Voting by Prisoners

Debate between Baroness Burt of Solihull and Chris Bryant

Thursday 10th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Chris Bryant]

Indeed. Perhaps consideration should also be given to the role of the Committee of Ministers. It has not thus far been able to play such a part, despite often applauding critical interventions by Ministers following Court decisions.

[Lorely Burt (Solihull) (LD)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Chris Bryant]

I will give way to the hon. Lady, but then I really must make progress.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lorely Burt]

I am extremely grateful.

A moment ago the hon. Gentleman was advancing a compelling argument, supported by Members on both sides of the House, about the enlightened way in which the European Court of Human Rights has been able, through its legislation, to change people’s idea of what is right and of morality. Does he not agree that if we pass the legislation that will give prisoners voting rights, in another 20 years that idea may prove just as unpalatable as some of the other measures introduced by the Court?

[Chris Bryant]

I have a problem with the position adopted by the Liberal Democrats since the general election. I should be happy to hear their arguments in favour of the substantive issue. Let them put the case, and put it convincingly, rather than hiding behind the process and the European Court. It would be quite nice to hear the Deputy Prime Minister say a single word on the subject.

Let me turn to the Court’s decision in Hirst v. the United Kingdom that the blanket ban on prisoners from voting contravenes article 3 of protocol 1—a decision which, I should point out, was not unanimous, and was not supported by the then Swiss President of the Court, Professor Luzius Wildhaber. The problem is simple. As is stated in the report of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, published yesterday,

“however morally justifiable it might be, this current situation is illegal under international law founded on the UK’s treaty obligations.”

Clearly, as some have already suggested today, we could tear up our treaty obligations. I believe that would be wrong in principle and foolhardy in practice. For the UK to leave the Court would be fatally to undermine its authority. It would be to abandon much of Europe to precisely the same disregard of human rights as was evident when the Court was founded, and for British industry and British citizens living, working and doing business across the continent, that rule of law, enforced through the right to petition the Court, is vital. Alternatively, we could seek to reform the Court, steering it away from trying to be a form of supra-national supreme court and quasi-legislature.

It may be that today’s motion could help in that process, as the Attorney-General has suggested. After all, the Court asserted that

“there is no evidence that Parliament has ever sought to weigh the competing interests or to assess the proportionality of a blanket ban”.

It was wrong on that, although there have not been many debates on the matter, but I think that is because there was unanimity in the House rather than because Members did not have a view on it. Following today however, a robust vote from this House will make it impossible for the Grand Chamber to maintain that claim.

The third course of action open to us is to enforce the Court’s judgment, and here there is another problem. While the Grand Chamber maintained that a blanket ban on all convicted prisoners was disproportionate, it also argued that

“Contracting States must be allowed a margin of appreciation in this sphere”

and that

“the margin in this area is wide.”

Subsequent judgments, not least those referred to by the Attorney-General of Frodl v. Austria, Py v. France—which he did not refer to—and Greens and M.T. v. the UK all point in different directions. In particular, Frodl v. Austria seems to suggest putting a new gloss on the Hirst interpretation, while Greens and M.T. v. the UK appears to be rather more lenient in its approach and allows a greater margin of appreciation.

The key question is: how wide is the margin, or how much wriggle room do we have? We know there are wide variations in European practice on prisoners’ voting. In Belgium, four months is the length of time, whereas in some countries the ban on voting can continue after the imprisonment has ended. That is why I wholly agree with the dissenting opinion of Professor Wildhaber and others in the Hirst case when they say

“the legislation in the United Kingdom cannot be claimed to be in disharmony with a common European standard.”

They said that because there is not a European standard, and it is therefore difficult to see how the courts could enforce in this direction. What is the absolute minimum the Government would have to do in order to appease the Court?