(1 day, 16 hours ago)
Public Bill Committees
The Chair
We continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill. Before we begin, I remind Members to switch off their electronic devices or put them on silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings. The selection list for today’s sittings is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. This shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped for debate. Members are reminded to bob and catch my eye if they wish to speak in any debate.
Clause 17
Sponsor claims
I beg to move amendment 130, in clause 17, page 13, line 30, leave out from “claim’” to “, at” in line 32.
This amendment and amendment 131 are consequential on the repeal of section 12 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 2006 (which was never commenced) by the Schedule inserted by NS1.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 131.
Amendment 94, in clause 17, page 14, line 8, at end insert—
“, provided that the Secretary of State may only designate a place by regulations made by statutory instrument and that such a statutory instrument may only be made if a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This amendment would require the place at which sponsor human rights claims may be made to be set by regulations subject to the affirmative procedure.
Amendment 112, in clause 17, page 14, line 11, at end insert—
“(e) after subsection (1A) insert—
“(1B) Where a person makes a sponsor human rights claim, the Secretary of State must carry out safeguarding checks in relation to that person before determining the claim.
(1C) The safeguarding checks under subsection (1B) must establish, so far as reasonably practicable, whether the person making the sponsor human rights claim—
(a) has been convicted of an offence involving domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage;
(b) is subject to a relevant protective order relating to domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage;
(c) has been the subject of a finding by a court or other competent authority of conduct involving domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage; or
(d) has previously been the subject of an immigration decision in which concerns relating to forced marriage, abuse or the genuineness of a family relationship were material.
(1D) Where information falling within subsection (1C) is identified, the Secretary of State must take that information into account when determining the sponsor human rights claim and any decision relating to the family member to whom the claim relates.
(1E) The Secretary of State must consider whether the information identified under subsection (1C) indicates that the admission of the family member to the United Kingdom would give rise to a safeguarding risk to—
(a) the family member;
(b) any child affected by the decision; or
(c) any other person who may reasonably be expected to be at risk as a result of the admission.””
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to carry out safeguarding checks where a person makes a sponsor human rights claim under Clause 17.
Amendment 95, in clause 17, page 14, line 15, leave out subsection (3).
This amendment would remove the exemption of sponsor human rights claims from the inadmissibility provisions in section 80A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, to test why such claims should be treated more favourably than other human rights claims.
Government amendment 96.
Amendment 97, in clause 17, page 15, line 4, at end insert—
“(8) In section 82 (right of appeal to the Tribunal), after subsection (1) insert—
“(1ZA) An appeal does not lie under subsection (1)(b) against a decision to refuse a sponsor human rights claim unless the family member to whom the claim relates would, if they lived with the person who made the claim, be a member of that person’s core cohabiting family within the meaning of section 117AA(2).””
This amendment would confine the new sponsor right of appeal to claims relating to a spouse, civil partner, partner or minor child (or, for a child sponsor, a parent), in line with the Government’s own definition of the core cohabiting family in clause 18.
Clause stand part.
It is good to see you again this morning, Mr Stuart, and good morning to all colleagues. We start our debate by moving on to part 2 of the Bill, which relates to article 8 of the European convention on human rights. Article 8, the right to a family life, is an important protection, but it is a qualified right. That means that it can be balanced against a public interest—such as the safety of the community or the security of our borders—where that outweighs an individual’s personal rights. We will not step away from our belief that the right to family and private life must be respected and upheld. However, we have been clear that we must strike the right balance between the rights of the individual and fairness to the UK public, and, crucially, bear down on abuse of the system.
As set out in our impact assessment, each main applicant granted first time on article 8 grounds carries an estimated lifetime cost to the taxpayer of about £141,000, equating to approximately £4.9 billion for those granted in 2025 alone. Home Office analysis suggests that 71% of first-time grants on the basis of article 8 were to individuals who had entered illegally and/or overstayed. If the same applied to the estimated 42,000 first-time grants in 2025, this would mean that 30,000 overstayers and illegal entrants would have been allowed to stay last year on the basis of article 8. Between 1 April 2016 and November 2021, of 1,011 foreign national offender deportation appeals allowed on human rights grounds, 70% were solely on article 8 grounds. And with 77,000 applications granted on article 8 grounds last year, this is having a significant effect on our ability to enforce our immigration laws.
Therefore, in this Bill, we are changing how article 8 is applied in the UK immigration system, to restore public confidence and ensure that the UK application of rights is in line with the Strasbourg court. The application of article 8 will be tightened to prevent misuse of the system and ensure that the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control carries proper weight in immigration decisions. As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has made clear, the abuse of human rights law does not just erode the public’s support for our immigration system; it erodes their support for the very idea of having such laws at all. For those who believe that those laws matter, it is essential that we reform them to end their abuse. The reforms will put more emphasis on compliance with our rules and contribution to our economy and to our society.
Clause 17 aims to bring greater clarity and control to entry clearance applications that engage article 8, protecting genuine family relationships while preventing weak or tenuous claims from undermining public confidence. Taken with the reforms in clauses 18 and 19, which we will come to in forthcoming groups and which tighten key elements of the article 8 assessment, it strengthens our ability to enforce the immigration rules and create a fairer, more controlled system.
The clause amends the definition of a human rights claim in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 to create a “sponsor human rights claim”. This will lay the foundations to allow UK-based sponsors to make an entry clearance application for an overseas family member to join them in the UK if the application relies on the sponsor’s article 8 right to family life. It will also enable the sponsor to appeal to the immigration tribunal if the Home Office refuses their application. I want to be very clear that only individuals with a specified status, including British citizens and those with other lawful residence, will be able to make a sponsor human rights claim. They need to establish a genuine family life claim and show that refusal would disproportionately interfere with their article 8 rights. These reforms do not create a new migration route or entitlement to come to the UK. They simply ensure a correct process that is based on the UK sponsor, not the family abroad.
The clause will affect sponsors who wish to rely on article 8 family life because their family member does not meet the entry clearance requirement under the family routes and immigration rules. Enabling the UK-based sponsor to apply will focus attention on the circumstances and article 8 rights of the sponsor, rather than the overseas family member. This reflects the established legal position that it is the sponsor who is within the UK jurisdiction for the purposes of article 8 decision making. The focus on the rights of the UK sponsor is intended to reduce expansive interpretation of where article 8 rights are found to exist, and to prevent article 8 becoming a route for those with tenuous family links to the UK.
Too often, the focus can be on the circumstances of the applicants abroad, whereas the main legal question should be whether there is a disproportionate interference with the family life of the UK-based sponsor.
Will clause 17 make it easier for people to come to the UK on an article 8 basis if we do not specify where sponsor human rights claims can be made?
I thank my hon. Friend for asking a really important question, because it is right that we clarify this matter. The clause does not make it easier for overseas family members to enter the UK. Sponsors will still need to meet a very high threshold to argue successfully that it would be a breach of their article 8 rights if the Home Office refused their family member entry to the UK. Strict requirements for the procedure sponsors must follow to make an application, which will be set out in the immigration rules.
The focus on the rights of the UK sponsor is intended to reduce expansive interpretation of where article 8 rights are found to exist, and to prevent article 8 from becoming a route for those with tenuous family links to the UK. Too often, the focus can be on the circumstances of the applicants abroad, whereas the main legal question should be whether there is a disproportionate influence on the family life of the UK-based sponsor.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
As I understand it, the purpose of this new provision is to focus on the rights of the person in the UK, to ensure that their right to a family life is respected according to their circumstances. But their circumstances will be that their other family member is living abroad; that is their family life. I do not understand why that pre-existing situation would suddenly infringe their human rights and give them the right to bring in a family member. Their circumstance, by nature, is people living in two different countries.
The hon. Member makes a really important point. That is why we are trying to narrow the definition to those who are here in the UK, because for far too long it has been on the basis of a very tenuous link that family members can put in a claim from abroad to come to the UK. This measure narrows that definition while still ensuring that we maintain our obligations under article 8 rights.
The recent Court of Appeal judgment in IA and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department provided helpful clarification around the correct tests to determine where article 8 family life exists, especially between extended family members. However, the judgment addressed an issue with article 8 family life being applied to a broader set of circumstances and relationships, which risked undermining our systems and rules. Despite these helpful findings, there remains a risk of inconsistent decision making, where the primary focus is not on the article 8 rights of the family member in the UK—the person within the UK’s jurisdiction according to ECHR case law.
The clause will add greater weight to the findings of the Court of Appeal and bring more clarity to decision making for entry clearance cases that engage article 8 family life. In IA, the Court of Appeal also reaffirmed the importance of the Government’s immigration policy when striking the right balance between an individual’s rights and the public interest.
In combination with the reforms in clauses 18 and 19, clause 17 makes it clear where the Government’s policy position lies in relation to the application of article 8 and where the Government expect the rules to be enforced. This will create a clearer, fairer and more controlled system. Details of the application process, including forms and evidential requirements, will be set out in immigration rules and supporting guidance.
Given the complexity of the clause, I will give Members an overview of each subsection. Subsection (1) creates a “sponsor human rights claim” in law by adding to the existing definition of a human rights claim at section 113 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. This has the effect of permitting a UK-based sponsor to appeal against a decision to refuse a human rights claim for their overseas family member. That is the starting point for future changes to the rules, forms and guidance.
Subsection (2) explains that further amendments are required to the 2002 Act for the clause to operate properly. Those changes are set out in subsections (3) to (7). Subsection (3) makes changes so that a sponsor human rights claim cannot be deemed inadmissible or not suitable to be considered, which is necessary because reforms in the clause mean that the UK sponsor is the applicant, not the overseas individual requiring entry clearance. As I will cover in relation to amendment 95, it would be inappropriate simply to refuse to consider a human rights claim because the UK sponsor is a national of a safe country. Such safeguards are designed to prevent improper protection claims from nationals of those countries.
Subsection (4) makes further changes linked to the fact that the clause makes the sponsor the applicant, not the person overseas. In effect, at appeal, the courts will hear all matters relating to the family member seeking entry to the UK and not include any immigration matters related to the sponsor. Subsection (5) creates an exception so that sponsor human rights claims do not need to have their appeals considered within the timeframe set out in the statute. That is because an individual will not be able to act as a sponsor if they are liable to deportation action.
Subsection (6) prevents a sponsor human rights claim being certified and denied an appeal simply because the UK-based sponsor is entitled to live in a safe state, primarily European countries. That would not be a fair application of the power where a right to family life was being relied on. The clause does not prevent a claim being refused and denied an appeal where the matters under consideration are clearly unfounded, for example because the relationship was a sham. Subsection (7) ensures that sponsor human rights appeals are not treated as abandoned or cancelled because the UK sponsor holds permission to be in the UK. Instead, an appeal is abandoned if the overseas family member is granted leave to enter or remain in the UK.
The Minister mentioned sham relationships. Will she clarify who will be eligible to act as a sponsor?
My hon. Friend makes an important point. Basically, anyone who is a British citizen will be eligible to become a sponsor, I believe. Forgive me, I did not want to mislead her by getting the wrong answer, but yes, I was right: individuals with specified status in the UK, including British citizens, settled persons and those with certain other lawful residence will be able to make a sponsor human rights claim. They will need to establish a genuine family life claim—we will talk about that in more detail in the following clauses—and show that refusal would disproportionately interfere with their article 8 rights. As I said, the reforms do not create a new migration route or entitlement; they simply ensure that human rights claims for those who are settled British citizens, settled persons and those with residence here are raised and considered through the correct process.
I thank the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire for tabling amendment 94. It would enable the Home Office to designate a place only when a sponsor human rights claim can be made via statutory instrument subject to the affirmative procedure. The Bill does not require the definition of a designated place to be the subject of regulations, as there are currently no plans to specify the geographical place from where such claims can be made. The focus of article 8 is on whether the individual in the UK making a sponsorship claim has a strong enough claim, not where the family is based. That is because a UK-based sponsor will be expected to make their claim through a paid-for online application. We will use the immigration rules to specify the procedures that applicants must follow to make a sponsor human rights claim. That will allow us to go into the necessary level of technical detail, while retaining flexibility to make changes as we implement the new application process.
Ben Goldsborough (South Norfolk) (Lab)
What is interesting about the subsections that the Minister has gone through is that one of the huge problems we face is the judicialisation of British law, where we see interpretation because the law has been too loose. Will she explain how the steps that we are taking will rein those powers back into the sovereignty of Parliament, so that we have more control and can represent our constituents on the issues that they care about the most?
My hon. Friend gets to the exact heart of what we are doing with this legislation. Through the build-up of the legal framework, we have been guilty of over-interpreting Strasbourg law. By codifying what we are doing, through this Bill, we are ensuring that we are not going over and above that but are simply complying with our international obligations.
Does the Minister have any thoughts about what the fee structure might look like?
That is an important point. I will be delighted to provide more evidence as we go through due process. We must make sure that they are proportionate and do not push people into poverty, but it is important that we are charging people a fee where they are bringing family members to this country under article 8. For the reasons I have set out, the Government do not support the amendment.
Amendment 112 would require the Home Office to carry out safeguarding checks on individuals who make a sponsor human rights claim and that any information uncovered in these checks is considered when the Home Office determines that claim. I thank the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) for raising the importance of safeguarding vulnerable migrants, particularly children and victims of domestic abuse, in this amendment. It is a really important issue and one that will be fully considered in the design and implementation of the application process for sponsor human rights claims. As clause 17 simply paves the way for changing how an entry clearance application relying on article 8 family life can be made, we do not believe this level of detail is required in the primary legislation.
The immigration rules already contain safeguards to protect children coming to the UK to join family members who could put them at risk of harm. However, we will fully consider if additional safeguarding requirements are necessary as we develop the procedural requirements for sponsor human rights claims in the immigration rules, because an important point is made through amendment 112. This is a safeguarding proposal that we would support in principle when the application process is designed. I hope that hon. Members are reassured that our support for the principle is on the record through this Committee.
Ben Goldsborough
I would be keen to hear the Minister expand on the issue of safeguarding particularly for victims of domestic abuse and domestic violence. Can she expand on the action the Government will be taking to protect people from that heinous crime?
Absolutely. We will of course come on to talk about modern slavery and so on later in the Bill. Protection for vulnerable people is at the heart of what this Bill is about.
Where a UK-based sponsor is young or vulnerable and unable to complete an application, they can give permission to someone else to enter their details, but for those who are vulnerable overseas, existing safeguarding measures are already in place to identify any indicators of coercion, exploitation or trafficking. We will of course consider how these measures can be further strengthened to enhance the identification and management of risk, but our approach ensures that vulnerable individuals are protected while maintaining the integrity of the system, through ensuring the rights of UK-based sponsors are the focus of entry clearance decisions that engage article 8.
We feel that a blanket rule to prevent individuals who have been convicted of these criminal behaviours would not be compatible with the EHCR, which necessitates an individualised assessment, but we are keen to make sure that safeguarding requirements are done through the immigration rules to protect anyone at risk of domestic abuse from their sponsor.
I want to press the Minister on this point. I am quite taken with amendment 112, and some of the issues to do with sponsors it raises are incredibly serious. I hear the Minister’s comment about not being explicit in primary legislation, but will she explain in simple details, for my understanding, how we will ensure that nobody convicted of an offence involving domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage will be able to be a sponsor for the purposes of article 8 claims?
I share my hon. Friend’s view. When I saw this amendment, I thought the principle was really important. When we come to write the immigration rules, we would absolutely want to make sure that it is at the heart of them. We would not ever want to see someone convicted of domestic violence, anything to do with child protection or any of the issues outlined in the amendment ever being a sponsor to bring anybody into this country. I hope that the Committee is reassured by my placing all of that on record: when the immigration rules come to be written I would hope and expect to see that at the heart of them, with those protections in there.
Joe Robertson
The Minister says that her provision on the core cohabiting family member has been restricted by this definition to tackle the issue of people coming into this country. Can she tell us how many people are currently in the UK with a core cohabiting family member outside the UK? What is that figure so we can understand at least the potential pool of applications?
I cannot give the hon. Gentleman the figures that he asked for. I gave some initial examples at the start of my introduction about the volumes that we are dealing with. Some 77,000 applications were granted on article 8 grounds last year. We know that 71% of the first-time grants on the basis of article 8 were to individuals who had entered this country illegally and were overstaying. We are keen that this issue forms a core part of the reforms.
Joe Robertson
Could the Minister perhaps provide that figure, either later on this morning or this afternoon, for how many people are in the UK with a cohabiting family member overseas as of today?
I can absolutely undertake to provide as much information as I can to the Committee on that issue. We may not know how many children somebody has in another country. Unless they have put in an article 8 claim, we would not necessarily know about their family members, so it may be a little difficult for us to predict that. However, I can undertake, and give my commitment to the Committee, that we will do our best to get as close to a figure as we can and to provide that to the Committee.
To continue on the rationale for opposing amendment 112, we already have safeguarding measures in place across the immigration system to identify indicators of coercion, exploitation and trafficking. We will consider whether these measures can be further strengthened to improve the identification and mitigation of risk. Our approach ensures that vulnerable individuals are protected while maintaining the integrity of the system by ensuring that the rights of UK-based sponsors are the focus of entry clearance decisions that engage article 8.
Clause 17 does not exempt human rights claims from the general certification power in section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which applies irrespective of whether the claimant can reside in the listed safe countries. That means that we will be able to prevent appeals by certifying human rights claims that are bound to fail. Although it may be relevant to consider whether the UK-based sponsor is able to reside with a family member abroad, that will be done as part of the substantive article 8 assessment.
Will the Minister confirm whether clause 17 will be the way that people who have refugee status are expected to sponsor family members?
As I set out at the beginning, it will be those who have a settled status. My understanding is that those that have a settled refugee status will be able to apply. Again, I can get confirmation for my hon. Friend on that point.
Amendments 95 and 96 taken together would mean that sponsor human rights claims can be made inadmissible or certified as clearly unfounded in the same way as other human rights claims. Applying section 80A or section 94(3) of the 2002 Act to sponsor human rights claims would preclude, in many cases, a substantive assessment of the claim if the sponsor were a national of, or able to reside in, any of the safe countries listed in the Act. In most cases, it would not be reasonable to refuse to consider a sponsor human rights claim fully, just because the sponsor making it was able to reside in one of those safe countries. For that reason, the Government cannot accept amendment 95.
As the Committee will be aware, I have tabled amendments to part 3 of the Bill to insert a new schedule that provides greater clarity on the Government’s approach to the core protection model. We will debate those amendments and the new schedule later in Committee.
Dr Zubir Ahmed (Glasgow South West) (Lab)
As a matter of record, it is important for my right hon. Friend to outline why the amendments and new schedule have been tabled now and why they were not included in the original Bill. I know my constituents take a keen interest in this matter, as my constituency has one of the highest amounts of asylum seeker housing in the country.
My understanding is that it was recognised that we want to use this opportunity to ensure that the security in this process is as firm as possible, and we obviously have a fair amount of work to undertake to do that during the swift passage of the Bill. It is about ensuring that this Committee has the opportunity to consider the amendments and new schedule and that they are brought in at the right stage of the Bill. Some of these things take time, but we are keen for the Bill to close as many loopholes as possible.
Without the introduction of new schedule 1 by the Government, amendments 95 and 96 as originally put forward would have the effect of making the nationality of the UK-based sponsor dictate how a sponsor human rights claim was considered. That would also impact British citizens who are dual nationals, even when they were born in the UK and/or are British from birth if they also hold another nationality that is on one of the safe country lists.
Amendment 95 would mean that a British citizen who was born in the UK to British citizen parents but who also has citizenship of an EU member state, for example through their grandparents, would have an application to sponsor a family member to join them in the UK under article 8 declared inadmissible. Ireland is an EU member state and is therefore included within the existing section 80A inadmissibility provisions. That currently means that if an Irish citizen claims asylum in the UK, the claim is declared inadmissible and not substantively considered, but amendment 95 would mean that if an Irish citizen, resident in the UK, sought to sponsor a family member to join them in the UK, relying on article 8, that would be declared inadmissible. In contrast, a British citizen who holds no other nationality, or a citizen of a non-EU country or a country not on the section 80A list who is settled in the UK, would be able to sponsor a family member and rely on article 8 of the ECHR.
The Opposition originally introduced amendment 96, which would have meant that the nationality of a sponsor would dictate whether any article 8 claim would be presumed to be clearly unfounded. Instead, the Government have adopted the amendment, which now removes the exemption for human rights claims, but does so because, within the new schedule 1, it has also repealed the reference to human rights claims in section 94(3) altogether. That means that the nationality of a person will continue to dictate whether there is a presumption that any protected claim that they make is clearly unfounded, but nationality will not create any presumption in respect of non-protected human rights claims.
The Government’s position is that the designation of any country as safe should, quite rightly, relate to protection claims and that article 8 claims based on family or private life will always be person-specific rather than place-specific—a very important difference. The test to clarify the refusal of any claim remains that, without substance, it is bound to fail. That test applies to any claim made by a person of any nationality. Government amendment 96, in conjunction with new schedule 1, does not change the test for certification, but merely removes any presumption of certification for article 8 private or family life claims based on nationality. Government amendments 96, 130 and 131 are consequential and will support the model that the Committee will examine shortly.
Amendment 97 would limit appeal rights to the immigration tribunal to sponsors whose article 8 claim relates to a member of their core cohabiting family, as defined in clause 18. The Government do not think that the amendment would be appropriate. ECHR case law is clear that family life is usually confined to, but can exist outside of, the core cohabiting family.
Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stuart.
I thank the Minister for her opening remarks, and indeed for pre-empting and answering some of the questions that I have in my speech. It is almost as if she might have had a spy in my team, looking at the questions that I might ask. For these debates on the ECHR, we perhaps had a dry run yesterday in the first Opposition day debate.
Let me start by saying that the Opposition oppose clause 17—perhaps not a surprise to Members, as we said so in our reasoned amendment on Second Reading—and we will vote against its standing part of the Bill. Our amendments are tabled to test the Government’s reasoning. Some of our points have already been answered by the Minister, but I will go through them for the record. If the Committee decides to keep the clause, we submit that our amendments would limit the damage that it will cause.
Clause 17 is the first clause of part 2 of the Bill, which the Government believe is the answer on article 8 of the ECHR. That makes this the right place to ask the question on which the whole debate on part 2 will turn: does the Bill change what a court must do when someone says that article 8 prevents their removal, or does it simply change what the court should have regard to? I will deal first with clause 17 itself and then with what it tells us about the Bill as a whole.
The clause creates a new statutory category of “sponsor human rights claim”. This would enable someone already situated in the UK to submit an application directly to the Secretary of State, at a location designated by the Secretary of State. Such a claim would assert that refusing a member of their family entry to the UK would breach article 8. Subsection (1)(d) then brings those sponsor claims within the scope of the human rights appeals framework set out in part 5 of the 2002 Act. As the explanatory notes confirm, the effect is that the UK-based sponsor becomes the claimant, with the right to appeal.
As the Minister went through, subsections (3) to (7) then carve out sponsor claims from the provisions that apply to other human rights claims in the 2002 Act. They cannot be declared inadmissible under section 80A of the 2002 Act; they cannot be certified as clearly unfounded under section 94; they sit outside the statutory timeframe in section 86B—I suspect that the civil servants might be looking those up now for the Minister—and there are bespoke rules on pending and abandoned appeals.
The Government are presenting these changes as a tightening of the rules: overseas family members may not claim, because the sponsor must. However, our reasoned amendment on Second Reading set out our concern that the Bill would allow sponsor human rights claims and so enable people outside the UK to enter on human rights grounds. There is nothing in the evidence, nor in what the Minister said in her opening remarks, to convince me that that concern was misplaced, so I have a few points to go through, if I may.
Is the shadow Minister’s principal concern that the clause will result in an increase in overseas human rights claims?
Blake Stephenson
Yes, and fundamentally I think the clause is tinkering around the edges with the application of the ECHR. We have been here before; I will come on to this later in my speech. Successive Governments have tried to do this, but my fundamental concern is that the clause will not work.
Let me turn first to the drafting. The explanatory notes say that overseas article 8 applications must be made by the sponsor, but the clause defines a claim as made
“at a place designated by the Secretary of State”.
As the House of Commons Library points out, it deals with the appeal stage; it does not say how claims are lodged in the first place. Minister, where in the Bill is the provision that stops an overseas family member applying? Which places will be designated and by what regulations, rules or guidance?
Who holds the right of appeal today? In written evidence submitted to the Committee, the Bar Council stated:
“Until now, an application for entry clearance to come to the UK had to be made by the person overseas and any appeal against refusal had to be brought by them.”
Clause 17 would now give the UK-based sponsor an appeal of their own. Does the Minister accept that clause 17 introduces a right of appeal that currently does not exist today? If so, how is clause 17 in any way, as she says, tightening the rules?
Secondly, I want to discuss the exemptions. Clause 17 leaves inadmissibility and certification in place for other human rights claims. Why should a sponsor claim be exempt from both? On amendments 95 and 96, I note that the Government have adopted our amendment 96, for which I am grateful. I am sure that they did so for their own good reasons, not just to copy and paste an Opposition amendment. Those amendments were tabled to remove those exemptions. They were probing amendments, but let us assume that amendment 96 probed sufficiently for it to be taken on board by the Government. If the Minister cannot explain to the Committee for what reason a sponsor claim would be treated more favourably than any other human rights claim, the exemptions should go. Perhaps she could address that point on amendment 95 in more detail.
There is a point of drafting to consider in whether the clause actually works at all. Clause 52(5) ties the commencement of clause 17(3) to section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, and clause 17(5) to section 50 of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025 when it comes fully into force. The Minister may not have the answers to a complicated drafting question, but perhaps during the course of today’s debate, her civil servants might provide an answer. I note that section 50 of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act is not yet in force, and that schedule 1 to this Bill would repeal it. Would the Minister explain how clause 17(5) is meant to commence? If there is an error in drafting, will it be corrected?
I will move on to the interaction with family reunion. Three witnesses in our oral evidence sessions—Vicky Tennant of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Jon Featonby of the Refugee Council and Angela Afzal of the International Rescue Committee—took views very different from the Opposition on the Bill, but their evidence is relevant as we scrutinise the clause. Ms Tennant told us that the Bill’s presumption of cohabitation
“is a difficult threshold to make”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 9, Q7.]
in the refugee context, particularly given the suspension of the refugee family reunion route. Mr Featonby estimated that probably 20,000 people have been unable to apply since that route was suspended just over a year ago. Ms Afzal warned that families could be encouraged to resort to smugglers to reunite.
The written evidence goes a bit further. The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association tells us that the human rights claim
“may be the only realistic remaining path”
for refugee families while the dedicated route is suspended. The Bar Council told us that it will be the “only practical gateway”. The British Red Cross highlights that 12,888 family reunion visas were granted in the year to June 2026, and that the core protection status of cause 21 is expected to carry “no family reunion rights” at all.
Although I draw different conclusions, the dedicated route has been suspended, and the clause creates a statutory sponsor claim with a right to appeal and without safe country filters. The people with expertise in this field who gave evidence expect that it will become the main entry route, so are the Government not simply closing one back door and opening another? What assessment has the Home Office made of those numbers?
David Smith (North Northumberland) (Lab)
It is obviously not on the face of the Bill, but does the hon. Gentleman recognise that the Government’s intention to introduce safe and legal routes would ultimately solve the problem that he is describing, as raised by the witnesses?
Blake Stephenson
I recognise the Government’s intentions. Of course, we are here to talk about the implications of the Bill, but I recognise the hon. Gentleman’s broader point.
The Bar Council also points out that the details of how the sponsor claims will work will be set out in immigration rules, which have not yet been made, although the Minister has referred to them. Will the Government publish the draft rules and the new refugee family reunion rules before Report so that Members of this House can know exactly what they are voting for?
The Library records that roughly 500 people abroad were granted article 8 visas in 2025. How many out-of-country applications and appeals are there each year, and how many do the Government expect there will be under clause 17?
Amendment 97 would at least confine the new right of appeal to the family, which is what the Government say article 8 is about. An appeal against a refused sponsor claim would stand only where the family member was part of the claimant’s core cohabiting family under proposed new section 117AA—that would be a spouse, civil partner, partner, minor child, or the parent of a child sponsor. If the Government truly believe in their own definition in clause 18, why will they not accept that the sponsor’s right of appeal should be limited to that definition?
Amendment 112, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford, would require the Home Secretary to carry out safeguarding checks before deciding a sponsor claim. Such checks would include whether the sponsor has convictions, protective orders or findings for domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage, or a history of immigration decisions in which those matters were material. It would also require a consideration of the weight of any risk to the family member, the children or others. If the Government are to create a statutory route in which the sponsor drives the claim, the least they should do is check who the sponsor is.
I thank the Minister for supporting the amendment in principle. She described some of the existing safeguarding measures, which will be strengthened, but I would be grateful if she unpacked that somewhat more to demonstrate the Government’s clear commitment to ensuring that the spirit of the amendment, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford, will be implemented in a way that works in practice, if it is not on the face of the Bill. I ask that for a particular reason. The Minister knows that I have been asking the Home Office quite a lot of written parliamentary questions in recent months, particularly about legal immigration and visa controls. Given the responses that I have been getting, I seriously question whether the systems that the Home Office has in place to monitor, track and oversee the compliance of visa sponsors are fit for purpose. It would be prudent for the Minister to provide comfort to this Committee that there will be better controls for sponsors who use this route.
Professor Singer—who, it is worth noting, is opposed to the Bill—told us that the Court of Appeal’s recent decision in IA and others
“was a very restrictive interpretation of article 8…I do not see the courts taking a particularly liberal approach to article 8.” ––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 61, Q99.]
If that is right, what is the mischief that clause 17 addresses? Is it meant to reverse the Court of Appeal in IA, to codify it, or to do something else? I know that the Minister referred to that particular Court of Appeal case, but I would be grateful if those specific questions could be answered.
Ben Goldsborough
I know that the Opposition place a lot of emphasis on the Lord Wolfson report on leaving the ECHR entirely, but that report states that doing so would terminate part 3 of the UK-EU trade co-operation agreement that was secured by the hon. Gentleman’s party, meaning that we would leave Eurojust, Europol and fast-track expedition frameworks. All that puts us at risk of not being able to manage the immigration system in the fair and transparent way that our constituents want. Does he not agree?
Blake Stephenson
Funnily enough, I do not agree with the hon. Member—shock horror. Lord Wolfson produced an extremely extensive piece of legal advice, running to some 180 pages, which the hon. Member has, I am sure, read from front to back. There are absolutely no legal impediments to us leaving the ECHR, and to do so would resolve the issues before us in the Bill. Some of the matters that he has raised are political rather than legal, in the sense that they can be negotiated politically. The important thing is that we are fair to the British people and that we have an immigration system that they can have confidence in, and we can deliver that only by departing from the ECHR. I do not want to go down rabbit warrens on all the reasons why it is a fantastic policy, but no doubt the hon. Member will ask further questions as we proceed.
The one time Parliament tried to disapply the convention in this area—hon. Members will love to hear the word “Rwanda”, I am sure—was in the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. The provision never took effect and was repealed by the Labour Government in 2025. Government and Parliament must be willing to take steps that require the courts to decide convention cases differently. That is the direction in which the evidence we heard points this Bill Committee.
If the Government will not change the framework and merely ask the courts to “have regard”, part 2 will at best deliver what the Government’s own impact assessment predicts: refusals that do not become removals. Why have the Government not considered giving the courts a direction that they cannot set aside—an exclusive code, for example, or disapplication of the Human Rights Act in this context? If they have considered that but have not moved forward with it, can the Minister explain why it was rejected?
The unfortunate reality for the Bill is that the Government are falling into the same trap as previous Governments: legislation that is well meaning—even well drafted—and designed to circumvent the constraints of the ECHR. The courts will inevitably default to the same positions that they always have, allowing people who have no right to be in this country to stay for longer in the meantime. If, or more likely when, this Bill fails to genuinely empower the Government to deal with the extensive grounds for resisting removal that the various articles of the convention create, will the Minister and other Labour Members finally join us in accepting that the issue here is not how carefully the legislation is drafted but the ECHR itself, and that we cannot have a meaningful conversation about restoring control over our immigration system without taking steps to leave the ECHR?
Blake Stephenson
I am going to close, because I think I have spoken enough and time is pressing on.
Clause 17 creates a new statutory claim for sponsors, and new rights of appeal, which will become the main route for refugee families. It exempts those claims from the safe country filter. Its detail is left to rules that we have not seen, and it commences by reference to provisions that are not yet in force or that the Bill would repeal. Amendment 84, which would have left out the clause, has not been selected, so the Committee will instead decide the matter by voting on whether the clause should stand part of the Bill. For the reasons I have mentioned in this speech, which has gone on far too long, the Opposition will vote against it.
Joe Robertson
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Stuart. I am speaking a little earlier than I had expected—I misunderstood the shadow Minister. I thought he was just getting started, but it turns out that he considers his speech on the long side. Just for the record, I do not.
I am going to address the wider issue of whether the Bill, the clause and this set of amendments really do address the issue that the Minister, and indeed the entire Government, want them to. Their intention, as I understand it—I do not think this is controversial, at least given what the Government say they want to do—is to reduce the number of claims, to ensure that claims are genuine and to create efficiencies in the system. Of course, we all have those aims. I think that the Government have made a genuine attempt with the Bill, but as far as I can see, it will fail substantially.
David Smith
I understand the point the hon. Gentleman seeks to make about the potential pool of people, but is that not theoretical? The pool of people around the world who may be refugees is tens of millions. Ultimately, it is up to the Government of this country to determine the criteria for someone to be accepted as a refugee. It seems like a slightly philosophical point, if he does not mind me saying so.
Joe Robertson
I do not accept that it is philosophical. The pool of people in the world who could make an asylum claim runs to hundreds of millions, and possibly billions, because, tragically, a lot of the world is very unsafe and there is a lot of inhumane treatment and activity. As much as our hearts want us to try to improve the lives of those people, we would probably all agree that the UK cannot take in those vast numbers. However, I am addressing the more limited provision that the Government have put forward; I am talking not about the pool of people in the world who may be suffering inhumane or degrading treatment, but about the “core cohabiting” family members overseas who have a family member in the UK who might want to make an application on their behalf under the newly qualified right to a family life in proposed new section 117AA of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
Let me turn to the new definition of a core cohabiting family member. Those words might prompt a debate of many hours or days, but the Bill helps us. It tells us that a “core cohabiting family” member of Person A is
“(a) A’s spouse, civil partner or partner;
(b) where A is a parent, A’s children who are under the age of 18;
(c) where A is under the age of 18, A’s parents.”
That makes sense: we are talking about children, parents, partners or civil partners. However, if we take the example of a civil partner, the provision would, as I understand it, allow someone in the UK—remember, that person may not be a British citizen, but someone who has a right to be here—to make an application to bring their civil partner, who is living outside the UK, into the UK, on the basis that to do anything else would be to infringe their right to a family life.
The Minister said pointedly that the focus is on the claim made by the person already here and their circumstances, rather than on the person outside the UK, but we know the circumstances of the person in the UK making such an application for their civil partner. Their family circumstances are that they are living a family life in two different countries; that is the pre-existing arrangement when they make the application. To most of us, though not everyone, that might seem unusual, but those are the circumstances. I do not understand why, if we have a system based on the circumstances of someone who has made an application, that application should seek to rearrange their family life and say, “We’re no longer happy to live in two different countries; we want to live in the same country—and, by the way, that same country must be the UK and not the other country.”
This provision does not seem to be person-focused at all; it seems to have been drafted in effect, almost as of right, to allow someone’s civil partner into the UK. If we run the argument the other way and say, “Of course two civil partners should be able to live together in the same country and, indeed, in the same household. Isn’t that what a right to a private family life means?”, the case will be won by the sponsor making the application, because they will say, “How can you possibly expect me to live in a separate country to my civil partner? That is inhumane and unfair. You wouldn’t expect it of an ordinary citizen in the UK, so why do you expect it of me? It is discriminatory. It is against the provisions in the Human Rights Act and the ECHR,” and so on. It seems to me that all those cases will be won on that basic assertion, and that what this provision really does is allow someone to bring in their civil partner in all circumstances, as of right.
Indeed, it may be worse than that. If that is in effect what is happening, we may as well say it, but what we have here is law that will be contested in court. If the Government contest each case, that will lead to a huge administrative process and a huge court backlog and appeals issues, just to end up with a set of decisions that all say the same thing: “Yes, of course, that overseas partner can come in.”
Setting that aside—and that is the most certain part of the provision, even though I argue that it is inherently uncertain and that it does not achieve its objectives—there are other circumstances set out in the provision in which someone does not need to be a core cohabiting family member. Proposed new section 117AA(1) says that the provision is “normally limited” to a core cohabiting family member, so there will be abnormal situations in which someone can come into this country even if they are not a core cohabiting family member. That, surely—obviously—is the gateway for Strasbourg jurisprudence. I acknowledge the Minister’s honesty when she said earlier that we—and by “we” I think she meant the British state rather than her Government particularly—as a country have been guilty of over-interpreting Strasbourg law, but that provision in her Government’s Bill is the gateway for Strasbourg law to be applied in the ordinary way that it has been over years, and that is the issue we are trying to tackle.
The Bill gives us some help on what constitutes an abnormal situation—a situation where a non-core cohabitant family member could come in. To quote proposed new section 117AA(4)(b) of the 2002 Act, that is where
“the circumstances are such that there is an additional element of dependency”
between two family members. But there could be an additional element of dependency between anyone residing in the UK and a family member overseas. Let us remember that we are not talking about core cohabitants now; we are talking about any family member. That could be a cousin, uncle, aunt, second cousin or third cousin—who knows?
Who will decide whether there is an additional element of dependency? Well, it will be based on the facts. The applicant will have to present a whole set of circumstances, including the family relationship that existed before anyone ever got to the UK and how much it meant to them emotionally or financially: “Yes, normally third cousins are not close and interdependent, but you must understand the culture where I am from. We had a relationship that was more like brother and sister or husband and wife, and therefore I should be successful.”
Who will decide that? It will be the bureaucratic infrastructure of the state, which is already overburdened, be it the Home Office, which typically makes a decision that gets overturned, a new system of judges appointed on the advice of the Home Office, or the existing appeal structure all the way up through the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court and the interpretation of Strasbourg jurisprudence, including the Human Rights Act and the fundamentals of the ECHR. All the things that currently challenge our ability to say no are brought in or retained by this provision. Even if a number of claims are unsuccessful—and I am sure a number will be—the number of cases that will go through the courts to establish their success or otherwise will continue to overburden the system and give everyone at least the hope that they might be successful, even in hopeless cases.
I say as a former lawyer—not a human rights lawyer or one who has been involved in this type of case—that this sort of provision is a gift to the world of ongoing litigation. Legal professionals try to construct a strong case with new legislation, as is their legitimate role. There is nothing like a bit of new legislation for the legal profession to get their teeth into. They try to create new case law to interpret it and find out what it is all about. Very often, litigation increases rather than decreases, at least in the short to medium term, when a novel provision like this one is introduced.
An abnormal, or not normal, family situation is not defined, but there are a few examples of an abnormal situation where an applicant would be successful. To paraphrase proposed new section 117AA(5)(b)(i) to (iii) of the 2002 Act—we can see just how complicated the Bill has become to try to achieve an aim that I do not think it will—one example is where there is mental illness in the person who is outside the UK, and care and support would need to be provided by the person in the UK. An application is therefore likely to be successful if the sponsor in the UK says: “My family member who is not in the UK”—they do not have to be a core cohabiting family member; they just have to be family, whatever that means—“has a mental illness.” Presumably whether they have a mental illness or not will be judged by a healthcare system outside the UK, which might be very different from our own, with a very different standard of what counts as a diagnosis. “That person has a mental illness and there is no care or support available to them other than me, a family member in the UK.” Again, they might be in a country with a health service that, almost universally, does not provide sufficient care and support to people with mental illness. That could, in reality, be quite an easy application to make.
The hon. Member has spent a long time focusing on clause 18. I wonder whether he is going to repeat his comments when we come to the next group of amendments.
Joe Robertson
I shall speak to the next group when the time comes. I do not make any apology for focusing on what I see as a major flaw in the legislation. I do not have a political disagreement with the Government; I just think that what they are trying to do is not achieved by this provision. I am certainly not here to give an overall appraisal of the Bill or of this group. That is for the Minister and the shadow Minister. As a Back Bencher, I am here to try to examine, explore and understand what I see as a weakness in the Bill. That is my job in Committee.
The hon. Gentleman is clearly misunderstanding, because this is not what we are meant to be discussing right now.
Joe Robertson
I have it right in front of me. I think the wider points have been made. The hon. Member is obviously desperate to make the decisions that a Chair would ordinarily make. Maybe one day she will be elevated to the position of chairing a Committee. If she would like me to repeat everything I have said, I will be happy to do so in this afternoon’s sitting.
I am slightly reluctant to stop now, because it looks like I have wilted in the face of an intervention from the Government Benches, but I had come to the end of my contribution. I hope I have made my point, even if it is not agreed with.
I thank the hon. Members for Mid Bedfordshire and for Isle of Wight East for their very thorough comments. For me, this absolutely explains the benefit of line-by-line discussion of a Bill. There have been important challenges and critiques, and I will do my best to answer as many as I can—I think the shadow Minister must have had more than 20 or 25 questions; I will endeavour to write to him and the Committee on any that I accidentally overlook.
I really appreciated the statements from the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East, but I think my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes was right: he did stray into clause 18, which we will come to this afternoon. I took note of his views and look forward to responding to some of those later.
There is a lot to cover, so I will do my best to race through it. We will have a longer conversation this afternoon about the ECHR, so I will not pre-empt my comments on that. I do want to push back on the accusation that the legislation will not make a difference. At the moment, we have a free-for-all. Courts are basically over-interpreting Strasbourg. There is no real codification in this country of what the right to a family life means, and we are seeing a huge number of cases, as we have discussed. The point of the Bill is to ensure that our provisions will be no different to the position under Strasbourg but will realign the domestic position, because we are currently being far more generous than our international obligations require. I think the Committee can agree that it is important that we do not over-interpret what Strasbourg suggests.
I appreciated the challenge from the shadow Minister about the 2014 Act and not reinforcing any previous errors, but the Government provisions reflect more up-to-date case law, which was not captured by that 2014 Act—for example, the weighting provisions, which will apply to all of family life. I hope, and am sure, that we will have more success than the 2014 Act had.
The Minister refers to the UK having gone above and beyond its requirements in relation to Strasbourg law. In bringing us into line and not overextending ourselves, I wonder whether there are any other countries with which we could compare ourselves, in terms of where we will find that line and alignment. That might assist us in understanding how this process will work in practice.
I appreciate my hon. Friend raising that point. We have become a country with pull factors that have encouraged people to this country while asylum claims have been going down across Europe. Ours have not been going down at the same pace, and I think our over-interpretation of some of the Strasbourg laws has been a pull factor. So I appreciate her raising that.
I have quite a lot to plough through, so I apologise if there is not a coherent thread to some of these answers. I will try to respond as quickly as possible to as many of the questions as I can. I remind the Committee that, just because family life is established, that does not necessarily mean that the individual will automatically be able to remain in or enter the UK. All cases where family life is found to exist will be considered at the second-stage test, where the courts will have to consider whether it is in the public interest to refuse leave to remain or enter. We will come to the issues that were referred to about mental illness and so on this afternoon, but I am trying to make the point that the partner will still need to meet those substantive tests.
On the family circumstances that we discussed, the vast majority of people seeking to bring a partner will have to meet the rules. That means minimum income and English language. The example that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East gave almost certainly would not meet the bar of a successful article 8 claim, unless there were extremely exceptional circumstances.
On the hon. Member’s point about volumes and numbers, I am struggling to understand what he is asking me to do. Anyone in this country who has a family member outside the UK could put in an appeal for this. There is absolutely no way we could know whether anyone in this room may have a child, a dependant or anyone in another country; that is simply not evidence or information that this country would keep.
Joe Robertson
If the Minister’s position ends up being that there is no data, I will take that. To be clear, I am asking for the data of people residing in the UK who have a family member who is not a British citizen and who has no right to be in the UK, be they a spouse, civil partner or child. If it is the case that we simply do not have that data, obviously I will accept that, but the question remains on the table.
I completely appreciate where the hon. Gentleman is coming from, because I know he wants to get a sense of how many people could and would apply, but it would be impossible for us to know without knowing the family circumstances of everyone in the country. What we can do is best extrapolate from the applications that have been made as to whether they would fail or pass our new tests. I reassure him that it will be a high bar; the majority will be refused if they and their overseas family members do not meet the rules. Article 8 is a safeguard—that is what the Bill maintains—not a gateway.
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, referenced the publishing of the modelling. He referred to the representative sample of 3,252 article 8-related applications. That is an internal sample that has not been published due to personal data sensitivities, but I commit to write to set out our data on article 8 for the Committee.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I am afraid I still cannot find the updated impact assessment, either on the website, by email or on the table in this Committee Room. I would very much like to see the new information that the Minister referred to yesterday.
I appreciate that. I believe the updated impact assessment has been published, but I will double-check. If it has not been published on the website, I am sure that the Clerks or someone in administration will be able to deal with that.
I want to draw out some of the figures from the impact assessment. There is to be an additional 3,600 removals a year. We have tried to be realistic and transparent in the impact assessment. We say that there will be 11,700 additional refusals a year. When applied to the net lifetime fiscal cost per applicant, 11,700 applicants would cost the taxpayer more than £1.7 billion, which is a considerable amount. I am sure hon. Members can understand why we are trying to do what we are doing through the Bill.
We took a deep-dive cohort analysis to examine the representative sample that I mentioned of 3,252 article 8-related applications. That was to support our policy development. I am afraid that further details of the cohort analysis from the unpublished internal sample will not be available due to personal data considerations, as I mentioned, but I appreciate the importance of further analysis. I have noted that, and we will bring that to the Committee.
A question was asked about what assessment has been made of the potential merits of disapplying the Human Rights Act to immigration matters. I remain committed to ensuring that our broader human rights framework is fit for the challenges of today, but there are currently no plans to amend the Human Rights Act. We do not have to withdraw from the ECHR—I will discuss that further this afternoon—or disapply the Human Rights Act to create meaningful reform. We are reviewing our approach to ECHR implementation within the immigration system; that is the intention of the Bill.
Articles 8 and 3 address different harms and legal thresholds. We do not expect the reforms to generate an increase in successful article 3 claims. There will be no new rights or entitlements that will make it any easier for people to apply. Indeed, we are codifying the restrictions in the clauses we will discuss this afternoon. Sponsors will still need to demonstrate a very high bar for their family to be able to join them in the UK on the basis of article 8.
The Government are keeping under review whether and how to commence the inadmissibility provisions in section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which amended section 88 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2022 to include human rights claims. However, those provisions would not be applied to sponsored human rights claims, as in most cases it would not be reasonable to declare a claim inadmissible just because the sponsor could reside in one of the listed safe countries. Clause 17 can be commenced without that, and we can write to Members further with the details.