King’s Speech

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Wednesday 8th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I too will miss Lord Judge keenly. He was so wise and encouraging, and such fun. I wish we had longer, because I would like to pursue the important point made by the noble Lord, Lord Patten, about casual racism, but I will not at this moment.

We have become accustomed, particularly in home affairs, to legislation being used to send messages. It does not always mean that something will be done, although inflammatory messages do something in themselves —they inflame. I hope—not in vain, I hope—that in this Session we will see the Government focus on walking in the shoes of those whom their legislation and messages affect.

I want to mention something that is unlikely to get any other mention today. There is a growing rhetoric about the need for the police to focus on “fighting crime”. I am not suggesting that it is not important to prevent and reduce crime. Of course it is. However, whether it is appropriate to do so by creating new offences or for the Government to tell the courts precisely what penalties to impose is another matter. The rhetoric sometimes includes the suggestion that, for the police to be effective and productive, some issues should be removed from the policing agenda or at any rate downgraded.

I must declare an interest. I am on an advisory board for the charity Missing People. We are worried that it would be all too easy for a policing response to someone going missing to slip down the agenda. There seem to be rumours to that effect. When someone goes missing, a lot of people—particularly that person’s family —are affected, so this is relevant to the topical issue of trust in the police, as well as important in itself.

The police are the only agency that has particular powers, resources and skills to find missing people and help them to safety. More than a thousand people died while missing in 2021-22; deaths have increased by 40% in the past five years. Missing reports are often related to crime, either as a cause or because the person is victimised while away. This is very stark in the case of children: so many are victims of sexual and criminal exploitation. For adults, missing can be an indicator of exploitation, trafficking, modern slavery, or a warning sign of escalating domestic abuse. I do not suggest that responsibility lies with the police alone, but the police are in a very particular position. All public services face huge pressures, but we must not introduce policies which allow vulnerable people to fall through the gaps by reducing the policing response, or that design people out of support. Success in this area may not grab the headlines, but that does not reduce its significance. I thought the Minister would be asked dozens of questions today. I am not sure that he has been yet, but mine is to ask for an assurance that he has heard this point.

As with so many situations, it is essential to address the underlying causes of criminality, which goes as well for something which is not criminal such as homelessness. This is something that the Justice and Home Affairs Committee, which I chair, is currently looking at in respect of community sentences—the noble Lords, Lord Beith and Lord Blunkett, have trailed this. It is welcome that this has risen up the Government’s agenda, and I hope we can encourage better use of community orders. In “better”, I include tailoring the order to the individual offender whose real need is mental health, or substance abuse treatment, or education, and supporting them to the point where a chaotic life can be sorted out. This requires treatment to be available, and probation officers in sufficient numbers and with sufficient experience. This should be the lens, not just a way to reduce the prison population.

The committee recently met Claire Waxman, the victims’ commissioner for London. She said:

“There is a misconception that all victims want really long sentences for their offenders and that is all they are calling for. Actually, many just want the offenders to stop, and to be reassured that no one else will be harmed by that individual”.


Vera Baird, who was the national Victims’ Commissioner, talked about how victims, who are also often witnesses, are treated as almost incidental:

“The existence of the adversarial system … means that the focus is on the defendant”.


She went on to say that victims need to be told

“that they are a valuable citizen and that the nation cares about them”.

I am glad that the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, is speaking today, with her role as interim or new Victims’ Commissioner—I do not know how to describe her position because I certainly do not want to call her a retread. She will speak for many of us when she reminds the House, as I am sure she often will over the next few months, that the Victims and Prisoners Bill must not let prison policy eclipse the interests of victims. No doubt the Bill will be a principal focus for the House in the legislative programme.

Prison Capacity

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Tuesday 17th October 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I fully agree that there needs to be close interdepartmental co-operation in dealing with this difficult issue.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, there are many reasons why community sentences may be far preferable to custody, but they do not come without cost. They are more complex than

“cleaning up our neighbourhoods and scrubbing graffiti off walls”,

in the words of the Statement. I think the Minister agrees that services for treatments to address the mental health and addiction problems of many offenders, generally provided by the third sector, must be properly resourced, widely available and centred on each individual. The Justice and Home Affairs Committee of your Lordships’ House, which I chair, has heard evidence of their underfunding alongside the overloading of the Probation Service, which is very reliant on inexperienced staff. Can I urge the Minister and the MoJ to have consultation with the treatment providers? I commend to him the quite detailed written and oral evidence which has been given to our committee.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I am sure the evidence before and the conclusions of the committee will be borne well in mind.

Illegal Migration Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 3rd July 2023 Lords Chamber

Once more, Amendment 152 is essential to most other protections which your Lordships propose. As for Amendment 153, I believe Clause 54 to be a negotiating position on the part of the Government, who are trying to negotiate with the Strasbourg court to improve the fairness of the Rule 39 jurisdiction. This speech was two and a half minutes long, and I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Ludford, who is unable to be here today, has her name to these amendments so I am speaking on her behalf, as it were, and on behalf of these Benches.

I make the general point that interim relief is an intrinsic and sensible part of our law. Injunctions are generally to prevent something happening, to maintain the status quo until there can be thorough consideration of a case. It is that way round because the person who wants to prevent that something happening is at risk of an action which would have a major effect on him—the other way round does not work in the same way. In this case, the action—removal from the UK —would effectively be the end of the story for the claimant and, if not that, it would at least make pursuit of claim from outside the UK very difficult indeed. That is quite different from the depiction we heard last week of a witness on a video link from another room or another building with all the normal support and access to his representatives.

This afternoon, I received an email from the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law—I stress “Bingham” and “rule of law”; noble Lords will note that title—with quite a long summary of a report on this subject which I understand is to be published tomorrow. It concludes that although improvements could be made to the process in the European Court of Human Rights, they do not affect the court’s jurisdiction to indicate binding interim measures. It makes the point that, when states signed up to the European convention, they expressly accepted that:

“In the event of dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall decide”.


So as not to detain your Lordships from making another trip to increase your steps through the Lobbies this evening, I will not read the whole of the summary. However, I make the point that the UK Government have proactively promoted the binding force of interim measures, advocating that other states, such as Russia, treat them as binding and comply with them. Given the provenance of that advice, I take it—and I hope your Lordships take it—very seriously.

[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

My Lords, I hope that the Minister when he speaks in a moment will explain what this is intended to deal with. It is only specific to these circumstances; is it that a certain number of lawyers are making a certain amount of money and he thinks that that is not helpful to the policy that the Government intend to put forward?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Bach, who moved this amendment with great skill. I am not going to make a long speech in support of him, because he does not need it. My observation, from refugees and asylum seekers whom I have met in a particular role during the last year, is that many complain that the legal advice they were able to obtain locally, wherever they were placed, was often not accurate, and they had to go through a second round of legal advice.

It is essential that people have access to competent, accurate and correct legal advice, or at least legal advice that might be correct, to enable them to challenge the case made against them. Many of the cohort of people we are talking about are numbed by the experience they have had. They did not expect to be treated as they have been by the United Kingdom. Perhaps, as the Government claim, one might argue that there are some good reasons for their being treated in that way, but to deprive them of the most basic legal advice will cause offence not only to lawyers in your Lordships’ House but to many others.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Ludford has put her name to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, which he explained very fully, and these Benches support. One often hears that immigration law is too complex for non-lawyers to understand—I have long held the view that it should not be—but, frankly, it is too complex for many lawyers as well. You need to be a specialist, and that is recognised by the system, but one still hears some horror stories.

The realities of legal advice for anyone in detention in the immigration system have long been bleak. There may be advice sessions but they are 30 minutes long, and it takes a long time for the client to be brought to meet the solicitor, which eats into the 30 minutes. Even with the most articulate client, it can take quite a long time to take instructions. I was a practising solicitor for many years and this cohort, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said, consists of individuals whose English may be inadequate. Interpretation is therefore required, which is cumbersome and difficult for everyone. In any event, they have a story that takes support to tell, and that requires a lot in the telling.

Given the relentless speed of the processes under the Bill, this amendment is very necessary. The Government have recognised that legal aid has a place here, given what they have done so far in the Bill and the consultation on the rates. Raising concerns about legal aid became even more relevant with last week’s impact assessment, which drew attention to the problems of accessing legal aid and legal aid services, especially outside London and the south-east. We are very happy to support this amendment.

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, I am a Member of this House whose memory of legal aid probably goes back to before others were here. I was called to the Bar in 1963 and took an active part in legal aid, being not only a recipient of legal aid cases but sitting on legal aid committees. I view it as one of the great social achievements of the Labour Government ending in 1951, and it has been a matter of great sadness that its extent and benefit has been so diminished over the years.

We have here a very important need for legal aid. Most if not all of those needing legal aid will not be able to speak English, will have no knowledge of English law and will be left isolated without that assistance. For that reason, I strongly support the amendment of my noble friend Lord Bach—although, most regrettably, he is not putting it to a Division.

Illegal Migration Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I support these amendments and the speeches that were just given. I want to make two points only. First, it is extraordinary to me that Schedule 1 shows a list of countries with which this country has no agreement. I cannot understand how one can put into primary legislation a list of countries with which the Government hope to have an agreement, when that is not yet happening.

Secondly, I spoke earlier, at greater length, about the unaccompanied child who comes to the age of 18. Your Lordships have only to think of a child of 10, and we know that some children of 10 have come through. With any luck, a child of 10 will not be kept in Home Office accommodation; he or she is likely to go into the care of a local authority under the Children Acts and will very likely be fostered. It is comparatively easy to be fostered at 10. The child would have spent eight years at an English school, would have grown into speaking English, probably forgetting his or her own language to some extent, and will be settled.

Immediately after the age of 18—subject to the Home Office’s inordinate delays in removing people, but assuming that it achieves something better in the future—he or she can be removed and will go to a country. At the moment, there is only one, unless the child is Albanian, when they would have gone back earlier. That child aged 18, just grown up, will find him or herself in a country the language of which they probably do not speak and he or she will know absolutely nothing. I hope your Lordships agree with me that that, quite simply, is cruel.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I return to the terminology in general. I had tabled amendments in the last group on Monday night, which was a very big group. I could not find a polite way of describing drafting that I regarded as very poor. I resorted to saying that I thought it was

“not a very imaginative way to describe a situation”.

The Minister responding said that the term “in general” is

“not new: it is the test set out”

in legislation of 2002. He continued:

“Including a country in Schedule 1 simply requires the Secretary of State to be satisfied that it is considered generally safe”.


He then said that “the individual”—and noble Lords are absolutely right to remind us that we are talking about individuals, not amorphous cohorts of people—

“would still have the opportunity to challenge their removal”.

Later in the debate, when a similar point came up again, the Minister said:

“This is going to be a matter for the judicial process—through the appeal process, the legal advice and the legal representation that these people have. If they can show serious and irreversible harm, then they will not be sent to these places”.—[Official Report, 5/6/23; cols. 1216-35.]


Having criticised the terminology in general, given that the opportunities to challenge Home Office decisions in 2002 were considerably more than are presented in the Bill, I would like a detailed understanding of the Minister’s explanation of using the processes available.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

55: Clause 7, page 9, line 36, at end insert “and,
(c) the Secretary of State has published guidance regarding what criteria will be used to determine the order in which individuals who the Secretary of State is required by section 2(1) to make arrangements for removal will be removed from the United Kingdom.”Member’s explanatory statement
This is a probing amendment regarding the process the Home Secretary will put in place to determine the order in which individuals will be removed from the UK once the duty to remove is in force.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, Clause 7 relates to further provisions about removal. I have three amendments in this group. Amendment 55—I apologise for the grammatical error in it—would require the Secretary of State to publish guidance about the criteria for the order in which individuals are to be removed. It is not likely to be a tidy process and, as we have been debating for two and a half days now, an awful lot of people will be involved.

Therefore, as much transparency as possible about the process is required. For instance, will decisions be taken on the basis of how long individuals have been detained compared with others, where they have been detained, the receiving country, a mixture of all of these, or none of them? On Monday we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, about a woman who had been waiting for 10 years—sadly, not that unusual a situation. The people who will be subject to these provisions are left not knowing what is going to happen to them. The lack of certainty is, to my mind, a cruelty among many others. To know not just that the decision is unfavourable but when its implications are going to be felt in the form of removal, as distinct from detention, will be very relevant.

Amendment 55A probes the process of notifying the Secretary of State under Clause 7(3)(b) regarding a suspensive claim, that the individual P

“does not intend to make a suspensive claim”

and proposes that that can be made through an immigration officer. I assume that that is the case. After all, the Secretary of State does not deal personally with every single application. However, with regard to the reference to notification being given orally, I want to raise the problem in my mind that it is too easy to be misrepresented when you make an oral representation, or simply not heard. I hesitated about tabling an amendment here because, on the other hand, I do not want to disadvantage an asylum seeker by requiring notification in writing if that is a difficult thing to do. I assume that P’s representative can give the notification on P’s behalf, but I would be glad of that assurance and also to know who that representative can be. Would it have to be a legal representative or could it be somebody who was providing support through one of the many organisations that work in this sector?

Amendment 57A would leave out the term “or indicated” in Clause 7(8). That provides for directions to transport officers about removal in a ship or whatever other vehicle

“specified or indicated in the direction”.

What does “indicated” mean? Does it mean “a ship” or “a train”? I suppose the latter would be Eurostar or perhaps a train between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic—I do not know. It seems—again referring back to the previous debate—that “indicated” is perhaps a rather loose term. I may be wrong—I will probably be told that it is used in other legislation—but I would be glad to hear from the Minister what we should understand by it. I beg to move Amendment 55.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 57 in this group, and also the clause stand part debate. I will address my Amendment 57 first, but there are serious matters in the clause as a whole which I will come back to in a moment.

Amendment 57 addresses the far-reaching and perhaps unrealistic legal obligations being placed on private actors and companies to effect removal. This includes the captain of a ship, the pilot of an aircraft, the train manager or the train driver being required to enforce removal of an individual by enforcing detention on the ship, aircraft or train, if required, to prevent disembarking before removal has been fulfilled—and also of course to do it the other way round, as these people are mandated to ensure that the person is taken by those means of transport to the country to which they are being deported.

Two things arise from this part of the clause. One is that it gives inordinate powers to the Secretary of State to requisition not just ships, boats, aeroplanes and whatever else but the services of those who run those means of transport to detain and restrain those who are being transported. I will address in a moment the criminalisation of those people in making them subject to this sort of regulation.

The Explanatory Memorandum says that the Government will procure those services by privately chartering planes or ships or whatever but, clearly, this part of the clause, as drafted, gives the power to the Government to requisition those services. The Explanatory Memorandum also says that the Government can requisition scheduled services—scheduled flights to Kigali, perhaps. There are no direct flights from the United Kingdom to Kigali, by the way, and the flights are all operated by airlines based mostly in the European Union. So the Secretary of State can intervene in scheduled flights and require that they take the asylum seeker to a destination.

The other problem is that clearly, there has been no consultation on this matter with those who are now going to be required by the Government to execute this role on their behalf. To emphasise that, I will read to the Committee the views of the UK Chamber of Shipping, the people whose vessels are likely to be requisitioned:

“We are greatly concerned about these clauses becoming law which could require the ship’s master and crew to detain passengers, something which they are not trained to do, at the direction of the Government. The clauses also seem to allow the Secretary of State to set the period for which a ship’s master is required to detain a person on board a vessel—this could potentially lead to a situation where a ship’s crew is stuck in port for an indeterminate amount of time having received an instruction to detain individuals who are then awaiting the outcome of various legal processes to determine their rights. We are concerned that this puts seafarers at much greater risk from positions of conflict and potential harm”.


That is from the chamber of shipping, which obviously has not been consulted. We have also received a letter from the RMT that makes the same points.

The issue here now is: why has this power been taken? The situation is very similar to that in the Nationality and Borders Bill, which, Members of the Committee will remember, would also have criminalised seafarers who perform humanitarian rescues of persons in distress at sea and bring them to the UK, but those provisions were dropped from that Bill because these people should not be criminalised in this manner.

My first question to the Minister is: if it was determined and agreed by Parliament that this sort of clause was not required for the Nationality and Borders Bill, what is different now? How are the circumstances different? Is it because there are many people—airline pilots or crew, perhaps—who have not been willing to deport people in the manner the Government propose? Secondly, is it because the Government are not intending to provide anyone to accompany these people on their journey but are expecting them to be dealt with entirely by the crews of existing means of transport?

It is beyond my ability to understand why this law is now being put in place when it was previously deleted from an Act that had some of the same intentions. It seems to me that this is an unworkable section of the Bill, particularly in respect of people’s understanding of how they are to be expected to carry out jobs for which they have received no training, in which they have no experience and which they may find morally repugnant.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I do not have the answer to that at my fingertips but, if I may, I will revert to the noble Lord with it. I suspect that the availability of legal advice will be drawn to the attention of individuals at the earliest possible time, but I will check that point and come back to the noble Lord.

In conclusion, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, made some valid points on which I will further reflect. I hope I have at least gone some way to respond to the probing amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. On that basis, I ask whether she is content to withdraw her Amendment 55.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, it is Committee stage and, as the whole Committee knows, that is what I will do.

On this amendment, the Minister said, possibly twice, that things will be done “as soon as practicable”, but we know that not very much is practicable. It sounds like a parallel, idealised—well, it is not ideal to me but it may be in the Government’s mind—universe where all is possible. On the previous group, my noble friend referred to being somewhere within the wizardry of Oz. I do not know who is which character, and perhaps it would be inappropriate to speculate. However, the point about uncertainty in the minds of the individuals concerned is serious, which is why I made it earlier.

I do not think the Minister answered my question on Amendment 55A about whether notification can be given by a representative of the individual and whether that has to be a legal representative or could be a support worker from an organisation in the sector. Is he able to respond to that now?

[Lord German (LD)]

I also asked a question to which the Minister did not reply, about a person escaping from South Sudan via Kenya. Kenya would be treated as an unsafe country because it is in Schedule 1. Could the Minister respond to that when he has a moment?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I apologise for not answering the noble Baroness’s question. Yes, is the answer; representatives could be provided in that way.

To reply to the hypothetical situation that the noble Lord referred to about someone from South Sudan travelling via Kenya, it would depend on the facts of the specific case and whether the conditions were met. It is perhaps not directly relevant to the debate we are having on this amendment, but I am happy to consider that hypothetical in more detail and write to the noble Lord.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

To be absolutely clear, is the Minister saying that notification can be given via any representative and that they do not have to be qualified in a particular way?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

That is certainly my understanding. If the situation is any different, I will let the noble Baroness know.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

I think that is quite important, as it matters how these things work in practice. Having said that, and as I indicated, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 55 withdrawn.

Illegal Migration Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 5th June 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

30: Clause 5, page 7, line 20, leave out paragraph (b)
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment removes a subjective power of the Secretary of State to determine that there are “exceptional circumstances” to prevent a removal.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I also have various other amendments in this group. I feel I should speak very slowly in the hope that those who have the other amendments in this group arrive in time to introduce them.

Amendment 30 relates to Clause 5, which is one of the removal provisions. A number of noble and learned Lords, all learned in the sense that one generally understands it—I can see one of them in her place—have put a good deal of work into the other amendments in this group. I do not want to pre-empt what they and my noble friend Lord Paddick will say, so I will leave that support unspoken.

Clause 5(4)(b) places the Secretary of State above the law and above the courts, because the first hurdle to making a protection or a human rights claim is that

“the Secretary of State considers there are exceptional circumstances”

preventing removal to a particular country. This amendment is intended to probe what is meant by “exceptional circumstances”. I hope the Minister can expand on this. We have examples in subsection (5) which are about particular countries and not individuals. I suspect that they may include situations which are the subject of many other amendments in this group, and if so we should spell that out and not make it a matter of discretion. I am questioning the Secretary of State’s discretion, as I understand it—reasoned discretion, one hopes—or consideration that there are exceptional circumstances which prevent removal to a particular country.

It was only when I was preparing for today that I paused on the word “prevent”. Does it really mean preventing removal, which to my mind conjures up pictures of protestors preventing take-off of a plane carrying a particular individual? Or does it mean that removal is inappropriate or risky because of the reception—in the broadest sense—at the other end; or that there are circumstances which mean that removal would be unsafe? If it is about treatment at the other end, I am not sure that “prevent” is the right term.

I very much support the amendments—which we will hear about in a moment— extending the list of countries and parts of countries which are dangerous to return people to.

My amendments are directed at, and opposing, the notion that an individual can be safe in a part of a country if he is not safe in another part of the same country. Not every country is in a tidy unity, but where there are laws, they tend to apply overall. Where there are prejudices in a country, those who may be a threat to an individual will be free to travel between different parts of the country. Those are Amendments 52A to 52D, Amendment 52G and Amendment 53A.

Amendments 52B and 52D challenge the proposition in Clause 6(1) of removal if “in general” there is no serious risk of persecution or that removal will not “in general” contravene obligations under the human rights convention. What is meant by “in general”? I do not understand the term in this context. It is not fair to call it a lazy term, because I appreciate the vast amount of work that goes into drafting any Bill—however much one dislikes it—but it is not a very imaginative way to describe a situation. If you cannot give an example, you should not be trying to use generalised terminology. This seems to be another demonstration of the Government clutching at anything they can to deny obligations to asylum seekers. I beg to move Amendment 30.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise for my slightly late arrival in the first minute of this debate. I rise because I am the signatory of a number of amendments tabled by my noble and learned friend Lord Etherton, and because I have some amendments in my own name: Amendments 33A, 34 and 35.

The aim of all these amendments is to ensure that something happens which I feel should not cause any differences with the Government. I think it may be a matter of interpretation or a matter of adding a few words to the Bill. Principally, it relates to the treatment in third countries of people who fall within the LGBTQ group. Section 80B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 provides that a state is a safe third state in relation to a claimant if

“the claimant’s life and liberty are not threatened in that State by reason of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”.

I focus on the words

“member of a particular social group”.

I am sure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, will acknowledge that the definition of a “particular social group” has been to the courts. Indeed, government guidance has been issued which accepts that being a member of the LGBTQ+ community, subject to the facts being established—obviously, there is a consideration of the facts in every case—entitles that person to protection from Section 80B, as I quoted. The purpose of these amendments, therefore, is to ensure that people who are seeking asylum because they are a member of that social group—or another definable social group—do not lose the full protection of the law by reason of the content of Schedule 1 to this Bill, and the provisions of Clause 5 in particular.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, at this stage I do not think I can elaborate beyond the answers I have already given. This is going to be a matter for the judicial process—through the appeal process, the legal advice and the legal representation that these people have. If they can show serious and irreversible harm, then they will not be sent to these places.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for the care with which he has responded to these amendments. I do not know whether I am right, and I do not want to embarrass him, but I sensed a slight feeling of discomfort with the issues we are having to address. I applaud him for that.

It seems to me that noble Lords have been both practical and principled in this debate. I agree with the analysis about half an hour ago by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, of the position, but the practicality has been by testing the reality of different circumstances. It was the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, who said that, when faced with the situation of somebody one knows well being in this precarious position, it all looks very different. I agree; it is rather similar to feelings about people who come from other cultures. We are suspicious of them—“But not So-and-so—no, she is fine”.

On Amendment 30, I will read the report of what the Minister has said. I was not challenging most of subsection (4). It was simply the discretion, and I take what has been said about the Secretary of State having to act reasonably and so on. Subsection (5), however, says that “exceptional circumstances include”. That, to me, raises questions about what might not be included on the face of the Bill.

The Minister is quite right that I was trying to read “prevent” as someone being put at risk, and I think the Bill should say so because a person is prevented from being removed only if, in his individual case, he falls within the exceptions. That is not the natural understanding of the term. I have to say that I remain very concerned about the issue of a part of a country. A conflict in one part of a country can spread very fast, and can the risk to an individual—if he is persona non grata in one part of the country, that can become known in another part of the country very easily—and we are talking about individuals.

I am still a bit confused about “in general”. I understand that the lists we have are an amalgam of previous lists. The Minister defends the position—I think I am right in saying—by referring to procedures that can be used to challenge a decision. We are going to get to some more of this later in the Bill, but noble Lords have already shown their concern about the very narrow circumstances in which challenges—if I can use the term broadly—can be made.

A couple of things have come up in the Minister’s response that have made me think again about these. I would have mentioned some in any event, but I sure that noble Lords will understand that I am, at this moment, speaking a little bit slowly for reasons of time. If there is to be a negotiation about a home country and whether to have a negotiation with that country, does that actually raise the risk of drawing the individual to the attention of the authorities in that country and putting that person in greater jeopardy than he may have been?

The notion of acceptance by the receiving country has also been raised. I do not know whether the Minister can answer this tonight; if he can take a couple of minutes to do so, it would be helpful. If the UK and other countries are going to say, “Will you accept this individual?”, does that not, again, put that individual in jeopardy, because the reason for his having sought asylum in the UK will become known? We are in Committee, so the Minister is free to reply if he can help at this point.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I expect that I am being asked to play a sort of night watchman role in continuing the batting until stumps are drawn. As far as I know, it is not the case that the Government intend to engage in negotiations in relation to particular individuals. The Government’s general policy is to engage in discussions with particular countries about reciprocal arrangements and migration partnerships. There are various reports of other countries that are currently engaged in discussions.

Subject to correction—I am sure my noble friend Lord Murray will put me right—I think it is very likely to be the case that a lot of what we have discussed tonight in relation to Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda is simply not going to arise. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and others are sceptical about that and it may be that the Government need to provide some further reassurance to satisfy noble Lords. Perhaps the noble Baroness will forgive me for noticing the time.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister. That has raised further issues in my mind about what information may be given—not necessarily about an individual—to a receiving country, whether the questions may be asked and how the UK responds.

I think stumps probably can be drawn, though it is not in my gift to say so. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 30.

Amendment 30 withdrawn.

Domestic Abuse: Defence for Victims who Commit an Offence

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Tuesday 21st February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, I too am appalled and shocked by the existing situation. But I submit that we are making quite good progress with the 2021 Act, the Home Office review and much greater awareness among the police, the CPS and the judiciary. We are also working with women in prison on these various issues.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, as the Minister is unable to answer the question about the timetable for the appointment of the Victims’ Commissioner, could he at any rate take back the importance of a Victims’ Commissioner being in post, especially at a time when we are considering so much which should be considered from the point of view of victims?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I will of course take that back.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, my name is to the opposition to Clause 29 and the other clauses mentioned in this group as well. Of course, opposing Clause 29 is a consequence of opposing the other clauses, all of which, we say, should go. I have written down “clauses on interpretation”; the term “laundering” had not yet occurred to me, but I follow the point about the interpretation or laundering of the refugee convention. The overall point, as I say, is that they should all go.

On Second Reading, I described it as perverse to use domestic legislation to impose an interpretation of an international convention. Since then, at earlier points in this Committee, we have heard much more powerful, analytical, legally informed responses, and, though I am speaking before the contributors to whom I am referring, I think I would be much better following them—that is not intended to be at all disrespectful to the Minister, nor indeed to the very experienced lawyer from whom we have just heard. The humanitarian arguments have been very well put, but the short point I took away from an earlier day is inarguable. We are party to the convention: it is our law; it is well-established law. If we were to leave the convention—which, of course, I am not advocating—that would be another matter. But we have not left it, and I hope we are not going to.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I add my voice to those of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, my noble and learned friend Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Chakrabarti, in saying to the Minister, for whom I have considerable respect—I know of his own track record in the area of international law and the upholding of human rights—that beyond the legal arguments that have already been put to him is the reputational damage to this country, not least because of international issues, some of which he will be aware of.

Anything that we do to dilute our commitment to the 1951 convention on the treatment of refugees—any unravelling or unscrambling of our commitments—is to be deplored. I will give two examples to the Minister. I co-chair the All-Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea and am vice-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Uyghurs. In the case of North Korea, we, the United Kingdom, will regularly raise with the People’s Republic of China the refoulement policy of sending North Koreans from the PRC, to which they have escaped, back to North Korea, knowing that terrible things, including executions, will happen to them when they are sent back—a clear dereliction of the commitment to which the PRC signed up in the 1951 convention on the treatment of refugees.

In the case of Uighurs, Turkey is presently considering sending back Uighurs because of an agreement that it has reached with the People’s Republic of China. Everyone in your Lordships’ House—notably the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who is in his place; he raised this issue with me as recently as last week, in another debate—is well aware that there are 1 million Uighurs in detention centres and camps in Xinjiang, and we know of terrible atrocities that have occurred. Our own Foreign Secretary has said that a genocide is under way. In that context, for any country, and in the case of Turkey a NATO country, to be sending people back, again in violation of its duties in the 1951 convention, seems to be deplorable. However, the United Kingdom can hardly start lecturing others not to do these things if we ourselves are going to unscramble and diminish the importance of the 1951 convention.

I suppose that, as a post-war baby, I have maybe too much admiration for what was not entirely a golden age, but think about all the things that were put in place at that time: everything from the Marshall aid programme to the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, with its 30 articles that set out our rights on an international basis, and the 1948 convention on the crime of genocide. Given all those things that have been put in place, we should think extraordinarily carefully before we do anything to diminish or dilute them. That is why I hope the Minister will give proper consideration to the interventions that he has heard so far—I am sure he will—and, between now and Report, see what more we can do to ensure that we do nothing to diminish the importance of the 1951 convention.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, does the noble Lord agree that it is, as he says, about more than our reputation and not being able to lecture or set a good example to others? It enables others to point to us.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

The Minister keeps saying that each state will define the refugee convention, and he alluded to the EU qualification directive; there is also the procedures directive. I declare an interest, as I worked on both directives as an MEP. Of course, that was an attempt not for each state in the EU to do its own thing but to have a collective set of laws which interpreted the refugee convention in detail and, as far as I know, complied with it. That prevented each country doing its own thing in a potentially destructive way.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

I have an associated point, to save the Minister bobbing up and down too much. I entirely take the point about non-political crime. I just wanted to make it clear that I was referring only to that bit of the Bill when I mentioned the case. I was not suggesting that it was the prompt for the whole of this part. But can the Minister explain more about the impact of our leaving the EU? Does that give us a legal opportunity, or is this happening because it is a convenient political point in the calendar, as it were?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

On the first point, of course the EU sought to interpret the refugee convention for all its members. But that actually makes my point, because it is only for the members of the EU. All the other states will interpret it in their own way. If you want to hand over your interpreting power to the EU, that is fine if you are a member—but I suggest that that does not cut across my basic point.

As to the effect of leaving the EU, if we have hitherto signed up to various interpretations through EU regulations, we now have an opportunity to look at the matter afresh, as I said when I began. To go further into that point would go way beyond the scope of this group.

Finally, I come back to the question put to me by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, about “scrapping” —I think that was the word she used last night as well—the Human Rights Act. I said last night, and I will give the same answer now, that the Human Rights Act brings into English domestic law the European Convention on Human Rights. We have reaffirmed— I did it yesterday; I will do it again now—that this Government will stay in as a signatory to the convention.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

I shall go on to Amendment 113, which deals with unaccompanied minors. The main effect of this amendment would be to put a considerable number of children in serious danger. As drafted, it applies only to children already in the EEA, but it would obviously be a major incentive for families now outside the EEA to pack their children off to Europe in the expectation that they could go on to the UK. The amendment is also widely drawn to include nieces, nephews, grandchildren, siblings, spouses—all from families that are very large in any case.

We have seen how opening this route would encourage minors to make dangerous journeys. In 2016, when there was talk of the UK taking significant numbers of children, the numbers of unaccompanied children literally doubled overnight. That is according to evidence given to the relevant parliamentary committee by the Home Office director responsible in December 2021. We have to consider the wider consequences of this, to which may be added the difficulties already facing the authorities in correctly assessing the age of those claiming to be children. We have discussed this before in Committee and we know that, in the last available year, 1,100 persons claiming to be children were found to be adults. This amendment is dangerous and unwise, and should not be accepted.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I have been encouraged to say a word—it was only going to be a word, but it will be a few more now—in support of my noble friend Lady Ludford. I am pleased that she has taken on this cause. I am not seeking to analyse every one of these amendments, but they are about protection in every sense of the word, which is what the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham was saying. I applaud the Government for enabling the reuniting of some families, but I am thinking about those who have not been reunited, where there are problems.

I had a similar experience to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, in a meeting with Brandon Lewis and a battalion of officials, when I remember being told that the rules are quite adequate—but they are discretionary.

We have been asked by the noble Lord, Lord Green, to think about the real world. The real world is not just in the UK. One of the aspects of children being alone in the UK is the cost to local authorities, which can be very substantial when children are here by themselves. One needs to include a number of factors when balancing the question of costs.

I would like to echo whoever it was who pointed to the importance of siblings being able be together. A child or young person—frankly, anybody coping with the experience of being a refugee—needs the support of family. A sibling can be such a support to a child; I have heard siblings speak of this. These amendments have my support.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, for his tireless work on family reunion, born out of his own personal experience. I also pay tribute to my noble friends: my noble friend Lady Hamwee, who ran the first leg with her Private Member’s Bill, before handing over to my noble friend Lady Ludford.

It is better for families to be together, not just for their own welfare but so that they can look after each other, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee had just said, rather than being looked after by the state. We strongly support Amendment 112. Amendment 113 would provide a mechanism for those unaccompanied refugee children who had reached an EEA country and who have a family member in the UK to be reunited with that family member. Amendment 114

“would require the Government to produce a negotiating mandate to seek reciprocal arrangements, with other states, on safe returns and safe legal routes.”

I am guessing that would be something akin to Dublin III. Amendment 117 from the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, would change the Immigration Rules to allow people currently in Europe to come to the UK to seek asylum—effectively be given a visa—if they have a family member in the UK. This is a subset of my noble friend Lady Hamwee’s Amendment 118 in the next group. We support all these amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

I will leave it to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, to deal with Amendment 119A on emergency visas, but I say simply that I associate myself entirely with the motives that underlie it. I have accompanied the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, to a number of meetings with Afghan judges, journalists and other human rights defenders, and the case being made for that amendment—comparing it with what goes on already in countries such as Canada—is well worth examination. I certainly commend it to the Committee.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I am sure this was not at the top of his list, but the noble Lord, Lord Alton, has reminded us of the role of the arts in this area. Artists, playwrights and others could express better than the rest of us what they feel, and audiences could perhaps get a wider and deeper understanding of the issues involved. The area of arts and culture is hugely important in this.

Earlier this evening the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, said that we will continue to grant humanitarian protection, and Amendment 118 seeks to extend that to a humanitarian visa. I will explain it as quickly as I can, because what is most important is that we hear what the Minister has to say. If it is a “Sorry, no”, we need to understand why. I express my gratitude to Garden Court Chambers for drafting this amendment, which spells out the requirements and the process.

The amendment seeks to provide an exceptional route by which a person abroad—not in this country—can obtain a visa to come to the UK to seek asylum. At the moment, it is generally not possible to claim asylum in the UK unless one is already here. This visa could be applied for from anywhere in the world. The person would have to show that, if made in the UK, the claim

“would have a realistic prospect of success”,

and also that

“there are serious and compelling reasons why”

it should be considered in the UK. In assessing that, the entry clearance officer would take into account the extent of the risk of persecution or serious harm—persecution having the meaning that it has in the UN refugee convention, and serious harm meaning treatment that, if it occurred in the UK, would be contrary to Article 2, the right to life, or Article 3, the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, of the European Convention on Human Rights.

If a humanitarian visa is granted, the person will be granted a visa—I stress that—of at least six months’ duration. The Home Secretary could set conditions such as restricting access to work. On coming to the UK, the person will be deemed to have made an asylum claim and will go through the normal asylum process like any other asylum seeker, so the normal processes would not be sidestepped. There would be a full right of appeal, which is Amendment 119.

I have written down the words “Controlled and organised process”. Those working in the sector have long advocated humanitarian visas, which would be one of a suite of safe and legal routes. The humanitarian visa route would not be something that many could take advantage of, but it is significant and structured.

I will leave that there; as I say, the Minister’s response is more important tonight. However, on Amendment 119A, I will say that I was not surprised to see it. The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, never misses an opportunity to buttonhole someone who might assist the women judges, other lawyers and others in Afghanistan. What she is seeking is only temporary, in the same way as a humanitarian visa would be. It is one thing to get people out of the country when they are at risk—she has had the most extraordinary success—but it is another to find somewhere for them to go.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I will not repeat myself—well, I am going to repeat myself just briefly. If the Government saw refugees as human beings, they would already have written these amendments into the Bill. We are pushing at a closed door at the moment. We should be taking more refugees and creating more safe routes.

I have a word of warning, which is that there will be many climate—ecological—emergencies over the next decade or so and, given that we have contributed a large part of the world’s accumulated CO₂ emissions, we have to understand that we have a moral duty to take our share of climate refugees. It is already happening. There are parts of Africa that are now almost uninhabitable because of climate change, and other places will shortly follow. We have to understand that refugees are not a temporary problem but a permanent problem, and there will be a lot more. If we prepare well and put the programmes and the funding in place, we can cope and do it well. However, while the Government treat refugees as criminals and unwanted people, I am afraid that I see this simply as another reason why the Government have to go.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hollins (CB)]

My Lords, Amendments 119C and 119D propose a code of practice for professionals involved in the assessment and care of people seeking asylum. Refugees and asylum seekers often have complex health needs influenced by experiences prior to leaving their home country, during transit or after arrival in the UK. Common examples include untreated communicable diseases, accidental injuries, hypothermia, malnutrition, poor maternity care and inadequately treated mental illness. These are made worse by the barriers to assessment and treatment that they face right from their arrival in the UK to the conclusion of the process and beyond. One common risk factor for poor health and well-being among this community is trauma. This may be the very trauma that they are fleeing from, the trauma of the journey or the psychological distress of overcrowding, the lack of privacy and the absence of culturally appropriate community support upon their arrival.

The World Health Organization reports double the rate of depression and anxiety in a humanitarian crisis; that is worth noting. Mental illness can influence the ability of asylum seekers to present their claims in a coherent way. The assessment of credibility is a fundamental aspect of the asylum decision-making process, and the decision-making immigration officer needs information to make their decision but they may be faced with a person with symptoms associated with a mental disorder and the psychological effects of trauma, such as memory loss, an inability to express or even feel emotions or profound guilt and shame at what they have experienced. Such trauma, which disproportionately affects women, may also lead to a reluctance or delay in disclosure that can negatively affect the application, as already highlighted in Amendment 40, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett.

The current government policy, as set out in the guidance on adults at risk in immigration detention, centres on indicators of vulnerability, including persons suffering from a mental health condition or impairment; victims of torture; those who have been a victim of sexual or gender-based violence; those who have been a victim of human trafficking or modern slavery; and those suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.

Once a person has been identified as having an indicator of risk, the “adults at risk” policy identifies levels of evidence for that risk. The level of evidence is used as a measure of the degree of risk, which is then weighed against a range of immigration factors when making decisions regarding the immigration process, particularly the detention of the person. However, the Royal College of Psychiatrists has raised concerns that people with significant mental illness may have difficulty in being effective self-advocates or may lack a full appreciation of the extent of their own vulnerability. They may lack the mental capacity to make decisions relating to their immigration situation. Many do not have access to a robust assessment process or, if identified as lacking relevant capacity, to a system designed to safeguard them or advocate for them in their best interest.

The Helen Bamber Foundation says that in its experience persons with significant mental illness, as well as those with evidence of past torture, sexual gender-based violence and those with PTSD, are being detained despite their mental-health-related vulnerability. The assessment and identification of mental health problems requires appropriately trained staff in a facilitative environment as well as close multidisciplinary working.

For some, the treatment of mental illness will require specialist trauma-focused therapeutic support. I am told that this is not happening in existing facilities, such as Napier Barracks. It is intended that through these amendments the mental health, mental capacity and physical health of asylum seekers would be assessed and considered properly on arrival and throughout the asylum claim processes, and that the treatment and care of asylum seekers would be sufficient to ensure their health and well-being by standardising and regulating a process that would apply to numerous agencies, public, independent and third sector.

The Secretary of State said in the other place that the Bill will increase the fairness of our system so we can better protect those who are in genuine need of asylum and continue to strengthen our proud record of supporting those in need. The amendments seek to support the Government in achieving just that. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, my name is on this amendment. The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, knows whereof she speaks, so I shall not attempt to do more than support her. To me, this is a matter of professional judgment, which she has brought, but also of common sense. What I hope is my common sense has been informed by what I have heard over quite some years, including, very significantly, in the debate that we had last week. It is clear that in the UK—it may in this context be England and Wales—the systems, if they can be called systems, for assessing the health needs of asylum seekers are patchy and often inadequate.

It is also common sense that assessment should start from a solid, informed base, incorporating the best, up-to-date understanding and experience, so a review is important. So is consultation with those who are expert in the field. I support the amendments.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I support these amendments, to which I was pleased to add my name. I thank the Royal College of Psychiatrists and the Helen Bamber Foundation for their help.

Many of us have already highlighted how provisions in this Bill will seriously harm the mental and physical health of people seeking asylum, through, for example, leaving group 2 refugees living in limbo with uncertain status or by placing people in vulnerable circumstances in accommodation centres that function as quasi-detention and have been shown to have a terrible impact on health.

The amendments are a positive step that aims to ensure that the physical and mental health needs of people seeking asylum are prioritised and that there is a comprehensive, co-ordinated approach to addressing those needs in line with our obligations under Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 to

“recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”.

Numerous reports and work by organisations such as the Helen Bamber Foundation, Freedom from Torture, the Royal College of Psychiatrists and the Equality and Human Rights Commission show that people seeking asylum face barriers in accessing services, including health services, throughout the asylum process, from their arrival in the UK to the conclusion of the process and beyond. They are also more likely to have specific healthcare needs caused by distressing experiences in their country of origin and traumatic experience during their journey seeking refuge.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, explained, there are numerous points in the asylum system where the physical and mental health of people seeking protection affects their ability to engage in the process or is worsened by the system we have in place. One particularly troubling example is the detention system, which the noble Baroness has talked about and is the subject of a later group of amendments—I shall scrub what I was going to say about that, given the lateness of the hour.

I am aware that the Home Office is currently engaging with the NHS, NGOs and other stakeholders through groups like its asylum seeker health steering group and associated subgroups. This is welcome, but much more is needed. The current guidance is inadequate and its implementation patchy. Codes of practice focused on the health and care of people seeking asylum and the responsibilities of all those engaging with them in the asylum system would not only increase the fairness and efficiency of the system but provide better protection and support to those in need of asylum.

I hope that the Minister will look kindly on these amendments, which I think are part of the solution.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this brief debate. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, for her amendments, which would insert two new clauses concerning the introduction of codes of practice to underpin the Secretary of State’s approach to identifying physical and mental health needs in the asylum system. It may assist if I clarify why the Government believe that these amendments are unnecessary.

Asylum seekers are already entitled to access medical services, including those related to mental health, that are provided by the NHS, in the same way as British citizens and other permanent residents. The Home Office provides accommodation and subsistence support to all asylum seekers who would otherwise be destitute, but medical services—including those related to mental health and trauma—medical assessment and treatment are provided by the NHS. At every stage in the process, from initial arrival to screening, and to the substantive asylum interview, our approach is to ensure that the healthcare needs and vulnerabilities of asylum seekers are identified and taken into consideration where it is appropriate to do so. We ask a broad range of questions —in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser—in the screening interview to establish a claimant’s needs, including any vulnerabilities or well-being needs. Claimants have signposted to them additional sources of support and advice as appropriate. Where any safeguarding concerns are identified, the Asylum Safeguarding Hub will look to make referrals to relevant bodies and signpost relevant organisations to the claimant.

As I say, where needs are identified we ensure that there is access to professional care, and assessments are conducted by professionally trained healthcare providers. While the Home Office clearly considers it vital to safeguard all aspects of asylum seekers’ health, the responsibility for assessing health issues rests with the statutory agencies of the NHS and social services. Therefore, we do not believe there is any need for further regulation in this area. Asylum seekers have every opportunity for their needs to be identified. The standard of care they would receive as a result of those needs is identical to that received by a British citizen—we should all, at this point, pay tribute to the work of the NHS. Therefore, I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

Before the noble Baroness responds, it may be that this amendment could be worded to put more emphasis on the guidance of those who come into contact with asylum seekers, rather than just assessment. Does the Minister accept that this is a very specialised area? Without for a moment being critical of the NHS, I suggest that that specialism needs to be recognised and learning from it made available to those who come into contact with the cohort we are discussing.

[Baroness Hollins (CB)]

My Lords, I cut my speech rather, because of the time, and I feel that maybe I did not manage to explain adequately. These are people with complex health needs. They are not just like any other patient in the NHS. They have had very difficult experiences and have difficult mental health needs. It is difficult for them to try to explain about their trauma to the first interpreter or the first person assessing them that they meet. This is something where it often takes years for people to trust sufficiently to be able to explain the impact on their situation, their circumstances, and their life chances. This is not just having an assessment and a conversation. It is about building a relationship of trust when people have experienced the most terrible circumstances. That is the difficulty.

I will give one quick example. One still very troubled lady, whose asylum claim was successful, described her claim and subsequent requests for ongoing support as “seriously retraumatising”. The paperwork that she received was confusing and negative in tone, with any success hidden somewhere in the small print. She asked, “Why do they do that to me? Why can’t they communicate with me? Why should I struggle so much? I feel like I’ve been through another fight”. This lady feels like giving up, despite the fact that her claim was eventually successful.

These amendments seek to see people treated fairly, compassionately and with more skill and understanding, so that they have the best hope of healing and settling in the UK. I thank noble Lords who have supported these amendments. I hope that the Minister will think again and accept the spirit of what I have proposed; otherwise, I and others will bring these amendments back on Report.

I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I strongly support the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, in what she had to say, but I would like some clarification. She said clearly that the effect of this clause is to criminalise the act of seeking asylum in the UK, which was the conclusion reached by the JCHR, of which she is a member. Does the Minister agree with the conclusion that this is what Clause 39 means? If she does not agree, what does it mean? If she does agree, I have a conundrum that is a variation of what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, has twice rehearsed now. He made the point that if an asylum seeker is deemed inadmissible, how do they even get to Clause 11 to be affected by the differential?

I have the same conundrum around criminalisation. If the very act of seeking asylum makes someone a criminal, how do they even get to Clause 11? I do not understand how Clause 11, inadmissibility and criminalisation interact with each other. It is rather late to go into this but, if the Minister cannot do it now, a letter to all the members of the Committee would be very helpful to clarify this interaction.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the fact that I am going to say that I could not agree more with my noble friend Lady Ludford and will not add to that should not be taken to reduce the strength of that view.

I added my name to Amendment 122 from the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, for the reasons she explained. After I did, I realised that there is a question to be asked about new subsection (E1), which makes it an offence for someone knowingly to arrive in the UK without an ETA, an electronic travel authorisation; I would say that it would be the same to enter, but I am not sure it would be possible to enter the UK without an ETA.

I feel very uncomfortable about new subsection (E1) which makes it an offence to do something under the ETA rules when we do not have those rules. The ETA is not in effect yet. Your Lordships may think it right, when we see what the scheme is, that an offence be created—but not at this stage.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, like others, I entirely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. I have to put it on the record that it is now 11.04 pm and we are debating major legal innovations with massive consequences.

I want to ask the Minister just one question. Let us imagine a person caught in these circumstances, who has gone on a small boat, been intercepted by the Royal Navy and brought to shore, arrived in the UK and put in jail for four years. That person is very likely from a country in a state of turmoil to which it is utterly impossible to return them for any conceivable time in the future after their four-year jail term. How does the Minister imagine the fate—the life—of that person proceeding from the point they walk out of the jail doors?

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 3rd February 2022 Lords Chamber

[The Lord Bishop of Durham]

My Lords, very briefly, my deep concern is that the Government’s proposal virtually rules out us ever being the first safe country in which to arrive, simply because of our geography. That is the fundamental problem I have with the whole proposal, because it feels like we are removing ourselves from being a front-line nation in receiving people. I believe the Minister does not actually think that, but this would be the impact. We need to strike these clauses out.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, my name is to a number of amendments in this group—including Amendments 69A, 71A, 71B, 73A and 73B—and they all come from the UNHCR. I had written down not “guardian” but “steward”, but it comes to the same thing—that is, stewardship of the convention. I am not suggesting for a moment that I would be happy—or that it would be happy—to see these clauses remain in the Bill, and I hope I am not too much in “lipstick on pigs” territory, but given that the UNHCR of all bodies has proposed these, I think it right that I speak to them, and I will do so reasonably quickly.

The UNHCR has reiterated that the Bill is fundamentally at odds with the Government’s avowed commitment to uphold the UK’s international obligations under the convention, and its long-standing role as a global champion of supporting and protecting refugees. It has reminded us that three safeguards are essential to any inadmissibility rules. First, they must not operate in a way that denies the fundamental right to seek and enjoy asylum, which is another way of saying a good deal of what has already been said. Secondly, they must protect rights under international law during the refugee process and once a refugee has been recognised. Thirdly, the aim should be to increase access to asylum globally. Clause 15 does not meet those tests; in the interests of time, I will not go through why.

The amendments in my name are to prevent the UK breaching international standards. They would mean that a safe third state must be safe in law—I should put that first—but safe in practice, and that a claim must be considered under the Immigration Rules, not as an optional matter; they broaden the circumstances in which the Secretary of State must consider the application and reduce the risk of an asylum seeker being sent to a country which is not a signatory to the convention and does not respect the rights of refugees under international law. The “connection” would be what most people would regard as a connection in ordinary language, and they define a “relevant claim” as a claim for protective status consistent with the convention. On Tuesday there was a lot of discussion about the importance of the convention as a matter of morality and, very importantly, as law. These amendments relate to both.

On the issue of formal returns agreements, to which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, referred, Amendment 195 would require a returns agreement before regulations were brought into force. I agree with that but with the condition that the agreements were acceptable. The amendment perhaps begs the question: I would like to think that it would be possible—it would be proper—for Parliament to have a role, which it will in an international agreement, and that amendments that are thought by Parliament to be required are made, so that the agreement is not just imposed.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, there are lots of issues here, but I start by making an overarching comment. A decade or more ago, the Home Office was dealing with many more applications for asylum than now. I am talking about initial decisions, not appeals. It was dealing with them more quickly and more effectively; the backlog was lower; and the successful appeal rate was lower. I try to be a “glass half full” person and usually fail miserably—but enough of my problems. Let me put it this way: the Home Office has proved in the past that it can deal efficiently and effectively with many more asylum applications than it is facing today. The fix for the current problems lies in the staffing systems and processes of our Home Office, not in the legislation or the number of asylum applications.

I have said it before, and I will say it again: the Government are focusing on the wrong things in the Bill and doing nothing to address the things that need to be addressed. This group of amendments is about unfairly and unreasonably reducing the number of asylum applications rather than increasing the capacity of the Home Office to handle them effectively, as it has proved it is capable of doing in the past.

Clause 14 proposes that all claims for asylum from EU nationals must be ruled inadmissible and that, as it is not a decision to refuse a claim but a decision to refuse to consider a claim, there be no right of appeal. A claim can be considered in exceptional circumstances, but the examples given are where the EU state is at war and has suspended the European Convention on Human Rights, or is going off the rails to such an extent that the EU itself is taking action against it for not complying with the standards of human rights expected of a member state.

These exceptional circumstances do not go far enough, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, said. We have seen EU states fail to act or take sufficient action to protect minorities. He mentioned Hungary. In 2020, six Polish cities announced LGBT-free zones. It may not necessarily be the case that an EU state, or even a municipality within an EU state, is overtly persecuting minorities, but failing to protect some minorities may make it unsafe for them to be in a particular state and as such may amount to grounds for asylum in the UK. Surely Home Office officials can determine whether any application for asylum has merit, whoever it is made by and whatever part of the world the applicant is from, without blanket bans of this kind in primary legislation. Amendment 68 from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, would be useful if the clause survives, but Clause 14 should not stand part of the Bill.

Another category of claim the Government want to rule as inadmissible is where the claimant has a connection, however spurious, with a safe third state. It just smacks of: “Let’s invent lots of excuses for rejecting someone’s asylum claim, however far-fetched they may be.”

In relation to the other amendments, if the clause remains part of the Bill, of course a safe third state must be safe—and that means safe for everyone, including minorities. It means that their rights will be protected and that the asylum system is compliant with the refugee convention. Of course the Home Secretary should not be able to remove a genuine refugee to any safe third state—to dump them anywhere in the world, whether they have any connection with that state or not.

On what planet does the following make sense? You establish some kind of connection between an asylum seeker and a safe third state, but you cannot send them there because you do not have a return agreement with that state. However, you still refuse to consider their application for asylum. So what are they supposed to do now?

Another amendment seeks to prevent the following scenario: even if the refugee has family in the UK, they could still be deported to a safe third state—“Sorry, lad, I know your parents are here but you’ve got a connection with Turkey because your grandparents are old and frail and could only make it that far, so off you go”.

The conditions for establishing a connection with a safe third state—we have seen this sort of thing before—look like an awayday board blast, where there are no wrong answers and anything you can think of is uncritically written on a flipchart. Can “Well, we think you should have made a claim elsewhere” seriously be a reason an official can give to rule a claim inadmissible, with no right of appeal?

Clauses 14 and 15 should not be part of the Bill, and we will support the other amendments only if those clauses remain.

I was going to speak to Amendment 76, which seeks to override

“all prior national and international law”,

but there is no one here to speak to it, so I shall decline.

--- Later in debate ---

So, will the Government at least change “will” to “may”? These are some of the problems and some of the concerns that we have and that, no doubt, other noble Lords have in the amendments that they have put forward. In seeking to solve their asylum problem, once again the Government’s objective seems to be to penalise the victims. It is an unacceptable way forward. The late compliance provisions fail to recognise the reality of life for many fleeing persecution, war or famine. Once again, the Government have been found wanting in protecting the basic human rights of people in this country and beyond.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, we have Amendments 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 82A, 82B, 86A, 86B, 90 and 90A in this group. I have also put my name to Amendment 95A along with that of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. I do not know whether she is planning to speak to it—it is the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins—but its thrust certainly falls within this group. Noble Lords will be pleased to know I am not going to speak precisely to each amendment.

I am slightly hesitant to raise this point, given the expertise of the noble Lord on the Front Bench and the noble and learned Lord sitting opposite, although it feels as if I have been sitting next to him through most of the passage of this Bill. Listening to the last exchange, is it something to do with the whole of our legal system that we place asylum seeker on one side opposite the state as the other party? The whole way this is designed is to have parties to proceedings fighting one another. I am glad to see the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, nodding at that. It has only just occurred to me.

This clutch of amendments addresses the period within which the claimant is to provide evidence. I hoped that the noble and learned Lord might be speaking ahead of me because I am sure I would be saying I agree with him. Why is the specific date a matter for the Secretary of State or the immigration officer? Different people will need different periods of time. That might be an argument for variability, but it should not mean that it can be an arbitrary date without there being a reasoned basis. The lawyers in the Chamber will tell me if I get this wrong, but I think one would usually expect to see time periods within tribunal rules with a possibility of applying for an extension, but the procedure rules are the subject of the next clause. I am concerned about whether this is a proper way to go about giving notice. It should be neutral and objectively appropriate, and Clause 17 gives the Secretary of State considerable power.

Under the new subsections introduced by Clause 18, the tribunal is required to make a statement as to whether the claimant has behaved in a way designed or “likely” to go to his credibility. When we tabled Amendments 82A and 82B, I was thinking about points noble Lords made and will make again and again about the impact of trauma on a claimant, and the difficulties someone may have—even someone who is not affected—in dealing with authority figures, accessing documents and so on. This point was very clearly made by the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, a couple of days ago. That is why I stress the word “likely”.

This gives me the opportunity to ask the Government why Clause 18 is included. It would be good to have that on the record. Others may have a different take on the reasons for some claims having taken the course they have.

In my Amendment 86A, I am not really seeking to amend the noble and learned Lord’s Amendment 86, just to add to it by requiring adequate time before a cut-off date in a priority removal notice. Amendment 86A would add more of the people about whom we have been concerned to the list; the same point is made on Amendments 90 and 90A.

I also have Amendment 86B in this group. I got into quite a circular argument with myself last weekend about this. I am not sure I resolved it, but I will not trouble the Committee with it this evening, given the time.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 95 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, who apologises for having had to leave early. This speech will be in two halves—although one will be rather bigger than the other. The first half is roughly what the noble Baroness would have said.

At Second Reading she spoke about the ways in which she believes this Bill places additional unacceptable barriers in the way of women refugees seeking asylum who are fleeing sexual violence and exploitation. The amendment seeks to remove one of those obstacles and to extend the benefit to other groups of asylum seekers who may be similarly disadvantaged, so that it is accepted that they have a good reason for a late claim.

As we understand it, the issue is that in the proposed legislation the authorities deciding an asylum claim or appeal are instructed to attach, as we have heard, only minimal weight to any evidence provided late by the applicant, unless there is a good reason for it being late. However, there is robust evidence to show that the trauma suffered by the victims of sexual violence or trafficking can impact on memory and the ability to recall information. The Home Office guidance itself makes this clear. The other categories she included in Amendment 95, such as victims of torture, modern slavery and trafficking, are just as likely to suffer the same effects on memory and should be protected in the same way. I strongly support what she would have said.

However, as the arguments from this perspective are very similar to those I made in support of Amendment 40 on Tuesday, I will focus on children, a group we have not talked much about so far, although I was very pleased that my noble friend Lord Coaker did so in introducing this group. It is the strong view of children’s organisations such as the Children’s Society—I am grateful for its help—that the Bill completely fails to protect children, a group in particular need of it. Despite recognition of this added need for protection, this Bill’s harsh reforms apply to children just as they do to adults, unless the Minister can tell me that I am wrong—I hope he can. This is not right; it is a serious failure of the Government’s duty to protect children.

We need only look at Clauses 25 and 17 to see the disproportionate impact many of these provisions will have on children and young people. Amendment 95 seeks to ensure that children are recognised as having a good reason for not providing evidence by the deadline and that any evidence they provide late is given due weight. We know from organisations on the ground that asylum-seeking children who have been forced to flee, who may have witnessed violence and the destruction of their homes or schools, or even death, and who may have endured traumatic journeys, might not be able to share all the details of their ordeal in the first instance to provide evidence to support their case. The particular difficulties children might face in providing prompt evidence are recognised by the JCHR.

The Government know this. Their only quality impact assessment, to which my noble friend referred, sets out how these clauses will have a disproportionate impact on vulnerable persons, including children. The Home Office’s Children’s Asylum Claims Casework Guidance makes it clear:

“Decision makers must take account of what it is reasonable to expect a child to know”—


or relay—

“in their given set of circumstances”.

It is inappropriate for authorities to question the credibility of a child’s claim if they omit information, bearing in mind the child’s age, maturity and other reasons that may have led to those omissions. Requiring time-limited evidence and penalising children when they are unable to meet the deadlines goes against the Government’s own assessments and guidance and does nothing to protect children or, as we have heard, their best interests.

As one young person supported by the Children’s Society, which has long supported asylum-seeking children and young people, reminds us:

“This is not a joyful moment in our lives. We have to talk through the worst parts of our past. It is very traumatic.”


Children and young people need time and a sense of safety before they can begin to disclose their experience. They also need good, child-appropriate legal representation, which we know they often do not get, unfortunately. All too often, asylum-seeking children receive poor initial legal advice, which can lead to ill-prepared claims and to them not feeling comfortable about setting out their information. Due to legal aid funding cuts, quality legal advice is not readily available.

Another young asylum seeker supported by the Children’s Society described his experience:

“My solicitor did nothing, it was horrible. They didn’t even prepare a witness statement for my interview. I had to do everything myself. I had my social worker but she didn’t know how to help me with my asylum case. The interviewer told me she had no information and I had to tell her everything.”


The Children’s Society sees many asylum-seeking children who have to provide evidence at later stages of their claim, not because of any weakness in the claim but because of the trauma they have endured or the consequences of non-existent or poor legal representation. No doubt the Minister will assure us that these concerns will be addressed in guidance and on a case-by-case basis, yet, as was highlighted in the recent report, An Inspection of Asylum Casework, guidance is often neither followed nor implemented by Home Office caseworkers. Home Office staff themselves stressed that they

“did not have time to consider each case on its own merits, contrary to the guidance they receive.”

So the aim of Amendment 95 is not to tie the hands of decision-makers or legislate for every situation in which a person might provide late evidence. Rather, it is to ensure that the most vulnerable are protected in the Bill, because we cannot leave their safety and well-being to chance. That is consistent with this highlighted observation from the JCHR:

“It is crucial that decision-makers recognise the many legitimate reasons why asylum seekers may struggle to provide evidence in support of their claims within tight deadlines.”


If Clause 25 stands part—I have to say that I will support the proposal that will be put by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti that it should not—this amendment represents the minimum necessary to protect children, women, women fleeing gender-based violence and others in the most vulnerable circumstances.

I want to return briefly to what the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, said. Given the Home Office guidance, we cannot see any logical or humane reason why the Government would not accept this amendment and establish on the face of the Bill that, in these circumstances, for these victims, any late evidence should always be accepted as being late for a good reason, and their application or appeal should not in any way be disadvantaged because of it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I have put my name to the proposal that Clauses 22 and 23 should not stand part of the Bill. When I first saw the term “expedited appeals”, my antennae twitched. It sounds such a benign and helpful term but then so did “detained fast track”—the accelerated process for considering asylum claims introduced in 2002, involving detention immediately after the asylum screening interview, which was followed shortly by the substantive interview, with a decision the following day and two days to appeal. The High Court found that the DFT, as operated, carried

“an unacceptably high risk of unfairness”

to vulnerable or potentially vulnerable applicants, and to that extent it found it to be unlawful, and the Home Office eventually suspended it. Expedited appeals are not the same but some of the issues are really quite similar.

As we have been discussing, the Bill of course provides for priority removal notices to be served on anyone liable for removal or deportation; we have discussed the cut-off date for the provision of evidence. However, it does not set out the factors that may lead to a PRN being issued. That is left solely to Home Office guidance. I support what the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, just said about needing to see guidance—but only so far because guidance, by definition, can be changed and although we may be reassured in February 2022, come February 2025 things might look quite different, with the same Government or another Government producing rather different guidance.

Listening to the previous debate, I was concerned that for an appropriate date to be set, the Home Office needs to know whether somebody is vulnerable, but it will know that only after the event of the notice. I understand the difficulty of trying to start without a starting point, which is the point that the Minister was making. Without a date, you cannot look further, but the extension of that is important. I found it quite difficult to follow all that. I am mentioning it now because it is part and parcel of the same issue and certainly Hansard will require careful reading.

The PRN will remain in force until 12 months after the cut-off date or exhaustion of appeal rights. We have talked about whether or not there is a principle. Clause 22 provides for an expedited appeal route for appellants who have been served a PRN and have made a claim on or after the cut-off date but while the PRN is still in force. In that circumstance, the Secretary of State may “certify”—an interesting term in itself—that any right of appeal against a Home Office refusal will be to the Upper Tribunal instead of the First-tier Tribunal. The Secretary of State can also certify that she or he is satisfied that there are good reasons for making the claim on or after the date. I cannot think of an alternative to what is probably an inappropriate term about being judge and jury in your own case, but I think noble Lords will understand what I mean.

The result of an appeal being certified is that one tier of appeal—the First-tier Tribunal—is lost. Under the Bill, the rules must provide for expedited appeals in the Upper Tribunal to be determined more quickly than an ordinary appeal in the First-tier Tribunal and allow for the Upper Tribunal to make an order that the expedited appeals process may—I stress “may”—not apply

“if it is satisfied that is the only way to secure that justice is done in the case of a particular expedited appeal”.

When someone is subject to the expedited process, Clause 23 provides that any other appeals they may have, for instance

“in respect of protection and human rights claims … deprivation of citizenship … EU citizens’ rights”

and so on, are dealt with as a related expedited appeal.

Ousting the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal, and so prohibiting an appeal from a first-instance decision, is clearly a significant matter. It would give no one the right of appeal to the Court of Appeal and, necessarily, not to the Supreme Court afterwards either. As we have discussed, the appeals concerned involve international protection rights, human rights, European Union and EEA citizens’ rights and the deprivation of citizenship, all areas where the UK has bound itself to abide by international agreements. For such a fundamental right as the right not to be sent back to a country where one is at risk of persecution to be excluded from an onward appeal to the Court of Appeal—even if the decision of the Upper Tribunal contains an error of law or a breach of natural justice—is extraordinary. This is not a criticism of the Upper Tribunal in any way; it is just not how things should be done. Removing Clauses 22 and 23 would leave the existing appeals structure in place.

How will one challenge Upper Tribunal decisions if these clauses stand? My noble friend made a caveat about the use of “constitutionality” but I think that it applies here, as well as on the impact on the rule of law. The Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House said in its report:

“The House may wish to consider the effect of clause 23 on the functioning of the appeals process and consequently on access to justice.”


That is quite strong stuff for a Lords committee.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I apologise but, in the war of attrition that this Bill has become, we seem to have lost any contributions other than from the Liberal Democrats and the Labour Front Bench.

Bearing that in mind, I will add to what my noble friend said rather than repeat anything she said. This clause smacks of the Home Office trying to remove or deport people before they have had a reasonable chance to appeal against a removal or deportation decision. No doubt it is embarrassing when repeated stories emerge of government charter flights taking off almost empty because the courts ruled that the majority of those with a seat on the plane should not be deported, but the answer is not to deport them before they have a reasonable chance to put their case before the courts. The answer is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Home Office to ensure that there is a cast-iron case for deportation that cannot be overturned in the courts at the last minute. Yet again, the Bill focuses on the wrong solution to the problem.

I am sure the Minister will agree that as the Home Office becomes better at making its decisions and more and more appeals are turned down, as opposed to the current situation where the majority are accepted by the tribunals, there will be fewer appeals as lawyers say to their clients “Look at what’s happening now. There’s absolutely no point in appealing.” That is the answer to this problem, not Clauses 22 and 23.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, as I said in an earlier group, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, who is the lead signatory of these amendments, could not stay so I am moving our amendments in this and the last group.

Clauses 65 and 66 amend LASPO—the Legal Aid, Sentencing and something Act—to allow for people already in receipt of legal aid for an immigration, asylum or human rights claim, under the exceptional case determination procedure, to receive legal aid advice in relation to a referral into the national referral mechanism, whereby they seek a positive reasonable grounds decision as a potential victim of slavery or human trafficking.

However, these provisions help only victims who already receive legal aid and know how to ask for it. It does not cover all victims. Exceptional case funding for legal aid is very difficult to secure in practice, so Clauses 65 and 66 will help only a small number of people, not least, as the Anti-slavery Commissioner has noted, because it requires a lot of time-consuming work up front to get that exceptional case funding and the solicitor is paid only if the application is successful.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights supports the request of the Anti-slavery Commissioner that legal aid advice of seven hours—or preferably more, as my noble friend’s Amendment 94A probes—should also be available to those in receipt of a slavery or trafficking notice in the same way as for those in receipt of a priority removal notice, to avoid victims of severe trauma remaining unidentified and unassisted. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, like others in Parliament, as I know from these Benches, has also repeatedly expressed its concern about legal aid deserts, but that is a wider debate. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 94A in this group. I am sorry that I could not respond to the Minister on the previous group, but I am sure we will come back to that. I was going to observe that the Chamber seemed largely to have cleared, possibly because other noble Lords could not bear this Bill any longer today, but some noble Lords have rejoined us.

It is clearly better that legal aid is available than not, but I am aware, as my noble friend is, of the shortage of provision and some of the problems here. I would say that it is not a matter for today, but actually it probably is. It is very significant, because the words in the Bill will not provide the advice. The Minister has referred two or three times very confidently to the legal aid offer; we are concerned to ensure that that offer has substance.

I have heard over the years of the difficulties of solicitors—if you can find one—advising and taking instructions in immigration removal centres, with the restrictions there on time, of 30 minutes eaten into by the client having to be fetched and then returned. I do not need to say again, but I will in one sentence, that the client often needs a lot of time over a period to tell his or her story.

My amendment seeks to understand how the Government have landed on seven hours. The Minister gently chided me for the use of the term “arbitrary” before. I will acknowledge that my proposal of 20 hours is arbitrary, but it is my way of probing why the Bill provides for seven hours. I asked ILPA whether that would be sufficient, and the reply was:

“I do not think seven hours of legal aid is sufficient to advise on the notice, the person’s immigration status, the lawfulness of removal, and immigration detention. The immigration system is complex, and the Bill makes it more complex through the expedited processes, priority notices, and new definitions/standards … It is also of concern”


that the Bill

“would allow a power to alter that 7 hour time limit.”

There must have been evidence for coming to the seven hours. If that is so, what evidence would the Minister apply to reduce that figure—or indeed extend it? ILPA says it does not

“have a sense as to the specific number of hours needed for this advice, as it would be so case-specific,”

which is entirely understandable,

“including the immigration and procedural history of the case, novelty of any legal arguments, number of bases on which to raise a claim, the legality of detention”

and so on. So I hope that the Minister can flesh out this provision in the Bill so we can understand what the Government think can be achieved with the seven hours of scarce legal aid.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, we support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, for the reasons my noble friend Lady Ludford has explained. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee has explained, Amendment 94A is not to replace one arbitrary number with another but to probe how much legal aid should be provided in such cases. The Minister described, in a previous group, how cases are of different complexity and how people will be given more time to secure and collate evidence if they are from a vulnerable background. For example, if they come from an LGBTQIA background, they are less likely to be able to acquire evidence quickly, and therefore, the date on the notice they are given would change even during the process. Surely that points to the fact that each and every case is different and will require a different amount of legal aid, depending on how much aid is needed to advise in each particular circumstance. I understand that people who are in this situation do need legal aid, but surely the number of hours should be as case-specific and flexible as the deadline date of any notice for them to submit their evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The noble Baroness must have had access to my notes, because that was just the point I was going to make. I have written down here that I know the Committee will ask about individuals who are not receiving legal aid for their protection or human rights claim—and sure enough, the Committee did. My answer is that there could be multiple reasons for an individual not receiving legal aid in those circumstances. The individual might not have passed the means or merits test, and those two tests, as the Committee will know, are there to ensure that legal aid is targeted at those most in need who cannot afford advice themselves. That is one possibility, and I will come back to that in a moment. Another possibility—and this does happen—is that the individual has just made an application to the Home Office by themselves and has not sorted out a lawyer. If so, I would strongly encourage them to seek out a legal aid lawyer, who would be able to provide more than the seven hours of advice that could be provided.

Turning to Amendment 94A, the short answer to why we have specified up to seven hours in Clause 24 is that a balance must be struck between giving free legal advice and using taxpayers’ money responsibly. Seven hours is intended to reflect that this is an opportunity for initial legal advice to help individuals understand what the notice is and what it is requiring them to. It is available on a non-means-tested and non-merits-tested basis. That means that anyone with a PRN is guaranteed access to legal aid for up to seven hours, but it does not mean that, after seven hours, there is no further access to legal aid. Some individuals will need further advice; it is not intended that seven hours will resolve every immigration issue. At the end of the seven hours, any individual who has an issue within the scope of the legal aid scheme and who passes the means and merits test will be eligible for ongoing legal advice funded by legal aid until the matter is resolved.

I am conscious that that gets us into the territory of means and merits tests. I answered an Oral Question in this area on Tuesday, when I said that there was a review of the means test under way at the moment, on which I have personally spent a lot of time. I hope very much that we will soon be able to go out for consultation on that. We are conducting a really thorough review of the means test.

Finally, I will address the noble Baroness’s concerns that the exceptional case funding scheme might not be up to standard. Respectfully, I disagree. That scheme is specifically designed to act as a safety net and to provide legal-aid funding to individuals who can demonstrate that, without it, their human rights might be breached. In 2019-20, of the immigration cases that applied for exceptional case funding, 80% were granted legal aid, so that shows that the system works. We are continuing to work with legal aid practitioners and the Legal Aid Agency to improve the scheme if we can.

For the reasons that I have set out, I hope that the noble Baroness, speaking also for the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, will be content to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

Before my noble friend responds, could the Minister at least acknowledge that it is not just a matter of hours? It is a matter of the difficulties of finding a legal aid lawyer and the very clear existence of legal aid deserts and so on? Even when it is not a desert, there are difficulties which are, to a very considerable extent, related to the terms for the lawyers themselves. I do not know whether it ever occurred to the noble Lord that he might pursue a career in legal aid; he probably felt as guilty as I used to, when I was in practice as a solicitor, that my firm did not do legal aid, or at least it gave up doing it. That is partly because you need to specialise in legal aid, as well as the subject that you are dealing with, and that is very difficult for a lot of lawyers. It has led to two classes of lawyers, and that is a very bad thing.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The noble Baroness’s question is quite broad. She knows that we have had a number of discussions about legal aid, which will continue. I did not do much legal aid in my practice. I do not want to advertise from the Dispatch Box, but my brother-in-law is one of the finest criminal legal aid solicitors in London—I am sure that no one here will ever need his services, but he is absolutely brilliant, none the less.

More seriously, I am very conscious of the need to make sure that people have access to a lawyer with the relevant skill set, because a general right to legal aid is not much use if you cannot find a legal aid lawyer—I absolutely appreciate that. On Tuesday, I explained some of the efforts that we are making in this area. To say any more now might trespass on the Committee’s patience, but I am obviously well aware of this point.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Lords Hansard - part two & Report stage
Wednesday 15th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)]

My Lords, I raised the issue of Friday releases at Second Reading and in Committee. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, for pursuing this issue now we are on Report. I agree wholeheartedly with his remarks. I was encouraged in Committee by the number of noble Lords who supported this amendment.

Some prisoners are lucky in that their families keep in touch with them while they serve their sentences. This means that on release they have somewhere to go. Others find that their friends and family no longer wish to be associated with them. It is not for me to comment on this aspect. It is those without support mechanisms on the outside that this amendment seeks to assist.

I will not repeat the remarks I made in Committee but just say that even the most well-organised and enthusiastic local authority housing department will have difficulty finding a suitable place if someone turns up at 3 pm on a Friday afternoon looking for accommodation. A roof over their head may be found but it may not be suitable due to previous difficulties such as drug and alcohol addiction. They may have been able to get themselves off their addiction during their time in prison but finding themselves in an overnight hostel on their release is not conducive to maintaining their willpower to remain clean and sober, or to their rehabilitation.

We are not suggesting that a definitive release date is suggested at the time of sentencing; that would be wholly inappropriate and unreasonable. But we are suggesting that prison governors should have discretion over the final days of the sentence so that the release date is not on a Friday, weekend or bank holiday for those without friends and family to support them, and that local authorities can be notified when someone is due to be released who may not have accommodation to go to. This seems to be a very reasonable way of ensuring that those released from prison have the best possible chance to keep their life on track and move forward positively. The prison strategy is welcome but waiting two years before tackling this issue of Friday, weekend or bank holiday releases is unacceptable.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I do not disagree with a word of what has been said but regarding “What’s not to like?”, what I do not like is looking at the symptoms rather than the cause of this. I have understood over many years that the problem arises because there is no—I do not like the word—“upstream” work undertaken to support prisoners coming up for release. It needs a lot of preparation if the situation that my noble friend Lady Bakewell has just described is not to be encountered. Proper preparation for the release of prisoners is what requires attention. As I said, I do not disagree with a word of what has been said and I am happy to support the amendment, but I hope that what is proposed and what the Government are proposing will not be seen as a panacea because it is not; it is a much bigger problem than just Friday releases.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I too pay tribute to the right reverend Prelate for her dedicated work in this matter. We could see her laser-like approach to looking at each of the issues facing this group of people, which are clearly addressed in these amendments. These amendments cover a range of issues, but I would like to take up the points already made by the right reverend Prelate, the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, about data.

It is interesting that on 6 December, the Minister, in replying to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, said:

“We do not hold current figures on how many women in prison aged (1) 18 to 24 or (2) 25 years or older have dependent children.”


I appreciate that there is attention being given to this for the future, but I can only echo the words that, if you do not know, then you are going to be making policy in the dark, as the right reverend Prelate said right at the beginning.

However, figures have been produced by the Howard League. I think it gained these figures by doing an analysis of what it could glean from talking to prison governors and staff. We know that women make up 5% of the prison population but are more likely than male prisoners to be serving short sentences for non-violent offences. The majority of those women experienced childhood abuse, and many are victims of domestic abuse, so they are more likely than male prisoners to report poor mental health and problems with alcohol and drugs.

Here is the crucial figure: the Howard League says that two-thirds of female prisoners are mothers of dependent children, and that at least a third of these are single parents. That means around 17,000 children are separated from their mothers by imprisonment each year, and the vast majority of them are moved out of their homes as a result. I am sure that every noble Lord here can understand the strong detrimental effect that has on their development and well-being. The harsh impact on the welfare of their mothers goes far beyond the impact of the imprisonment itself.

There was a review of women in prison in 2006-07 by the noble Baroness, Lady Corston. One of the outcomes of that was women’s centres, which have so far proved very effective at keeping women out of prison. However, there are insufficient numbers of them, and they are insufficiently well resourced. We need to enlarge that figure considerably.

The important feature here is the future. We understand that the Government now intend to collect the right data, so that we can inform our policy-making. The issue of recall, which the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, talked about just now, is a specific issue and one that has a double effect, of course, because sometimes the reason for being recalled is very slender. The children’s lives are then doubly affected.

Finally, I go back to the number of children. A substantial number of children in this country are moved out of their homes and lack the family basis on which they are being brought up. We must recognise that this specific factor—all the other factors range with it—affects the future of those children. If nothing else, this series of amendments must put right, full and square, that the welfare of the child is fundamental in everything we do. There is an awful lot that we need to do, and these amendments reflect that.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, one of the children to whom my noble friend refers gave evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights when I was a member and we were looking at the impacts on children of imprisonment of mothers in particular—and fathers too. That child had been 15, I think, and found herself going from literally dancing around the living room to music when her mother was in court to finding herself responsible, as she saw it, for herself and her younger brother. The impact is devastating. I do not want to spend any longer on this at this time of night, but I thank the people who give evidence to committees such as the JCHR and the all-party groups about this sort of situation. It is very vivid and helps us to understand better than we can from words on paper just how devastating this situation can be.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Wednesday 8th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, arguing this case is far beyond my pay grade, but I support everything that my noble friend Lord Hailsham said in opposition to these amendments. I do not support Amendment 1.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, we have more and more life sentences and less and less judicial discretion. The point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that deterrence is not a factor in this really should not be glossed over; it is very important.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I am puzzled by the mechanism that the Government are trying to use to increase sentences, which, in some cases, should rightly be higher, in relation to the deaths of emergency workers. After a long period of development, we created a completely new mechanism: the Sentencing Council. Judges must have regard to sentencing guidelines in every case, and those guidelines are complex. They give examples of levels at which sentences should start in certain circumstances.

I see a number of noble Lords around this Chamber who have either acted as police officers or have prosecuted and defended manslaughter cases. In my case, I have done, on one side or the other, a number of one-punch manslaughter cases, in which there was a conviction, and perhaps a sentence of three or four years’ imprisonment. One can imagine circumstances in which that could have arisen where the person who died was an off-duty emergency worker trying to help someone, and the perpetrator of the offence had no idea that that person was an emergency worker.

Surely the better mechanism is to use the flexible, living instrument of the Sentencing Council, and the sentencing guidelines, and not to inhibit the discretion of judges. The Sentencing Council and the judges will, of course, respond to the pressure that rightly arises from the awful case that has given rise to this discussion and this amendment. With great respect to the Minister, relying on “exceptional circumstances”, a description that is always determined in a restrictive way—rightly so—by the Court of Appeal, seems to be the wrong mechanism to achieve the right result.