English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Baroness Taylor of Stevenage Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 29th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak initially to my Amendments 70 and 71 in this group. It is a pleasure being here with noble Lords; it feels like a reunion of assembly or London Councils meetings. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Gascoigne, who I know is not able to be here today, for adding his name to Amendment 70, and the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, for adding his name to Amendment 71. Both noble Lords have direct experience of the GLA and London government as a whole. Like other noble Lords, in drafting these amendments I bring 26 years’ experience as an assembly member and a London borough councillor.

Amendment 70 is about the power of summons. The law as it stands means that the assembly has relatively limited powers of summons over individuals and documents. It can summon the Mayor of London only in his or her role as chair of one of the functional bodies. For example, you could summon the mayor to a meeting as chair of Transport for London, but you could not summon them to come to a meeting if there was a huge failure or difficulties in their housing or solar programme and you wanted a detailed discussion. That makes no sense.

Furthermore, the assembly is prevented from summoning those delivering services in London. Noble Lords might well think that that does not matter because people will go and give evidence, so we do not need this power, but I will give the Committee a concrete example. Many years ago, I led an investigation into High Speed 2—then an initial programme that was going to have a huge impact in west London. High Speed 2, admittedly at that time under different management, refused to come before the assembly to give evidence to our inquiry. Despite huge amounts of correspondence, including the Department for Transport trying to put direct pressure on this body that was accountable to it, High Speed 2 refused to give any evidence at all. Yet it was delivering a project affecting London with huge amounts of public money.

Similar bodies, including the Environment Agency, the Port of London Authority and even London Councils, may attend if requested, but they, too, have at times decided not to. That cannot be right when we are trying to look at services delivering for London. This power would strengthen the assembly, allowing it to fully carry out its scrutiny role. It sits well with Amendment 72, which proposes a London local authorities joint committee, because there would need to be scrutiny of that body and this new power would allow the assembly to carry that out.

As I said, the noble Lord, Lord Gascoigne, is unable to be here today, but in correspondence last night he said that he was happy for me to explain his support for this. He comes at it from a different point of view. He used to work for the former Mayor of London and he said that, although we come at this from different angles—he would brief the mayor ahead of scrutiny and I would be there as a scrutineer—he feels that these scrutiny sessions are serious, healthy, important and substantive and he does not see any potential for these powers to be abused because you would use them only in exceptional circumstances. He feels that, ultimately, if the mayor turns up, they may not answer the questions put to them, but at least you would have that opportunity—so he was keen to support this amendment. This issue has had cross-party support on the assembly for years, so I hope that the Minister will seriously consider this amendment.

Of course, if more powers are given to the mayor, as was discussed at the start of this group, the assembly should be strengthened alongside this. The noble Baroness, Lady Scott, mentioned London being up on a pedestal but, actually, Manchester has more power than London in certain areas, such as health, and it feels as though London potentially needs to catch up.

Amendment 71 would remove the anomaly that, to amend the Mayor of London’s budget, a two-thirds majority is needed at the final stage. For many years, this has meant us, as assembly members, sitting there and rejecting the mayor’s budget and then it still going through at the final meeting because the threshold has not been reached. Such a threshold does not exist in any other part of local government, and I do not understand why it is needed here for London. I ask the Government to remove this requirement so that any mayor has to work with the assembly to ensure that a budget has majority support.

The other amendments in this group cover the establishment of a London local authorities joint committee and the power to pay grants to it. This would, as we have heard, put in place formally what is already taking place through other means. I am happy with these amendments. They have cross-party support and support from the London Assembly. As I said, they complement my amendment on the power of summons for the London Assembly, because I think that this joint committee should be subject to scrutiny as well.

Amendment 75, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill of Bexley, makes a reasonable point—the noble Baroness and I exchanged some correspondence at the weekend about it. As many of us have said, reviewing how the London system works and what lessons there are for other areas does not necessarily need to be in the Bill. I come at this from a different point of view. I am really keen to increase the powers of the London Assembly and to look at stronger scrutiny arrangements across the country with the rollout of mayoral and combined authorities. For me, that is the gap in the model that is being rolled out.

At the moment, there is little to no real scrutiny of billions of pounds-worth of expenditure across the country. This is a huge deficit in these new mayoral models. This scrutiny must be carried out by members who are not conflicted through other roles, such as being leaders of authorities. This is probably where I differ from the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, and the noble Lord, Lord John, because I think that council leaders can be conflicted. They want to secure funding for their borough, and that can cause tension—they may not want to get into the bad books of a mayor. That is where the benefits of the GLA model, with scrutineers who are directly elected, comes in. They can look at things more independently, ask the tough questions and, sometimes, produce very tough reports.

I disagree with the suggestions we have heard in the debate on the amendments in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Fuller and Lord Harris, about reducing the number of London boroughs. I do not think that that would be right. The amount of work, including casework, that borough councillors have to do in London is unbelievable compared to their colleagues elsewhere. That would not be a realistic option.

I look forward to the Minister’s response with interest. I hope we can start to see some movement to strengthen the powers of the assembly and to support London Councils on this matter.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (Baroness Taylor of Stevenage) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey and the noble Baronesses, Lady Scott of Bybrook, Lady Pidgeon and Lady O’Neill of Bexley, for their amendments relating to London devolution. As a mere veteran of what the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, described as provincial local government, I feel a little hesitant about sticking my head into the lion’s den of London local government—but it is my job, so I will do it anyway.

I start with the stand part notice in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, which would remove Clause 15 from the Bill. It is vital that the devolution framework works for the unique circumstances of London’s governance. Clause 15 must stand part of the Bill in order to signpost to Schedule 25 to the Bill and the GLA Act 1999. This enables the Government, among other things, to confer functions on the Mayor of London, the Greater London Authority and its functional bodies. Contrary to the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, about putting London on a pedestal, the provision enables us to confer powers on the mayor and the GLA. If the GLA was excluded from Schedule 25, it would then be the only strategic authority that would require primary legislation for the conferral of functions, and there is no rationale for creating a divergent approach just for London. Schedule 25 will ensure that the Greater London Authority benefits from the devolution framework and can deepen its powers over time.

The noble Baroness asked a question about consultation. Ahead of the Bill being introduced, the Government engaged the mayor, the GLA and London Councils on proposals in the devolution White Paper.

I thank my noble friend Lord Harris for bringing his wealth of experience and knowledge of London to our debates on this Bill. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady O’Neill, Lady Pidgeon and Lady Hayter, and the noble Lords, Lord Tope, Lord Moylan and Lord John. I have not yet been able to add up their joint years of London experience, but it is of significant breadth and depth, and it is welcome to have that informing our discussions on the Bill. For the record, my local council was formed in 1971 and has been a Labour council to this day. It does not quite meet the 60 years mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, but we are not far away, and we are a new town.

We are currently engaging positively with London Councils and the Greater London Authority on this matter. In the context of that ongoing work and the need to continue to work jointly towards a constructive resolution, I do not feel that it would be appropriate to rush in a legislative change for the unique arrangements for London governance through this amendment. I am very happy to meet my noble friend Lord Harris and other London partners, if he feels that that would be helpful before Report, because I understand the points he has made.

On Amendment 70, in the English devolution White Paper the Government committed to strengthening scrutiny in strategic authorities. As the noble Baroness knows, London is unique among strategic authorities, in that the mayor’s work is scrutinised by the directly elected London Assembly. It is my understanding that the mayor is committed to appear before 10 sessions each year for scrutiny. If he does not do so, or misses more than a number of those sessions, he can be sanctioned by the GLA.

As the Government consider the best way to strengthen scrutiny in strategic authorities, it is right that we tailor our approach to the arrangements in London. We will engage the GLA and the London Assembly on any potential changes. I have much sympathy with the frustration about key partners and providers that spend public money and then refuse to come before scrutiny bodies. I will not go into my particular pain over bus companies, but I understand the point that the noble Baroness was making there. This amendment would significantly alter the powers of the London Assembly and preclude the Government’s ongoing work on this issue, which is being taken forward in close discussion with combined authorities and the GLA.

Similarly, on Amendment 75, London’s model is unique among strategic authorities and has successfully served the people of London for the last 25 years—I think the noble Lord, Lord John, referred to the successful part of London governance. The Government are regularly in contact with the GLA to understand how its governance, scrutiny arrangements and partnership working arrangements are delivering for Londoners. As London’s devolution settlement evolves, the Government want to continue to see positive working between the GLA and its partners, including London borough councils, to deliver on shared priorities. We hope to build on these where possible. Therefore, we do not believe that a formal review is necessary.

I listened to the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, about issues around boroughs neighbouring London, Lee Valley park, the London grants scheme and so on. I will reflect on those. A meeting might be helpful, because I did not quite understand the balance between “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix” and there being things that need to be fixed that we should have a look at to see what changes would be necessary. It would absolutely not be right to interject a legislative knee-jerk into this space without the work that is needed between all parties to determine a way forward. I hope that we can move that forward before Report.

Amendment 71 seeks to introduce simple majority voting for the London Assembly to amend the Mayor of London’s final draft budget. This Bill includes measures to unblock mayoral decision-making. Primarily, this is by stipulating that most decisions in combined authorities and combined county authorities require a simple majority including the mayor, but also by making some functions, such as those concerning police and fire, exercisable by the mayor only.

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[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

We talked about a review of the scrutiny arrangements of other metro mayors, if you like—mayoral and strategic authorities. Is the Minister able to give us a timescale for that? We also talked about discussions with the GLA; the GLA is made up of the Mayor of London and the London Assembly. Is the department talking to officers and members of the London Assembly, because the Civil Service often uses the term “GLA” when it means just the mayor’s office.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My understanding is that discussions are with the GLA, but I will double-check on that and respond to the noble Baroness in writing.

We are putting in place a robust system of overview and scrutiny for the combined authorities. We are also considering, as we discussed with the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, the other day, whether a system of local public accounts committees might also be relevant.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

There is a certain sleight of hand going on. The noble Baroness referred to scrutiny arrangements and, of course, the London Assembly is largely a scrutiny body; that is what it spends most of its time doing. But when it comes to budget setting, it is a co-decision-maker. That is a crucial difference. Setting and amending the budget is not a scrutiny activity by the London Assembly; it is a co-decision-making function with the mayor, which strengthens democratic oversight of the mayor’s expenditure of what are now very large amounts of money—£20 billion-plus—on the people of London.

The question is what an appropriate position and appropriate balance of power for the assembly is in that co-decision-making role—not its scrutiny role, but its co-decision-making role. We are now into 26 years of existence of the London Assembly. The fact that that threshold has never once been met illustrates that it is not allowing the assembly to function as intended, as a co-decision-making body. It needs to be adjusted. One might say that the mayor’s executive functions would be hampered if democracy were improved, but of course the mayor’s executive functions would be further unhampered if there were no democracy at all. The London Assembly is meant to be a democratic body. Why is it not allowed to function as a normal democratic body in this one area where it has a co-decision-making power?

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I was referring to the difference between the combined authorities and the combined county authorities, which are made up of the constituent members from the local area. The GLA does not work like that, as we all know. It is not a body that represents the London boroughs; it is a different, directly elected body and it has a different scrutiny function. I was not trying to engage in sleight of hand; I was just pointing out the difference between the two bodies.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, I have listened carefully to noble Lords’ contributions, for which I am very grateful. It is so refreshing to hear about London local authorities. I have talked for a number of years in both Chambers about local government, but we very rarely have a proper debate on London governance. It is very refreshing and I thank noble Lords who have, it seems to me, hundreds of years of experience in the great city’s governance. It is seriously refreshing.

To the noble Lord, Lord Harris, I say that of course I understand the role of our great capital city and its importance in the economy of our country, but I do not think that that means that we cannot at times challenge it and scrutinise it from here, and I think that that is what we are doing. It is our genuine desire to ensure that community empowerment, efficiency and localism should apply to London as well when we are looking at the rest of the country.

Clause 15 remains wholly unclear, both in its purpose and its intention. Empowering one individual further without compelling justification or evidence is not the right direction of travel in our opinion. It may be that we need to review London before we give these further powers, as we are doing for the rest of the country. Are we giving these powers to an authority that is as efficient as it can be in governance, just as the rest of the country is being challenged to be before it gets those powers?

If there is a case for expanding the powers in London, I suggest that the Government look at that governance before they make that decision, which is why the amendment was tabled. If such a case exists, I believe that it should be laid before Parliament transparently rather than delivered through secondary legislation at a later stage in a way that limits our scrutiny and public understanding, which is important.

Equally, amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, and the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, have highlighted a real concern about the existing governance arrangements and structures, although I remain unconvinced that more layers of committees are the answer. None the less, not only are the Government taking, in our opinion, the wrong direction of travel, but they are also missing a great opportunity in this primary legislation. The proposal to reduce the two-thirds majority to a simple majority, as we have heard, for changes to the GLA council tax requirement would empower councillors, as we are trying to do in this Bill. My understanding is that, when the budget is debated, many of the issues in the budget are voted down by the GLA but, when it gets to the budget decision, that decision is lost. That does not seem right and the Government need to seriously look at this again.

The amendment tabled by my noble friend Lady O’Neill of Bexley—I thank her for all her work in the London boroughs—would give us exactly the opportunity that we want in order to assess what currently works, what does not work and where genuine reform, rooted in efficiency, transparency and local empowerment, might be needed.

I suggest that the Government are not listening to what we are saying. It seemed to me that, at different levels, there was pretty much cross-party agreement. I believe that they must explain with much more clarity why Clause 15 is necessary without some sort of review of London, who it benefits and what problems it seeks to solve. We all want a London that works for Londoners, for the people who come here to enjoy our wonderful capital city and for the economy that it feeds in this country.

I also believe that the Government’s arrangements for our city should be proportionate to those for the rest of the country. Further empowering an already powerful mayor without a real, robust rationale does not achieve that. I urge the Minister to reflect carefully between now and Report. In the meantime, I will withdraw my stand part notice but will be considering what we bring forward on Report.

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[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, we have had an interesting debate. In essence, we are debating a philosophical issue here. I firmly believe in democracy. Elections take place; your Lordships would be surprised to know that I do not always like some of the decisions that the electorate make, but I will defend every time the public having the opportunity to elect whom they want to represent them. That is a priority.

Just because I do not like it or just because they have a second job that I may not think appropriate, they should have that opportunity. We need some protections in place for fraud and other things, but I believe in democracy and, in essence, that is what the comments of my noble friends Lord Fuller and Lady O’Neill are about, and I associate myself with them. We should not prevent people standing for election; we should allow the electorate to make their choice. That is what democracy is. We may all have our views about whether a job is too big and therefore we cannot have somebody doing two of them but, if you believe in democracy, you believe that the electorate should have the facts presented in front of them and they should be given that choice. That is my strong philosophical view. We should not be telling the electorate, “No, you cannot have this person because they are already too busy”. Therefore, I genuinely believe my noble friend’s comments and that it is right that we should trust the electorate.

I appreciate that that may not align with certain party rules on different things, but there is no reason that the law has to mirror a certain party’s rules. I have no problem with whatever party having particular rules for the candidates they choose. That is the right thing to do. I know, from my own experience as chairman of the LGA, that the Conservative group had some very different rules from the Labour, Liberal and independent groups for how long people could stand and who was eligible. That is fine; I would not criticise the rules that Labour or the Liberals had, and I hope they did not criticise our rules. That was a choice; we were not imposing them by statute.

I very much support both the amendments of my noble friend Lord Gascoigne and the proposal that this clause not stand part of the Bill from my noble friend Lord Fuller. If Clause 16 stands part, the amendments proposed by my noble friend Lord Gascoigne would introduce a certain amount of flexibility. Given the amendments that the Government are proposing, what would happen if an election were to take place, let us say, 10 days before the end of a parliamentary term? Would the Government really want to impose a mayoral election? I am not quite sure that 10 days works, but I am sure your Lordships get my gist. If Clause 16 were to stand, a certain amount of flexibility would be beneficial, notwithstanding my previous comments.

I also agree with the Government’s amendments, assuming that eight days is the correct period and would give time for an MP to stand down and so forth, but I have a particular question on this. It may be very unlikely, but what happens if an election for a mayor happens when Parliament is not sitting? My understanding is that an MP cannot resign when Parliament is not sitting. Could the Minister at least consider that? I am not necessarily expecting an answer here, but a written answer would be helpful for everyone.

The fundamental point is why this Government believe that the electorate are not the right group of people to decide who represents them, even if they decide that it is Andy Burnham.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Gascoigne and Lord Fuller, for their amendments, and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, for moving the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Gascoigne, on members of legislatures disqualified for being a mayor of a strategic authority, and for probing whether Clause 16 is needed.

It is not the job of this Committee to debate the Labour Party rulebook or decisions of its national executive committee. Your Lordships must trust me that they do not want that job. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, and the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, for their interventions on that issue.

Clause 16 will prevent individuals being a Member of Parliament, or of the devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and a mayor at the same time. This is an important clause for two reasons. First and most critically, the post of mayor is a vital role at the forefront of delivering change—whether that is economic growth, public services, planning for the strategic area, transport or many other issues—and its responsibilities will only increase with this Bill. The role must demand a person’s full attention as a full-time post, rather than being a part-time position done alongside another vital public service role.

Secondly, elected members and mayors have a duty to represent the constituents who elected them. The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, raised the potential issue of having different constituencies. Fulfilling two different roles on behalf of different geographical areas could lead to conflicts of interest or undesirable trade-offs. This is absolutely not party political; it is common sense. Indeed, it is now the case that those mayors who are also police and crime commissioners—Andy Burnham and Tracy Brabin—cannot be Members of a UK legislature at the same time.

I know that this House operates on a slightly different basis, but when I joined it, I was still leader of my council. As a Minister you cannot do both jobs at the same time, but even before I was a Minister, I would not have dreamed of trying to do so. They are different jobs; both carry a heavy level of responsibility, and it was important to me to focus on one.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

Can the Minister clarify that what she just said about PCCs and Members of the legislature concerns the elected Members? We have to be very careful here; we are part of the legislature.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I apologise; I could have been clearer on that. The noble Baroness is quite right: it is the elected legislature. In view of my comments, I ask that noble Lords do not press their amendments.

Government Amendments 77, 80, 82, 85 and 90 will modify Clause 16 to introduce a grace period in which a mayor can hold office and simultaneously be a Member of a UK elected legislature without being disqualified. The period will be eight days. To answer the question from the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, the eight days enables the Chiltern Hundreds process to happen—that is the period required for going from being an MP to being a mayor. To go from being a mayor to being an MP, it enables the mayor to put their affairs in order before they take up their post as an MP. In the event that a mayor is running to be a Member of a UK legislature, it will be eight days beginning on the day when they are elected to that legislature.

I will write to the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, as I do not know the answer to his question. It is important that Members are given reasonable time to get their affairs in order and to ensure their resignation from the respective legislature. These amendments address concerns raised in the other place about ensuring that an orderly transition can occur in the event that an MP is appointed as a mayor. Similarly, mayors running to be a Member of a UK legislature would otherwise be disqualified immediately on election. Introducing the grace period provides a period of transition for the outgoing mayor to get their affairs in order. I commend these government amendments to the Committee.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

I raised another point in relation to the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Gascoigne. With a very strict timetable of eight days, one could envisage situations where any sensible person would stand back and ask, “Do we really want to have a mayoral election for the sake of two, three or four weeks?” Will the Government consider a bit more flexibility?

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I apologise; I meant to say to the noble Lord that I will write to him about the situation in which Parliament may not be sitting when that election takes place.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

I appreciate that the Minister will do that, but I was also making the point that the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Gascoigne, would at least provide some flexibility. The common-sense approach would be to ask, “Why would I have a mayoral election this month when there’s one happening next month anyway?” Can there be a bit more flexibility? As the Labour Party has rightly said, it costs a lot of money to run an election in Manchester.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I will reflect on that question and come back to the noble Lord.

[Baroness O’Neill of Bexley (Con)]

I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

77: Clause 16, page 20, line 7, at end insert—
“(1A) If a person—(a) is elected as the mayor for the area of a combined authority, and(b) is, on the first day of the mayoral term, an elected member of a legislature in the United Kingdom,the person is not disqualified under this paragraph for holding office as the mayor at any time in the period of eight days beginning with the first day of the mayoral term.(1B) If a person—(a) becomes an elected member of a legislature in the United Kingdom, and(b) is, when the person becomes the elected member, the mayor for the area of a combined authority,the person is not disqualified under this paragraph for holding office as the mayor at any time in the period of eight days beginning with the day on which the person becomes the elected member of the legislature.”Member’s explanatory statement
This would stop the new disqualification from applying during an 8 day “grace period” beginning with the day when it would otherwise apply (in the absence of this amendment). This would give time for an orderly resignation as legislator (where the person becomes mayor) or as mayor (where the person becomes a legislator).

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Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

80: Clause 16, page 20, line 13, at end insert—
““first day of the mayoral term” , in relation to a person who is elected as the mayor for the area of a combined authority, means the day that would be the first day of the person’s term as the mayor if it is assumed that the person is not disqualified under this paragraph.””Member’s explanatory statement
This makes clear that the effect of the new disqualification provision must be ignored when working out what is the first day of the mayoral term.

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Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

82: Clause 16, page 20, line 23, at end insert—
“(1A) If a person—(a) is elected as the mayor for the area of a CCA, and(b) is, on the first day of the mayoral term, an elected member of a legislature in the United Kingdom,the person is not disqualified under this paragraph for holding office as the mayor at any time in the period of eight days beginning with the first day of the mayoral term.(1B) If a person—(a) becomes an elected member of a legislature in the United Kingdom, and(b) is, when the person becomes the elected member, the mayor for the area of a CCA,the person is not disqualified under this paragraph for holding office as the mayor at any time in the period of eight days beginning with the day on which the person becomes the elected member of the legislature.”Member’s explanatory statement
This would stop the new disqualification from applying during an 8 day “grace period” beginning with the day when it would otherwise apply (in the absence of this amendment). This would give time for an orderly resignation as legislator (where the person becomes mayor) or as mayor (where the person becomes a legislator).

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Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

85: Clause 16, page 20, line 29, at end insert—
““first day of the mayoral term” , in relation to a person who is elected as the mayor for the area of a CCA, means the day that would be the first day of the person’s term as the mayor if it is assumed that the person is not disqualified under this paragraph.”Member’s explanatory statement
This makes clear that the effect of the new disqualification provision must be ignored when working out what is the first day of the mayoral term.

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Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

87: Clause 16, page 20, line 38, at end insert—
“(1A) If a person—(a) is elected as the Mayor, and(b) is, on the first day of the Mayoral term, an elected member of a legislature in the United Kingdom,the person is not disqualified under this section from being the Mayor at any time in the period of eight days beginning with the first day of the Mayoral term.(1B) If a person—(a) becomes an elected member of a legislature in the United Kingdom, and(b) is, when the person becomes the elected member, the Mayor,the person is not disqualified under this section from being the Mayor at any time in the period of eight days beginning with the day on which the person becomes the elected member of the legislature.”Member’s explanatory statement
This would stop the new disqualification from applying during an 8 day “grace period” beginning with the day when it would otherwise apply (in the absence of this amendment). This would give time for an orderly resignation as legislator (where the person becomes Mayor) or as Mayor (where the person becomes a legislator).

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Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

90: Clause 16, page 21, line 6, at end insert—
““first day of the Mayoral term” , in relation to a person who is elected as the Mayor, means the day that would be the first day of the person’s term as the Mayor if it is assumed that the person is not disqualified under this section.”Member’s explanatory statement
This makes clear that the effect of the new disqualification provision must be ignored when working out what is the first day of the Mayoral term.

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[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly to these amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, who asked a number of important and timely questions.

Let me use her first amendment in this group as an example. It would require the Secretary of State, when making regulations, to consider and

“minimise any conflict, overlap, or duplication between the functions of the Mayor and the functions of other authorities or public bodies”.

This is absolutely sensible and common-sense, and it should happen. However, I suggest that, for clarity, this should extend also to Whitehall, from where powers are devolved; then, with the exception of oversight, those powers and the bureaucracy involved should no longer exist within Whitehall.

The Bill amends the 2023 Act through numerous schedules and amendments. It is right, therefore, that we ensure this clarity and avoid unnecessary overlap. I am sure that many Members in this Grand Committee will remember the passage of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill through the House. It was a long and complex piece of legislation—I pay tribute to the excellent work done by my noble friend Lady Scott—and the changes in this policy and space must be approached with care. I am keen, therefore, to hear from the Minister about the Government’s overall approach to avoiding unnecessary and costly duplication and legal uncertainty, in relation not just to this amendment but across the Bill as a whole.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, for her amendments on the role of mayors. Before I respond to these amendments, I want to clarify the rationale for Clause 18. The clause will extend an existing power of the Secretary of State to provide that certain general functions may be exercised solely by a mayor. The power currently exists in the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 and, as the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, said, in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023. This clause will ensure that it can also apply to general functions conferred under any other regulation or Act of Parliament. The extension of this existing power reflects the broader range of routes through which functions may be conferred on strategic authorities and their mayors, once the current Bill becomes law.

Amendments 91 and 92 seek to amend this clause and prevent the potential for conflict, overlap or duplication between a mayor’s functions and those of other authorities or public bodies. As your Lordships will know, mayors of combined authorities or combined county authorities are not corporate entities in themselves. For that reason, all functions must be conferred on the underlying authority rather than directly on to the mayor. However, some functions may be designated as mayoral functions, as they are to be exercised only by the mayor. Where functions have been made mayoral, they typically relate to the management of day-to-day activities.

Key strategic decisions still require approval by the strategic authority constituent members. To give an example, all members will vote on which roads form part of a key route network, after which the mayor will be responsible for managing it. This will allow for swifter decision-making and more effective governance on day-to-day matters.

It will be important that all tiers of local government work together to benefit their communities. This is why principal local authorities will be embedded within the decision-making structures of strategic authorities as full constituent members. This will ensure that they play a central role in drawing up specific strategies and plans, such as local growth plans. Furthermore, before any new function is conferred on a strategic authority by regulations, the Secretary of State will be required to consult the constituent councils of any affected strategic authorities and any other person who exercises the function concerned. This will ensure that the views of those affected are properly considered.

I hope that, with these explanations, the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Thornhill (LD)]

I absolutely accept that the new structures are complex and complicated. It is very easy to be seduced by the noble Baroness’s fluent explanation. My amendment was coming more from the perspective of practicalities, which was also borne out by the comments earlier that, in reality, there is overlap, with weakened scrutiny, unclear accountability and eroded public trust. I would like to feel that a lot of work was being done into what those are. We know it is probably happening, but it is all going to come later through SIs and secondary legislation. I wanted to make it absolutely clear, up front, that those overlaps and duplications will be considered, because they will be a source of conflict and friction going forward. It was interesting that the leaders of boroughs are saying that that is happening even 20 or however many years later. But, for the moment, I will withdraw my amendment.

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[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, the issues raised in this group are fundamental, and I support everything that has been said so far, broadly speaking. Our efforts to identify how the new structure will relate to all the other organisations delivering public services, and how they will all work together, demonstrates the importance of Committee. I hope that when the Minister replies there will be some positive movement on that.

I hope the Minister will not think me flippant when I have said what I am about to say. Amendments 98 and 99 are important in probing the necessity of forcing local partners to respond to meeting requests. Many of the Bill’s pages—pages 23 to 34—are about mayoral powers to require local partners to attend meetings and other mayors to collaborate, and so on. I have a simple question for the Minister about local partners; as I say, I hope she will not think I am being flippant. The Bill says:

“The mayor for the area … may convene meetings with local partners to consider relevant local matters”.


I understand that, but can local partners convene a meeting with the mayor to consider relevant local matters?

I ask that question because, on previous days in Committee, the answers that we have had about devolution away from mayors to, say, constituent councils, have been that there is to be no power of scrutiny for a constituent council within a strategic authority. That is a very serious matter—I do not think it will work. My question is simple: can local partners convene a meeting with the mayor, or is this a one-way power whereby only the mayor can convene meetings with local partners? If it is, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, and the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, will be willing to pursue the matter when we get to Report.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Scott and Lady Royall, and the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, for their amendments on local partners’ co-operation with mayors. This is an important group of amendments. Without this type of local co-operation, devolution will not work, so I take it very seriously.

Amendment 98 would provide for the Mayor of London, instead of the Secretary of State, to define “local partners” for the purposes of Clause 21. Elsewhere in England, it would remain for the Secretary of State to define the meaning of “local partners” in regulations. Were this amendment to be made, it would create an immediate inconsistency between the powers of the Mayor of London and the approach taken elsewhere in England. Allowing the Mayor of London to specify local partners where other mayors could not would lead to a piecemeal and unclear definition of local partners, risking confusion at all levels. Defining “local partners” in regulations will allow for appropriate parliamentary scrutiny—I think that is important—will provide a single, coherent definition across England and will ensure that mayors’ power to convene can be clearly understood by both mayors and local partners.

Examples of the types of organisations the regulations may include are those that deliver public services on behalf of, or receive funding from, a mayoral strategic authority; are identifiable as key enablers in statutory strategies; or play a material role in helping a mayoral strategic authority perform its functions within its local area. We are not seeking to define “local partners” in isolation. We are interested in understanding from strategic authorities and their mayors the type of organisations and institutions that should fall under a definition of a “local partner”. We are doing some more work on that with our strategic authorities.

I turn to Amendment 99, which seeks to understand the requirement for local partners to respond to a notification from a mayor of a strategic authority to convene a meeting. Clause 21 provides mayors with a new power to notify local partners of their intention to convene a meeting on a local matter that relates to their areas of competence. It also places a corresponding requirement on any local partner to respond to such a notification. This power is designed to enable mayors to bring the right people around the table, so that partners can work together to tackle shared challenges, seize opportunities for their communities and deliver the best outcomes for local people. The point from the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, about data sharing was very relevant to this. It is often the lack of ability to share data across organisations that slows down these kinds of collaborative projects.

The requirement on local partners is proportionate and not unduly burdensome. It does not oblige partners to engage beyond acknowledging the notification, nor does it prescribe what steps a local partner must take following any meeting or how they must act. Rather, the requirement is simply to respond to a mayor’s notification. The intention is to promote constructive dialogue even where there may be a difference of view on the relevant local matter. Taken together with the other mayoral powers of competence in this Bill, Clause 21 will strengthen the role of strategic authority mayors, giving them the means to drive growth, foster collaboration and deliver improvements for their communities.

On the point that the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, made about whether public bodies can require the mayor to attend, the mayor’s role in convening will probably answer that point, but I will reflect on it. If the mayor had a duty to convene people to collaborate on issues, and another body requested a meeting to discuss something like that, it would not seem in the spirit of what is in this Bill for the mayor to decline that invitation. I will take that back and think about it a little more.

Finally, I turn to Amendments 196 and 237 from my noble friend Lady Royall and the noble Lord, Lord Bichard. I assure noble Lords that the Government —and I—strongly support the spirit of the amendments: local public service partners and strategic authorities should collaborate to ensure quality, joined-up services for local people. Placing a new, wide-ranging statutory duty on local public service partners to attend meetings; provide information and assistance; and engage with strategic and local authorities in their local area may place an additional and unwarranted burden on these bodies. I, too, remember the Total Place initiative. One thing that got in the way of that was the dialogue between bodies, when they said, “We just do not have the capacity to provide that at the moment”. It caused some friction between some bodies.

As set out in the English devolution White Paper, it is the intention that mayors act as conveners on public service reform. The Bill provides them with the power to do this by granting them a power to convene local partners on their areas of competence, which include health, well-being and public service reform. The Bill places a corresponding duty on local partners to respond to a request by a mayor to meet. It is important to note that this does not place a duty on local partners to agree to particular policies of the mayor or to meet if they do not think that it is appropriate. We believe that this strikes the right balance between giving mayors the tools to drive collaboration, protecting the independence of local partners to act as they think fit and avoiding burdensome duties to which they must adhere.

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[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

I will take back what the noble Baroness says. In this case, my point is that a random unelected body is not the same as an elected body. I genuinely think that democracy is important. If you wish to engage, you probably need to be a bit more nuanced in whom you engage with, because it should not be random; it should be those people who can really give you the feedback and information you need, depending on the subject and the place. Take central Bedfordshire, for example: a random 100 people from across central Bedfordshire will not be particularly helpful when we are discussing what is happening in my own little village of Maulden; I would rather discuss it with the residents of Maulden.

With that, I shall move on. This debate has made it clear that collaboration is important—in many cases, essential. I hope that it will be taken seriously by the Minister and that she will come back with some flexibility later on in the Bill’s passage.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I am sorry that we have been pressing on time; the Hansard team and other officers were here until very late last night and we do not want to put them under any further pressure.

I thank the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, the noble Lords, Lord Ravensdale and Lord Wallace, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett and Lady Janke, for their amendments on the duty to collaborate. I shall start with Amendment 100, for which I thank the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty. I completely understand the intention behind this amendment—we have now had many discussions on this issue—but we ultimately think that it is unnecessary, as cultural well-being is captured in the current wording of Clause 22.

Culture underpins our creative and visitor economies; in this way, cultural activity is inherently captured in the meaning of

“economic, social or environmental well-being”.

The formulation is intentionally wide so that mayors can request collaboration on a broad range of matters; it is also intended to avoid an exhaustive or prospective list. Adding “cultural” risks undermining that approach and creating pressure to enumerate further dimensions of well-being without delivering any substantive new effect. Indeed, explicitly singling culture out could invite arguments that other aspects of well-being that are not listed are of lesser importance, or that cultural interests should be interpreted narrowly or separately from economic, social or environmental considerations.

Mayors of strategic authorities can, and already do, collaborate on cultural matters. The Mayors of South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, York and North Yorkshire have come together to sign the White Rose Agreement, committing to work together on high-profile culture and sporting events and to celebrate Yorkshire’s heritage. I hope that the noble Earl and the other noble Lords who raised the issue of culture have been reassured by my agreement to reflect on how culture is treated in the competency framework.

I turn to Amendment 101, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, which seeks to promote greater regional collaboration between mayors and other public and private partners. The Government agree with the value and benefits of regional collaboration. However, while the amendment is well intentioned, we do not think it is necessary. Strategic authorities and their mayors already have a wide range of mechanisms to collaborate across administrative boundaries, and several mayors are already doing so successfully. We heard some examples from the noble Lord.

The powers in Clause 22 are not intended to replace the wide range of positive and informal collaboration that already takes place. They are intended to supplement these existing mechanisms and strengthen mayoral leadership by providing a more formal route for cross-boundary pan-regional collaboration where this can improve outcomes for communities. However, it should be for mayors to decide for themselves how to use these powers rather than for the Government to prescribe or constrain the purposes and form that mayoral collaboration must take. More broadly, under existing legislation, combined authorities and combined county authorities can already enter into joint committees, allowing them to discharge certain powers together and jointly produce legislative documents such as spatial development strategies.

I turn to Amendment 102 from the noble Lord, Lord Wallace; this is not from Sir Humphrey, but from me—I am passionate about devolution and am not letting anyone get in the way of that; it is good programme, though, and I like it. This amendment would require strategic authorities to prepare joint strategic development plans, covering two or more strategic authority areas in certain circumstances. I appreciate the intent behind the amendment to join up strategic authorities, but I do not agree that the amendment is necessary. We already have broadly equivalent powers as a result of the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025. New Section 12B of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, as inserted by the 2025 Act, enables the Secretary of State to require authorities to work together on spatial development strategies through the establishment of a strategic planning board. The Government intend to use these powers, in particular in areas without a combined authority or a combined county authority. The same Act gives the Secretary of State a wide range of intervention powers in relation to the preparation and adoption of spatial development strategies.

It is worth highlighting that, where strategic planning authorities are working on separate spatial development strategies, they are required by the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, as amended by the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025, to have regard to the need to be consistent with current national policies. The National Planning Policy Framework sets out strong expectations on authorities to work effectively across local government boundaries.

I turn to Amendment 103. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for raising the importance of citizen engagement in local decision-making. The Government fully agree that residents should have meaningful opportunities to shape the decisions that affect their areas. However, as the locally elected leaders in their regions, mayors should have the ability to decide on how best to engage with their local communities. Mayors can convene citizens’ assemblies if they wish to, and, in places such as South Yorkshire, mayors have decided to use these powers. Once the Bill becomes law, all mayors will have general powers of competence conferred automatically on them, which will enable them to convene citizens assemblies should they wish to do so.

Finally, the Bill already includes a provision in this area. Clause 60 introduces a neighbourhood governance duty, requiring all local authorities to put in place arrangements to secure effective neighbourhood governance. That will ensure that communities have meaningful opportunities to inform and influence local decisions.

I turn to Amendment 104, from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and Amendment 196, from the noble Baroness, Lady Janke. Both seek to ensure that mayors and strategic authorities work closely with their local authorities, public service providers and bodies representing local communities in town and parish councils. I recognise the spirit in which these amendments have been made. It is important for all mayors to engage with the wider public sector and the local authority family in delivering their own functions. However, strategic authorities are already expected, through existing legislation and provisions in this Bill, to work collaboratively with local partners and communities when exercising their functions.

Amendment 104 in particular would impose a disproportionate administrative burden on mayors of strategic authorities by placing a new duty requiring them to meet local authorities, public service providers and town and parish councils. As an illustration, North Yorkshire alone compromises 729 individual parishes, organised into 412 town and parish councils. Expecting a mayor to discharge this proposed duty in respect of each body would be impractical and may crowd out some of the time needed for the officer’s other strategic responsibilities. Parish and town councils continue to be supported in their work, and local authorities are strongly encouraged to work with them to understand the contribution they are able to make to the delivery of local services and the management of local assets.