Immigration and Asylum Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Anna Turley Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I wish to speak briefly against clause 38. Public order disqualification, in the way it has been applied so far, has exacerbated ongoing systemic issues arising from failures in identification and safeguards within the criminal justice system. Available evidence shows that this provision has disproportionately affected individuals subjected to criminal exploitation.

As we heard when discussing previous clauses, many survivors of criminal exploitation were forced to commit offences as part of their exploitation. They are often prosecuted for those crimes as a result of gaps in the application of the non-punishment principle in the UK, including defences under section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. Those who have criminal convictions are at heightened risk of exploitation, too. The criminalisation of survivors has been used time and again as a tool to control people and keep them in exploitation. The clause is an unnecessary extension of existing harms and should be dropped.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is a pleasure to serve under chairmanship, Mr Twigg. I thank colleagues for their contributions to the discussion of the clause.

Clause 38 strengthens and clarifies the public order and bad faith disqualification frameworks due to long-standing challenges in their practical operation, especially in cases involving foreign national offenders. It expands the grounds on which an individual can be disqualified if they pose a threat to national security or public order by including suspended sentences to reflect the changes in the Sentencing Act 2020. It provides clarity in statute as to what is meant by bad faith, ensuring that those who seek to misuse the system with false and fabricated claims, or by raising information for the first time only after removal directions have been set, can be disqualified, ensuring that they are not able to take advantage of the generosity of our system.

The clause also makes it clear that no further modern slavery decision making is required should someone become disqualified. Finally, it exempts child victims from disqualification on public order grounds and makes the exemption for all victims where the risk of re-trafficking is clear. The clause provides a more consistent and robust approach to disqualification decisions and strengthens the Government’s ability to respond where individuals pose a threat to public order or seek to misuse the system.

I shall respond to some of the points that hon. Members made. The shadow Minister asked for case studies or examples of where the clause would be implemented. Suppose that individual C is convicted and receives an 11-month custodial sentence for common assault, battery or breach of a restraining order, which are not covered by public order disqualifications; when they raise modern slavery grounds, that is considered by the national referral mechanism. Where they are a victim, the individual will proceed through the decision-making stages, gaining protection from removal and access to support, and on to a conclusive grounds determination. Where they have ongoing needs and no right to remain, they would get a temporary permission to stay consideration.

Under the new system, even if individual C is a modern slavery victim, a foreign national offender who has received any custodial sentence, including a suspended sentence, will fall within scope of public order disqualification. Where the disqualification is applied, they will be disqualified from support and no further decision making on modern slavery will take place unless an “immediate and significant” risk of re-trafficking in the UK is identified. That means they will not receive a conclusive grounds decision and will not therefore be eligible for temporary permission to stay. British nationals are subject to a different threshold; they will be disqualified on the basis of a public order threat where they have committed one of the crimes set out in section 4 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

The shadow Minister also asked why children are still in scope of the national security limit disqualification. It is right that we can withhold modern slavery protections where an individual poses a threat to national security. That principle should apply regardless of age. Retaining the power to disqualify a child on national security grounds exists solely as a backstop for the rare circumstances in which an individual under 18 poses a significantly serious national security threat and disqualification from the national referral mechanism is therefore appropriate. The exception to disqualification where there is a risk of re-trafficking in the UK will still apply and require decision makers to consider the facts of each case.

This approach intends to strike an appropriate balance between safeguarding children and ensuring that national security considerations are prioritised where necessary. In parallel with our modern slavery response, the UK has one of the most robust counter-terrorism frameworks in the world. Prevent is one of the four pillars of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy; it operates in the non-criminal space and is designed to support people away from radicalisation before they commit an offence. The Home Office is testing new approaches to better spot and refer individuals at risk of radicalisation online, and testing how those insights can be translated into timely, proportionate interventions. That is particularly important considering the rise in children being arrested for terrorism-related activity, much of which is carried out online.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asked about how we will ensure people who are exploited in criminal activity will not be unduly penalised for the exploitation that they have suffered. It is important to flag that the criminal justice system contains safeguards against penalising victims of exploitation, including under section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. That provides a defence in criminal proceedings for people who have been forced or compelled to commit crimes through slavery or exploitation. Clause 38 also expressly sets out that disqualification will not apply where a person is considered to be at “immediate and significant risk” of exploitation in the UK.

I hope I have responded to all of the questions that hon. Members had and provided clarification. I commend amendments 114 to 118 and clause 38 to the Committee.

Amendment 114 agreed to..

Amendment 115 to 118 agreed to.

Clause 38, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 39

Removal of duty to grant leave to remain to assist recovery

[Anna Turley]

I beg to move amendment 119, in clause 39, page 43, line 13, at end insert—

‘(za) in subsection (1)—

(i) omit “and” at the end of paragraph (a),

(ii) in paragraph (b), after “leave to” insert “enter or”, and

(iii) at the end of paragraph (b) insert

“, and

(c) who does not have a right of abode in the United Kingdom”,’

This amendment will clarify that the duty to grant limited leave to remain to a victim of slavery or human trafficking does not apply if the victim already has leave to enter the United Kingdom or a right of abode in the United Kingdom.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

New clause 29—Changes to leave to remain for victims of slavery or human trafficking—

“(1) Section 65 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (leave to remain for victims of slavery or human trafficking) is amended as follows.

(2) For subsection (2), substitute—

‘(2) The Secretary of State must grant the person—

(a) leave to remain in the United Kingdom for a period lasting no less than 60 months,

(b) recourse to public funds, and

(c) the right to work.’

(3) After subsection (2), insert—

‘(2A) A person granted leave to remain in the United Kingdom under subsection (2) is eligible for settlement in the United Kingdom after residing, with any form of leave, in the United Kingdom for a period of five years.”

(4) Omit subsections (4) and (5).’”

This new clause is a redrafted version of Clause 39 and would, if that clause is omitted, give limited leave to remain to all victims of slavery or human trafficking and prevent such leave being withheld if the Secretary of State believes a victim’s needs can be met elsewhere.

[Anna Turley]

Through the Bill, the Government are seeking to simplify and clarify protection and leave routes while ensuring fairness and public confidence in the system. The modern slavery system and the associated temporary permission to stay provision are not intended to be a broad route to immigration status for victims of modern slavery. Instead, the UK offers comprehensive protection and leave routes for individuals who would otherwise be at risk upon return or who need to remain in the UK for broader reasons.

The modern slavery-specific provision is intended for very particular purposes, which clause 39 clarifies. The clause will end the provision of a specific form of modern slavery leave to remain in the UK to assist victims in their recovery from physical or psychological harm arising from their exploitation. The Government’s view is that granting temporary permission to stay on recovery grounds goes beyond what is necessary to meet our international obligations, and we simply need to restore the right balance to the system. Temporary permission to stay will remain available for victims who need to remain in the UK to seek compensation or to support police investigations to bring perpetrators to justice.

I want to be extremely clear up front that this Government remain absolutely committed to supporting victims of modern slavery. This change does not alter the support entitlements for victims while they are in the UK. Access to modern slavery support in the UK is not dependent on the grant of temporary permission to stay. This Government provide a comprehensive support package while individuals are in the UK. Confirmed adult victims will continue to access specialist support where they have ongoing needs through the adult victim support contract and wider state services. Confirmed child victims will continue to receive statutory safeguarding support via local authorities, healthcare and the independent child trafficking guardian service.

Both currently and following this change, individuals not granted temporary permission to stay will continue to have access to other routes to remain in the UK, depending on their circumstances. Any applications will be considered on their individual merits in line with published policy. For example, permission to stay may be available to a victim of modern slavery who entered the UK as an overseas domestic worker, a domestic worker in a private household or as a private servant in a diplomatic household. The change to temporary permission to stay will not alter that. An individual’s immigration status and assessment of risk upon return is considered if an individual makes a protection claim. That includes an assessment of serious harm and consideration of risk of re-trafficking and reflects risks of success of specific exploiters, wider vulnerabilities of the individual to re-trafficking and the ability of the return country to protect that individual. Any claim will be considered on its individual merits.

Clause 39 will therefore create a clearer and more coherent temporary permission to stay framework, while maintaining support for victims and preserving the appropriate immigration and protection routes for those who qualify. Amendment 119 is a technical change that clarifies the eligibility criteria for individuals to be considered for temporary permission to stay. It makes clear that individuals who already hold valid leave to enter, leave to remain or a right of abode in the United Kingdom are not eligible for temporary permission to stay.

The change relates only to eligibility for temporary permission to stay. It does not change the grounds for granting temporary permission to stay, or the entitlements available to those granted the leave. As I have already made clear, that change does not impact support entitlements. Victims will still have access to support provided through the national referral mechanism while they remain in the UK. A grant of temporary permission to stay is not needed to access support.

New clause 29 was tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. I will respond to it in full once the hon. Lady has spoken about it. The clause would require the Secretary of State to grant all eligible confirmed victims of modern slavery at least five years’ leave to remain with a route towards settlement. Although I appreciate the intention behind the new clause, temporary permission to stay was never intended to be a general immigration route or a pathway towards settlement to meet the UK’s international obligations under the refugee convention. The new clause goes far beyond what is proportionate and reasonable in these circumstances, though I look forward to hearing the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion’s arguments for it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

Supporting a victim of modern slavery and deciding what immigration permission that person should have are related questions, but they are not the same. The law must protect people who have been exploited while maintaining an immigration system that is controlled, and that the public can have confidence in. Clause 39 removes the specific duty to grant limited leave to help someone recover from physical or psychological harm caused by their exploitation. It keeps the duty where leave is needed for a victim to seek compensation or to co-operate with an investigation or criminal proceedings.

Whatever some may claim, this is not the removal of every route by which a confirmed victim can receive leave. The Opposition support keeping this route focused on a specific, evidenced need. A finding that someone has been exploited does not answer every question about where they should live or for how long. The Minister needs to tell us how this will work for a genuine victim who still needs help, and how continuity of recovery support will be ensured.

There is also a bigger point here: the grounds that remain are the ones that matter most for bringing traffickers to justice. However, according to the figures that charities have put before the Committee, in 2024 only a handful of grants were made so that victims could seek compensation or help with criminal proceedings. A prosecution that collapses because the key witness left the country is a win for the trafficker, and nobody on the Committee wants that. Can the Minister tell us how the Home Office will ensure that these remaining grounds are actually used, and that its decisions never undermine a victim’s ability to help put an exploiter behind bars?

Government amendment 119 adds existing leave to enter and the right of abode to the circumstances in which there is no duty to grant leave under this provision. Avoiding duplication makes sense, and we support it. New clause 29 goes in a very different direction: it would require at least five years’ leave for qualifying confirmed victims, with access to public funds and permission to work, as well as eligibility for settlement after five years’ residence with any form of leave. That is a very substantial immigration proposal, and it would send exactly the wrong signal to the gangs who sell places on small boats. We oppose it.

Being recognised as a victim is a serious finding, but it should not automatically settle the separate question of a long period of residence, access to public funds and a route to settlement. Those who back the new clause need to explain why five years is the right minimum in every single qualifying case; how many people it would cover; what it would cost in housing and public services; and why residence under any form of leave should count towards settlement. We support clause 39 and Government amendment 119, and we hope that the Minister will set out the safeguards that will sit alongside them.

[Anna Turley]

I thank all the hon. Members who have tabled amendments in this group and contributed to the debate. I want to start with new clause 29, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. As was set out earlier, it would grant eligible confirmed victims of modern slavery at least five years’ leave to remain, with a route towards settlement.

I want to be clear that temporary permission to stay is a targeted and temporary form of leave designed to meet specific needs arising from an individual’s experience of exploitation that meets the UK’s international obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. Temporary permission to stay will continue to be available where it is necessary for a confirmed victim to remain in the UK to co-operate with law enforcement agencies in the investigation of crimes or to seek compensation in relation to their exploitation.

New clause 29 would require the Government to grant leave in a way that would go beyond what is proportionate or reasonable and would significantly exceed what is required under our international obligations.

[Siân Berry]

I asked in my speech not about people claiming asylum but about those here under other forms of immigration status. Does the Minister not see the replacement of those with VTS leave being reduced as a result of clause 39? That is one of the problems that I wanted to raise. When people are here under potentially coercive forms of leave, such as sponsored work visas, will VTS leave still be available as a replacement to prevent people being left in the hands of exploiters?

[Anna Turley]

I will cover that in the more in-depth response to the hon. Lady’s comments at the appropriate time.

As I said, the new clause would require the Government to grant leave in a way that would go beyond what is proportionate or reasonable, and that would significantly exceed what is required under our international obligations. When individuals require protection or are seeking to remain in the UK, other routes remain available, depending on the individual circumstances. Creating an automatic pathway to long-term leave and settlement through modern slavery provisions would conflate the modern slavery identification and support system with an immigration route, and thus risks blurring that distinction. That has the potential to increase opportunities for improper use of the system and would have significant implications for wider immigration objectives, which we have been clear must operate on the principles of fairness.

I hope to cover some of the points that the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion raised—if I fail to pick them up, I ask her to come back to me or I can respond in writing. She asked whether the temporary permission to stay framework meets our international obligations. Decision to grant temporary permission to stay does not automatically lead to removal from the UK. There are various routes to remain in the UK that will remain available to foreign nationals depending on their circumstances. Any applications will be considered on their individual merits in line with published policy.

The hon. Lady asked whether any further statistics could be shared. Temporary permission to stay data is currently drawn from a number of different Home Office systems. Further work is under way to establish the most robust dataset. We are continuing to assess what information can be shared publicly and we will provide further data in due course where appropriate.

The hon. Lady also asked whether we are disadvantaging people by removing recovery from exploitation. The measure does not prevent individuals from accessing support from the point of their positive reasonable grounds decision—or earlier, if emergency support is required to assist with recovery from their exploitation. Access to the national referral mechanism support is based on national referral mechanism status, not immigration status. All adult victims in England and Wales who need to can continue to access specialist needs-based support to assist their recovery, irrespective of their immigration status or a refusal of temporary permission to stay.

The hon. Lady also flagged whether the changes were compliant with international law. The Government’s view is that the change to the temporary permission to stay policy absolutely does not impede our compliance with our international compliance. Temporary permission to stay, in its current forms, goes beyond what is required under article 14 of the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. The changes will provide stronger clarity on the UK’s obligations while still complying with article 14.

Article 4 of the European convention on human rights imposes a positive obligation on member states to identify and protect victims of trafficking, which is met in part through the operation of the national referral mechanism. That obligation does not go so far as to require member states to grant leave. In any event, support is not dependent on temporary permission to stay leave being granted, so that even when an individual is not granted temporary permission to stay leave, they can still access modern slavery support while they remain in the UK.

Further, an individual’s immigration status and assessment of risk on return are considered if an individual makes a protection claim. That includes an assessment of whether the individual has a well-founded fear of persecution or is at real risk of serious harm. Any claim will be considered on its individual merits, in line with published policy and country information.

The hon. Lady also asked about skilled workers. As of 8 October 2026, skilled workers who receive a positive conclusive grounds decision, where that decision was made during their most recent permission, may have their visa amended for the remaining period of extant leave. Individuals will not need to be sponsored and can work in any occupation. The change supports skilled workers to leave exploitative employers and move to new, safe employment. In the immigration White Paper, the Government committed to explore introducing further reforms to our sponsorship system by putting more responsibility and accountability on effective and responsible sponsors. That will include exploring whether the Government can make it easier for workers to move between licensed sponsors for the duration of their visa, giving them more control over who they work for and reducing the risk of exploitation.

The hon. Member for Stockton West asked what the changes will mean for compensation and people’s co-operation with the process. Under the changes to temporary permission to stay, victims can continue to engage with law enforcement agencies in supporting criminal investigations and pursue compensation in relation to their exploitation. By focusing temporary permission to stay on those specific purposes, the Government can ensure that it remains available in supporting victims’ engagement with the criminal justice system and accessing compensation. More broadly, the Government are strengthening the tools available to law enforcement and courts to disrupt criminal activity, prevent modern slavery and protect those at risk.

On victim engagement with the criminal justice system, I should say that the modern slavery victim care contract provides adult victims in the national referral mechanism with a dedicated support worker to assist them to access legal aid and legal representation. That support will be further strengthened when the modern slavery victim care contract is replaced by the new support for victims of modern slavery service. The new contract introduces specialist support workers to help victims to engage better with the criminal justice system. That will include, but is not limited to, providing tailored guidance and advocacy to help victims understand complex legal processes, and helping to remove barriers to accessing and receiving the assistance they need at every point in the criminal justice process.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 41 and 42 stand part.

[Anna Turley]

I turn to our commitments to ensure that all exploited and trafficked children can access the support they need for their recovery. Clause 40 seeks to amend sections 48 and 58 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to rename independent child trafficking advocates as independent child trafficking guardians, following the recommendation of the independent review of the Modern Slavery Act and the subsequent renaming of the role in June 2019. The Government consider that “guardian” better reflects the role and is more easily understood and used by children and the professionals supporting them. The clause makes a change in terminology and does not alter the functions or powers of independent child trafficking advocates.

As I have said, this Government are committed to supporting vulnerable children. Clause 41 makes clear our ongoing commitment to providing specialist modern slavery support for children through independent child trafficking guardians across England and Wales. The clause ensures that all children in England and Wales who are potential victims of this horrendous crime will have a statutory right to access that support. It reflects the lessons learned from the existing pilot and stakeholder engagement, and gives independent child trafficking guardians flexibility to respond to each child’s needs. It clarifies that they can provide representation, support, or both—either directly to the child or indirectly by supporting other professionals who provide services or make decisions about the child.

Although independent child trafficking guardians already engage in practice from the point of referral, references to “reasonable grounds” in section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act risk creating confusion with national referral mechanism decision-making thresholds, which in turn risks an inconsistent approach to supporting vulnerable children. The clause clarifies that support should be provided at the earliest opportunity, and implements recommendations made by the independent review of the Modern Slavery Act. Importantly, it also clarifies the need for collaboration by requiring public bodies to have due regard to independent child trafficking guardians’ expertise, to share relevant information and to involve independent child trafficking guardians in discussions and decisions relating to the child. That will help independent child trafficking guardians work effectively with the authorities responsible for the child’s care, providing specialist expertise to help make sure that children access the support required to recover from this awful abuse.

Further detail will be outlined in the regulations and statutory guidance, which will be published alongside the national roll-out of the service. The clause ensures that there is clear and consistent support for exploited children; I commend it to the Committee.

Clause 42 removes a fulfilled requirement in section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 for the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a report setting out proposed steps in relation to the arrangements for independent child trafficking guardians within nine months of the Modern Slavery Act’s being passed.

The then Government fulfilled that obligation in 2015 when they laid before Parliament a report setting out their proposed approach to implementing the service. Since then, the independent child trafficking guardian service has been developed, tested and refined through the pilot service, independent evaluations, feedback from children and young people, and the recommendations from the independent review of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

The requirement to report again on the proposed approach is therefore no longer necessary as the service model is now established and its operation is well understood. The clause also removes the specific commencement provisions relating to the independent child trafficking guardian measures in section 61 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The relevant provisions in section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act will instead be subject to the general commencement arrangements in the Act. The clause does not itself alter the functions or powers of independent child trafficking guardians. I commend clauses 40 to 42 to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

A child who has been trafficked or enslaved has already been let down by adults in the worst way imaginable; they now need adults who will take responsibility and keep them safe, not a maze of agencies arguing about whose job that is. That is the test that we apply to these clauses and, based on that test, the Opposition support them.

Clause 40 renames independent child trafficking advocates as independent child trafficking guardians. Those advocates were one of the innovations of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, and we have no difficulty with a title that better describes their role. However, a new name will not, on its own, protect a single child. What matters is whether the guardian has the expertise, access and authority to make a difference.

Clause 41 is more substantive. It allows guardians to provide representation, support or both, and makes clear that the role covers children who may be victims of slavery as well as trafficking. That recognises that exploitation does not always fit neatly into one box. Many of us have seen in our own communities how county line gangs groom children to run drugs. That is exploitation, plain and simple.

The clause also allows assistance to be given indirectly through the professionals who provide services to or make decisions about the child. Helping those professionals to understand the risks has real value, but indirect support must never become a convenient substitute for someone actually being there for a child who needs them. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell us who will decide whether indirect support is enough and how the child’s own voice will be heard in that decision.

The guardians’ involvement in decisions must also be meaningful. There is little point in appointing someone to stand up for a child if the big decisions have been made before they are in the room. Guardians also need a clear and fast route to the police when an exploiter is trying to get back in touch with a child. They are part of the safeguarding response, and the gangs who prey on children must be hunted down and prosecuted.

Clause 42 would remove the requirement to report to Parliament on proposed steps under section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act and change the commencement arrangements. In July, the Government announced £25 million to extend the guardian service to the remaining 179 local authorities in England that do not have it yet. We welcome that, but a child in one of those areas needs a guardian now. Can the Minister tell us when the service will be available in every one of them? Removing a reporting requirement must not mean that Parliament knows less about whether children are actually being kept safe.

Finally, the service will work only if it can meet demand. Can the Minister tell us how many children the expanded service is expected to support and what will happen when demand outstrips capacity? The Government should set out how they will measure whether guardians are actually making children safer, to ensure that this is a real step forward and not simply a change of name. We support clauses 40 to 42.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his questions; I will seek to respond to them in my reply. This group of clauses makes clear the Government’s commitment to providing specialist modern slavery support for children through the independent child trafficking guardians across England and Wales. Clause 40 amends the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to rename independent child trafficking advocates as independent child trafficking guardians, as recommended by the independent review of the Modern Slavery Act, and their service’s renaming in 2019.

Clause 41 ensures that all children in England and Wales have a statutory right to access support. It reflects lessons learned from existing pilot and stakeholder engagement. It clarifies that support should be provided at the earliest opportunity, and the need for collaboration between independent child trafficking guardians and public bodies.

Clause 42 removes a requirement in the 2015 Act for the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a report setting out proposed steps in relation to the arrangements for independent child trafficking guardians within nine months of the Act being passed. The Government at the time fulfilled the obligation and now consider it unnecessary. It removes the commencement provisions relating to independent child trafficking guardian measures in section 61 of the Modern Slavery Act. Instead, they will be subject to general commencement arrangements in the Act.

The hon. Member for Stockton West asked about the UK-wide application of the child trafficking guardianship service. In England and Wales, we recently announced a £25 million investment in the national independent child trafficking guardianship service, which—combined with the provisions in the Bill to place the guardian support on a statutory footing—will end the postcode lottery and ensure that exploited and trafficked children will have access to the support that they need.

The hon. Gentleman asked about the model and how we decided on the more indirect model. The independent child trafficking guardian support model remains largely unchanged from the 2024 operational model. This flexible, needs-based approach was found better to meet the needs of vulnerable children by the independent evaluation of the independent child trafficking guardian service, published in 2024. It is supported by best practice and the Home Office response to the modern slavery review.

Every child is entitled to indirect support where independent child trafficking guardians promote effective, multi-agency working to ensure that the child’s needs are met by the most appropriate professional, and provide specialist modern slavery and exploitation expertise to support professionals who may already have established relationships with children. Direct one-to-one support is generally provided to children with no figure of parental responsibility in the UK. However, the service also has the flexibility to provide direct support in other cases where that is appropriate to meet a child’s needs. As the independent child trafficking guardian service is rolled out nationally, the Government will continue to monitor and evaluate its impact to ensure that it remains effective in supporting child victims of modern slavery.

The hon. Gentleman asked about safeguarding partners. If they already have legal duties, why are independent child trafficking guardians needed, and how will different organisations work together not to duplicate the contact with the child and the help for that child to navigate the system? Independent child trafficking guardians provide specialist modern slavery expertise and independent advocacy, complementing rather than duplicating the statutory safeguarding role of other agencies. The legislation strengthens collaboration by requiring public bodies to have due regard to independent child trafficking guardians’ views and recommendations, to provide access to the relevant information and to involve independent child trafficking guardians in discussions and decisions relating to the child.

That means that public authorities must properly consider and take account of independent child trafficking guardians’ views when exercising their functions, but retain responsibility for making decisions and discharging their statutory duties. Details of how that will be achieved will be outlined in the independent child trafficking guardians statutory guidance, which will be published alongside national roll-out of the guardians service. The legislation does not require public authorities to follow any particular recommendation made by an independent child trafficking guardian. Rather, public authorities must have due regard to the independent child trafficking guardian’s views and recommendations before reaching their own decisions. That requirement will be further supplemented by guidance. For public bodies not paying due regard to independent child trafficking guardians, concerns may be expressed through existing safeguarding and accountability processes. Public bodies remain accountable for ensuring that the decisions are lawful, properly reasoned and consistent with their statutory duties.

The hon. Member for Stockton West asked further about indirect and direct support, and the more appropriate form of it. It will be for Barnardo’s—the service provider—to determine what support a child needs. Clear guidance will be provided by the Home Office. The service also has the flexibility to determine where direct support is appropriate to meet a child’s needs, for instance where there is no figure of parental responsibility for the child in the UK. We believe it is appropriate this decision making sit with the service provider that is best able to make this decision. This flexible, needs-based approach was found to better meet the needs of vulnerable children by the independent evaluation of the independent child trafficking guardian service, published in 2024.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

It is my view and that of a wide range of refugee and modern slavery organisations that clause 43, particularly subsection (3), is incompatible with article 12 of the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings, which puts a duty on state parties to afford support to survivors of modern slavery in receipt of a reasonable grounds decision. The removal of the duty to provide support will put adults, children and young people at risk of destitution, homelessness and further harm, as we have discussed in relation to previous clauses.

We know that trauma can manifest in a wide range of ways and may significantly affect an individual’s ability to engage consistently with support services or comply with procedural requirements. Penalising people for such difficulties fails to take account of the realities of trauma and recovery and, again, creates detriment from a known feature of abuse. Additionally, while we agree that safeguarding and supporting children should be the responsibility of local authorities, they do need to receive adequate resources in order to discharge those duties appropriately and in the best interests of the child. Local authorities do not currently receive any funding to offer specialist support to children affected by trafficking and exploitation, and my amendments to this clause therefore seek both to reduce the harms being caused by it and to boost the support that can be offered to survivors.

Amendment 70 would remove subsection (3) and take away the Secretary of State’s power to override professional assessments. Support for the survivors of modern slavery is currently delivered through Government-funded contracts such as the modern slavery victim care contract in England and Wales, and equivalent arrangements across the devolved Administrations. Specialist organisations and trained support workers provide this support directly to survivors and are responsible for carrying out detailed assessments of need. The assessments should be informed by the professional expertise of frontline practitioners and crucially by survivors’ own views and experiences. I believe that support workers and survivors are best placed to identify an individual’s needs, because they are in direct and ongoing contact with the person concerned. It would therefore be harmful for the Secretary of State, who is removed from this direct engagement, to override such assessments without having had contact with the individual or a comparable understanding of their circumstances.

Allowing decision makers who are distant from a survivor’s situation to disregard professional assessments risks undermining survivor-centred support and could result in people being discharged from support with outstanding high needs. The Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group has presented further evidence to us on these points, around subsection (3). It says that it

“reflects the operational reality of how the MSVCC contract already functions in assessing survivors' needs.”

It therefore makes worse what is already bad. At the moment, an MSVCC provider completes a needs assessment and submits it to the Home Office for approval. The Home Office then reviews the assessment and either agrees or disagrees with both the assessment itself and the level of support recommended. It is concerning that this decision maker power, that ultimately rests with the Home Office, will be given directly to the Secretary of State.

The Secretary of State will be even further removed from the care, safeguarding and day-to-day insight available to frontline service providers, and could issue blanket rules or directives in situations of strained resources, for example, that would even more arbitrarily remove support from survivors. The Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group tells us that there is evidence for already ongoing issues with meeting the thresholds required to secure additional support, including for mental health needs. The recovery needs assessment process is highly bureaucratic—individuals are often discharged from support despite having significant unmet needs. If a similar approach is applied to decisions relating to the recovery and reflection period, there is a substantial risk that individuals will be discharged from support while still experiencing high levels of unmet need, exposing them to an increased risk of re-exploitation.

In amendment 72, I have asked for assistance to apply to children. While we agree that safeguarding and supporting children should be the responsibility of local authorities, I think it is very important that the Secretary of State retains an overarching duty to ensure that children receive support in line with article 12 of the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. This would help ensure national accountability for the protection and recovery of child victims of trafficking and not leave it to the piecemeal provisions of local authorities. Maintaining this duty would also ensure that the Secretary of State remains responsible for ensuring that local authorities are adequately resourced, as my next amendment would require. It would be, therefore, an important safeguard to ensure that all children receive the support and assistance to which they are entitled, regardless of where they are located.

Amendment 73 would ensure funding for local authorities to support children. We need to make sure that they have adequate resources to discharge their duties in the best interest of children. Currently, local authorities do not receive any specialist support funding for children affected by trafficking and exploitation, but it is essential, as is the mainstream child protection that local authorities provide. The charity, ECPAT, which stands for Every Child Protected Against Trafficking, has told me that not providing dedicated funding to local authorities to meet the ECAT entitlements of children leaves an enormous gap. It says that the Home Office provides local authorities with £143 per child, per night, towards the cost of supporting unaccompanied children, but there is no equivalent funding attached to a child’s identification as a potential victim of trafficking. That responsibility is placed on the existing social care system, which we all know is under substantial financial pressure. I really hope that the Government will listen to that point.

A final point in relation to subsection (3) is that all it says is

“where the Secretary of State disagrees”

—which is incredibly broad. Will the Minister tell us whether the Secretary of State will publish criteria governing when this override power may be used, and will she address the fact that there is currently no defined threshold for displacing an authorised person’s professional assessment by the Home Office? I will not press my amendments to a vote, but I want to see the risks and problems identified by them addressed, either in regulations or in the Bill, before the legislation leaves this House and goes to the other place.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for tabling amendments 70 to 73, which propose several changes to clause 43 on support and assistance provided to adult and child potential victims of modern slavery. I will start by reiterating the purpose of clause 43 and then turn to the amendments. Currently, where a potential victim has had suitable statutory support put in place to meet a modern slavery need, and that support is removed due to their conduct, the Secretary of State is required to provide that person with the equivalent support again. That results in the duplication of support provided across Government and the associated excessive costs to the taxpayer.

Clause 43 will ensure that the Secretary of State is not required to provide equivalent support again in those circumstances. For example, if a potential victim has their asylum accommodation withdrawn because they did not follow asylum support conditions, they will no longer be able to access equivalent modern slavery accommodation in its place. That will safeguard the integrity of the modern slavery system, ensuring support is not provided unconditionally and indefinitely. We recognise, however, the specific vulnerabilities and impact that trauma may have on an individual’s conduct. To safeguard vulnerable victims, support will not be withheld if there is a good reason, related to their modern slavery experience, for the conduct that led to that element of support being removed.

I wish to be clear that the Government remain committed to supporting vulnerable people. We have invested £25 million in the national independent child trafficking guardianship service and are in the process of procuring the new adult victim support contract to assist victims to achieve long-term stability and to live independently, and to reduce their risk of re-exploitation. Together, those investments form part of our wider programme of modern slavery reform, designed to safeguard the integrity of the system and ensure that resources are targeted at those who need them.

Clause 43 also makes technical amendments to section 50A of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. They will not change the support provided to adult or child victims; rather, the clause ensures that current support arrangements for adult and child victims are correctly reflected in statute. In line with existing practice, the amendments remove children from the provision to reflect that local authorities safeguard and promote the welfare of all children within their area, and the independent child trafficking guardian service provides further specialist modern slavery support. The amendments also make it clear that an authorised support provider can assess the support needs of adult victims of modern slavery.

Turning to amendments 70 to 73, the Government understand that their intention is to safeguard vulnerable potential victims. The Government share that commitment and are equally committed to ensuring that all victims of modern slavery, including child victims, can access the necessary support and assistance they require. The Government do not, however, consider the amendments necessary. In fact, they directly contradict the intention of clause 43 in two ways.

First, amendment 70 seeks to remove the Secretary of State’s power to override an authorised person’s assessment that support is necessary to assist a potential victim in their recovery. That would mean that the Secretary of State would be unable to intervene where appropriate to ensure that the outcome of a support assessment aligned with the relevant statutory guidance. That is a necessary power, ensuring fairness in the provision of support to adult victims across England and Wales. The power provides an important safeguard to ensure that Government-issued guidance on the assessment of necessary support is appropriately adhered to.

The need to intervene may arise in particularly complex cases and where other state support services have jurisdiction. For example, where an authorised support provider has determined that financial support is necessary but has not accounted for income the victim receives from another statutory service, the Secretary of State must be able to intervene to ensure that financial support is not provided where it is not necessary, in line with guidance.

As an another example, where an authorised support provider has determined that ongoing support should be provided to a victim despite their lack of engagement, but it has not given due attention to the non-engagement policy and the other statutory support available to a victim, the Secretary of State must be able to intervene to withdraw that support in line with statutory guidance on non-engagement to ensure consistency and fairness in the application of the policy across victims in England and Wales. I want to be clear, however, that the Home Office has a robust contract management regime in place to ensure that our supplier will deliver a high-quality service to victims in line with its contractual obligations underpinned by statutory guidance. The supplier has consistently met and exceeded delivery expectations, and the Home Office has a strong relationship with it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

My concern is that subsection (3) provides the Home Secretary with a broad, unqualified power to disagree with the assessments that the Minister has just mentioned. Amendment 71 seems to provide a perfectly reasonable set of safeguards against breaching those international obligations. Will the Minister look at providing more detail about the criteria that the Home Secretary would use in future regulation to reassure us?

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the hon. Lady referencing that. Of course, we will always consider any issues and desires for clarification that are raised in this Committee through the development of the regulations. Her concerns have been noted, but I am reassured that we are compliant with the ECAT and ECHR obligations.

The hon. Lady made a couple of other points about a potential increase in homelessness and destitution. The Home Office remains committed to meeting legal obligations, ensuring that policies do not leave people destitute or at risk of re-trafficking. However, individuals should not be able to use modern slavery to circumvent the conditions for other statutory support services. To ensure a coherent approach across Government to supporting victims, adult modern slavery support will be withheld in particular circumstances in order to align with decisions made by wider statutory services to withdraw support from someone who has failed to follow reasonable conditions.

To safeguard vulnerable victims, support will not be withheld if a victim has a good reason related to their modern slavery experience to explain why they were unable to meet reasonable conditions. As only the particular element of modern slavery support that was removed by another service will be withheld, where necessary, support worker assistance will remain available to advise and signpost to other avenues of accommodation or financial support.

The hon. Lady also asked about the Home Office’s oversight and monitoring of local authorities to ensure that children do not fall through gaps in provision. I think I have covered most of that, but the children’s social care national framework is statutory guidance for local authorities that sets the national direction for practice. It provides clarity on the outcomes that children’s social care should achieve for children, young people and families. “Working Together to Safeguard Children 2026” is the multi-agency statutory guidance. It provides detailed information on the duties and responsibilities of all agencies to safeguard children.

Both pieces of statutory guidance—the national framework and “Working Together”—should be read alongside each other. Ofsted independently inspects local authority children’s services through its inspecting local authority children’s services framework. Those inspections consider the experiences and progress of children and families, the quality of practice and leadership, and whether services are meeting their statutory duties. Local authorities are assessed using performance data, reform, delivery and wider regional intelligence to determine the appropriate level of support and intervention.

As I have outlined, the amendments are unnecessary, as the Government are confident that support provisions for adult and child potential victims are compliant with our international obligations. Adult support needs assessments already consider the individual support needs and circumstances of victims, and local authorities already have a duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of all children within their areas. For the reasons outlined, I respectfully request that the amendments not be pressed.

Government amendments 120 to 123 will make minor changes to proposed new subsection 50A(5ZA) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, inserted by clause 43, to clarify how the provision will work in practice. First, amendments 120 to 122 put beyond doubt that proposed new subsection 50A(5ZA) is a targeted provision such that where a particular form of support is to be withheld, such as accommodation, the duty to provide other forms of support, such as financial support, will continue. That will prevent the duplication of support provided across Government and the associated excessive costs to taxpayers by ensuring that specific forms of support are not provided unconditionally and indefinitely. However, we recognise the specific vulnerabilities and impact that trauma may have on an individual’s conduct, which is why the amendments will make the safeguards for vulnerable potential victims clearer.

As a result of amendment 123, when decision makers are deciding whether an element of support should be withheld, they will consider whether the conduct that resulted in other statutory support being removed is attributable rather than “properly” attributable to their modern slavery experience. That is to avoid decision makers having to make unduly complex assessments, which could have an adverse impact on vulnerable potential victims. I commend Government amendments 120 to 123 and clause 43 to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Support for potential victims must reach those who genuinely need it, with clear responsibility for decisions and proper accountability for every pound of taxpayers’ money. Clause 43 raises three practical questions. Who assesses that need? Who can overrule that assessment? How does this support fit alongside other services?

The clause allows an authorised person to assess the assistance someone needs while keeping a power for the Secretary of State to override a positive assessment. Amendment 70 would scrap that override. I understand the worry about specialist advice being set aside, but Ministers must remain answerable to this House for the public money in this system, so we cannot support the amendment. What the power does demand is clear reasons. I would welcome the Minister telling us when the override is expected to be used, what evidence would justify it, and how a wrong decision would be put right.

Amendment 71 would add a list of factors to be assessed, including the best interests of the person and their dependent; their individual needs; and compatibility with the relevant conventions. Good decision makers should already be weighing a person’s need, and writing a long list of factors into statute invites challenge on every one of them and risks turning each decision into a legal contest. We do not support the amendment.

Government amendments 120 to 123 are the latest in a string of changes that the Government have made to their Bill in this part alone, but these amendments are an improvement. Where someone loses support elsewhere because of their conduct, the exclusion is narrowed to the particular kind of support they have lost, rather than letting the loss of one service become a reason to withhold everything. That is a fair balance. Conditions attached to public assistance must still mean something, and the taxpayer should not simply be asked to replace support that someone has lost through their own misconduct.

Government amendment 123 removes the word “properly” from the test of whether that conduct is attributable to harm arising from exploitation. We will not oppose it, but the Minister should explain why the word is going, and confirm that it does not lower the bar. The question must still be answered on the evidence. Neither an automatic excuse nor an automatic penalty makes for good decisions.

Amendments 72 and 73 concern children. Clause 43 removes children from these Home Office support duties while separate duties on local authorities and other agencies remain. Amendment 72 would keep the Home Office duty for children, and amendment 73 would require resources for local authority provision and reporting on funding.

Protecting children is essential, but keeping two overlapping duties risks the very thing we all want to avoid: two bodies each assuming that the other has it covered while the child falls through the middle. We do not support these amendments either, but the Government must be clear about where responsibility now lies. I would be grateful if the Minister could set out who is responsible at each stage of a child’s case, how local authority provision will be funded, and what happens immediately if that provision is not there. We support clause 43 and Government amendments 120 to 123.

[The Chair]

Does the Minister wish to respond?

[Anna Turley]

I think I have answered most of the hon. Gentleman’s questions, and if not, I will clarify in writing.

[Siân Berry]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: 120, in clause 43, page 45, line 9, after “support” insert “of a particular kind”.

This amendment and amendments 121 and 122 clarify that where assistance or support of a particular kind would have been available from elsewhere had it not been for the victim’s conduct it is only assistance or support of that particular kind that the Secretary of State will no longer be under a duty to provide.

Amendment 121, in clause 43, page 45, line 10, leave out first “the”.

See the explanatory statement for amendment 120.

Amendment 122, in clause 43, page 45, line 10, after “support” insert “of that kind”.

See the explanatory statement for amendment 120.

Amendment 123, in clause 43, page 45, line 15, leave out “properly”.—(Anna Turley.)

This amendment leaves out an unnecessary word from the inserted subsection (5ZA).

Clause 43, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 44

Content of slavery and human trafficking statements

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I shall now speak to clauses 44 to 49. While we take seriously the need to investigate modern slavery within the UK and provide support to victims, we must also remain cognisant of the global reach of UK business and supply chains. Globally, it is estimated that 27.6 million people are trapped in forced labour, with around two thirds of those cases linked to global supply chains. Section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act established the UK as the first country in the world to require businesses to report on how they are tackling modern slavery in their operations and supply chains. While the transparency in supply chains regime was widely welcomed by businesses and non-governmental organisations when it was first introduced, it has since faced criticism that it is merely a tick-box exercise that lacks any teeth in respect to enforcement.

Compliance with section 54 is difficult to quantify, but analysis from the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre in 2021 suggested that around only 60% of companies have met basic reporting requirements. This month, the Rathbones “Votes Against Slavery” report identified 194 instances of non-compliance across 160 FTSE 350 companies over the last six years. Measures in the Bill will address that by raising expectations on businesses and public sector organisations to improve their reporting and act on exploitation in their supply chains, with stronger consequences for non-compliance. We are bringing in a more consistent approach to how organisations report, and by penalising those that do not comply, we can better highlight those that are taking positive action to ensure their supply chains are free from modern slavery. Those that fall short will be clearly exposed, encouraging a race to the top.

Clause 44 strengthens transparency by requiring organisations to cover mandatory content in their annual modern slavery statement, as set out in proposed new schedule 4ZA. It replaces the existing discretionary reporting areas in section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act with mandatory areas in proposed new schedule 4ZA, set out in schedule 5 of the Bill. We expect businesses and the public sector to report meaningfully on the actions they are taking. In making this change, reports will become more standardised, comprehensive and open to greater public scrutiny. Clause 44 also enables the Secretary of State to amend those requirements through regulations following consultation with persons the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

Schedule 5 sets out the information that must be provided in a slavery and human trafficking statement. Statements must include information on the organisation’s structure, operations and supply chains; risks in their operations and supply chains, and steps taken to manage those risks; policies in relation to slavery and human trafficking; relevant due diligence processes; training for staff; and an assessment of the effectiveness of action taken. If an organisation does not have any relevant information to provide under any of these topics, they must provide a reason.

This provides a clear and consistent framework for businesses and public authorities to report on action they have taken to assess and address risks of modern slavery in their operations and supply chains. By standardising reporting in line with the Government’s comprehensive guidance, consumers and investors will have greater access to relevant information to support making informed choices on where to spend their money.

The Modern Slavery Act is ambiguous in its expectations on organisational accountability for the content of modern slavery statements and how group structures may meet their reporting requirements. The Government want to ensure that senior parties are held to account for the contents of their organisations’ statements, and to certify that they are current. Clause 45 mandates that signatories state that the contents of their reports are accurate to the best of their knowledge and belief, and that they sign after the end of the financial year to which it relates.

We also want to continue to allow the private sector to report in groups, where appropriate, as a means of balancing transparency with the burdens on business. Clause 45 sets out that parent companies may produce statements on behalf of their subsidiaries. It therefore clarifies responsibility for modern slavery statements by ensuring that accountability rests with a clearly identifiable senior individual. That will strengthen governance and oversight, promote greater board-level engagement and reinforce the expectation that signatories take responsibility both for the accuracy of the statement and for the organisation’s approach to managing modern slavery risks. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Clauses 44 and 45, together with schedule 5, set out what businesses must tell us about modern slavery and who takes responsibility for that information. The Modern Slavery Act 2015 put responsibility on businesses to explain what they were doing about the slavery in their operations and supply chains. That was an important Conservative reform. We should build on that where there are gaps, and judge the changes by whether they help to expose and stop exploitation.

An honest business that pays its workers properly should not be undercut by someone whose low prices depend on exploitation further down the chain. Nor should a customer have to wonder whether the bargain they have bought came at somebody else’s expense. Clear information can help with both, but a longer statement is not necessarily a better one, and paying someone to produce a polished document is no substitute for checking what is happening on the ground. Clause 44 and schedule 5 make reporting topics compulsory. They cover the organisation and its supply chains; the risks and the steps taken to address them; policies, checks and staff training; and whether action taken has worked.

We support the principle of making statements more useful and easier to compare. A reader should be able to work out what an organisation has actually done without wading through pages of comforting language. Ministers will have a power to change the required content, so I would be grateful for an assurance that any future change will be assessed for its cost to business as well as for its expected benefit.

There is an important qualification, however. Schedule 5 still allows an organisation to say that it has not assessed the risk, put policies in place or taken particular steps, provided that it gives an explanation. The Minister should be clear about what is being promised. This is a duty to report on specified matters; it does not, by itself, require every organisation to take every action described in the schedule. That raises an obvious question: what happens when the same organisation reports year after year that it has done nothing? Who will look at the explanation and what will prompt further scrutiny? There is a difference between being honest about a gap and treating an annual explanation as permission to leave that gap untouched.

The detail must be workable. A company may buy through several suppliers before the chain reaches the people making the product, and information will not always be easy to obtain. Ministers need to explain what reasonable inquiries look like to avoid creating a system in which large companies simply pass endless questionnaires down to smaller firms. Small suppliers should be able to spend their time dealing with real risks, rather than answering the same question in 10 different formats. Businesses will also need proper notice before the new requirements apply; I hope the Minister will tell us how much notice they will get.

Clause 45 deals with approval and signing, including certification by a parent undertaking. That can avoid duplication, but it must not allow the activities of a subsidiary to disappear inside a vague statement about the wider group. The person signing should have asked enough questions to stand behind the declaration of accuracy. Board approval should mean that somebody has actually paid attention. The Minister should explain how group reporting will stay clear about which businesses it covers, and what evidence directors should have in front of them before they sign. We support clearer reporting and proper responsibility at the top, but the Government must show that the changes will help to identify exploitation, and that the information produced will actually be used. Otherwise, we will have added to the paperwork and left the people being exploited exactly where they were.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his questions on these important measures, which we are very proud to bring in.

As discussed, clause 44 strengthens the transparency of modern slavery statements by requiring organisations to cover the mandatory topics set out in schedule 4ZA. That will allow statements to be more standardised and comprehensive, and open to greater public scrutiny. Schedule 5 provides a clear and consistent framework for businesses and public authorities to report on the action they have taken to assess and address risks of modern slavery in their operations and supply chains. Clause 45 improves accountability for reporting by holding senior parties to account, while also allowing private sector group structures to balance transparency on those important issues with the burdens of running a business.

The hon. Gentleman asked what the mandatory content requirements would be. As I said, they are set out in schedule 5. Statements will need to contain information on the organisation’s structure, operations and supply chains; the modern slavery risks within them; the steps taken to address those risks; modern slavery policies; due diligence processes; relevant staff training; and the assessment of the organisation’s effectiveness in preventing modern slavery in its operations and supply chains. If a statement does not contain relevant information under any of those topics, the organisation must state that the information has not been included for that topic and give a reason why. The mandatory content requirements align with updated statutory guidance published in March 2025. The guidance was updated with input from stakeholders from Government, business, civil society and academia to ensure that it reflects best practice and international standards.

The hon. Gentleman asked why these topics in particular have been selected. They build on the voluntary topics set out in the original legislation, informed by the updated statutory guidance, which, as I have just outlined, was developed in consultation with stakeholders. The guidance sets out how an organisation may produce a modern slavery statement in line with best practice and international standards, which include the UN guiding principles on business and human rights and the OECD due diligence guidance for responsible business conduct. The mandatory topics also align with legislation in Australia and Canada. Organisations in scope of reporting requirements across the three jurisdictions may use the joint-reporting template published in July 2025 to create one statement that would be compliant in all three countries.

The hon. Gentleman asked about enforcement, about organisations that have said they would take no action or have identified no risk, and about what teeth are behind the measures. The new measures require businesses to provide a reason if they have not taken any steps to assess modern slavery risks. If they have assessed that there are no risks, they must set out their risk assessment approach. The purpose of the regime is not to penalise organisations for identifying risks or for being at an earlier stage in managing them, but to ensure greater transparency about the action they are taking and the basis for their decisions.

By bringing a more consistent approach to how businesses report, we can better shine a light on those that take positive action to ensure that their supply chains are free from modern slavery, and highlight those that fall short, encouraging a race to the top. Stronger transparency enables consumers and investors to make informed choices and hold businesses and private sector organisations to account, encouraging more proactive efforts to manage modern slavery in supply chains. Of course, we will consider some of the other reporting and monitoring measures, and the punishment measures, as part of the coming groups.

On businesses wanting further clarity on reporting requirements, we consulted widely, as I have said, with businesses, non-governmental organisations and civil society during the recent update to the guidance on transparency in supply chains, which was published in March 2025. Businesses themselves asked for greater clarity on how parent companies and their subsidiaries can report as a group. The updated guidance now includes details on the best-practice approach to reporting as a group when, for example, companies share the same procurement or operate in similar markets. To enable that practice to continue, we have included measures in the Bill to make it clear that companies may report as a group and thereby continue to report in the most efficient way for their business.

As I said, schedule 5 improves the accountability for reporting, holding senior parties to account, while allowing private sector group structures to balance transparency on such important issues against the burdens of running a business. I hope hon. Members share our view that making the requirements mandatory will help individuals, consumers and all those of us who are concerned about the impact of modern slavery in supply chains across the globe to hold companies to account further.

[Siân Berry]

I add my support—for a change in this Committee—to the broad approach taken in this part of the Bill. I realise that the Bill’s scope is narrow, but have the Minister or the Home Secretary had any discussions with colleagues in the Cabinet and other Departments about using these quite creative new reporting requirements—which cover the supply chain and require reasons to be given for not doing things—as a template for use in other areas, such as environmental pollution or other human rights issues? Will the Minister commit the Home Office to taking the learnings from implementing this to other Departments?

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Lady makes an important point. We are proud of the provisions, and a review is being undertaken by the Department for Business, Innovation, Science and Trade to consider how to develop them further. I hope that the Home Office example is setting out best practice for other Departments to ensure that, in a world of global business, we are able to hold corporations to account in our legislative and democratic framework. I appreciate her point.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 44 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 5 agreed to.

Clause 45 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 46

Application to public authorities

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Anna Turley]

As just discussed, section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act requires large businesses to report on the steps that they take to prevent modern slavery within their operations and supply chains. However, equivalent requirements do not apply to the public sector. Given that the Government spend approximately £295 billion annually on procurement, there is a clear risk that public sector supply chains may also be exposed to modern slavery. The clause addresses that gap by extending transparency requirements to public authorities and strengthening accountability for modern slavery risks in public procurement.

Public authorities will be required to publish annual modern slavery statements covering the mandatory topics set out in schedule 4ZA, and to upload those statements to the modern slavery statement registry within six months of the end of the relevant financial year. The clause also sets out who may sign a statement, requires signatories to confirm its accuracy to the best of their knowledge and belief, and provides for group reporting where appropriate.

By bringing the public sector into line with the private sector, the clause will improve transparency, strengthen accountability and help ensure that public money is not contributing to modern slavery. It is important to note that this is a groundbreaking and important aspect of the Bill. As I have set out, we spend a huge amount on public procurement contracts, and I am sure that the vast majority of people would hope and expect that taxpayers’ money spent by the Government, local authorities and our broader public sector does not have any damaging effect on modern slavery around the world.

Placing this responsibility on public bodies, as we do for private bodies, is not just a really important statement about levelling up; it is an important statement that every penny of taxpayers’ money should be spent in an ethical way and must not support modern slavery in any of our supply chains. It is an important provision, and we should be proud to have included it in the Bill.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 46 brings public authorities within the modern slavery reporting system. It is right that we look closely at how they account for the money they spend. If we expect businesses to explain what they are doing about exploitation in their supply chains, public bodies should be prepared to do the same. Taxpayers are entitled to know that money taken from their wages is being spent responsibly. The fact that a contract is paid for by the state does not make the risks behind it disappear. We support the principle of the clause.

Let us consider a public body that buys uniforms, cleaning services or equipment. The contract may look perfectly respectable, but who has checked the arrangements further down the chain? Who has asked how the workers are recruited, or whether a subcontractor is using labour supplied on terms that should ring alarm bells? Those questions need asking before a problem becomes a scandal, and the Government should lead by example here. Ministers cannot demand standards from the private sector and then accept an annual statement from a public body as evidence that everything must be fine. The statement needs to reflect the decisions made by the people who are actually buying the goods and services. If the procurement team finds a serious risk, it needs a clear route to someone who can act on it.

The threshold also matters. The Bill leaves both the minimum budget and the way in which it is calculated to be decided by regulations. Until we see them, we cannot know which bodies will be covered or what the burden will be. Businesses must report once their turnover reaches £36 million; I would be grateful if the Minister told us whether the public sector threshold will match that. How many authorities are expected to be covered, and what assessment has been made of their capacity to comply? The Government’s notes say that applying those duties to public authorities in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland requires the consent of the devolved legislatures. Has that consent has been sought?

The clause also allows one public authority to certify another’s statement. There may be sensible reasons for that, particularly where services or purchasing arrangements are shared, but responsibility must remain clear. If a statement turns out to be inaccurate, the answer cannot be that one authority relied on another and neither checked. The Minister should tell us what assurance the signing authority will be expected to obtain. The named intelligence agencies are excluded—there are obvious sensitivities around public disclosure of their operations—but the power to add further exemptions should be used sparingly. I would welcome it if the Minister set out the principles that will govern any further exclusions.

We support clause 46, but now we need is a workable timetable, clear responsibility and a proper connection between reporting and purchasing decisions. Public bodies should be able to show that they are tackling the risks that they find, and Ministers should be ready to answer when those bodies are not doing so.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s contribution. Abhorrent practices such as modern slavery have no place in public supply chains. We have taken action, through the Procurement Act 2023, to strengthen the rules around excluding suppliers because of serious misconduct anywhere in their operations, including certain key subcontractors.

In February 2025, the Government updated procurement policy note 009, “Tackling modern slavery in government supply chains”, advocating a risk-based approach to identifying and managing modern slavery risks, and encouraging Departments to conduct due diligence using a range of tools, such as the modern slavery assessment tool.

The modern slavery assessment tool is a risk identification management tool that has been designed to help public sector organisations to work in partnership with suppliers to improve protections and reduce the risk of exploitation of workers in their supply chains. The Government also made the anti-slavery risk tiering tool available to public sector buyers in October 2025. That tool enables faster risk assessments and clear next steps to mitigate modern slavery risks across the commercial lifecycle.

The hon. Gentleman asked which organisations will be required to start reporting. Based on the evidence in our impact assessment, we estimate that around 1,040 organisations will be required to report, and that, because of the ability to report in groups, which we have explicitly allowed for, that will likely result in approximately 380 statements.

The hon. Gentleman also asked about devolved Government consent. We are having conversations as part of this process. He asked about timings and when public sector organisations will start to publish their statements. Through the Bill, the Government are extending the duty to report on actions being taken to address modern slavery in supply chains, as introduced in section 4 of the Modern Slavery Act. We expect the measures to take effect for an organisation’s financial year beginning on or after commencement. While commencement timelines are still to be finalised, we do not expect the first compliance statements will be required any earlier than the end of 2028.

I think I have answered all the shadow Minister’s questions. I thank Members for their interest in the clause, which is about extending transparency requirements relating to modern slavery to public authorities. Our intention is to align the public sector procurement process with the private sector, and to ensure that no public money is contributing to modern slavery.

[Matt Vickers]

We talked about the number of organisations that we expect to be impacted. In terms of proportionality and balance, where will the threshold lie? For businesses, it is a turnover of £36 million, but what will be the scale of public sector organisations expected to comply versus the private sector?

[Anna Turley]

It is difficult to make a direct comparison. Organisations will be expected, to some extent, to lead this themselves. For example, NHS England will make a decision on whether it is accountable as a body as a whole, or whether it provides multiple responses from regional bodies. Those organisations will come forward to us with their recommendations on how they would like to report, which will give us a sense of the scale. I do not think this is directly comparable to the private sector in a like-for-like way. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 47

Statements: publication and submission

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Anna Turley]

Under the Modern Slavery Act 2015, organisations are required to publish modern slavery statements on a prominent place on their website. If they do not have a website, they must make their statement available on request. That makes it difficult to access modern slavery statements, assess levels of compliance and hold organisations to account, as there is no central means of reporting.

Clause 47 seeks to address that gap by creating a clear requirement for organisations to submit their modern slavery statements to a specified electronic platform, such as the modern slavery statement registry that exists for voluntary submissions. The clause requires statements to be submitted within six months of the end of the relevant financial year, ensuring that reporting is timely, accessible and easily monitored. By centralising statements in a single location, the Government will be more able to identify organisations that are complying with their statutory obligations and take action on those that are failing to do so.

That will strengthen oversight, improve transparency and support more effective enforcement of the reporting regime. It will also make information on modern slavery risks and actions more readily available to consumers, investors, civil society and other stakeholders, enabling greater scrutiny of organisational practices and more informed decision making. The clause transforms a reporting requirement into a more effective accountability mechanism. By ensuring that statements are submitted to a central registry within a defined timeframe, it will improve monitoring of compliance, strengthen enforcement and increase transparency across both public and private sector supply chains.

[Matt Vickers]

Following our consideration of what these statements should contain, clause 47 turns to whether they reach the people who need to read them. There is little value in requiring a statement if nobody can find it, or if the only version available is several years out of date. A customer, supplier or member of the public should be able to see what an organisation says it is doing and when it last accounted for its actions. We support making that information easier to find.

The clause requires publication on an organisation’s website, when it has one, with a prominent link on the home page. It also allows regulations to require electronic submission to the Secretary of State. Organisations must comply as soon as reasonably practicable after the financial year ends and within six months at the latest. That gives them a clear deadline, but the practical question is whether the Home Office will know when it has been missed. A collection of statements tells us who has submitted what; it does not, on its own, tell us who should have submitted one and has stayed silent.

The existing registry can already send reminders to organisations that have signed up, but it cannot chase an organisation that should be reporting and has never registered at all. I would be grateful if the Minister explained how the Department will identify every organisation covered, and how it will follow up missing statements.

--- Later in debate ---

For those reading the statements, it should be easily to tell the current version from an old one and to identify the organisation concerned. Where a parent company reports for its subsidiaries, the coverage should be obvious, otherwise the public may think a business has failed to report when its statement is simply filed under a different name. I would welcome a clear timetable for the submission regulations. The point of all this is to make scrutiny possible, and Ministers must ensure that publication produces information that people can actually use. We support clause 47.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman. To reassure him, we will be building on the modern slavery statement registry. More than 34,000 organisations are already registered there. Therefore, familiarisation costs to those organisations are likely to be minimal, as they already use that platform. For organisations that have not used the registry before, we expect the costs of familiarisation, which includes the time taken for personnel for register and learn how to use it, to be very low. The impact assessment estimates the first-year cost to businesses is approximately £0.4 million, and the ongoing costs are estimated to be approximately £0.2 million per year.

The hon. Gentleman asked about timetable and whether there should be a single reporting deadline. It is important that we recognise that businesses may have different financial reporting periods based on how their financial year operates, as most businesses’ reporting will align with their financial year timescales. We want to ensure that businesses can align their modern slavery reporting with their ongoing reporting operations and obligations to minimise the burdens.

I want to clarify the broader impact of the measures. It is important to reiterate that this requirement is not new; businesses in scope should already be producing their modern slavery statements in line with section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act. The measures in the Bill will require some changes to the content and process for completing and submitting a statement, but those will be minimal. A full impact assessment and breakdown of costs, as I have said, has already been published. On registry notifications and how to identify the organisations covered, we are working with the Department for Business to build the in-scope list, so I can keep the hon. Gentleman and the Committee updated on that.

The hon. Gentleman also asked about the enforcement. Multiple models could be used to deliver that, including conferring functions on an existing regulator or within the Home Office. We are doing the work to ensure that the most appropriate model for enforcement and for administering these financial penalties will be in place. We will consult on the draft regulations during the passage of the Bill.

I thank Members for this important debate. The clause strengthens reporting requirements, improves transparency and makes it easier to identify and take action against modern slavery risks. I commend it to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 48

Guidance

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Anna Turley]

Given the changes to reporting requirements in the Bill, clause 48 seeks to ensure that the provision for the Secretary of State to issue guidance aligns with these updates. The clause sets out that the Secretary of State can issue guidance for both the private and public sectors on how to write a modern slavery statement and provide examples of good practice in tackling modern slavery in supply chains and examples of information that may be included in addition to the mandatory information. That will ensure that there is adequate information to support organisations in producing modern slavery statements that cover all of the mandatory content requirements set out in schedule 5.

In summary, clause 48 will help promote consistency, transparency and good practice in reporting across both the public and private sectors, strengthening the overall effectiveness of the modern slavery transparency regime. I commend clause 48 to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

For these new duties to work, the people carrying them out need clear instructions. That is where the guidance under clause 48 comes in. It is a short clause, but the guidance will matter a great deal to the people expected to make the preceding clauses work. They need to know what a useful statement looks like, what information they should seek from suppliers and how to explain a risk they have identified. They should not need a lawyer to translate the Government’s instructions before they can get started.

Timing matters. Organisations need time to understand the requirements and put arrangements in place. Publishing guidance at the last minute would create avoidable mistakes and leave Ministers blaming people for confusion of the Government’s own making. Will the Minister commit to having the guidance available well before the new duties take effect?

Businesses have also only recently been told to review updated Home Office guidance on their statements. They should not have to rewrite everything a second time; the new guidance should build on what organisations have just put into place rather than start again from scratch. There also needs to be a clear distinction between what the law requires and what the Government would like organisations to do voluntarily. The clause allows guidance to cover additional information that statements may include. That should be plainly labelled; businesses should not discover that an optional suggestion has become an unofficial requirement when somebody comes to assess their compliance.

Practical examples would help, particularly for organisations with different kinds of supply chains. Guidance should explain how to report a problem honestly and what to do when there is evidence that somebody is being exploited. Nobody should wait for the next annual statement before raising a serious concern with the appropriate authorities.

We support clause 48, but the Minister should tell us who will be consulted on the guidance and how future changes will be communicated, so that organisations are never caught out. Clear instructions from the outset would save everybody time and keep the focus where it belongs: on the people these measures are intended to protect.

[Anna Turley]

Simply put, clause 48 gives the Secretary of State the power to provide practical guidance on how modern slavery statements should be prepared in line with the new requirements in the Bill, including, as the shadow Minister suggested, good practice in identifying and tackling modern slavery risks within operations and supply chains.

The shadow Minister asked when the updated guidance will be issued; I am pleased to reassure him that the Secretary of State will issue the new guidance in time for commencement. He also wanted further clarity on the reporting requirements. During the recent update to the transparency and supply chain guidance, published in March 2025, we consulted widely with businesses, NGOs and civil society. This has been well received. It aligns with the international standards that I set out earlier, such as the OECD due diligence guidelines.

The purpose of clause 48 is to support compliance and improve the overall quality of reporting. I commend it to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 49

Enforcement

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Anna Turley]

Compliance with reporting requirements remains inconsistent and there are limited consequences for organisations that fail to meet their obligations. Clause 49 introduces a civil enforcement framework, including financial penalties, for organisations that fail to comply with their statutory reporting obligations under section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

The clause provides the Secretary of State with powers to impose penalties of up to £1 million or 1% of annual turnover—or of the budget, for public authorities—to make sure that there are real consequences for those who do not take the duty seriously. It also provides a power, by regulation, for the Secretary of State to set out procedural safeguards, including warning notices, opportunities to make representations, rights of appeal and provisions relating to determination of the penalty amount, cost recovery, interest on late payment, and enforcement of unpaid penalties. That will ensure that enforcement is fair, proportionate and effective.

The changes are central to strengthening the transparency in supply chains regime, ensuring that there are meaningful consequences for non-compliance and addressing long-standing concerns that the current framework lacks teeth. I commend clause 49 to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 49 brings us to the practical question of what happens when an organisation fails to do what the law requires. We have spent preceding groups discussing what organisations must report, and how we must publish it. Those duties need to mean something. A business that takes its responsibility seriously should not find that a competitor can ignore the rules and carry on without consequence. We support effective enforcement against organisations that fail to comply without a reasonable excuse.

The clause allows Ministers to establish financial penalties through regulations. The maximum for an individual penalty will be the higher of £1 million or 1% of the organisation’s total turnover, or of a public authority’s total budget. That is a substantial power. It is a ceiling, not a standard fine, and how penalties are set below it will matter enormously. There must be a sensible distinction between a genuine mistake that is quickly corrected and a deliberate refusal to comply.

An organisation that has ignored repeated requests should not be treated in the same way as one that has made an isolated administrative error. Equally, the “reasonable excuse” provision must not become a stock response for those who simply cannot be bothered. Much of that detail is left to regulation. The clause allows for warning notices, representations and appeals. Organisations should know how a penalty has been calculated and have a fair opportunity to challenge a wrong decision. I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed which of those safeguards the regulations will include, and how the seriousness of a failure will be assessed.

There is a particular issue with fining public authorities. A fine on a public body ultimately comes out of public money, but that does not mean that public bodies should escape enforcement. However, moving money out of a service budget while leaving the same failures untouched would achieve very little. The Minister should explain how a penalty will lead to better conduct and how senior officials will be held accountable for putting matters right.

The clause also provides for civil court enforcement; the Minister should explain how that route and the penalty regime will fit together, and who will make the decisions. There is an example here from the existing law. The 2015 Act already allows the Home Secretary to seek an injunction against a business that fails to publish a statement, yet that power has, as far as I am aware, never been used. A strong power on paper is of little use if the enforcement team lacks the information or capacity to use it. The Minister should tell us what resources have been judged necessary and when the new arrangements will be up and running.

Finally, we should be clear about what the penalties address. They concern failures to comply with the reporting duties. The compliance statement is not proof that exploitation is absent and a reporting penalty is no substitute for investigating evidence of slavery. Where such evidence emerges, there needs to be a clear route to the agencies that can protect victims and pursue the perpetrators. We support giving these duties proper teeth and we support clause 49. The test for Ministers is whether persistent non-compliance is tackled, whether decisions are fair and whether identified risks lead to action. I look forward to the Minister’s explanation of how the regulations will deliver that in practice.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I thank hon. Members for their contributions and questions on these important clauses.

The shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asked who will be determining and enforcing the financial penalties. The Secretary of State may determine who will impose financial penalties on non-compliant organisations, and a number of models can be used to deliver that. That work is ongoing, but it could potentially be done through an existing regulator or within the Home Office itself. I appreciate that that will be an important part of the regulations we are drafting, and they will be shared during the Bill’s passage. We continue to engage with partners to ensure that we develop the most appropriate model for enforcement, so that we can administer financial penalties without placing an additional burden on the taxpayer by creating a new institution.

The shadow Minister asked about the High Court injunction power. Under the current framework, if an organisation fails to publish a statement, the Home Secretary can seek an injunction to require compliance. However, that power has not been used to date, due to the difficulties of monitoring compliance under the current regime, where there are no mandatory requirements or clear deadlines.

Pursuing an injunction can be a burdensome and resource-intensive process, and the court could only require the injuncted organisation to comply; it cannot issue a financial penalty. The measures in the Bill provide clearer expectations on what compliance looks like, allowing for more effective monitoring of compliance. They also introduce powers to impose stronger consequences on those who do not take their duties seriously.

On our expectations for the collection of these civil penalties, the purpose of the penalties is to encourage compliance with the transparency in supply chain requirements. We know from similar reporting regimes, such as gender pay gap reporting, and from Companies House, that organisations typically comply with their obligations once an investigation is opened, and before it gets to a stage where a financial penalty is issued. Therefore, the expectation is that the number of penalties issued will actually be very low. In addition, the penalty amount will vary depending on a number of factors, including organisational turnover. Given the penalty calculations and the expectation of almost full compliance, it is difficult to give an estimate of expected revenue from civil penalties. On where those penalties will go, the Bill provides that any financial penalties received by the enforcement agency must be paid into the Consolidated Fund, as is typical for such penalty regimes.

The shadow Minister asked about public bodies. As I said, they will be in scope of the reporting requirements, and financial penalties will apply to organisations that are legally separate from the Crown, such as local authorities and arm’s length bodies. As a matter of constitutional principle, the Government do not impose financial penalties on themselves.

We expect that the provisions will apply to modern slavery statements covering an organisation’s financial year that begins on or after commencement. While commencement timelines are still to be confirmed, we do not expect that the first compliance statements will be required any earlier than 2028. As I said, clarification on the details of the enforcement body will be provided as the Bill progresses through Parliament.

I thank Members again for their contributions to this discussion. Clause 49 introduces a new civil enforcement framework that will include financial penalties for companies that fail to comply with their reporting obligations under section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act, as improved by the previous clauses. Doing so will strengthen the regime and give it real teeth when looking to tackle the problem of modern slavery in supply chains.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 1

Enforcement

“(1) A sum payable in pursuance of a decision of the IIAA is recoverable in England and Wales as if it were payable under an order of the county court.

(2) A sum payable in pursuance of a decision of the IIAA may be enforced in Scotland in the same manner as an extract registered decree arbitral bearing a warrant for execution issued by the sheriff court of any sheriffdom in Scotland.

(3) A sum payable in pursuance of a decision of the IIAA is recoverable in Northern Ireland as if it were payable under an order of the county court.

(4) Where action is taken under this section for the recovery of a sum payable in pursuance of a decision of the IIAA, the decision—

(a) in relation to England and Wales, is to be treated for the purposes of section 98 of the Courts Act 2003 (register of judgments and orders etc) as if it were a judgment entered in the county court;

(b) in relation to Northern Ireland, is to be treated for the purposes of Article 116 of the Judgments Enforcement (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/226 (N.I. 6)) (register of judgments) as if it were a judgment in respect of which an application has been accepted under Article 22 or 23(1) of that Order.

(5) IIAA Procedure Rules may provide for any or all of subsections (1) to (4)—

(a) to apply only in relation to sums of a description specified in the Rules, or

(b) not to apply except in relation to sums of a description specified in the Rules.”—(Anna Turley.)

This new clause would insert a new clause, to go after clause 10, which makes provision about the enforcement of the payment of any sums required to be paid by virtue of decisions of the IIAA.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill

New Clause 2

Increasing the availability of IIAA advice and IIAA representation

“(1) The Secretary of State may take such steps as the Secretary of State considers appropriate to increase the general availability of IIAA advice and IIAA representation.

(2) The power under subsection (1) may, in particular, be used to provide financial or other assistance (subject to any conditions the Secretary of State considers appropriate)—

(a) for persons undertaking education or training;

(b) for persons providing education, training or accreditation;

(c) for persons who provide IIAA advice or IIAA representation.

(3) In this section—

‘IIAA advice’ means advice from a qualified person about an appeal or bail application that has been or may be made to the IIAA;

‘IIAA representation’ means representation by a qualified person in proceedings before the IIAA;

‘qualified person’ means a person who is qualified for the purposes of section 84 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.”—(Anna Turley.)

This new clause authorises the Secretary of State to take steps to increase the general availability of advice and representation for persons who make an appeal or bail application to the IIAA. The new clause would be inserted after clause 10.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 3

Late claims process: credibility

“(1) This section applies to proceedings that are subject to the late claims process (see section 12).

(2) In determining whether to believe a statement made by or on behalf of the appellant, an IIAA adjudicator must take account, as damaging the appellant’s credibility, of the fact that they provided late information.

(3) But if the IIAA adjudicator considers that there are good reasons why the appellant provided the information late, the adjudicator may decide that subsection (2)—

(a) applies to a lesser extent than it would if there were no good reasons, or

(b) does not apply at all.

(4) If in the course of the proceedings the appellant provides late evidence, an IIAA adjudicator must take that fact into account, as damaging the appellant’s credibility.

(5) But if the IIAA adjudicator considers that there are good reasons to do so, they may decide that subsection (4)—

(a) applies to a lesser extent than it otherwise would, or

(b) does not apply at all.

(6) The IIAA adjudicator must include, as part of their reasons for a decision that disposes of the proceedings, a statement explaining—

(a) how the adjudicator has applied subsection (2), and in particular—

(i) the extent to which they decided that the appellant’s credibility was damaged by the provision of late information,

(ii) the impact any credibility damage had on the determination of the appeal, and

(iii) if the appellant provided reasons for the provision of late information, what those reasons were and how they affected the application of subsection (2);

(b) whether the adjudicator has applied subsection (4), and in particular—

(i) whether the appellant provided late evidence and if so what that evidence was,

(ii) the extent to which the adjudicator decided that the appellant’s credibility was damaged by the provision of late evidence,

(iii) the impact any credibility damage had on the determination of the appeal, and

(iv) if the adjudicator considered that there were good reasons as mentioned in subsection (5), what those reasons were and how they affected the application of subsection (4).

(7) In this section—

‘late evidence’ means evidence provided to the IIAA after any deadline imposed in relation to the evidence by or under IIAA Procedure Rules;

‘late information’ means immigration information provided by the recipient of a claim notice in response to the notice—

(a) after the claim notice deadline, and

(b) at a time when the recipient was detained or had been given a notice of departure details as mentioned in section 12(1)(a) or (b);

‘immigration information’ has the meaning given in section 12;

‘claim notice’ and ‘claim notice deadline’ have the meanings given in section 11.”—(Anna Turley.)

This new clause would insert a new clause, to go after clause 12, providing that, where proceedings are subject to the late claims process (see clause 12), the appellant’s credibility is damaged. And if such an appellant provides evidence late, their credibility is damaged further. It also requires IIAA adjudicators to make a statement about the application of this section.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 4

Late information etc: proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission

“In the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997, after section 2 insert—

‘2ZA Provision of late information etc: effect on credibility

(1) This section applies where an appellant in proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission under section 2—

(a) has been served with a claim notice, and

(b) has provided any immigration information in response to the notice after the claim notice deadline—

(i) at a time when they are detained under a relevant detention provision, or

(ii) at any time after they have been given a notice of departure details.

(2) In determining whether to believe a statement made by or on behalf of the appellant, the Commission must take account, as damaging the appellant’s credibility, of the fact that they provided late information.

(3) But if the Commission considers that there are good reasons why the appellant provided the information late, the Commission may decide that subsection (2)—

(a) applies to a lesser extent than it would if there were no good reasons, or

(b) does not apply at all.

(4) If in the course of the proceedings the appellant provides late evidence, the Commission must take that fact into account, as damaging the appellant’s credibility.

(5) But if the Commission considers that there are good reasons to do so, it may decide that subsection (4)—

(a) applies to a lesser extent than it otherwise would, or

(b) does not apply at all.

(6) The Commission must include, as part of its reasons for a decision that disposes of the proceedings, a statement explaining—

(a) how the Commission has applied subsection (2), and in particular—

(i) the extent to which it decided that the appellant’s credibility was damaged by the provision of late information,

(ii) the impact any credibility damage had on the determination of the appeal, and

(iii) if the appellant provided reasons for the provision of late information, what those reasons were and how they affected the application of subsection (2);

(b) whether the Commission has applied subsection (4), and in particular—

(i) whether the appellant provided late evidence and if so what that evidence was,

(ii) the extent to which the Commission decided that the appellant’s credibility was damaged by the provision of late evidence,

(iii) the impact any credibility damage had on the determination of the appeal, and

(iv) if the Commission considered that there were good reasons as mentioned in subsection (5), what those reasons were and how they affected the application of subsection (4).

(7) In this section—

“claim notice” and “claim notice deadline” have the meanings given in section 11 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 2026;

“immigration information,” “notice of departure details” and “relevant detention provision” have the same meanings as in section 12 of that Act;

“late evidence” means evidence provided to the Commission after any deadline imposed in relation to the evidence by or under rules under section 5;

“late information” means information provided by the recipient of a claim notice in response to the notice—

(a) after the claim notice deadline, and

(b) at a time when the recipient was detained or had been given a notice of departure details as mentioned in subsection (1)(b);’”—(Anna Turley.)

This new clause would add a new clause making similar provision for proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission to that made by the new clause inserted by NC3. It would be inserted into the Bill after the new clause inserted by NC3.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 5

Liability to deportation of certain residents despite section 7 of the Immigration Act 1971

“In section 7 of the Immigration Act 1971 (exemption from deportation for certain existing residents), after subsection (1) insert—

‘(1A) But the Secretary of State may decide that, despite subsection (1)(b), a person to whom subsection (1)(b) applies is liable to deportation (and may accordingly make a deportation order against them under section 5) if the Secretary of State—

(a) has deprived the person of citizenship status under section 40(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981 (deprivation where conducive to public good), or

(b) is satisfied that the person has engaged in behaviour that would render them liable to deprivation of citizenship status under section 40(2) of that Act (whether or not they have such status).

(1B) A decision under subsection (1A) must be taken personally by the Secretary of State.

(1C) The Secretary of State may make a decision under subsection (1A) where the person—

(a) was deprived of citizenship status, or

(b) engaged in behaviour that would render them liable to deprivation of citizenship status,

before subsection (1A) came into force.’”—(Anna Turley.)

This new clause, to be inserted after clause 49, would enable the Secretary of State to override the exemption from deportation in s.7(1)(b) of the Immigration Act 1971 for certain Commonwealth and Irish citizens where they have behaved in a way that would render them liable to citizenship deprivation.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Anna Turley]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment 47.

[Anna Turley]

New clause 5 will mean that a person’s exemption from deportation under section 7 of the Immigration Act 1971 can be disapplied where they have engaged in conduct such as terrorism, war crimes or serious organised crime. Section 7 provides protection from deportation for certain Commonwealth and Irish citizens who were ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom before 1 January 1973. It is an important safeguard for many people with long-standing ties to the UK.

The recent high-profile case of Shabir Ahmed highlighted a significant anomaly in the current law. In cases where the person’s conduct is serious enough to justify the removal of their citizenship, section 7 prevents us from deporting them. That cannot be right. Some of the most serious offenders, including individuals involved in terrorism, serious organised crime, sexual grooming or war crimes, should not be able to avoid deportation purely on the basis that they have been in this country since before 1973.

Our new clause will end the disparity in the powers available to protect the public from the most dangerous people. Decisions to disapply the exemption will be taken personally by the Home Secretary. Safeguards put in place by the new clause ensure that the legislation will not affect the vast majority of people protected by section 7. It will be used to ensure that only those individuals whose conduct places them among the most serious threats to the public can be deported.

As we saw with the case I mentioned, changing the law is only half the problem. Arranging the deportation of such individuals can take time, as successive Governments have found previously. Introducing this important new clause will ensure that we have the power to deport this individual, and that will be taken forward in the usual way. Given the danger that this individual poses, Government amendment 47 would amend the commencement clauses in the Bill to ensure that the new clause comes into effect upon Royal Assent.

[Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)]

New clause 5 closes an anomaly that dates back to 1973, under which Commonwealth and Irish citizens living in the country when the Immigration Act 1971 came into force are protected from deportation by section 7, however serious their conduct. The new clause would let the Home Secretary decide that such a person is liable to deportation where they have been or could have been deprived of citizenship on conduct grounds. We support it and amendment 47, which brings it into force on Royal Assent.

The Conservative plan is to deport all foreign criminals. Not some of them—all of them. Any measure that removes a barrier to deportation is a step in that direction. New clause 5 is indeed a step in the right direction, but it is such a small step that it is challenging to see that it will make a noticeable impact. It is a personal discretion, not a duty, for the Home Secretary. Every person it covers will still be able to resist removal under article 8 and article 3, through the Human Rights Act 1998. Compare that with the much more robust new clause 45, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), which would mean automatic deportation for every foreign national convicted of an offence. That is what our borders plan means by deporting all foreign criminals.

For the purposes of the debate, I have three questions for the Minister. How many people do the Government estimate are protected by section 7 and could be made liable to deportation under new clause 5? What is the Government’s legal assessment of the clause’s reliance on conduct before commencement? How will the power apply to Irish citizens, given the common travel area, and have the Irish Government been consulted on the measure?

We will support Government new clause 5, but if the Government accept the principle that dangerous people should not be protected from deportation by legal technicalities, I hope they will support our new clauses in that regard too.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I want to raise a few alarm bells in terms of what I feel about this measure, and I hope the Minister can answer me clearly. My misgivings arise partly because the Minister talked about basing the need for the new clause on a single case example; partly because it has been introduced into the Bill at a late stage in our considerations; and partly because it will come into force immediately on Royal Assent. It appears to be a rush, and I am not convinced that it will not have equalities impacts or overlap with the lessons we should have learned from the Windrush scandal. If the Minister can give some more assurance that this has been looked at carefully and not rushed into on the basis of a single case, I would be glad to hear it.

[Anna Turley]

I can be explicit: this change in the legislation has been inspired by one particular case. I will not apologise for that, because I am sure the hon. Lady would agree that the current situation is not acceptable. Some of the most serious offenders, including individuals involved in terrorism, serious organised crime or war crimes, cannot be deported even after we have stripped them of British citizenship, because of this loophole. It is important that we take steps to address it.

I want to give the hon. Lady some reassurance, however, because people may express concerns about protection given in law to others—for example, the Windrush generation or others who came here previously. I will be absolutely clear and explicit in Committee: they will not be affected. Any broader protection for the Windrush generation is not affected by the new clause. The power will be exercised personally by the Home Secretary. The Government are clear that the wider protections offered by section 7 will remain intact. The new clause will not affect the overwhelming majority of people protected by section 7 or their rights. This measure is intended solely to ensure that specific individuals whose conduct places them among the most serious threats to the public can be deported.

[Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)]

We support closing this gap. Given that the test is an issue of the Home Secretary’s judgment, rather than of a conviction, and that it applies to past conduct, it would be helpful if the Minister can give reassurances. Given how serious and huge the power will be, some sort of reporting mechanism will help us to understand how often it might be used and how many people fall under it.

[Anna Turley]

The power is similar to those the Home Secretary has already, including the ability to prevent people from coming here and to ask for people to be removed. We agree that if deprivation on conducive grounds is to be used sparingly, it should be against those who pose a serious threat to the UK or whose conduct has involved very high harm. Other than where a decision is taken on the grounds that the person has conducted themselves in a manner that is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the UK, the conducive power is limited so that it can be applied only to those who are dual citizens. Parliament chose to enact the power on that basis to avoid the prospect of leaving people stateless, which would be contrary to the UK’s commitments under the 1961 statelessness convention. To respond further, the Home Secretary is of course accountable to this place on a daily basis. On high-profile cases, I am sure she will continue to give her usual response on the Floor of the House.

The hon. Member for Stockton West asked for an estimated projection. We do not have the statistics, but I have been clear and up front that we are responding to a particular case. We expect these to be extreme and unusual cases, where someone has been guilty of a crime of this magnitude, but is of that generation prior to 1973. The hon. Gentleman also asked about the consideration of the legal assessment. We have reviewed the legal position very carefully. We are content that it is lawful, which is why we are taking this measure forward.

The hon. Gentleman mentioned Irish citizens. Irish citizens are liable to deportation, but in practice are only pursued in limited circumstances.

I thank hon. Members for their contributions to this important debate. As they will know, the Government have made this change to end the disparity in powers available to protect the public from the most dangerous people. The recent high-profile case of Shabir Ahmed has highlighted a significant anomaly in the current law. In cases where the person’s conduct is serious enough to justify the removal of their citizenship, section 7 currently prevents us from deporting them.

[Tom Gordon]

I sit on the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and we have published a report on accountability for Daesh war crimes. Included in that report was the fact that the UK Government use their powers to strip citizenship more than almost any other country in the world, and in a way that has often been described as not particularly transparent. Could I press the Minister to go further on the reporting mechanisms that we need to see if we have this new clause and also existing Government citizenship stripping?

[Anna Turley]

This new clause does not influence our decisions to deprive people of citizenship—that remains. This is simply about our ability to remove them. That is the important loophole that we are trying to close, to create consistency on that front.

Safeguards put in place by Government new clause 5 ensure that legislation will not affect the vast majority of people protected by section 7. It will only be used to ensure that those individuals whose conduct places them among the most serious threats to the public can be deported.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 5 read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 32

Exception from automatic deportation of foreign criminals

“In section 33 of the UK Borders Act 2007 (exceptions from automatic deportation of foreign criminals) for subsection (6A) substitute—

‘(6A) Exception 6 is where—

(a) the foreign criminal has limited leave to remain in the United Kingdom under section 65(2) of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (leave to remain for victims of slavery or human trafficking),

(b) the Secretary of State is under a duty to grant the foreign criminal limited leave to remain in the United Kingdom under that section, or

(c) the Secretary of State intends to grant the foreign criminal limited leave to remain in the United Kingdom under that section despite not being required to do so as a result of the application of subsection (7)(a) of that section.’”.—(Anna Turley.)

This new clause, to go after clause 39, replaces an exception from the duty to deport foreign criminals. The existing exception operates by reference to the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. The replacement exception will operate by reference to the domestic legislation that gives effect to that Convention.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Anna Turley]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Section 33 of the UK Borders Act 2007 sets out exceptions to the automatic deportation of foreign criminals. This technical amendment provides greater legal clarity in relation to the exception that may apply where a foreign criminal is also a confirmed victim of modern slavery.

At the time the UK Borders Act was enacted, there was not a detailed domestic legal framework in place for the identification and protection of victims of modern slavery. Since then, the Government have introduced specific domestic modern slavery legislation, including the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. The ongoing work on this Bill has highlighted the outdated reference to the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings—ECAT—and this provides an opportune moment to update the legislation so that it refers to the relevant domestic modern slavery framework.

New clause 32 replaces the existing reference to the United Kingdom’s obligations under ECAT with a reference to the relevant domestic modern slavery legislation, namely the temporary permission to stay provision in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022.

Since the introduction of the 2007 Act, the UK has introduced specific modern slavery legislation and these provisions will now provide the legal framework for identifying and protecting victims of modern slavery in the UK. The new clause aligns the deportation framework with existing domestic legislation on modern slavery provisions and provides greater legal clarity.

The new clause does not expand or alter the protections. It simply clarifies and clears up any ambiguity in the law. It simply places the exception to automatic deportation on a clearer domestic statutory footing, while ensuring the Secretary of State retains flexibility to grant temporary permission to stay in exceptional circumstances where appropriate.

[Blake Stephenson]

New clause 32 rewrites the exception to automatic deportation for foreign criminals who are victims of trafficking. At present, section 33(6A) of the UK Borders Act 2007 disapplies automatic deportation where removal would breach our obligations under the Council of Europe trafficking convention. The new clause would replace that with a test based on leave under section 65 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, including where the Home Secretary merely intends to grant such leave, even where she is under no duty to do so.

A criminal conviction should trigger automatic deportation, and those deported as foreign criminals should not be able to make protection claims to stop that deportation. New clause 32 keeps a route by which a foreign criminal can avoid automatic deportation and it widens the discretion to use it.

I am sure nobody in this Committee wants genuine victims of trafficking to be left unsupported, but in clause 38, the Government accept that people who pose a threat to public order should be disqualified from protection. Why, then, keep the exception to automatic deportation for people who have been convicted of crimes here? Why widen the range of cases where there is no duty to grant leave at all?

How many foreign criminals relied on the trafficking exemption in each of the past three years? In what circumstances would the Home Secretary intend to grant leave under section 65 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 where there is no duty to do so? How many foreign criminals do the Government expect to benefit? Unless the Minister can show that this exception will be rare and tightly controlled, it is a back door through which foreign criminals will continue to avoid removal.

[Anna Turley]

Temporary permission to stay is granted only in limited circumstances for specific purposes and for time-limited periods. Confirmed victims who are considered a risk to public order who have made a modern slavery claim in bad faith will not usually be granted temporary permission to stay in the UK. In rare cases, the Secretary of State may decide that temporary permission to stay is to be granted to an individual who has been convicted of a crime, for example, where their presence is necessary to support a law enforcement investigation or criminal proceedings. The new clause ensures that the Secretary of State retains this discretion as is befitting with clauses we considered earlier. Any grant of temporary permission to stay is subject to the individual continuing to meet the relevant requirements and lasts only for as long as it is necessary to achieve the purpose for which it is granted.

I will undertake to write to the Committee on the specific numbers that the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire asked for. I thank Members for their interest in the new clause. It replaces the existing reference to the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings with a reference to the relevant domestic modern slavery legislation, namely the temporary permission to stay provision in the Nationality and Borders Act. The technical new clause provides greater legal clarity in relation to the exception that may apply where a foreign criminal is also a confirmed victim of modern slavery.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 32 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 33

Enforcement of decisions of the Immigration Services Commissioner

“(1) Part 5 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (immigration advisers and immigration service providers) is amended as follows.

(2) In section 92F (enforcement of penalty notices) (inserted by paragraph 9 of Schedule 1 to the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025)—

(a) in subsection (1), after ‘notice’ insert ‘(“a penalty”)’;

(b) for subsections (2) to (4) substitute—

‘(2) In England and Wales, the penalty is recoverable as if it were payable under an order of the county court.

(3) In Scotland, the penalty may be enforced in the same manner as an extract registered decree arbitral bearing a warrant for execution issued by the sheriff court of any sheriffdom in Scotland.

(4) In Northern Ireland, the penalty is recoverable as if it were payable under an order of the county court.

(5) Where action is taken under this section for the recovery of a penalty, the penalty—

(a) in relation to England and Wales, is to be treated for the purposes of section 98 of the Courts Act 2003 (register of judgments and orders etc) as if it were a judgment entered in the county court;

(b) in relation to Northern Ireland, is to be treated for the purposes of Article 116 of the Judgments Enforcement (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/226 (N.I. 6)) (register of judgments) as if it were a judgment in respect of which an application has been accepted under Article 22 or 23(1) of that Order.’

(3) In Schedule 5 (the Immigration Services Commissioner), in paragraph 9C (enforcement of orders to refund fees or pay compensation) (inserted by paragraph 14(5) of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025)—

(a) for sub-paragraph (3) substitute—

‘(3) Any amount to be refunded or paid under the order (“the amount owing”)—

(a) in England and Wales, is recoverable by P or the Commissioner (on P’s behalf) as if it were payable under an order of the county court;

(b) in Scotland, may be enforced by P or the Commissioner (on P’s behalf) in the same manner as an extract registered decree arbitral bearing a warrant for execution issued by the sheriff court of any sheriffdom in Scotland;

(c) in Northern Ireland, is recoverable by P or the Commissioner (on P’s behalf) as if it were payable under an order of the county court.’;

(b) in sub-paragraph (4), for ‘make an application under sub-paragraph (3)’ substitute ‘take steps to recover or enforce an amount owing’;

(c) for sub-paragraphs (5) and (6) substitute—

‘(5) Where action is taken under this paragraph for the recovery of an amount to be refunded or paid under an order of the Commissioner, the order—

(a) in relation to England and Wales, is to be treated for the purposes of section 98 of the Courts Act 2003 (register of judgments and orders etc) as if it were a judgment entered in the county court;

(b) in relation to Northern Ireland, is to be treated for the purposes of Article 116 of the Judgments Enforcement (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/226 (N.I. 6)) (register of judgments) as if it were a judgment in respect of which an application has been accepted under Article 22 or 23(1) of that Order.

(6) For the purposes of this paragraph, an appeal is pending during the period—

(a) starting when the appeal is brought, and

(b) ending when the appeal is finally determined, abandoned or withdrawn.’”—(Anna Turley.)

This amendment would insert a new clause, to go in after clause 49, amending the provision inserted into the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 about the enforcement of orders made by the Immigration Services Commissioner for penalties, refunds and compensation, so as to make it work effectively in Northern Ireland.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Anna Turley]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Government new clause 33 seeks to amend the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 to ensure that the enforcement of orders made by the Immigration Services Commissioner under that Act for penalties, refunds and compensation work effectively in Northern Ireland. Provisions regarding enforcement of unpaid monetary penalties, refunds of fees or payments of compensation in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland were part of the Immigration Services Commissioner measures in the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025. Upon making preparations to commence the measures, however, it became apparent that the current provisions are not compatible with the system in place in Northern Ireland. Therefore, the Government are taking steps to rectify the situation so that the enforcement regime can operate as intended.

The Government new clause ensures that any unpaid monetary penalty, refund of fees or payment of compensation imposed by the Immigration Services Commissioner on advisers providing poor or illegal immigration services or advice can be recovered in Northern Ireland as they can in England, Wales and Scotland. It also makes provision for penalties to be entered into the relevant registers in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Procedures for recovery of debts differ in Scotland from those in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. In Scotland, statutory penalties need not be treated as an existing court judgment. In keeping with other types of statutory penalty in Scotland, the proposed drafting allows for these penalties to be treated as an extract registered decree arbitral, bearing a warrant for execution for purposes of enforcement. That means that no application is needed to the court to enforce a debt or penalty, as it is treated as having been registered with the court and authority given the execution.

Amendments in later groups will make provision for the commencement of the new clause to take place in conjunction with the measures it relates to within the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 as amended by the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025.

[Blake Stephenson]

New clause 33 makes the Immigration Services Commissioner’s penalties, refund orders and compensation orders enforceable as court orders across the United Kingdom, including in Northern Ireland. These are technical improvements and we support them.

Rogue immigration advisers do real damage. They take money from vulnerable people, and, too often, they coach claims designed not to establish the truth but to delay removal, including the late claim lodged the night before a flight, and the fresh claim built on a story that has changed. We would end immigration legal aid and limit judicial review to cases where the Home Office has acted outside its powers, which would remove much of the market that these advisers exploit.

In the meantime, the regulator should have teeth. How many penalties has the commissioner imposed in the last three years, how much has actually been recovered and how many prosecutions for giving unregulated immigration advice have there been? As I said, we support this move, but I look forward to the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I undertake to write to the shadow Minister with those figures as I do not have them to hand, but I appreciate his interest in the new clause. Government new clause 33 ensures that any unpaid monetary penalty, refund of fees or payment of compensation imposed by the Immigration Services Commissioner on advisers for providing poor or illegal immigration advice or services can be recovered in Northern Ireland, just as they can be in England, Wales or Scotland. It also makes provision for penalties to be entered into the relevant registers in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The new clause will ensure that the system relating to the Immigration Services Commissioner operates as intended.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 33 read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 34

Meaning of “the Immigration Acts”

“In section 61(2) of the UK Borders Act 2007 (meaning of ‘the Immigration Acts’)—

(a) omit the ‘and’ at the end of paragraph (n);

(b) at the end insert

‘, and

(p) the Immigration and Asylum Act 2026.’”—(Anna Turley.)

This new clause, which would go in after clause 50, would add the Bill to the list of “Immigration Acts” in the UK Borders Act 2007. “The Immigration Acts” is a general term used across the statute book and is defined in the Interpretation Act 1978.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Anna Turley]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This new clause makes a straightforward technical amendment to the UK Borders Act 2007. It adds the Bill, once enacted, to the statutory list of enactments that comprise “the Immigration Acts” in the 2007 Act. References to “the Immigration Acts” appear throughout the statute book and are used in connection with a wide range of immigration powers, enforcement provisions and other immigration functions. It is therefore important that, once enacted, the Bill is included within that established statutory definition.

The effect of the new clause is to ensure that references elsewhere in the legislation to “the Immigration Acts” will apply consistently to the revisions contained in the Bill in the same way as they apply to other immigration legislation. The new clause is a technical provision that ensures the legislation fits coherently within the wider immigration statute book and that existing references to “the Immigration Acts” operate as intended.

[Blake Stephenson]

Mr Twigg, you and the Committee members will be pleased to hear that this will be the shortest speech of the day. The new clause adds the Bill, once enacted, to the list of “the Immigration Acts”. It is a technical provision, and we do not oppose it.

[Anna Turley]

I thank Members for their overwhelming interest in and enthusiasm for this new clause. As discussed, this is a straightforward amendment that adds the Bill to the statutory list of enactments that comprise “the Immigration Acts” in the 2007 Act. It will simply mean that references elsewhere in legislation to “the Immigration Acts” will apply consistently to the provisions contained in the Bill in the same way that they apply to other immigration legislation.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 34 read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Jade Botterill.)

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Anna Turley Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

I beg to move amendment 113, in clause 25, page 24, line 17, after “Crown Court” insert “or Court of Appeal”.

This amendment means that where the Court of Appeal makes a slavery and trafficking risk order under section 29(1)(a) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 any application to vary, renew or discharge the order will be determined by the Crown Court.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

[Anna Turley]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Dr Murrison. Good morning to all colleagues.

Before we get into the detail of the various clauses, I want to place part 5 of the Bill, and all the provisions concerning modern slavery, in their wider context. Modern slavery is a vicious, cruel and barbaric crime that dehumanises people. This Government are absolutely committed to tackling it in all its forms, and to identifying victims and giving them the support that they need.

However, for the Government to continue to meet that commitment, we must go further. We need a robust end-to-end system supporting earlier identification, ensuring clear decisions and addressing opportunities for improper use, so that the system works effectively for those it is intended to protect. These measures will improve alignment with wider immigration and support systems while enhancing protections for child victims. We need to reduce further the risk of exploitation by increasing expectations on businesses to tackle abuse in their supply chains, and by strengthening the enforcement powers available to our courts and the police to stop offenders in their tracks. The clauses in the Bill will do all that.

Clauses 25 to 34 are focused on strengthening slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. As modern slavery offending continues to evolve, the tools used to manage offending behaviour must keep pace to enable law enforcement and the courts to take more efficient and tougher action. Slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders give law enforcement agencies and the courts powers to apply for and grant orders to prohibit certain behaviour and to prevent harm, but they are not operating as effectively as they could be. The measures will strengthen those powers, making them more efficient and flexible to use, and improving their effectiveness as preventive tools. The changes will help to prevent further exploitation, better protect victims from harm and reduce the risk of exploitation and reoffending.

Clause 25 amends the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and provides the power for the court before which a person is acquitted of a slavery and human trafficking offence to make a slavery and trafficking risk order. The appropriate court is the court where the person was acquitted following a trial, the court allowing an appeal, or the Crown court on remittal following a successful appeal to the Court of Appeal.

Under existing legislation, a slavery and trafficking risk order is available only on application to the magistrates court. In circumstances where a person is acquitted of slavery and trafficking offences by the Crown court, the process places additional pressure on law enforcement and court time. Allowing the court that made the acquittal decision—including on appeal—to make an order, and extending the power to make an order to the higher court, will remove delays caused by the current process. As the trial court has already heard the evidence, it need not be repeated in the magistrates court. That will also mean that the courts can make an order of their own motion. That will improve efficiency and effectiveness by dealing with an individual immediately following the trial, reducing the risk of offending and preventing harm to others without delay.

The clause also enables the court to adjourn proceedings relating to a slavery and trafficking risk order on acquittal. The reasons we need adjournment of proceedings will be discussed in further detail under clause 30.

Government amendment 113 sets out a technical amendment to clause 25 to clarify which court is responsible for dealing with any future application to vary, renew or discharge a slavery and trafficking risk order made by the Court of Appeal on acquittal. The amendment makes it very clear that any subsequent application will be heard by the Crown court, rather than the Court of Appeal. That aligns the provision of the slavery and trafficking risk order made on acquittal with the existing approach under section 29 of the 2015 Act, which covers appeals of the decision to make an order and ensures a consistent process for managing such orders. The amendment will also ensure that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal is not taken up by further matters in respect of the orders. I commend the amendment to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is, as ever, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison.

Clause 25 allows a court to make a slavery and trafficking risk order when someone is acquitted of a slavery or trafficking offence. The court may do so only when it is satisfied that the person’s conduct shows a risk that they will commit such an offence, and that an order is necessary to protect people from harm. It is worth reminding the Committee that these orders exist because of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, brought forward by Theresa May as Home Secretary. That legislation put this country at the forefront of the fight against modern slavery, and the Opposition welcome measures that build on it.

Modern slavery is a vile crime. It preys on the vulnerable and hides in plain sight in our towns and on our high streets, and the police need every reasonable tool to get ahead of it. Let me be clear: an acquittal must be respected, and nobody should treat a risk order as a second verdict. However, a trial can bring out evidence of risky conduct that falls short of proving the offence charged. Where the statutory test is met, it makes sense for the court that has heard all the evidence to be able to act there and then. The alternative is that the police must start again in another court, with another application, another handover and another chance for the case to fall through the cracks. The person at risk cannot afford that.

This power will not use itself, however. Prosecutors and police need to have considered it before the trial ends, with the evidence ready and a plan for who will manage any restrictions afterwards. Otherwise, we risk passing a good clause that goes unused at the very moment it matters. Government amendment 113 corrects the Government’s own drafting—I suspect that it will not be the last correction we see in Committee. An appeal against such an order will be treated like an appeal against sentence. The Court of Appeal may end up making an order itself. The amendment ensures that any late application to vary, renew or discharge that order goes to the Crown court.

Officers should know which court to go to without a dispute over jurisdiction, so we support the amendment, but we should be honest about where many of the applications will land. The Crown court backlog reached a new record of more than 80,800 cases at the end of June. Every additional application joins that queue, and victims are already waiting far too long. That is not a reason to oppose this power, but it is a reason for the Government to tell the Committee what assessment they have made of the court time needed and how it will be found.

The clause also amends the Scottish and Northern Irish legislation, so that breaching one of the new orders is an offence in those jurisdictions, too. Those who exploit others do not stop at borders, and someone subject to an order must not be able to escape enforcement by moving to another part of the United Kingdom.

We support the clause and the Government amendment, but I would be grateful if the Minister answered three questions. First, who will be responsible for identifying suitable cases before an acquittal brings proceedings to an end, and what guidance will prosecutors be given? Secondly, how many of the orders do the Government expect to be made each year? Thirdly, if someone subject to one of the orders moves to Scotland or Northern Ireland, how will the order be enforced there promptly?

[Anna Turley]

I thank the shadow Minister for his response to this debate. As discussed, the clause makes important amendments to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and provides the power for the court before which a person is acquitted of a slavery and human trafficking offence to make a slavery and trafficking risk order.

Let me address a couple of the points made by the hon. Gentleman. He asked whether the measures would contribute to an increase in court time. The court will have heard the evidence during the trial or considered it on appeal, and it will be best placed to assess whether an order is necessary. The Government amendment will also mean that the evidence heard in the Crown court does not need to be repeated in the magistrates court, so court time in the magistrates court will be reduced, improving efficiency and effectiveness by handling the case immediately following the trial.

The hon. Gentleman also asked whether the measures will increase the use of orders and how many orders we expect to see. As hon. Members know, we have published an impact assessment setting out the analytical case for the proposed measures, and developed a justice impact test with the Ministry of Justice. The estimated impacts are therefore only indicative, as no available evidence or data estimates the magnitude of the increase in the number of orders issued as a result of the changes, but the scenarios assume that the number of prevention or risk orders will increase by between 25% and 75%, which equates to an increase of 20 to 30 orders per year.

Government amendment 113 is technical and will merely clarify which court is responsible for dealing with any future application to vary, renew or discharge a slavery and trafficking risk order made by the Court of Appeal on acquittal. I commend it to the Committee.

Amendment 113 agreed to.

Clause 25, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 26

Power for Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force to apply for prevention and risk orders etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 27 stand part.

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Member for Stockton West was right to raise the concerns of law enforcement partners about the limitations to the effectiveness of slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. We are seeking to deal with that issue through these clauses.

Our ambition is to ensure that law enforcement agencies have exactly the right tools they need to respond as offending evolves. Currently, the British Transport police must rely on a local force to make an application for a slavery and trafficking order on their behalf, even if the British Transport police have undertaken all relevant investigations. That means that there are delays between identifying a risk and an application for a slavery and trafficking order.

Clause 26 extends the list of bodies to allow the chief constable of the British Transport police to apply to a magistrates court to make, vary, discharge and renew slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. Giving an express power to the British Transport police will enhance the force’s capability to disrupt and tackle criminal exploitation and sexual exploitation on the transport network, and to keep pace with how modern slavery offending has evolved. It will also reduce costs and the time spent by local forces on making and processing applications of these orders on behalf of the British Transport police, and will enable swifter protection of victims by minimising the length of time between the offence taking place and the application being made. Extending these powers to the British Transport police will send a message to organised criminal gangs that all areas of law enforcement are equipped to take decisive action against perpetrators who exploit vulnerable individuals.

Clause 27 will remove a further limitation on law enforcement applications for slavery and trafficking orders: the restriction on chief officers of police of being able to make applications for slavery and trafficking orders only in relation to a person who lives in their police force area. The nature of modern slavery offending, and the links to other types of crime, have evolved since the Modern Slavery Act 2015 was introduced. Both criminal and sexual exploitation offending can take place across force areas, in multiple locations across the country, and online.

The legislation also needs to evolve to remain effective and to reduce the risk of offending and harm caused. The current legislation does not account for instances where the perpetrator has never visited or does not intend to visit the location where the offending occurs—that includes circumstances in which the offending takes place online. In such cases, the offending is more likely to be identified by the force in the location where the offending occurs, but the responsibility for applying for an order currently falls on the force in the perpetrator’s area of residence. Removing that restriction will enable law enforcement to improve the way it targets and disrupts modern slavery and human trafficking offending by relieving the burden on forces. It will cut back on application delays by allowing any force to apply for the order. The application will need to be made in the area where the defendant lives, or in the police area where the applicant believes the defendant is or is intending to come to. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 26 brings the chief constable of the British Transport police into the arrangements for applying for slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. Clause 27 widens the ability of territorial police forces to apply for these orders against people who live outside their area. The Opposition welcome both clauses.

The gangs behind modern slavery do not respect police boundaries, and our ability to stop them should not be hemmed in by those boundaries. The gangs move people by road and rail, they recruit in one town and exploit in another, and they rely on the gaps between agencies. Officers on our railways might be the first to see what is going on. If a British Transport police officer keeps seeing the same man shepherding the same frightened young people between stations, and gathers the evidence and identifies the risk, the next step should not be a phone call to ask another force to make the application.

Clause 27 deals with the same problem for territorial forces. Under the current law, a force can apply only in respect of someone who lives in its area or who intends to come into its area, but someone can live in one force area and do their damage in another. The force holding the evidence should be able to act, but wider powers require clear responsibility. If several forces have an interest in the same individual, who leads? Who checks that the person is complying with the order? Who answers the phone when a victim reports contact that might breach the order? Criminals exploit gaps, and we should not create new gaps between police forces.

Let me make a point that applies to the whole of part 5 of the Bill, so that I do not have to repeat it when addressing every group of amendments. Every new power in clauses 25 to 34 comes with work attached. Officers must recognise when an order is appropriate, build an application that will stand up in court, attend hearings and then manage the order for years. The British Transport police already have a demanding job keeping passengers safe, and our courts are already stretched. This is not about point-scoring on resources, but none of those powers will work just because a clause has been passed. Officers need training, guidance and capacity, and Ministers cannot hand forces new duties and leave them to pick up the bill.

We support clauses 26 and 27, but I would be grateful if the Minister could answer the following questions. First, were these changes requested by chief officers, including the chief constable of the British Transport police, and if so, what problems did they identify? Secondly, will there be an agreed protocol in place before these powers come into force, setting out which force leads when more than one force is involved? Thirdly, what assessment have the Government made of the training, guidance and capacity that forces will need to use the new powers set out in this part of the Bill?

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his contribution and his questions, and we appreciate his support for these important clauses.

Put simply, clauses 26 and 27 address the important issue of how law enforcement agencies will deal with the issues in their area. Clause 26 extends the provisions to the British Transport police, while clause 27 removes the restriction on chief officers of police of being able to apply for orders only in relation to people living in their local area.

As I set out earlier, currently there are unnecessary limitations on law enforcement’s ability to apply for slavery and trafficking orders. The constraints on how the orders can be applied for restrict their effectiveness. This means that we could be doing more to manage the risks identified, to protect vulnerable people who are at risk of exposure to these horrendous crimes.

To manage that, we have worked closely with enforcement colleagues—including, to respond to the hon. Gentleman, the British Transport police—to design new clauses that will allow forces to apply for the orders and remove the restriction on chief officers of police of being able to apply for orders in relation only to individuals living in their local police area. That will allow forces to better manage individuals who are committing offences across police force boundaries.

The hon. Gentleman asked about how the responsibility for monitoring and enforcing would be managed, and how the process would work. This amendment will improve co-operation between local forces and the British Transport police, who have to work collaboratively at almost every stage of the process, from application to monitoring. The British Transport police will still need to engage with the relevant local forces, give notice of the application to the chief officer of police, and conduct monitoring of the orders.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether a national monitoring system would be introduced. Law enforcement is responsible for monitoring and managing compliance with slavery and trafficking orders. The former modern slavery and organised immigration crime unit issued guidance to law enforcement on obtaining and managing slavery and trafficking prevention risk orders, to help ensure consistency across forces in England and Wales. When the changes are introduced, that statutory guidance will be updated to align with them, ensuring that all those involved have the right training and preparation for the new powers.

Together, clauses 26 and 27 allow the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to remain relevant to the modern world. I commend them to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 26 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 27 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28

Notification requirements in slavery and trafficking prevention orders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 29 stand part.

[Anna Turley]

Under section 19 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, courts may require individuals subject to slavery and trafficking prevention orders and slavery and trafficking risk orders to notify the police or another specified agency of personal information, including their name and address. However, monitoring and enforcement are currently inconsistent across police forces, which affects their ability to manage individuals and respond effectively to risk. That can result in police forces collecting information on individuals subject to an order in different ways, leading to delays in identifying breaches and an inconsistent approach to preventing individuals from engaging in criminal behaviour.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his questions. As he has set out, the orders in clauses 28 and 29 are crucial tools to allow our law enforcement to protect victims, and we appreciate the support of His Majesty’s Opposition.

The clauses address a gap in the current framework for managing individuals subject to slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. Currently, notification requirements are discretionary, which has contributed to there being different approaches to monitoring and enforcement across police forces, and that can limit law enforcement’s ability to identify breaches, manage risk and safeguard potential victims. Clauses 28 and 29 strengthen that regime by making the notification requirements mandatory, while also enabling courts to impose additional risk-based notifications where necessary and proportionate. This flexibility will allow the requirements placed on individuals to keep pace as modern slavery evolves.

The hon. Gentleman asked about the additional data that will be collected under clause 29. Currently, each force collects and records said data differently; that is part of the problem we are trying to address according to local needs. It is for the forces to decide how to monitor and manage individuals subject to an order. He also asked about some of the things that could be requested and collated: those could include phone numbers, email addresses, online usernames and vehicle registrations. They will be considered on a case-by-case basis specific to an individual that addresses proportionality and necessity based on the risk of offending, which I think answers his question about additional data. The shadow Minister also mentioned the regulations we refer to. We will publish those as soon as possible.

Together, these measures will support a more consistent and effective approach to monitoring individuals subject to orders. Strengthening orders and increasing notification requirements sends a strong message to both perpetrators and victims that exploitation will be detected. I commend clauses 28 and 29 to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 29 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 30

Slavery and trafficking prevention orders: adjournment of proceedings

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Anna Turley]

There is a risk that the current legislation is not clear that a court can adjourn proceedings, although it is common practice for courts to adjourn proceedings in relation to the slavery and trafficking prevention orders. Clause 30 makes it explicit that a court can adjourn proceedings when a person has been found guilty of a slavery and trafficking offence before making a slavery and trafficking prevention order. It ensures that the court has the option to adjourn proceedings for a slavery and human trafficking offence even after sentencing. That will remove any existing or future doubt.

The clause also includes provision for when an individual does not attend proceedings, to ensure that the criminal justice process can continue. It is simply about ensuring that courts have the necessary powers to ensure a smooth and effective court process.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 30 allows a court to adjourn proceedings on a slavery and trafficking prevention order at sentencing. If the defendant does not attend the adjourned hearing, the court may adjourn again, issue a warrant for their arrest or, subject to safeguards, proceed in their absence. A court deciding whether to make one of these orders needs the evidence to get it right, and the Opposition support giving it the time to do so. Proposed restrictions may need checking, or information from another force may still be outstanding. Rushing that work could produce an order that misses the very conduct it is meant to stop.

We should be clear about what an adjournment means in practice: another hearing has to be listed, officers may have to return to court, and if the offender is not in custody the risk they pose has to be managed while the case waits. When someone has been convicted of exploiting another human being, the public will rightly expect any continuing risk to be dealt with promptly. Given the Crown court backlog of a record more than 80,000 cases, nobody should be adding avoidable hearings to that list.

It is also worth noting that the clause places no limit on how long proceedings can be adjourned or how many times. That is why so much depends on preparation. The possibility of a prevention order should not suddenly occur to someone at the end of a sentencing hearing. An adjournment may sometimes be necessary, but it must not become the fall-back for an application that nobody got ready.

We welcome the power to proceed when the defendant fails to attend; a convicted offender should not be able to hold up a protective order simply by staying at home. The safeguards in the clause matter. Before issuing a warrant, the court must be satisfied that the defendant had “adequate notice” of the hearing before proceeding in their absence. It must also be satisfied that the defendant was told the hearing could go ahead without them. If that is not done properly, the court cannot take the next step. Getting the paperwork right is what allows the court to act firmly.

We must not forget the victim. If the hearing has been put off, the victim needs to know that restrictions are not in place. Otherwise, they may rely on protection that does not yet exist. We support clause 30, but I would be grateful if the Minister answered the following questions. When proceedings are adjourned and the offender is not in custody, how will any immediate risk be managed until the order is made? Who will be responsible for telling victims that an order has been delayed and what has and has not been put in place? Will the Government monitor how often such proceedings are adjourned and how many times in a single case, so that a sensible power does not become another source of delay?

[Anna Turley]

I thank the shadow Minister for his thoughtful contributions. Clause 30 is simple: although courts can adjourn proceedings, the current legislation does not explicitly provide for that, which has created the potential for real uncertainty.

During the passage of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 in the House of Lords, a specific provision was requested in related to serious violence reduction orders to make it clear that proceedings could be adjourned even after sentencing took place. The specific provision for adjournment has been included in domestic abuse protection orders. That is intended to enable the court to determine any outstanding prevention orders, even after the criminal proceedings have concluded. Replicating measures such as those for instances of modern slavery will remove any current or future doubt that the court is able to determine a slavery and trafficking prevention order after sentencing.

Adjournment is a procedural tool that the court might take after sentencing or acquittal to consider imposing an order. The court may then consider further evidence related to the future risk of offending when considering whether to make a slavery and trafficking prevention order. Clause 30 is about enabling the court to more effectively address offending while the defendant is still under their power and to ensure that outstanding matters in a case can be dealt with at the same time. Adjourning proceedings in relation to the making of a prevention order is currently common practice, but we are making that explicit and mirroring the similar provisions in other legislation providing for civil orders.

The shadow Minister asked whether the measure would result in an increase in non-attendance in the courts and potentially an increase in warrants. A court can hear the proceedings in a person’s absence if it is satisfied that the defendant

“has had adequate notice of the time and place of the adjourned proceedings, and…has been informed that if the defendant does not appear for those proceedings the court may hear the proceedings in the defendant’s absence.”

As such, a person cannot continually delay proceedings by not attending, but the notice requirements are safeguarded to ensure that defendants are aware of the proceedings. The court cannot issue a warrant unless it is satisfied that the person

“has had adequate notice of the time and place of the adjourned proceedings”.

Clause 30 also makes clear that a court can adjourn proceedings where a person has been found guilty of a slavery and trafficking offence before making a slavery and trafficking prevention order.

I will pick up on the shadow Minister’s point about victim liaisons because that is important; I will undertake to get back to him and the Committee about that. The clause also undertakes a court process, which is currently common practice in relation to these orders and mirrors established legislative precedent from other civil orders. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 30 according ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 31

Slavery and trafficking prevention orders: electronic monitoring

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clauses 32 and 33 stand part.

[Anna Turley]

There is currently no express power in the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to impose an electronic monitoring requirement as a condition of slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. Case law suggests that that may be within the court’s existing powers; however, as it is not explicit in the current legislation, it can be unclear to the court that electronic monitoring—tagging, as we know it—is an option as a monitoring tool for slavery and trafficking orders. Introducing an express power will ensure that there is no doubt that electronic monitoring can be used where it is deemed necessary.

Clauses 31 and 32 set out the explicit provision for courts to impose an electronic monitoring requirement as part of a slavery and trafficking prevention order or an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order, or a slavery and trafficking risk order or an interim slavery and trafficking risk order. Such a requirement will be applied only where the court is satisfied that it is necessary for the purpose of protecting persons from physical or psychological harm. We want to ensure that law enforcement has all the tools it needs to manage offenders effectively.

Electronic monitoring enables law enforcement to monitor compliance with the conditions of an order where they include an exclusion zone, a curfew or travel restrictions. The conditions imposed by each order are tailored by the court depending on the nature of the individual’s risk of offending. Electronic monitoring, as a condition of a slavery and trafficking order, would also help to prevent reoffending and prevent offenders from fleeing, leaving the country and escaping criminal punishment.

We know that electronic monitoring of an offender can make victims and survivors feel safer in some instances and improve their engagement with the criminal justice system. Electronic monitoring can also act as a deterrent to perpetrators while the tag is being worn. Electronic monitoring will ensure certainty of detection when protective licence conditions are breached, strengthen offender management, help victims and survivors feel safe following the release of their perpetrators and help to prevent further offending.

Clause 33 sets out a number of consequential amendments to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to support the introduction and enforcement of electronic monitoring requirements for individuals subject to slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders. The clause updates section 30 of the 2015 Act so that the existing offence of breaching an order applies consistently to all the modern slavery and trafficking orders. This ensures a consistent enforcement framework across the full range of orders.

The clause also sets out a requirement for the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice governing the processing of data obtained through electronic monitoring. That will provide clear guidance on the handling of information gathered through electronic monitoring while ensuring that appropriate safeguards are in place. The clause also provides the appropriate regulation-making framework for electronic monitoring arrangements and clarifies the parliamentary procedure for regulations specifying who may be responsible for electronic monitoring.

Clauses 31 to 33 will strengthen the operation of slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders, support the use of electronic monitoring and provide a clear framework for enforcement, governance and oversight, and I commend them to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Clauses 31 to 33 provide for electronic monitoring in slavery and trafficking prevention orders and risk orders, including interim orders, and require the issuance of a code of practice on how the monitoring data is handled. A court order must mean something. If somebody is told to stay away from a potential victim or a particular place, the authorities need to know when that order is broken, and they need to act. Electronic monitoring can help with that, and the Opposition support these powers.

However, we should not view tagging through rose-tinted glasses. A tag tells the authority where someone is. It cannot stop the person picking up a phone and getting someone else to do their dirty work, and a tag is only as good as the response when it goes off. Picture someone walking into an area the court has barred them from because a potential victim lives there. The device records it and an alert is raised. Then what? Who receives that alert first, how quickly is it passed to the police, and how quickly do officers arrive? Someone who is at risk at 11 o’clock on a Saturday night cannot wait until Monday morning for someone to check a screen.

That is not a theoretical concern. Only this week, Sky News reported that the Metropolitan police will no longer respond to curfew or tag battery breaches lasting under an hour, unless the wearer is judged to pose a particular risk. The commissioner says his officers are dealing with more than 100 tag breaches a day, driven in part by the Government’s early release scheme. One sergeant put it simply:

“there are not enough cops”.

The Met itself described cases in which officers were told about a breach many hours after it had happened. The problem is therefore at both ends: alerts that are slow to reach the police, and police too stretched to respond when they do. The Minister must tell us how alerts under these new orders will avoid both.

Monitoring can also be imposed only where suitable arrangements are available in the area, so a court may decide that monitoring is necessary but still be unable to order it. Will monitoring be available consistently across the country from the day these powers come into force, or will protection depend on where a victim happens to live?

The person being monitored must allow the equipment to be fitted and maintained, and must not interfere with it. Deliberate tampering cannot be allowed to defeat an order, and it must be treated as the enforcement matter it is. Equally, officers need to be able to tell a flat battery from a deliberate attempt to go off the radar, so that they spend their time on the real risks. Clause 33 requires a code of practice on monitoring data. That code must protect the data properly, but it must also let the right officers get hold of information quickly, and make sure that it is preserved where it may be needed as evidence.

We support clauses 31 to 33, but we have questions for the Minister. When an alert is raised under one of these orders, who receives it? How is it passed to the police, and how quickly will officers respond, including at night and on weekends? Where will monitoring be available when these powers come into force, and when will it be available everywhere? When will the Committee see a draft of the code of practice on monitoring data?

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman again for his helpful and thoughtful contributions, and for his support for the clauses. As discussed, this group covers the electronic monitoring requirements for slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders, along with consequential amendments.

As I laid out previously, law enforcement does not always have the tools needed to support it in effectively monitoring those subject to these orders or to identify breaches at an earlier stage. The clauses will enable courts, where necessary and proportionate, to impose electronic monitoring requirements. That will strengthen the management and enforcement of orders, help to identify breaches sooner and disrupt further offending, and provide greater protection and reassurance to victims.

The hon. Member for Stockton West raised a few questions, which I am very happy to answer. First, he asked whether the code of practice would be subject to parliamentary procedure. Given the likely content and nature of the code, the fact that it is not going to define or create any new legal responsibilities, and that the processing of data must be in accordance with the requirements of data protection legislation, the Government do not consider it necessary for the code to be subject to any parliamentary procedure.

The hon. Gentleman asked for some more detail on what the code of practice would look like. This clause sets out that the Secretary of State must issue a code of practice relating to the processing of data gathered in the course of the electronic monitoring of individuals where that has been imposed. The code of practice is intended to set out the appropriate tests and safeguards for the processing of such data, in order to ensure compliance with the UK General Data Protection Regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018.

The Government consider that a code of practice is the most appropriate vehicle for setting out expectations and responsibilities in relation to the processing of data gathered under electronic monitoring requirements. It is important to have the flexibility to update the code to keep pace with any changes to that legislation and to ensure that it can be aligned with operational guidance.

The hon. Gentleman asked about resourcing. There is currently no intention to increase the number of electronic monitoring cases. Electronic monitoring will be used only in cases where it is justified against the legislative requirements and considered necessary to protect persons from harm. The number of orders issued with electronic monitoring as a condition will depend on the nature of the offending, the assessment of the court hearing the case and the other conditions available that could address the risk. As such, it is not possible to say whether, overall, the use of electronic monitoring will increase or decrease. It is about giving the courts the clarity that they need.

It is important to consider that electronic monitoring can help to reduce the amount of resource used trying to trace offenders who breach the conditions of their orders. Electronic monitoring would enable forces to respond more effectively to the risk posed by offenders, and we could see some early intervention and prevention as a result of that.

Electronic monitoring can be a condition of an order only if the court has been notified by the Secretary of State that electronic monitoring arrangements are available in the relevant area, and the court is satisfied that the necessary provision can be made under the arrangements currently available. I think I have covered the issues raised by the shadow Minister.

Clauses 31 to 33 will also align the slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders with other civil orders, as I mentioned, which have explicit provision for electronic monitoring. This is about clarity for the courts on the face of the law. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 31 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 32 and 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 34

Variation etc of slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Anna Turley]

This clause, building on the group we have just discussed, strengthens the operation of slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders by allowing courts to include additional notification requirements and electronic monitoring when orders are renewed or varied. It ensures that such measures may be applied only when the court is satisfied that the requirement is necessary for the purpose of protecting persons from physical or psychological harm, and it introduces safeguards governing the use of electronic monitoring, including limits on the duration of monitoring extensions.

[Matt Vickers]

The clause brings the new notification and electronic monitoring requirements into the process for varying and renewing slavery and trafficking prevention orders and risk orders. An order has to keep protecting people long after the day it is made. Those subject to the orders could move, change how they operate or find a way around a restriction and the police must be able to respond. The Opposition support the clause. There should be no reward for wriggling around an order. If the evidence shows the restrictions need strengthening, the authorities should be back in front of the court quickly, not waiting for someone to come to further harm.

A power to apply for a variation, however, does not tell an officer when to use it. Take someone whose activities have shifted to a different town. The police know things have changed and that the original conditions no longer fit the risk, but unless someone picks up the file and takes it back to court, the order stays exactly as it was. Someone has to be responsible for spotting that gap and closing it.

The clause also deals with orders made before the Bill. As we discussed under clauses 28 and 29, some such orders contain no notification requirements at all. Under clause 34, when an older order is varied, the court can add those requirements only if it is satisfied that they are necessary, but when an older order is renewed, they must be included. That is welcome, but it means the protection depends on someone bringing the older order back to court.

Electronic monitoring brings deadlines of its own. A court can extend a monitoring requirement by no more than 12 months at a time, so every order with a tag will need to come back to court at least once a year to keep it in place. Expiry dates should never come as a surprise. An ongoing risk must not go unmonitored because a renewal application was left sitting in someone’s in-tray. There is a practical catch, too: a tag can be added on variation only if the defendant is present in court, so the person who stays away from the hearing may be the very person who cannot be tagged. I will be grateful if the Minister could say how that will be handled.

The clause rightly keeps the requirement for the court to assess risk and necessity. Good evidence makes for a stronger order, and a stronger order is one that officers can enforce with confidence. I set out our concerns about police and court capacity when we debated clauses 26 and 27, and they bite the hardest here. Reviewing existing orders and returning to court every year is exactly the kind of work that does not happen unless someone is given the job of doing it. We support clause 34, but I would be grateful if the Minister could answer the following questions. Who will review existing orders, and who will ensure that a renewal reaches the court before the order or the monitoring runs out? How quickly will an urgent variation be heard when fresh evidence shows that the risk has grown, and what happens if the defendant does not attend? How will victims be told when an order is varied, renewed or allowed to lapse, so that they know what protection they actually have?

[Anna Turley]

As I laid out earlier, we want to ensure that law enforcement and the courts have the tools required to prevent harmful behaviour, including when orders are renewed or varied. Put simply, clause 34 strengthens the operation of slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders by allowing courts to include additional notification requirements and electronic monitoring when orders are renewed and varied. That will enable orders to respond to changing risks, help law enforcement manage those risks effectively and better protect potential victims.

The hon. Gentleman asked an earlier question about resource, and it is important to re-emphasise that electronic monitoring can often reduce the resource wasted in trying to trace offenders. Instead, it can allow forces to effectively respond to the risk posed by offenders. He also asked who will be involved, but it will follow the existing process already undertaken by those police forces.

I want to further discuss the balance between the powers given under the clause and human rights, as I think it is important to get this on the record. Electronic monitoring would only be applied by a judge to orders where it is appropriate within the confines of the European convention on human rights. There are also restrictions on the specified length of the electronic monitoring period that can be applied, based on the circumstances of the individual cases—for example, it could be up to 12 months. The decision to electronically monitor a subject will only be made following great consideration by the courts, and it will be applied only where there is justification and it is demonstrated to be proportionate in that case.

Providing the courts with this explicit power to require electronic monitoring as a condition of a slavery and trafficking order does not mean that what constitutes an acceptable threshold for electronic monitoring will be lowered. The provision will only allow for it to be quickly put in place where merit is identified. If I have not addressed any of the hon. Gentleman’s questions, I commit to write to him further on those, but I am grateful for his support. The clause introduces important safeguards governing the use of electronic monitoring, and I commend it to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 35

Authority responsible for deciding if a person is a victim etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 4 and clause 36 stand part.

[Anna Turley]

I will speak to clauses 35 to 43. Since the modern slavery system was established, the nature and volume of referrals have changed. Compared with 2014, referrals into the national referral mechanism—the system for identifying potential victims of modern slavery—have increased by 900%. In 2025, modern slavery referrals from those who arrived by small boat were the highest since records began in 2018, and more than half of referrals now relate to exploitation that took place overseas. Our system seeks to identify, support and protect individuals at the earliest opportunity, and that is in everyone’s interest.

However, we cannot ignore the fact that, because of the protections offered by the system, there is value for some in seeking to misuse it. In 2025, over a third of chartered flight returns that failed to go ahead involved a modern slavery referral lodged after that return was arranged. That type of action undermines the integrity of the system and creates disproportionate operational pressures.

We need a robust end-to-end system—one that supports earlier identification of victims, delivers clear and timely decisions and addresses opportunities for improper use. Importantly, it must be one that works effectively for those who it is intended to protect. This Government have been particularly clear in our commitment to embed protections for those who are most vulnerable, including exploited and trafficked children, and the clauses will bring balance and order to the system to do just that.

First, clause 35 clarifies a key part of our modern slavery system: who can make decisions about whether an individual is a victim of modern slavery for the purposes of part 5 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. For adults, it will formalise the existing operational model where the Secretary of State acts as the competent authority or decision-making body for all modern slavery decisions. For children, it will enable the Secretary of State to nominate other public authorities to act as the competent authority in relation to reasonable and conclusive grounds decisions on a case-by-case basis. We know this model can be successful; we have been piloting the approach since 2021, enabling local safeguarding partners, who will often be involved in the child’s care, to make decisions about whether the child is a victim of modern slavery.

Stakeholders have told us that embedding decisions with those working directly with a child removes the perceived disconnect between identification and support and delivers a more sustainable model of decision making aligned with existing safeguarding frameworks. However, legislative change is required to implement this approach on a greater scale.

That is what this clause delivers: the legal foundation to devolve modern slavery decision making for children nationally, ensuring decisions are made by those best placed to safeguard them. By embedding these responsibilities within existing local safeguarding structures, the clause will strengthen partnership working, increase awareness of exploitation, support earlier identification of vulnerable children and create greater opportunity to prevent harm before it occurs.

Schedule 4 will play a critical role in implementing the changes made through clause 35 of the Bill, making consequential amendments to reflect the definition of “competent authority” and ensure consistency across the statute book. It will enable the Secretary of State to lay regulations on the making of reasonable or conclusive grounds decisions by all competent authorities and issue guidance on the processes to be followed by nominated public authorities.

Together, the measures will enable consistent, high-quality devolved decision making for children by local safeguarding partners. First, schedule 4 updates definitions to reflect the change in who can make decisions set out in clause 35. Secondly, the regulations ensure persistent decision making across all decision-making bodies, setting a clear framework for the making of modern slavery decisions, what bodies should make them and how they should do so. This will be underpinned by guidance that makes it clear what is expected of public authorities while also providing transparency on how their competence will be addressed. That will help ensure consistent and quality decision making, and that public authorities are trained and supported to deliver to the required standard.

Thirdly, regulations will make it clear that information sharing and joint working across multi-agency safeguarding partners is paramount to strong decision making, enabling the Secretary of State to require public authorities other than the Home Office to engage in decision making. That is crucial not just for information sharing for partners with the Home Office, but to deliver the tried-and-tested approach to decision making for children, which will see responsibility embedded with those best able to make decisions for children and ensure it is done in a consistent and controlled way.

Turning to clause 36, the Government are committed to ensuring that decisions made under the national referral mechanism are robust, preventing opportunities for improper use of the system and providing clarity in legislation. To deliver that, it is essential that the factors that a decision maker must consider to negatively impact a person’s credibility are clear.

Currently, decision makers can consider factors such as the timing of disclosure and consistency in the information a person has provided, which may have an impact on the credibility of a person’s account. This assessment can be used to inform the outcome of a reasonable grounds or conclusive grounds decision. However, there is no legal requirement for this credibility assessment to inform part of the decision making.

The clause will place those credibility considerations on a statutory footing, making it clear that those factors, which can often be an indicator of a lack of veracity, will be considered to be damaging to a person’s credibility unless good reasons are put forward. That will provide a more robust framework supporting consistent decision making and a clear understanding across potential victims and those representing them.

We recognise that there may be factors that explain the presence of credibility indicators. For example, a person may be suffering from coercion, fear or trauma. That is why the legislation also requires decision making to assess whether there are good reasons that could explain the presence of factors that would otherwise impact on an individual’s credibility. Detailed guidance will be set out on what will constitute good reasons, recognising that these are non-exhaustive. It will support decision makers in considering each person’s individual circumstances and experience.

This is a key safeguard that balances the importance of preventing improper claims with the recognition that some factors that point to a lack of credibility are the result of individual circumstances that require consideration. By setting out a statutory duty to consider credibility considerations and the impact of those factors on decisions, the clause will strengthen the legal robustness of decision making and provide greater clarity for decision makers, potential victims and those representing them. I commend clauses 35 and 36 to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

There were 23,411 referrals into the national referral mechanism last year, which is the highest number since it began, and 25,373 in the year to June. Behind those numbers are genuine victims who deserve our protection, but there are also people who have worked out that a modern slavery claim can be used to frustrate removal.

The British public want two things from our modern slavery system, and they are not in conflict: they want genuine victims protected, and they want the system to stand firm against those who try to game it to avoid removal. Every bogus claim wastes taxpayers’ money, ties up officials who should be helping real victims, and delays the removal of people with no right to be here, and every bad decision risks leaving someone who has been exploited in the hands of the very people who exploited them. The Opposition believe that these clauses can help on both counts and we support them.

Clause 35 sets out who makes the decisions. For adults, it is the Secretary of State. For children, it can be the Secretary of State or another public authority nominated for that purpose. Schedule 4 makes the consequential changes needed for that to work. A name in legislation has to mean real accountability. A child’s treatment should not depend on whose desk the file happens to land on.

Clause 36 deals with credibility. When deciding whether to believe someone’s account, decision makers must treat certain things as damaging to credibility unless there are good reasons for them. Those things include a delay in making a claim or providing information, material inconsistencies and omissions, inconsistencies with what the person has said in an asylum claim or in court, and striking similarities with other people’s accounts. That is common sense. If someone tells one story in an immigration application and a very different one the moment removal becomes a real prospect, the decision maker should test that difference hard. If an account bears an uncanny resemblance to someone else’s, officials must be free to ask whether they are looking at genuine evidence or a script supplied to frustrate removal.

The principle behind the clause is one that we legislated for in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022: that late disclosure without good reason should count against credibility. Labour opposed the Act at the time, so I welcome the fact that the Government now recognise the value of that principle and are building on it. There is common ground across the Committee on this issue. The clause is carefully drawn. It is about damage to credibility. It does not say that every claim must fail or that every inconsistency proves a lie, and it allows for good reasons. Someone threatened by a gang may be terrified to speak. Someone describing horrific events that they have witnessed may not get it all out at once.

However, the Bill does not define a good reason; it leaves it to guidance. That guidance must help caseworkers tell a genuine explanation from a convenient excuse, and it needs to be ready before the clause comes into force, not cobbled together afterwards. The rules will work only if caseworkers have the information to apply them. The clause asks them to compare an account with what the person said in an asylum claim or in court proceedings, and with accounts given by other people. That is not much use if the caseworker cannot see the earlier account or has no means of spotting that the same story has appeared in a dozen other claims.

We support clauses 35 and 36 and schedule 4, but I would be grateful if the Minister could answer the following questions. First, which authorities does she expect to be nominated to make decisions in children’s cases? Has legislative consent been sought from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and who will check the quality of decisions across the United Kingdom? Secondly, will the guidance on what counts as a good reason be published in draft before Report, and how will it apply at the reasonable grounds stage where the threshold is deliberately low? Thirdly, what systems will caseworkers have to see earlier accounts held elsewhere in the Home Office and to identify striking similarities across different claims?

Clear credibility rules should mean quicker and better decisions. What happens to support once a negative decision has been made is the subject of clause 37 in the next group, and I will come to it there.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I thank all hon. Members for their contributions. This is a really important discussion because these are important clauses. Clause 35 clarifies who can make decisions about whether an individual is a victim of modern slavery for the purposes of part 5 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. For adults, as I have said, it will formalise the existing operational model, with the Secretary of State acting as a competent authority for all modern slavery decisions. For children, it will enable the Secretary of State to nominate other public authorities to act as the competent authority. That will allow modern slavery decisions relating to children to be devolved nationally, ensuring that decisions are made by those best placed to safeguard and support them, building on the success of the pilot.

Schedule 4 complements these changes by making important consequential amendments to reflect the definition of competent authority and ensure consistency across the statute book. It will enable the Secretary of State to lay regulations on the making of reasonable or conclusive grounds decisions by all competent authorities and issue guidance on the processes to be followed by nominated public authorities.

Clause 36 places on a statutory footing credibility considerations that are already set out in guidance. That will make it clear that these factors will be considered to be damaging to a person’s credibility unless good reasons are put forward. That will provide a more robust framework—one that supports consistent decision making while recognising factors that could impact credibility indicators, such as a person suffering from coercion, fear or trauma.

I come back to the points raised during the discussion. I am afraid that I take issue with the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for talking as if the purpose of the Bill is just to drive rhetoric or a political argument. These important measures will give our constituents confidence in the immigration and asylum system, and they will make sure that these important provisions, which are a credit to the Conservatives, are genuinely there to protect those who require and deserve support having faced the horrendous issue of modern slavery. It is really important that we protect them from abuse.

I go back to some of the facts and evidence I have already mentioned. The hon. Lady seems to dismiss the evidence out of hand, but there are some important factors here. I mentioned in my introductory remarks that modern slavery referrals have gone up 900% since 2014. Of arranged returns that failed to go ahead, 34%, or over a third, involved a referral for modern slavery made after the return had been arranged—not prior, but after. That is people who have gone through numerous appeals processes and have had numerous opportunities to highlight issues or concerns, but who had a return arranged because they have no right to be in this country.

Of cases raised through the national referral mechanism’s out-of-hours decision-making service ahead of a charter flight, 76% were raised between the hours of 3 pm on the day prior to the planned removal and 6 am on the day of the planned charter removal. Of the total referrals, 15% were raised after 11 pm.

[Siân Berry]

Will the Minister give way?

[Anna Turley]

I am just addressing the hon. Lady’s point. She said that those are not big statistics, or she dismissed them. They might appear small in scale, but they place a hugely disproportionate pressure on operations. Home Office officials are getting all the paperwork in place and liaising with different countries and airlines. These cases are hugely expensive and damaging for operations. They delay removal action due to disingenuous claims, prevent proper decision making and impact support for those who need it most. That is what the Bill aims to address.

[Siân Berry]

This is a useful debate, because the Minister’s points are speaking to the operational nature of this. I hope she will go away and reflect on the wider harm that will be caused by adding this to all victims, in response to what is an operational decision. She is very much relying on that, rather than on our obligations under human rights law and the nature of why late referrals may occur in those circumstances.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the hon. Lady’s intervention. I will come on to trauma and the exemptions that we have, because this is really important. We want to make sure that genuine victims are protected, but I want to outline another fact—the facts are really important here—because the UK refers more victims of modern slavery than the whole of Europe put together. In 2023, the UK referred 17,004 cases, yet there were 10,907 referrals in the whole EU. I do not think anyone can accuse us of not living up to our obligations on modern slavery.

The hon. Lady and the hon. Member for Wimbledon have both mentioned victims of trauma. As a Government, we have engaged extensively with organisations working to address modern slavery. We have had a call for evidence and lived experience forums. We have had a range of expert insights, including survivor voices, to ensure that we have informed policy development. That has helped to ensure that the reforms reflect how the system operates in practice and take a trauma-informed approach to identifying and supporting victims. We will continue to engage with stakeholders as the Bill progresses, to ensure that the system remains responsive to victims’ needs.

I reiterate that individuals have opportunities throughout their immigration process to raise any modern slavery-related information, or any other information.

[Siân Berry]

Will the Minister give way on that specific point?

[Anna Turley]

I will give way, and then I will make the point I had intended to make.

[Siân Berry]

The Minister repeatedly refers to “individuals” making the claim, but people cannot self-refer to the national referral mechanism. A professional is making the judgment that they may be a victim. Will the Minister acknowledge that? These claims of abuse hinge on the belief that individuals are making claims, but they are not.

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Lady must not misinterpret us; we are absolutely clear that individuals do not make those claims. However, they raise information. If they raise information on the plane’s steps, it is very clear that many individuals are knowingly gaming the sorts of information that will be relevant to a modern slavery claim. Individuals can raise, at any point in the immigration process, not a referral but any information relating to any concerns they may have about their experience of modern slavery. That could be at the moment they arrive at a UK port, when they are encountered by immigration officials, or it could be to the police, a local authority, a community group or a charity. All this information can be flagged.

If modern slavery information is raised, or if it is identified through general immigration screening processes, a trained first responder—in these circumstances, from UK Visas and Immigration, Border Force, Immigration Enforcement or the police—will make a national referral mechanism referral. Adults must consent to such a referral being made. The referral process includes questions designed to surface any modern slavery experience, to aid decision making by the single competent authority and the immigration enforcement competent authority. People are trained specifically to ask questions throughout the process to identify victims of modern slavery.

Returning to the issues of trauma, the Government recognise the horrific experience that many victims of modern slavery have endured. We understand that trauma can have a profound effect on their ability to raise and discuss it, which is why decision makers are trained and must consider whether there are good reasons to explain the factors that might otherwise be viewed as undermining an individual’s credibility.

Detailed guidance will support decision makers in considering each person’s individual circumstances and experience. That will be trauma-informed, and it will ensure that credibility assessments are made fairly and on a case-by-case basis. First responders are also trained to recognise any signs of modern slavery and identify potential victims, to use trauma-informed approaches to help individuals disclose their experiences and, where appropriate, to refer them to the national referral mechanism.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asks about the provisions applying to children. The Bill’s credibility provisions will apply to individuals of all ages, but specific safeguards will be in place with regard to age. The Government recognise the specific vulnerabilities that children can have, which may affect their ability to disclose relevant modern slavery information. That will be factored into decision makers’ consideration of whether there are good reasons to explain the factors that might otherwise be viewed as undermining an individual’s credibility. This could include, for example, a child’s developmental stage and emotional maturity, which could have an impact on their ability to disclose information. Detailed guidance will support decision makers in considering each person’s individual circumstances and experiences, ensuring that credibility assessments are made fairly and on a case-by-case basis.

The hon. Lady also asks whether the credibility provisions will apply to British nationals. Yes, they will apply to all individuals, including British nationals. We recognise that some individuals, including British nationals who have experienced modern slavery, may have reasons for being unable to disclose information at an early opportunity. For example, victims of historical exploitation may not have previously come into contact or had repeated interactions with authorities, resulting in delayed disclosure. Equally, victims might not recognise themselves as victims of modern slavery or might be reluctant to be identified as such. That is why our first responders are trained to understand and identify signs that may indicate that a person is a victim.

The clause also requires decision makers to consider all relevant circumstances and evidence when assessing the credibility of an individual’s account on a case-by-case basis. As I said, where they identify that there are good reasons for the delayed disclosure, they will not draw a negative credibility finding on that basis alone.

The hon. Lady mentioned the al-Fayed cases. We are absolutely committed to supporting victims to come forward and disclose their experiences, including victims of historical exploitation, victims of grooming gangs and al-Fayed trafficking victims. Those are horrendous cases. Under the modern slavery system, first responders must refer consenting adults and children to the national referral mechanism when modern slavery indicators are present. This is true regardless of how long ago the incidents may have occurred. Decision makers will take this into account when considering cases. Where there is an explanation for the time taken between the exploitation and disclosing it, the delay in disclosure will not result in a negative credibility finding on that basis alone. The credibility provisions on delayed disclosure focus on where individuals have had repeated opportunities to disclose and did not do so. It is not a blanket provision on all lateness.

Hon. Members have asked for more detail on why good reasons are not listed in the Bill. The Bill sets out a pretty exhaustive list of five specific factors that decision makers are required to consider as having a negative impact on credibility when assessing the account of an individual referred to the national referral mechanism, while recognising there might be legitimate reasons for these issues arising. Where the competent authority is satisfied that there are good reasons for the issues with an individual’s account, such as delayed disclosure and inconsistency of account, this will mitigate against any adverse credibility finding. The legislation does not include an exhaustive list of good reasons, primarily because the range of potential mitigating circumstances is so broad that any attempt to provide a closed list would inevitably fail to capture the full range of potential mitigating circumstances.

Decision makers should not be restricted to a set of good reasons. Having these reasons in guidance will retain flexibility for decision makers to consider individual factors that appear to impact on an individual’s credibility. Those decision makers should consider all relevant factors in the round on a case-by-case basis before making a credibility finding. In terms of good reasons, relevant consideration may include the impact of trauma, fear of authorities, cultural or gender-related barriers to disclosure, a lack of self-identification as a victim or, for children, factors such as developmental stage, maturity and the effects of grooming, coercion and control.

The hon. Member for Stockton West asked about consistency across local authorities and local decision-making structures. It is important to say that any individual would receive a consistent decision and outcome. That is important to us, irrespective of which competent authority makes the decision. Regulations will be put in place to establish a clear framework that all competent authorities will be expected to operate within in order to ensure that decisions are taken consistently across all areas. All decisions will be made in line with modern slavery statutory guidance that will be consistent across all competent authorities. For decisions made by local public authorities, there will be separate additional guidance setting out the process and timelines for decision making through this model.

The shadow Minister also asked who might be nominated. Ahead of any public authority being nominated as a competent authority, it will be provided with a comprehensive programme of training to ensure that it understands its responsibilities as a competent authority and is able to make timely and accurate decisions. In addition, the Home Office will put in place clear oversight processes, including clear intervention steps that will be taken should concerns be raised about performance.

The shadow Minister also asked how the measures will apply in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The intention is for this model of decision making to apply to children across all parts of the United Kingdom. We already have successful pilot sites operating in all four nations, as the model allows for local safeguarding partners to have flexibility over how they deliver many elements of the decision-making process. This means that decisions can work alongside any differences in legislative framework across the UK, while ensuring that all decisions are made to a consistent standard. We will continue to work with local safeguarding partners and devolved Governments on this approach and implementation.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Anna Turley]

This Government are clear that we must be able to move individuals more efficiently through the system without unnecessary delay, and ensure that those who are deemed not to be victims of modern slavery do not receive protection and support that they do not need and are not entitled to. Clause 37 makes it clear that a negative conclusive grounds decision ends the modern slavery recovery period, so there will be no requirement to wait for the 30-day recovery period to end before confirming that an individual is not a victim.

At present, after referral to the national referral mechanism, if an individual receives a positive reasonable grounds decision, they receive a statutory 30-day recovery period. That protects them from removal and enables access to support. Even where a decision maker has the evidence to issue a negative conclusive grounds decision within 30 days, and so conclude that the individual is not a victim, that would not end the recovery period nor these entitlements.

Clause 37 rectifies this problem. Where there is enough evidence to conclude that an individual is not a victim of modern slavery, a negative conclusive grounds decision can be issued within the recovery period, and the issuing of that negative decision will end the recovery period. This is important to ensure that we remove inefficiencies in our system and do not retain unnecessary barriers to removal. It will also ensure that support resources remain focused on supporting and protecting genuine victims. I commend clause 37 to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 37 raises a simple question: once the competent authority has considered a claim and reached a negative conclusive grounds decision, why should the recovery period carry on just because the calendar has not yet reached 30 days? Under clause 37, the recovery period ends when a negative conclusive grounds decision is made, even if that is before the 30 days are up. If no decision has been made by then, the period continues until a decision is made. Corresponding changes are made for further recovery periods. The Opposition support this principle.

The recovery period exists so that a claim can be properly considered. Once it has been considered and found wanting, the protection should not roll on automatically. Our immigration system will not command respect if an unsuccessful claim simply buys another stretch of waiting at taxpayers’ expense. Where the legal process is complete and someone has no right to be here, they should leave.

We should be honest about what the clause does and does not do. Ending a recovery period lifts the legal bar on removal and ends the support that goes with it. However, it does not remove a single person; that depends entirely on what happens next, which is a point that applies just as much to the groups of clauses either side of this one. Too often, a decision is made in one part of the Home Office, while another part carries on as if nothing has happened. Ministers should be lining up the next steps while a case is still being considered, so that a negative decision is followed swiftly by action, not by a trip to the back of another queue.

Speed must not come at the expense of getting it right. A rushed decision that falls apart under scrutiny helps nobody and ends up in court. In the year to June, more than four in five conclusive grounds decisions that were reconsidered came out positive. Whatever the reason for that, it tells us that first decisions do not always hold up. If a negative decision will now end support immediately, the quality of that decision matters more than ever.

The Government announced earlier this month that the backlog of conclusive grounds decisions had been cleared, yet more than 6,000 cases were still waiting at the end of September, and that number has been rising. The Home Office’s own statistics show that the number of cases awaiting a final decision fell in every quarter until April this year, but has since risen by 23% between March and June and by a further 6% in September alone. I would be grateful if the Minister explained what the Government mean by “cleared”, and what they are doing to stop the queue from growing again.

The person, their representative and the organisations supporting them also need to know what has been decided and what happens next. A recovery period that ends overnight must not leave anyone unsure of whether they are still entitled to support.

We support clause 37, but I would be grateful if the Minister answered three questions. First, what checks will take place before a negative conclusive grounds decision is issued, and how will a genuine mistake be put right without that process becoming an endless source of delay? Secondly, once a negative decision is made, who takes ownership of the case, and how will cases that are already in the system when the clause comes into force be treated? Thirdly, will the Government publish regular figures showing how long it takes, after a negative conclusive grounds decision, for the next enforcement step to happen? Counting decisions alone will tell us nothing about whether the system is actually working.

[Siân Berry]

I also oppose clause 37. Under that clause, survivors who receive a negative decision could be immediately removed from support, which could expose them to destitution, homelessness and an increased risk of further harm and exploitation.

Allowing competent authorities to make and serve conclusive grounds decisions during the recovery and reflection period could have a devastating impact on survivors’ wellbeing and recovery. This approach may reduce the amount and quality of evidence available to inform decision making, because survivors may not have sufficient time to understand the process, build trust with support providers or access legal advice. Given the complexity of many cases and the evidential requirements often associated with conclusive grounds decisions—including the need for medical or mental health assessment reports—many individuals may find it difficult to obtain and submit the necessary evidence within such a short timeframe.

I believe that there will also be wider impacts on survivors and society—particularly an increase in homelessness, which the Prime Minister is committed to reducing. Clause 37 could result in survivors being exited from support on the same day that they receive a negative decision, which would clearly put them at a heightened risk of destitution and homelessness. A negative decision notwithstanding, anyone in the national referral mechanism was referred by a first responder who identified trafficking indicators. Those indicators suggested the need for appropriate support to prevent the individual’s situation from deteriorating, whether or not they met the threshold for identification as trafficked at the point of referral.

Additionally, instructing decision makers to decide at any point in the recovery and reflection period means that survivors may be expected to provide far too much relevant information about their case far too quickly after being rescued or escaping a situation of exploitation. Those decisions may be rushed; there may be political or administrative pressure on decision makers to rush processes so that decisions are made more quickly and support can be withdrawn. The overturning data is very instructive on that point. I agree that the quality of decisions matters more than speed. Clause 37 is very risky in its potential to do harm.

The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association suggested in evidence that if clause 37 is retained, a further short 30-day period of support should be provided, to avoid the cliff edge. No amendment to that effect has been tabled. Does the Minister really intend for people to receive literally nothing after a negative decision, risking homelessness, destitution and re-exploitation? She should bear in mind not the six people disqualified on bad faith grounds, or the small number of people whose cases start while they are under removal plans, but the huge number of potential survivors this will affect right across the country.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the contributions that hon. Members have made. As I have made clear, the Government are committed to ensuring that the modern slavery national referral mechanism operates efficiently and effectively. Clause 37 is an important part of that. It will remove inefficiencies and allow for support to be targeted at those who are recognised as victims, rather than having an arbitrary period to wait when we have conclusively identified that an individual is not a victim. As I am sure hon. Members would agree, support should be removed in a recovery period when there is sufficient evidence to conclude that an individual is not a victim of modern slavery.

Let me respond to some of the points that colleagues have made. I have heard language describing people whose conclusive grounds decisions state that they are not victims of modern slavery described as “survivors”. It is important to note that the conclusive grounds decision is that they are not a victim of modern slavery, and therefore that they are not considered to have recovery needs stemming from modern slavery. It stands to reason that those individuals should not be entitled to the recovery period or to modern slavery-specific support—nor would they need them.

For someone who does not receive a negative conclusive grounds decision in the recovery period, those protections will continue for the duration of the 30 days or until such time as a conclusive grounds decision is made. During the recovery period, when there are still reasonable grounds to suspect that a person is a victim of modern slavery, protection from removal and entitlement to support will be ongoing. The recovery period itself is not being reduced; the new provision merely makes it clear that, where there is sufficient evidence to warrant making a negative conclusive grounds decision during that time, doing so will end the recovery period.

The quality of decision making has been flagged by a number of Opposition Members. We are talking about highly trained staff, and negative conclusive grounds decisions are always checked by a second pair of eyes, so there is quality assurance and effective decision making. In 2025, of the 17,560 negative decisions, only 1,467 were accepted for reconsideration. Changing the outcome, however, does not mean that the original decision was incorrect. In most cases, additional information was provided that was not available originally, so that is not an issue of decision-making quality.

--- Later in debate ---

Disqualification from protection

[Anna Turley]

I beg to move amendment 114, in clause 38, page 40, line 16, leave out—

“except where the person is within subsection (1A)”

and insert—

“in a case where the person is aged 18 or over”.

This amendment limits the duty of the Secretary of State to disqualify potential victims of slavery or trafficking from certain protections when they are a threat to public order so that the duty will apply only in respect of adults.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 115 to 118.

Clause stand part.

[Anna Turley]

Our modern slavery system is generous in the rights and protections it provides those who require them to recover from that abhorrent crime. The Government remain committed to ensuring that such protections are available to those for whom they are intended. It is right—indeed, it is within our international obligations—that the Government can deny modern slavery protections to those who pose a threat to public order or seek to misuse the system through dishonest claims made in bad faith.

The practical operation of the disqualification mechanisms has long-standing challenges, including in cases involving foreign national offenders. The current disqualification framework does not always provide sufficient clarity on when disqualification should apply and what the consequences of that decision are, or on when a claim should be treated as having been made in bad faith. Such ambiguities have created operational uncertainty and complicated decision making, and ultimately mean that the disqualification framework does not operate as effectively as it should.

Clause 38 addresses those issues by strengthening and clarifying the public order and bad faith disqualification frameworks, while maintaining appropriate safeguards for children and those at risk of re-trafficking. First, it expands the grounds on which a person can be disqualified, based on the national security or public order threat that they pose, to include suspended sentences, reflecting the changes made in the Sentencing Act 2026. Secondly, it clarifies the consequences that follow a decision to disqualify, making clear that no onward modern slavery decision making is required, rectifying an existing lack of clarity. Thirdly, it clarifies that where an individual is at an immediate and significant risk of re-trafficking in the UK, the national security or public order disqualification will not apply. That necessary and targeted safeguard provides clarity for decision makers, potential victims and professionals, and balances the need to protect people at significant risk with the duty to disqualify. That exemption ensures that, where there is a direct risk of someone being exploited or exploited again in the UK, they retain access to NRM support for protection.

Clause 38, combined with amendment 115, also introduces a specific, targeted exemption from disqualification for all children on public order grounds, while maintaining the disqualification where the national security criteria are met, to ensure that the acute vulnerabilities of children are appropriately recognised. Importantly, the clause also separates bad faith from public order, and, for the first time in statute, defines circumstances in which a claim is to be treated as having been made in bad faith. That includes claims based on falsified documents or claims made only after removal action has commenced without compelling justification, thereby disincentivising people from trying to misuse the system.

Those measures will provide a more consistent and robust approach to disqualification decisions, helping to ensure that the modern slavery system safeguards the public interest, commands public confidence and strengthens the Government’s ability to respond where individuals pose a threat to public order or seek to misuse the system. The clause therefore addresses existing uncertainty that underpins the current disqualification framework, strengthens and clarifies the circumstances in which disqualification will apply, embeds more appropriate safeguards, and ultimately supports a more effective modern slavery system.

Amendment 115, which is consequential on amendment 114, ensures that all children are treated equally under the public order disqualification in clause 38. Presently, clause 38 exempts children with leave to remain or right of abode in the UK from disqualification based on public order threat based on criminality. Amendments 114 and 115 recognise the vulnerabilities of all children and make an important change to ensure that all children under the age of 18 are treated consistently. The same exemption from the public order disqualification on criminality grounds will therefore be afforded to all children regardless of their immigration status. The amendments do not affect disqualification on national security grounds, for which all children remain in scope. I hope that Members will agree that the amendments are sensible and proportionate, and ensure that the public order disqualification provision, and our safeguarding duties, can operate as intended.

Amendment 118 is a technical amendment to provide greater clarity win the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 on how the public order disqualification, bad faith disqualification and temporary permission to stay provisions operate together. Amendments 116 and 117, which are consequential on amendment 118, remove references to temporary permission to stay from the public order and bad faith disqualification provisions in section 63 of the 2022 Act.

That will create a clearer distinction between a disqualification decision and a temporary permission to stay decision under section 65 of the same Act, the latter of which can be considered only after a positive conclusive grounds decision has been made. Importantly, section 65 already makes clear the circumstances in which the duty to grant permission to stay does not apply, including where public order, national security or bad faith concerns arise. The amendments therefore improve the clarity and consistency of the legislation, without changing the underlying policy intent.

[Matt Vickers]

A modern slavery claim must never become a “get out of jail free” card for someone who threatens our national security or is deliberately abusing our immigration system. Clause 38 deals with disqualification from protection on grounds of national security, public order and bad faith, and the Opposition support its purpose. It builds on the public order disqualification that the last Conservative Government introduced in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022—a measure that Labour voted against.

When we legislated again in 2023, the then Prime Minister said that our modern slavery measures would drive “a coach and horses” through protections. Labour has kept those measures and is now are adding to them—we welcome that. However, the Committee must understand exactly who is caught, which protections fall where and how such decisions will be taken. The Government have had to table—

Oral Answers to Questions

Anna Turley Excerpts

Monday 26th October 2026 Commons Chamber

[Sarah Pochin (Runcorn and Helsby) (Reform)]

3. What steps she is taking to expedite the deportation of foreign national offenders.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

Anyone coming to the United Kingdom knows that doing so is a privilege, not a right. Any foreign national who breaks our laws is not welcome. All foreign national offenders who receive a prison sentence or suspended sentence are now eligible for deportation. Since this Government came to power, we have removed over 11,700 foreign national offenders; that is up 41% on the two years before then. We are determined to ensure that more foreign criminals are removed from our shores.

[Sarah Pochin]

Gift Oladele successfully appealed his deportation, after sexually assaulting a woman in Manchester. He then went on to rape a 19-year-old young woman in Wrexham. Can the Minister explain exactly what changes her Government have made to article 8 of the European convention on human rights to make sure that this does not happen again, and when they will take effect?

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the hon. Lady raising this case, and look forward to her supporting our Immigration and Asylum Bill, which is going through Parliament. We are determined to build on the progress we have made, and which I have just outlined. Our asylum Bill will fix the broken appeals system and close the human rights loopholes, so that they cannot be exploited. From early next year, we will be able to remove offenders immediately after sentencing, allowing us to scale up deportations even further. We will be relentless in ensuring that all who break our laws are removed.

[Ben Goldsborough (South Norfolk) (Lab)]

Nearly 6,000 foreign national offenders were returned in the last year—12% more than in the year before. Clause 20 of the Immigration and Asylum Bill strengthens the measures on circumstances in which it is in the public interest to deport foreign criminals, particularly where their offending is more serious. Will my hon. Friend explain how these changes will build on the progress that has been made, and further strengthen public security?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We remain firmly committed to the ECHR and the protections it gives us all, including the prohibition on torture, a right to life and protections from the state. However, we are determined, through this legislation, to protect its principles from over-interpretation, both domestically and internationally, and to ensure we have an immigration and asylum system that has the consent of the British people.

[Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)]

There are 21,000 serious foreign criminals still in the UK. Today, a foreign criminal jailed for four years or more cannot use family or long residence exceptions to avoid deportation. Last week, the Government voted down our amendments in Committee to keep that rule and extend it to terrorists, making the Immigration and Asylum Bill softer on the worst offenders than current law. Will the Home Secretary admit that only leaving the ECHR will guarantee us that foreign criminals are deported?

[Anna Turley]

It is sad to see the Conservative party so spooked by the far right that they are trashing some of the finest work of their greatest Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. When he said, “Never again,” and led the way in building a European convention on human rights, he knew the protection it gave everyone from tyrants, despots, torture and death. This Government will defend Churchill’s legacy—even if the Conservatives will not—by reforming both the ECHR, internationally, through co-operation with our European neighbours, and its domestic application through the forthcoming Bill, to ensure that its protections and principles are fit for the modern world.

[Kirsteen Sullivan (Bathgate and Linlithgow) (Lab/Co-op)]

4. What steps she is taking to help reduce levels of abuse experienced by retail workers.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Lamont (Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk) (Con)]

Mears, acting for the Home Office, is acquiring properties to accommodate asylum seekers in small, rural communities in the Scottish Borders, where GP surgeries, schools and transport are already stretched. Scottish Borders council tells me that it is not being properly consulted by either the Home Office or Mears before these properties are acquired. Will the Minister meet me, together with representatives from Scottish Borders council, so that we can discuss how engagement can be improved?

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

I would be happy to meet the hon. Gentleman and his colleagues. Home Office officials continue to engage with Scottish Borders council and other local partners on asylum accommodation. We value and recognise the importance of working with those local authorities, taking account of local circumstances when considering accommodation requirements.

[Jeff Smith (Manchester Withington) (Lab)]

T9. Have Ministers noted the recent report from the University of Sheffield, which showed that drug diversion schemes for people caught in possession of controlled drugs are more successful at cutting reoffending than prosecutions? Will the Minister encourage police forces to use those schemes?

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir James Cleverly (Braintree) (Con)]

The asylum accommodation centre at Wethersfield has blighted the local community and made it impossible for people to sell their homes. The number of pupils in the primary school is declining, putting the school’s future in question. When I was Home Secretary there was a cap on numbers and a commitment to a closure date in spring next year. The Government have reneged on both of those. When will the asylum centre in Wethersfield close, and when will my constituents be able to get back on with their lives properly?

[Anna Turley]

The Wethersfield centre, which was opened under the right hon. Gentleman’s Government, has operated for years with robust security arrangements to maintain the safety and security of both residents and the wider community. The chief constable has said that the centre is not having a negative impact on crime. This Government are proud to put fairness at the heart of our approach by moving to alternative accommodation, including former military sites, which reduce the burden on communities because they are self-contained, with 24/7 security and CCTV.

[Andy McDonald (Middlesbrough and Thornaby East) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Policing Minister for her confirmation that £5.2 million will be sent to Cleveland police to help to deal with the mutual aid bill—that is most welcome—but she will recognise that the police funding formula is simply not fit for purpose, especially when Cleveland has the highest level of crime and the poorest level of resources devoted to it. Although I welcome her indication about exceptional funding, does she agree that the situation will not be resolved until there is a complete reconfiguration of policing in this country? The people of Cleveland cannot wait for police restructuring.

[David Davis (Goole and Pocklington) (Con)]

Following their convictions for LIBOR manipulation, Jay Merchant and Christian Bittar were deported from the UK and barred from returning. Earlier this month, their convictions were comprehensively quashed by the Court of Appeal. With their convictions thrown out, the reason for their deportation is completely invalid, but the deportation order will remain in place until removed by the Home Office. Will the Home Secretary look into those cases, accelerate the decision-making process on their applications and have their deportations revoked, so that they do not receive any more unearned punishment?

[Anna Turley]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for raising those cases. I would be happy to meet him to discuss it further and will look into it.

[Dawn Butler (Brent East) (Lab)]

MPs’ safety is paramount. After my speech in the Black History Month debate on Thursday, a shadow Minister posted a racially charged tweet online that has resulted in more abuse against me. Do Ministers accept that MPs are bound by the code of practice, and, at the very least, that they should not be racist online?

--- Later in debate ---

[Noah Law (St Austell and Newquay) (Lab)]

I welcome the Home Secretary’s progress in reducing those perilous and often exploitative small boat crossings, but aside from the misplaced idea that asylum seekers have significant recourse to public funds or mainstream benefits, we must still be honest that a lot of human behaviour ultimately boils down to incentives. What consideration have Home Office Ministers given to the Danish model in terms of narrowing any incentive gap for migrants between coming here for work and doing so by other, irregular means?

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate my hon. Friend raising that question. He will be aware that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has visited Denmark. This year she announced that we would introduce a new approach to refugee protection in the UK called core protection, which marks a shift to a more streamlined approach that meets our international obligations without going beyond them. We are committed to upholding our international obligations, but we no longer want a system that is seen as over-interpreting those obligations or that is open to abuse, and that is what my right hon. Friend is ensuring through the Immigration and Asylum Bill.

[Jim Allister (North Antrim) (TUV)]

The Home Secretary talked positively about reducing the number of illegal migrants coming in by small boats. Could I ask her, though, what actual steps the Government are taking to thwart illegal migration to the United Kingdom across the open border from the Republic of Ireland into Northern Ireland?

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart Andrew (Daventry) (Con)]

The villages of Crick and Flore in my constituency are two small rural communities with few amenities, but both have hotels housing asylum seekers. The previous Minister responsible for asylum, in fairness, recognised that they are not suitable and said that they would be temporary, but all the communication I get now says, “It will be done by 2029”. Can I invite the Minister to visit these villages and see for herself how unsuitable they are for those hotels?

[Anna Turley]

I would be more than happy to meet the right hon. Gentleman to discuss that and hear more about his local area. As he knows, we have made great progress in closing asylum hotels, and we are committing to doing that by the end of this Parliament. We have saved over £1 billion since inheriting the chaotic and disastrous hotel accommodation situation from the previous Government.

[Chris Ward (Brighton Kemptown and Peacehaven) (Lab)]

October marks the first anniversary since the appalling arson attack on a mosque in Peacehaven in my constituency. I will forever be grateful to the Home Secretary and the Policing Minister for coming to Peacehaven in the immediate aftermath and standing with me and the local community. I am also grateful to the Home Office for the extra security measures it has given to my community. A year on, what more does the Home Secretary think we can do to stop this kind of appalling hate crime and rebuild community cohesion so that something like that never happens again?

--- Later in debate ---

[Euan Stainbank (Falkirk) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for confirming that the contract for the Cladhan to be used as asylum accommodation signed by the previous Government will be cancelled this year. Will my right hon. Friend confirm that that was enabled only by significantly falling small boat numbers and the lowest backlog since 2019, and that claims that people are just being moved around are not borne out by the numbers?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend is right. We are extremely proud of the fact that we have reduced the numbers of those crossing by boat by 40%, and deportations are up—we have removed over 80,000 people. Those numbers continue to bring down the pressure on the asylum system.

[Dawn Butler]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker. I need some clarification. After I posted my Black History Month speech last week, I received thousands of abusive messages. The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Harborough, Oadby and Wigston (Neil O'Brien), posted:

“If you want to tax my constituents more to fund random handouts to your mates overseas then yes, that is ‘stolen wealth’—their money is not yours, they have done nothing wrong, and you can do one.”

That resulted in a racist pile-on, and I am troubled and concerned by the phrase “your mates overseas”. What exactly does the Member mean?

I am deeply concerned by this. It is not about the reparations debate—I can handle people disagreeing with that—but “The Code of Conduct” states that Members are required to “treat others with respect.” I have emailed the Member to ask for an explanation, but none was given. Mr Speaker, could you advise me on how I can obtain an explanation for what was meant?

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Tenth sitting)

Anna Turley Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Government amendments 124 and 125.

Amendment 76, in clause 23, page 22, line 6, leave out from “without” to end of line 7 and insert—

“them or their household becoming impoverished.

(5A) For the purposes of subsection (5), a person or household is impoverished if its equivalised net income for the relevant financial year is less than 60% of median equivalised net household income for that financial year.”

This amendment would amend the provision relating to repayment of asylum support so that people would not be required to make payments if doing so would leave them, or their household, impoverished (defined as having an equivalised net income of less than 60% of the median).

Amendment 79, in clause 23, page 22, line 7, at end insert—

“(5A) Regulations under subsection (4) must include provision to ensure that a person is not required to make payments in excess of the cost of the support provided to them while in receipt of asylum support.”

This amendment would ensure that an individual would not be liable to repay amounts above the actual cost of the support they received.

Government amendment 126.

Amendment 141, in clause 24, page 23, line 3, at end insert—

“(7A) In deciding an application for entry clearance, leave to enter or leave to remain in the United Kingdom (including indefinite leave to remain), the Secretary of State may take into account any amount that a person has been required to pay under section 23 and has not paid.

(7B) Nothing in subsection (7A) applies to an amount which, by virtue of regulations made under section 23(4) in accordance with section 23(5), the person was not required to pay.”

This amendment would mean that any sums that a person has been required to repay towards asylum support and has not paid may be taken into account when deciding applications to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, including for settlement.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is a pleasure to see you back in the Chair, Mr Twigg. I appreciate all the discussion and debate we have had so far today. I will pick up my response to the various Opposition amendments, starting with amendment 141, in the name of His Majesty’s Opposition, which would allow outstanding liabilities to be considered in immigration applications, including for settlement. The Government are already considering the wider approach to settlement, as hon. Members will hopefully have seen from some of the media debate. That is currently undergoing a lot of discussion, so it would not be appropriate to pre-empt that work through this amendment. For those building a life in the UK, paying towards the cost of their asylum support will form part of their wider contribution to society. People with outstanding asylum support debt will be prevented from returning to the UK until that debt is repaid. It is our intention that those who receive support will be expected to make contributions when they are financially able to do so.

The detailed operation of the scheme will be set out in secondary legislation. As I have mentioned to hon. Members already today, we have committed to sharing draft regulations during the passage of the Bill, providing them with the opportunity to scrutinise the detail of the policy and how those provisions will operate in practice. That approach ensures appropriate parliamentary oversight, while retaining the flexibility needed to develop the scheme in the light of wider decisions on settlement policy. The draft regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure and will afford a further opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny before they are made.

I will take this moment to respond to some of the questions that the hon. Member for Stockton West raised this morning. He asked whether the scheme would raise more money than it costs, which I think is an important challenge. The Government are determined to reduce the cost to the taxpayer. That is part of the principle of this, although the primary objective is fairness and sustainability, with any revenue generated reducing the burden on the public purse. As I have said, details of the scheme are under development and will be published in draft regulations. We will look for as much transparency as possible, not just in the process but in how we can publish data in our regular asylum statistics.

The hon. Gentleman also mentioned amendment 124, which is about the powers given to the Home Secretary for exemptions, and the circumstances in which they might be used. The amendment enables regulations to confer a discretion on the Secretary of State to waive, reduce or refund liabilities arising under the asylum support contribution scheme. As I mentioned this morning, that is commensurate with article 8 of the Immigration (Health Charge) Order 2015, which gives the Secretary of State for the Home Department the same discretionary power to reduce, waive or refund part of that charge. The power will of course be at the discretion of the Secretary of State, and we anticipate that it will be used only in exceptional cases.

The hon. Gentleman asked about the amount payable and how the income threshold will be set. Hon. Members have raised the £10,000 figure, which is an indicative estimate of the standard contribution that may be required. The final flat-rate contribution will be set in secondary legislation. As we discussed this morning, it is intended to reflect average asylum support costs across the system, rather than the precise costs incurred in an individual case. That is how the figure was reached. The estimates will depend on the final design and implementation of the scheme, including collection mechanisms. We will continue to assess the expected costs and benefits as the scheme is developed. However, we do not consider it appropriate to make commencement legally dependent on five-year forecasts, which may be subject to considerable uncertainty. I hope I have addressed the issues that the hon. Gentleman raised.

On Government amendment 124, the policy intention remains that those with the means to contribute towards the cost of the support they previously received should do so. However, there may be circumstances in which it would be fair and proportionate to depart from that general principle. The amendment provides flexibility to respond to such circumstances and supports the fair and effective administration of the scheme. The detailed circumstances will be set out in regulations and will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The amendment therefore complements the wider contribution scheme, while ensuring that it can operate fairly and proportionately in individual cases.

Government amendments 125 and 126 are technical amendments that deal with how the requirement to pay back a contribution towards asylum support operates if the recipient becomes bankrupt or enters another form of insolvency process. The amendments enable the Secretary of State to make regulations that set out the effect of a person becoming insolvent on their liability to make payments. They also define when a person is to be treated as insolvent across the jurisdictions of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. That will allow the Government to set out in regulations that, where appropriate, liabilities under the scheme are not extinguished by bankruptcy or certain other insolvency processes.

In addition, the amendments provide a power for regulations to make consequential provision in relation to insolvency legislation where necessary. The amendments provide the flexibility needed to ensure that the asylum support scheme can operate effectively alongside existing insolvency frameworks across the United Kingdom. They make no changes to the safeguards that will be built into the scheme.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

It is very good to have you in the Chair this afternoon, Mr Twigg. From the discussions we have had today, I think it is clear what a mess the proposals in clauses 23 and 24 are. If it is not an itemised recovery of costs, it is a refugee tax—worse, it has become clear that is only a poor refugee tax. As such, the philosophical basis for the proposals is broken.

The Government have set a terribly high bar for being excused, and they are not seeking any payment from successful refugees who have the means to support themselves while they wait for a decision. That is despite the hon. Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes likening the proposal to NHS surcharges for those on work visas, to which the Minister also referred. The Government have been clear that they are setting a flat charge rate, but they will not apply it to all asylum seekers. Why not? If one accepts the premise of the charge—I do not—would that not be fairer across the board? The Government propose to charge it only to those people who are destitute when they arrive here.

This will do much harm to these people’s ability to settle in the future. Why would the Government drive them into poverty for extended periods and cause that kind of problem? It seems unfair to impose this on people. The Government have introduced this in clause 23, while amendment 141, tabled by the Conservatives, tries to codify it further. In my view, any kind of refugee tax should not be an additional barrier to stability. These clauses are reckless, unfair, cruel and irrational. Without my amendments, they become even worse. I will seek to divide the Committee on them.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Twigg. I will speak briefly about two of the exemptions to requiring someone to make a payment for their asylum support. They have been referred to already; they are in clause 23(6)(a) and (b).

Subsection (6)(a) states a person is exempt for the purposes of this section if they

“were under 18 at all times at which they received asylum support”.

I accept that if someone was a child throughout the entire period they received asylum support, they would be fully exempt, but I think I disagree with the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion on an interpretation point. That is the problem with the Bill; it is badly drafted and unclear in places. If someone under the age of 18 was receiving asylum support, then turned 18 and sought it afterwards, they would not be exempt—of course not, because they also received asylum support as an adult—but one would assume that they would not be charged for the portion of time that they had received asylum support while under 18. The Minister needs to clarify that point, but giving clarity in Committee is not sufficient when it is unclear in the legislation. She would do better to clarify it in the legislation.

The second exemption I want to briefly refer to, as the shadow Minister has, is subsection (6)(b). It gives an exemption to someone who

“started to receive asylum support before the day on which this section comes fully into force”.

As a counterpoint to what I just said, I do not understand why, if someone received asylum support for a year—let us say; typically it is a lot longer—and day one was before this section came into force, but day two and 364 of the 365 days were after it came into force, they would be exempt from making contributions for their asylum support. They would receive the vast majority of that support after the legislation comes into force, so I would have thought it a fairly obvious pro rata exercise to say that they do not pay for the portion of time they spent receiving support before the law was in place— I take the point that we do not have retrospective law in this country—but they do thereafter.

It makes me wonder whether my understanding of the child-becoming-an-adult element is wrong. The Government need to be clear about whether a pro rata approach is being taken when a child becomes an adult. If so, why is that not being applied when someone starts receiving support before the Bill comes into play and continues to receive support after? I hope the Minister can give us some clarity.

[Anna Turley]

I thank hon. Members across the Committee for tabling the amendments in this group and for the explanations that they have given. The Committee will forgive me if I once again stress that clause 23 establishes an important and fair principle of contribution and reciprocity: where someone has received asylum support at public expense and later has the means to contribute to help to maintain that system and the public consent for that system, it is reasonable that they should do so. That ensures that those who have a right to support still receive it, but that comes with responsibilities and expectations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joe Robertson]

It sounds like the Minister is saying that when a child becomes an adult and is still receiving support, they will then be liable to pay for the support they received as a child and it is their choice whether to continue with their asylum application.

[Anna Turley]

Apologies for any misconception. A person will not have to pay for the support they received entirely as a child. I will make sure that I clarify the wording of that for the Committee’s understanding.

The Bill also includes a power to establish further exemptions through secondary legislation. That is the appropriate mechanism. It provides flexibility, allows clear definitions aligned with wider frameworks, such as in relation to debt, and enables the approach to be kept under review. The amendments do not establish consistently how eligibility would be evidenced, when liability should cease or how particular circumstances should interact with an individual’s current means. Those details are critical to protect the policy’s aims and mitigate against abuse, so such exemptions should not be in the Bill.

In relation to amendment 82, which suggests an exemption for those granted status on appeal, the policy in the Bill seeks a contribution from all recipients of asylum support, regardless of the outcome of their claim. I note the wider areas of interest of hon. Members in terms of those exemptions. We will consider everything discussed and heard in Committee when preparing the secondary legislation to which the Government have committed during the passage of the Bill.

I will respond to some of the issues raised in the discussion. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion mentioned targeting those who are destitute. I want to be clear: we are still providing support to those who need it most. The repayment begins only later, when individuals have the means for it. There are clear safeguards, such as income thresholds and exemptions, to protect the most vulnerable. There will also be a grace period after support finishes but before repayment is required to allow individuals time to establish themselves. Far from being punitive, the policy reflects a principle that when someone can contribute, they should.

The hon. Member also mentioned exemptions for vulnerable groups. Those exemptions are not in the Bill because that is the wrong place for them, but we will make those regulations. Hon. Members’ contributions and concerns have been heard and will form part of that discussion. For the reasons I have outlined, I respectfully ask hon. Members not to press their amendments.

Amendments 139 and 142 concern the scope, enforcement and parliamentary oversight of the asylum support contribution scheme. I thank the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire for tabling them, but we cannot accept them. Amendment 139, which aims to allow liability to arise for support received before the scheme is fully commenced, goes against the principle of this legislation. The Government’s approach is deliberately prospective: liability should arise only once the detailed rules, notification arrangements and safeguards are in place. Applying the scheme retrospectively to earlier support would create uncertainty, move the goalposts and not provide people with sufficient clarity about the potential consequences of receiving support.

[Joe Robertson]

I take the point that the scheme should not be applied retrospectively, but let us take the example of student loans: students take out loans on terms that are then changed in the future. If UK students have to deal with that, why should it be any different for asylum provisions?

[Anna Turley]

That example is about changing the level of a loan that has been provided. I do not think we can expect people who may have fled war and persecution to come to this country on one understanding, only to have that changed while they are here. This is an entirely new system; it is not about changing the level of a loan or a return. It is important that we do it only going forward; trying to apply it retrospectively would be open to an extreme amount of legal challenge.

Amendment 142 would require any regulations that specify further exemptions under clause 23 to be subject to the affirmative procedure. We will reject the amendment, but again, with an emphasis on consensus, I say that I firmly believe in the principle of parliamentary debate and discussion, particularly on important regulations such as these. Although we are rejecting the amendment, I undertake to review the matter during the passage of the Bill, because such important exemptions need appropriate scrutiny, and these regulations will need the full scrutiny of Parliament. As I say, I am open-minded about considering that as the Bill progresses.

As we have already committed, the detailed scheme will be published in secondary legislation during the passage of the Bill, so I hope that will give hon. Members plenty to engage with during the process.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I have spoken quite a lot about my overall position on these clauses, but I would like to say a little more about the fact that clause 23 gives the Home Secretary the power to require these unfair payments from a minority of asylum seekers who are destitute when they arrive here. The Minister needs to consider the lack of safe routes and the extent to which people wanting to claim asylum here end up more destitute as they are exploited the entire way by the kind of organised criminals that are currently running the only routes into this country. We need to see much more detail than is on the face of the Bill about how the system will work.

I essentially wish to speak in support of amendment 140, tabled by the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire. He makes a good point. On Second Reading, the Home Secretary promised that Parliament would have the opportunity to see draft regulations, but we have not seen them yet. The Committee is being asked to assess and approve a system when we are not able to scrutinise the details. We deserve to see more of them now. They are not minor details. We have already spoken about the fact that £10,000 is the amount that the Government are talking about, but that is not on the face of the Bill, and neither is the payment threshold nor how much people will have to pay over that amount. All of that is information that we would need to assess the impact that this policy would have on individual refugees at the point they are trying to rebuild their lives, not just on the public purse, as the Opposition amendment seeks to set out.

Although the Government have indicated how they might recover those payments, the detail of the Bill does not cover everything. They say it will enable the Home Office to have its own cost recovery mechanism, supported by HMRC, which will apparently play its part. How will that work, how will it sit within other parts of the Government’s core protection system, and how much will it cost? That is especially important when weighed against the fact that the policy might bring in only limited amounts and may even reduce the overall tax take from this group. Without knowledge of the decisions about the system, the Government may be proposing something that costs the public purse large amounts in cash terms, let alone in its wider impacts. I think we need to see the Government’s analysis of all this.

It is also important to acknowledge that individuals claiming asylum have fled war and persecution and are not responsible for the overall cost of asylum support. That cost has grown, often as a result of policy decisions or failings of this Government and the previous one. Earlier, we discussed the difference in cost between nightly paid hotel accommodation and properly settled dispersal accommodation in genuine homes. The Government are not spending their money wisely at present, and I think Ministers are seeking to address that. Would tackling that not be more cost-effective than trying to recover money from close-to-destitute asylum seekers?

The Home Secretary has also said this policy is introducing a “contributory principle”. What she ignores, however, is that refugees do contribute, and have always done so, through working, paying taxes and contributing to their local communities. In fact, on wider impacts, the refugee tax is not introducing the idea that refugees should contribute. In my view, it is making it harder for them to do so, while also harming community cohesion and integration.

A policy that was truly focused on increasing refugee contributions could look at how barriers to employment can be removed, so that people can access work more easily, progress in a career and transfer their qualifications to this country. I have had casework on those matters, which are barriers to refugees contributing to society through their taxes and making the most of the skills they can bring here by accessing education and further training. That would all help the Government to address asylum support costs, but it would do so by supporting vulnerable refugees, not targeting them with this tax.

Has the Minister really addressed, in any of her comments today, the facts in the letter she wrote to us at the end of the oral evidence session, which admits fully that three in five of the people currently awaiting a decision are not claiming support? Why are those people not being asked to contribute in any way, if recovering the costs from people is the most important thing to the Government? Amendment 140 gets to the heart of that: what is the balance of payments?

Finally, I believe this policy is cruel. It seeks to deter people from coming to this country, and that is the key reason why it is so targeted at the most vulnerable refugees, and not at those who can pay their own way. However, will it actually work as a deterrent? In general, the Home Office already has evidence that punitive measures such as the refugee tax have little impact on where people choose to seek asylum. Furthermore, in the oral evidence session, when asked about this, the Refugee Council highlighted that people will be able to avoid these payments simply by not applying for asylum support while their application is being processed, a risk also recognised in the Home Office’s impact assessment. Although that may reduce asylum support costs, I do not think that such a result is the Government’s intention, as it will push more people seeking asylum into vulnerable situations in which they can be exploited further. Do the Government not think that policies from this and previous Governments have already done enough of that?

[Anna Turley]

I thank hon. Members for their amendments in this group, as well as for the discussion and interest they have shown in this provision, which we have debated at length today.

Clause 23 enables the Secretary of State to require those who have received asylum support and accommodation, known as section 4 and section 95 support, to pay a contribution towards those costs. The clause contains an important safeguard: it requires the regulations to ensure that individuals are not required to pay when doing so would cause them to become destitute. That means that people will not be required to pay if it meant they could not meet their essential living needs or if it would place them at risk of homelessness.

The clause exempts children. Other exemptions will be set out in secondary legislation to ensure safeguards, thus protecting vulnerable groups. I look forward to working further with Members on that throughout the course of the Bill. Details of how the charge will be applied and how the system will operate will be set out in regulations and the Home Secretary has committed to sharing a draft of those regulations with Parliament.

The Bill is built on a balance of rights and responsibilities. This reform protects support for those who need it most, while reinforcing the principle that support should come with an expectation of contribution when that is affordable. When confidence in the asylum system is low, and with asylum support costing the taxpayer around £4 billion, it is right to take steps to reduce costs and ensure that those who can make a proportionate contribution do so. This policy achieves that.

The measure is not a tax on asylum seekers or refugees. It does not affect a person’s right to claim asylum nor their entitlement to receive support when it is needed. The clause reflects the broader principle that, alongside the rights and protections afforded to those seeking asylum, there are responsibilities that our constituents would expect one another to undertake: to contribute towards public costs where it is fair and reasonable to do so. This aids integration, helping to foster a shared sense of fairness, responsibility and belonging. It says to our constituents who contribute for their entitlement that no one should be entitled to a free pass.

Building on the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk, the measure is also about asking people to contribute for those who come after them. My hon. Friend the Member for North Northumberland mentioned the desire that he heard expressed by asylum seekers coming to this country that they want to pay and contribute. Many of them will want to enable the system to continue, so that other people fleeing war and persecution can benefit.

Clause 24 enables asylum support repayments to be recovered through the tax system. It provides a power for regulations to make provision for HMRC to collect repayments on behalf of the Secretary of State from individuals who are liable under clause 23. The clause also creates the statutory framework for information sharing between HMRC and the Home Office where that is necessary for the administration and collection of repayments.

Hon. Members asked whether HMRC will be responsible for collecting payments. We are ensuring a range of repayment mechanisms, including options that could make use of the tax system. Decisions on the final repayment model will be taken in due course, informed by our discussions. We will continue to work across Government to identify the most effective and proportionate response.

The powers we are introducing will help ensure that, should the Government decide to use the tax system as a collection mechanism, repayments can be administered effectively and efficiently. The clause therefore provides the legislative framework necessary to support recovery of asylum support costs through the tax system. I listened carefully to the points made by hon. Members and their detailed questions on the set-up of the scheme, its processes and the collection mechanisms. The Home Secretary has committed that information on those factors will be published during the process of the Bill. I undertake to ensure that hon. Members continue to get more information as the drafts are published.

Moving on to the amendments in this group, amendment 140 and new clause 62 concern transparency and reporting on the asylum support contribution system. The Government recognise the importance of scrutiny, but we cannot accept these provisions. On amendment 140, the Government have already committed to sharing draft regulations during the Bill’s passage, allowing Parliament to discuss the detailed operation of the scheme. Building on the conversation we had on the previous group, I will review whether exemptions will be subject to the affirmative rather than the negative procedure. I hope hon. Members will take that commitment.

The amendment would also make commencement of the scheme conditional on publishing five-year estimates of the number of people liable, sums recovered and administrative costs. Those will depend on the final design and operation of the scheme, and may be subject to considerable uncertainty. For example, the numbers of asylum claims in this country are coming down, so five-year estimates would not necessarily give us any degree of certainty. We will provide relevant analysis through the impact assessment, and are committed to providing data to support transparency on the effectiveness of the scheme as implemented. However, we do not consider it appropriate to make commencement dependent on such five-year forecasts.

Likewise, we do not think that a separate reporting scheme on liabilities, recoveries, write-offs, exemptions and administrative costs, as set out in new clause 62, should be prescribed in primary legislation. We will explore what appropriate information on the operation of the scheme can be incorporated into Government asylum statistics and reporting once the scheme is operational.

To conclude, the Government are committed to ensuring that the scheme is transparent and deliverable, and provides value for money.

[Matt Vickers]

The Home Office confirmed that it spent £22,000 on its “don’t rape women” guide for asylum seekers. Can the Minister confirm that clause 23 restricts the sums that are recoverable purely to accommodation and subsistence, rather than to the Home Office’s comms budget?

[Anna Turley]

I moved to my conclusion too quickly; forgive me, Mr Twigg. I still have a number of points to respond to—I thought we were getting an early escape.

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point, and one that I wanted to cover, regarding asylum support. Section 98 support is temporary emergency accommodation, which is not within the scope of clause 23. Section 98 is the immediate emergency support, and asylum seekers then apply for section 95 support, which is what the clause addresses. He asks why that is not included, and I take his point. We are trying to move away from the kind of expensive and unsustainable emergency support that we saw explode under his party’s Administration. We have already saved more than £1 billion by closing hotels, so that will not be part of this measure. The asylum support that people apply for is what is covered by the clause.

The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire asked about repayment thresholds. As I said, the Bill establishes the principle and the key framework for the recovery of asylum costs; the detailed operation, including thresholds, will be set out in secondary legislation. That is a common and proportionate approach to drafting such legislation, for which operational detail may be adjusted over time. The policy intent is that repayment will begin only once an individual reaches a defined threshold for repayment, and that deductions will be set at a manageable rate, so that recovery remains proportionate and does not cause hardship or destitution. Any regulations will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny, and there will be clear safeguards.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asked whether we expected to raise any money. The answer is yes. As I have mentioned, the asylum system represents a significant cost to the taxpayer of about £4 billion. The Government are determined to bring those costs down. The policy of recouping asylum support is a world first. It is about ensuring that those who benefit from this specific, targeted form of support contribute towards its cost, when they can. Our objective is fairness to everyone in this country, as well as sustainability, with any revenue generated reducing the burden on the public purse. It is about not just recovering costs, but contribution. Costs will be recouped over time from individuals who have moved into employment or otherwise have the means to contribute.

[Siân Berry]

Will the Minister give way?

[Anna Turley]

I was going to mention work and study, but I will come back to that.

[Siân Berry]

My question is more about the revenue and its spending. We have heard from local authorities concerned that they might have higher costs as a result of the measures. Can the Minister give us any reassurance that the costs will not spill over into services that might be affected by some of the things in the impact assessment?

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Lady makes an important point, but I do not see that the implications will fall on local authorities. As I said, in the course of publishing regulations as a result of the passage of the Bill, we will explore the mechanisms for bringing the money in and for where it will go in the Exchequer. However, at this point I do not want to commit to any undertakings to local authorities. The measure is about ensuring that people contribute and pay their fair share.

The hon. Lady mentioned work—we share that commitment. We all want to see those who have come here fleeing persecution move as quickly as possible into work and into contributing to this country. That is why our new work and study routes will allow people to get off core protection, off dependency and as quickly as possible into the work and study routes that we will provide and encourage asylum seekers to use.

[Mr Kohler]

I wish to make two swift points about what the Minister has just said. First, does the tax system not allow people to contribute—is that not the whole point? When people are integrated, they contribute via the tax system. Othering refugees because they came to us as refugees strikes me as completely the wrong approach, and one that we do not apply to other forms of state help.

Secondly, I am no doubt being obtuse here, but can the Minister point me to the consequences for non-payment? I am still not clear on that.

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Gentleman’s first point is not correct. We ask immigrants to pay a number of other things, including the health surcharge. Asylum seekers have the opportunity to contribute not just through taxes, but by making a significant contribution to these substantial costs. There are very few benefits that our constituents get and would not be expected to pay back in some form.

[Mr Kohler]

The Minister mentions the health surcharge, but it is different for somebody who comes to the country on a work visa and goes in with their eyes open about what the deal is, how they will be paid and how the market assesses costs to them. We are talking here about supporting people who are desperate and have come to us for help, and then saying, “Oh, by the way, you now owe us a vast amount of money.” What we should want is for them to contribute by integrating into society and paying their taxes.

[Anna Turley]

I think the hon. Gentleman completely misses the point about the principle of fairness. I invite him to come and talk to some of my constituents, who might feel differently from his. Some of them feel extremely aggrieved that a huge number of people create this £4 billion burden on the taxpayer. I invite Members to think about what we could do with that money. Of course, we want to fulfil our obligations to those who come here fleeing war and persecution, but we are giving them quite substantial support, and I do not think it unacceptable or inappropriate to ask them to contribute towards those costs when they are integrated, in work and earning enough to do so.

The Government are committed to ensuring that the scheme is transparent and deliverable, and provides value for money. As we have discussed, this debate is, at its heart, about fairness. What we are discussing here is the concept of individuals who have benefited from the sanctuary and generosity of this country and its taxpayers making a contribution to the support that they have received. This is not about punishing anyone; it is about those who received support having a stake in this country’s success, and contributing to those costs—and thereby to the sustainability of that support for others—when they are financially able to do so.

The right to receive support must come with responsibilities. It is right that we provide support to those fleeing war and persecution, and that those who receive our support make a fair and proportionate contribution when they can, putting back into the system that supported them, contributing themselves to such support for those who come after them, and ensuring that the consent of the British public, who pay for that support, remains. Our constituents would expect nothing less. I therefore invite the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire to withdraw his amendment, and I commend clauses 23 and 24 to the Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Ninth sitting)

Anna Turley Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Before we begin, I remind Members to switch electronic devices to silent and that tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. It shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. Members are reminded to bob to catch my eye if they wish to speak in any debate.

Clause 22

Interpretation of Refugee Convention: “lawfully staying”

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

I beg to move amendment 133, in clause 22, page 21, line 1, leave out paragraph (b).

This amendment would omit the transitional provision for clause 22. Amendment 135 would provide for clause 22 to be commenced by regulations, and that would mean that the transitional provision could also be included in the regulations rather than in the primary legislation.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

New clause 61—Removal of persons within Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention: disapplication of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998—

“(1) Section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (acts of public authorities) does not apply to a decision of the Secretary of State to remove from, or require to leave, the United Kingdom a person who is not to be taken to be lawfully staying in the United Kingdom by virtue of section 37A of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (as inserted by this Act).

(2) In proceedings relating to such a decision, a court or tribunal may not treat the decision as unlawful by reason of its incompatibility with a Convention right.

(3) In this section ‘Convention right’ has the same meaning as in the Human Rights Act 1998.”

This new clause would mean that the Human Rights Act 1998 would not prevent the removal from the United Kingdom, where the Refugee Convention permits their return, of a refugee who is a danger to national security, or who has been convicted of a particularly serious crime and is a danger to the community.

[Anna Turley]

It is a pleasure, as always, to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Barker. If the Committee will bear with me, I will set out some reminders of the purposes of the clause to which amendment 133 refers, to give some context to the discussion and debate that I look forward to this morning.

Clause 22 provides that those who are excluded from the protections of the refugee convention because they have committed a “particularly serious crime” or who are a danger to the security of the UK cannot expect the same entitlements as refugees who comply with our laws and contribute positively to life in this country. The UK has a proud tradition of providing protection to those who need it, in accordance with our international obligations. It is right that we help individuals from around the world who flee conflict and oppression, but the asylum system must be fair and effective so that we can better protect, support and focus our efforts on those in genuine need of protection. Those who break our laws and undermine our way of life do not deserve to have our support or indulgence any longer.

Those granted refugee or human rights protection status are provided with the rights and support necessary to rebuild their lives, to integrate into our communities, to support themselves and their families, and to contribute to the UK. That includes access to employment, education and, where appropriate, public funds. However, we are equally clear that those who commit serious crimes are not welcome. Those who can be deported will be deported, and those we are unable to remove will be denied the benefits of protection status. They cannot expect the same treatment as refugees who respect our laws. Through their serious offending, they have demonstrated conduct that justifies a different approach to the benefits and entitlements associated with protection status.

All those who claim asylum undergo a series of security checks against immigration and police databases, and they are screened to identify individuals who may have been involved in criminality, both inside and outside the UK, or are of national security interest. Under the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025, we have already acted to ensure that those guilty of the most serious crimes will not be welcomed here. We have expanded the definition of “particularly serious crime” so that any registered sex offender or any individual convicted of a schedule 3 sex offence can be denied protection status, alongside individuals who have received a custodial sentence of 12 months or more.

[Ben Goldsborough (South Norfolk) (Lab)]

This is a huge concern in rural constituencies like mine. There is no support any more for the immigration and asylum system. Will the Minister explain how she believes that these changes will assure people that there is a safeguard in place to make sure that those who are threats not only to individuals but to our nation will not be welcomed here?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend makes an extremely important point, and one that my constituents share with his. There is real concern that anyone who comes here and breaks our rules should not enjoy the benefits that we provide to those genuinely fleeing persecution who abide by the rules and standards we expect of them. No member of this Committee should be in any doubt about our intention to ensure that those who have committed serious offences are deported. We have deported more than 12,000 foreign national offenders, up 41% on the two years before we came into power. As I say, no one should be in any doubt about our determination.

The clause focuses particularly on those who have committed serious crimes but cannot currently be removed. Where removal is not possible, those individuals are already granted shorter, more restricted leave, with conditions attached, and are subject to regular review until they can be removed at the earliest opportunity. We are clear that we will continue to monitor and review these individuals until removal is possible. They cannot qualify for settlement, and their continued presence in the UK is permitted for only so long as the barrier persists.

We are determined that protection from removal, where required by international obligations, should not automatically confer the broader benefits associated with protection status. It is right that there is a clear distinction between those who commit serious crimes and those who do not—those who make the effort to integrate into the UK and those who do not.

Certain rights under the refugee convention are owed only to individuals who are “lawfully staying” in the UK. The Secretary of State’s policy is that refugees who have been excluded from the protections of the refugee convention under article 33(2) are not lawfully staying in the UK. Clause 22 puts that policy on a statutory footing for the first time, so that it must be applied by courts and tribunals. That will support efforts to distinguish between those who commit serious crimes and those who do not. I hope the Committee agrees that it cannot be the case that those who have committed those crimes against the public are automatically able to access the same benefits and entitlements as refugees who have respected and complied with our laws.

New clause 61, tabled by the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, would enable the removal of refugees who pose a danger to national security or who have been convicted of a particularly serious crime and pose a danger to the community. I look forward to hearing his argument for the new clause, but it is important to clarify that we would always seek to remove any foreign criminal convicted of a serious crime. My initial response is that simply disapplying the Human Rights Act 1998 does not address the point about international law or customary international law, and that any attempt to ignore those obligations would likely result in people being removed to places where they face torture or death. That would not comply with our obligations under the refugee convention, which we ourselves established, to ensure that we never again see the kinds of scenes we saw under Nazi Germany.

[Ben Goldsborough]

Is not one of the risks with the Opposition’s proposition that, by disapplying the European convention on human rights, we would have to strike a new deal with other nations every single time? That is the reason for the slow returns processes we currently have with countries that are not in the ECHR.

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is why, in every experience I have ever had in this portfolio and others, international co-operation has been the solution, not the problem, whether it is driving down fraudulent asylum applications or dealing with those who break the rules when they are here.

Finally, Government amendment 133 will simply allow for transitional provisions to be included in the commencement regulations, rather than being on the face of the Bill.

[Melanie Onn (Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Barker.

The current rules allow too many foreign national offenders to avoid deportation. That undermines public safety and confidence in our immigration system, so it is right that through the Bill we strive to balance the public interest against individual rights, and to ensure that the application of article 8 of the ECHR in deportation cases reflects that balance. The existing tests do not place enough weight on the public interest, especially on public safety and crime prevention. The tougher action that the Government propose is intended to ensure that the courts consistently prioritise public protection, which is welcome.

It is incomprehensible to most people how those who have been granted permission to live and work in the UK and then seriously break the law of the land do not then forfeit the rights that have been conferred on them. That view is heightened when people are part of organised crime gangs, have only recently arrived in the country or have arrived without permission and request asylum. We say that the UK is a tolerant country, but I see that tolerance fracturing as UK citizens see the rules of the country failing in the face of modern migration. We are not the only country experiencing this, and failing to address it will only ensure even greater civil unrest.

It is worth noting that, between 2016 and 2021, about 70% of successful appeals by foreign national offenders allowed them to stay solely on article 8 grounds. Other data shows that nearly 20,000 foreign offenders remain in Britain due to a clogged appeals system, with many winning cases based on human rights arguments. It is interesting to see an amendment propose incredibly tough, specific measures when, during their time in government, the Conservatives failed to implement any changes that would have prevented the disgraceful scenes that we see around the country today.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

We are talking about people who pose a threat to our national security and are, categorically, a danger to our community. I think that the rights of the people in my community should trump the rights of people who pose a threat to our national security and are a danger to that community—[Interruption.] I will try to make a bit of progress, or we might be here for quite a while.

New clause 61 would remove the domestic legal barrier that too often leaves Ministers unable to act. It is a concrete step that the Committee could take today. If the Government reject that approach, what is the answer? Where removal is lawful, how quickly will it happen? Where return home is barred, will Ministers seek agreements with safe third countries? While the person remains here, what measures will manage the risk, and who is accountable for making sure that they work?

Government amendment 133 removes the transitional provision from clause 22. As introduced, the clause applies only to decisions made after it comes into force. The Minister’s explanatory statement says that amendment 135

“would provide for clause 22 to be commenced by regulations,”

which means that the transitional provision can be dealt with in those regulations rather than in the Bill. That means that the question of who this clause applies to and whether it reaches existing cases or only future decisions will be settled by Ministers, not by this Committee. I ask the Minister directly: will existing cases be reassessed, or will this apply only to future decisions? When will the regulations be published, and when will this clause actually take effect? Until Ministers commence clause 22, neither it nor new clause 61 can apply to a single person.

We also need to know who will decide that someone falls within article 33(2) of the refugee convention, what evidence will be required and how challenges will be handled. Those decisions must be robust, otherwise we risk years of litigation while the person concerned stays put.

We will support clause 22 because it tightens the position of these individuals, but our support should not be mistaken for confidence that it solves the problem. Declaring someone dangerous is not the same as protecting the public from them. New clause 61 confronts the gap between the two, and we will press it to a Division at the appropriate point. If Ministers will not support it, they must explain what they will do instead to keep this country safe.

[Anna Turley]

I thank Members for their contributions. It has been a lively one this morning; I think colleagues have had their Weetabix, and I welcome that.

As I said in my introductory comments, clause 22 shows the Government’s determination that those who are excluded from the protections of the refugee convention because they have committed a particularly serious crime or who are a danger to the security of the UK cannot expect the same entitlements as refugees who comply with our laws. When an individual is released from prison, clause 22 will allow the Home Office greater distinction and flexibility to grant shorter periods of leave, restrict access to work or public funds, and impose additional requirements such as reporting and residence.

To pick up on the challenge from the hon. Member for Stockton West, some of the conditions could include restricted leave, a constant renewal of their status every six months, not being able to come back if they leave the country, no access to public funds, restrictions on work, being tagged and reporting requirements. Hopefully that gives him some indication of the steps those people will have to take. The clause will allow a greater distinction between those individuals and those who respect the values of this country and refrain from committing heinous crimes.

I will pick up on the challenge from the hon. Member for Wimbledon. I welcome him to his place on day four; I hope that he has had the chance to read—[Interruption.] I have good intentions. I genuinely hope that he has had the opportunity to read the transcript of our previous sessions, because they have been incredibly constructive. I have welcomed the challenge, the Divisions and the nature of discussion and debate we have had in this Committee.

[Mr Kohler]

Has anything changed? In all those discussions, has any position moved at all?

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point about democracy in this country. The Government have a majority because that is what the British people voted for in 2024, but the importance of this Committee for us is to listen to challenges and criticisms. I hope Opposition colleagues will recognise that we may not always agree, but I assure the hon. Gentleman that we listen and take things very seriously. There is a long process to go through on this Bill yet. There may well be more changes as we go. I hope he feels valued and respected within this Committee, because his presence is certainly welcome.

[Catherine Fookes]

I gently remind the hon. Member for Wimbledon that his party has abstained at every Division. What does that mean about their partaking in democracy? They cannot seem to choose a side.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate that, but I will make some progress, because I want to maintain our focus and seriousness, showing the hon. Member for Wimbledon that we respect and will respond to his challenges. He asked about the status of people who are not “lawfully staying” and cannot be removed. At the moment, there is a vacuum and a free-for-all. The purpose of the Bill is to introduce clarity to the law. They will be a refugee who is present but not lawfully staying, as clarified in the Bill.

The hon. Gentleman also, rightly, mentioned the challenge from the UNHCR that this clause conflates two issues: article 33(2) and “lawfully staying”. We are confident that our interpretation is compatible with the refugee convention. The convention refers to a variety of attachments that a refugee may have to the UK. Where a refugee commits a particularly serious crime, we are satisfied that they have forfeited the lawfully staying attachment, even if states have reached similar interpretations in their own provisions of entitlements under EU law.

I turn to new clause 61, tabled by the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire. The new clause concerns enabling the removal of refugees who pose a danger to national security, or who have been convicted of a particularly serious crime and pose a danger to the community. Article 33(2) of the refugee convention allows this sort of refugee to be removed, notwithstanding the convention’s usual protection against refoulement. Removal, however, may still be prevented by the UK’s wider international obligations. The hon. Gentleman’s new clause seeks to address that issue. In practical terms, new clause 61 would disapply the Human Rights Act, including articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR, thereby enabling the Secretary of State to remove any person who falls within the ambit of the proposal under clause 22 of this Bill, and prevent a UK court from treating any such removal decision as unlawful.

The trouble with new clause 61 is that disapplying the Human Rights Act domestically does not disapply our international obligations, nor does it remove the jurisdiction of the ECHR, address interim measures issued by that court, or remove other relevant international obligations, including under customary international law or the prohibition on refoulement set out by the UN convention against torture. Conservative colleagues may reach for the easy response of, “Leave the ECHR.” We have had interesting discussions throughout Committee on that. Although I completely understand the emotion and desire to ensure that those who commit crimes in this country are not protected by human rights courts, it is important to understand how we got here and the situation into which the ECHR was born.

As the Minister for Migration and Citizenship, my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw (Jo White), powerfully put it in a debate last week, a previous member of the Conservative party, Sir Winston Churchill, was the first champion of the convention, which upheld basic human rights following his experience of standing up to the tyranny of the Nazis during the second world war. Some 13 million people were murdered, and in the face of that, the European convention of human rights defines what we mean by “never again”.

The ECHR includes freedom of assembly, freedom to a fair trial, the prohibition of torture, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and the right to life, including the right not to be murdered in one’s own state. That is what the Nazis did and that is where the ECHR comes from. Those principles remain essential. The only two countries that have chosen to stay out of the ECHR are Russia and Belarus. By leaving the ECHR, we throw away protections against show trials and political persecution. We will not hand over our freedoms to the whims of tyrants and dictators.

That said, the current situation is not perfect. Many of our constituents are concerned that their human rights are being violated by individuals in this country, and we know there has been over-interpretation. Through the Bill, we are seeking to correct the problem. Last year, the Home Secretary committed to overseeing reforms to bring the ECHR into the modern age. She committed to make the ECHR work for everyday people and ensure that the human rights of individuals who have been wronged are upheld above the rights of those who choose to commit unspeakable crimes.

This Government intend to stand with the principles of Churchill. This Government will continue to build a fair and controlled immigration system that is free from abuse. The issue is not the existence of the convention but the way in which it has been applied over time. That is partly what the Bill seeks to address. We do not fix it by walking away and leaving the UK isolated—by throwing away our global moral and ethical leadership. We sort it out by restoring the right balance and ensuring that the system works as intended.

That is why all 46 members of the ECHR adopted the Chişinău declaration in May, which creates a solid basis for reform. That gave us a really good opportunity to go further in terms of removals and deportations. It was a shared view on maintaining public confidence. That is really important—this is about ensuring that the EHCR operates as it was intended.

[Ben Goldsborough]

That gets to the crux of the issue that we are trying to combat within the Bill. The issue itself is not necessarily the principles behind the ECHR; it is the over-interpretation—the juridification—of the law. What we are seeking to do through the Bill, which my constituents greatly welcome, is rein in the courts and make them understand that Parliament sets the rules of the game. We will ensure that they are firm but fair for all residents, as well as for those stuck on waiting lists who need swift action.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is the crux of the Bill: ensuring that we define matters for courts so that we do not see the free-for-all of over-interpretation that we have seen before.

I see this as a binary choice: reform the ECHR and have greater control over our borders, or leave and lose our ability to return illegal migrants and foreign criminals. I choose the powers that the ECHR gives us, which protect our individual rights and freedom.

[Matt Vickers]

The Minister talked about Winston Churchill. Does she think that Winston Churchill would have desired legislation that allows people who are categorically a threat to our national security, or a danger to the community, to stay in this country?

[Anna Turley]

I would put that back to the hon. Gentleman and ask whether he thinks that Winston Churchill would have desired the British state to seek to remove people to places where they will face almost certain death, torture and war.

[Matt Vickers]

The clause relates to people who are too dangerous to lawfully stay in the country. It is not giving us a perspective by which to remove those people. Those people are a danger to our community—you are saying that they are a danger to our community and a threat to our national security—yet we are not going far enough to remove them. It undermines the entire clause.

[The Chair]

Order. I remind Members that there have been several uses of the words “you” and “your” this morning. This is not about me.

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Gentleman misunderstands the purpose of the clause. We have taken plenty of action on deporting people, and we are pursuing plenty of other provisions. The clause sets out that people who we cannot deport should not have the same rights and entitlements as people who are genuinely fleeing war and persecution and abide by our rules and laws—we are making a very clear distinction. Although I am questioning it now, I am sure that his intent would not be to create a situation whereby this country removes people to places where they face death. I will leave it there in the hope that he will not pursue new clause 61.

[Matt Vickers]

rose—

[Anna Turley]

I will be generous and give way again, but then we have to move on.

[Matt Vickers]

This new clause sets out that we would remove people under the mechanism only where doing so complied with the refugee convention. It is there in black and white: we are complying with our obligations under the convention on refugees.

[Anna Turley]

The hon Gentleman’s new clause appears to override those protections and would very likely result in people being removed to places where they face torture, inhuman treatment or even death. That is very clearly the consequence of his new clause, whether he intends it or not.

[Melanie Onn]

I thank the Minister for giving way; she is being incredibly generous with her time. Is there a point to be made about retaining our responsibilities in relation to the ECHR? Critically, international co-operation will enable us to deport more easily people who have no right to be here.

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and that is what we seek to do. We seek to show leadership, just as Winston Churchill did in Europe after the second world war, by working with our partners—all 46 members of the ECHR. This year, they agreed a declaration to give us a stronger platform to drive change through the courts, improve our outcomes in removals and deportations, and have a shared view of how that can be applied in the modern world.

[Matt Vickers]

Disapplying the Human Rights Act is about disapplying our domestic legislation—our domestic barriers. That is entirely compliant with the international refugee convention. This is not about international barriers; it is about our domestic barrier, the Human Rights Act.

[Anna Turley]

That Act is the interpretation of these principles in our domestic law, so it is the same outcome.

I have thoroughly enjoyed the debate this morning. Clause 22 ensures that our protection system remains fair, and preserves our commitment to providing sanctuary and the benefits of the refugee convention to those who genuinely need them. At the same time, it recognises that those who commit serious crimes should not be entitled to the same benefits and privileges as those who respect our laws. We are rightly obliged not to send them back to face death or torture, but that does not mean that we should give them the package of support and entitlement that other decent law-abiding refugees get. In so doing, the clause delivers a clearer, fairer and more meaningful distinction between those who deserve our protection and those who have fundamentally abused it.

Amendment 133 agreed to.

Clause 22, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23

Power to require payments from recipients of asylum support

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I beg to move amendment 81, in clause 23, page 21, line 33, at end insert—

“(3A) Subject to subsection (3B), where the Secretary of State did not make a decision on a person’s protection claim within 180 days of the making of the protection claim, any sums to be paid by the person under subsection (3) must be reduced by 20% for every period of 30 days that elapsed before a decision on the person’s protection claim was made.

(3B) Subsection 3A does not apply where a decision on the protection claim was not made within 180 days of the claim being made due to the actions of the applicant.

(3C) For the purposes of subsection (3A), ‘protection claim’ has the same meaning as in section 82(2)(a) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.”

This amendment would reduce the level of payments required from a person by 20% for every 30 days longer than six months that passed before a decision was made on the person’s asylum claim.

--- Later in debate ---

[Blake Stephenson]

I absolutely agree with the hon. Gentleman. This is not a refugee tax.

On 18 March 2025, Labour Members voted down that new clause 37. The then Minister told that Committee that it was not sufficiently developed to be put into primary legislation. Interestingly, we heard the same criticism from witnesses about clause 23 of this Bill, and even the Government’s own impact assessment rates the impact of these measures as “uncertain”. I ask the Minister what amount and what income threshold the Government intend to set. The Home Office has spoken of £10,000; will that be a flat rate per adult, and over what period? How will the threshold be set so that the charge does not deter people from taking work or declaring their earnings—a risk that the Government’s own impact assessment identified?

Amendment 76 would prevent any payment that would leave a person or household with below 60% of median household income. Clause 23(5) already provides that no one will be required to pay if it would make them “destitute”. Amendment 76 would go far beyond destitution: with a 60% median test, very few people who had been supported by taxpayers would ever pay anything; it would turn into a repayment scheme in name only.

Amendment 81 would cut the amount owed by 20% for every 30 days beyond six months that the Home Office took to decide a claim. I understand the point being made—delays cost money and are not the claimant’s fault—but it is the taxpayer who has paid for those months, and the answer to delays is making faster decisions, not giving a discount. What is the current average time to an initial decision, and what is the Government’s target?

Amendment 79 would cap repayments at the cost of the support received. I would be surprised if the Government intend anything else. Will the Minister confirm that nobody will be asked to repay more than the support they receive, which is the point made by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion? If so, the amendment is unnecessary.

Government amendment 124 will enable repayments to be reduced, waived or refunded, including by giving the Secretary of State discretion. Amendments 125 and 126 deal with insolvency. The supplementary memorandum to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee says that the powers will be subject to the negative procedure because they can only benefit individuals. The Opposition will not oppose the measures, but the use of a discretion to waive, exercised on a case by case basis and never reported, is how schemes like this quietly stop working. What criteria will govern waivers? Will the number and value of waivers be published each year? Will a person be able to clear the debt by making themselves bankrupt?

The Committee is entitled to know whether the scheme will ever recover meaningful sums. Migration Observatory expects that unless the threshold is set significantly below the minimum wage, the number of people earning enough to reach it will be relatively small. That is set against the enormous cost to the British taxpayer. Around 97,500 asylum seekers receive taxpayer-funded support, costing the taxpayer roughly £4 billion in 2024-25. Simple division of that figure suggests that the costs are close to £40,000 a year per person supported. A £10,000 contribution, if it were ever collected, would recover only a small proportion of the initial cost.

During the Committee’s oral evidence session, when my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West asked the Minister what measurable difference the Bill will make, she said:

“I do not want to put a specific figure on it.”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 72, Q127.]

Can she do so now? How many people do the Government expect to pay? How much will be recovered each year, and over what period? How much will it cost to build and run the system? Given that the Government do not have a good history of running systems, can she assure us that the scheme will raise more money than it costs?

Amendment 141, tabled in my name, would ensure that where an individual has been required to repay asylum support costs, any unpaid amount can be considered when deciding applications to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, including for settlement. That would give the scheme more weight by providing that the debt will influence settlement decisions until it is paid off. If amendment 141 is not made, the consequence of not paying will depend on earned settlement rules that have not been laid before Parliament. Will the Government support the amendment?

The Opposition oppose amendments 81, 76 and 79, but not Government amendments 124 to 126. As I mentioned, the principle of clause 23 was originally in a Conservative proposition, so of course we support it, but our concern is that a repayment scheme with discretionary waivers and no consequences for non-payment will be ineffective. We look for assurance from the Minister on that. I will be pressing amendment 141 to a Division.

[Anna Turley]

I thank Members for their important contributions to this debate on asylum costs and the mechanism the Government are creating to recover some of them. As we heard from my hon. Friends, fairness is at the heart of this debate. We are discussing the concept that individuals who have benefited from the sanctuary and generosity of this country and its taxpayers should contribute towards the support that they received. That is not about punishing anyone; it is about those who have received support having a stake in the success of this country and contributing to the cost of that support, and thereby to the sustainability of giving it to others, once they are financially able.

The right to receive support must come with responsibilities. Each year, the taxpayer funds £4 billion of asylum costs. While it is right that we support those fleeing war and persecution, it is also right that those who have received that support make a fair and proportionate contribution when they can. The measures will ensure that they put back into the system that supported them and contribute towards the provision of that support to others, as well as ensuring that others who are paying for that support consent to doing so.

We have heard examples of our constituents contributing to many different forms of collective support, including through national insurance, and through tax to fund access to healthcare. Contribution is an important principle of the social contract in this country. For that reason, the Bill introduces a new power, under which asylum seekers will pay back a portion of the cost of their support when they are financially able to do so. It will be possible to recover those costs through tax receipts, benefit payments and/or as a debt to the Home Office. That mirrors the way in which the Department for Work and Pensions deducts from universal credit where people have child support payments due, owe money for hardship payments, or have unpaid bills or tax.

Amendments 81, 76 and 79, which were tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, seek to prescribe in the Bill how and when asylum support contributions should be calculated and reduced. The Government cannot accept the amendments because they would be too complex to enable effective delivery of the policy and would move us away from the policy intent of a fair and proportionate contribution towards the costs of support once a person is financially able to pay.

Clause 23 establishes an important principle that, where someone has received asylum support at public expense and later has the means to contribute, it is fair that they do so. Of course, any contribution must remain affordable and not push a person into destitution. Clause 23(5) already requires regulations to include provisions to ensure that nobody pays where it would leave them destitute. Further details of this important safeguard will be set out in the regulations that we have committed to sharing during the passage of the Bill.

[Siân Berry]

Will the Minister give way?

[Anna Turley]

I have a huge pile of responses to the points the hon. Lady made, and there are some important clarifications I want to make. If I do not answer her questions sufficiently, I will be happy to take an intervention.

I want to pick up the hon. Lady’s point about destitution and poverty. I think it is right to set the provision at this level, and I do not think it is appropriate to define poverty in the statute book. Given I have wards in my constituency where as many as 60% of children are growing up in poverty, as per the definition that the hon. Lady set out—I am sure the same is true for the constituencies of other Members present—I am afraid I cannot accept an amendment that says that people in my area can be below that poverty line but asylum seekers cannot. All my constituents have obligations to pay that are contributing to the challenges that they face, and I do not think it is appropriate to safeguard one group and not another, as much as we all have a desire—an absolute commitment—to reduce poverty, particularly child poverty, in this country.

The hon. Lady also raised the matter of whether the Bill breaches article 25 of the declaration of human rights. We are absolutely confident that it meets our international obligations, including under the refugee convention. We believe it is compatible with both the letter and the spirit of our international obligations, while maintaining a sustainable system for the future.

The convention does not anywhere require states to provide indefinite support, free of charge and irrespective of an individual’s circumstances. What it does require is that people fleeing persecution be given protection and access to support, which we are doing. Asylum seekers receive a comprehensive package of taxpayer-funded accommodation support, which is very different from the state support provided to destitute British nationals. Nothing in the refugee convention prevents us from requiring asylum seekers to make a contribution, when they can, towards the system that they benefit from. Protecting refugees and ensuring fairness to taxpayers are not mutually exclusive—we can and will do both.

The hon. Lady also asked how we got to the figure. The figure is an indicative amount. The exact figure will be set out in regulations. I want to reiterate that we have committed to publishing the regulations during the course of the Bill’s passage, and I undertake to do that as soon as possible. I am sure that colleagues will understand that it requires a lot of complex engagement with the Treasury and others. We want to make sure that we have got this absolutely right and that we do not fall foul of the situation Opposition Members found themselves in when they tried to introduce this Bill—the workings out had not been done.

The hon. Lady asked why anyone should pay more than the cost of the support they received. This policy is intended to generate a contribution towards the overall cost of asylum support, not to be an itemised recovery of the precise costs incurred by an individual. That would be extremely difficult—nigh on impossible—and it would undermine the ability for us to raise any money through the measure. The flat rate will be calculated by reference to average support costs and the average time spent in asylum accommodation. A flat rate is clearer and more feasible to administer, while payments will remain linked to affordability.

The hon. Lady also asked about the Home Secretary’s power to make exemptions. I want to flag that it is very similar to an existing power that the Home Secretary has that is covered by the Immigration (Health Charge) Order 2015. It is really important to maintain the ability to make exemptions in extreme and unusual circumstances.

I want to pick up the point about forcing people into destitution. That will not be the case. Payments will apply only where someone has the means to pay. Safeguards will ensure that no one is pushed into destitution. Payments will be linked to income and affordability thresholds. Deduction rates and exemptions will be designed to protect those without the means to contribute. As I said, further guidance will be set out throughout the course of this Bill’s passage. Could a person be penalised where a payment could cause destitution? No. Clause 23 requires regulations to contain provisions that ensure that a person is not required to pay where doing so would cause destitution, as we have already flagged.

Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Jade Botterill.)

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Eighth sitting)

Anna Turley Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Amendment 108, in clause 20, page 18, line 13, at end insert—

“(3A) The first and second sets of exceptional circumstances do not apply where a person has been convicted of—

(a) a specified offence within the meaning of section 306 of the Sentencing Code, or

(b) an offence listed in Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 committed against a person under the age of 18.”

This amendment would prevent foreign nationals convicted of specified violent, sexual or terrorism offences, or sexual offences against children, from resisting deportation on the long-residence or “unduly harsh” family grounds, whatever their sentence.

Amendment 109, in clause 20, page 18, line 29, leave out from “is” to end of line 30 and insert

“over and above that which would arise if the circumstances in subsection (4) or (5) applied.”

This amendment would require very compelling circumstances going beyond the long-residence and family exceptions, rather than circumstances merely “at least as strong as” them, restoring the formulation in the current section 117C(6).

Amendment 110, in clause 20, page 18, line 34, after “3(5)(a)” insert “, (5)(b)”

This probing amendment would include family members of a deportee within the definition of a person liable to deportation for the purposes of Part 5A.

Amendment 111, in clause 20, page 18, line 36, leave out “(2) to (4)” and insert “(2) and (3)”

This amendment is related to Amendment 107. It would retain section 117D(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which sets out how a period of imprisonment is calculated for the purposes of Part 5A of that Act.

Clause stand part.

New clause 45—Deportation of foreign offenders—

“(1) The UK Borders Act 2007 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 32, for subsections (1) to (3) substitute—

‘(1) In this section “foreign criminal” means a person—

(a) who is not a British or Irish citizen, and

(b) who is—

(i) convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence, or

(ii) charged with an offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971.’

(3) In section 33, omit subsections (1)(b), (2), (3) and (6A).

(4) In section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971, omit all instances of the word ‘knowingly’.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to make a deportation order in respect of a foreign national who is convicted of an offence or who is charged with an offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971.

New clause 66—Automatic deportation: forced-marriage offences—

“(1) Section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007 is amended as follows

(2) In subsection (1)(c), for ‘Condition 1 or 2’ substitute ‘Condition 1, 2 or 3’.

(3) After subsection (3) insert—

‘(3A) Condition 3 is that the person has been convicted of an offence under section 121 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (offence of forced marriage: England and Wales).’”

This new clause would amend section 32 of the UK Borders Act to create a separate basis for automatic deportation where a person is convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence under section 121 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, concerning forced marriage.

New clause 67—Particularly serious crime: National Security Act 2023 offences—

“(1) Section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 is amended as follows.

(2) After (5ZB) insert—

‘(6) A person is presumed to have been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime if—

(a) the person is convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence listed in the National Security Act 2023; and

(b) the person is not, by virtue of the conviction, a person falling within subsection (2).’”

This new clause would make any conviction of an offence under the National Security Act 2023 an automatic deportation offence, as is currently the case with offences under Schedule 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is, as always, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Barker. This morning, we were debating clause 20 and amendments 107, 109 and 111, and I will pick up where I left off.

There will be an assessment of the public interest in every case before an article 8 breach can be found, taking into account not only the seriousness of someone’s offending, but other relevant factors such as their immigration status. The aim of the new article 8 test is to take a broader view of the public interest and move away from the sentence-based or offence-type focus when assessing the severity of offending.

Conservative amendment 109 seeks to elevate the test of “very compelling circumstances” in the third set of exceptional circumstances, requiring circumstances above and beyond what would be demonstrated by meeting either of the other two exceptional circumstances tests. The exceptions in the current article 8 framework are different from the three sets of exceptional circumstances, and it is through that new framework that very compelling circumstances must be viewed.

The third exceptional circumstance does not replace the current “very compelling circumstances” test and does not operate in the same way. The three sets of exceptional circumstances are intended to be exactly that: exceptional. They serve as a gateway to a full consideration of whether the public interest in deportation is outweighed in the individual case.

Under the current framework, the exceptions operate as exceptions to deportation. If a foreign criminal meets one of the exceptions, or can show very compelling circumstances over and above those exceptions, deportation will be prevented. Under the new framework, the third exceptional circumstance, which refers to very compelling circumstances, simply ensures that a person has a sufficiently strong article 8 claim before the courts consider whether the interference with their article 8 rights outweighs the public interest in deportation.

Meeting that threshold does not mean that deportation is automatically avoided—it is not a pass or a threshold to get over. It acts a filter to ensure that, where a person cannot meet one of the three sets of exceptional circumstances, their article 8 claim will fail without the court proceeding to a proportionality assessment. This is not a watering down of the very compelling circumstances test as it applies under the current framework. Rather, under the new framework, “very compelling circumstances” operates as a gateway to a full consideration of whether the public interest in deportation is outweighed in the individual case.

Amendment 110 would bring those being deported as the family member of a foreign national offender into scope of clause 20. Although the Immigration Act 1971 makes provision for the deportation of family members as a matter of policy, that is not a course that Governments have pursued in practice. Instead, where a family member’s permission to stay in the UK depends on the status of the person being deported, the usual approach is to consider their removal under administrative removal powers. Where a family member raises an article 8 claim, it will be considered under section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

The exclusion from clause 20 of section 3(5)(b) of the 1971 Act is deliberate. Clause 20 is concerned with how article 8 is to be interpreted in cases involving the deportation of a foreign national whose own conduct has made them liable to deportation. A family member liable to deportation under section 3(5)(b) of the Immigration Act 1971 is not being deported because of their own criminality or conduct. Even if that power were used, it is appropriate that any article 8 claim made by that family member should continue to be assessed under the framework set out in section 117B of the 2002 Act, rather than under the deportation framework.

The amendments are unnecessary. Clause 20 already ensures that no foreign criminal will avoid deportation simply by establishing an impact on their private or family life. Instead, every case will require a full assessment of whether any interference with article 8 rights is outweighed by the public interest in deportation, with particular weight given to the seriousness of offending. The clause therefore strengthens the deportation framework while preserving individual assessment in genuinely exceptional cases.

Before I move on, I will come back to the questions raised by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion this morning, as I did not get the chance to respond. In our debate about financial independence and public service pressures, she mentioned discrimination and concerns about vulnerability. I want to be clear that the intention is not to penalise people for hardship. The reforms preserve protections for vulnerable people and children while making it clear that immigration control and the wider public interest should be given proper weight. It is about restoring balance, not removing safeguards.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion also made points about the best interests of children. We are clear that the reforms set out in clause 19 do not remove protections for children. The best interests of children will remain a primary consideration in immigration decision making. The reforms ensure that children’s interests are considered along with other important factors, such as compliance with immigration law and the wider public interest in maintaining an effective immigration system. The reforms ensure that all relevant factors are properly weighed and that immigration decisions are fair, proportionate and consistent. Where a decision is taken to remove a child’s parent, it is ultimately for the parents to decide whether to relocate together as a family or to live separately. In every case, the Government will continue to consider fully the best interests of any child involved.

The hon. Member addressed the word “precarious” and questioned whether clause 19 would mean that little weight is given to family life in cases in which a person has anything short of settled status. Let me be clear: the reforms do not penalise people for following our immigration rules. They place greater emphasis on the public interest in fair and controlled immigration systems, with greater weight given to compliance with the rules and with the public interest test. Article 8 rights developed while someone is in the UK without settled status are given less weight, in recognition that the ability to maintain family or private life in a country where the individual does not have permanent status is naturally precarious.

I was also asked what constitutes a serious breach. We expect everyone to comply with the conditions of their permission to stay, but I want to be clear that not every breach is equal. It would not be right to treat a minor or technical breach in the same way as deliberate or repeated non-compliance, or to equate it to illegally entering or staying in the UK. Whether a breach is serious will depend on its circumstances. The nature of the breach, why it occurred, its frequency and duration, and whether the individual disclosed it and engaged with the Home Office will all be taken into consideration. Should someone who knowingly and repeatedly fails to comply with reporting requirements be treated the same as someone who misses a single appointment for a genuine reason and informs the Home Office? I think we know the answer. The distinction allows us to take a firm but proportionate approach, including where multiple breaches taken together amount to serious non-compliance.

On the impermissibility limit and whether the circumstances of offending are taken into account, proposed new section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 expressly allows for the

“nature and circumstances of…offending”

to be taken into account. I am grateful to the Committee for allowing me to clarify those points from the earlier discussion.

On new clause 45, the Government are clear that foreign nationals who commit serious crimes should be deported. The automatic deportation provisions already provide a firm statutory framework for foreign criminals who meet the relevant thresholds. They require that a deportation be made wherever the law permits. Outside the automatic deportation regime, there are legal powers to consider the deportation of any non-British citizen whose deportation is conducive to the public good. The new clause is not a proportionate or workable way to strengthen that framework. It would make any conviction, however minor, sufficient to trigger automatic deportation. If a foreign national had resided lawfully in the country for over 40 years but received an absolute discharge on conviction for a minor motor offence, the Home Secretary would be under a duty to deport them unless an exemption applied. Such deportations would likely be unworkable in practice because they would be disallowed on appeal on article 8 grounds under the European convention on human rights.

The new clause would also bring a person within the definition of a “foreign criminal” merely because they had been charged with an immigration offence before a court had determined guilt. That would be fundamentally contrary to our legal system, in which an individual is innocent until proven guilty, and it would represent a substantial expansion of the auto-deport regime. The new clause would also remove statutory exceptions and delete the word “knowingly” throughout section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971. Those changes could have consequences well beyond the stated aim of the new clause, including for criminal liability, fairness and the UK’s international obligations.

Decisions to deport must be robust, lawful and capable of withstanding challenge. A measure that is drafted too broadly risks delay, additional litigation and outcomes that cannot be lawfully implemented. For those reasons, I ask Conservative Members not to pursue new clause 45.

I turn to new clause 66. Forced marriage is an appalling crime, as the Committee would agree. The Government are clear that people who commit that offence must face the full force of the criminal law and, where they are foreign nationals, deportation—I want to be absolutely explicit about that in this Committee. However, we do not consider that the new clause is the right way to achieve that aim. Under the UK Borders Act 2007, the Secretary of State is already required to make a deportation order where a qualifying foreign criminal receives a sentence of at least 12 months, subject to the statutory exceptions.

If that threshold is not met, the existing power to deport where conducive to the public good—of which I think this crime would be clear evidence—remains available. The new clause would make a conviction for one specified offence sufficient to trigger automatic deportation, regardless of the sentence imposed. It could therefore apply even when the sentencing court considers that a non-custodial sentence is appropriate. That would cut across the existing structure, which uses the sentence and other statutory criteria as indicators of seriousness.

Although I recognise the intention and understand the purpose of the new clause, it is not feasible to specify on the face of the Bill all the crimes that we would like to carry that result. We use sentences to indicate seriousness, and we would be in danger either of missing out or of diminishing other horrendous offences if we did not also put them in the Bill—I am sure that that is not the intention of the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire. The new clause is also confined to the England and Wales offence and does not address equivalent offending across the whole of the UK. Automatic deportation would in any event remain subject to the exceptions in section 33 of the UK Borders Act, including our international obligations. I understand the objective of the new clause, but for those reasons, and although I acknowledge the abhorrence of forced marriage, I ask the Committee to reject it.

I turn to new clause 67. Before considering it in detail, I draw attention to the fact that, despite what is asserted in the explanatory statement provided by the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns), the new clause would not achieve her aims. It amends the test for disapplying the prohibition against returning refugees to danger, rather than amending the threshold for auto-deportation. It sets out that convictions for offences under the National Security Act 2023 should be presumed to be particularly serious crimes under section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Article 33 of the refugee convention already allows refugees to be returned to their country when they have committed a particularly serious crime and, as a result, constitute a danger to the community. There is no definition of “particularly serious crime” in the convention, and no universal uniformity in the interpretation adopted by other states parties. It is open to the UK to interpret the term in good faith, which requires consideration of the ordinary meaning of the words, and it is clear that national security offences are particularly serious crimes.

Article 33.2 of the refugee convention also allows refugees to be refouled where they are a danger to the security of the UK. That may include individuals who engage in unacceptable behaviours in the UK or abroad, or who undertake or espouse extremist views, as well as those who foment, justify or glorify terrorist violence to further particular beliefs or provoke others to commit terrorist acts. There is no requirement in the convention for a criminal conviction. The new clause would therefore have very little impact in practice; if anything, it would set the threshold too high. It is already Home Office policy in cases involving national security threats, or where there is a conviction for a particularly serious crime and the individual is considered to pose a threat to the community, to refuse refugee status and to seek to remove the individual from the UK.

It is imperative that any asylum seekers and refugees who have been convicted of particularly serious crimes, or who constitute a danger to UK society, do not benefit from protection status. Not only have they failed to respect the laws of the United Kingdom by committing heinous acts, but they have also undermined public confidence in the ability of the state to protect the public. For the reasons that I have outlined, I respectfully request that hon. Members do not pursue their amendments and new clauses, and I commend clause 20 to the Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Barker. Let me set out the test that we will apply to this part of the Bill. Protection should be there for people who genuinely need it, when they need it. When that need ends, they should go home. That is what the public expect, and it is what the Government say they want. The question is whether this part of the Bill delivers it.

First, to give them credit where it is due, the Government now propose to replace clause 21 with new clauses 35 and 36 and new schedule 1. Instead of leaving the whole framework to regulations, Ministers propose to put the definition into the Bill itself. That is better. Amendment 132 has not been selected so the question of retaining clause 21 will come through the stand part debate, but there is still a scrutiny problem. New clause 36 keeps a power to change primary legislation with no time limit. The linked Government amendment 134 makes those changes subject to affirmative approval, but other regulations would use the negative procedure. Why should powers to confer rights or impose obligations operate on that basis? What further change does the Minister already have in mind?

I support amendment 137, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire. Before any further leave is granted, it would require consideration of whether removal would still breach our obligations on the convention or humanitarian protection grounds. That means checking the continuing need at every renewal, not just in selected cases. Government new clause 35 would give the Home Secretary a power to revoke protection status, but a power to revoke is not a duty to review. Will the Minister carry the principle of amendment 137 into the replacement framework? When protection is no longer needed, how will departure follow?

That is why we cannot support amendment 53, tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough. It would require an initial grant of at least five years and eligibility to apply for settlement after five years, but the passing of five years tells us nothing about whether protection is still needed. That need should determine the approach. Nor can we support amendment 54. It would allow partners, children and dependent adult children to apply to join someone with protection status without fees, a health surcharge, an income test or maintenance or accommodation requirements. Who pays when the sponsor cannot support or house the family? What assessment has been made of the numbers and the pressure on housing, schools and GP surgeries?

On amendment 75, how would children’s interests be considered under the replacement framework? Amendment 51 would challenge the power to confer rights and impose obligations, while amendment 52 would challenge a different provision for convention and humanitarian claims. What difference does the Minister intend? On amendment 74, would the commitment not to reduce existing entitlements still apply?

I support amendment 138, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire. Before the first regulations were put to Parliament, it would require the publication of draft regulations and a statement of the proposed immigration rules, covering the length of leave, reviews of protection and the qualifying period for settlement. Those details would tell us how this will actually work. Although the amendment was drafted against clause 21, the need for those answers does not disappear when the Government replace it. Will the Minister publish the equivalent material for the new framework before asking Parliament to approve its implementation?

What happens to existing grants, pending claims and live appeals? Will anyone have to reapply because the label has changed? What staff and resources will be needed to review protection properly without creating another backlog? We support protection for as long as it is needed. Amendments 137 and 138 ask Ministers to explain how they will check that need and show Parliament the rules. Putting definitions in the Bill is welcome, but we still need to know how the system will work.

[Anna Turley]

I really appreciate the contributions from all the hon. Members this afternoon. Before responding directly to the clauses and amendments that we have discussed so far, I hope the Committee will allow me to set out why this approach is being taken.

As part of the wider core protection reforms set out by the Home Secretary last year in the “Restoring Order and Control” statement, the UK’s asylum policy statement published in November 2025 set out the new approach to protection in the UK. That marks a significant change in direction away from an assumption of offering permanent protection towards protection that is granted for the duration of need, which we call “core protection”. Put simply, replacing the two categories of protection—refugee and humanitarian protection status—with one single form of protection status will simplify the asylum decision making process and prevent unnecessary and tenuous appeals.

It is important to reflect on how we got to where we are. Those two protection statuses are essentially a historical relic from separating those in danger on return to their countries of origin from those in need of protection for political or identity reasons. As time has evolved, the two statuses have become functionally identical, except in some small areas such as travel documents. That creates an administrative burden for the Home Office for no good reason. We are therefore proposing to merge those two statuses.

Clause 21 will reconcile those two statuses so that the system is administratively simpler for refugees and decision makers. In order to do that, we are also taking a limited power to deal with the existence of terms such as “refugee”, “refugee protection” and “humanitarian protection”, which exist throughout our extensive immigration and asylum statute book and will need replacing with a single term: “core protection”. Under the current system, those who qualify for refugee or humanitarian protection status are granted similar entitlements—30 months’ permission to stay and the same route to settlement. Where there are differences, such as in relation to travel documents, we are making changes to ensure that all those who are granted core protection are eligible.

One of the points raised in the debate was about whether we are more expansive than other European countries. That is absolutely right; as the Home Secretary set out in “Restoring Order and Control”, our offer to refugees is more expansive than that of other European countries. Once they are granted refugee status, the current system grants leave to remain for five years. At the end of that period, refugees can immediately apply for settlement, giving them an indefinite right to live in the UK. This application is fee-free and essentially automatic, being almost entirely absent of requirements.

When compared with that of some of our European neighbours, this approach to protection is generous. In Denmark—a country that has tightened its asylum system in recent years—residence permits are issued to refugees for just two years, and they are designed to be temporary. Settlement can typically be obtained only after eight years of residence and is subject to multiple conditions, including full-time employment, meeting an earnings threshold, language proficiency and active citizenship.

Clause 21 sets out what constitutes a protection claim and who will qualify for protection status. A person has protection status if they have been granted permission to stay in the UK because removing them would breach our obligations under the refugee convention, or if they would be at real risk of serious harm. The UK is proud to offer sanctuary to those in need, for as long as it is needed, in line with our international obligations. We believe that all those who face persecution for a specified reason, as contained in the 1951 convention, as well as those who fear torture or indiscriminate violence due to war, should receive protection, and that this country should play its part.

This measure is part of simplifying the current system, which has two forms of protection status that grant similar entitlements, namely refugee status and humanitarian protection. Under the new system, individuals who qualify for protection will be granted core protection status. As such, this change will streamline asylum decision making and reduce unnecessary appeals.

Before I turn to the amendments themselves, I want to draw the Committee’s attention to Government new clauses 35 and 36 and new schedule 1. I will discuss them in detail in a moment, but it is the Government’s intention—quite unusually—that these new clauses will replace clause 21, as we have essentially updated it. I know that this is unusual, so I would just like to explain it to members of the Committee. Having included a limited power in the Bill upon its introduction, we now want to narrow that power with more detail, as we work through the technicalities of how this part will interact with what I know Members will agree is a very large volume of legislation on the statute book.

I thank the hon. Members for Harrogate and Knaresborough and for Brighton Pavilion for tabling amendments 53 and 54 and amendment 74 respectively, and I will address some of the questions they raised before I go into their specifics. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion suggested that there was the potential here to reduce entitlement, but that is absolutely not the case. If anything, there will be a minor levelling-up of humanitarian entitlement when it comes to travel documents. So there will be no reducing of entitlement.

We do not think that the origin of the claim should matter for the grounds for protection. We believe that there should be consistency across the two, so the entitlement is therefore the same. We want to be clear that, in all the amendments we have made, there is to be absolutely no levelling-down. As we heard, the Home Secretary’s delegated powers memorandum itself was clear that the powers would not be used to reduce entitlement.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion mentioned the best interests of children, which builds on a debate we had earlier today. Of course, their interests are absolutely the priority throughout this process. Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 places a duty on the Home Office to ensure that its immigration, asylum, nationality and general customs functions are discharged with regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of all children in the UK. The Home Office takes its section 55 duty seriously, and every child matters, as set out in our statutory guidance. We are committed to ensuring that we have regard to this duty in the development and implementation of new policy, including core protection, as well as when decision makers apply these policies to children within the UK.

The hon. Member asked about a sunset clause and why we have removed that in the existing powers. The key consequential amendments to primary legislation will be on the face of the Bill through new schedule 1. However, significant additional changes will still be needed for secondary legislation, which is why that was removed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

I would like further clarity on why those grounds—the reasons for which revocation could be made—which the Minister read out very clearly, are not simply added to the Bill at this point to make the situation incredibly clear.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the hon. Lady’s question. The reason is that immigration rules are not normally put on the face of primary legislation. It would be unusual to do that on the face of the Bill. I can clarify that shortly with the hon. Lady, but that is my understanding of why this is not on the face of the Bill—because it is done through the usual route of immigration rules.

The hon. Lady asked what applicants will be told and how this will support those going through the process in simplifying their decision making. The decision-making process will be simplified in all decisions that would not currently be a grant of refugee status, because they will no longer refuse refugee status and then go on to separately consider serious harm. Instead, a single decision on risk on return will be made. Officials are already working with non-governmental organisations in the sector to identify the precise wording most appropriate in a new grant letter.

The hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough asked what the 30-month renewal will involve. We are committed to ensuring that our policies are sustainable and do not place unnecessary burdens on the taxpayer, and this policy is no different. In terms of resources and processing, only those who do remain on core protection will have their protection needs regularly reviewed. Reviews will be targeted based on objective country information and any other new information that comes to light, allowing us to make the most efficient use of resources. We will continue to monitor staffing levels and will deploy our workforce flexibly, subject to business needs, as we have done in the past. The approach to reviewing status will be efficient and targeted, and we will reassess where country conditions or personal circumstances change.

[Tom Gordon]

I understand the point the Minister is making about targeting resource efficiently, but can she elaborate on exactly what that looks like in practice? There are lots of nice words about efficiency, but until we know what that entails, it is quite hard to believe.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman raising that point. He will understand that this decision making is part of the core business for the Home Office. I can come back to him during the Committee with more specific detail on what that process will look like, but it is important to reassure him that we will continue to monitor our staffing levels and deploy our workforce flexibly, subject to business needs.

[Siân Berry]

It is important to know whether the 30-month process will be more like a simple renewal—like me renewing my TV licence or something like that—or whether it will be a reinterrogation of the person seeking protection all over again? Will the onus be on the Government to say, for example, that a country has suddenly become safe, that there has been a new Government, that major changes have occurred and, therefore, that we will look more closely at a number of cases, but that in countries where the situation has remained the same, we will not be looking in depth? How simple the process will be is really bothering people. Having all their circumstances reinterrogated and having to prove themselves over and over again is something people have learned to expect from the Home Office. It is up to the Minister to reassure us on this point.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the hon. Lady raising that point. I was intending to come to it; she will be pleased to know that I still have quite a lot to get through in my speech. To reassure her, individuals will need to meet the relevant suitability requirements for ongoing permission to stay. If someone is convicted of a criminal offence that meets the relevant thresholds, they will be excluded from protection and will not be eligible for core protection. If there has been a significant and durable change in their country’s situation or a change in their personal circumstances, their ongoing need for protection will be reviewed. For anyone who has returned to the country of persecution or serious harm, or obtained a national passport, their circumstances will be reviewed. I hope that that gives the hon. Lady a degree of clarity, but I am happy to go back and clarify that in more detail during the Committee—I can see that it would mean a lot to both her and the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough.

Amendments 53 and 54, tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, would revert to the previous position of granting five years’ leave to remain to refugees and placing them on a five-year route to settlement, and would allow automatic entitlement to family reunion. In recent years, the number of people seeking protection has significantly increased, placing unprecedented pressure on housing, public services and communities across the UK. From 2004 to 2020, between 22,000 and 46,000 people were claiming asylum in the UK each year. However, there has been a huge increase since the second half of 2021, reaching a peak of 110,000 in the year ending September 2025. Although the numbers of people claiming asylum fell to 85,891 in the year ending June 2026, it still remains high compared with levels seen in the decade to 2021.

I know that many of our constituents have huge concerns about fairness, how the system operates and whether it supports those who truly need protection. That is why the Government published a new asylum policy statement in November last year that set out significant reforms to the UK’s asylum system. Core protection is one of the key elements of the asylum reforms. Under this new policy, protection will be granted for the duration of need and will be renewable where a person remains at risk on return. Greater entitlements, including a shorter period to settlement and a route to sponsor family members, will be accessed by demonstrating contribution to and integration into UK society. Settlement will no longer be automatic. Instead, there will be a 20-year route to permanent residency, crucially with the ability to reduce that period by switching into the protection work and study route to ensure long-term commitment, contribution and integration.

As a first step towards that, the Government changed immigration laws on 5 March 2026. Any adult or accompanied child who claims asylum from 2 March 2026 onwards and qualifies for a grant of refugee status or humanitarian protection will be granted leave for 30 months. At a 30-month review, refugees with a continuing need of sanctuary will have their protection renewed, while those who no longer have a protection need will be expected to return home. The safe return review will consider whether there has been a fundamental and durable change in their country of origin.

We recognise that, when a country situation changes, not everyone will be safe. Of course, as occurs now, individual circumstances will be taken into account, and each case will be assessed on its own merits. The overthrow of one political party in favour of another might only be transitory. The changes must be such that the reasons for becoming a refugee have ceased to exist and there are no other reasons for an individual to fear returning to their country.

[Siân Berry]

For clarity, will the onus be on the Government to prove the change, or will it be like reapplying from scratch each time? Again, my casework shows that we are more used to the Home Office asking for chapter and verse from the applicant each time. If the Minister is prepared to promise that it will be for the Government to prove changes, that would mean a lot to many people listening.

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Lady pre-empts my next paragraph. To clarify for her, once the individual acquires protection status, the burden of proof is on the Home Office to demonstrate that protection is no longer required. It will be us who will demonstrate that; it will not be for the claimant to make another asylum claim, unless there are new grounds that have not been raised before. Any decision to revoke protection status will continue to have a right of appeal. As always, we will continue to uphold the fundamental principle that we will not return anyone to a country where they are at risk.

Refugees with a continuing protection need will have to wait 20 years for settlement unless they switch to protection work and study as part of the core protection model. A new, bespoke work and study route will allow access to family reunion and settlement rights, with new fees and conditions in accordance with the rules of that route. That will enable refugees to earn down the length of time before they can settle in the UK, and demonstrate that they are contributing to the UK and can support their family before they may bring their partner and children over. Further details will be set out in future immigration rule changes. This route will not include a safe return review.

[Tom Gordon]

I welcome the fact that the Minister says details will be set out in future immigration regulation, but there is no clarity in the Bill for people now. I asked her a number of questions about eligibility, whether the family would move on to that route together and what that actually looks like. Can she say anything about that at this stage?

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Gentleman will recognise that the provision we are debating gives power to the Secretary of State to make changes to immigration rules. We will make changes to the immigration rules through the usual process, so he will have the opportunity to debate them when they come before the House for affirmative resolution, but this debate is about the power. I am sure that debate will continue in the weeks and months ahead, and I look forward to engaging with the hon. Gentleman on it.

For the people who claim asylum and are granted protection in the UK, our new regime providing support for refugees will be entirely in accordance with our international obligations, but it does not exceed them. These are significant reforms. They are designed to ensure that our asylum system is fit for the modern world and, crucially, that public consent for having an asylum system at all remains. Genuine refugees will receive the protection they need. We therefore oppose the amendments.

Amendments 51 and 52, tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, set out to limit the power to make regulations about protection status and claims. Due to the drafting of clause 21(3), the amendments would not prevent the Home Secretary from making such regulations about protection status and claims because the power in clause 21(1) is a broad one. However, without this explicit provision, such regulations would be more vulnerable to challenge on grounds that they were ultra vires. Government new clauses 35 and 36 will replace clause 21. They aim to set out on the face of the Bill the provision that would otherwise have been made under the power in clause 21. They also give the Secretary of State the power to make further consequential and related amendments, including to primary legislation. The amendments are therefore unnecessary.

The Government new clauses ensure that the key consequential amendments to primary legislation are made on the face of the Bill. However, as I am sure hon. Members will agree, many references to asylum and humanitarian protection legislation require simplification following the introduction of the single concept of protection. The narrow power here is considered the most efficient way to bring the rest of the statute book in line with that change. Regulations amending primary legislation must be made by affirmative procedure, which allows an appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny because any legal challenges can be debated and authorised by Parliament.

Amendments 74 and 75, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, also seek to limit the power by preventing regulations from restricting the rights and entitlements available to those with protection status and by requiring the Home Secretary to take into account the best interests of children when making regulations. The Government have tabled their own amendments to replace clause 21 and define the single concept of protection on the face of the Bill. The purpose of the single concept of protection is to create a single definition of protection claim and a single form of protection status. It will replace and amalgamate the two separate forms of protection: refugee status and humanitarian protection.

Anyone at risk of persecution or serious harm due to third-party actors on return to their home country will be granted protection status and all the associated entitlements. We recognise that all those who face persecution for a specific reason in the 1951 convention, as well as those who are at risk of torture or indiscriminate violence due to war, should receive protection and the same entitlements. To the extent that we retain a power to make amendments, many references to asylum and humanitarian protection legislation require simplification following the change. The power is the simplest and most efficient way to bring the rest of the statute book in line with that change. Regulations amending primary legislation must be made by affirmative procedure, which allows the appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny.

As I have mentioned, the Government have already committed in the delegated powers memorandum that the power will not be used to reduce the entitlements currently held by refugees, and the Home Secretary is already under a duty to have regard to the need to safeguard the welfare of children in the UK under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. The Government consider that there are ample safeguards on the exercise of the power, and the amendments are therefore unnecessary.

Amendments 137 and 138, taken together, set out to add additional requirements to clarify the powers in clause 21. In order to respond, it may be helpful to set out the purpose of clause 21 and the Government amendments I am introducing at this stage. The Government are introducing amendments to replace clause 21. These new clauses aim to set out on the face of the Bill the provision that would otherwise have been made under the power in clause 21. They also give a power to the Secretary of State to make further consequential and related amendments, including to primary legislation.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Seventh sitting)

Anna Turley Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison.

The clause addresses a basic question: when someone asks to stay in this country, what does the public interest expect of them? The Government’s answer is one that I suspect most of our constituents would recognise: that the person pays their way, does not rely on the state to put a roof over their head, does not commit crimes, co-operates with the authorities and is of good character. Those are reasonable expectations and we welcome much of the clause.

The clause’s strength, however, comes down to a handful of words. Proposed new subsection 117B(4) of the 2002 Act says:

“No weight should be given to a private or family life”

that is built up while someone is here unlawfully, on leave obtained by deception or in serious breach of their conditions. Think about who that covers—someone who came here illegally, lied to get a visa or broke the conditions on which this country let them in. When the time comes to remove them, that person asks a court to weigh a life built up in that time against their removal.

We agree with the Government that weight should not be given. However, “should” is the language of advice; “must” is the language of law. The Government have already moved from “little weight” to “no weight”, and I welcome that—amendment 105 simply finishes the job. If the Government mean that no weight must be given, let the statute say, “No weight must be given”. In this area of law, a door left ajar is an invitation.

Moreover, the no weight rule applies only where someone is in serious breach of their conditions. What is serious? Is it working beyond the hours that their visa allows? Is it claiming benefits that they are not entitled to? Is it overstaying their visa by a month? The Bill does not say, so a tribunal will decide case by case, which will bring us back to the very weighing exercise that the Government say they want to end. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell the Committee what the Home Office understands a “serious breach” to mean, and whether it will be defined in guidance.

Amendment 104 deals with good character. Proposed new subsection 117B(3A) says it is in the public interest that people seeking to stay here are of good character, but clause 19 does not say what good character means. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire that there is already a well-established test in the good character requirement for British citizenship set out in Home Office guidance. Amendment 104 says that the court should apply that test. It would be strange if the bar to stay in this country were lower than the bar to become a citizen of it, and stranger still for every tribunal to invent its own version from scratch.

The clause asks the right questions. Our amendments ensure that the answers carry the force of the law. The Government have chosen “no weight” over “little weight”, and that is welcome; let them finish the job by replacing “should” with “must” and telling us what they mean by “good character” and “serious breach”. I commend our amendments to the Committee.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Dr Murrison. I thank all hon. Members for their contributions to the debate on the clause and amendments in this grouping.

Before moving on to the amendments, I will give some background on what the clause will do. The balance between an individual’s family rights and the public interest in maintaining an effective and controlled immigration system has shifted, and it needs to be reset. Without greater clarity from Parliament on how that balance should be struck, the domestic interpretation of article 8 has expanded beyond what our international obligations require, resulting in inconsistent decision making and high volumes of article 8 grants to people who cannot meet the rules to come or to stay in the UK.

More than half of those who stayed in the UK for family reasons last year did not meet our criteria to be able to stay here, instead relying on their article 8 rights. That undermines public confidence in the immigration system and the rules-based international order. It also comes at a significant cost to the UK taxpayer. As has already been mentioned, the average net lifetime fiscal cost for each first-time grant is £141,000, equating to approximately £4.9 billion for those granted on the basis of article 8 in 2025 alone.

Colleagues have asked about the evidence base behind those figures, so I will give a bit more information about it. We undertook a deep dive cohort analysis to examine a representative sample of 3,252 article 8-related applications, in order to support the policy development of these measures in the Bill. Further details are in the impact assessment. I am afraid that the unpublished internal sample that was referred to will not be made available due to the personal data sensitivities involved, but we will obviously keep under review any further analysis that we would be keen to share with the Committee throughout the course of the Bill, for example other statistics that have been mentioned.

This trend has been driven by high volumes of people who have arrived illegally or overstayed in the UK, at 71% of first-time grants, or by people who are unemployed and are making a minimal economic contribution—76% of first-time grants. It is clear that the system is not functioning fairly and effectively. That is why the British public feel exasperated that such exemptions are being abused to enable people to circumvent the system.

Clause 19 will help to restore a fairer balance between an individual’s right to family life and the public interest in maintaining an effective and controlled immigration system. It will provide a clearer statutory framework that places greater emphasis on compliance and contribution, resulting in more consistent and robust outcomes. These reforms will realign UK legislation with Strasbourg, ensuring that our domestic approach to article 8 is within and, crucially, not beyond our international obligations, as it is now.

[Mr Paul Foster (South Ribble) (Lab)]

Clause 19 introduces some quite fundamental changes, which I fully support, but is the Minister confident that it will still meet the requirements of the European convention on human rights? That is the litmus test.

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend makes an extremely important point. That is why the drafting of clause 19 has been very clear and specific, which I will say more about later.

It is important that we comply with our international obligations. We have a proud history of doing so—we helped to devise, draft and create these obligations—but we also have a history of overinterpreting them. It is not a free-for-all, but it is important that we act within the requirements we are obliged to meet and do not go beyond them. That is what the provisions in the Bill seek to achieve.

That includes a clarification that judges must consider the economic impact on the taxpayer of allowing people to remain in the UK, including by considering whether they can support themselves and their family. It is only fair to all those who work hard in this country to be financially independent and to house themselves, and who are not overly reliant on public services, that they do not see others who otherwise have no right to be here imposing avoidable burdens on society and public services.

[Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)]

Will the financial independence test be individualised, will it be evidence-based in its assessment, and will it recognise barriers such as credit history, references and guarantors? Furthermore, will a survivor’s use of refuge or public funds to escape abuse count against them?

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his questions and I will say a lot more about those issues when I respond to the contributions by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. However, we are absolutely clear that we are not going to penalise people for experiencing hardship. These reforms preserve protections for vulnerable people and children, but it is vital that we make it clear that immigration control and the wider public interest should be given proper weight in any consideration. This is about restoring balance, not removing safeguards. That is critical.

[Mr Jonathan Brash (Hartlepool) (Lab)]

Having listened to some contributions, particularly from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, I think that most fair-minded people would be concerned that these reforms could have a detrimental impact on children. Can the Minister confirm whether or not these reforms remove protections for children?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend raises a critical issue that is, of course, dear to all of our hearts. Again, I will say more about it later, but these reforms absolutely do not remove protections for children. The best interests of children will continue to remain a primary consideration in immigration decision making, as they should be. The reforms in clause 19 ensure that children’s interests are considered alongside other important factors, including compliance with immigration law and the wider public interest in maintaining an effective immigration system.

[Tom Gordon]

Will the Minister give way?

[Anna Turley]

Forgive me, but I have not addressed these issues yet, so if the hon. Gentleman can be patient for a little longer—I am sure he will have more questions afterwards—I would like to make some progress, if I may.

The clause also introduces character and conduct as a factor in the public interest test. This will require judges to have regard to harmful conduct, including criminality below the deportation threshold and outside the mandatory suitability refusals. This is an important element of tackling abuse and takes us one step towards a fairer system that the public can have confidence in.

The clause further reduces avenues for abuse by requiring that no weight—instead of little weight, as now—should be given to an article 8 claim established when someone is here illegally, or legally but only by deceiving the Home Office, or if they have seriously breached the conditions of their permission to be in the UK. That will enable us to more effectively enforce our immigration rules and prevent people from unfairly benefiting from time spent in the UK in violation of our rules, and will avoid the creation of perverse incentives for people who are here unlawfully to try to deliberately establish article 8 claims.

Although it is right that essential protections for children are retained, it is not right that adults who abuse our immigration system are almost guaranteed to be allowed to stay if they can prove a parental relationship with a child in the UK. Currently, there is no need to carry out a full balancing exercise if there is a child. This is the main source of successful article 8 claims, two thirds of which result in residence rights being granted.

The clause clarifies which factors should be considered when determining whether it is in the public interest to remove the parent of a qualifying child from the UK, and introduces a provision to assess the impact of removing a parent where a child remains in the UK.

I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for amendment 61, which sets out a new public interest consideration, under which specific regard would be given to the circumstances of victims of violence against women and girls when assessing whether interference with an individual’s article 8 right is justified. Of course, we absolutely recognise and take seriously the importance of tackling violence against women and girls, and the devastating impact that it has on victims. However, the Government do not consider the amendment to be necessary.

Clause 19 already preserves a case-specific assessment in which courts and tribunals can consider all relevant facts and evidence, including experiences of domestic abuse, violence and exploitation, and the safeguarding concerns that the hon. Lady mentioned in her case studies. The holistic article 8 assessment that the clause retains ensures that protections exist for vulnerable people and that support remains available for those who genuinely need it. In addition, existing provisions in the immigration rules, including “Appendix Victim of Domestic Abuse” and the migrant victims of domestic abuse concession, provide specific protections. Those safeguards are there to ensure that victims’ experiences are properly recognised and taken into account.

I thank the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire for tabling amendment 104. I understand the intention behind it, but I am afraid that the Government do not consider the amendment to be helpful. I agree that good character is an important consideration in article 8 cases. Including that factor in the public interest test ensures that protections are focused on those who have acted responsibly. That is an important element of creating a fair system that the public have confidence in and that is not open to abuse. The clause establishes that and requires the courts and tribunals to have regard to harmful conduct, including that below the deportation threshold and outside mandatory suitability refusals. We will set out further detail on that in published guidance and the immigration rules.

Let me be clear that the existing guidance, including the guidance mentioned by the hon. Gentleman, will be a useful comparator and will play an important role in shaping this. We do not want to be tied exclusively to the 1981 guidance, but want to develop ours further. Our approach will therefore reflect that already taken in nationality legislation, where good character is not exhaustively defined on the face of the Bill but is addressed through the guidance.

[Siân Berry]

I am very interested in the fact that the Minister has just talked about going further on good character in some guidance. Will that guidance take into account factors that might otherwise weigh against the character of someone making an appeal if they have been exploited or abused? Is that the kind of thing that the Minister is thinking about in terms of deviating from the 1981 guidance?

[Anna Turley]

The guidance will set out very clearly what we will ask the courts and tribunals to have regard to in relation to harmful conduct. We will also make sure, as I have already mentioned, that there is sufficient protection regarding issues around domestic violence. That will be in our immigration rules, and it is in our existing provisions. We will ensure that courts and tribunals consider all relevant facts and evidence. I place this on the record in Committee: we will expect experiences of domestic violence, abuse and exploitation, and safeguarding concerns to be a key part of that.

To go back to amendment 104, our approach will reflect the approach already taken in nationality legislation, so that good character is not exhaustively defined in the Bill, but addressed through guidance. Everything raised by colleagues in Committee will be on the record.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joe Robertson]

Surely the Minister understands that while “no weight” may be the starting point, the end point is the decision, and that is the issue. A decision maker can have a starting point of “no weight”, but attach weight, and suddenly the decision is not where I think even she might intend in many cases.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make, but it is important for cases to be considered on a case-by-case basis. We can be as specific as possible, but the reality is that courts and tribunals have to maintain the flexibility to determine cases based on the individual facts and circumstances before them. It is important that our drafting enables that.

[David Smith (North Northumberland) (Lab)]

rose—

[Blake Stephenson]

rose—

[Anna Turley]

I will give way first to the hon. Gentleman.

[Blake Stephenson]

I want to press that point. If the Minister’s position is that she wants the starting point for tribunals to be “no weight”, then what is the harm in adding “must” to make it absolutely clear that the House expects tribunals to apply “no weight”? But then she says that she wants tribunals to have flexibility, so which one is it?

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make, but we absolutely cannot bind the courts’ hands in this situation. The reality is that they have to be flexible. We can set a very clear steer—that is on the record, in the Bill and in legislation—but it is important that we allow the courts flexibility, because their role is to establish the facts, case by case.

[David Smith]

I was going to make the same point that the Minister has just made to some degree. It seems to me that the key terminology in the clause is “no weight”. Can she say more about what that will mean in practise?

[Anna Turley]

As my hon. Friend rightly flags, “no weight” is the starting point for the weight that should be given to a person’s private or family life established in the time that they were in the UK without permission. That is a clear definition for the court. Applying the “no weight” rule to all breaches of leave could mean minor or technical breaches leave cases open to challenges of disproportionality.

Amendment 106 is in a similar vein. Although we agree that non-compliance must have consequences, it is appropriate that we distinguish between serious breaches and less significant or technical non-compliance, because we always have to have proportionality. Removing “serious” would considerably widen the provision and could require the same approach to be taken to conduct of very different gravity. The Government’s reforms already substantially strengthen the public interest side of the article 8 balancing exercise. The inclusion of “serious” helps to ensure that the reforms are focused on the cases of greatest concern.

[Blake Stephenson]

In that case, if “serious” is to remain in the Bill, will the Minister help the Committee to understand what types of scenarios might constitute serious or not serious?

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s attempts to define this, but it is important to say that we are keen not to include specific definitions in the Bill, as we are worried that they could result in disproportionate outcomes. Our approach is to be robust, targeted and, crucially, legally sustainable. We do not want to allow ourselves to be open to challenge.

[Tom Gordon]

The Minister talks about not wanting to include specific definitions in the Bill, but some stakeholder groups are concerned that the Bill does not rule out British children being subject to the child test. Would she not consider including such a provision in the Bill to ensure that it does not end up forcing a British child out of the country?

[Anna Turley]

Again, we have to look at each case on its individual merits, and we cannot bind the court’s hands in such a situation; the family rules will be taken in their entirety.

[Tom Gordon]

Can I press the Minister a little further on that point? To give a direct quote, can the Minister guarantee that no British child will be expected to leave the country of which they are a citizen as a result of this clause?

[Anna Turley]

I am not going to rule that out here in the Committee, but I can come back and clarify that point for the hon. Gentleman. My expectation is that if someone is deported, and they wish to take their child with them, they are perfectly entitled to do so. It is not for the Government to say that the child has to stay in this country, rather than moving with their family. I will not rule that out here in the Committee.

In conclusion, clause 19 tightly defines the public interest test to ensure that individual rights are properly balanced against the public interest in effective immigration control, and to eradicate the abuse that has crept into our system.

[Siân Berry]

Further to the discussion with the Minister about ensuring that victims of abuse and sexual violence are protected, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 105, in clause 19, page 17, line 3, leave out “should” and insert “must”.—(Blake Stephenson.)

This amendment would require, rather than advise, that no weight is given to private or family life established while a person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully, with leave obtained by deception or in serious breach of their conditions.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I thank hon. Members for a very full discussion of the amendments. I have a lot to respond to, so I hope colleagues will bear with me while I try to pick up on all the points and make as much progress as I can.

I think all of us in this room will share a real commitment to the clause and this group of amendments. The clause is a huge priority; it really underlines the issue of the deportation of foreign national offenders and the exemptions through which they have sought to remain in this country. As the hon. Member for Stockton West expressed, the issue causes huge concern, fear, anxiety and outrage. This is such an important clause and such important part of the Bill and of what we are trying to do.

I also put on record the Government’s commitment on this issue; that is not to make a political point, but we have deported more than 60,000 foreign national offenders since we came to power at the 2024 elections—the highest number in a decade, and 41% higher than in the previous two-year period. I say that not to make a political point, because we are in Committee, but to underline our determination and commitment on this issue, should there be any doubt, given some of the concerns raised by Opposition Members, about our absolute determination on this issue. It is extremely important to us.

Clause 20 reforms the application of article 8 in deportation cases, restoring a proper balance between individual rights and the public interest. The current framework contains different, sentence-based tests, which act as exceptions to deportation. Where a person can meet the private and family life exceptions, or the higher test, which applies for the most serious offenders, they will not be deported. That means that, in some cases, deportation can be avoided by meeting the family or private life exceptions, without the court conducting a full consideration of all factors weighing in favour of the public interest in deportation.

The clause addresses that by requiring the courts to conduct a full proportionality assessment before it can find that deportation would be disproportionate. The public interest will therefore be considered in every deportation case before an article 8 breach can be found, rather than only in some categories of case, as at the moment. Judges will be able to block deportation only in certain exceptional circumstances. The clause retains important existing concepts, including “unduly harsh”. I appreciate some of the concerns expressed by Opposition Members, which I will come to, but the concept is well understood by the courts and supported by extensive case law.

Under the new framework, showing that deportation would have an unduly harsh effect is insufficient—without further consideration—to demonstrate a breach of article 8 and will no longer be the point at which an article 8 claim succeeds automatically. That is a fundamental change. The court will now have to go on to consider whether the interference with private or family life can be justified when weighed against the public interest in deportation. The new framework establishes a clear statutory framework for assessing whether deportation will be disproportionate, requiring proper weight to be given to factors such as the nature and seriousness of the offending, the person’s immigration status, the economic impact of allowing them to remain in the UK, and the wider public interest in public safety and the prevention of disorder and crime.

The effect of the reforms is to establish a clearer and more consistent framework, in which deportation may be avoided only in truly exceptional cases. For the record hereafter, I clarify that emphasis in Committee. A person will still receive an individual assessment of their circumstances, but the courts will be required—I emphasise “required”—to give proper weight to Parliament’s view that deportation is strongly in the public interest.

Before I speak to the amendments, I will refer to some of the points made in the debate. I was asked whether the clause weakens provision for more serious offenders. No, it does not; they must still meet the same tests as other offenders, and face a proportionality test. The clause provides that the more serious the offence, the greater the public interest in deportation. Again, I will say more on that when I come to the specific Opposition amendments.

I was asked why sentence thresholds are being removed. We do not need sentence thresholds if we are going to treat all deportation cases the same. The courts can still, and indeed must, take account of sentences and seriousness of offending in considering proportionality. That is required on the face of the Bill by subsection (2) of proposed new section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire asked, why not cover family deportation under section 3(5)(b) of the Immigration Act 1971? The key point is that the exclusion of section 3(5)(b) is deliberate. Clause 20 is concerned with how article 8 is to be interpreted in cases involving the deportation of a foreign national whose own conduct has made them liable to deportation. A family member liable to deportation under section 3(5)(b) of the 1971 Act is not being deported because of their own criminality or conduct. Even if that power were used, it is appropriate that any article 8 claim made by that family should continue to be assessed under the framework set out in section 117B of the 2002 Act, rather than the deportation framework.

The hon. Member for Stockton West made a number of points. On his point about the House of Commons Library briefing, those with a sentence of over four years would previously need to establish that they meet very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions. Now they must establish that they meet an exception and that their deportation cannot be justified. We would expect such cases to fail the proportionality assessment even if they meet the exception. Our provisions enhance those deportation provisions.

I would also like to refer to some of the questions raised by the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East. He criticised proposed new section 117C of the 2002 Act. It is important to make it clear that the public interest is in deportation unless it is not justified. That is enhanced in proposed new section 117C(2) by making it clear that the more serious the offending, the stronger the public interest is. The hon. Gentleman is right that the first exception under proposed new section 117C(4)(a) means the person’s whole life, not just their adult life. That is the same as under existing law. To his points on social and cultural integration, the onus is on the applicant to establish that. Again, that is already covered in existing legislation. Caseworkers are experienced in how to deal with that and familiar with that understanding.

I want to make some more points on the “unduly harsh” test. Again, that is in existing legislation. The Supreme Court has already interpreted it extremely narrowly. On the issue of court latitude, which the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East raised, proposed new section 117C makes it clear that deportation is in the public interest and, as I have said, that the more serious the offending, the stronger the public interest will be. It is important that courts have a clear steer on Parliament’s view of public interest, and the process of the Bill will establish that. To resist deportation, someone must meet the exceptions and establish that their deportation cannot be justified in the light of the public interest. Deportation can therefore be resisted only in clearly defined and limited circumstances.

I will move on to the amendments, and I hope to provide a bit more clarity. Amendments 107, 109 and 111 seek to impose a higher threshold for deportation for foreign criminals who receive a custodial sentence of four years or more, or who commit certain more serious offences. The amendments would require such persons to demonstrate something more than meeting the private or family life exceptional circumstances test. There should be no suggestion that we are seeking to lower the threshold for foreign criminals who are given sentences of more than four years. That is misplaced.

Clause 20 amends the current deportation framework by introducing a full proportionality exercise before an article 8 breach can be found. That will ensure that the courts are required to consider and take account of the overall public interest in deportation. All foreign nationals subject to deportation will now have to meet a two-stage test to succeed in their article 8 claim. The first stage of the test requires the person to satisfy one of three exceptional circumstances tests. Where that exceptional circumstances test is met, they must also show that the interference with their private or family life rights—as demonstrated by an exceptional circumstance—cannot be justified. The second stage of the test requires a full proportionality exercise, weighing all the factors in favour of deportation.

As I have said, clause 20 specifically states that the greater the severity of offending, the greater the public interest in deportation. That is clear. It will make it less likely that the interference with article 8 rights will outweigh the public interest in deportation. We expect the courts to give significant weight to the public interest in deporting persons with long custodial sentences and those who have committed serious offences. I also clarify for the record that exceptional circumstances are not exceptions to deportation. Now, when someone demonstrates an interference with their family or private life, they will no longer automatically avoid deportation. There will be an assessment of the public interest test—

11.25 am

The Chair adjourned the Committee without Question put (Standing Order No. 88). 

Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Sixth sitting)

Anna Turley Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers]

We are trying to define something, and I think it is on us to define it. Adding “normally”—inviting them to look for the exception—is very unhelpful, particularly when proposed new section 117AA(4)(b) actually sets out the exception and gives that bandwidth for people to find exceptional cases. To write “normally” beside all these properties is to open a door, and would mean that we fail to do what we are aiming to do. That is the objective of the Bill. Amendments 99, 101 and 102 would take that word out. If the Government believe that their definition is right, let us say what it means.

Amendment 98 tackles the same problem from another angle. Under the clause, a court deciding whether article 8 was engaged must “have regard to” proposed new section 117AA, but having regard to something is not the same as following it. The court can have regard to the definition, nod politely and decide a case on a different basis altogether. Amendment 98 says that the court

“must determine that question in accordance with section 117AA.”

If Parliament is going to define family life, the court should apply that definition, not merely consider it.

Amendment 100 asks a simple question: what is a partner? The clause does not say. The immigration rules have required unmarried couples to have lived together in a relationship akin to marriage for at least two years. Amendment 100 would put that test into statute so that a relationship formed a few weeks before a removal date could not be used to frustrate it. It is good enough for the rules; it is good enough for the Bill.

Moving on to amendment 103, in proposed new section 117AA, subsection (5) says that financial dependency, illness short of needing constant care, emotional reliance or worry about relatives in a warzone do not, on their own, create family life between adults. Fair enough, but subsection (6) then says that nothing in subsection (5) stops a court considering every one of those factors at the public interest stage. Can the Minister explain what subsection (5) achieves if subsection (6) allows the very same factors to tip the balance a few paragraphs later?

I welcome Government amendment 45. It asks decision makers to look at whether contact between a parent and child has only recently been established or re-established. That goes to a real problem: relationships that come to life only when removal is on the cards. By tabling it, the Government make our point for us. If it is right to be sceptical of a parental relationship that appears just in time, it is right to be sceptical of a partnership that does the same. That is all amendment 100 asks. Clause 18 is a good idea let down by its drafting. The Government have written a definition and then handed every lawyer in the land the words to argue their way around it. Our amendment would make that definition stick.

If the Minister cannot accept our amendments, I hope that the Government will reflect before Report. I commend the amendments to the Committee.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. I thank hon. Members for their contributions this afternoon. It has been fascinating to have one side saying that we are not going far enough and the other that we are going too far. I hope that means that we are getting the right balance between what the British people wish to see and allowing for the fundamental human rights we all benefit from.

I hope the Chair will indulge me for a moment because I would like to directly address the comments from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. It was unfair and, frankly, quite insulting to suggest that we introduced the Bill to chase rhetoric. I feel very passionately on behalf of my constituents about the importance of the Bill. I know that the hon. Lady and I represent very different constituencies, but she says that there is universal support for refugees. I am sure that she, like me, is watching with horror the masked-up thugs on the streets trying to attack asylum seekers and chasing them out of their accommodation, but when I knock on doors in my constituency, people constantly raise the unfairness of people who seek to exploit our systems, processes and commitment to values like universal human rights, because they can see that those people are not genuine and that they are exploiting our generosity. While we want to fulfil those commitments, it is really important to me that the system has integrity, and that is what the Bill is about.

[Siân Berry]

rose—

[Anna Turley]

I do not mean to be rude, but the hon. Lady has had plenty of time. We can pick this up outside the Committee room, but I wanted to get that on the record.

Clause 18 introduces a definition of article 8 family life into UK primary legislation for the first time, giving courts and decision makers a more consistent framework to apply to immigration cases. Until now, courts have had to determine the existence and scope of family life on a case-by-case basis, which has resulted in significant variability in outcomes. Article 8 is a two-stage test. First, a decision maker or court must decide if family or private life exists. Secondly, where family or private life is established, they must decide whether interference with it pursues a legitimate aim, such as the interests of public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, and is proportionate when the nature of the breach is balanced against the public interest of removing an individual or refusing them entry.

It is right that article 8 acts as a safeguard to protect genuine family relationships. However, these protections can create opportunities for individuals to rely on weak or peripheral family connections as a basis to remain in or come to the UK. Clause 18 addresses this. It acts in tandem with clause 19 by setting coherent parameters for when family life can be established in line with Strasbourg case law before the strengthened public interest test is applied. It provides a clearer statutory framework for determining whether family life exists for article 8 purposes.

[David Smith]

Does the Minister agree that unless we introduce a definition of a family, the term becomes entirely subjective?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is why we have seen the extreme examples of people clearly thwarting the system to try to remain.

The clause makes clear that family life will normally concern the core cohabiting family unit while retaining provision for cases involving genuine parental relationships or additional elements of dependency. This will narrow the circumstances in which a tenuous relationship with a child, or an extended family relationship involving no more than nominal ties, can be used as the basis of a claim. It will support more consistent decision making while retaining the flexibility required. This is key to restoring order and control to the immigration system, ensuring that if someone does not meet the requirements of our rules, they will not have the right to reside here.

Clause 18 makes clear that family life is normally limited to the core cohabiting family unit while preserving flexibility for cases where family life may exist outside of that, aligned with Strasbourg case law. It also clarifies that biological parenthood alone is not enough to constitute family life; there must be evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship. For adult relatives outside the core family unit, financial support, illness, emotional support or concern about conditions overseas will not by themselves establish family life; the relationship must involve true elements of dependency.

[Melanie Onn]

Would it be the case that someone who had hitherto been an absent father would not meet the criteria in the Bill?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is exactly what we are seeking to do. We have had evidence of people moving back in with families and dependants purely on the basis of trying to put forward this claim.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

We are talking about the use of the term “normally”, but would the examples the Minister listed not fall into subsection (4)(b) anyway, meaning that the word “normally” is not required to help them get across the line?

[Anna Turley]

I am afraid that I disagree. I remind the Committee that, just because family life is established, it does not mean that an individual will automatically be able to remain in or enter the UK. Instead, all cases where family life is found to exist will also be considered at the second stage test, where the courts will have to consider whether it is in the public interest to refuse leave to remain or enter.

[Joe Robertson]

Will the Minister give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I will just explain a little bit more, and I will hopefully answer the hon. Gentleman’s point. The word “normally” is deliberate and necessary. It allows us to establish a clear and deliberatively restrictive framework in which article 8 family life will ordinarily be confined to the core family while retaining the limited flexibility required for ECHR compliance.

Family relationships, as we have said, do not always fit neatly in formal categories or involve cohabitation. In exceptional cases, a relationship outside the core cohabiting family may, in substance, be akin to one within it. “Normally” enables a court to recognise genuine family life in those limited circumstances, based on the facts of the individual case. Removing it would turn a strong presumption into an inflexible rule, which would risk the exclusion of genuine family relationships and therefore be incompatible with the ECHR, potentially opening us up to even more litigation.

Crucially, this is only a threshold test. Establishing that family life exists does not mean that an article 8 claim succeeds, or that an individual has the right to remain. It simply means that the court moves on to the next stage to consider whether interference with that family life is justified and proportionate, taking account of public interest. Accordingly, the Government do not support the amendments.

Amendment 103, also tabled by the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, seeks to remove subsection (6) of this clause, on the basis that it undermines the effect of subsection (5). I do not, however, accept that that is the case. Those two provisions address different questions: subsection (5) clarifies what cannot independently establish family life between adult extended family members, while subsection (6) preserves the fact-sensitive assessment that is required once family life is engaged.

Subsection (5) makes it clear that financial support, emotional reliance, illness and concern for someone living amid war or instability do not, when taken independently, establish the necessary dependency. Those circumstances do not, however, cease to be relevant for every purpose. If family life is established, the court must then undertake the separate public interest and proportionality assessment.

Subsection (6) therefore provides an important safeguard to ensure that, at that stage, the full factual circumstances can be considered when balancing any interference with family life against the public interest. It also protects the Home Office’s freedom to consider those factors when arguing that the public interest requires a refusal of leave.

Turning to the Government amendments, it is right that children are given additional safeguards in article 8 decision making. Given those well-meaning protections, a tenuous relationship with a child can be used by an adult to remain in the UK. The first step to prevent people from relying on weak parental links to children in article 8 claims is to ensure that the genuine and subsisting parental relationship test under this clause operates as intended.

Government amendment 44 therefore makes it clear that a parent does not normally have family life with a child under the age of 18 for the purposes of article 8 unless there is evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship. It broadens the application of the test so that it applies consistently to all parent-child relationships involving a child under 18, regardless of whether the parent and child live together. That clarifies what is relevant: the substance of the parental relationship, not simply the living arrangements. The amendment aims to reduce the scope for weak or limited parental relationships to be relied on in article 8 claims, including where cohabitation has been resumed opportunistically for immigration purposes; it does not remove protection for genuine parent-child relationships. Where there is evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship, family life will continue to be recognised.

Government amendment 45 builds on amendment 44 to ensure that the genuine and subsisting parental relationship test under the clause will have its intended effect of preventing people from relying on weak parental links to children in article 8 applications. Government amendment 45 provides additional detail on how courts and tribunals should assess whether a parent has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a child for the purposes of article 8. It sets out factors that may be relevant to that assessment, including the nature of the relationship, the duration and frequency of contact, and whether contact has recently been established or re-established. The amendment aims to promote greater consistency in the application of the genuine and subsisting parental relationship test, ensuring that courts and tribunals focus on the substance of the relationship; the amendment does not prevent genuine parent-child relationships from attracting article 8 protection. Courts and tribunals will continue to consider all relevant circumstances in each individual case.

[Joe Robertson]

What would happen if someone were living here, but their child was overseas with the other parent—they were cohabiting there, not with the parent here—but the parent overseas died? What happens to the child? I cannot see a provision by which the child can come here, because there was no core cohabiting family arrangement.

[Anna Turley]

Exactly such a circumstance is why we have provided flexibility within the Bill. The individual case will be assessed under article 8. In such a situation, there is space for that individual case to be assessed. Together with clause 19, Government amendments 44 and 45 provide a clearer and more consistent framework for determining whether removing an individual with a tenuous relationship to a child in the UK is compliant with article 8.

I will just add something on the key principles behind clause 18. The clause establishes clear boundaries for where family life exists, consistent with Strasbourg case law, providing the foundation on which clause 19’s strengthened public interest test is applied. Together, clauses 18 and 19 will ensure that article 8 is not used routinely to circumvent immigration rules, supporting a more ordered and controlled system where those who do not meet the rules are not routinely able to stay in the UK. Members have suggested that the clauses are too expansive and may widen where family life can be found to exist, but that is not correct. A recent Court of Appeal judgment reaffirmed the existing legal framework for assessing family life under article 8. Clause 18 provides greater clarity. The reforms will make clearer how family life and dependency should be assessed, promoting greater consistency in decision making and curtailing expansive interpretation of where family life can be found to exist. I had intended to talk more about the ECHR, but I shall not test the patience of the Committee.

Other points made during the debate included whether the clause was relevant or whether the courts would just ignore what we are trying to codify. Successive Governments have recognised concerns about how article 8 operates in the immigration system, but this Government are undertaking the hard work to understand the comprehensive reform required to restore order and control to the system. We are working within our international obligations to reset this balance, and to provide a more comprehensive and consistent framework to article 8 decision making. Clause 18 works alongside clause 19 by establishing the clear basis on which the Home Office can argue that family life does not exist before consideration of whether the public interest warrants a refusal of leave. Together, the clauses provide a clearer framework for how article 8 should be assessed to promote greater consistency in decision making and ensure that when considering article 8 immigration decisions, the courts place appropriate weight on what Parliament considers to be in the public interest.

In response to some of the other points made by hon. Members, the framing of proposed new section 117AA preserves the small degree of flexibility necessary for decision makers and the courts not to be constrained to determine claims made under article 8 that are inconsistent with the article. Reference was made to the definition of an eligible partner. That definition will be set out in rules and guidance; it is not appropriate to have that level of detail in primary legislation. We need to have flexibility to be able to change and respond to patterns of behaviour and abuse. One hon. Member spoke about young adults. The word “normally” in clause 18 is a caveat to preserve flexibility for young adults who have family life with parents.

I was asked for more evidential requirements; here some case studies might be helpful. The family immigration rules are intended to create a fair system that balances the important of protecting family and private life. When 71% of first-time grants are made to applicants who have arrived illegally or who have overstayed the time they are permitted to be here, it is clear that article 8 is not operating effectively. I was also asked about retrospective claims and whether the measures would impact people already in the UK. Clause 52(9) allows part 2 of the Bill to be commenced with retrospective effect; we will set out our plans for how the measures will be commenced in due course.

I was asked how the adjudicators would be able to interpret the complexity of clause 18 without legal training—something the Committee spoke about quite a lot in the first sitting of its scrutiny. Adjudicators will be properly trained, with all the safeguards that we talked about in the Committee sitting last Tuesday, to apply the new framework and immigration law. The authority will have legal support, underpinned by clauses 2 and 3 of the Bill. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asked about interference. Clause 18 is not about whether interference is proportionate—that is assessed under clause 19. The grounds for interference, such as for the effectiveness of the immigration system, are consistent with ECHR case law.

Nothing in the Bill prevents individualised decision making; we have deliberately kept that ability, and that is a clear requirement of article 8 compliancy in decision making. Hon. Members also spoke about Home Office decision making. As I have made clear throughout the passage of the Bill, we will of course continue to work to improve decision making. The reforms in the clause clarify how family life should be assessed and strengthen the role of public interest in maintaining effective immigration control, which will help to improve decision making by providing the courts with greater clarity, consistency and predictability.

On mental illness and whether that is a route, it is correct that under proposed new section 117AA(4), family life can be engaged where a person suffers a mental illness or infirmity. However, they would need to be incapacitated to the extent that they need constant care and support, and there would have to be no other viable care options. Examples in established case law include where an adult or child becomes paraplegic after a serious illness, or where an adult or child suffers from Down syndrome and is fully incapacitated. It is worth remembering that the provision is only about establishing family life, and that the decision makers and the courts will go on to consider the public interest question. I hope I have answered all colleagues’ points, and I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifth sitting)

Anna Turley Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

We continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill. Before we begin, I remind Members to switch off their electronic devices or put them on silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings. The selection list for today’s sittings is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. This shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped for debate. Members are reminded to bob and catch my eye if they wish to speak in any debate.

Clause 17

Sponsor claims

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

I beg to move amendment 130, in clause 17, page 13, line 30, leave out from “claim’” to “, at” in line 32.

This amendment and amendment 131 are consequential on the repeal of section 12 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 2006 (which was never commenced) by the Schedule inserted by NS1.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendment 131.

Amendment 94, in clause 17, page 14, line 8, at end insert—

“, provided that the Secretary of State may only designate a place by regulations made by statutory instrument and that such a statutory instrument may only be made if a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

This amendment would require the place at which sponsor human rights claims may be made to be set by regulations subject to the affirmative procedure.

Amendment 112, in clause 17, page 14, line 11, at end insert—

“(e) after subsection (1A) insert—

“(1B) Where a person makes a sponsor human rights claim, the Secretary of State must carry out safeguarding checks in relation to that person before determining the claim.

(1C) The safeguarding checks under subsection (1B) must establish, so far as reasonably practicable, whether the person making the sponsor human rights claim—

(a) has been convicted of an offence involving domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage;

(b) is subject to a relevant protective order relating to domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage;

(c) has been the subject of a finding by a court or other competent authority of conduct involving domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage; or

(d) has previously been the subject of an immigration decision in which concerns relating to forced marriage, abuse or the genuineness of a family relationship were material.

(1D) Where information falling within subsection (1C) is identified, the Secretary of State must take that information into account when determining the sponsor human rights claim and any decision relating to the family member to whom the claim relates.

(1E) The Secretary of State must consider whether the information identified under subsection (1C) indicates that the admission of the family member to the United Kingdom would give rise to a safeguarding risk to—

(a) the family member;

(b) any child affected by the decision; or

(c) any other person who may reasonably be expected to be at risk as a result of the admission.””

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to carry out safeguarding checks where a person makes a sponsor human rights claim under Clause 17.

Amendment 95, in clause 17, page 14, line 15, leave out subsection (3).

This amendment would remove the exemption of sponsor human rights claims from the inadmissibility provisions in section 80A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, to test why such claims should be treated more favourably than other human rights claims.

Government amendment 96.

Amendment 97, in clause 17, page 15, line 4, at end insert—

“(8) In section 82 (right of appeal to the Tribunal), after subsection (1) insert—

“(1ZA) An appeal does not lie under subsection (1)(b) against a decision to refuse a sponsor human rights claim unless the family member to whom the claim relates would, if they lived with the person who made the claim, be a member of that person’s core cohabiting family within the meaning of section 117AA(2).””

This amendment would confine the new sponsor right of appeal to claims relating to a spouse, civil partner, partner or minor child (or, for a child sponsor, a parent), in line with the Government’s own definition of the core cohabiting family in clause 18.

Clause stand part.

[Anna Turley]

It is good to see you again this morning, Mr Stuart, and good morning to all colleagues. We start our debate by moving on to part 2 of the Bill, which relates to article 8 of the European convention on human rights. Article 8, the right to a family life, is an important protection, but it is a qualified right. That means that it can be balanced against a public interest—such as the safety of the community or the security of our borders—where that outweighs an individual’s personal rights. We will not step away from our belief that the right to family and private life must be respected and upheld. However, we have been clear that we must strike the right balance between the rights of the individual and fairness to the UK public, and, crucially, bear down on abuse of the system.

As set out in our impact assessment, each main applicant granted first time on article 8 grounds carries an estimated lifetime cost to the taxpayer of about £141,000, equating to approximately £4.9 billion for those granted in 2025 alone. Home Office analysis suggests that 71% of first-time grants on the basis of article 8 were to individuals who had entered illegally and/or overstayed. If the same applied to the estimated 42,000 first-time grants in 2025, this would mean that 30,000 overstayers and illegal entrants would have been allowed to stay last year on the basis of article 8. Between 1 April 2016 and November 2021, of 1,011 foreign national offender deportation appeals allowed on human rights grounds, 70% were solely on article 8 grounds. And with 77,000 applications granted on article 8 grounds last year, this is having a significant effect on our ability to enforce our immigration laws.

Therefore, in this Bill, we are changing how article 8 is applied in the UK immigration system, to restore public confidence and ensure that the UK application of rights is in line with the Strasbourg court. The application of article 8 will be tightened to prevent misuse of the system and ensure that the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control carries proper weight in immigration decisions. As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has made clear, the abuse of human rights law does not just erode the public’s support for our immigration system; it erodes their support for the very idea of having such laws at all. For those who believe that those laws matter, it is essential that we reform them to end their abuse. The reforms will put more emphasis on compliance with our rules and contribution to our economy and to our society.

Clause 17 aims to bring greater clarity and control to entry clearance applications that engage article 8, protecting genuine family relationships while preventing weak or tenuous claims from undermining public confidence. Taken with the reforms in clauses 18 and 19, which we will come to in forthcoming groups and which tighten key elements of the article 8 assessment, it strengthens our ability to enforce the immigration rules and create a fairer, more controlled system.

The clause amends the definition of a human rights claim in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 to create a “sponsor human rights claim”. This will lay the foundations to allow UK-based sponsors to make an entry clearance application for an overseas family member to join them in the UK if the application relies on the sponsor’s article 8 right to family life. It will also enable the sponsor to appeal to the immigration tribunal if the Home Office refuses their application. I want to be very clear that only individuals with a specified status, including British citizens and those with other lawful residence, will be able to make a sponsor human rights claim. They need to establish a genuine family life claim and show that refusal would disproportionately interfere with their article 8 rights. These reforms do not create a new migration route or entitlement to come to the UK. They simply ensure a correct process that is based on the UK sponsor, not the family abroad.

The clause will affect sponsors who wish to rely on article 8 family life because their family member does not meet the entry clearance requirement under the family routes and immigration rules. Enabling the UK-based sponsor to apply will focus attention on the circumstances and article 8 rights of the sponsor, rather than the overseas family member. This reflects the established legal position that it is the sponsor who is within the UK jurisdiction for the purposes of article 8 decision making. The focus on the rights of the UK sponsor is intended to reduce expansive interpretation of where article 8 rights are found to exist, and to prevent article 8 becoming a route for those with tenuous family links to the UK.

Too often, the focus can be on the circumstances of the applicants abroad, whereas the main legal question should be whether there is a disproportionate interference with the family life of the UK-based sponsor.

[Melanie Onn (Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes) (Lab)]

Will clause 17 make it easier for people to come to the UK on an article 8 basis if we do not specify where sponsor human rights claims can be made?

[Anna Turley]

I thank my hon. Friend for asking a really important question, because it is right that we clarify this matter. The clause does not make it easier for overseas family members to enter the UK. Sponsors will still need to meet a very high threshold to argue successfully that it would be a breach of their article 8 rights if the Home Office refused their family member entry to the UK. Strict requirements for the procedure sponsors must follow to make an application, which will be set out in the immigration rules.

The focus on the rights of the UK sponsor is intended to reduce expansive interpretation of where article 8 rights are found to exist, and to prevent article 8 from becoming a route for those with tenuous family links to the UK. Too often, the focus can be on the circumstances of the applicants abroad, whereas the main legal question should be whether there is a disproportionate influence on the family life of the UK-based sponsor.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

As I understand it, the purpose of this new provision is to focus on the rights of the person in the UK, to ensure that their right to a family life is respected according to their circumstances. But their circumstances will be that their other family member is living abroad; that is their family life. I do not understand why that pre-existing situation would suddenly infringe their human rights and give them the right to bring in a family member. Their circumstance, by nature, is people living in two different countries.

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Member makes a really important point. That is why we are trying to narrow the definition to those who are here in the UK, because for far too long it has been on the basis of a very tenuous link that family members can put in a claim from abroad to come to the UK. This measure narrows that definition while still ensuring that we maintain our obligations under article 8 rights.

The recent Court of Appeal judgment in IA and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department provided helpful clarification around the correct tests to determine where article 8 family life exists, especially between extended family members. However, the judgment addressed an issue with article 8 family life being applied to a broader set of circumstances and relationships, which risked undermining our systems and rules. Despite these helpful findings, there remains a risk of inconsistent decision making, where the primary focus is not on the article 8 rights of the family member in the UK—the person within the UK’s jurisdiction according to ECHR case law.

The clause will add greater weight to the findings of the Court of Appeal and bring more clarity to decision making for entry clearance cases that engage article 8 family life. In IA, the Court of Appeal also reaffirmed the importance of the Government’s immigration policy when striking the right balance between an individual’s rights and the public interest.

In combination with the reforms in clauses 18 and 19, clause 17 makes it clear where the Government’s policy position lies in relation to the application of article 8 and where the Government expect the rules to be enforced. This will create a clearer, fairer and more controlled system. Details of the application process, including forms and evidential requirements, will be set out in immigration rules and supporting guidance.

Given the complexity of the clause, I will give Members an overview of each subsection. Subsection (1) creates a “sponsor human rights claim” in law by adding to the existing definition of a human rights claim at section 113 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. This has the effect of permitting a UK-based sponsor to appeal against a decision to refuse a human rights claim for their overseas family member. That is the starting point for future changes to the rules, forms and guidance.

Subsection (2) explains that further amendments are required to the 2002 Act for the clause to operate properly. Those changes are set out in subsections (3) to (7). Subsection (3) makes changes so that a sponsor human rights claim cannot be deemed inadmissible or not suitable to be considered, which is necessary because reforms in the clause mean that the UK sponsor is the applicant, not the overseas individual requiring entry clearance. As I will cover in relation to amendment 95, it would be inappropriate simply to refuse to consider a human rights claim because the UK sponsor is a national of a safe country. Such safeguards are designed to prevent improper protection claims from nationals of those countries.

Subsection (4) makes further changes linked to the fact that the clause makes the sponsor the applicant, not the person overseas. In effect, at appeal, the courts will hear all matters relating to the family member seeking entry to the UK and not include any immigration matters related to the sponsor. Subsection (5) creates an exception so that sponsor human rights claims do not need to have their appeals considered within the timeframe set out in the statute. That is because an individual will not be able to act as a sponsor if they are liable to deportation action.

Subsection (6) prevents a sponsor human rights claim being certified and denied an appeal simply because the UK-based sponsor is entitled to live in a safe state, primarily European countries. That would not be a fair application of the power where a right to family life was being relied on. The clause does not prevent a claim being refused and denied an appeal where the matters under consideration are clearly unfounded, for example because the relationship was a sham. Subsection (7) ensures that sponsor human rights appeals are not treated as abandoned or cancelled because the UK sponsor holds permission to be in the UK. Instead, an appeal is abandoned if the overseas family member is granted leave to enter or remain in the UK.

[Melanie Onn]

The Minister mentioned sham relationships. Will she clarify who will be eligible to act as a sponsor?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. Basically, anyone who is a British citizen will be eligible to become a sponsor, I believe. Forgive me, I did not want to mislead her by getting the wrong answer, but yes, I was right: individuals with specified status in the UK, including British citizens, settled persons and those with certain other lawful residence will be able to make a sponsor human rights claim. They will need to establish a genuine family life claim—we will talk about that in more detail in the following clauses—and show that refusal would disproportionately interfere with their article 8 rights. As I said, the reforms do not create a new migration route or entitlement; they simply ensure that human rights claims for those who are settled British citizens, settled persons and those with residence here are raised and considered through the correct process.

I thank the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire for tabling amendment 94. It would enable the Home Office to designate a place only when a sponsor human rights claim can be made via statutory instrument subject to the affirmative procedure. The Bill does not require the definition of a designated place to be the subject of regulations, as there are currently no plans to specify the geographical place from where such claims can be made. The focus of article 8 is on whether the individual in the UK making a sponsorship claim has a strong enough claim, not where the family is based. That is because a UK-based sponsor will be expected to make their claim through a paid-for online application. We will use the immigration rules to specify the procedures that applicants must follow to make a sponsor human rights claim. That will allow us to go into the necessary level of technical detail, while retaining flexibility to make changes as we implement the new application process.

[Ben Goldsborough (South Norfolk) (Lab)]

What is interesting about the subsections that the Minister has gone through is that one of the huge problems we face is the judicialisation of British law, where we see interpretation because the law has been too loose. Will she explain how the steps that we are taking will rein those powers back into the sovereignty of Parliament, so that we have more control and can represent our constituents on the issues that they care about the most?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend gets to the exact heart of what we are doing with this legislation. Through the build-up of the legal framework, we have been guilty of over-interpreting Strasbourg law. By codifying what we are doing, through this Bill, we are ensuring that we are not going over and above that but are simply complying with our international obligations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Melanie Onn]

Does the Minister have any thoughts about what the fee structure might look like?

[Anna Turley]

That is an important point. I will be delighted to provide more evidence as we go through due process. We must make sure that they are proportionate and do not push people into poverty, but it is important that we are charging people a fee where they are bringing family members to this country under article 8. For the reasons I have set out, the Government do not support the amendment.

Amendment 112 would require the Home Office to carry out safeguarding checks on individuals who make a sponsor human rights claim and that any information uncovered in these checks is considered when the Home Office determines that claim. I thank the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) for raising the importance of safeguarding vulnerable migrants, particularly children and victims of domestic abuse, in this amendment. It is a really important issue and one that will be fully considered in the design and implementation of the application process for sponsor human rights claims. As clause 17 simply paves the way for changing how an entry clearance application relying on article 8 family life can be made, we do not believe this level of detail is required in the primary legislation.

The immigration rules already contain safeguards to protect children coming to the UK to join family members who could put them at risk of harm. However, we will fully consider if additional safeguarding requirements are necessary as we develop the procedural requirements for sponsor human rights claims in the immigration rules, because an important point is made through amendment 112. This is a safeguarding proposal that we would support in principle when the application process is designed. I hope that hon. Members are reassured that our support for the principle is on the record through this Committee.

[Ben Goldsborough]

I would be keen to hear the Minister expand on the issue of safeguarding particularly for victims of domestic abuse and domestic violence. Can she expand on the action the Government will be taking to protect people from that heinous crime?

[Anna Turley]

Absolutely. We will of course come on to talk about modern slavery and so on later in the Bill. Protection for vulnerable people is at the heart of what this Bill is about.

Where a UK-based sponsor is young or vulnerable and unable to complete an application, they can give permission to someone else to enter their details, but for those who are vulnerable overseas, existing safeguarding measures are already in place to identify any indicators of coercion, exploitation or trafficking. We will of course consider how these measures can be further strengthened to enhance the identification and management of risk, but our approach ensures that vulnerable individuals are protected while maintaining the integrity of the system, through ensuring the rights of UK-based sponsors are the focus of entry clearance decisions that engage article 8.

We feel that a blanket rule to prevent individuals who have been convicted of these criminal behaviours would not be compatible with the EHCR, which necessitates an individualised assessment, but we are keen to make sure that safeguarding requirements are done through the immigration rules to protect anyone at risk of domestic abuse from their sponsor.

[Melanie Onn]

I want to press the Minister on this point. I am quite taken with amendment 112, and some of the issues to do with sponsors it raises are incredibly serious. I hear the Minister’s comment about not being explicit in primary legislation, but will she explain in simple details, for my understanding, how we will ensure that nobody convicted of an offence involving domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage will be able to be a sponsor for the purposes of article 8 claims?

[Anna Turley]

I share my hon. Friend’s view. When I saw this amendment, I thought the principle was really important. When we come to write the immigration rules, we would absolutely want to make sure that it is at the heart of them. We would not ever want to see someone convicted of domestic violence, anything to do with child protection or any of the issues outlined in the amendment ever being a sponsor to bring anybody into this country. I hope that the Committee is reassured by my placing all of that on record: when the immigration rules come to be written I would hope and expect to see that at the heart of them, with those protections in there.

[Joe Robertson]

The Minister says that her provision on the core cohabiting family member has been restricted by this definition to tackle the issue of people coming into this country. Can she tell us how many people are currently in the UK with a core cohabiting family member outside the UK? What is that figure so we can understand at least the potential pool of applications?

[Anna Turley]

I cannot give the hon. Gentleman the figures that he asked for. I gave some initial examples at the start of my introduction about the volumes that we are dealing with. Some 77,000 applications were granted on article 8 grounds last year. We know that 71% of the first-time grants on the basis of article 8 were to individuals who had entered this country illegally and were overstaying. We are keen that this issue forms a core part of the reforms.

[Joe Robertson]

Could the Minister perhaps provide that figure, either later on this morning or this afternoon, for how many people are in the UK with a cohabiting family member overseas as of today?

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I can absolutely undertake to provide as much information as I can to the Committee on that issue. We may not know how many children somebody has in another country. Unless they have put in an article 8 claim, we would not necessarily know about their family members, so it may be a little difficult for us to predict that. However, I can undertake, and give my commitment to the Committee, that we will do our best to get as close to a figure as we can and to provide that to the Committee.

To continue on the rationale for opposing amendment 112, we already have safeguarding measures in place across the immigration system to identify indicators of coercion, exploitation and trafficking. We will consider whether these measures can be further strengthened to improve the identification and mitigation of risk. Our approach ensures that vulnerable individuals are protected while maintaining the integrity of the system by ensuring that the rights of UK-based sponsors are the focus of entry clearance decisions that engage article 8.

Clause 17 does not exempt human rights claims from the general certification power in section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which applies irrespective of whether the claimant can reside in the listed safe countries. That means that we will be able to prevent appeals by certifying human rights claims that are bound to fail. Although it may be relevant to consider whether the UK-based sponsor is able to reside with a family member abroad, that will be done as part of the substantive article 8 assessment.

[Melanie Onn]

Will the Minister confirm whether clause 17 will be the way that people who have refugee status are expected to sponsor family members?

[Anna Turley]

As I set out at the beginning, it will be those who have a settled status. My understanding is that those that have a settled refugee status will be able to apply. Again, I can get confirmation for my hon. Friend on that point.

Amendments 95 and 96 taken together would mean that sponsor human rights claims can be made inadmissible or certified as clearly unfounded in the same way as other human rights claims. Applying section 80A or section 94(3) of the 2002 Act to sponsor human rights claims would preclude, in many cases, a substantive assessment of the claim if the sponsor were a national of, or able to reside in, any of the safe countries listed in the Act. In most cases, it would not be reasonable to refuse to consider a sponsor human rights claim fully, just because the sponsor making it was able to reside in one of those safe countries. For that reason, the Government cannot accept amendment 95.

As the Committee will be aware, I have tabled amendments to part 3 of the Bill to insert a new schedule that provides greater clarity on the Government’s approach to the core protection model. We will debate those amendments and the new schedule later in Committee.

[Dr Zubir Ahmed (Glasgow South West) (Lab)]

As a matter of record, it is important for my right hon. Friend to outline why the amendments and new schedule have been tabled now and why they were not included in the original Bill. I know my constituents take a keen interest in this matter, as my constituency has one of the highest amounts of asylum seeker housing in the country.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

My understanding is that it was recognised that we want to use this opportunity to ensure that the security in this process is as firm as possible, and we obviously have a fair amount of work to undertake to do that during the swift passage of the Bill. It is about ensuring that this Committee has the opportunity to consider the amendments and new schedule and that they are brought in at the right stage of the Bill. Some of these things take time, but we are keen for the Bill to close as many loopholes as possible.

Without the introduction of new schedule 1 by the Government, amendments 95 and 96 as originally put forward would have the effect of making the nationality of the UK-based sponsor dictate how a sponsor human rights claim was considered. That would also impact British citizens who are dual nationals, even when they were born in the UK and/or are British from birth if they also hold another nationality that is on one of the safe country lists.

Amendment 95 would mean that a British citizen who was born in the UK to British citizen parents but who also has citizenship of an EU member state, for example through their grandparents, would have an application to sponsor a family member to join them in the UK under article 8 declared inadmissible. Ireland is an EU member state and is therefore included within the existing section 80A inadmissibility provisions. That currently means that if an Irish citizen claims asylum in the UK, the claim is declared inadmissible and not substantively considered, but amendment 95 would mean that if an Irish citizen, resident in the UK, sought to sponsor a family member to join them in the UK, relying on article 8, that would be declared inadmissible. In contrast, a British citizen who holds no other nationality, or a citizen of a non-EU country or a country not on the section 80A list who is settled in the UK, would be able to sponsor a family member and rely on article 8 of the ECHR.

The Opposition originally introduced amendment 96, which would have meant that the nationality of a sponsor would dictate whether any article 8 claim would be presumed to be clearly unfounded. Instead, the Government have adopted the amendment, which now removes the exemption for human rights claims, but does so because, within the new schedule 1, it has also repealed the reference to human rights claims in section 94(3) altogether. That means that the nationality of a person will continue to dictate whether there is a presumption that any protected claim that they make is clearly unfounded, but nationality will not create any presumption in respect of non-protected human rights claims.

The Government’s position is that the designation of any country as safe should, quite rightly, relate to protection claims and that article 8 claims based on family or private life will always be person-specific rather than place-specific—a very important difference. The test to clarify the refusal of any claim remains that, without substance, it is bound to fail. That test applies to any claim made by a person of any nationality. Government amendment 96, in conjunction with new schedule 1, does not change the test for certification, but merely removes any presumption of certification for article 8 private or family life claims based on nationality. Government amendments 96, 130 and 131 are consequential and will support the model that the Committee will examine shortly.

Amendment 97 would limit appeal rights to the immigration tribunal to sponsors whose article 8 claim relates to a member of their core cohabiting family, as defined in clause 18. The Government do not think that the amendment would be appropriate. ECHR case law is clear that family life is usually confined to, but can exist outside of, the core cohabiting family.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joe Robertson]

I have it right in front of me. I think the wider points have been made. The hon. Member is obviously desperate to make the decisions that a Chair would ordinarily make. Maybe one day she will be elevated to the position of chairing a Committee. If she would like me to repeat everything I have said, I will be happy to do so in this afternoon’s sitting.

I am slightly reluctant to stop now, because it looks like I have wilted in the face of an intervention from the Government Benches, but I had come to the end of my contribution. I hope I have made my point, even if it is not agreed with.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Members for Mid Bedfordshire and for Isle of Wight East for their very thorough comments. For me, this absolutely explains the benefit of line-by-line discussion of a Bill. There have been important challenges and critiques, and I will do my best to answer as many as I can—I think the shadow Minister must have had more than 20 or 25 questions; I will endeavour to write to him and the Committee on any that I accidentally overlook.

I really appreciated the statements from the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East, but I think my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes was right: he did stray into clause 18, which we will come to this afternoon. I took note of his views and look forward to responding to some of those later.

There is a lot to cover, so I will do my best to race through it. We will have a longer conversation this afternoon about the ECHR, so I will not pre-empt my comments on that. I do want to push back on the accusation that the legislation will not make a difference. At the moment, we have a free-for-all. Courts are basically over-interpreting Strasbourg. There is no real codification in this country of what the right to a family life means, and we are seeing a huge number of cases, as we have discussed. The point of the Bill is to ensure that our provisions will be no different to the position under Strasbourg but will realign the domestic position, because we are currently being far more generous than our international obligations require. I think the Committee can agree that it is important that we do not over-interpret what Strasbourg suggests.

I appreciated the challenge from the shadow Minister about the 2014 Act and not reinforcing any previous errors, but the Government provisions reflect more up-to-date case law, which was not captured by that 2014 Act—for example, the weighting provisions, which will apply to all of family life. I hope, and am sure, that we will have more success than the 2014 Act had.

[Melanie Onn]

The Minister refers to the UK having gone above and beyond its requirements in relation to Strasbourg law. In bringing us into line and not overextending ourselves, I wonder whether there are any other countries with which we could compare ourselves, in terms of where we will find that line and alignment. That might assist us in understanding how this process will work in practice.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate my hon. Friend raising that point. We have become a country with pull factors that have encouraged people to this country while asylum claims have been going down across Europe. Ours have not been going down at the same pace, and I think our over-interpretation of some of the Strasbourg laws has been a pull factor. So I appreciate her raising that.

I have quite a lot to plough through, so I apologise if there is not a coherent thread to some of these answers. I will try to respond as quickly as possible to as many of the questions as I can. I remind the Committee that, just because family life is established, that does not necessarily mean that the individual will automatically be able to remain in or enter the UK. All cases where family life is found to exist will be considered at the second-stage test, where the courts will have to consider whether it is in the public interest to refuse leave to remain or enter. We will come to the issues that were referred to about mental illness and so on this afternoon, but I am trying to make the point that the partner will still need to meet those substantive tests.

On the family circumstances that we discussed, the vast majority of people seeking to bring a partner will have to meet the rules. That means minimum income and English language. The example that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East gave almost certainly would not meet the bar of a successful article 8 claim, unless there were extremely exceptional circumstances.

On the hon. Member’s point about volumes and numbers, I am struggling to understand what he is asking me to do. Anyone in this country who has a family member outside the UK could put in an appeal for this. There is absolutely no way we could know whether anyone in this room may have a child, a dependant or anyone in another country; that is simply not evidence or information that this country would keep.

[Joe Robertson]

If the Minister’s position ends up being that there is no data, I will take that. To be clear, I am asking for the data of people residing in the UK who have a family member who is not a British citizen and who has no right to be in the UK, be they a spouse, civil partner or child. If it is the case that we simply do not have that data, obviously I will accept that, but the question remains on the table.

[Anna Turley]

I completely appreciate where the hon. Gentleman is coming from, because I know he wants to get a sense of how many people could and would apply, but it would be impossible for us to know without knowing the family circumstances of everyone in the country. What we can do is best extrapolate from the applications that have been made as to whether they would fail or pass our new tests. I reassure him that it will be a high bar; the majority will be refused if they and their overseas family members do not meet the rules. Article 8 is a safeguard—that is what the Bill maintains—not a gateway.

The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, referenced the publishing of the modelling. He referred to the representative sample of 3,252 article 8-related applications. That is an internal sample that has not been published due to personal data sensitivities, but I commit to write to set out our data on article 8 for the Committee.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I am afraid I still cannot find the updated impact assessment, either on the website, by email or on the table in this Committee Room. I would very much like to see the new information that the Minister referred to yesterday.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate that. I believe the updated impact assessment has been published, but I will double-check. If it has not been published on the website, I am sure that the Clerks or someone in administration will be able to deal with that.

I want to draw out some of the figures from the impact assessment. There is to be an additional 3,600 removals a year. We have tried to be realistic and transparent in the impact assessment. We say that there will be 11,700 additional refusals a year. When applied to the net lifetime fiscal cost per applicant, 11,700 applicants would cost the taxpayer more than £1.7 billion, which is a considerable amount. I am sure hon. Members can understand why we are trying to do what we are doing through the Bill.

We took a deep-dive cohort analysis to examine the representative sample that I mentioned of 3,252 article 8-related applications. That was to support our policy development. I am afraid that further details of the cohort analysis from the unpublished internal sample will not be available due to personal data considerations, as I mentioned, but I appreciate the importance of further analysis. I have noted that, and we will bring that to the Committee.

A question was asked about what assessment has been made of the potential merits of disapplying the Human Rights Act to immigration matters. I remain committed to ensuring that our broader human rights framework is fit for the challenges of today, but there are currently no plans to amend the Human Rights Act. We do not have to withdraw from the ECHR—I will discuss that further this afternoon—or disapply the Human Rights Act to create meaningful reform. We are reviewing our approach to ECHR implementation within the immigration system; that is the intention of the Bill.

Articles 8 and 3 address different harms and legal thresholds. We do not expect the reforms to generate an increase in successful article 3 claims. There will be no new rights or entitlements that will make it any easier for people to apply. Indeed, we are codifying the restrictions in the clauses we will discuss this afternoon. Sponsors will still need to demonstrate a very high bar for their family to be able to join them in the UK on the basis of article 8.

The Government are keeping under review whether and how to commence the inadmissibility provisions in section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which amended section 88 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2022 to include human rights claims. However, those provisions would not be applied to sponsored human rights claims, as in most cases it would not be reasonable to declare a claim inadmissible just because the sponsor could reside in one of the listed safe countries. Clause 17 can be commenced without that, and we can write to Members further with the details.

MOD Bicester and Illegal Migrants

Anna Turley Excerpts

Wednesday 14th October 2026 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

I thank the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Joy Morrissey) for calling this debate. I place on record my thanks to all hon. Members in this House who have engaged with me in the few weeks since I took on this role about asylum accommodation in their constituency. It is really important that we continue that powerful dialogue, including with you, Madam Deputy Speaker; you have engaged with me often on this issue, and I appreciate that engagement.

I particularly thank the shadow Minister because I really do welcome this opportunity to update Members on the Government’s work to fix our country’s broken asylum system. The system was in a state of absolute chaos and disarray when we took office two years ago. We are dealing with the legacy left by the hon. Lady and her team today. I will shortly come on to the action that we are taking to restore fairness, order and control, but it is really important to put any debate on asylum in its proper context, and that means recognising the situation that we inherited. It was this Government who picked up the pieces after the general election, following years of inaction and ineptitude. There has been mud-slinging, finger pointing and blaming from the Opposition today, but we are getting on with fixing the mess, and fixing the flow that the Conservatives allowed. The hon. Lady referred to their 14 years and our two years; I look forward to setting out in my speech the difference between those 14 years and the last two years.

In 2018, about 300 people arrived here by small boat. In the years that followed, an entire criminal industry built up along our borders, on the Conservatives’ watch. Ruthless smugglers sent people on dangerous, unnecessary and—far too often—fatal journeys, making a fortune in the process. The consequences of all this are well known in the House, but they bear repeating. Between January 2021 and June 2024, 110,000 people came here by small boat. Meanwhile, the asylum system ground to a halt. Decision making collapsed, leaving thousands in limbo for years at the taxpayers’ expense, and so did the return of those with no right to be in the UK, while a further 175,000 people claimed asylum by other routes. As the numbers rose, so did the cost to the taxpayer. In just a single year, spending on asylum support under the Conservative party was £4.7 billion. That is an incredible cost to the taxpayer—money that we could and should be spending on the other priorities we debate in this place.

[Chris Murray]

Over the last two years, we on the Home Affairs Committee have looked into the cost of this to the taxpayer. Does the Minister share my outrage that huge amounts of public money have gone to private companies, some of whose owners entered The Sunday Times rich list while our communities suffered? Does she also agree that the author and signer of those contracts was the right hon. and learned Member for Fareham and Waterlooville (Suella Braverman), on the Reform Benches?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend makes an extremely important point. Under the last Government, £9 million a day was spent housing people in 400 asylum hotels. That was costly and inefficient. The evidence has shown that it was part of the draw that people knew they could come here and be put in a nice hotel. It was one of the pull factors that we are trying to deal with and tackle today. As we have heard, all we had in response to this people smuggling on an industrial scale was the farce of the Rwanda scheme, in which £700 million was spent on sending four volunteers to Rwanda.

[Dr Murrison]

The Minister is talking about Rwanda, but she did not give the scheme a chance to generate results. On day one, the previous Prime Minister, Sir Keir Starmer, canned it, without any prospect of it showing demonstrable results. Looking back, does she think that was wise?

[Anna Turley]

I do not know how much good money the right hon. Gentleman wants to throw after bad, but £700 million on four volunteers was an incredible waste of money.

The British people have a natural sense of fairness. We are a nation that has benefited from centuries of facing outwards towards the world, both reaching out across the globe and welcoming people in. There can be barely a Member here who does not have some historical migration in their family, or family ties to other nations. The British people will always accept those who are genuinely fleeing peril. They will welcome those who come here legally and who contribute. They know we are a place where people can come to build their life and aspire to do great things. Even this House, its representatives and their stories reflect that; we have seen that in the last week or so.

However, the British people will not accept chaos at our borders. They will not accept a lack of control over who comes in. They will not accept the unfairness of a broken system, in which those who break the rules are the ones who benefit from our welcome. Nor will they tolerate expensive and often iconic hotels across their communities being used to house asylum seekers at vast expense to the taxpayers.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Anna Turley]

I will make a bit of progress, if I may.

The British people will not tolerate illegal migrants placing pressure on our public services, while efforts to remove them are frustrated. There is no quick fix, but the task of ending the chaos and, crucially, of restoring fairness falls to this Government, and we embrace it. It is only a Labour Government who will fix the broken system, restore control at our borders and bring back fairness to our public services. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for South Northamptonshire (Sarah Bool) is chuntering from the Opposition Benches, but I am coming to the exact subject of our progress so far, which I hope she will see contrasts nicely with what happened in the previous 14 years.

[Alan Gemmell (Central Ayrshire) (Lab)]

I thank the Opposition spokesperson for this debate today, but can I also say how grateful I am that the Minister for Border Security and Asylum, my right hon. Friend the Member for Redcar (Anna Turley) is in her place? More than 20 years ago, she and I worked in the Home Office, where we inherited another Tory mess on asylum. With a great Home Secretary and a brilliant team, we reduced the backlog, made appeals much more difficult and made the country a much safer place. Will she bring some of her experience from 20 years ago to this job, after the mess the Tories left have us?

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate my hon. Friend drawing attention to that. It was a privilege—in, I think, 2003—to work for the now Lord David Blunkett to close the Sangatte refugee centre, put juxtaposed controls on French shores and end the situation of people coming through as clandestines in the back of lorries with the Bill that we took through at that time as civil servants. It was a privilege to play that role. Here we are, yet again, fixing the legacy of the previous Government.

As I said, the British people will not tolerate illegal migrants placing pressure on our public services while efforts to remove them are frustrated. It is only the Labour Government who will fix the broken system, restore control and bring back fairness, but we will do so without performative cruelty, without the deliberate fomenting of grievance and without destroying our international reputation. Thanks to the action the Labour Government are taking, the picture today is improving, with crossings down, removals up and the system now finally on a more stable footing.

Over the last two years, this Government have acted to restore fairness and control to our asylum system, first by taking the fight to the criminal gangs and bearing down on illegal crossings. One of the first steps the then Home Secretary took following the general election was to establish Border Security Command. The command has had a significant impact, especially in its efforts, alongside a strengthened National Crime Agency, to ramp up law enforcement action on organised immigration crime.

[Dr Mullan]

Did the Minister reflect on what the National Crime Agency said about the need for a deterrent? What assessment has she made of how effective the Australian approach to third-country processing has been in bringing down its crossings?

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman raising the point about deterrence. It is extremely important but, as I said, the Rwanda deterrent was not effective. [Interruption.] Millions of pounds and a handful of volunteers. It has been disproven and clearly did not have any impact. I will come on to the deterrent that is actually working.

We have also given our agencies counter-terror style powers via the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025. In the last financial year, organised immigration crime was disrupted on over 3,700 occasions, up by 46% over the same period. This includes organised immigration crime arrests, which were up 74%, as we took down the criminals behind this vile trade. For example, just in June, two men became the first to be jailed under the new “endangerment at sea” offence for piloting dangerously overcrowded small boats across the channel—that is a deterrent, that is working. We are also denying gangs the equipment and infrastructure they rely on. In May, an operation involving the National Crime Agency and German, French and other international partners seized more than 30 boats, over 20 engines, 360 pumps and more than 9,000 life jackets. Since entering office, we have seized over a total of 1,100 boats and engines.

[Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)]

I thank the Minister for giving way and for setting out her arguments. I am just wondering whether she will actually come on to Piddington and the impact on the residents there—we have people in the Gallery today. This issue is about the impact on women and girls there. I would be interested to know how many Ministers have actually been to Piddington and spoken to the residents themselves directly.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the hon. Lady. Of course, I will come on to Piddington—that is the content, the subject and the title of this debate—but it is really important to understand the people we are talking about having to house, how we are having to house them and the issues we are dealing with. I am proud of the steps we have taken to reduce that number so that we can hopefully reduce the number of people dependent on asylum accommodation as we go forward.

In partnership with French law enforcement, we have now stopped more than 50,000 attempted channel crossings. As a result, small boat arrivals are down around 40% on last year and asylum claims are down by 20%—real action, real results.

The task of responding to large-scale movements of people is one that we share with many Governments across the globe. It is, without question, one of the defining challenges of our age and to meet it we must work with source, transit and destination countries alike. That is why the Government have made it a priority to strengthen our co-operation with a range of international partners, striking new agreements and strengthening existing partnerships.

Just last month, the Home Secretary signed an agreement with her Belgian counterpart to intensify UK-Belgium co-operation and tighten the net around criminal gangs behind small boat crossings. We are taking our partnership with France further, following the new deal signed in April. French boots on the ground have already increased by 24% and a further 50 specialist officers will now be deployed on high-risk red days when conditions indicate crossings are likely, doubling the size of the current unit. First, by disrupting the movements of goods and infrastructure, tackling the gangs across borders and working with our international partners, we are reducing the flow of people heading towards our borders. Secondly, as the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle (Dr Mullan) flagged, we are addressing the pull factors that fuel illegal migration, and we are enforcing the laws of this land.

To live in this country is a privilege, but it comes with responsibilities. When people abuse our hospitality, staying for longer than they are entitled to or committing criminal offences in our communities, the public rightly expect every effort to be made to remove them from British soil. That is why the total failure to remove illegal migrants and foreign offenders in the years before the general election was so damaging, and why the Government are putting right the wrongs of the past.

[Sir John Hayes]

The Minister is of course right that international co-operation matters in terms of dealing with these things, particularly channel crossings, but the point made earlier was that where countries refuse to take back their nationals who have committed crimes here, we should take further action, should we not? Part of that might be cutting aid or dealing with visas, as has been suggested. There are all kinds of other levers that can be used by Government to tell those countries, “You’ve got to take them back, because they’re not our responsibility and we’re not going to pay for them any more.”

[Anna Turley]

I think we are in danger of having a rare moment of cross-party consensus and agreement, because that is something the Government are already taking many steps towards. We are looking at visa enforcements. We have already had a number of successes on that front and will continue to use that, because where we see countries refusing to take people back, we have those levers within our power and we are using them.

[Dr Murrison]

Would the Minister like to look at the way the previous Government dealt with illegal Albanian migrants? It was hugely successful, yet this Government do not appear to have learnt any lessons from that. They are persisting with allowing illegal migrants to remain here indefinitely without any realistic prospect of being returned, and there is no meaningful pressure on Governments, particularly Pakistan, to take people back.

[Anna Turley]

I am afraid that one moment of consensus has already broken down. I disagree. We are undertaking a range of consultation and engagement on measures with those partners. The Albania agreement was important, but the Home Secretary is making a number of arrangements, and we look forward to announcing them. I hope hon. Members will be patient with us, but I look forward to making more announcements in the weeks and months ahead.

[Dr Mullan]

On that point, will the Minister give way?

[Anna Turley]

I am going to move on. Forgive me.

We have driven up removals to the highest level in a decade—an important point to stop and reflect on—because of the progress we are making, with 80,000 individuals returned since the general election, including immigration offenders, people in the country illegally and foreign criminals. We know, too, that the ability to melt into the illegal economy too often lures people here, so we have raised illegal working enforcement to record levels.

As we rebuild our shattered asylum system, we are also lightening the burden on local communities. The Government committed to ending the use of asylum hotels within this Parliament and we will do so. Two years in, we have already emptied one in three, reducing the hotel population by 50% in the last year and by 71% since the peak under the previous Government. We have cut asylum costs from hotels by £1 billion. That is £1 billion that we can spend on the other priorities of the British people and I think that that should be recognised.

We have made significant progress on the chaos we inherited two years ago, but we know there is more to be done to restore fairness to our asylum system: fairness for genuine refugees, who deserve our sanctuary and wish to contribute to our society; and fairness for British citizens, our constituents, who shoulder the current burden in their taxes and in their communities. That is why we continue to work relentlessly at home and abroad to prevent people from coming here illegally in the first place, dismantle the criminal networks that facilitate dangerous and unnecessary crossings, remove those who break our laws and have no right to be here, and ensure that this country maintains its proud tradition of helping the world’s most vulnerable people where it can, but in a secure and orderly way through new safe and legal routes.

That is why we have introduced the new Immigration and Asylum Bill. It will cut the asylum backlog by making decisions faster and fairer, close loopholes so that those with no right to be here can be rapidly removed, and ask those who have benefited from public support to contribute to their costs where they are able. I thank the Members who are currently scrutinising the Bill in Committee.

I turn now, as the hon. Member for Chester South and Eddisbury (Aphra Brandreth) implored, to the issues around MOD Bicester. For too long, the way in which we house asylum seekers has not been fair. Billions of pounds have been spent putting them up in hotels, while communities have seen those hotels, often at the centre of their towns or cities, become a symbol of a broken asylum system. Areas where housing costs were low and that already felt left behind were asked to bear more than their fair share, which has been a source of anger and frustration for many people—and understandably so.

As well as reducing the backlog, we are working with local authorities on a fairer distribution of asylum seekers across the country. That means ending the use of costly hotels, and instead, moving asylum seekers into more appropriate accommodation.

[Greg Smith]

Will the Minister give way?

[Anna Turley]

I am going to make some progress, because I have detained the Chamber a little too long.

That appropriate accommodation includes former military sites, which are basic, safe and self-contained by their nature. As I have said, that approach has already saved the taxpayer £1 billion. But, of course, we recognise the concerns of certain communities.

While the Home Office has submitted a planning application to use the MOD Bicester site for asylum accommodation, no final decision has been made. As part of that planning process, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government provided members of the public and local organisations an opportunity to give their views, ensuring we can fully understand the impact on the local community. I want to pay tribute to the campaign in Piddington. It has been an incredibly imaginative and forceful democratic campaign, which I recognise and respect.

There are many facets to the process and a lot of different considerations to take into account, but I am clear that public safety is and always will be at the forefront of our thinking. If the site is taken forward, there would be specialist security onsite 24/7, supported by CCTV. Everyone must sign in and out, and we would work closely with the police, the council and other local organisations to address concerns.

It is important to note that this is not the first proposal of its kind. Similar sites such as Wethersfield have operated for years with no evidence of any significant increase in criminality attributable to the operation of that site. In fact, in September this year, the chief constable of Essex police confirmed that crime linked to the Wethersfield site is very low, and that there is no reason for the public to be concerned about possible criminality in the area associated with the site.

I emphasise that I fully understand the important desire of Members across the House to press for what they see as the best outcome for the areas and people that they represent. That is their democratic duty, and it is right that any Government are held to account for the decisions that they make. At the same, it is the duty of Government to act in a way that reflects the needs of the whole country. The approach we are taking is in the national interest, and it is the fairest way to restore order and control to our asylum system: ending the use of hotels; reducing the numbers in the system by addressing pull factors; removing those with no right to be here; and opening safe and legal routes, underpinned by community sponsorship, so that those with genuine claims can come to this country in an orderly and controlled way.

Finally, I will address the reference in the Opposition motion to the European convention on human rights. As I have set out, removals of those with no right to be in this country are at the highest level in years. That is thanks to the work that this Government have done and continue to do. But there is much more to be done. The idea that leaving the convention is the way forward is not born out by reality. Not only is it unnecessary to restore effective control of the immigration system, but it would be counterproductive given the risk of undermining crucial co-operation with European partners—something we are already dealing with as a consequence of Brexit.

Let us be clear: the convention delivers for people in this country too. It guarantees their right to privacy, a fair trial, free speech—permanent privileges that cannot be chopped and changed. In an increasingly dangerous and uncertain world in which conflict and cross-border crime present shared challenges, a close relationship with our European allies has never been more important. It is for those reasons that we remain committed to the ECHR and those relationships.

Of course, commitment does not mean complacency. This Government have worked hard to listen to the concerns of the public with respect to the ECHR and the immigration system. That is why our focus is on reforming the domestic application of article 6 and restoring the proper balance between individual rights and public interest. The UK is proud of the role that we played in drafting the convention, and now it is our responsibility to ensure that it is strong and relevant for today’s world. That requires honest conversations and continued evolution, not turning our backs when it matters most.

We have ahead of us what I expect will be a wide-ranging debate. I conclude by recounting the central facts about our record. Crossings: down. Asylum hotel use: down. Removals: up. Order and control: returning at last. [Interruption.] The right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp) has chuntered from a sedentary position for a while, but I remember that when he was in the Home Office his Government began the use of many similar large sites, such as Wethersfield. [Interruption.] I am just reminding him that Wethersfield was opened under his watch.

Let us remember the “why” as well as the “what.” The reason underlying all that we have done, are doing, and will do in this area is fairness—fairness to those in genuine need of sanctuary from tyranny, conflict and persecution; and fairness for the British public, who rightly expect their Government, not criminal gangs, to determine who can come to this country, and who expect asylum seekers to be fairly housed across the country. Fairness is the principle on which our progress to date has been built, and the work continues relentlessly.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

Unfortunately, the Front Bench speeches went on for quite some time, so Back Benchers will begin with a six-minute speaking limit. I call on the Liberal Democrat spokesperson also to respect the amount of time that we have for the debate.