Immigration and Asylum Bill (Sixth sitting)

Anna Turley Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers]

We are trying to define something, and I think it is on us to define it. Adding “normally”—inviting them to look for the exception—is very unhelpful, particularly when proposed new section 117AA(4)(b) actually sets out the exception and gives that bandwidth for people to find exceptional cases. To write “normally” beside all these properties is to open a door, and would mean that we fail to do what we are aiming to do. That is the objective of the Bill. Amendments 99, 101 and 102 would take that word out. If the Government believe that their definition is right, let us say what it means.

Amendment 98 tackles the same problem from another angle. Under the clause, a court deciding whether article 8 was engaged must “have regard to” proposed new section 117AA, but having regard to something is not the same as following it. The court can have regard to the definition, nod politely and decide a case on a different basis altogether. Amendment 98 says that the court

“must determine that question in accordance with section 117AA.”

If Parliament is going to define family life, the court should apply that definition, not merely consider it.

Amendment 100 asks a simple question: what is a partner? The clause does not say. The immigration rules have required unmarried couples to have lived together in a relationship akin to marriage for at least two years. Amendment 100 would put that test into statute so that a relationship formed a few weeks before a removal date could not be used to frustrate it. It is good enough for the rules; it is good enough for the Bill.

Moving on to amendment 103, in proposed new section 117AA, subsection (5) says that financial dependency, illness short of needing constant care, emotional reliance or worry about relatives in a warzone do not, on their own, create family life between adults. Fair enough, but subsection (6) then says that nothing in subsection (5) stops a court considering every one of those factors at the public interest stage. Can the Minister explain what subsection (5) achieves if subsection (6) allows the very same factors to tip the balance a few paragraphs later?

I welcome Government amendment 45. It asks decision makers to look at whether contact between a parent and child has only recently been established or re-established. That goes to a real problem: relationships that come to life only when removal is on the cards. By tabling it, the Government make our point for us. If it is right to be sceptical of a parental relationship that appears just in time, it is right to be sceptical of a partnership that does the same. That is all amendment 100 asks. Clause 18 is a good idea let down by its drafting. The Government have written a definition and then handed every lawyer in the land the words to argue their way around it. Our amendment would make that definition stick.

If the Minister cannot accept our amendments, I hope that the Government will reflect before Report. I commend the amendments to the Committee.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. I thank hon. Members for their contributions this afternoon. It has been fascinating to have one side saying that we are not going far enough and the other that we are going too far. I hope that means that we are getting the right balance between what the British people wish to see and allowing for the fundamental human rights we all benefit from.

I hope the Chair will indulge me for a moment because I would like to directly address the comments from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. It was unfair and, frankly, quite insulting to suggest that we introduced the Bill to chase rhetoric. I feel very passionately on behalf of my constituents about the importance of the Bill. I know that the hon. Lady and I represent very different constituencies, but she says that there is universal support for refugees. I am sure that she, like me, is watching with horror the masked-up thugs on the streets trying to attack asylum seekers and chasing them out of their accommodation, but when I knock on doors in my constituency, people constantly raise the unfairness of people who seek to exploit our systems, processes and commitment to values like universal human rights, because they can see that those people are not genuine and that they are exploiting our generosity. While we want to fulfil those commitments, it is really important to me that the system has integrity, and that is what the Bill is about.

[Siân Berry]

rose—

[Anna Turley]

I do not mean to be rude, but the hon. Lady has had plenty of time. We can pick this up outside the Committee room, but I wanted to get that on the record.

Clause 18 introduces a definition of article 8 family life into UK primary legislation for the first time, giving courts and decision makers a more consistent framework to apply to immigration cases. Until now, courts have had to determine the existence and scope of family life on a case-by-case basis, which has resulted in significant variability in outcomes. Article 8 is a two-stage test. First, a decision maker or court must decide if family or private life exists. Secondly, where family or private life is established, they must decide whether interference with it pursues a legitimate aim, such as the interests of public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, and is proportionate when the nature of the breach is balanced against the public interest of removing an individual or refusing them entry.

It is right that article 8 acts as a safeguard to protect genuine family relationships. However, these protections can create opportunities for individuals to rely on weak or peripheral family connections as a basis to remain in or come to the UK. Clause 18 addresses this. It acts in tandem with clause 19 by setting coherent parameters for when family life can be established in line with Strasbourg case law before the strengthened public interest test is applied. It provides a clearer statutory framework for determining whether family life exists for article 8 purposes.

[David Smith]

Does the Minister agree that unless we introduce a definition of a family, the term becomes entirely subjective?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is why we have seen the extreme examples of people clearly thwarting the system to try to remain.

The clause makes clear that family life will normally concern the core cohabiting family unit while retaining provision for cases involving genuine parental relationships or additional elements of dependency. This will narrow the circumstances in which a tenuous relationship with a child, or an extended family relationship involving no more than nominal ties, can be used as the basis of a claim. It will support more consistent decision making while retaining the flexibility required. This is key to restoring order and control to the immigration system, ensuring that if someone does not meet the requirements of our rules, they will not have the right to reside here.

Clause 18 makes clear that family life is normally limited to the core cohabiting family unit while preserving flexibility for cases where family life may exist outside of that, aligned with Strasbourg case law. It also clarifies that biological parenthood alone is not enough to constitute family life; there must be evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship. For adult relatives outside the core family unit, financial support, illness, emotional support or concern about conditions overseas will not by themselves establish family life; the relationship must involve true elements of dependency.

[Melanie Onn]

Would it be the case that someone who had hitherto been an absent father would not meet the criteria in the Bill?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is exactly what we are seeking to do. We have had evidence of people moving back in with families and dependants purely on the basis of trying to put forward this claim.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

We are talking about the use of the term “normally”, but would the examples the Minister listed not fall into subsection (4)(b) anyway, meaning that the word “normally” is not required to help them get across the line?

[Anna Turley]

I am afraid that I disagree. I remind the Committee that, just because family life is established, it does not mean that an individual will automatically be able to remain in or enter the UK. Instead, all cases where family life is found to exist will also be considered at the second stage test, where the courts will have to consider whether it is in the public interest to refuse leave to remain or enter.

[Joe Robertson]

Will the Minister give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I will just explain a little bit more, and I will hopefully answer the hon. Gentleman’s point. The word “normally” is deliberate and necessary. It allows us to establish a clear and deliberatively restrictive framework in which article 8 family life will ordinarily be confined to the core family while retaining the limited flexibility required for ECHR compliance.

Family relationships, as we have said, do not always fit neatly in formal categories or involve cohabitation. In exceptional cases, a relationship outside the core cohabiting family may, in substance, be akin to one within it. “Normally” enables a court to recognise genuine family life in those limited circumstances, based on the facts of the individual case. Removing it would turn a strong presumption into an inflexible rule, which would risk the exclusion of genuine family relationships and therefore be incompatible with the ECHR, potentially opening us up to even more litigation.

Crucially, this is only a threshold test. Establishing that family life exists does not mean that an article 8 claim succeeds, or that an individual has the right to remain. It simply means that the court moves on to the next stage to consider whether interference with that family life is justified and proportionate, taking account of public interest. Accordingly, the Government do not support the amendments.

Amendment 103, also tabled by the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, seeks to remove subsection (6) of this clause, on the basis that it undermines the effect of subsection (5). I do not, however, accept that that is the case. Those two provisions address different questions: subsection (5) clarifies what cannot independently establish family life between adult extended family members, while subsection (6) preserves the fact-sensitive assessment that is required once family life is engaged.

Subsection (5) makes it clear that financial support, emotional reliance, illness and concern for someone living amid war or instability do not, when taken independently, establish the necessary dependency. Those circumstances do not, however, cease to be relevant for every purpose. If family life is established, the court must then undertake the separate public interest and proportionality assessment.

Subsection (6) therefore provides an important safeguard to ensure that, at that stage, the full factual circumstances can be considered when balancing any interference with family life against the public interest. It also protects the Home Office’s freedom to consider those factors when arguing that the public interest requires a refusal of leave.

Turning to the Government amendments, it is right that children are given additional safeguards in article 8 decision making. Given those well-meaning protections, a tenuous relationship with a child can be used by an adult to remain in the UK. The first step to prevent people from relying on weak parental links to children in article 8 claims is to ensure that the genuine and subsisting parental relationship test under this clause operates as intended.

Government amendment 44 therefore makes it clear that a parent does not normally have family life with a child under the age of 18 for the purposes of article 8 unless there is evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship. It broadens the application of the test so that it applies consistently to all parent-child relationships involving a child under 18, regardless of whether the parent and child live together. That clarifies what is relevant: the substance of the parental relationship, not simply the living arrangements. The amendment aims to reduce the scope for weak or limited parental relationships to be relied on in article 8 claims, including where cohabitation has been resumed opportunistically for immigration purposes; it does not remove protection for genuine parent-child relationships. Where there is evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship, family life will continue to be recognised.

Government amendment 45 builds on amendment 44 to ensure that the genuine and subsisting parental relationship test under the clause will have its intended effect of preventing people from relying on weak parental links to children in article 8 applications. Government amendment 45 provides additional detail on how courts and tribunals should assess whether a parent has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a child for the purposes of article 8. It sets out factors that may be relevant to that assessment, including the nature of the relationship, the duration and frequency of contact, and whether contact has recently been established or re-established. The amendment aims to promote greater consistency in the application of the genuine and subsisting parental relationship test, ensuring that courts and tribunals focus on the substance of the relationship; the amendment does not prevent genuine parent-child relationships from attracting article 8 protection. Courts and tribunals will continue to consider all relevant circumstances in each individual case.

[Joe Robertson]

What would happen if someone were living here, but their child was overseas with the other parent—they were cohabiting there, not with the parent here—but the parent overseas died? What happens to the child? I cannot see a provision by which the child can come here, because there was no core cohabiting family arrangement.

[Anna Turley]

Exactly such a circumstance is why we have provided flexibility within the Bill. The individual case will be assessed under article 8. In such a situation, there is space for that individual case to be assessed. Together with clause 19, Government amendments 44 and 45 provide a clearer and more consistent framework for determining whether removing an individual with a tenuous relationship to a child in the UK is compliant with article 8.

I will just add something on the key principles behind clause 18. The clause establishes clear boundaries for where family life exists, consistent with Strasbourg case law, providing the foundation on which clause 19’s strengthened public interest test is applied. Together, clauses 18 and 19 will ensure that article 8 is not used routinely to circumvent immigration rules, supporting a more ordered and controlled system where those who do not meet the rules are not routinely able to stay in the UK. Members have suggested that the clauses are too expansive and may widen where family life can be found to exist, but that is not correct. A recent Court of Appeal judgment reaffirmed the existing legal framework for assessing family life under article 8. Clause 18 provides greater clarity. The reforms will make clearer how family life and dependency should be assessed, promoting greater consistency in decision making and curtailing expansive interpretation of where family life can be found to exist. I had intended to talk more about the ECHR, but I shall not test the patience of the Committee.

Other points made during the debate included whether the clause was relevant or whether the courts would just ignore what we are trying to codify. Successive Governments have recognised concerns about how article 8 operates in the immigration system, but this Government are undertaking the hard work to understand the comprehensive reform required to restore order and control to the system. We are working within our international obligations to reset this balance, and to provide a more comprehensive and consistent framework to article 8 decision making. Clause 18 works alongside clause 19 by establishing the clear basis on which the Home Office can argue that family life does not exist before consideration of whether the public interest warrants a refusal of leave. Together, the clauses provide a clearer framework for how article 8 should be assessed to promote greater consistency in decision making and ensure that when considering article 8 immigration decisions, the courts place appropriate weight on what Parliament considers to be in the public interest.

In response to some of the other points made by hon. Members, the framing of proposed new section 117AA preserves the small degree of flexibility necessary for decision makers and the courts not to be constrained to determine claims made under article 8 that are inconsistent with the article. Reference was made to the definition of an eligible partner. That definition will be set out in rules and guidance; it is not appropriate to have that level of detail in primary legislation. We need to have flexibility to be able to change and respond to patterns of behaviour and abuse. One hon. Member spoke about young adults. The word “normally” in clause 18 is a caveat to preserve flexibility for young adults who have family life with parents.

I was asked for more evidential requirements; here some case studies might be helpful. The family immigration rules are intended to create a fair system that balances the important of protecting family and private life. When 71% of first-time grants are made to applicants who have arrived illegally or who have overstayed the time they are permitted to be here, it is clear that article 8 is not operating effectively. I was also asked about retrospective claims and whether the measures would impact people already in the UK. Clause 52(9) allows part 2 of the Bill to be commenced with retrospective effect; we will set out our plans for how the measures will be commenced in due course.

I was asked how the adjudicators would be able to interpret the complexity of clause 18 without legal training—something the Committee spoke about quite a lot in the first sitting of its scrutiny. Adjudicators will be properly trained, with all the safeguards that we talked about in the Committee sitting last Tuesday, to apply the new framework and immigration law. The authority will have legal support, underpinned by clauses 2 and 3 of the Bill. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asked about interference. Clause 18 is not about whether interference is proportionate—that is assessed under clause 19. The grounds for interference, such as for the effectiveness of the immigration system, are consistent with ECHR case law.

Nothing in the Bill prevents individualised decision making; we have deliberately kept that ability, and that is a clear requirement of article 8 compliancy in decision making. Hon. Members also spoke about Home Office decision making. As I have made clear throughout the passage of the Bill, we will of course continue to work to improve decision making. The reforms in the clause clarify how family life should be assessed and strengthen the role of public interest in maintaining effective immigration control, which will help to improve decision making by providing the courts with greater clarity, consistency and predictability.

On mental illness and whether that is a route, it is correct that under proposed new section 117AA(4), family life can be engaged where a person suffers a mental illness or infirmity. However, they would need to be incapacitated to the extent that they need constant care and support, and there would have to be no other viable care options. Examples in established case law include where an adult or child becomes paraplegic after a serious illness, or where an adult or child suffers from Down syndrome and is fully incapacitated. It is worth remembering that the provision is only about establishing family life, and that the decision makers and the courts will go on to consider the public interest question. I hope I have answered all colleagues’ points, and I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.