Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill

Debate between Baroness Neville-Rolfe and Lord Stevens of Birmingham

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th April 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

The honest answer is that I do not know about the lottery, but I will find out for the noble Baroness and write to her. On universities, of course she is right: very substantial sums of money, rightly, are involved in the education of our children. What I was explaining was that, at the margin of this activity—involving procurement and investment—the sum is relatively small compared with all that is done by universities.

[Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)]

May I offer a constructive suggestion on the clarity that might be adduced between now and further stages? Picking up on the question of the noble Baroness, Lady Blackstone, as I understand it, in 2003 the first case before the court to answer the question was Poplar housing association, where it was deemed that Poplar was a functional public authority under the Human Rights Act. That takes us to the useful report that was referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, from the Lords and Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights back in 2003-04, entitled The Meaning of Public Authority under the Human Rights Act, which gets to the very matter we have been discussing. Obviously, jurisprudence has developed substantially since then. If the Minister could set out in writing how the Government regard the situation as having evolved since this very clear statement of the answer to the question we are struggling with this afternoon, that would perhaps nail the matter.

[Lord Boateng (Lab)]

The Minister has been enormously forbearing and we are very grateful for that. I wonder whether she could help us in this regard in relation to cultural bodies—here I must declare an interest, as an independent non-executive director of the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra. What would be the position of an orchestra that received some funding—by no means the majority of its funding—from the Arts Council, and which determined that, in the aftermath of an invasion of a sovereign nation by another sovereign nation, it no longer wanted to perform supportively of, say, the Bolshoi Ballet? What would be the position of such an orchestra, or of a board, that made that decision because it saw a real reputational risk, in the aftermath of the invasion of a sovereign country, of appearing in support of the national ballet company of the invading nation?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)]

I take the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Blackstone, just made in respect of schools, but I also agree with the point the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, made about the jurisprudence that has arisen, which has clarified this for a number of institutions, including, I think the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester will find, the Church of England. In fact, I believe the first case to test whether a body in the Church was indeed a public authority was Aston Cantlow Parochial Church Council, which was trying to exact a chancel repair charge. In the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords at the time, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, deemed that the parochial council was not a public authority. Many details have been laid out by the courts quite clearly over the years, but if the Government could adduce that on to a single sheet of paper in the way that has been described, it would be very helpful.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, as I set out in my response to the previous group, the Government chose to apply the ban to public authorities as defined by Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. It is a great advantage that your Lordships, perhaps in contrast to the other place, scrutinise Bills in this way. I cannot accept that it is a sloppy Bill—it is a good Bill—but I think that concerns have been overstated. My noble friend Lady Noakes just explained why, very eloquently. We need clarity. Most bodies know whether or not they are covered.

There is another good reason for using the Human Rights Act definition—obviously, I am happy to look further at its implications, as I have said—which is that the Government intended to apply the Bill to a broad range of bodies when they are exercising public functions. This was to ensure a consistent approach to foreign policy across the UK’s public institutions, to stop public bodies legitimising divisive campaigns, which can undermine community cohesion, and to allow public bodies to focus on their core purpose when engaging in procurement and investment. That was the intention of the manifesto commitment that I mentioned in the previous group.

These amendments seek, rightly, to probe the scope of the Bill’s definition of public authorities, but they also probe the need for the power to make exceptions to the ban. I will try to address each in turn.

I am very glad that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester has joined the debate. The Church of England would be in the Bill’s scope only to the extent that it exercises public functions. We have heard a little about the interpretation of that in the courts.

Before I address the specific amendments, I remind the Committee that the Bill will not create any new criminal offences. That is a very important point. I also take this opportunity to address the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Boateng, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, which was picked up by my noble friend Lord Deben, on orchestras. Orchestras are very unlikely to be regarded as public authorities. Moreover, withdrawing from an event is unlikely to be regarded as a procurement decision for the purposes of our Bill. The definition of a procurement decision does not include contracts where it is the public authority providing the service.

I can also reassure the noble Baroness who raised the issue that defence contracts are also exempt from the Bill. In addition, for contracts in scope, the Bill already contains an exception to the ban for national security considerations. In practice, if a case is reported to an enforcement authority it will look at whether the public authority had regard to any of the exemptions to the Bill—for example, the national security exemptions —during the decision-making process. Evidence of this might include if the public authority shows that it was following guidance from the UK Government, or became aware, for example, that a supplier was engaged in espionage.

Amendments 26 and 23 probe whether charitable organisations would come under the Bill’s scope. Charities would be captured by the ban only if they were performing public functions. It is the Government’s understanding that most charities will not be covered by the Bill. I hope that provides reassurance to noble Lords.