National Security (State Threats) Bill

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 30th June 2026 Lords Chamber

Just because we cannot bring ourselves to accept that China is our enemy does not change the fact that China, Russia and Iran view us as exactly that and act accordingly. Taken together, the amendments in this group take the fight to our enemies, including non-state actors and media organs. These amendments strengthen the Bill by optimising its effect and, crucially, its message. Surely, at a time when the credibility of the free world has rarely been so undermined by its own leader in the White House, demonstrating to our enemies and our friends that we are determined to be on the front foot in addressing both state and non-state threats has never mattered more. That is why the amendments in this group deserve our support.

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, I will remark briefly on the excellent intervention by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and others, on the sleeping crocodile and toothbrushes. I ask the Minister to say, in summing up, why it is so very difficult for the UK Government to be extremely firm with China on the issues we are discussing today, which involve vast trampling on international norms and human rights. China itself has made it clear that if it wishes to continue trade with the UK, it will do so. China acts in its own best interests. No matter how firm we are on other issues, if it is in China’s interest to trade in toothbrushes or whatever, it will continue to do so. I do not understand why the Government are so reluctant to build and publish a strategy that is extremely and overtly firm regarding the kind of transgressions we are discussing throughout this Bill.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I regret that I was unable to take part on Second Reading owing to a long-standing family commitment, but I am very grateful on behalf of both the Liberal Democrats and many others for the Minister’s engagement with us before Second Reading and since. It has been extremely helpful, and his Bill team have been extremely helpful. The fact that most of the issues we face are now resolved owes a great deal to that commitment.

As was made clear at Second Reading, we support the aim of the Bill, in the light of the advice given to the Government by Jonathan Hall KC that further legislation is needed to enable appropriate action to respond to damaging activity by foreign state actors, as opposed to private bodies, that is prejudicial to the United Kingdom’s security and national interests.

We also understand the urgency of the Bill and the reason why it has been taken, effectively, as emergency legislation. However, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Alton, that the degree of hurry and the haste overall have, sadly, reduced the amount of scrutiny we have been able to give it. The speed does not obviate the need for Parliament, and this House in particular, to give the Bill as much scrutiny as it can in the limited time available. But we do so in the light of the Government’s commitment, given in the King’s Speech, and to which my noble friend Lady Ludford referred, to introduce legislation to tackle the growing threat from foreign state entities and their proxies and to improve the country’s defences against cyber security threats. The Minister has mentioned those again in recent days, and we therefore accept that this Bill is not the end of the story in relation to those commitments, and that its structure requires further development to respond adequately to these ongoing, complex and ever-changing threats.

In this group I will add only briefly to my noble friend Lady Doocey’s careful and comprehensive explanation in her speech on Amendment 5—to which the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and I have added our names—of the dangers of artificial intelligence and superintelligence. Such developments would enable artificial intelligence and superintelligence systems to exacerbate foreign power and foreign state threats. Were Amendment 5 to be passed, they would be specifically subject to the National Security Act. The amendment addresses the particular threat of hostile or potentially hostile foreign state actors and their proxies developing and exploiting these new systems, which are capable, as my noble friend Lady Doocey said, of wreaking untold damage to our national infrastructure and our economic and military interests.

The extent and forms of such damage, the scope of the threats proposed and the potential shape of future attacks are unforeseen and unforeseeable today—and therein lies a great part of their danger. The dangers outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, to our academic life and our universities are all exacerbated by the growth of AI and ASI alongside them. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, in a lighter moment, said that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, had frightened her; well, she has frightened us all, and rightly.

Until this morning, we found the Government’s response to this amendment slightly inadequate. However, following our meeting yesterday with the Minister, the Government have given a strong indication that they recognise the development by foreign powers of highly advanced AI systems that pose risks to our cyber security and our national security. The Government will therefore seek and take into account the views of the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation as to whether amendments to our legislation are necessary to redefine power threat activity accordingly.

That undertaking goes a long way towards meeting our objective. However, I am keen to see—and I hope the Government will add to this—the involvement of others going wider than the independent reviewer. For all that he is widely respected, his term is in any case due to end shortly. But real expert input in this area is necessary, and the Government need to take advantage of it. I would be keen to know that the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament is to be consulted on this issue, and it should have the remit to consult with wider experts on AI development as needed.

As to the need for further legislation on this issue, we need look no further than the statement issued by our Five Eyes allies, including the leaders of our National Cyber Security Centre, on 22 June—only last week. The statement was headed, “The AI shift in cyber risk: why leaders must act now”. It made the urgency clear:

“While AI will help us improve cyber defence over time, it also accelerates the speed, scale, and sophistication of cyber threats.


Frontier AI models are anticipated to exceed current industry expectations, fundamentally transforming both offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. The timeline is not years, it is months”.


This is a threat to take seriously, and we underestimate it at our peril.

National Security (State Threats) Bill

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 23rd June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness D’Souza (CB)]

My Lords, I think this is the first time ever that I have followed the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, and I am delighted to do so.

I begin by thanking the Minister and his officials for meeting some of us and going through the Bill in detail. I welcome the Bill, as so many others do, but continue to believe that there is a lack of clarity on some important issues and that this may result in unintended consequences—a very well-rehearsed phrase in the context of this debate. The points that I would have wished to make have been eloquently reiterated by many of your Lordships, notably my noble friend Lord Anderson, so I am going to cut to the chase in a minute, although I would add that some of the points that have been made repeatedly are so serious that they bear repetition.

My main concern remains the danger that humanitarian organisations could fall foul of a future law that forbids supporting or assisting a designated body or obtaining material benefits from such a body. As we have heard, designated bodies could include emergency assistance and/or development aid bodies, peacebuilding bodies and demining organisations which deal with sensitive material—as indeed does Inter Mediate. These entities regularly communicate with foreign government departments that are likely, under the terms of the Bill, to be designated. One example given by the Norwegian Refugee Council concerned a tax rebate rightfully owed to it by the Iranian Government.

Another concern is the stringent bank requirements surrounding the sending of funds to dubious foreign government departments—which, again, we have heard from many different Peers. The banks, which have a low risk threshold, as is the case with suppliers, donors and trustees, have made it increasingly clear that they do not accept verbal assurances and demand explicit protection to be on the face of the Bill.

The Home Secretary in the other place cited new Section 17B(6)(b) as providing the necessary protection. She assured the House that anything that has been approved by the UK would not be caught and urged humanitarian organisations to talk to the FCDO—which they already do, at length and frequently. However, the Bill as it stands does not make it clear what exactly will be covered or how such an arrangement could be confirmed or sought. Emergency responses require licences, if operating under current sanctions, that necessarily take time: for example, humanitarian action following the earthquake in Myanmar in early 2025 took over a year to negotiate, by which time most people affected by the earthquake had either not survived or had recovered.

Furthermore, any doubts about the legality of communications with designated bodies will have if not a chilling then certainly a delaying effect on humanitarian action—which the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, referred to—and on the transfer of resources. No trustee of a charitable organisation will be happy to risk the reputation of a charity, or even legal action, unless there are clear terms of engagement. Moreover, the courts, if it got to that stage, would not be bound by the Explanatory Notes, which are subject to interpretation.

The Bill targets state bodies, and this implies that whole ministries could well become designated: for example, the interior ministry of a country subject to severe UK sanctions such as Iran. Humanitarian organisations of many different kinds necessarily have to deal with ministries to obtain official agreements to operate in a country, and to receive licences and work permits. These take time and, should a humanitarian organisation be refused permission and subsequently make an application to the Secretary of State to exercise his or her power under Section 33A to remove the designation status, this would take even longer, with no guarantee that the Secretary of State would find in the organisation’s favour.

Again, the Minister in the other place, responding to this concern, cited the “prohibited purpose” clause, which has been discussed and which serves as an additional safeguard that protects legitimate conduct, in that it requires any conduct to be prejudicial to the safety or interest of the UK—although it is not necessary for the individual involved to know that a body is designated for the offence to apply, which seems somewhat odd.

I trust that the Minister accepted our concerns at the meeting that we recently held and undertook to look again at the Bill following its completion in the other place. However, the Bill remains unamended, and our concerns have not, so far, been fully addressed.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness D'Souza]

387C: After Clause 161, insert the following new Clause—
“Amendment to the Sentencing Act 2020 to introduce public interest compensation orders(1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.(2) After section 133(b) (compensation orders), insert“, or(c) to make a payment to one or more relevant organisations for public interest or social purposes (“public interest compensation order”).(2) In this Chapter, “relevant organisation” means an organisation listed in Schedule 5A (relevant organisations for public interest compensation orders).”(3) After section 135 (making a compensation order), insert—“135A Public interest compensation orders(1) When convicting a person of a relevant offence, the court shall consider whether to issue a public interest compensation order, and what the terms of that order should be.(2) In this section “relevant offence” means an offence listed in Schedule 5B (relevant offences for public interest compensation orders).(3) The Secretary of State may by order amend the relevant offences listed in Schedule 5B.(4) In determining whether to make a public interest compensation order against an offender, the amount to be paid under such an order, or to which relevant organisations the payments should be made, the court must, in addition to the factor in section 135(3), have regard to—(a) the rights of victims of human rights violations (inside or outside the United Kingdom) to receive effective reparation and remedy,(b) the fact that individuals who are not proven to be direct victims of the offender’s offence may nevertheless be victims of human rights violations to which the offender’s offence is related,(c) the broader impact of the offender’s offence on victims of human rights violations in the United Kingdom or in other countries, (d) where there is a large number of victims of human rights violations to which the offender’s offence is related, the urgency of victims’ needs (which may vary depending on the harms that they have suffered),(e) where the relevant offence is an offence under regulations imposed under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, the purposes of the relevant regulations and any human rights violations arising in connection with conduct that these regulations seek to discourage, and(f) whether it would be appropriate to make another type of compensation order and, if so, whether the offender has sufficient means to pay both orders, as well as the need to prioritise compensation to direct victims of the offender’s offence.(5) If the court considers issuing a public interest compensation order, the court may (but is not required to) ask the Secretary of State to recommend the relevant organisations to which the funds subject to the order should be paid and if the court makes such a request—(a) the Secretary of State shall, within 90 days (the “relevant period”), recommend to the court in writing one or more organisations to which the funds subject to the order should be paid (the “recommendation”) and in doing so, the Secretary of State must have regard to the same factors as under subsection (4) above;(b) the court may issue a public interest compensation order after the earlier of—(i) the court having received a recommendation, and(ii) the relevant period having expired;(c) if a recommendation has been made within the relevant period, the court may take it into account in issuing a public interest compensation order but shall not be bound by it.(6) The court may direct that confiscated funds be paid to a relevant organisation subject to such conditions as it considers appropriate.(7) The Secretary of State may by order amend the organisations listed in Schedule 5A and the Secretary of State shall review the organisations listed in Schedule 5A at least annually.(8) If, under subsection (5) above, the Secretary of State recommends one or more organisations that are not listed in Schedule 5B, the organisations recommended by the Secretary of State shall be considered relevant organisations for the purposes of the public interest compensation order at issue.(9) For the purposes of this section, a court may issue a public interest compensation order regardless of whether there is a direct connection between the offender’s conduct and the harm suffered by the ultimate recipients or beneficiaries of the public interest compensation order.”(4) After Schedule 5 (Breach, revocation and amendment of reparation order), insert the following new Schedule—“Schedule 5ARelevant organisations for public interest compensation ordersThe following organisations—The Trust Fund for Victims, created by the Assembly of States Parties in accordance with article 79 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.The Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, established within the framework of the Council of Europe by Resolution CM/Res(2023)3, or any successor body or attached fund. The United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture, established by the United Nations General Assembly through resolution 36/151 of 16 December 1981.”(5) After Schedule 5A (Relevant organisations for public interest compensation orders), insert the following new Schedule—“Schedule 5BRelevant offences for public interest compensation ordersThe following offences to the extent that they are offences under the law of England and Wales—Offences arising under regulations imposed under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to amend the Sentencing Act 2020. It would allow the courts to award compensation orders not only to individuals but also for public interest or social purposes, thereby enabling the proceeds of confiscated criminal assets to be more readily used to compensate victims of offences under the UK’s sanctions legislation.

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, in the absence of the noble Lord, Lord Banner, I shall move the amendment, although my defence of it will be less than perfect, given that I have only just seen it. However, I must first thank the Minister for having kindly organised a meeting between the noble Lord and officials at the Home Office in order to discuss the Bill. That was extremely useful and important.

I support the Bill and am trying to find quickly the reason why I support these amendments. They would enable the courts to award compensation to public interest companies instead of simply to victims. The current mechanism is that, in the case of sanctions in particular, the moneys recovered from sanctions, which can often be substantial, go straight to the Government. Admittedly, it is important that the Government have resources in order to strengthen enforcement mechanisms, but it seems to me somewhat unfair that the victims do not get a look in in terms of compensation when, after all, the sanctions have been devised in order to protect victims and, indeed, reward them. Although we recognise that compensation is not always monetary, it is important that there is official acknowledgement of the wrongs that have been done to them.

The fact that the courts cannot enable the money derived to go to public interest compensation is an anomaly that I think needs to be corrected. One of the reasons for that that the Minister gave in the meeting, which, as I mentioned, he kindly set up, is that it would be difficult to determine who was a victim and what sort of compensation was necessary or just, simply because the number of victims of aggression, particularly in the context of conflict, is huge, wide and difficult to determine. The Government are concerned that the right money goes to the right victims. That is acknowledged, and it is a very important point.

However, Redress, which has drafted many of the amendments on this aspect of the Bill, has pointed out that there already exist relevant organisations that can receive funds for victims, including the Trust Fund for Victims, which was created by the Assembly of States Parties, in accordance with Article 79 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. There is also the Register of Damage, for damage caused by the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, established within the framework of the Council of Europe by resolution or any successor body or attached fund. There is also the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture, which was established by the United Nations General Assembly through its resolution of 16 December 1981. It is also worth pointing out the relative ease that Ministers and the Government would have in keeping a register of those organisations that receive compensation funds and monitoring them.

In essence, it seems just and fair that the victims of aggression, particularly in the area of conflict, and those it is eventually agreed should receive compensation, should in fact receive that money; it goes to the Government—the Treasury and other sources within government—in order, as I have said, to strengthen the enforcement mechanisms. I entirely agree with that, but I am not sure that all the money should go there; some of it should be set aside for the victims. Again, I stress that the reason for this is that, although sanctions are set up to retrieve funds meant for the victims, the fact is that the victims do not always get this money. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I am especially grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, for moving this amendment on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Banner. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lady Goudie for speaking in support of the noble Baroness.

As the noble Baroness and my noble friend know, I arranged a meeting for the noble Lord, Lord Banner, to discuss these matters with Redress. Both attended, as did other Peers, including the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool. I set out then, as I did in Committee, the rationale for the Government’s position in relation to these amendments. I should say to my noble friend Lady Goudie that, although today I will restate the Government’s position, which is not to accept the amendments, we always keep these matters under review and will continue to do so.

The compensation of victims is an extremely serious issue and something that we take seriously. Last time out, in Committee, I laid out the UK’s various mechanisms for victim compensation; I will not repeat those now, in the interests of time. In his amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Banner, raises this issue in the context of Russia’s war with Ukraine. I appreciate the continued support of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for the approach that has been tabled today, but, if I may, I shall speak to this amendment in the context of where the noble Lord, Lord Banner, was, I think, coming from. I acknowledge the support for the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel.

The noble Lord, Lord Banner, has spoken to me on many occasions about the need for wider community compensation, rather than just for individuals, in the context of the war in Ukraine. I affirm this Government’s support for Ukraine. Indeed, the UK is already one of Ukraine’s largest supporters and donors, providing significant financial aid alongside working with international partners to support Ukraine as much as possible. The UK has already committed £21.8 billion, of which £13 billion is for military support, £5.3 billion is for non-military support and £3.5 billion is for UKEF cover; there is also an ongoing commitment to provide £3 billion annually either for as long as it takes or until 2030-31. We are also supporting, along with the G7, loans backing profits belonging to Russian sovereign assets in the EU, as well as the interest on those assets being put towards Ukrainian interests.

Therefore, there are a number of issues on which we are fully supportive and where we are using resources to meet the objectives of the noble Lord, Lord Banner. However, I say to him and to those who have spoken in favour of the amendment today that, given the limited number of cases to which these amendments would apply, they would create only a minimal impact on the people of Ukraine. I suggest that it would be better for us, in the initial stages, to focus our efforts on the larger international mechanisms for compensation, in line with our international partners, which provide far greater funds. I have pointed in particular not just to the UK’s direct taxation commitment but to the G7’s $50 billion ERA loan, which is backed by interest generated from Russian sovereign assets in the EU and the UK.

I understand the noble Baroness’s support on this issue. I particularly understand the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Banner, around this matter, as well as his desire to help and support our friends in Ukraine; I completely share that desire. However, following the rationale that I have laid out, I suggest that this would be best done through the current mechanisms of government, not through these amendments. I will keep all matters under review but I feel that these amendments would distract the UK—and, indeed, our partners—from the core principle of supporting Ukraine, particularly in this time of great need. I ask the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, to withdraw Amendment 387C.

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister as always for his response and for the support that the Government are providing, particularly in Ukraine after the Russian aggression. I still feel, however, that the definitions within the Bill of “victim” and “loss” are too narrow and indirect victims are clearly not eligible. We all know that there are many tragic indirect victims of war crimes. It is very likely that there will be more sanctions to come and that there will be further need for victim compensation. At present, there are 2,500 Russia-targeted sanctions. The Government still retain most of the proceeds of these.

Nevertheless, I hear what the Minister has said about keeping this under review. Given the fact that I do not think these amendments have been properly addressed by me—although they have by the Member opposite and by the Opposition Front Bench—I will not press them. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 387C.

Amendment 387C withdrawn.

Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 14th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, this is a small but very important Bill. Most of the important issues it raises have already been spoken to by noble Lords, but some of them bear repetition.

To my mind, this is yet another Bill that, depressingly, seeks to make indents in our constitutional, judicial and democratic rights. The Bill, as we have heard, overturns the presumption that court orders take immediate effect. Clause 1 gives the Government of the day the power to overrule the court’s decisions by ignoring court rulings that have found the Government’s actions to be unlawful.

In brief, the Bill will deny citizenship to individual cases which the courts have already ruled eligible for further appeal. This denial persists until the last of all possible appeals have been exhausted, and as again we have heard, in some cases this may amount to years. Individuals awaiting appeal, and especially their children, are vulnerable, in that, in whatever conditions they find themselves, they are precluded from consular or any other protections.

In effect, this clause renders individuals stateless, and their children open to all kinds of other abuse, including forcible recruitment to armed militias from the age of 12, and/or to compulsory training camps, as happens in northern Syria. UK citizens in northern Syrian camps, for example, have already languished awaiting a court decision, and in some cases face life-threatening conditions. The Bill, given its retrospective mandate, will add years to their detention and render their children, some as yet unborn, vulnerable for years to come.

The purpose and the outcome of the Bill, to quote from a recent Reprieve briefing, is

“to prevent individuals from exercising their rights as British citizens even after the courts have ruled their deprivation unlawful, purely to maintain the Home Secretary’s unchecked ability to exclude them from the UK—however grave the abuses to which they risk being exposed”.

As we know, again, there was an attempt in the other place to introduce an amendment by Kit Malthouse, which proposed, among other elements, that a judge would be able to determine that an order had no effect during the appeal period if the individual faced a substantial threat of harm due to the order. This might be because such an order would adversely affect their ability, for example, to mount an effective defence, and/or the duration of the appeal period was excessive due, perhaps, to actions or omissions by public authorities.

Current levels of deprivation of citizenship in the UK are already very high and— again depressingly—disproportionately affect those from ethnic communities. The Home Secretary’s authority is considerable, in being able to issue an order to deprive a person of his or her citizenship on the basis simply that a person’s presence as a citizen is not conducive to the public good. There is no requirement, as far as I can tell, for judicial oversight, nor is the targeted individual necessarily informed of such a decision. Challenge at this stage is virtually impossible, as decisions are made under secret proceedings. Moreover, the current appeals system is lengthy, complicated and expensive, and certainly not easily accessed by those outside the UK.

This Bill is unnecessary. I hope very much that the relevant clauses will be challenged in Committee to ensure a more equitable, democratic and transparent procedure.