.
Paul Holmes
Q
Very quickly, as I know other people want to ask questions, I can see why people would want to support new clause 24’s repository of digital political advertising. One of the drawbacks that I think we can see in the new clause, which I want to strengthen, is that the Electoral Commission obviously will have responsibility for establishing a repository of paid-for digital political advertising within the 72-hour window. Where do you both think is the ideal location for that repository? Where would it sit? Would it sit with a Government Department or in a Government agency? Who would be the regulator, and who would be the manager and data controller of that repository? Do you have a preference for how that might be legislated for, such as in a new amendment?
Azzurra Moores: Our original preference was for this to sit with Ofcom. To be frank with the Committee, when this amendment was tabled, there was pushback on including any new powers for Ofcom in the Bill. At the moment, new clause 24 puts those powers on the Electoral Commission, and I personally do not mind who holds that power. I do not think it particularly matters, and it is really for Members to decide themselves.
What matters are the principles that we are trying to discuss here. We want to give voters the ability to verify whether a political ad is real, and we want to allow them to do that in real time. We have given scope for 72 hours, but we would obviously hope that it would be sooner. We also want those adverts to be transferred to the National Archives so that, in years to come, we understand how elections were fought.
Who holds or pays for that? I think that is really a matter for the Committee. We can discuss in detail whether it should be Ofcom or the Electoral Commission, but I think we need to make sure that we agree on the principle that elections are no longer fought just in person; they are fought online, and we therefore need really stringent measures to understand how elections were fought in years to come.
Chris Morris: But I would argue that it should not be a Government Department, which you suggested as a possibility. I think it should be Ofcom or the Electoral Commission, and I think the Electoral Commission would be happy to take on that responsibility. Again, it comes back to the issue of transparency, as people deserve to be able to see what is there. It is important not only for researchers but for ordinary voters, because they are bombarded from so many angles with advertising of various kinds. Creating a repository would be a big democratic step forward.
Paul Holmes
I would be one of the people sad enough to go to the National Archives to look at them, so I am fully in favour of it.
Azzurra Moores: Me too.
Chris Morris: See you there.
Samantha Dixon
Q
Chris Morris: It is not all doom and gloom. If we take the example of digital imprints, measures have been taken to extend the digital imprint regime. Our argument is simply that it does not go far enough, and it should go further. For example, it should cover things like fake newspapers or websites, which can be set up in seconds, that do not include their political party affiliation. The digital imprint regime is being slightly improved by the Bill, but it is simply not ambitious enough.
We also have to think not just of 2026, but of 2029. If you look at how technology has changed since the last general election in 2024, it is almost in a different league. I regularly ask my head of AI, “Where are we going to be in three years’ time?”, and he usually says, “I’m not sure where we are going to be in three months’ time.” We need to have the flexibility to make sure that the measures are as wide as possible, because even if we broaden them in the way that we suggest to include a wider variety of things, by 2029 we may be looking back and saying that it probably was not enough.
Azzurra Moores: It is very hard to disagree with Chris. The imprints work is huge progress. Obviously, it could go further, but I appreciate that a lot of the things we are asking for were not in scope when the Bill was being drafted. Does it cover the issues we are talking about? No, because it never intended to. That is where we are saying there is a real opportunity for the Bill to go further and be wider.
While it may have started with a narrow scope, perhaps once you hear what Philip Rycroft says through his review—and read our amendments slightly further—it will be appreciated that there is an opportunity to say, “How else can we make the Bill safeguard elections for the future?”
Chris Morris: To add to that, on a slightly different part of the legislation, it is good that the Electoral Commission will have greater powers on information sharing and enforcement, but we would like to see it have greater powers on information gathering.
There is a bit of a gap on who is responsible for regulating in that area. We would have liked to see that covered in the Online Safety Act 2023 and given to Ofcom. That did not happen, but one thing that could and should happen in this legislation is giving the Electoral Commission the power to compel people to hand over information or documents really quickly, such as in the heat of an election campaign, without having to turn it into a formal investigation, which as you probably know is laborious and takes time. A lot of this is about agility as well as transparency.
Zöe Franklin
Q
I want to talk about doxing, and my understanding is that it is not currently within the scope of the Bill. For anyone who is not on top of doxing, it is where information is gathered about you and then dropped online so that people can find out where you live and other information. Given that the Speaker’s Conference and the Crown Prosecution Service have both spoken out about how important it is to address this, do you feel that it is a problem that doxing is not currently in or addressed by the Bill?
Azzurra Moores: What you are trying to address is the issue of online harassment. Doxing is one part of it, but online harassment takes many shapes. I certainly do not need to describe that to members of the Committee, who will have experienced it themselves.
We definitely feel that tackling online harassment is a massive missed opportunity in the Bill. For those of you who might have followed the work of the Online Safety Act Network, it has proposed a new code to tackle online abuse and harassment during elections. Again, that has not been tabled as an amendment to the Bill, partly because it was felt to be out of scope.
When looking at in-person harassment, we also need to understand that those in-person threats happen digitally as well. Certainly, the issues you are raising, such as doxing, could fall under that code. As I said, it is not something that has been tabled, partly because of the narrow scope of the Bill, but I encourage Members to look to that and perhaps have representatives from the Online Safety Act Network come in to give evidence.
Zöe Franklin
Q
Chris Morris: My one-word answer is yes, but let me explain it in various ways.
Broadly speaking, it is not unreasonable for us to ask the most powerful companies in the world—who have enormous power over our information environment and, therefore, increasingly over how everyone in this country gets information—to take on a more responsible attitude, some of which we believe should be made statutory.
As part of media and political literacy campaigns, for example, there could be education about why harassing candidates is not a good thing to do. Some of that behaviour comes from ignorance, and from people seeing how others behave on social media.
One of the recommendations we have made, and it is in our written statement, is that there should be a statutory obligation for the big tech companies, the online platforms, to make sure they are fully involved in media and political literacy campaigns. They do some good things, but we have to recognise, and we have to be realistic, that in the end their bottom line is their share price. Regulating how information flows is difficult. At the moment, we are essentially allowing them to regulate themselves, and I think sensible regulation of these companies—we know there will be howls of protest—is exactly what the Members of this House should be doing.
Azzurra Moores: Maybe I can quickly explain why we have gone for such a narrow scope in our recommendation on deepfakes. We recognise that deepfakes are a really complicated topic to regulate, and they need something far bigger than an elections Bill to regulate. Really, wholesale AI regulation is needed.
While the section 106 recommendation does not put new requirements on platforms, it starts to test the bounds on how you would regulate political deepfakes, which we appreciate is a really complicated topic. It is a slow and steady approach to amending legislation, rather than coming in and making big mistakes straightaway. This would be a first step, but obviously there need to be conversations within Government about how we could go further on that as well.
Dr Chowns
Q
Secondly, do you agree that we need to regulate not just during the regulated period but all year round, because disinformation has corrosive effects all year round? Thirdly, do you have any comments on the need for better enforcement of existing imprint laws? Finally, you referenced the Rycroft review, which of course covers only foreign interference. Are we paying enough attention to domestic disinformation?
Azzurra Moores: There were lots of good questions there. You ask what more could be done on bots. Chris raised a proposal to increase the Electoral Commission’s investigative powers. For those of you looking at the amendment paper, that is new clause 25 tabled by Emily Darlington.
Tackling bots is going to be really complicated, but we think a really important first step is to give the Electoral Commission investigative powers on the back end of platform data, to try to understand the scale and scope of the problem. Part of the reason we cannot do much more at the moment is that we have a real evidence gap—a real evidence deficit. We need to start giving our regulators, which are on the frontline, more ability to understand the scale of the problem. For us, that would be a first step.
I am intrigued to see what the Rycroft review publishes. Demos gave evidence to Rycroft, and we highlighted that foreign misinformation is obviously impacting our democracy, but so is domestic misinformation. We are waiting to see what he publishes before going further on that.
On international counterparts, we have recommended that this Government establish a critical election incident protocol, modelling what happens in Canada. It is quite a complicated protocol, and it is proposed in new clause 26, but essentially, if there was any interference with an election—if there was an information crisis that impacted the integrity of the election—there would be a published protocol on what officials would do to react to that.
We are a real outlier here in the UK, compared with the other Five Eyes nations, in not having a public protocol. We think this elections Bill is another really important opportunity to say, “We know there are vulnerabilities. We know there are risks. We need to establish transparent public protocols so that, should any of these interferences happen, we have a set of measures that mean we know how to react in that instance.”
The Chair
You have 10 seconds.
Chris Morris: To add to that, Full Fact first put forward the idea of a critical election incident protocol in 2022, and really nothing has been done. The problem we have is that there are plenty of people working on this behind the scenes—the joint election security preparedness unit and the defending democracy taskforce—but it is all very much being done in the shadows. This is not always a case of democracy dying in darkness; this is about democracy under threat in the bright blue backlit light of a million scrolling phones.
That is the scale of the challenge we are facing now. It is not just about making sure we have an electoral framework that is fit for purpose; it is about making sure that there is a public perception that it is fit for purpose. That is why the issue of transparency is so important. If there were to be a major information incident—by that, we mean in the last days of the campaign, clear evidence emerging of a concerted attempt to alter the course of the outcome of an election in some way or another—the more transparent and public the process is for revealing that, the better.
The Chair
That brings us to the conclusion of this evidence session. I thank both witnesses on behalf of the Committee for their evidence.
Examination of Witnesses
Duncan Hames, Dr Sam Power and Dr Susan Hawley gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from Transparency International, Dr Sam Power and Spotlight on Corruption. We have until 5.50 pm for this panel. Could I ask each of you to introduce yourselves and say a little about your organisations?
Duncan Hames: Hello, I am Duncan Hames. I am the director of policy and programmes at Transparency International UK, which is the British chapter of a worldwide anti-corruption movement in more than 100 countries.
Dr Power: Hi, I am Dr Sam Power. I am a lecturer in politics at the University of Bristol. I should also say, for transparency, that for about the past 18 months I have been funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and internal University of Bristol funds to work as a parliamentary academic fellow in the House of Commons Library. Based on my area of expertise, I have written various impartial briefings on matters relevant to this Bill, but I am, of course, speaking in my capacity as an independent academic from the University of Bristol today.
Dr Susan Hawley: Hi, I am Dr Susan Hawley. I am executive director of Spotlight on Corruption. We are an anti-corruption charity that focuses on the enforcement of the UK’s anti-corruption laws, including on political integrity and political finance.
Paul Holmes
Q
I have taken great pleasure in reading all the evidence that has come in today. There are some bits I agree with—particularly from Dr Hawley and Dr Power—but there are some recommendations that I would be concerned about if we started to implement. Sorry, Mr Hames, but I am going to focus on the other two witnesses first. First, where do you see the balance between the freedom to practise democracy and overburdensome restrictions that could harm transparency and restrict voter interaction with the party political process?
We have heard this morning that there is a perception that overseas voters are finding it incredibly hard to engage with voting and have many obstacles to voting. You have a proposal that any overseas voter wishing to be considered a permissible donor should also be a UK-registered taxpayer and have submitted at least one non-zero tax return in the two years prior to making the donation. Does that not risk creating two tiers of voter—well, we already have that, but exacerbating it? For example, someone in receipt of benefits or who falls underneath the tax threshold in this country is allowed to vote. Why should they be allowed to vote, if an overseas voter who does not pay tax should not be allowed to vote? That is to Dr Power, then I will come back with another question.
Dr Power: There is a two-tier system, effectively, if you have overseas voters and overseas taxpayers, and UK-based taxpayers. It is pretty easy to draw a distinction between where the level of threat is and where the level of overburdensome regulation is, if you will.
I sometimes get concerned when I hear about how this approach can be overly burdensome. It is often used as a crutch to prevent genuine weaknesses in the system being dealt with. I do not think it is too much to ask of people who live overseas, who might well be slightly more politically exposed, to show that they are also engaging with the British system and paying tax in that respect. I do not necessarily have concerns that that creates a two-tier system—people are allowed to donate in the UK, of course, and people are allowed to donate overseas. Of course, if they lived overseas and did not pay tax, they could donate under the £500 limit.
Paul Holmes
Q
“Parties are increasingly building up their war chests well before the run-up to elections and engaging in permanent campaigning. This can have an impact on subsequent elections; as the Committee for Standards on Public Life…noted in its 2021 report”.
It is always going to be the case that political parties have to fundraise to communicate with the electorate. Where is the balance? What I could not quite work out from that submission is where you see the balance between restricting fundraising and keeping communications with the electorate going over that 18 months, rather than seeing it as campaigning? I might not be clear, but I am trying to see where you see that balance coming through.
Dr Susan Hawley: This is not about stopping it; it is about having limits apply across the annual period. An amendment that relates to the digital campaigning side has already been tabled. That is a recognition that we are in an age of permanent campaigning and to make sure that the public know what is being spent to influence them. It is about transparency and fairness, because if some parties are able to keep a lot of money in those pre-regulated periods and others are not, an imbalance is created when it comes to the election. It is about transparency and fairness.
Paul Holmes
Q
“Prohibit crypto donations until/unless…crypto currency becomes much more widely used by a greater cross-section of the population”.
That is something that needs to be seriously explored, because of evidence given to us earlier in Committee about the lack of regulation that has caught up with something that is to me completely not understandable. You support that proposal, Dr Hawley, because it is your proposal, but do the other two witnesses support an interim ban on cryptocurrency donations until the regulatory framework has caught up? Also, if we get a suitable regulatory framework, do you think such donations should be re-established or do you think that they should just be banned permanently?
Duncan Hames: We do support a moratorium for the purposes you describe. How temporary it should be depends on whether it is possible to address the risks. At such point as Parliament is confident that other forms of payment carry no additional risk to sterling or even cash, then the case for the moratorium would not be as strong. Right now, it is an absolute minefield to try to work out exactly where this money originates, which drives a coach and horses through the existing rules we have on political finance.
Paul Holmes
Thank you. Dr Power?
Dr Power: We are short on time, so I will say yes, and you can refer to my evidence. The only thing I would add is that one of the concerns we have about crypto-currency generally is its ability to supercharge donations below £500, which is underneath the check for permissibility. If that is a particular concern with cryptocurrency, there is a case for not only banning it, but bringing down the level of the permissibility requirement. In my submission, I suggest £50, which aligns with the candidate regime, because that would create a further barrier to that particular concern.
Samantha Dixon
Q
Dr Susan Hawley: We welcome the introduction of the “know your donor” regime, and the clarifications that it will have robust penalties for parties and candidates who do not undertake proper risk assessments. I am afraid that it currently needs some tweaks to be strengthened.
Obviously, we do not want to impose too much of a burden on parties but, if we are addressing foreign interference, it is very odd that the current “know your donor” policy does not say anything about addressing the potential source of wealth from high-risk jurisdictions or politically exposed persons. That is our first point. Any other regulated sector would and does need to address those risks.
Secondly, as the policy is currently framed, we think there is far too much discretion for political parties to decide what the risks are. That is unhelpful, because there will be inconsistent application of risk assessments across parties. That discretion should be reduced.
Finally, we have concerns that the fact that the Electoral Commission’s guidance can essentially be changed by the Secretary of State could lead to it being completely overridden, and that would be really problematic. We would like to see safeguards to ensure that cannot happen if there is to be a power for the Secretary of State to amend the Electoral Commission’s guidance.
The Chair
Q
Dr Power: I would only add that I concur. The one slight concern I have with the “know your donor” requirements is overly burdensome regulation. The thresholds for conducting those requirements should align with the thresholds for the person having to undertake them, because you could end up with a situation where a regulated entity is looking at three different thresholds. I would want the Bill to be clear that these align, and I know that the Electoral Commission shares that concern.
Lisa Smart
Q
You talked about reducing discretion, and there are proposed amendments that would clarify who is no longer a permissible donor. I agree that clarifying some of that would be helpful for political parties. However, may I invite all the witnesses to talk about what is currently in the Bill on money coming in from overseas? The Government have been very clear that they want to take steps to tackle foreign interference, and we are looking at the recommendations from Philip Rycroft’s review. Could you say whether the provisions in the Bill are robust enough to stop foreign money being funnelled through UK entities? If not, what steps would you recommend to tackle that?
Duncan Hames: We certainly welcome the valiant efforts that officials in the Minister’s Department have been making to address this issue, and there are some welcome steps, particularly on unincorporated associations, to ensure that they are not used as a back door. However, we do not have any prohibitions in this country on people who are not entitled to vote in this country owning companies that trade here. Therefore, it would be entirely possible for someone who you all agree should not be allowed to donate money in British politics to none the less acquire a company that does that job for them, which would comply with the provisions as currently set out in the Bill.
Our view is that, hard as we might try, so long as people are determined to find a way, it is very hard to be absolutely confident that you have shut this door. That is why we think the lack of any kind of cap whatsoever on how much any one person can put into British politics means that the risk of money entering British politics and getting round these controls is uncontained. We would argue that these measures need to be accompanied by some kind of donations cap.
Dr Susan Hawley: It is absolutely a risk. I believe the Rycroft review is looking at whether you make sure that the regulated sector and financial institutions in the UK are playing their role. There would definitely be scope for a joint intelligence unit where they could share transactions that appear suspicious with law enforcement. Obviously, that relates to whether the enforcement set-up is sufficient and whether the laws are sufficient. In relation to enforcement, this also comes down to having proper donor declarations and beefing up the section 54A donor declaration to address some of those risks and make sure that the money is not coming via permissible donors in the UK, but from abroad.
Dr Power: We also have regulated and unregulated periods at which different levels of scrutiny apply to donations to different regulated entities. Of course, some of those entities are less regulated or unregulated during unregulated periods.
As a thought experiment, if I were a malign foreign actor, I would probably focus on the unregulated periods as the times when I could use my money wisely, as it were. There is a good case for considering, within reason, how we can move towards a system with year-round regulations, taking into account the importance of a vibrant democracy, such that we do not end up with money being spent and donated during relatively unregulated times.
Lisa Smart
I am working with the Public Bill Office on an amendment that extends the regulated period. Given the narrow scope of the Bill, that is a way of thinking about that.
Lloyd Hatton
Q
Dr Susan Hawley: The Electoral Commission needs to come up with robust guidance on that. It needs to look at industry standards from the regulated sector to tackle money laundering. I want to come back to the donor declaration, because that is also critical to this. We have heard from law enforcement that it is not clear to them that the proceeds of crime are not allowed as donations, for instance. If you have a situation where proceeds of crime can be donated, that is pretty extraordinary. We need a robust section 54A that puts some onus on the donor and makes a false declaration a criminal offence.
I do not know whether that answers your question, Lloyd, or whether you wanted me to talk more about “know your donor”, but I think they complement each other. You have “know your donor”, which is about what parties do, but also the donor declaration, so that you are putting some onus on the donor to actually be honest about where that money comes from.
Lloyd Hatton
Q
Dr Susan Hawley: No. I think it has done a valiant job in introducing the beneficial owner test and a UK connection test, but we know that the Electoral Commission has flagged the revenue test for corporations as a real risk for foreign interference. The way that is laid out in the Bill also does not provide a cap at all; it allows money to be donated to a host of different people.
The revenue test really needs to be looked at again, because we have the Electoral Commission saying very clearly, “There is an increased risk of foreign interference if you keep the revenue test.” You also have tax experts saying that it is actually fairly easy to generate significant UK turnover while having no genuine UK operations. This is the moment to look at that again. It is also not quite clear why a company that owes a lot of tax, or that is making a loss, should feel it needs—or should be able—to donate.
Lloyd Hatton
Q
Dr Susan Hawley: It is very much an improvement on what we have at the moment; I think everyone would agree that, if you have a multimillion-pound campaign budget, a £20,000 fine is frankly laughable. We would, however, like to see it strengthened in two ways.
First, we would like this to be on the face of the Bill. We have a report coming out next week in which we compare the Electoral Commission’s powers to the Information Commissioner’s Office and Ofcom. Those bodies have this in the legislation, and they also have not just a maximum fine level but a percentage; the Committee on Standards in Public Life recommended that it should be £500,000 or 4%, whichever is higher. Again, you could argue that, if you have a multimillion-pound campaign budget, £500 k could become a potential cost of doing business, so we need that percentage option to give the Electoral Commission the flexibility to impose penalties in egregious cases.
Secondly, the Electoral Commission has a very high threshold, compared with other regulators, for when it can actually impose penalties. Ideally, we would like to see that looked at again, because no other regulator is hampered by that high threshold.
Duncan Hames: If I may, the problem with enforcement is that it takes a long time, and we are talking about democratic events here; by the time enforcement takes place, the consequences have already happened. People saw Elon Musk giving out cheques to make millionaires of people taking part in an election campaign in the States; they all thought that the rules were being broken and that something should be done about it, but nothing was, and he was at the right hand of the President within weeks of that moment. We ought to be looking at measures that we can take that prevent problems from happening, rather than just chasing things after the event.
Nathan Gill is serving a 10-year prison sentence for bribery offences, which he admitted to in court, that happened nearly 10 years before he was convicted. There is a long lag if you rely on that kind of enforcement to address offending, and the problem that you are trying to stop.
Lloyd Hatton
Q
Dr Susan Hawley: We really welcome the recommendation of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy—published today—that there should be a specific unit. I think that there is growing recognition within law enforcement bodies that that is required. Up to now, the problem has been that those law enforcement bodies will argue that they do not have the laws or the sentences that would empower them to use the serious investigative tools that they have at their disposal to get to the bottom of some of this behaviour. That is why the criminal offence in section 54 and section 54A really needs to be looked at. We welcome the amendment recently tabled by Matt Western to address the knowledge test so that it is not set too high.
We also need to look at sentences because we hear again and again from law enforcement that if you do not have a serious crime-level sentence, you cannot use the skills that you can deploy for serious crime for this kind of offending. If we are talking about foreign interference, those are the tools that need to be deployed against impermissible donations.
Dr Chowns
Q
Duncan Hames: We propose that a cap of £50,000 annually from any one donor is reached by 2030. That would still be much higher than in a number of other jurisdictions that have introduced donation caps, such as Canada, France, Italy and—from July—Australia. If it were phased in, with a cap reducing year by year between now and then, that would provide time for political parties to adapt.
We have done our own modelling, which I would be happy to share with the Committee, in which we look at the effect of that cap on overall party fundraising. I think you will find that, although we have recently had an arms race in campaign spending—not least because the spending limits were raised so dramatically just before the last general election—political parties fought all sorts of elections and referendums in the previous decade without needing anything near the kind of money that was available in the last general election, when nearly £100 million was spent.
Dr Power: I agree that we absolutely need a cap on donations. I am less wedded to a level as much as to the idea that there needs to be a cap that people can get around the table and agree to, and which seems fair. To not have a cap on donations risks much more than to have one. It is absolutely essential. We have seen the effect that can have in countries that do not have caps on donations, particularly the USA, and the effect that the very rich can then have.
What I mean by that is not an effect on the outcome of politics but an effect on the process of politics. You end up with about 400 individuals accounting for 75% of total party donations. Given that we are discussing the Representation of the People Bill, that is not a situation in which people are represented. It is essential that we find some way—in a Bill called “Representation of the People”—to fix the system properly such that the people feel represented. A cap on donations is essential and well within the remit of the Bill.
On a cap on spending, I align with the 1998 CSPL review, as well as Jack Straw when he introduced the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. He said that there has been an “arms race” in spending and that we should always set a spending limit below the extent to which we expect to spend at an election. Until 2023, that limit was set at £19.5 million, if you stood a candidate in every constituency, which does not happen. If we say that the limit was £19.5 million, that should have been the baseline, and there was no good justification for it to be uprated in 2023—in fact, I think there is a good case for bringing the limit down further still. It would not have an effect on the good that money does in a system, which is to enrich debate and to allow political parties to get their positions across.
The Chair
That brings us to the end of this panel. On behalf of the Committee, I thank all our witnesses for their evidence.
Examination of witness
Samantha Dixon MBE MP gave evidence.
The Chair
We are now going to hear oral evidence from the Minister. We all appreciate that the Minister has been struggling with her voice today, and I am sure we will bear with her during this evidence session, which is scheduled to last until 6.10 pm.
Samantha Dixon: Thank you, Chair—you are really kind. I hope Members will indulge me, and I will do my best to answer their questions today.
Paul Holmes
Q
Part of my concern about this Government’s approach to legislation is that we very often see a jumping to legislate before the evidence is there, and then a backtracking on a number of things. For example, we had a planning and infrastructure Bill being implemented before a devolution Bill, and that devolution Bill cancelled elections to enable things to be delivered, but the elections were then forced back on. It seems that this Government do not think through public policy properly, and I think the Bill is no exception.
It seems odd to me that the Government asked Philip Rycroft to conduct a review into election interference, but they have then introduced a Bill that is bringing forward a number of measures in the same field. As a result, the Bill may go through the vast majority of its parliamentary stages and then rely on secondary legislation, which is a concern that many professors outlined earlier.
Have you made any representations to other Ministers in the Department or to No. 10 for a delay in this legislation, so that the Rycroft review can report and develop recommendations? You could then come back to the House and form a cross-party Committee to see whether those recommendations can be implemented, rather than following this hotchpotch approach that will see the Bill passed, only for a review to then make a number of recommendations on the same subject matter. Does that not seem odd to you?
Samantha Dixon: Last July, the statement of policy was set out in Parliament, so there was quite a considerable amount of time before the introduction of the Bill. You have seen policy developing over that time.
The conviction of Nathan Gill, which is why the Secretary of State asked Philip Rycroft to undertake the review, was a pivotal moment that highlighted and brought together a number of the issues that the witnesses have talked about today. The Secretary of State set the terms of reference for that review very carefully, but I think that Philip Rycroft indicated that he would act with speed. While I have not met him to date, I know that many people have, including members of this Committee, because his door has been very open to those who want to talk to him. I anticipate that his recommendations will come forward soon, and it is the Government’s intention to listen closely and carefully to what he brings forward.
The Bill, as you will know from Second Reading, is a carry-over Bill, which gives us an opportunity, as we go forward, to consider the recommendations. It is likely that our Committee will finish around the time that we are prorogued, and that Report will come in the second Session of this Parliament. That pause is being provided to us by parliamentary time.
Paul Holmes
Q
I have one more question, which is about digital ID. Since this Government were elected, fairly and resoundingly, it has been clear that they have a problem with the previous Government’s measures on digital ID. Almost every witness today has outlined that the Government’s proposals on bank cards as a potential form of ID are not a good idea; they said that that would not increase security at polling stations or people’s security over their vote, but actually reduce it.
Will you listen to those witnesses and give a commitment to the Committee to go back to the Department and remove bank cards as an acceptable form of ID? Can you outline to the Committee how showing a card with a name on guarantees that the person who is turning up at the polling station is the named person, and how that is fundamentally different to the old system, where a polling card could be taken to a polling station and a vote be given out?
Samantha Dixon: I think that the integrity of the UK banking system is such that the possession of a bank card requires a degree of ID that is necessary and appropriate. We have to remember that prior to the 2022 Act, there was no ID requirement at all. We have also heard evidence that instances of fraud were extremely low. The introduction of the bank card ID is important because it is widely held by the population, in particular by under-represented groups including 16 and 17-year-olds. I have heard the evidence that the Committee has heard; none the less, I think the inclusion of UK-issued bank cards is an important addition to voter ID, and one that we should continue.
Paul Holmes
Q
One of the witnesses today suggested that you could have automatic enrolment to voter identification paperwork or digital ID; that is something we would support. What problem are you trying to solve in trying to bring in a bank card as a possible type of identification, when that does not prove your identity? A very minor number of people are affected by this. How much do you anticipate that a bank card will make a difference to the numbers we have heard about today?
Samantha Dixon: We are talking about people who have the right to vote, but are excluded from voting because they do not have the appropriate ID. Although I accept that many people have passports and driving licences, not all do, and many more people have bank cards. The legitimacy of the banking system in the UK means that those cards should be used by younger people in particular, but could be used by any person who wants to vote in person at a polling station.
Paul Holmes
I find it interesting that most of the people who we consider to be academics, and have made their life’s profession the integrity of the election system, are not in favour of it, but the Government are choosing to go ahead with it anyway. We will look at that further in line-by-line scrutiny. Thank you very much for your time this afternoon.
Lisa Smart
Q
It is clear from all the evidence we have heard today that all the witnesses welcome a number of the steps in the Bill, but a number of them expressed disappointment that the scope had been written so narrowly and that it does not stand up to the moment of crisis and peril that our democracy faces. If the Government think that first past the post is the right system, why not have a national commission on the voting system to test that thesis?
Samantha Dixon: The Government believe that the voting systems that we use to elect our representatives are really at the heart of our democracy; they are of fundamental importance. We welcome views and feedback on how democracy can be improved. I am grateful for the interest that you have shown in this particular area, but I can confirm that we are content with the voting system that we currently use in general elections, and we have no plans to establish such a commission.
For UK parliamentary elections, we believe that the first-past-the-post system establishes a really strong link between the constituency and the representative. Although it may not be perfect, we believe it is well understood by the electorate and the communities that we represent. When a seat needs to be filled in Parliament or a council, for example, that link between the representative and those they represent is important. First past the post is appropriate for that system.
There are occasions for other voting systems for wider electorates, and this Bill will make provision for them. For example, for a mayoral election, we are in the process of bringing forward legislation to revert that system back to supplementary voting. When it is a broader constituency—a mayoral area that may cover many constituencies—we accept that that voting system is more appropriate. But at this stage, for council wards and parliamentary constituencies, we remain of the view that first past the post is the best system.
Lisa Smart
Q
Samantha Dixon: The view of the Government is that companies that pass all of the other tests and want to donate to a political party may on occasion be in a position where they are not making profit. For example, if they are taking investment decisions across a particular year, which mean that they are in a non-profit situation but their revenue is still working, they should not be excluded from donating to the political system. That is why the Government’s view is that the test should be revenue, as well as the other tests in place, which we feel are very robust, around UK residency of the persons of particular interest but also the UK headquarters rules and the “know your donor” rules.
The raft of measures that we are introducing make it far more difficult, notwithstanding the evidence and views of those we have heard today. We feel that it brings in protections that currently are not there and will protect our electoral system. It may be that Philip Rycroft comes forward with measures around this, which we will listen to as well as the evidence that we have heard today.
Lisa Smart
Q
Samantha Dixon: We have not designed these measures around specific individuals. I am not sure that the hypothetical illustration that you have given would pass the “know your donor” test, but I am happy to come back to you on that point.
David Simmonds
Q
Clause 47 is also silent on the use of virtual cards. We know many banks issue payment cards that are online, so quite a lot of people have their payment card on a mobile phone and do not have any physical item with them that would meet that standard. Are the Government open to amendments to clause 47 to try to address that and at least bring clarity to what is meant by a bank card, so that polling staff, who may have to have that conversation with people, know exactly where they stand?
Samantha Dixon: You mentioned digital ID. For example, we have introduced the digital veterans card as a form of ID. It has the holographic clock in it, which means that it cannot be screenshotted or used fraudulently.
David Simmonds
Q
Samantha Dixon: Right. My point is that, where a digital ID has that holographic clock, it is possible that the Government would consider that measure. But I do not believe that digital bank cards currently do.
Katrina Murray
No, I will put the Minister out of her misery; hopefully, she can get to bed.
The Chair
On that basis, I call proceedings to a halt. Thank you, Minister, for your efforts. That brings us to the end of today’s session. I understand that the Government intend to amend the programme order.
Ordered,
That in paragraph (1) of the Sittings Motion agreed by the Committee on 18 March 2026, leave out line (b). —(Deirdre Costigan.)
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Deirdre Costigan.)