Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifth sitting)
Thursday 15th October 2026
(1 day, 13 hours ago)
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The Chair
We continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill. Before we begin, I remind Members to switch off their electronic devices or put them on silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings. The selection list for today’s sittings is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. This shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped for debate. Members are reminded to bob and catch my eye if they wish to speak in any debate.
Clause 17
Sponsor claims
The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)
I beg to move amendment 130, in clause 17, page 13, line 30, leave out from “claim’” to “, at” in line 32.
This amendment and amendment 131 are consequential on the repeal of section 12 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 2006 (which was never commenced) by the Schedule inserted by NS1.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 131.
Amendment 94, in clause 17, page 14, line 8, at end insert—
“, provided that the Secretary of State may only designate a place by regulations made by statutory instrument and that such a statutory instrument may only be made if a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This amendment would require the place at which sponsor human rights claims may be made to be set by regulations subject to the affirmative procedure.
Amendment 112, in clause 17, page 14, line 11, at end insert—
“(e) after subsection (1A) insert—
“(1B) Where a person makes a sponsor human rights claim, the Secretary of State must carry out safeguarding checks in relation to that person before determining the claim.
(1C) The safeguarding checks under subsection (1B) must establish, so far as reasonably practicable, whether the person making the sponsor human rights claim—
(a) has been convicted of an offence involving domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage;
(b) is subject to a relevant protective order relating to domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage;
(c) has been the subject of a finding by a court or other competent authority of conduct involving domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage; or
(d) has previously been the subject of an immigration decision in which concerns relating to forced marriage, abuse or the genuineness of a family relationship were material.
(1D) Where information falling within subsection (1C) is identified, the Secretary of State must take that information into account when determining the sponsor human rights claim and any decision relating to the family member to whom the claim relates.
(1E) The Secretary of State must consider whether the information identified under subsection (1C) indicates that the admission of the family member to the United Kingdom would give rise to a safeguarding risk to—
(a) the family member;
(b) any child affected by the decision; or
(c) any other person who may reasonably be expected to be at risk as a result of the admission.””
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to carry out safeguarding checks where a person makes a sponsor human rights claim under Clause 17.
Amendment 95, in clause 17, page 14, line 15, leave out subsection (3).
This amendment would remove the exemption of sponsor human rights claims from the inadmissibility provisions in section 80A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, to test why such claims should be treated more favourably than other human rights claims.
Government amendment 96.
Amendment 97, in clause 17, page 15, line 4, at end insert—
“(8) In section 82 (right of appeal to the Tribunal), after subsection (1) insert—
“(1ZA) An appeal does not lie under subsection (1)(b) against a decision to refuse a sponsor human rights claim unless the family member to whom the claim relates would, if they lived with the person who made the claim, be a member of that person’s core cohabiting family within the meaning of section 117AA(2).””
This amendment would confine the new sponsor right of appeal to claims relating to a spouse, civil partner, partner or minor child (or, for a child sponsor, a parent), in line with the Government’s own definition of the core cohabiting family in clause 18.
Clause stand part.
Anna Turley
It is good to see you again this morning, Mr Stuart, and good morning to all colleagues. We start our debate by moving on to part 2 of the Bill, which relates to article 8 of the European convention on human rights. Article 8, the right to a family life, is an important protection, but it is a qualified right. That means that it can be balanced against a public interest—such as the safety of the community or the security of our borders—where that outweighs an individual’s personal rights. We will not step away from our belief that the right to family and private life must be respected and upheld. However, we have been clear that we must strike the right balance between the rights of the individual and fairness to the UK public, and, crucially, bear down on abuse of the system.
As set out in our impact assessment, each main applicant granted first time on article 8 grounds carries an estimated lifetime cost to the taxpayer of about £141,000, equating to approximately £4.9 billion for those granted in 2025 alone. Home Office analysis suggests that 71% of first-time grants on the basis of article 8 were to individuals who had entered illegally and/or overstayed. If the same applied to the estimated 42,000 first-time grants in 2025, this would mean that 30,000 overstayers and illegal entrants would have been allowed to stay last year on the basis of article 8. Between 1 April 2016 and November 2021, of 1,011 foreign national offender deportation appeals allowed on human rights grounds, 70% were solely on article 8 grounds. And with 77,000 applications granted on article 8 grounds last year, this is having a significant effect on our ability to enforce our immigration laws.
Therefore, in this Bill, we are changing how article 8 is applied in the UK immigration system, to restore public confidence and ensure that the UK application of rights is in line with the Strasbourg court. The application of article 8 will be tightened to prevent misuse of the system and ensure that the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control carries proper weight in immigration decisions. As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has made clear, the abuse of human rights law does not just erode the public’s support for our immigration system; it erodes their support for the very idea of having such laws at all. For those who believe that those laws matter, it is essential that we reform them to end their abuse. The reforms will put more emphasis on compliance with our rules and contribution to our economy and to our society.
Clause 17 aims to bring greater clarity and control to entry clearance applications that engage article 8, protecting genuine family relationships while preventing weak or tenuous claims from undermining public confidence. Taken with the reforms in clauses 18 and 19, which we will come to in forthcoming groups and which tighten key elements of the article 8 assessment, it strengthens our ability to enforce the immigration rules and create a fairer, more controlled system.
The clause amends the definition of a human rights claim in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 to create a “sponsor human rights claim”. This will lay the foundations to allow UK-based sponsors to make an entry clearance application for an overseas family member to join them in the UK if the application relies on the sponsor’s article 8 right to family life. It will also enable the sponsor to appeal to the immigration tribunal if the Home Office refuses their application. I want to be very clear that only individuals with a specified status, including British citizens and those with other lawful residence, will be able to make a sponsor human rights claim. They need to establish a genuine family life claim and show that refusal would disproportionately interfere with their article 8 rights. These reforms do not create a new migration route or entitlement to come to the UK. They simply ensure a correct process that is based on the UK sponsor, not the family abroad.
The clause will affect sponsors who wish to rely on article 8 family life because their family member does not meet the entry clearance requirement under the family routes and immigration rules. Enabling the UK-based sponsor to apply will focus attention on the circumstances and article 8 rights of the sponsor, rather than the overseas family member. This reflects the established legal position that it is the sponsor who is within the UK jurisdiction for the purposes of article 8 decision making. The focus on the rights of the UK sponsor is intended to reduce expansive interpretation of where article 8 rights are found to exist, and to prevent article 8 becoming a route for those with tenuous family links to the UK.
Too often, the focus can be on the circumstances of the applicants abroad, whereas the main legal question should be whether there is a disproportionate interference with the family life of the UK-based sponsor.
Melanie Onn (Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes) (Lab)
Will clause 17 make it easier for people to come to the UK on an article 8 basis if we do not specify where sponsor human rights claims can be made?
Anna Turley
I thank my hon. Friend for asking a really important question, because it is right that we clarify this matter. The clause does not make it easier for overseas family members to enter the UK. Sponsors will still need to meet a very high threshold to argue successfully that it would be a breach of their article 8 rights if the Home Office refused their family member entry to the UK. Strict requirements for the procedure sponsors must follow to make an application, which will be set out in the immigration rules.
The focus on the rights of the UK sponsor is intended to reduce expansive interpretation of where article 8 rights are found to exist, and to prevent article 8 from becoming a route for those with tenuous family links to the UK. Too often, the focus can be on the circumstances of the applicants abroad, whereas the main legal question should be whether there is a disproportionate influence on the family life of the UK-based sponsor.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
As I understand it, the purpose of this new provision is to focus on the rights of the person in the UK, to ensure that their right to a family life is respected according to their circumstances. But their circumstances will be that their other family member is living abroad; that is their family life. I do not understand why that pre-existing situation would suddenly infringe their human rights and give them the right to bring in a family member. Their circumstance, by nature, is people living in two different countries.
Anna Turley
The hon. Member makes a really important point. That is why we are trying to narrow the definition to those who are here in the UK, because for far too long it has been on the basis of a very tenuous link that family members can put in a claim from abroad to come to the UK. This measure narrows that definition while still ensuring that we maintain our obligations under article 8 rights.
The recent Court of Appeal judgment in IA and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department provided helpful clarification around the correct tests to determine where article 8 family life exists, especially between extended family members. However, the judgment addressed an issue with article 8 family life being applied to a broader set of circumstances and relationships, which risked undermining our systems and rules. Despite these helpful findings, there remains a risk of inconsistent decision making, where the primary focus is not on the article 8 rights of the family member in the UK—the person within the UK’s jurisdiction according to ECHR case law.
The clause will add greater weight to the findings of the Court of Appeal and bring more clarity to decision making for entry clearance cases that engage article 8 family life. In IA, the Court of Appeal also reaffirmed the importance of the Government’s immigration policy when striking the right balance between an individual’s rights and the public interest.
In combination with the reforms in clauses 18 and 19, clause 17 makes it clear where the Government’s policy position lies in relation to the application of article 8 and where the Government expect the rules to be enforced. This will create a clearer, fairer and more controlled system. Details of the application process, including forms and evidential requirements, will be set out in immigration rules and supporting guidance.
Given the complexity of the clause, I will give Members an overview of each subsection. Subsection (1) creates a “sponsor human rights claim” in law by adding to the existing definition of a human rights claim at section 113 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. This has the effect of permitting a UK-based sponsor to appeal against a decision to refuse a human rights claim for their overseas family member. That is the starting point for future changes to the rules, forms and guidance.
Subsection (2) explains that further amendments are required to the 2002 Act for the clause to operate properly. Those changes are set out in subsections (3) to (7). Subsection (3) makes changes so that a sponsor human rights claim cannot be deemed inadmissible or not suitable to be considered, which is necessary because reforms in the clause mean that the UK sponsor is the applicant, not the overseas individual requiring entry clearance. As I will cover in relation to amendment 95, it would be inappropriate simply to refuse to consider a human rights claim because the UK sponsor is a national of a safe country. Such safeguards are designed to prevent improper protection claims from nationals of those countries.
Subsection (4) makes further changes linked to the fact that the clause makes the sponsor the applicant, not the person overseas. In effect, at appeal, the courts will hear all matters relating to the family member seeking entry to the UK and not include any immigration matters related to the sponsor. Subsection (5) creates an exception so that sponsor human rights claims do not need to have their appeals considered within the timeframe set out in the statute. That is because an individual will not be able to act as a sponsor if they are liable to deportation action.
Subsection (6) prevents a sponsor human rights claim being certified and denied an appeal simply because the UK-based sponsor is entitled to live in a safe state, primarily European countries. That would not be a fair application of the power where a right to family life was being relied on. The clause does not prevent a claim being refused and denied an appeal where the matters under consideration are clearly unfounded, for example because the relationship was a sham. Subsection (7) ensures that sponsor human rights appeals are not treated as abandoned or cancelled because the UK sponsor holds permission to be in the UK. Instead, an appeal is abandoned if the overseas family member is granted leave to enter or remain in the UK.
Melanie Onn
The Minister mentioned sham relationships. Will she clarify who will be eligible to act as a sponsor?
Anna Turley
My hon. Friend makes an important point. Basically, anyone who is a British citizen will be eligible to become a sponsor, I believe. Forgive me, I did not want to mislead her by getting the wrong answer, but yes, I was right: individuals with specified status in the UK, including British citizens, settled persons and those with certain other lawful residence will be able to make a sponsor human rights claim. They will need to establish a genuine family life claim—we will talk about that in more detail in the following clauses—and show that refusal would disproportionately interfere with their article 8 rights. As I said, the reforms do not create a new migration route or entitlement; they simply ensure that human rights claims for those who are settled British citizens, settled persons and those with residence here are raised and considered through the correct process.
I thank the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire for tabling amendment 94. It would enable the Home Office to designate a place only when a sponsor human rights claim can be made via statutory instrument subject to the affirmative procedure. The Bill does not require the definition of a designated place to be the subject of regulations, as there are currently no plans to specify the geographical place from where such claims can be made. The focus of article 8 is on whether the individual in the UK making a sponsorship claim has a strong enough claim, not where the family is based. That is because a UK-based sponsor will be expected to make their claim through a paid-for online application. We will use the immigration rules to specify the procedures that applicants must follow to make a sponsor human rights claim. That will allow us to go into the necessary level of technical detail, while retaining flexibility to make changes as we implement the new application process.
Ben Goldsborough (South Norfolk) (Lab)
What is interesting about the subsections that the Minister has gone through is that one of the huge problems we face is the judicialisation of British law, where we see interpretation because the law has been too loose. Will she explain how the steps that we are taking will rein those powers back into the sovereignty of Parliament, so that we have more control and can represent our constituents on the issues that they care about the most?
Anna Turley
My hon. Friend gets to the exact heart of what we are doing with this legislation. Through the build-up of the legal framework, we have been guilty of over-interpreting Strasbourg law. By codifying what we are doing, through this Bill, we are ensuring that we are not going over and above that but are simply complying with our international obligations.
Melanie Onn
Does the Minister have any thoughts about what the fee structure might look like?
Anna Turley
That is an important point. I will be delighted to provide more evidence as we go through due process. We must make sure that they are proportionate and do not push people into poverty, but it is important that we are charging people a fee where they are bringing family members to this country under article 8. For the reasons I have set out, the Government do not support the amendment.
Amendment 112 would require the Home Office to carry out safeguarding checks on individuals who make a sponsor human rights claim and that any information uncovered in these checks is considered when the Home Office determines that claim. I thank the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) for raising the importance of safeguarding vulnerable migrants, particularly children and victims of domestic abuse, in this amendment. It is a really important issue and one that will be fully considered in the design and implementation of the application process for sponsor human rights claims. As clause 17 simply paves the way for changing how an entry clearance application relying on article 8 family life can be made, we do not believe this level of detail is required in the primary legislation.
The immigration rules already contain safeguards to protect children coming to the UK to join family members who could put them at risk of harm. However, we will fully consider if additional safeguarding requirements are necessary as we develop the procedural requirements for sponsor human rights claims in the immigration rules, because an important point is made through amendment 112. This is a safeguarding proposal that we would support in principle when the application process is designed. I hope that hon. Members are reassured that our support for the principle is on the record through this Committee.
Ben Goldsborough
I would be keen to hear the Minister expand on the issue of safeguarding particularly for victims of domestic abuse and domestic violence. Can she expand on the action the Government will be taking to protect people from that heinous crime?
Anna Turley
Absolutely. We will of course come on to talk about modern slavery and so on later in the Bill. Protection for vulnerable people is at the heart of what this Bill is about.
Where a UK-based sponsor is young or vulnerable and unable to complete an application, they can give permission to someone else to enter their details, but for those who are vulnerable overseas, existing safeguarding measures are already in place to identify any indicators of coercion, exploitation or trafficking. We will of course consider how these measures can be further strengthened to enhance the identification and management of risk, but our approach ensures that vulnerable individuals are protected while maintaining the integrity of the system, through ensuring the rights of UK-based sponsors are the focus of entry clearance decisions that engage article 8.
We feel that a blanket rule to prevent individuals who have been convicted of these criminal behaviours would not be compatible with the EHCR, which necessitates an individualised assessment, but we are keen to make sure that safeguarding requirements are done through the immigration rules to protect anyone at risk of domestic abuse from their sponsor.
Melanie Onn
I want to press the Minister on this point. I am quite taken with amendment 112, and some of the issues to do with sponsors it raises are incredibly serious. I hear the Minister’s comment about not being explicit in primary legislation, but will she explain in simple details, for my understanding, how we will ensure that nobody convicted of an offence involving domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage will be able to be a sponsor for the purposes of article 8 claims?
Anna Turley
I share my hon. Friend’s view. When I saw this amendment, I thought the principle was really important. When we come to write the immigration rules, we would absolutely want to make sure that it is at the heart of them. We would not ever want to see someone convicted of domestic violence, anything to do with child protection or any of the issues outlined in the amendment ever being a sponsor to bring anybody into this country. I hope that the Committee is reassured by my placing all of that on record: when the immigration rules come to be written I would hope and expect to see that at the heart of them, with those protections in there.
Joe Robertson
The Minister says that her provision on the core cohabiting family member has been restricted by this definition to tackle the issue of people coming into this country. Can she tell us how many people are currently in the UK with a core cohabiting family member outside the UK? What is that figure so we can understand at least the potential pool of applications?
Anna Turley
I cannot give the hon. Gentleman the figures that he asked for. I gave some initial examples at the start of my introduction about the volumes that we are dealing with. Some 77,000 applications were granted on article 8 grounds last year. We know that 71% of the first-time grants on the basis of article 8 were to individuals who had entered this country illegally and were overstaying. We are keen that this issue forms a core part of the reforms.
Joe Robertson
Could the Minister perhaps provide that figure, either later on this morning or this afternoon, for how many people are in the UK with a cohabiting family member overseas as of today?
Anna Turley
I can absolutely undertake to provide as much information as I can to the Committee on that issue. We may not know how many children somebody has in another country. Unless they have put in an article 8 claim, we would not necessarily know about their family members, so it may be a little difficult for us to predict that. However, I can undertake, and give my commitment to the Committee, that we will do our best to get as close to a figure as we can and to provide that to the Committee.
To continue on the rationale for opposing amendment 112, we already have safeguarding measures in place across the immigration system to identify indicators of coercion, exploitation and trafficking. We will consider whether these measures can be further strengthened to improve the identification and mitigation of risk. Our approach ensures that vulnerable individuals are protected while maintaining the integrity of the system by ensuring that the rights of UK-based sponsors are the focus of entry clearance decisions that engage article 8.
Clause 17 does not exempt human rights claims from the general certification power in section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which applies irrespective of whether the claimant can reside in the listed safe countries. That means that we will be able to prevent appeals by certifying human rights claims that are bound to fail. Although it may be relevant to consider whether the UK-based sponsor is able to reside with a family member abroad, that will be done as part of the substantive article 8 assessment.
Melanie Onn
Will the Minister confirm whether clause 17 will be the way that people who have refugee status are expected to sponsor family members?
Anna Turley
As I set out at the beginning, it will be those who have a settled status. My understanding is that those that have a settled refugee status will be able to apply. Again, I can get confirmation for my hon. Friend on that point.
Amendments 95 and 96 taken together would mean that sponsor human rights claims can be made inadmissible or certified as clearly unfounded in the same way as other human rights claims. Applying section 80A or section 94(3) of the 2002 Act to sponsor human rights claims would preclude, in many cases, a substantive assessment of the claim if the sponsor were a national of, or able to reside in, any of the safe countries listed in the Act. In most cases, it would not be reasonable to refuse to consider a sponsor human rights claim fully, just because the sponsor making it was able to reside in one of those safe countries. For that reason, the Government cannot accept amendment 95.
As the Committee will be aware, I have tabled amendments to part 3 of the Bill to insert a new schedule that provides greater clarity on the Government’s approach to the core protection model. We will debate those amendments and the new schedule later in Committee.
Dr Zubir Ahmed (Glasgow South West) (Lab)
As a matter of record, it is important for my right hon. Friend to outline why the amendments and new schedule have been tabled now and why they were not included in the original Bill. I know my constituents take a keen interest in this matter, as my constituency has one of the highest amounts of asylum seeker housing in the country.
Anna Turley
My understanding is that it was recognised that we want to use this opportunity to ensure that the security in this process is as firm as possible, and we obviously have a fair amount of work to undertake to do that during the swift passage of the Bill. It is about ensuring that this Committee has the opportunity to consider the amendments and new schedule and that they are brought in at the right stage of the Bill. Some of these things take time, but we are keen for the Bill to close as many loopholes as possible.
Without the introduction of new schedule 1 by the Government, amendments 95 and 96 as originally put forward would have the effect of making the nationality of the UK-based sponsor dictate how a sponsor human rights claim was considered. That would also impact British citizens who are dual nationals, even when they were born in the UK and/or are British from birth if they also hold another nationality that is on one of the safe country lists.
Amendment 95 would mean that a British citizen who was born in the UK to British citizen parents but who also has citizenship of an EU member state, for example through their grandparents, would have an application to sponsor a family member to join them in the UK under article 8 declared inadmissible. Ireland is an EU member state and is therefore included within the existing section 80A inadmissibility provisions. That currently means that if an Irish citizen claims asylum in the UK, the claim is declared inadmissible and not substantively considered, but amendment 95 would mean that if an Irish citizen, resident in the UK, sought to sponsor a family member to join them in the UK, relying on article 8, that would be declared inadmissible. In contrast, a British citizen who holds no other nationality, or a citizen of a non-EU country or a country not on the section 80A list who is settled in the UK, would be able to sponsor a family member and rely on article 8 of the ECHR.
The Opposition originally introduced amendment 96, which would have meant that the nationality of a sponsor would dictate whether any article 8 claim would be presumed to be clearly unfounded. Instead, the Government have adopted the amendment, which now removes the exemption for human rights claims, but does so because, within the new schedule 1, it has also repealed the reference to human rights claims in section 94(3) altogether. That means that the nationality of a person will continue to dictate whether there is a presumption that any protected claim that they make is clearly unfounded, but nationality will not create any presumption in respect of non-protected human rights claims.
The Government’s position is that the designation of any country as safe should, quite rightly, relate to protection claims and that article 8 claims based on family or private life will always be person-specific rather than place-specific—a very important difference. The test to clarify the refusal of any claim remains that, without substance, it is bound to fail. That test applies to any claim made by a person of any nationality. Government amendment 96, in conjunction with new schedule 1, does not change the test for certification, but merely removes any presumption of certification for article 8 private or family life claims based on nationality. Government amendments 96, 130 and 131 are consequential and will support the model that the Committee will examine shortly.
Amendment 97 would limit appeal rights to the immigration tribunal to sponsors whose article 8 claim relates to a member of their core cohabiting family, as defined in clause 18. The Government do not think that the amendment would be appropriate. ECHR case law is clear that family life is usually confined to, but can exist outside of, the core cohabiting family.
Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stuart.
I thank the Minister for her opening remarks, and indeed for pre-empting and answering some of the questions that I have in my speech. It is almost as if she might have had a spy in my team, looking at the questions that I might ask. For these debates on the ECHR, we perhaps had a dry run yesterday in the first Opposition day debate.
Let me start by saying that the Opposition oppose clause 17—perhaps not a surprise to Members, as we said so in our reasoned amendment on Second Reading—and we will vote against its standing part of the Bill. Our amendments are tabled to test the Government’s reasoning. Some of our points have already been answered by the Minister, but I will go through them for the record. If the Committee decides to keep the clause, we submit that our amendments would limit the damage that it will cause.
Clause 17 is the first clause of part 2 of the Bill, which the Government believe is the answer on article 8 of the ECHR. That makes this the right place to ask the question on which the whole debate on part 2 will turn: does the Bill change what a court must do when someone says that article 8 prevents their removal, or does it simply change what the court should have regard to? I will deal first with clause 17 itself and then with what it tells us about the Bill as a whole.
The clause creates a new statutory category of “sponsor human rights claim”. This would enable someone already situated in the UK to submit an application directly to the Secretary of State, at a location designated by the Secretary of State. Such a claim would assert that refusing a member of their family entry to the UK would breach article 8. Subsection (1)(d) then brings those sponsor claims within the scope of the human rights appeals framework set out in part 5 of the 2002 Act. As the explanatory notes confirm, the effect is that the UK-based sponsor becomes the claimant, with the right to appeal.
As the Minister went through, subsections (3) to (7) then carve out sponsor claims from the provisions that apply to other human rights claims in the 2002 Act. They cannot be declared inadmissible under section 80A of the 2002 Act; they cannot be certified as clearly unfounded under section 94; they sit outside the statutory timeframe in section 86B—I suspect that the civil servants might be looking those up now for the Minister—and there are bespoke rules on pending and abandoned appeals.
The Government are presenting these changes as a tightening of the rules: overseas family members may not claim, because the sponsor must. However, our reasoned amendment on Second Reading set out our concern that the Bill would allow sponsor human rights claims and so enable people outside the UK to enter on human rights grounds. There is nothing in the evidence, nor in what the Minister said in her opening remarks, to convince me that that concern was misplaced, so I have a few points to go through, if I may.
Melanie Onn
Is the shadow Minister’s principal concern that the clause will result in an increase in overseas human rights claims?
Blake Stephenson
Yes, and fundamentally I think the clause is tinkering around the edges with the application of the ECHR. We have been here before; I will come on to this later in my speech. Successive Governments have tried to do this, but my fundamental concern is that the clause will not work.
Let me turn first to the drafting. The explanatory notes say that overseas article 8 applications must be made by the sponsor, but the clause defines a claim as made
“at a place designated by the Secretary of State”.
As the House of Commons Library points out, it deals with the appeal stage; it does not say how claims are lodged in the first place. Minister, where in the Bill is the provision that stops an overseas family member applying? Which places will be designated and by what regulations, rules or guidance?
Who holds the right of appeal today? In written evidence submitted to the Committee, the Bar Council stated:
“Until now, an application for entry clearance to come to the UK had to be made by the person overseas and any appeal against refusal had to be brought by them.”
Clause 17 would now give the UK-based sponsor an appeal of their own. Does the Minister accept that clause 17 introduces a right of appeal that currently does not exist today? If so, how is clause 17 in any way, as she says, tightening the rules?
Secondly, I want to discuss the exemptions. Clause 17 leaves inadmissibility and certification in place for other human rights claims. Why should a sponsor claim be exempt from both? On amendments 95 and 96, I note that the Government have adopted our amendment 96, for which I am grateful. I am sure that they did so for their own good reasons, not just to copy and paste an Opposition amendment. Those amendments were tabled to remove those exemptions. They were probing amendments, but let us assume that amendment 96 probed sufficiently for it to be taken on board by the Government. If the Minister cannot explain to the Committee for what reason a sponsor claim would be treated more favourably than any other human rights claim, the exemptions should go. Perhaps she could address that point on amendment 95 in more detail.
There is a point of drafting to consider in whether the clause actually works at all. Clause 52(5) ties the commencement of clause 17(3) to section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, and clause 17(5) to section 50 of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025 when it comes fully into force. The Minister may not have the answers to a complicated drafting question, but perhaps during the course of today’s debate, her civil servants might provide an answer. I note that section 50 of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act is not yet in force, and that schedule 1 to this Bill would repeal it. Would the Minister explain how clause 17(5) is meant to commence? If there is an error in drafting, will it be corrected?
I will move on to the interaction with family reunion. Three witnesses in our oral evidence sessions—Vicky Tennant of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Jon Featonby of the Refugee Council and Angela Afzal of the International Rescue Committee—took views very different from the Opposition on the Bill, but their evidence is relevant as we scrutinise the clause. Ms Tennant told us that the Bill’s presumption of cohabitation
“is a difficult threshold to make”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 9, Q7.]
in the refugee context, particularly given the suspension of the refugee family reunion route. Mr Featonby estimated that probably 20,000 people have been unable to apply since that route was suspended just over a year ago. Ms Afzal warned that families could be encouraged to resort to smugglers to reunite.
The written evidence goes a bit further. The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association tells us that the human rights claim
“may be the only realistic remaining path”
for refugee families while the dedicated route is suspended. The Bar Council told us that it will be the “only practical gateway”. The British Red Cross highlights that 12,888 family reunion visas were granted in the year to June 2026, and that the core protection status of cause 21 is expected to carry “no family reunion rights” at all.
Although I draw different conclusions, the dedicated route has been suspended, and the clause creates a statutory sponsor claim with a right to appeal and without safe country filters. The people with expertise in this field who gave evidence expect that it will become the main entry route, so are the Government not simply closing one back door and opening another? What assessment has the Home Office made of those numbers?
David Smith (North Northumberland) (Lab)
It is obviously not on the face of the Bill, but does the hon. Gentleman recognise that the Government’s intention to introduce safe and legal routes would ultimately solve the problem that he is describing, as raised by the witnesses?
Blake Stephenson
I recognise the Government’s intentions. Of course, we are here to talk about the implications of the Bill, but I recognise the hon. Gentleman’s broader point.
The Bar Council also points out that the details of how the sponsor claims will work will be set out in immigration rules, which have not yet been made, although the Minister has referred to them. Will the Government publish the draft rules and the new refugee family reunion rules before Report so that Members of this House can know exactly what they are voting for?
The Library records that roughly 500 people abroad were granted article 8 visas in 2025. How many out-of-country applications and appeals are there each year, and how many do the Government expect there will be under clause 17?
Amendment 97 would at least confine the new right of appeal to the family, which is what the Government say article 8 is about. An appeal against a refused sponsor claim would stand only where the family member was part of the claimant’s core cohabiting family under proposed new section 117AA—that would be a spouse, civil partner, partner, minor child, or the parent of a child sponsor. If the Government truly believe in their own definition in clause 18, why will they not accept that the sponsor’s right of appeal should be limited to that definition?
Amendment 112, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford, would require the Home Secretary to carry out safeguarding checks before deciding a sponsor claim. Such checks would include whether the sponsor has convictions, protective orders or findings for domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage, or a history of immigration decisions in which those matters were material. It would also require a consideration of the weight of any risk to the family member, the children or others. If the Government are to create a statutory route in which the sponsor drives the claim, the least they should do is check who the sponsor is.
I thank the Minister for supporting the amendment in principle. She described some of the existing safeguarding measures, which will be strengthened, but I would be grateful if she unpacked that somewhat more to demonstrate the Government’s clear commitment to ensuring that the spirit of the amendment, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford, will be implemented in a way that works in practice, if it is not on the face of the Bill. I ask that for a particular reason. The Minister knows that I have been asking the Home Office quite a lot of written parliamentary questions in recent months, particularly about legal immigration and visa controls. Given the responses that I have been getting, I seriously question whether the systems that the Home Office has in place to monitor, track and oversee the compliance of visa sponsors are fit for purpose. It would be prudent for the Minister to provide comfort to this Committee that there will be better controls for sponsors who use this route.
Professor Singer—who, it is worth noting, is opposed to the Bill—told us that the Court of Appeal’s recent decision in IA and others
“was a very restrictive interpretation of article 8…I do not see the courts taking a particularly liberal approach to article 8.” ––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 61, Q99.]
If that is right, what is the mischief that clause 17 addresses? Is it meant to reverse the Court of Appeal in IA, to codify it, or to do something else? I know that the Minister referred to that particular Court of Appeal case, but I would be grateful if those specific questions could be answered.
Ben Goldsborough
I know that the Opposition place a lot of emphasis on the Lord Wolfson report on leaving the ECHR entirely, but that report states that doing so would terminate part 3 of the UK-EU trade co-operation agreement that was secured by the hon. Gentleman’s party, meaning that we would leave Eurojust, Europol and fast-track expedition frameworks. All that puts us at risk of not being able to manage the immigration system in the fair and transparent way that our constituents want. Does he not agree?
Blake Stephenson
Funnily enough, I do not agree with the hon. Member—shock horror. Lord Wolfson produced an extremely extensive piece of legal advice, running to some 180 pages, which the hon. Member has, I am sure, read from front to back. There are absolutely no legal impediments to us leaving the ECHR, and to do so would resolve the issues before us in the Bill. Some of the matters that he has raised are political rather than legal, in the sense that they can be negotiated politically. The important thing is that we are fair to the British people and that we have an immigration system that they can have confidence in, and we can deliver that only by departing from the ECHR. I do not want to go down rabbit warrens on all the reasons why it is a fantastic policy, but no doubt the hon. Member will ask further questions as we proceed.
The one time Parliament tried to disapply the convention in this area—hon. Members will love to hear the word “Rwanda”, I am sure—was in the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. The provision never took effect and was repealed by the Labour Government in 2025. Government and Parliament must be willing to take steps that require the courts to decide convention cases differently. That is the direction in which the evidence we heard points this Bill Committee.
If the Government will not change the framework and merely ask the courts to “have regard”, part 2 will at best deliver what the Government’s own impact assessment predicts: refusals that do not become removals. Why have the Government not considered giving the courts a direction that they cannot set aside—an exclusive code, for example, or disapplication of the Human Rights Act in this context? If they have considered that but have not moved forward with it, can the Minister explain why it was rejected?
The unfortunate reality for the Bill is that the Government are falling into the same trap as previous Governments: legislation that is well meaning—even well drafted—and designed to circumvent the constraints of the ECHR. The courts will inevitably default to the same positions that they always have, allowing people who have no right to be in this country to stay for longer in the meantime. If, or more likely when, this Bill fails to genuinely empower the Government to deal with the extensive grounds for resisting removal that the various articles of the convention create, will the Minister and other Labour Members finally join us in accepting that the issue here is not how carefully the legislation is drafted but the ECHR itself, and that we cannot have a meaningful conversation about restoring control over our immigration system without taking steps to leave the ECHR?
Blake Stephenson
I am going to close, because I think I have spoken enough and time is pressing on.
Clause 17 creates a new statutory claim for sponsors, and new rights of appeal, which will become the main route for refugee families. It exempts those claims from the safe country filter. Its detail is left to rules that we have not seen, and it commences by reference to provisions that are not yet in force or that the Bill would repeal. Amendment 84, which would have left out the clause, has not been selected, so the Committee will instead decide the matter by voting on whether the clause should stand part of the Bill. For the reasons I have mentioned in this speech, which has gone on far too long, the Opposition will vote against it.
Joe Robertson
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Stuart. I am speaking a little earlier than I had expected—I misunderstood the shadow Minister. I thought he was just getting started, but it turns out that he considers his speech on the long side. Just for the record, I do not.
I am going to address the wider issue of whether the Bill, the clause and this set of amendments really do address the issue that the Minister, and indeed the entire Government, want them to. Their intention, as I understand it—I do not think this is controversial, at least given what the Government say they want to do—is to reduce the number of claims, to ensure that claims are genuine and to create efficiencies in the system. Of course, we all have those aims. I think that the Government have made a genuine attempt with the Bill, but as far as I can see, it will fail substantially.
David Smith
I understand the point the hon. Gentleman seeks to make about the potential pool of people, but is that not theoretical? The pool of people around the world who may be refugees is tens of millions. Ultimately, it is up to the Government of this country to determine the criteria for someone to be accepted as a refugee. It seems like a slightly philosophical point, if he does not mind me saying so.
Joe Robertson
I do not accept that it is philosophical. The pool of people in the world who could make an asylum claim runs to hundreds of millions, and possibly billions, because, tragically, a lot of the world is very unsafe and there is a lot of inhumane treatment and activity. As much as our hearts want us to try to improve the lives of those people, we would probably all agree that the UK cannot take in those vast numbers. However, I am addressing the more limited provision that the Government have put forward; I am talking not about the pool of people in the world who may be suffering inhumane or degrading treatment, but about the “core cohabiting” family members overseas who have a family member in the UK who might want to make an application on their behalf under the newly qualified right to a family life in proposed new section 117AA of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
Let me turn to the new definition of a core cohabiting family member. Those words might prompt a debate of many hours or days, but the Bill helps us. It tells us that a “core cohabiting family” member of Person A is
“(a) A’s spouse, civil partner or partner;
(b) where A is a parent, A’s children who are under the age of 18;
(c) where A is under the age of 18, A’s parents.”
That makes sense: we are talking about children, parents, partners or civil partners. However, if we take the example of a civil partner, the provision would, as I understand it, allow someone in the UK—remember, that person may not be a British citizen, but someone who has a right to be here—to make an application to bring their civil partner, who is living outside the UK, into the UK, on the basis that to do anything else would be to infringe their right to a family life.
The Minister said pointedly that the focus is on the claim made by the person already here and their circumstances, rather than on the person outside the UK, but we know the circumstances of the person in the UK making such an application for their civil partner. Their family circumstances are that they are living a family life in two different countries; that is the pre-existing arrangement when they make the application. To most of us, though not everyone, that might seem unusual, but those are the circumstances. I do not understand why, if we have a system based on the circumstances of someone who has made an application, that application should seek to rearrange their family life and say, “We’re no longer happy to live in two different countries; we want to live in the same country—and, by the way, that same country must be the UK and not the other country.”
This provision does not seem to be person-focused at all; it seems to have been drafted in effect, almost as of right, to allow someone’s civil partner into the UK. If we run the argument the other way and say, “Of course two civil partners should be able to live together in the same country and, indeed, in the same household. Isn’t that what a right to a private family life means?”, the case will be won by the sponsor making the application, because they will say, “How can you possibly expect me to live in a separate country to my civil partner? That is inhumane and unfair. You wouldn’t expect it of an ordinary citizen in the UK, so why do you expect it of me? It is discriminatory. It is against the provisions in the Human Rights Act and the ECHR,” and so on. It seems to me that all those cases will be won on that basic assertion, and that what this provision really does is allow someone to bring in their civil partner in all circumstances, as of right.
Indeed, it may be worse than that. If that is in effect what is happening, we may as well say it, but what we have here is law that will be contested in court. If the Government contest each case, that will lead to a huge administrative process and a huge court backlog and appeals issues, just to end up with a set of decisions that all say the same thing: “Yes, of course, that overseas partner can come in.”
Setting that aside—and that is the most certain part of the provision, even though I argue that it is inherently uncertain and that it does not achieve its objectives—there are other circumstances set out in the provision in which someone does not need to be a core cohabiting family member. Proposed new section 117AA(1) says that the provision is “normally limited” to a core cohabiting family member, so there will be abnormal situations in which someone can come into this country even if they are not a core cohabiting family member. That, surely—obviously—is the gateway for Strasbourg jurisprudence. I acknowledge the Minister’s honesty when she said earlier that we—and by “we” I think she meant the British state rather than her Government particularly—as a country have been guilty of over-interpreting Strasbourg law, but that provision in her Government’s Bill is the gateway for Strasbourg law to be applied in the ordinary way that it has been over years, and that is the issue we are trying to tackle.
The Bill gives us some help on what constitutes an abnormal situation—a situation where a non-core cohabitant family member could come in. To quote proposed new section 117AA(4)(b) of the 2002 Act, that is where
“the circumstances are such that there is an additional element of dependency”
between two family members. But there could be an additional element of dependency between anyone residing in the UK and a family member overseas. Let us remember that we are not talking about core cohabitants now; we are talking about any family member. That could be a cousin, uncle, aunt, second cousin or third cousin—who knows?
Who will decide whether there is an additional element of dependency? Well, it will be based on the facts. The applicant will have to present a whole set of circumstances, including the family relationship that existed before anyone ever got to the UK and how much it meant to them emotionally or financially: “Yes, normally third cousins are not close and interdependent, but you must understand the culture where I am from. We had a relationship that was more like brother and sister or husband and wife, and therefore I should be successful.”
Who will decide that? It will be the bureaucratic infrastructure of the state, which is already overburdened, be it the Home Office, which typically makes a decision that gets overturned, a new system of judges appointed on the advice of the Home Office, or the existing appeal structure all the way up through the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court and the interpretation of Strasbourg jurisprudence, including the Human Rights Act and the fundamentals of the ECHR. All the things that currently challenge our ability to say no are brought in or retained by this provision. Even if a number of claims are unsuccessful—and I am sure a number will be—the number of cases that will go through the courts to establish their success or otherwise will continue to overburden the system and give everyone at least the hope that they might be successful, even in hopeless cases.
I say as a former lawyer—not a human rights lawyer or one who has been involved in this type of case—that this sort of provision is a gift to the world of ongoing litigation. Legal professionals try to construct a strong case with new legislation, as is their legitimate role. There is nothing like a bit of new legislation for the legal profession to get their teeth into. They try to create new case law to interpret it and find out what it is all about. Very often, litigation increases rather than decreases, at least in the short to medium term, when a novel provision like this one is introduced.
An abnormal, or not normal, family situation is not defined, but there are a few examples of an abnormal situation where an applicant would be successful. To paraphrase proposed new section 117AA(5)(b)(i) to (iii) of the 2002 Act—we can see just how complicated the Bill has become to try to achieve an aim that I do not think it will—one example is where there is mental illness in the person who is outside the UK, and care and support would need to be provided by the person in the UK. An application is therefore likely to be successful if the sponsor in the UK says: “My family member who is not in the UK”—they do not have to be a core cohabiting family member; they just have to be family, whatever that means—“has a mental illness.” Presumably whether they have a mental illness or not will be judged by a healthcare system outside the UK, which might be very different from our own, with a very different standard of what counts as a diagnosis. “That person has a mental illness and there is no care or support available to them other than me, a family member in the UK.” Again, they might be in a country with a health service that, almost universally, does not provide sufficient care and support to people with mental illness. That could, in reality, be quite an easy application to make.
Melanie Onn
The hon. Member has spent a long time focusing on clause 18. I wonder whether he is going to repeat his comments when we come to the next group of amendments.
Joe Robertson
I shall speak to the next group when the time comes. I do not make any apology for focusing on what I see as a major flaw in the legislation. I do not have a political disagreement with the Government; I just think that what they are trying to do is not achieved by this provision. I am certainly not here to give an overall appraisal of the Bill or of this group. That is for the Minister and the shadow Minister. As a Back Bencher, I am here to try to examine, explore and understand what I see as a weakness in the Bill. That is my job in Committee.
Melanie Onn
The hon. Gentleman is clearly misunderstanding, because this is not what we are meant to be discussing right now.
Joe Robertson
I have it right in front of me. I think the wider points have been made. The hon. Member is obviously desperate to make the decisions that a Chair would ordinarily make. Maybe one day she will be elevated to the position of chairing a Committee. If she would like me to repeat everything I have said, I will be happy to do so in this afternoon’s sitting.
I am slightly reluctant to stop now, because it looks like I have wilted in the face of an intervention from the Government Benches, but I had come to the end of my contribution. I hope I have made my point, even if it is not agreed with.
Anna Turley
I thank the hon. Members for Mid Bedfordshire and for Isle of Wight East for their very thorough comments. For me, this absolutely explains the benefit of line-by-line discussion of a Bill. There have been important challenges and critiques, and I will do my best to answer as many as I can—I think the shadow Minister must have had more than 20 or 25 questions; I will endeavour to write to him and the Committee on any that I accidentally overlook.
I really appreciated the statements from the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East, but I think my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes was right: he did stray into clause 18, which we will come to this afternoon. I took note of his views and look forward to responding to some of those later.
There is a lot to cover, so I will do my best to race through it. We will have a longer conversation this afternoon about the ECHR, so I will not pre-empt my comments on that. I do want to push back on the accusation that the legislation will not make a difference. At the moment, we have a free-for-all. Courts are basically over-interpreting Strasbourg. There is no real codification in this country of what the right to a family life means, and we are seeing a huge number of cases, as we have discussed. The point of the Bill is to ensure that our provisions will be no different to the position under Strasbourg but will realign the domestic position, because we are currently being far more generous than our international obligations require. I think the Committee can agree that it is important that we do not over-interpret what Strasbourg suggests.
I appreciated the challenge from the shadow Minister about the 2014 Act and not reinforcing any previous errors, but the Government provisions reflect more up-to-date case law, which was not captured by that 2014 Act—for example, the weighting provisions, which will apply to all of family life. I hope, and am sure, that we will have more success than the 2014 Act had.
Melanie Onn
The Minister refers to the UK having gone above and beyond its requirements in relation to Strasbourg law. In bringing us into line and not overextending ourselves, I wonder whether there are any other countries with which we could compare ourselves, in terms of where we will find that line and alignment. That might assist us in understanding how this process will work in practice.
Anna Turley
I appreciate my hon. Friend raising that point. We have become a country with pull factors that have encouraged people to this country while asylum claims have been going down across Europe. Ours have not been going down at the same pace, and I think our over-interpretation of some of the Strasbourg laws has been a pull factor. So I appreciate her raising that.
I have quite a lot to plough through, so I apologise if there is not a coherent thread to some of these answers. I will try to respond as quickly as possible to as many of the questions as I can. I remind the Committee that, just because family life is established, that does not necessarily mean that the individual will automatically be able to remain in or enter the UK. All cases where family life is found to exist will be considered at the second-stage test, where the courts will have to consider whether it is in the public interest to refuse leave to remain or enter. We will come to the issues that were referred to about mental illness and so on this afternoon, but I am trying to make the point that the partner will still need to meet those substantive tests.
On the family circumstances that we discussed, the vast majority of people seeking to bring a partner will have to meet the rules. That means minimum income and English language. The example that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East gave almost certainly would not meet the bar of a successful article 8 claim, unless there were extremely exceptional circumstances.
On the hon. Member’s point about volumes and numbers, I am struggling to understand what he is asking me to do. Anyone in this country who has a family member outside the UK could put in an appeal for this. There is absolutely no way we could know whether anyone in this room may have a child, a dependant or anyone in another country; that is simply not evidence or information that this country would keep.
Joe Robertson
If the Minister’s position ends up being that there is no data, I will take that. To be clear, I am asking for the data of people residing in the UK who have a family member who is not a British citizen and who has no right to be in the UK, be they a spouse, civil partner or child. If it is the case that we simply do not have that data, obviously I will accept that, but the question remains on the table.
Anna Turley
I completely appreciate where the hon. Gentleman is coming from, because I know he wants to get a sense of how many people could and would apply, but it would be impossible for us to know without knowing the family circumstances of everyone in the country. What we can do is best extrapolate from the applications that have been made as to whether they would fail or pass our new tests. I reassure him that it will be a high bar; the majority will be refused if they and their overseas family members do not meet the rules. Article 8 is a safeguard—that is what the Bill maintains—not a gateway.
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, referenced the publishing of the modelling. He referred to the representative sample of 3,252 article 8-related applications. That is an internal sample that has not been published due to personal data sensitivities, but I commit to write to set out our data on article 8 for the Committee.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I am afraid I still cannot find the updated impact assessment, either on the website, by email or on the table in this Committee Room. I would very much like to see the new information that the Minister referred to yesterday.
Anna Turley
I appreciate that. I believe the updated impact assessment has been published, but I will double-check. If it has not been published on the website, I am sure that the Clerks or someone in administration will be able to deal with that.
I want to draw out some of the figures from the impact assessment. There is to be an additional 3,600 removals a year. We have tried to be realistic and transparent in the impact assessment. We say that there will be 11,700 additional refusals a year. When applied to the net lifetime fiscal cost per applicant, 11,700 applicants would cost the taxpayer more than £1.7 billion, which is a considerable amount. I am sure hon. Members can understand why we are trying to do what we are doing through the Bill.
We took a deep-dive cohort analysis to examine the representative sample that I mentioned of 3,252 article 8-related applications. That was to support our policy development. I am afraid that further details of the cohort analysis from the unpublished internal sample will not be available due to personal data considerations, as I mentioned, but I appreciate the importance of further analysis. I have noted that, and we will bring that to the Committee.
A question was asked about what assessment has been made of the potential merits of disapplying the Human Rights Act to immigration matters. I remain committed to ensuring that our broader human rights framework is fit for the challenges of today, but there are currently no plans to amend the Human Rights Act. We do not have to withdraw from the ECHR—I will discuss that further this afternoon—or disapply the Human Rights Act to create meaningful reform. We are reviewing our approach to ECHR implementation within the immigration system; that is the intention of the Bill.
Articles 8 and 3 address different harms and legal thresholds. We do not expect the reforms to generate an increase in successful article 3 claims. There will be no new rights or entitlements that will make it any easier for people to apply. Indeed, we are codifying the restrictions in the clauses we will discuss this afternoon. Sponsors will still need to demonstrate a very high bar for their family to be able to join them in the UK on the basis of article 8.
The Government are keeping under review whether and how to commence the inadmissibility provisions in section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which amended section 88 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2022 to include human rights claims. However, those provisions would not be applied to sponsored human rights claims, as in most cases it would not be reasonable to declare a claim inadmissible just because the sponsor could reside in one of the listed safe countries. Clause 17 can be commenced without that, and we can write to Members further with the details.
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Sixth sitting)
Thursday 15th October 2026
(1 day, 13 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Immigration and Asylum Bill 2026-27 View all Immigration and Asylum Bill 2026-27 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 15 October 2026 - (15 Oct 2026)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 4 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 11 / Noes: 1 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Government amendment 131.
Amendment 94, in clause 17, page 14, line 8, at end insert
“, provided that the Secretary of State may only designate a place by regulations made by statutory instrument and that such a statutory instrument may only be made if a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This amendment would require the place at which sponsor human rights claims may be made to be set by regulations subject to the affirmative procedure.
Government amendment 96.
Amendment 97, in clause 17, page 15, line 4, at end insert—
“(8) In section 82 (right of appeal to the Tribunal), after subsection (1) insert—
“(1ZA) An appeal does not lie under subsection (1)(b) against a decision to refuse a sponsor human rights claim unless the family member to whom the claim relates would, if they lived with the person who made the claim, be a member of that person’s core cohabiting family within the meaning of section 117AA(2).””
This amendment would confine the new sponsor right of appeal to claims relating to a spouse, civil partner, partner or minor child (or, for a child sponsor, a parent), in line with the Government’s own definition of the core cohabiting family in clause 18.
Clause stand part.
Amendment 130 agreed to.
Amendment made: 131, in clause 17, page 13, line 33, leave out paragraph (b).—(Anna Turley.)
See the explanatory statement for amendment 130.
Amendment proposed: 94, in clause 17, page 14, line 8, at end insert
“, provided that the Secretary of State may only designate a place by regulations made by statutory instrument and that such a statutory instrument may only be made if a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”—(Blake Stephenson.)
This amendment would require the place at which sponsor human rights claims may be made to be set by regulations subject to the affirmative procedure.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 98, in clause 18, page 15, line 14, leave out from “must” to end of line 15 and insert
“must determine that question in accordance with section 117AA.”
This amendment would require courts and tribunals to decide whether Article 8 is engaged in accordance with new section 117AA, rather than only to have regard to it.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 99, in clause 18, page 15, line 21, leave out “normally”.
This amendment, with Amendments 101 and 102, would remove the word “normally” from new section 117AA so that family life for the purposes of Article 8 is limited to the core cohabiting family and the other relationships specified, without an open-ended qualification.
Amendment 100, in clause 18, page 15, line 25, at end insert
“(but only where A and the partner have lived together in a relationship akin to marriage or civil partnership for at least two years)”.
This amendment would require a partner who is not a spouse or civil partner to have lived with the person in a relationship akin to marriage or civil partnership for at least two years to count as part of the core cohabiting family.
Government amendment 44.
Amendment 101, in clause 18, page 15, line 30, leave out “normally”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 99.
Government amendment 45.
Amendment 102, in clause 18, page 15, line 33, leave out “normally”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 99.
Amendment 103, in clause 18, page 16, line 17, leave out subsection (6).
This amendment would remove the provision allowing the factors excluded by new section 117AA(5) to be considered at the public interest stage, to test whether subsection (6) undoes the effect of subsection (5).
Clause stand part.
Blake Stephenson
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg.
Clause 18 is at the heart of part 2 of the Bill, and is where the Government set out for the first time in statute, as we heard earlier, what counts as family life for the purposes of article 8 of the European convention on human rights. Other than the fact that the Conservatives would withdraw from the ECHR to implement our borders plan, allow me to say at the outset that the Opposition do support the broad direction of travel of the clause. The public are entitled to expect that the right to respect for family life protects genuine, close family relationships and does not stretch to cover extended relationships and loosely evidenced dependency, which is the very problem that the Government’s explanatory notes identify. In my opinion, the question for the Committee is not whether the clause points the right way; it is whether it will make any difference at all in the courtroom. On the evidence the Committee has heard and read so far, I fear the answer is unfortunately that it will make very little difference.
Clause 18 does three things. First, subsection (3) inserts a two-stage sequence into section 117A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. A court or tribunal must first decide whether article 8 is engaged at all, having regard in particular to proposed new section 117AA, and only then turn to the public interest question. Secondly, clause 18(4) inserts proposed new section 117AA into the 2002 Act. A person’s family life is normally limited to their core cohabiting family: a spouse, civil partner or partner and minor children or parents, to the extent that they live together. A parent who does not live with a child does not normally have family life with that child unless there is evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship, and an adult does not normally have family life with another adult unless they live together as partners or there is an additional element of dependency beyond normal emotional ties.
Thirdly, clause 18(5) lists four things that, on their own, do not amount to that additional dependency: financial dependence; illness, unless it meets a three-part test of constant care; emotional resilience; and concern for a relative living in a country affected by war or instability. Subsection (6) then provides that nothing in subsection (5) stops the court considering those same factors when it comes to the public interest question.
Why is the direction right? There is a real problem here. Mr Smith, the former director general of Border Force, told the Committee that article 8 is
“often used as a lever quite late in the process”,––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 44, Q67.]
as we all know from the cases we hear about on the news.
The Minister gave the Committee an example from Home Office casework of a man who falsely claimed paternity of eight children and was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. Families, of course, take many forms, and nobody on this side of the Committee wishes to deny that. However, the law should be clear that the core of family life is the family that lives together, and that anything beyond it must be proved. We support the principle of the clause, but we have been here before—I refer to the debate on clauses in group 14 and the many good speeches made—with the immigration rules in 2012 and the Immigration Act 2014. I want to test whether this clause will succeed where those attempts did not.
First, on the language, proposed new section 117AA to the 2002 Act does not say that family life is limited to the core cohabiting family; it says that it is “normally” limited to it. The same word appears in subsections (3) and (4). Professor Ekins told us that this word is where the litigation will end up turning. Justice, which opposes this part of the Bill, makes the same point from the other side: its written evidence accepts that the use of “normally”, together with the need only to “have regard” to those considerations,
“preserves the possibility of finding family life beyond these prescribed circumstances.”
I ask the Minister: in what circumstances do the Government expect a court to find family life outside the core cohabiting family, and will that be set out anywhere? If the Government cannot say, why is the word “normally” there at all? Amendments 99, 101 and 102 would remove it.
Secondly, let us look at the duty itself. Proposed new subsection (1B) to section 117A says that the court
“must (in particular) have regard to”
section 117AA. It does not say that the court must apply it—that matters. In Rhuppiah, a case mentioned in the previous sitting, the Supreme Court held that the “have regard” formula in the 2014 Act
“cannot put decision-makers in a strait-jacket”.
As was mentioned earlier, Chris Rowe of Swansea University, writing for the UK Constitutional Law Association, described the device as “insufficiently potent” to force a result incompatible with the convention. Clause 18 uses exactly the same device. What in proposed new subsections (1A) to (1C) to section 117A differs in kind from the formula that the Supreme Court has already held cannot bind? Amendment 98 would replace “have regard to” with a requirement that the court determine the question in accordance with proposed new section 117AA.
Proposed new section 117AA(5) tells the court that financial dependence, illness, emotional reliance and concern for a relative in a war zone do not, on their own, create family life. Subsection (6) tells the court that it may consider every one of those factors when it weighs the public interest. The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association adds that the Bill is silent on whether those factors may be combined when the court decides whether there is an additional element of dependency, and that the Strasbourg court, in Kumari and Martinez Alvarado, allows exactly that. If the court reads a combination test into paragraph (4)(b) to keep the clause compatible, the list in subsection (5) will do very little work. What is subsection (6) for, if not to give back at the second stage what subsection (5) takes away at the first? Amendment 103 would leave it out, to test exactly that.
The central question is whether clause 18 changes the law. The Government’s human rights memorandum says that proposed new section 117AA codifies the Strasbourg principles on the existence of family life. The House of Commons Library notes that the Strasbourg court has itself said, in Kumari v. the Netherlands, that family life is
“normally limited to the core family”,
and it records Professor Singer’s view on the clause’s effect, that
“it is unclear how this would differ significantly from current practice”.
However, the Law Society tells this Committee that the new emphasis on cohabitation is
“a significant move away from the current position in UK law and a substantial narrowing of Article 8 protections.”
Justice says the clause
“falls short of codifying the Strasbourg principles on the existence of family life, despite the Government’s assertion to the contrary in its ECHR memorandum”,
in particular for
“young adults who are still living with their parents”.
Ben Goldsborough
As the hon. Member very kindly name-checked my speech yesterday, I need to thank him first of all. He says there is no issue of “Lock, Stock and Two Smoking Barrels” when leaving the ECHR, but there is an issue concerning our colleagues and friends on the island of Ireland. What would be the result of leaving the ECHR when it comes to the Good Friday agreement? There is no question about it: Lord Wolfson may say that there may or may not be an issue with that, but the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission has noted that there would be an issue, and we have the history as well. Anything that comes back with this idea that, “Well, Australia and New Zealand don’t operate within these systems,” does not take into account the history of the island of Ireland.
Blake Stephenson
I thank the hon. Member for his intervention—perhaps my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East was correct to say that I was far too generous in taking it; I should have just closed my speech.
The hon. Member for South Norfolk clearly recognises that the Opposition commissioned Lord Wolfson to conduct a very serious legal analysis of the benefits or otherwise of leaving the ECHR, which he has done. I go back to the comment I made earlier about how there are no legal barriers to us departing the ECHR. There is no risk to the Union and there is no risk to the Good Friday agreement in a legal sense. It will, of course, result in a political discussion, and that will be had at the appropriate time, but the political questions that will arise are not insurmountable.
I will now close. The Opposition support the aim of clause 18 and will not oppose it standing part of the Bill. We support Government amendments 44 and 45, but a definition that is qualified by “normally” applied through a duty only to “have regard to”, with the excluded factors let back in by clause 18(6), is a definition that the courts can step around. I will seek to press amendments 98 and 99 to a Division.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
It is a pleasure to have you in the Chair today, Mr Twigg.
I take completely the opposite position from the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire in almost every respect. I am going to speak against clause 18 and its inclusion in the Bill, and I am going to oppose the Government amendments that would put further tests on parent-child relationships and parental involvement for refugees. I will also be opposing the Conservative amendments, which would put even tighter constraints on family life.
I am here to defend our article 8 protections—I say “our”, because I believe it is really important that we set laws for refugees and asylum seekers that we would happily be subject to ourselves. That is absolutely at the core of the universal nature of human rights and the international agreements we have made to respect human rights around the world in the way that we would want them to be respected should we be in the horrible position of needing to claim asylum.
Article 8 protects the right to family life specifically for us under the European convention on human rights. Although it is not absolute, it requires any state interference in these rights to be lawful, necessary and proportionate. I do not agree with the Government when they say in their human rights memorandum that they are taking
“proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aims.”
To me, paragraph 26 in the memorandum clearly admits that there is interference in our rights with this legislation. The Government are using the argument that they are taking “proportionate means” of “achieving the legitimate aims”, but the legitimate aims they lay out are:
“maintaining effective immigration control, economic wellbeing and the prevention of disorder or crime.”
I honestly do not see how clause 18, on family life and people making claims for reuniting their families and maintaining this essential human right protected under article 8, comes into those “proportionate means”. It is about reducing the ability of families to reunite. The impact assessment clearly says that many thousands of people who would be able to come here under current laws will be denied their claims. This is a reduction in human rights and it seriously needs looking at. I am neither equipped nor planning to add further arguments relating to Northern Ireland and the Windsor framework, but further conversations are needed about what is currently in the Bill, never mind what would happen if we withdrew from the ECHR.
Everybody on the Committee wants a fair, robust and effective immigration system—one that works and upholds the rule of law and on in which people have confidence. Article 8 is not an abstract concept within all this; it is the law that decides whether a parent can stay in the country where their children live or whether a British child grows up with both parents. We do not want to see families separated or children separated from the parents who care for them, yet that is precisely the risk posed by clause 18, according to the Government’s own impact assessment.
Dr Zubir Ahmed (Glasgow South West) (Lab)
Does the hon. Lady accept that article 8 was never intended to be interpreted as it is now, and therefore that if we do not provide guidance or adjust it, we will further dampen the British public’s confidence and trust in the immigration and asylum system? I can tell her from personal experience that when that happens, it is people from minority communities that are already here, sometimes for many generations, such as my father, who are first in the firing line. Does she therefore agree that if she, like me, wants Britain to be a compassionate, welcoming country, we must acknowledge that those articles are in some cases not being interpreted in the intended manner and that the adjustment is appropriate?
Siân Berry
I thank the hon. Member for his perspective. He must appreciate through his constituency casework, as I do, the general principle that article 8 claims need to be assessed on an individual basis. The Bill tries to codify and generalise things in ways that reduce the ability for anyone making decisions to look at the genuine family lives of those making the claims. Bad decisions can result from people misunderstanding different cultures, from unconscious biases and from all kinds of things like that. It is really important that we do not try to prescribe family life under state definitions. I will come on to talk more about that and about the toxic rhetoric and the awful anecdotes, such as the examples we have heard from Ministers, which increase the toxicity of the debate. We can do much better than this Bill to reduce that.
Clause 18 would replace the reality of family relationships with statutory presumptions. Families today come in many forms. We have single-parent households, blended families, grandparents raising children, and parents who do not live under the same roof through circumstance rather than choice. A family does not stop being a family because it fails a cohabitation test. I will always stand up against people trying to define what a normal family is. The Government’s stated objective is to confine family life “normally” to the core cohabiting family unit. A parent who does not live with their child must prove that the relationship is genuine and be judged on how often and how recently they have had contact, even where work, shared care or the immigration system itself has kept them apart.
Ben Goldsborough
If we followed the hon. Lady’s line of thinking, my concern is that we would leave section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 completely unamended, which would mean that there is no clarity—not just for the state and our constituents, but for those going into the system who may be seeking refuge. Is there not also a moral case? If we leave this be, we will end up in a muddle, which will mean that backlogs continue to grow, people do not get the surety of an answer and the immigration and asylum system will not have the confidence of the public.
Siân Berry
I thank the hon. Member for making those points, but as we spoke about on Second Reading and in earlier debates on this topic, the muddle lies in the bad initial decision making in the Home Office. If it is not clear what kind of evidence people need to establish family life, it should be dealt with through better processes, better information and more support for legal representation. Codifying it, as is done in the Bill, is not the right way to deal with that.
David Smith
I thank the hon. Lady for being so generous with her time. I want to build on the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk. The hon. Lady spoke about the Bill referring to core cohabiting family, but does she accept that there must at some point be a limit on what we define as family? If I were fleeing to another country, would it be reasonable for me to say, “I desperately want my third great uncle on my mum’s side to be part of my family”? Does she accept that there has to be a definition and parameters for what family actually is, which the Bill seeks to establish?
Siân Berry
I disagree wholly with that. During the speeches made by Opposition Members earlier in the debate, I kept thinking about the people who, due to natural disasters or wars, are left without core family, and have to find another family member who will take them in and take that place. There is an inherent danger in putting in place these limits, and in the amendments tabled by Conservative Members that would add rigid definitions. Given the stories about the different ways in which people have experienced refugee status over the years, which all hon. Members will have heard about in casework and read about in memoirs and novels, the need for this change does not ring true. We should keep the system as it is now, where the reality of every single case needs to be looked at.
Blake Stephenson
The hon. Lady described our amendments as “rigid definitions”, but is it not right that we as legislators make sure that our definitions have certainty? We want to have a system that the British public have confidence in, and that is not the case at the moment—in good faith, the Government are trying to deal with that. Do we not need rigid definitions and certainty to achieve that?
Siân Berry
I fundamentally disagree with the hon. Member. We need to look at individual cases individually, as no two families are the same. We could imagine many circumstances for which we would want exceptions to this rule. The Government have rightly left caveats in the Bill, but the Opposition are arguing against them. Putting in rigid criteria on top of what is already in the Bill is absolutely the wrong way to go about addressing the issue. The best way to deal with any problems we might see is to do so in the initial decision making.
Clause 18 says that financial or emotional dependence, illness, or living in a conflict zone alone is not enough to establish family life, yet families routinely support each other financially, emotionally and practically. Ministers say that those factors can still be weighed at the public interest stage, but once family life is ruled out, that stage is never reached. What will that mean in practice? As I have hinted at, the Government’s impact assessment says that their article 8 reforms will mean 14,000 more refusals every year. Even after appeals, around 11,700 people more will be refused each year. Under the law as it stands, those people would succeed. That shows that clause 18 does not simply clarify existing principles, but is intended to change outcomes at a substantial scale. The clause does diminish human rights for refugees in this country, as is admitted in the Government’s human rights memorandum.
The way the clause is doing that is very troubling for two main reasons. First, it suggests that family relationships deserve protection only when they fit a model chosen by the state, but article 8 has never worked that way. The European Court has always looked at the substance of an individual relationship, not its form. Indeed, the very cases the Government cite require an individualised assessment of all the circumstances. As the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire said, we have been here before. The examples we are hearing from the Home Secretary and the Minister come as part of what is now a mini-tradition of Home Secretaries using exaggerated anecdotes to add to toxic rhetoric about migrants.
Blake Stephenson
This might be an opportune moment to intervene and allow the hon. Lady to get to the right place in her notes. She mentioned that we have been here before; that was a central part of my speech. In order to break this cycle, would she not agree that the right thing to do is to depart from the ECHR?
Siân Berry
I thank the hon. Member for trying, but he is talking to a person who cannot read the universal declaration of human rights without welling up, and I will never give up making arguments of this sort.
Previous legislation on these matters, to which the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire referred, followed on directly from the infamous 2011 party conference speech of the then Home Secretary—now Baroness May of Maidenhead. She repeated false claims from newspapers that judges had permitted a man to escape deportation because he had a pet cat—something she says she did not make up. In reality, neither of the judges’ decisions in the case was based on the man having a pet, and the second and final decision was not based on any human rights consideration at all. It was straightforwardly based on a failure by the Home Office to apply its own policy.
Amnesty International gave us more information in its written evidence:
“This—together with the readiness of many political commentators to cherry pick often minor or irrelevant facts that are mentioned in tribunal or court judgments and present these as if the main or sole reason for a decision that may have little or nothing to do with them—continues to underpin criticism of Article 8 in immigration-related decision-making. That criticism is plainly misinformed, often careless and, in some cases, on its face, clearly ill-intended—including out of dogmatic hostility to the ECHR and other political motivations.”
On Second Reading of the Bill, the current Home Secretary summarised an unnamed case. She said:
“In 2025, an Albanian man jailed for growing cannabis escaped deportation not because he had any right to be here, but because it was deemed unduly harsh on his partner to deport him. She was not his wife or life partner—instead, this relationship began only after a deportation order had been served. Why was the deportation deemed to be unduly harsh? The partner spoke no Albanian and had never visited the country before.”—[Official Report, 13 July 2026; Vol. 789, c. 675.]
Ben Goldsborough
I thank the hon. Lady, who is being very generous with her time. It is important for us to hammer home that, through the Bill, we are passing legislation for all eventualities. I wish that everyone coming here was squeaky clean and had the best intentions in the world, but we have to pass legislation that takes those with bad motivations into account. Will she respond to that?
Siân Berry
Yes, I will respond to that shortly with some data.
To return to the anecdote from the current Home Secretary, Amnesty again corrects the record:
“A key error in this summary is the statement that the relevant relationship had only begun after a deportation order had been served. That is not correct. The judge’s decision makes clear that it began significantly before the order. Of especial relevance was that the notice that such an order might be made was served in December 2019, but no order was then made for more than four years. By the time it was made in January 2024, the relationship had developed over a relatively lengthy period.”
The Home Secretary mentioned the criminal conviction. Amnesty also corrects that information. It says that he was jailed for four months for a relatively minor offence, and was now
“working lawfully and supporting himself.”
It also says:
“There was no suggestion of any risk of reoffending. His partner, who had no connection and had never been to Albania, was working and providing daily support to her sister and mother. Whatever may have been the position in 2019 was clearly not the position in 2024; and the relevant facts were clearly not adequately presented in what had been reported or at Second Reading.”
Melanie Onn (Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes) (Lab)
The hon. Lady says that this is not a way to reform the system. Does she have any ideas about the kinds of reform that she would be ready to accept?
Siân Berry
I have said that, based on my own casework, my experience of the Home Office’s errors, and the cases that I have seen, I would like to see investment in Home Office decision making to make it better in the first place. That would be the best way to deal with this issue, particularly when more than half of appeals are being approved.
Melanie Onn
I thank the hon. Lady for giving way once again. Given the number of amendments she has tabled—the point being that she will not support any element of change whatsoever—I gently and respectfully suggest that she is actually very happy with the system as it is, she is happy to accept all the evidence from a huge industry that exists to support immigrants, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and she does not want any reform whatsoever other than throwing the system open even further.
Siân Berry
It is pretty clear that I think the Bill is a result of the Government responding to toxic rhetoric coming from other parties, and that it is an attempt to be seen to be doing something.
Siân Berry
I will finish my point. In an evidence session, we challenged the National Crime Agency on the roots of the organised crime that the hon. Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes mentions, which is doing huge harm. I will not argue that the small boats system is the best way to bring people to this country. Small boat numbers started to grow the moment safe routes were closed. We need safe routes, and that is the approach the Government could take to reduce small boat crossings. The law that protects our rights does not need to be undermined. I would absolutely argue that.
Blake Stephenson
The hon. Lady refers to other parties and their toxic rhetoric. Perhaps she could give some examples. If she wishes to call out those parties, will she do so by giving clear examples rather than by making throwaway comments? That would really help the Committee.
Siân Berry
I am happy to clarify that I am talking primarily about Reform UK. That party is not represented on this Committee and can answer for itself in other ways, but it has, until recently, been taking votes from the Government on the right. I am happy to come back in future sittings with further examples of anecdotes being used instead of evidence. I chose to highlight two examples of Home Secretaries doing that, because the Minister is here to represent a Home Secretary.
Several hon. Members rose—
Siân Berry
This is turning into a very broad debate, but I give way to the hon. Member for Glasgow South West.
Dr Ahmed
It is the hon. Lady’s contention that those of us on the Government Benches were somehow manipulated by others to arrive at this Bill. Will she at least concede that toxic rhetoric and hatred do not occur in a vacuum, as I know personally, but often exploit structural deficiencies in systems, and that sadly there are structural deficiencies in this system? Is fixing them not therefore the responsible thing to do, so that we can turn the tap off that these haters and racists use to fire abusive language at Members of Parliament and members of the public who do not look like them?
The Chair
Order. I have been very lenient, but I gently say that we need to keep interventions sharp and succinct, please.
Siân Berry
Much appreciated, Mr Twigg.
I would say that the best way to stand up to toxic rhetoric is to stand up to it. We are familiar with the concept of the Overton window, and I am distressed that a Labour Government have been moving in this direction through their immigration policies. As I said at the beginning of my speech in the previous debate, the Government ought not to bring forward this Bill or row back on other civil liberties and human rights legislation—that would be the right thing to do. I am a lone voice on this Committee, but that cannot be right when we know that people around the country want migrants to be welcomed and want to see more unity, inclusion and social cohesion. The way to build that is not to hear the argument about how article 8 and the ECHR need to go and then do a little bit of that. The answer is to stand up to the rhetoric and build a better country.
Joe Robertson
I agree with the hon. Lady that there is some toxic rhetoric around this, although not from Members on this Committee. Does she not agree nevertheless that there is a problem with immigration and asylum in this country, and that part of the problem is that the numbers are too high?
Siân Berry
I do not concede that we are taking in too many refugees. As I said at the beginning, we have an international obligation to take our fair share of people seeking asylum, because of all the causes around the world that the hon. Gentleman mentioned earlier—he left out climate change, but I will forgive him that. There are many, many reasons why we ought to take a humane approach to asylum.
Some Government Back Benchers talked earlier about safe routes. There have been good schemes, aimed at particular conflicts in particular countries, and I hope the Government will continue to bring in more such schemes, but it is not good enough to cherry-pick particular conflicts or the kinds of refugees that we find acceptable. The volume of Ukrainian refugees has been absolutely huge, and has not caused social cohesion problems. We can make that work for many other countries as well, but the volumes in other schemes have always been too low. We need a universal framework of law that will work for all kinds of refugees.
David Smith
I was one of the Members who referred earlier in the debate to safe and legal routes, which are a very good idea. May I ask a very simple question: are there any specific restrictions at all that the hon. Lady would like to add to our immigration system?
Siân Berry
Off the top of my head, I cannot think of any. I really think that the current law needs to be administered better, and that we need better decision making, more humanity in all of this, and more support for people to get good decisions made the first time. I would be very happy to receive from the Government any clear evidence of abusive claims under the current law that does not rely on anecdote, but I am absolutely sure that, in clause 18, the Government are seeking to prevent people who would currently succeed from achieving asylum in this country and from being reunited with their families.
Let me move on to more things that the Government have said. The Government tell us that clause 18 is consistent with Strasbourg case law, and they even cite the cases, but, as other hon. Members have mentioned, they cannot have it both ways. If the clause simply restates the law, it is unnecessary. The Government’s impact assessment says that they expect grants to be cut by a third by those reforms. If the clause goes further, it risks putting the country in breach of the convention and inviting years of litigation. Either way, the clause does not deliver the clarity that Ministers promise, and I think that Opposition Members are united on that today.
I believe that a fair immigration system should tackle abuse while protecting genuine family life, and that it should put the best interests of children first and reflect the reality of modern families. Clause 18 does neither. It risks real hardship for genuine families, with little evidence that it will achieve anything else. I urge the Government to think again. We can maintain effective immigration control without using this clause to break up thousands of families. We can protect our borders without sacrificing the fundamental British values of compassion and fairness. For those reasons, I ask the Committee to agree that clause 18 should not stand part of the Bill.
Joe Robertson
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Twigg. I will address clause 18. I must confess that I have a slight tendency to stray, but I am comforted by the fact that the hon. Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes will be on it and ensure that I stick to the grouping before us.
I made some comments on clause 18 in the morning sitting, so what I will say now is additional. I will focus on situations in which a right to family life can still be argued under the Bill, even though it seeks to restrict human rights applications based on family life. Those are not situations involving a core cohabiting family, but ones in which a sponsor in the UK who does not necessarily have a UK passport but nevertheless has a right to reside here applies for somebody—not necessarily a family member—who lives elsewhere with no right to come here, has a mental illness, needs the sponsor’s support and cannot find that support at home. That seems to me the widest part of the Bill, allowing a great range of claims to be made and increasing or maintaining the backlog at the Home Office and in the courts.
It seems that this mental illness provision could create a dodgy market of mental health clinics elsewhere in the world, set up specifically to provide paperwork for an application—that is not fanciful. We know the huge pressure from the black market abroad, involving people smugglers and all sorts of behaviour that is not just immoral but illegal and abhorrent, to get people into this country, because of course it is a great place to live and build a life. We know that the pressure is already there; that is why we have such high numbers coming. Setting out in law a mental illness route that seems to have such a low bar for evidence could lead, I think, to an entirely new dodgy avenue opening up.
Let us envisage a very real type of application. Someone in this country says that a family member or close friend living in another part of the world has a mental illness and a certificate to prove it. However, that certificate could very well come from a clinic that does not adhere to the standards of the NHS, the Care Quality Commission or anything that could be recognised in this country. That bit of paperwork—the bottom of which says, by the way, “Sorry, there is no support at home”—could give rise to an application. Without any evidence to the contrary, I do not see how the Home Office—or indeed a court—could deny that application.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg.
Let us be clear about what clause 18 is actually for. The phrase “family life” has been stretched for years, and now covers almost anything: adult siblings, distant relatives and relationships that seem to spring up the week a removal notice lands on the doormat. The Government say that clause 18 will bring that to an end, and that family life will mean what most people think it means: someone’s husband or wife, partner or children. That is what the public think family life means, and it is what Parliament should say it means.
The trouble is the drafting. Clause 18 sets out a clear definition and then, in three separate places, adds a single word that undoes it. As my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East rightly set out, that word is “normally”. Proposed new section 117AA says that family life
“is normally limited to their core cohabiting family.”
A parent who does not live with their children does not “normally” have family life with them. One adult does not “normally” have family life with other adult relatives, such as brothers and sisters, unless there is real dependency.
Every immigration lawyer in the country will read the word “normally” the same way. If family life is only “normally” limited, their job is to show that their client is not normal. Every case becomes the exception. We have seen that before: a clear rule, a soft word and 10 years of litigation about what the soft word means. It is not as if the clause lacks a safety valve. Proposed new section 117AA(4)(b) provides for adults with a genuine
“additional element of dependency (beyond normal emotional ties)”.
The Court of Appeal set out that test in Kugathas v. Secretary of State for the Home Department more than 20 years ago, and it is where genuinely exceptional cases belong. “Normally” does not add fairness; it adds a second door.
David Smith
I have a fundamental question. The hon. Gentleman is outlining the word “normally”; if, to his estimation, all asylum lawyers or whoever is involved in the process would look at their individual case and say, “That’s not normal,” surely none of it would be exceptional.
Matt Vickers
We are trying to define something, and I think it is on us to define it. Adding “normally”—inviting them to look for the exception—is very unhelpful, particularly when proposed new section 117AA(4)(b) actually sets out the exception and gives that bandwidth for people to find exceptional cases. To write “normally” beside all these properties is to open a door, and would mean that we fail to do what we are aiming to do. That is the objective of the Bill. Amendments 99, 101 and 102 would take that word out. If the Government believe that their definition is right, let us say what it means.
Amendment 98 tackles the same problem from another angle. Under the clause, a court deciding whether article 8 was engaged must “have regard to” proposed new section 117AA, but having regard to something is not the same as following it. The court can have regard to the definition, nod politely and decide a case on a different basis altogether. Amendment 98 says that the court
“must determine that question in accordance with section 117AA.”
If Parliament is going to define family life, the court should apply that definition, not merely consider it.
Amendment 100 asks a simple question: what is a partner? The clause does not say. The immigration rules have required unmarried couples to have lived together in a relationship akin to marriage for at least two years. Amendment 100 would put that test into statute so that a relationship formed a few weeks before a removal date could not be used to frustrate it. It is good enough for the rules; it is good enough for the Bill.
Moving on to amendment 103, in proposed new section 117AA, subsection (5) says that financial dependency, illness short of needing constant care, emotional reliance or worry about relatives in a warzone do not, on their own, create family life between adults. Fair enough, but subsection (6) then says that nothing in subsection (5) stops a court considering every one of those factors at the public interest stage. Can the Minister explain what subsection (5) achieves if subsection (6) allows the very same factors to tip the balance a few paragraphs later?
I welcome Government amendment 45. It asks decision makers to look at whether contact between a parent and child has only recently been established or re-established. That goes to a real problem: relationships that come to life only when removal is on the cards. By tabling it, the Government make our point for us. If it is right to be sceptical of a parental relationship that appears just in time, it is right to be sceptical of a partnership that does the same. That is all amendment 100 asks. Clause 18 is a good idea let down by its drafting. The Government have written a definition and then handed every lawyer in the land the words to argue their way around it. Our amendment would make that definition stick.
If the Minister cannot accept our amendments, I hope that the Government will reflect before Report. I commend the amendments to the Committee.
The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. I thank hon. Members for their contributions this afternoon. It has been fascinating to have one side saying that we are not going far enough and the other that we are going too far. I hope that means that we are getting the right balance between what the British people wish to see and allowing for the fundamental human rights we all benefit from.
I hope the Chair will indulge me for a moment because I would like to directly address the comments from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. It was unfair and, frankly, quite insulting to suggest that we introduced the Bill to chase rhetoric. I feel very passionately on behalf of my constituents about the importance of the Bill. I know that the hon. Lady and I represent very different constituencies, but she says that there is universal support for refugees. I am sure that she, like me, is watching with horror the masked-up thugs on the streets trying to attack asylum seekers and chasing them out of their accommodation, but when I knock on doors in my constituency, people constantly raise the unfairness of people who seek to exploit our systems, processes and commitment to values like universal human rights, because they can see that those people are not genuine and that they are exploiting our generosity. While we want to fulfil those commitments, it is really important to me that the system has integrity, and that is what the Bill is about.
Anna Turley
I do not mean to be rude, but the hon. Lady has had plenty of time. We can pick this up outside the Committee room, but I wanted to get that on the record.
Clause 18 introduces a definition of article 8 family life into UK primary legislation for the first time, giving courts and decision makers a more consistent framework to apply to immigration cases. Until now, courts have had to determine the existence and scope of family life on a case-by-case basis, which has resulted in significant variability in outcomes. Article 8 is a two-stage test. First, a decision maker or court must decide if family or private life exists. Secondly, where family or private life is established, they must decide whether interference with it pursues a legitimate aim, such as the interests of public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, and is proportionate when the nature of the breach is balanced against the public interest of removing an individual or refusing them entry.
It is right that article 8 acts as a safeguard to protect genuine family relationships. However, these protections can create opportunities for individuals to rely on weak or peripheral family connections as a basis to remain in or come to the UK. Clause 18 addresses this. It acts in tandem with clause 19 by setting coherent parameters for when family life can be established in line with Strasbourg case law before the strengthened public interest test is applied. It provides a clearer statutory framework for determining whether family life exists for article 8 purposes.
David Smith
Does the Minister agree that unless we introduce a definition of a family, the term becomes entirely subjective?
Anna Turley
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is why we have seen the extreme examples of people clearly thwarting the system to try to remain.
The clause makes clear that family life will normally concern the core cohabiting family unit while retaining provision for cases involving genuine parental relationships or additional elements of dependency. This will narrow the circumstances in which a tenuous relationship with a child, or an extended family relationship involving no more than nominal ties, can be used as the basis of a claim. It will support more consistent decision making while retaining the flexibility required. This is key to restoring order and control to the immigration system, ensuring that if someone does not meet the requirements of our rules, they will not have the right to reside here.
Clause 18 makes clear that family life is normally limited to the core cohabiting family unit while preserving flexibility for cases where family life may exist outside of that, aligned with Strasbourg case law. It also clarifies that biological parenthood alone is not enough to constitute family life; there must be evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship. For adult relatives outside the core family unit, financial support, illness, emotional support or concern about conditions overseas will not by themselves establish family life; the relationship must involve true elements of dependency.
Melanie Onn
Would it be the case that someone who had hitherto been an absent father would not meet the criteria in the Bill?
Anna Turley
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is exactly what we are seeking to do. We have had evidence of people moving back in with families and dependants purely on the basis of trying to put forward this claim.
Matt Vickers
We are talking about the use of the term “normally”, but would the examples the Minister listed not fall into subsection (4)(b) anyway, meaning that the word “normally” is not required to help them get across the line?
Anna Turley
I am afraid that I disagree. I remind the Committee that, just because family life is established, it does not mean that an individual will automatically be able to remain in or enter the UK. Instead, all cases where family life is found to exist will also be considered at the second stage test, where the courts will have to consider whether it is in the public interest to refuse leave to remain or enter.
Anna Turley
I will just explain a little bit more, and I will hopefully answer the hon. Gentleman’s point. The word “normally” is deliberate and necessary. It allows us to establish a clear and deliberatively restrictive framework in which article 8 family life will ordinarily be confined to the core family while retaining the limited flexibility required for ECHR compliance.
Family relationships, as we have said, do not always fit neatly in formal categories or involve cohabitation. In exceptional cases, a relationship outside the core cohabiting family may, in substance, be akin to one within it. “Normally” enables a court to recognise genuine family life in those limited circumstances, based on the facts of the individual case. Removing it would turn a strong presumption into an inflexible rule, which would risk the exclusion of genuine family relationships and therefore be incompatible with the ECHR, potentially opening us up to even more litigation.
Crucially, this is only a threshold test. Establishing that family life exists does not mean that an article 8 claim succeeds, or that an individual has the right to remain. It simply means that the court moves on to the next stage to consider whether interference with that family life is justified and proportionate, taking account of public interest. Accordingly, the Government do not support the amendments.
Amendment 103, also tabled by the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, seeks to remove subsection (6) of this clause, on the basis that it undermines the effect of subsection (5). I do not, however, accept that that is the case. Those two provisions address different questions: subsection (5) clarifies what cannot independently establish family life between adult extended family members, while subsection (6) preserves the fact-sensitive assessment that is required once family life is engaged.
Subsection (5) makes it clear that financial support, emotional reliance, illness and concern for someone living amid war or instability do not, when taken independently, establish the necessary dependency. Those circumstances do not, however, cease to be relevant for every purpose. If family life is established, the court must then undertake the separate public interest and proportionality assessment.
Subsection (6) therefore provides an important safeguard to ensure that, at that stage, the full factual circumstances can be considered when balancing any interference with family life against the public interest. It also protects the Home Office’s freedom to consider those factors when arguing that the public interest requires a refusal of leave.
Turning to the Government amendments, it is right that children are given additional safeguards in article 8 decision making. Given those well-meaning protections, a tenuous relationship with a child can be used by an adult to remain in the UK. The first step to prevent people from relying on weak parental links to children in article 8 claims is to ensure that the genuine and subsisting parental relationship test under this clause operates as intended.
Government amendment 44 therefore makes it clear that a parent does not normally have family life with a child under the age of 18 for the purposes of article 8 unless there is evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship. It broadens the application of the test so that it applies consistently to all parent-child relationships involving a child under 18, regardless of whether the parent and child live together. That clarifies what is relevant: the substance of the parental relationship, not simply the living arrangements. The amendment aims to reduce the scope for weak or limited parental relationships to be relied on in article 8 claims, including where cohabitation has been resumed opportunistically for immigration purposes; it does not remove protection for genuine parent-child relationships. Where there is evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship, family life will continue to be recognised.
Government amendment 45 builds on amendment 44 to ensure that the genuine and subsisting parental relationship test under the clause will have its intended effect of preventing people from relying on weak parental links to children in article 8 applications. Government amendment 45 provides additional detail on how courts and tribunals should assess whether a parent has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a child for the purposes of article 8. It sets out factors that may be relevant to that assessment, including the nature of the relationship, the duration and frequency of contact, and whether contact has recently been established or re-established. The amendment aims to promote greater consistency in the application of the genuine and subsisting parental relationship test, ensuring that courts and tribunals focus on the substance of the relationship; the amendment does not prevent genuine parent-child relationships from attracting article 8 protection. Courts and tribunals will continue to consider all relevant circumstances in each individual case.
Joe Robertson
What would happen if someone were living here, but their child was overseas with the other parent—they were cohabiting there, not with the parent here—but the parent overseas died? What happens to the child? I cannot see a provision by which the child can come here, because there was no core cohabiting family arrangement.
Anna Turley
Exactly such a circumstance is why we have provided flexibility within the Bill. The individual case will be assessed under article 8. In such a situation, there is space for that individual case to be assessed. Together with clause 19, Government amendments 44 and 45 provide a clearer and more consistent framework for determining whether removing an individual with a tenuous relationship to a child in the UK is compliant with article 8.
I will just add something on the key principles behind clause 18. The clause establishes clear boundaries for where family life exists, consistent with Strasbourg case law, providing the foundation on which clause 19’s strengthened public interest test is applied. Together, clauses 18 and 19 will ensure that article 8 is not used routinely to circumvent immigration rules, supporting a more ordered and controlled system where those who do not meet the rules are not routinely able to stay in the UK. Members have suggested that the clauses are too expansive and may widen where family life can be found to exist, but that is not correct. A recent Court of Appeal judgment reaffirmed the existing legal framework for assessing family life under article 8. Clause 18 provides greater clarity. The reforms will make clearer how family life and dependency should be assessed, promoting greater consistency in decision making and curtailing expansive interpretation of where family life can be found to exist. I had intended to talk more about the ECHR, but I shall not test the patience of the Committee.
Other points made during the debate included whether the clause was relevant or whether the courts would just ignore what we are trying to codify. Successive Governments have recognised concerns about how article 8 operates in the immigration system, but this Government are undertaking the hard work to understand the comprehensive reform required to restore order and control to the system. We are working within our international obligations to reset this balance, and to provide a more comprehensive and consistent framework to article 8 decision making. Clause 18 works alongside clause 19 by establishing the clear basis on which the Home Office can argue that family life does not exist before consideration of whether the public interest warrants a refusal of leave. Together, the clauses provide a clearer framework for how article 8 should be assessed to promote greater consistency in decision making and ensure that when considering article 8 immigration decisions, the courts place appropriate weight on what Parliament considers to be in the public interest.
In response to some of the other points made by hon. Members, the framing of proposed new section 117AA preserves the small degree of flexibility necessary for decision makers and the courts not to be constrained to determine claims made under article 8 that are inconsistent with the article. Reference was made to the definition of an eligible partner. That definition will be set out in rules and guidance; it is not appropriate to have that level of detail in primary legislation. We need to have flexibility to be able to change and respond to patterns of behaviour and abuse. One hon. Member spoke about young adults. The word “normally” in clause 18 is a caveat to preserve flexibility for young adults who have family life with parents.
I was asked for more evidential requirements; here some case studies might be helpful. The family immigration rules are intended to create a fair system that balances the important of protecting family and private life. When 71% of first-time grants are made to applicants who have arrived illegally or who have overstayed the time they are permitted to be here, it is clear that article 8 is not operating effectively. I was also asked about retrospective claims and whether the measures would impact people already in the UK. Clause 52(9) allows part 2 of the Bill to be commenced with retrospective effect; we will set out our plans for how the measures will be commenced in due course.
I was asked how the adjudicators would be able to interpret the complexity of clause 18 without legal training—something the Committee spoke about quite a lot in the first sitting of its scrutiny. Adjudicators will be properly trained, with all the safeguards that we talked about in the Committee sitting last Tuesday, to apply the new framework and immigration law. The authority will have legal support, underpinned by clauses 2 and 3 of the Bill. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asked about interference. Clause 18 is not about whether interference is proportionate—that is assessed under clause 19. The grounds for interference, such as for the effectiveness of the immigration system, are consistent with ECHR case law.
Nothing in the Bill prevents individualised decision making; we have deliberately kept that ability, and that is a clear requirement of article 8 compliancy in decision making. Hon. Members also spoke about Home Office decision making. As I have made clear throughout the passage of the Bill, we will of course continue to work to improve decision making. The reforms in the clause clarify how family life should be assessed and strengthen the role of public interest in maintaining effective immigration control, which will help to improve decision making by providing the courts with greater clarity, consistency and predictability.
On mental illness and whether that is a route, it is correct that under proposed new section 117AA(4), family life can be engaged where a person suffers a mental illness or infirmity. However, they would need to be incapacitated to the extent that they need constant care and support, and there would have to be no other viable care options. Examples in established case law include where an adult or child becomes paraplegic after a serious illness, or where an adult or child suffers from Down syndrome and is fully incapacitated. It is worth remembering that the provision is only about establishing family life, and that the decision makers and the courts will go on to consider the public interest question. I hope I have answered all colleagues’ points, and I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put, That the amendment be made.