Council of Europe: 75th Anniversary

Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts

Tuesday 16th April 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton (Con)]

My interpretation of recent political movements in Poland is that it has rather moved back to the centre, having elected Donald Tusk and my counterpart, Radek Sikorski. I will look specifically at the point about restitution, because I am not aware of that, but I make the broader point that one of the reasons why some of these more fringe parties are doing well in Europe—look at the Portuguese elections, for instance—is because mainstream politicians have not done enough to demonstrate that immigration is under control, that illegal immigration is cracked down on, and that migration policies are designed in and by parliaments for the specific benefits of the countries. Where you see that happen in Australia or Canada, which have higher rates of migration than we do but it is so clear that the policies are designed by those countries and for those countries, they seem to have less of a problem with extremist parties than many countries in Europe.

[Lord Clarke of Nottingham (Con)]

My Lords, I think I am right in saying that the only country on the entire continent that has always rejected membership of the Council of Europe and refused to accept the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights is Belarus, which is a cruel dictatorship with no regard for human rights at all. Russia has been expelled. My noble friend was a little evasive on the present position of the court. Reform is undoubtedly one thing, which can be collectively agreed on by all the members of the Council of Europe, but can he not just give a simple, categorical assurance on the part of the present Government that they will not at any stage contemplate rejecting membership of the Council of Europe or the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, which is a most important international institution, particularly for the reasons given by the previous questioner?

[Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton (Con)]

Let me be clear: the Government see no inconsistency between their policies and our membership of the Council of Europe. We do not have any plans to act in the way that my noble friend says. The point I am making— I am being very frank and open with your Lordships’ House—is that there are moments of extreme frustration. My noble friend will remember serving in government with me when the European Court of Human Rights ruled repeatedly that we had to give prisoners the vote. There is nothing in the European convention that says anything about giving prisoners the vote. To me, that is a decision for democratic parliaments. You can decide that everybody has the vote irrespective of what crime they have committed, but that is not my position. I think that if you commit a crime, you go to prison and lose your right to vote. That is a perfectly reasonable, democratic and, dare I say, almost liberal position that you should be entitled to hold, so when the court told us that we could not hold that opinion we disagreed with vigour. The point I am making is that these organisations are important and do good work, but if they overreach they plant the seeds of their own destruction.

Israel and Gaza

Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts

Tuesday 27th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Lord Clarke of Nottingham (Con)]

My Lords, practically every Government from outside that is taking an interest could quite easily agree on the path that my noble friend has been describing, leading to a two-state solution and a permanent ceasefire. The difficulty is there seems to be not the slightest prospect of Hamas ever agreeing to accept the continued existence of Israel and not the slightest chance of a Netanyahu Government agreeing to a two-state solution, which they would regard as giving Hamas a victory for its 7 October activities—and they probably have the majority of the Israeli population at this present time agreeing with them at least on that. As noble Lords have indicated in earlier questions, the only way that anyone can foresee the kind of agreement that my noble friend has been describing being reached is by some sort of enforcement mechanism being applied from outside. A peacekeeping mission would need to be established to try to ensure that it does not all collapse and go back into calamity in a very short time. I realise that that is a big proposition, which could never happen unless the US Government began to take an interest in that kind of intervention. Have the British Government considered that kind of approach? Have we ever raised it with our American allies? Is there any prospect of getting together with the Arab states to contemplate such a thing? Otherwise, although we wish every success to the present activities, I cannot believe that many people listening to this are optimistic about their success.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My noble friend will know from his time in government that there are details that are currently under way with regard to securing what is necessary for Israel and providing it with security guarantees. That will constitute a presence beyond the Israeli Army that is currently in Gaza that has the confidence of the Palestinians within Gaza, but, importantly, has the security guarantees that Israel needs. We are working on that.

On the specifics, of course we are working hand in glove with the Americans. My noble friend will have seen the Secretary of State’s repeated engagements in the region, and we are complementing those. This is very much a coherent effort. If I may personalise this, in my almost seven years at the Foreign Office I have never known a diplomatic effort of this nature that is so intertwined with key partners—not just traditional partners, such as those within the EU and of course the US, but our key partners in the region that are playing the important role of ensuring that the Arab presence on security will be acceptable to the Palestinians. I cannot go into more detail, but I assure my noble friend that we are very much seized of that.

Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2022

Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts

Thursday 3rd March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Waverley (CB)]

My Lords, these are dark days. I am delighted to follow and identify with the initial remarks of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and the noble Lord, Lord Austin. Our hearts are with the brave people of Ukraine. The Russian people will suffer long-term hardship but nothing compared to that befalling the extraordinary people of Ukraine.

It is no fault of the Russian people that they have no understanding of the reality of why they are being fully penalised. It is quite astounding that, from my calls to Russia, their perception of what is going on in Ukraine borders, frankly, on the fanciful. Disinformation is rife. These measures are very necessary and the UK Government are doing exactly what they have to do. They have my full support.

[Lord Clarke of Nottingham (Con)]

My Lords, I fully support these sanctions and I congratulate the Government on the packages brought forward. I look forward with interest to the replies to be given to several of the detailed points raised about exactly how firmly they will be enforced.

I will look forward a little. The medium to long-term reality is that we are applying these sanctions against Russia, but Russia is almost certain in the end to achieve some degree of military success. A new reality will dawn, probably with a puppet Government in Ukraine, and the whole issue will start fading from international debate, from the media and so on. What are the Government’s plans for the medium term and, if necessary, the longer-term future in sustaining these sanctions and this level of pressure on the Russian regime?

In reality, there will be quite rapidly a tendency to put pressure on the Government to allow people to return to a new normality: to allow Russian companies to have access to the City of London again and to ease sanctions causing financial losses to lawyers, accountants and firms here. Is the Minister able to assure me that, as far as the British Government are concerned, we intend to retain this degree of sanctions until some satisfactory solution to the political problem is achieved, with a genuine agreement with a respectable Ukrainian Government who have proper regard to international law and national sovereignty? Will the British Government remain one of the more robust in the western lands? There will be considerable pressure to stop doing so much once we have, as it were, done our best to protect the Ukrainian regime during the conflict.

The sooner we start addressing that problem, the sooner we will start facing up to realistic problems that we must plan for. The Russians will undoubtedly, for example, try to ensure that the sanctions do quite a bit of damage to western economies, and will start trying to use their influence on the oil and energy markets to demonstrate that they can cause us some continuing loss unless we begin to lose interest—shall we say?—in the crisis that has so shocked the world. Are we determined to be one of those western countries that will seek to maintain the fullest force of sanctions we can unless and until a satisfactory solution is reached with the Russian regime?

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble and learned Lord, who has just given the Government some wise advice which I hope the Minister will carry back to his colleagues.

We welcome the sanctions and look forward to the arrival of the economic crime Bill when it comes from the Commons the week after next. That has flushed out quite a lot of advice and some very strong comments from people who have been looking at the area of economic crime and kleptocracy in this country. One of the threads coming through, which goes back to the issue of what we can do now to stem that flight of capital, is that we are not fully using the anti-money laundering laws that we already have on statute in order to do that now. Will the Minister agree that more can be done with current legislation, which can be used to help stem the flow of money stolen from the people of Russia? Does he undertake to redouble efforts with all the bodies that have the power to use these anti-money laundering laws to get on and do it?

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd October 2019 Commons Chamber

[Dominic Raab]

I will certainly pass on the hon. Lady’s specific request to the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government. She is right to raise the quality of housing. When I was Housing Minister, we developed proposals for a social housing Green Paper. We want social housing tenants to feel they are treated with respect. I remember meeting an individual who said that he ran his own business, and when he went to work he was treated with respect but when he came back home he was treated disrespectfully by his housing association. That is not right.

I would gently say to the hon. Lady that we have delivered over 222,000 additional homes in the past year—the highest level in all but one of the past 31 years —and we have built more council housing than in the previous 13 years of the last Labour Government.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Ind)]

Sir John Major rang me about half an hour ago simply to give vent to his indignation, which I already fully shared, that a major policy announcement of historic significance—our last offer, apparently, to the EU of a withdrawal agreement—was being made not to this House of Commons, which is not even to have a statement, and not after discussion in the Cabinet, most of whose members know nothing about it, but in a speech to the Conservative party conference in which the Prime Minister—who, I remind you, was one of those who voted to stop us leaving the European Union at the end of March—began with an attack on Parliament. If a deal is obtained, I will be delighted and I will apologise to the Prime Minister. I will vote for any deal that is agreed among the 28 member states of the European Union. But can the Foreign Secretary reassure me—it seems to me obvious, otherwise—that this is not just a party political campaigning ploy to blame the European Union for the lack of an agreement and to arouse fury between people and Parliament so as to escape from the responsibility that seems to me to lie with the Spartans on the far right of the party, with whom he and the Prime Minister used to be close allies?

[Dominic Raab]

I thank my right hon. and learned Friend. On the specific point, the proposals we are setting out to Brussels—David Frost, the Prime Minister’s special adviser, is in Brussels doing that—will be set out first in the House of Commons. They will be published—[Interruption.] No. The shadow Foreign Secretary is chuntering from a sedentary position, but the proposals have not been set out in Manchester; they will be set out in written proposals to Jean-Claude Juncker and published in the House later on. I gently say to my right hon. and learned Friend: I know—[Interruption.] Later today—[Interruption.] The shadow Foreign Secretary is continuing to talk from a sedentary position. My right hon. and learned Friend and I have always had slightly nuanced but differing views on the EU, but I think the one thing we all want to do is to get a deal right now—that is why the attempts by Parliament to frustrate that have been deeply counterproductive—and to give effect to the promises that, on all sides of the House, we made to give effect to the referendum and to keep trust with the electorate of this country.

Venezuela

Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts

Monday 28th January 2019 Commons Chamber

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I totally agree with the hon. Lady. What the Venezuelan people have had to suffer at the hands of Maduro is beyond contempt. Across the Floor of the House, we all believe that it is very important to champion human rights. I remind those who think that it is appropriate to support Venezuela at the moment on the one hand, and then on the other believe that they are also champions of human rights, that it is Venezuela’s neighbours who have referred not only the person but the entire state, for the first time ever, to the International Criminal Court, citing 8,000 extrajudicial executions, 12,000 arbitrary arrests and 13,000 political prisoners in custody. If people want to champion Venezuela, they are also championing that, and they should be ashamed of themselves.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)]

I have been listening carefully to these exchanges because I visited Venezuela quite frequently until about 10 years ago. I remember it as a very attractive place with a rapidly emerging economy and a reasonably democratic constitution. Does my right hon. Friend share my slight trepidation and sense of powerlessness about exactly what the United Kingdom and our various allies are going to do? When he is consulting with the United States and the European Union, will he advise against just imposing more economic sanctions, which will cause even more poverty to the population of Venezuela, probably without moving the Maduro Government unduly? Will he consider targeted sanctions aimed at shifting the military elite, who are obviously solely responsible for keeping this dreadful Government in power? Will he consult not only the European Union and the United States, but friendly countries in the rest of Latin America? Governments such as that of Colombia will be the best guides to what might be done to change something in this completely failed and disgraceful regime.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

As usual, my right hon. and learned Friend offers the House some very wise advice and guidance, and I am able to say yes to pretty much everything he said. First, when it comes to sanctions, it is important to target individuals rather than cause increased pain to the citizens of Venezuela. On the other hand, most of the money that goes in gets stolen anyway and goes to the elite, so although one might think that sanctions would in normal circumstances often cause more damage to the country, they in fact do more broadly target the elite.

When it comes to talking to Venezuela’s neighbours, that is exactly what we in the Government and I personally have been doing for well over a year. The Lima Group, which is championed, as the name suggests, by the Foreign Minister of Peru, have been acting very closely together, and they are the ones that have been very tough on Venezuela—in some cases, removing ambassadors and calling for early elections and the removal of Maduro—and we are talking to them. It is from Venezuela’s regional neighbours that we perhaps take our most detailed steer and guidance in knowing how to approach this very difficult issue.

Detainee Mistreatment and Rendition

Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts

Monday 2nd July 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on whether the Government will now reinstate the judge-led inquiry that the former Government promised in 2012, in the light of the two Intelligence and Security Committee reports on detainee mistreatment and rendition published on 28 June 2018.

[Mr Speaker]

Order. Before the Minister of States replies—we look forward to that with eager anticipation—perhaps I can be the first in the House to congratulate the right hon. and learned Gentleman, the Father of the House, on his birthday. The only prediction I feel that I can make with any confidence is that, as he celebrated two weeks ago today the 48th anniversary of his first election to the House, it is a fair bet that he has now reached the mid-point of his parliamentary career.

[The Minister for Europe and the Americas (Sir Alan Duncan)]

May I also congratulate my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke)? At the outset, I want to thank him for his question and his leadership of the all-party parliamentary group on extraordinary rendition.

The Government welcome the publication of the Intelligence and Security Committee’s reports and are grateful for its vital work and examination of allegations of UK involvement in mistreatment and rendition. May I also declare that between 2014 and 2016, I was for a period on the Intelligence and Security Committee when it was conducting this very long investigation? It is right that these reports and as much information as possible from this period are put in the public domain. We need to ensure that we learn from past mistakes so that they are never repeated. The Prime Minister laid a written ministerial statement in Parliament last Thursday, setting out the Government’s initial response to the reports.

It is important to note the context in which the Government, including the security and intelligence agencies and the armed forces, were working in the immediate aftermath of 11 September 2001. The UK responded to the tragic events of 9/11 with the aim of doing everything possible to prevent further loss of innocent life. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that UK personnel were working within a new and challenging operating environment for which, in some cases, they were not prepared. It took too long to recognise that guidance and training for staff was inadequate, and too long to understand fully, and take appropriate action on, the risks arising from our engagement with international partners.

The “Current Issues” report recognises that improvements have been made to operational processes since those post-9/11 years. In particular, the consolidated guidance, published in 2010—I would point out that we are the only country to have active consolidated guidance of this sort in operation—provides clear direction for UK personnel and governs their interaction with detainees held by others and the handling of any intelligence received from them. This is coupled with world-leading independent oversight, including by the Committee and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, Sir Adrian Fulford.

Formal oversight responsibility for the consolidated guidance rests with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. Last week, Sir Adrian Fulford welcomed the Prime Minister’s invitation to him to make proposals on how the consolidated guidance could be improved further and he would be able to take account of the Committee’s views and those of civil society. The Prime Minister has stated that the Government will give further consideration to the Committee’s conclusions and recommendations. The Government will also give careful consideration to the calls for another judge-led inquiry and will update the House within 60 days of publication of the reports.

I would like once again to reassure the House that the Government do not participate in, solicit, encourage or condone the use of torture for any purpose. We can and should be proud of the work done by our intelligence and service personnel, often in the most difficult circumstances. It is right that they should be held to the highest possible standards, and I am confident that the changes we have made in recent years will allow us both to protect our national security and to maintain our global reputation as a champion for human rights across the world.

[Mr Clarke]

We need robust and effective intelligence services to protect our national security, and I am sure we are all grateful to those who carry out this work and do it for us. I welcome the Minister’s reiteration of our opposition to torture and our acceptance that good but robust standards must be maintained. In the light of that, however, I would like to know why the Intelligence and Security Committee was stopped from completing the report, on which he himself had been working, when it had already uncovered the unacceptable situation of a large number of cases of British complicity in torture, mistreatment and hijacking of people to Guantanamo Bay and to Libya?

The Committee reached the stage at which it wished to call witnesses directly involved. As it makes clear in its own report, it reached the stage at which it wanted

“to examine certain matters in detail, which could only be done by taking evidence from those who had been on the ground”.

The Government denied that, and the Committee felt it had no alternative but to stop its work. Why was that done, and what are we trying to cover up of what was done during the time of the Blair Government?

The judge-led inquiry was set up in 2010, to wide welcome, and Sir Peter Gibson produced a report that established more than 20 important questions that we all agreed should be answered. The inquiry had to be suspended—brought to an end—in 2012 while we waited for the police investigations on Libya to finish. As Justice Secretary at the time, I announced the delay to the House. I said:

“It will then be possible for the Government to take a final view as to whether a further judicial inquiry still remains necessary to add any further information of value to future policy making and the national interest.”—[Official Report, 19 December 2013; Vol. 572, c. 916.]

We had actually guaranteed earlier that the inquiry would be resumed, which was welcomed across the House. It was suspended so that the ISC could start, and then the suspension was put in place, under the terms I have just read out.

It is quite obvious that, as the ISC had not finished its work under the previous coalition Government—I spoke with the full authority of the then Prime Minister and the whole Government, including the current Prime Minister, who was then Home Secretary—we would have considered it necessary to appoint a fresh judge-led inquiry, as the ISC has been frustrated from going any further. Therefore, what reputable reasons do the Government have for not holding an inquiry? I am glad that the Minister has said that a judge-led inquiry is still being considered, and I hope that a prompt announcement will be made that such an inquiry will now follow.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend. As he rightly says, he was the Minister who made statements to the House on whether there should be a judge-led inquiry. Indeed, as Justice Secretary, he made a statement in January 2012, and as Minister without Portfolio, he made a further statement in December 2013. In the further statement, there was a slight measure of doubt about whether there would indeed be a judge-led inquiry. He said:

“It will then ​be possible for the Government to take a final view as to whether a further judicial inquiry still remains necessary”—[Official Report, 19 December 2013; Vol. 572, c. 916.]

That remains the case. As I said earlier, the Government will give careful consideration to whether a judge-led inquiry is necessary.

I say again to my right hon. and learned Friend that this inquiry has gone on for very many years—his statements about the judge-led inquiry were made in 2012 and 2013, and here we are in 2018. I take issue with his use of the word “complicity”, which I think was a notch too strong. I think that it is honest to say that the ISC found no evidence that agencies had deliberately turned a blind eye.

Perhaps the main issue here is whether in our intelligence agencies it would be right, 15 years after the event, to take someone who was then a junior operative in the field and put them in front of a judge-led inquiry. It is senior people who should take responsibility. Whether someone who was then of a lower rank should be subjected to such an inquiry 15 years later is, I think, one of the serious question that must be asked before a decision is made.

Iran Nuclear Deal

Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts

Wednesday 9th May 2018 Commons Chamber

[Boris Johnson]

The right hon. Gentleman will know that the UK remains a party to the JCPOA, and we will do our utmost to protect UK commercial interests.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)]

I congratulate the Foreign Secretary on his unswerving loyalty to collective Government policy at the Dispatch Box this afternoon. Does he agree that one of the many dangers following the President’s decision is that the so-called moderates in Iran—although they are not very moderate by our standards—will be undermined by the decision, which will strengthen even more hard-line people? While the Foreign Secretary may take steps to try to reduce Iran’s malign behaviour in some areas, will he give an unswerving guarantee that Britain will stick to its commitments under the agreement so long as the Iranians are fully compliant with the commitments that they entered into and that we will not modify that in any way?

[Boris Johnson]

I thank my right hon. and learned Friend, and I remember getting a lot of wonderful copy when I was a political journalist from his own displays of unswerving loyalty to Government policy. By the way, I am completely in conformity with Government policy on the matters to which I believe he is referring, since that policy has yet to be decided. On his wider point, it is absolutely vital that we continue to get the message over to the moderates in Iran—I include President Rouhani in their number—that the UK remains committed to this agreement.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [Lords]

Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 1st May 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)]

The right hon. Lady has conceded that we use with reluctance our undoubted power to exercise our jurisdiction in these territories and she has given the very important areas in which this House has already done that. Does she accept that, when such vast sums of dishonest money are being channelled through the territories, and when such obviously little progress is being made in many of them to deal with the matter, that is a situation that justifies our jurisdiction? As the Cayman Islands have a rather better record than some of the other British overseas territories—they do co-operate very closely with our law authorities, as the dependent territories do—it is open to their Government to consider the matter and act on their own accord given the steer that this House is giving to them.

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

I completely concur with the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s succinct remarks. People have said to me that the areas in which we have intervened—we do intervene with huge reluctance—are moral issues. I cannot think of another issue that is more moral than trying to intervene to prevent the traffic in corrupt money and illicit finance across the world.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Mitchell]

My hon. Friend makes an extremely good point about Gibraltar. I have heard him speak about that subject in the House previously, and what he says is absolutely right. Last night, I received a three-page letter from the Chief Minister of Gibraltar. I was at a loss to understand why he felt that new clause 6 negatively affected him, since he has already committed, through the EU directive, to implement the whole of the new clause one year earlier than is specified. I therefore feel that the Chief Minister and my hon. Friend should be content with new clause 6.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke]

I entirely agree that the Government of Gibraltar achieve the standards described by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), and I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell) that as they are about to go further, the new clause does not affect them. I recall, however, that that was not always the case. Twenty or 30 years ago, persuading the then Government of Gibraltar that access to EU financial markets required an altogether higher standard of regulation and compliance was not an easy task, and we had to imply that we might take steps to exercise our powers unless something was done about it. That might be a useful precedent for the overseas territories in the Caribbean with regard to the step that the House is taking today.

[Mr Mitchell]

My right hon. and learned Friend the Father of the House, given his longevity and distinguished ministerial experience over many years, will be familiar with the points that are being made about Gibraltar and, indeed, about the importance of clamping down on money laundering.

Thirdly, the overseas territories pray in aid the prayer of St Augustine—“Oh Lord, make me chaste, but not yet”—and argue that all the hot money will go to the Dutch Antilles. But it is a little bit like the battle against malaria. We seek to narrow the footprint of that disease—in this case, of illicit money—to diminish the areas affected, and then eradicate it. Through this measure, we will significantly narrow the footprint of tainted money. We should bring the same vigour and determination to the fight against poisoned money as we do to the fight against deadly insects.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Henry Bellingham]

I will not get into an argument with my right hon. Friend because I think we agree on so much of this. My concern is that it required a leak from Panama to expose those people, and there will be many other jurisdictions that may not have leaks in future and where much of the business will go, unless the whole world moves to the end goal of open registers—

[Mr Kenneth Clarke]

I accept the point that my hon. Friend is making, but it is not the best point. Until we move, we have little chance of speeding up any response by Delaware, Panama and the other places he named. It is not an overwhelming argument to say, “Well, we should carry on having billions of pounds of criminal money flowing through our overseas territories while we wait for Panama to make a move.” That is not the strongest argument.

[Sir Henry Bellingham]

My right hon. and learned Friend the Father of the House is, as ever, very wise. I want to proceed on a pragmatic, staged basis, and I think we could have come together on the Government’s compromise, had it been tabled in good time.

Venezuela: Political Situation

Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts

Tuesday 5th September 2017 Westminster Hall

[Graham Jones]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Clarke]

No, I will not.

[Victoria Atkins]

Let me try to bridge the gap between the right hon. Member for Warley (John Spellar) and Conservative Members. Is there not, indeed, a great deal of agreement in this Chamber about the woeful conditions in Venezuela? Is not my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland (Mr Clarke) simply saying that it would be nice if the Leader of Her Majesty’s Opposition joined us in condemning Venezuela and the way in which it is treating its people?

Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Lord Clarke of Nottingham Excerpts

Wednesday 13th July 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

The point that I have made already and will make again is that as I understand it Sir John has not identified lack of remit as the reason why he has given no opinion on the legality of the war. He has identified a lack of appropriate skill sets in the inquiry, and he suggested that it should be a matter that is dealt with by a properly constituted and internationally recognised court. As I have said already, the Government in looking at the report of the Iraq inquiry—it will take some time to do that—will consider all these matters, including questions that the right hon. Gentleman is raising about whether any further documents can appropriately be declassified and made available.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)]

Obviously, John Chilcot’s report is masterful in its description of the formal records and the detail, and in the lessons he very wisely draws. However, will the Foreign Secretary, as a politician, look at the political context for a moment? Does he agree that the background was clearly that the Americans and the Blair Government wished to invade Iraq to change the regime and get rid of Saddam Hussein? However, that would have been illegal regime change, so what my right hon. Friend has just gone through—people’s desperate desire to find evidence and to persuade themselves that there were weapons of mass destruction, that Saddam was not co-operating with the inspectors, that there was a risk of terrorism and so on—was mainly, and no doubt subconsciously, motivated by a desire to give the Attorney General some basis on which he could say that this action was legal?

[Mr Hammond]

My reading of the inquiry report is that it does indeed identify that regime change as an objective would be illegal in UK law, but I think the suggestion is that, through a process of group-think, the people who were involved in this process came to see regime change as a means to deliver the legitimate objective, which was compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions. A fair reading of the report suggests that that is the process of mind that is being spelled out by Sir John.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)]

The decision to invade Iraq was the most disastrous foreign policy decision taken by this country in my lifetime. It did not cause, but it greatly contributed to, the extraordinary problems that have persisted in the middle east and the wider world ever since. I fear it will continue to have tragic consequences for some years to come.

First, we all owe a debt to Sir John Chilcot for producing what will undoubtedly be the most authoritative analysis of how on earth such an appalling blunder came to be made. I certainly have not had the chance to get much beyond the executive summary and just a little bit of the rest of it. It will take a long time before anybody in this House gets through the millions of words that have been produced. The lessons for the inquiry into the Iraq war will be of benefit in particular to specialists: those in the military, the intelligence service, the diplomatic corps and politicians—Ministers, shadow Ministers and those who hold the Government to account—for many years to come. It is too soon to follow up on his extremely formidable findings, which I am sure are correct, but there is a role for this House to begin to consider, as we are, its political aspect.

Sir John Chilcot has examined the formal records, meetings and processes. He analysed them to see what happened, but he is not a politician. The House of Commons and the Ministers involved are able to look at this with a slightly different eye. Why did people reach particular decisions? What is it that makes us want to reach those decisions? Where did it go wrong, in particular as far as the collective system of Cabinet Government is concerned, and the accountability, through Parliament, to the wider public? Because Sir John Chilcot is not a politician, I am not sure that he is able to answer on the wider perspective.

I would like to begin by agreeing with one point made by the hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry) and say how irrelevant it has been to try to turn all this into a witch hunt against celebrity individuals who were involved at the time. That is one of the great failures of political debate in our day. As far as the wider media and the world were concerned, the recent referendum debate was largely the Dave and Boris show. It is quite pointless to say, “Let’s persecute Tony Blair. He was in charge. Are we going to censure him? Is he going to be prosecuted as a war criminal?” and all the rest of it. That is also true for all the other individuals involved.

The one thing the report makes quite clear is that nobody has committed any crime. As one who was present at the time, I have absolutely no doubt that anybody acted on any other basis than that they believed passionately they were acting in the public interest. One of the great things about Tony Blair was that he did believe passionately in what he was doing at the time. That was very evident on the Floor of the House. He never had a doubt about what he was doing, so I am not surprised that he continues to protest as strongly as he does. He has not changed his mind. He believed he was acting in the national interest in cementing our alliance with the Americans. He thought that was absolutely key to our security. He thought that a British contribution would help the Americans with planning, advocacy and so on. He firmly believed that just removing Saddam Hussein was a virtuous act that would make the world a better place—he still does.

Then, as now, regime change is the point on which he gets most passionate. He really thinks—he is probably right; I agree with him, actually—that he got rid of an evil regime. I agree with those who say that that was not in itself a totally adequate achievement. He certainly believed that the regime had weapons of mass destruction. I faced him in the House, intervening on him and so on. I remember one day thinking, “This is the last man still living who still believes they are going to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.” It was increasingly obvious to everyone else that no such material was going to be found. Pursuing Tony Blair is a complete irrelevance to what the House should be looking at.

[Caroline Lucas]

rose—

[Mr Clarke]

I will give way briefly to the hon. Lady, but I am not on the Front Bench and cannot keep on giving way as previous speakers have. I hope everybody understands that.

[Caroline Lucas]

I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way and agree with him on the dangers of focusing on just one person. We need to focus on that person, but we also need to focus on the system. However, I worry about the way in which the right hon. and learned Gentleman appears to be letting that one person off any real responsibility for misleading the House. We only have to read Chilcot to see, for example, how Blair misled the House about the position of the French. The motion Blair moved in the House stated that,

“it has not proved possible to secure a second Resolution in the UN because one Permanent Member of the Security Council made plain in public its intention to use its veto whatever the circumstances”.—[Official Report, 18 March 2003; Vol. 401, c. 760.]

Yet within a few minutes, even before Prime Minister’s questions, the French were on the phone to Tony Blair saying, “You are deliberately misrepresenting our position.” This happens time and again in the Chilcot report, so while we should not focus only on one man, let us not let him off the hook completely. That does not do any of us any good.

[Mr Clarke]

I certainly did not rise to defend Tony Blair, but he is not the first politician to make a mistake and he will not be the last. If the hon. Lady believes the French, she believes the French. The French were able to exercise a veto in the Security Council. It was a mistake at the time to try to blame the French entirely. They were never going to get a majority in the Security Council, but the French were adamantly—[Interruption.]

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Mr Speaker]

Order. The House must come to order. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has made it perfectly plain that at this point he is not giving way. Therefore, the House must listen to the development of his argument.

[Mr Clarke]

Mr Speaker, I have already spent more time than I intended to on Tony Blair. Members who wish to argue about the French veto in 2003 can do so between themselves.

The political background to what was being decided and what the politicians wanted to do was key. I was a Back-Bench Opposition Member at the time, but I followed the events with some care. I had one advantage: I did not have access to what was going on inside the Government, but I knew a lot of American, as well as British, politicians. At various political gatherings—Bilderberg, Davos and so on—I knew and was on friendly terms with quite a few of the key American neo-cons. I was arguing against the merits of the invasion of Iraq before the debate ever even started here.

That is important background. In the Bush Administration, the key policy makers wanted to invade Iraq immediately after 9/11. By 2001, there was not the slightest doubt but that they would invade. They had a rather naive, idealistic approach that faintly shocked me: they thought the previous Administration had not used American military power for all the benefits it could produce in the world, but they were going to use it for good, and they thought they would be treated as liberating heroes when they arrived in Baghdad and set up a better regime.

They thought that a man called Chalabi would win the election held thereafter. I met Chalabi once or twice. He once got about 2% in an Iraqi election. They thought he would be in charge but that he would need supervision, so there was going to be a US general—constant comparisons were made with General MacArthur turning Imperial Japan into a democracy after the war. Much was also made of the importance of denazification following Hitler’s fall, hence there was going to be de-Ba’athification in Iraq to get rid of all these people in the army and the security services and so on. The House will be reassured to know that I fiercely disagreed. I liked these people, but my thought, during such a discussion, was always, “One of us isn’t on the same planet.” I formed a fairly hostile view, therefore, long before it arrived here.

If I knew in 2001 that the Bush Administration was going to invade Iraq, I am quite certain that Tony Blair and the British military knew, and that they had a long time to work out how they were going to join in. That explains a lot. Why did the Americans want the British to join in? They did not need us for military purposes. They could defeat the Iraqis without our military assistance. They did not rate our military that highly—although they thought our special forces and intelligences were very good—but we were a very valuable political ally. They thought that the presentation would be greatly improved if the British, of all people, were at the heart of the alliance, and as I have said, Tony Blair was very keen to join them. I doubt he bought all the neo-con theories, but he clearly thought that getting rid of Saddam Hussein’s regime was one of the best contributions he could make to the future of the Iraqi people and he was determined to join in.

Reading these mysteries, one must ask, “What was the snag for Tony Blair and the Government?” I am confident I knew enough, through my contacts, to know that the snag for Tony Blair, who wanted to take part and who—it seems—had already told George W. Bush that he wanted to take part, was that it was not legal for the UK to take part in a war being launched for the purpose of changing the regime in another country. When he received that advice, with which I think every lawyer in the place agreed, it was undoubtedly right.

As somebody said, however, that was not the view the Americans took. American neo-cons are not so impressed with international law. Their constitution does not constrain them. I once had a key American official tell me, “We have all the legal authority we need to invade: we have a large majority in both Houses of Congress.” And that was it. But they were so keen to have the British that they were prepared to give Tony Blair some time to tackle this problem of whether it was lawful for him to take part, and to work out a basis upon which the British could join.

At this point, I think, these people’s motives were virtuous. They believed all this. They were making the world a better place by removing a tyrant and installing a pro-American, pro-western, pro-Israeli, democratic Government in a liberal society. They were going to change the regime, and we were going to do it lawfully, so we had to turn to the question of the dreadful weapons that Saddam Hussein undoubtedly had used against his own people years before, and whether they had all been disposed of or whether we could demonstrate that he was a continuing threat. If we could demonstrate that he had weapons of mass destruction, that they were a threat to British interests and our neighbours, and that he was not co-operating with weapons inspections and so on, and if we could get a UN resolution, then we had a legal basis for invading.

Once one realises that that was the—perfectly worthy and well-intentioned—mindset of most of the British people taking part in the process to intervene, one can understand why some of these extraordinary processes happened. I personally believe that the American Administration delayed the invasion for a month or few—

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

Two months.

[Mr Clarke]

Two months, says my right hon. Friend. They delayed the invasion to give the British more time to get through this convoluted legal stuff—I use sarcastic words of the kind the occasional impatient American used at the time—before they could join in. The problem was that the Americans, although they went to the UN and got resolution 1441 and all the rest of it, began to lose patience, seeing that this could go on forever, and it reached the stage where they were going to invade in March 2003. They could not wait any longer. The Blair Government—those who knew what was going on—had to speed the thing up a bit, realising that if they were not careful, they would fail to get there in time.

One thing that surprises me in the Chilcot report concerns the advice the Government got from the Joint Intelligence Committee, which eventually produced enough intelligence that was plausible and no doubt believed by those putting it in the reports for the Attorney General to be persuaded—obviously quite reluctantly—that there probably was a basis for going ahead. The urgent debates then took place in this House, the last one being about two days before the date when everyone knew the troops, already in battle positions in the middle east, were about to go ahead with the operation.

We should learn the political lessons from all that. One of the first lessons relates to the ever-increasing rush to get into the position of being able to invade lawfully, so that everybody wanted to be persuaded that various things were correct and that various steps had been taken. If they had submitted themselves to slower, more challenged and more careful consideration, however, it would have led to a different conclusion.

What, then, is the outline of the main political lessons to be learned from all this? First, the American alliance should not be entered into blindly. Let me say briefly that I am as passionate a believer as Tony Blair that our alliance with the United States is crucial to this country’s future security and role in the world. There is not a trace of anti-Americanism in what I am saying; our alliance is one of the most valuable features of our foreign policy. That does not mean, however, that we should allow ourselves to go along blindly and always—right or wrong—with what the American President of the day wishes to do. I take that no further, but we might have a President Trump, so it is a question worth bearing in mind. I agree with the hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry) that the American alliance will not be destroyed—it might be damaged for a month or two—if we do not absolutely go along with what the American President wants us to do.

Let me move on to something that is clear in Chilcot—though I have not made the point much myself—and was plain to see in how the Ministry of Defence behaved at the time. The advice of our defence chiefs is hugely important, and I share the support for and pride in them that keeps being expressed in these debates. Yet—subconsciously, I am sure—they always want to take part in any military activity that the Americans want them to join. It might be considered advice, but it always comes down to “We must ask the Americans to let us make as big a contribution as we can”. A trained military man is trained for the purpose of using military force in the national interest and further worthwhile objectives, and cannot help thinking, “This is our moment; this is the great action in which we must take part.”

It is the same with the intelligence services. They prize their relationship with the Americans above all other relationships they have with the outside world. They are dependent on co-operation in some ways, but they are anxious to please and to do what they think their American colleagues wish them to do. In this particular case, we had a Prime Minister and a Government who wanted to enter the war, so everybody was extremely anxious to find the facts, to be convinced of the situation and to enable the Prime Minister to go ahead and do what he wanted. That is an essential point, but it requires a simple politician like me to make it; it does not appear in the pages of the Chilcot report. When one is raising one’s eyebrows at what happened, I think that that answers a lot.

Particularly at the time we are talking about—and sometimes still today—there were not enough diplomats involved. There was not enough looking at the expertise of the Foreign Office. We had a lot of Arabists. The Americans had some, but they got rid of most of theirs and brought people in who had been involved in the Nicaraguan episode because they were seen as being ideologically more sound. Americans did not like the Arabists we had in the Foreign Office because they kept complicating things by talking about tribes and different sorts of Muslim, which the policy makers in Washington thought were irrelevant to the new era of western democracy in which they thought they were going to take the country.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Clarke]

I am sorry, but I do not have the time.

I shall not go on by adding more to the strictures about the Attorney General—[Hon. Members: “Go on!”]. The Attorney General was obviously giving the right advice. I am sitting alongside someone who was a very tough Attorney General—my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve)—who would not give the advice that eager Prime Ministers sometimes want, and neither would Michael Havers or quite a few others I recall being in government with. As has been said, that is what the Attorney General is for. I know Lord Goldsmith and he is perfectly all right. He must have felt so exposed in the end that he gave into the temptation to say, “Well, it’s just about lawful; it is just about satisfactorily proved.”

I am sorry to have taken a little longer than I intended, but let me conclude with my main point. The big thing that matters—and it matters very much as we are having a change of Government today—is how the Cabinet and Government processes come into the equation. What about accountability to Parliament? It was obvious at the time, obvious if anyone listened to what the Foreign Secretary said publicly, obvious in what half the Labour party said and obvious from listening to officials that Cabinet Government was not working properly in Tony Blair’s Government. He went in for sofa government. Margaret Thatcher got keener and keener on sofa government towards the end of her time, but Tony Blair had taken it to an art form by the time he got into issues such as Iraq. It was the same with Parliament. There was a reluctance to come to Parliament. Both were essentially seen as hurdles to be surmounted. Once you had your policy, how were you going to get it through the Cabinet and how were you going to get it past Parliament?

My suggestion for the future is that we should all agree that that is not the mindset that people should have. They should set the proposition, and, of course, advocate it to the Cabinet, and then, with the benefit of proper information, they should listen to it being debated and examined by those who have time to do so. Similarly, Parliament should be consulted when it can be, and given proper information. One should not rely on clever timing of the debate and the work of the Whips to get it through and afterwards say that there is a democratic endorsement. I have no time to apply all my strong strictures to the circumstances of the time, but I think that, if read with my arguments in mind, the Chilcot report feeds the impression that I had then, as someone who participated in debates.

Military action is difficult. There is no point in politicians being lightheartedly irresponsible and saying, “We have got to be involved in every decision.” There will be occasions when that is not possible. There will be occasions when someone has just attacked a British interest, and we have to fight back. You can tell the Cabinet and you can tell Parliament afterwards, and any sensible Cabinet and any sensible Parliament will of course endorse it. But this was not an emergency. For two years our allies had told us that they were going to invade Iraq. It had been planned. It had been worked on. It had been discussed. The reason there was not full Cabinet discussion, and the reason there was not timely parliamentary debate, was that someone who did that might not get it by them. We did not start debating the issue until Parliament until February 2003, and the final, key vote took place when the troops were in the field. That put a lot of Conservatives off the idea of voting against it, when they might otherwise have done so. Our boys were about to go into action, the next day—which is what occurred.

Some of those matters have been addressed. The National Security Council is a hugely beneficial innovation introduced by my right hon. Friend the outgoing Prime Minister, who is probably already the ex-Prime Minister. Now is not the time to debate it, but it still needs to be improved. It has not covered everything, although it is a lot better than it was. As for Cabinet government, I think that my right hon. Friends should ask themselves— if they are still in office under the next Prime Minister—whether they can ensure that adequate time is given to discuss things, and adequate information is given in advance. Cabinet government does not mean moving quickly from item to item; people must have some papers beforehand so that they can consider the issues properly.

The National Security Council is very valuable, because it contains defence and intelligence people alongside the politicians. I genuinely congratulate the outgoing Prime Minister: some of the best discussions in which I participated took place in the National Security Council, with my total approval. However, although I may be too sensitive, I think that it could be improved sometimes. There are occasions when a fait accompli is brought there and explained to you, and the defence and intelligence people explain why you should agree, and off you go.

I think it right to look into why we might have avoided what happened in Libya. The whole history of the middle east and north Africa involves our removing fascist dictatorships of the most poisonous kind from country after country, and then being surprised when they have been replaced by a situation that is, in some instances, even worse than the one that we have removed. A continuing answer to that problem needs to be sought, although at present we may have to confront even bigger problems.

I began by saying that this was the biggest foreign policy disaster of my time. We all have to ask why the institutions of the United Kingdom failed even to develop a hint of that. It was not particularly courageous for the House to vote in favour. Opinion polls showed that 70% of the British public supported the invasion. For the first week or two it was extremely popular. Had we held a referendum, which is now the fashionable way of governing the country—compared with this old-fashioned parliamentary democracy—it would have sailed through with an enormous majority. The danger of following opinion polls is shown by the fact that a year later I could not find a member of the public who had ever met anybody who agreed with the invasion of Iraq, because in the light of better information people suddenly realised it had been a terrible error.

There are Members sitting here now who were here at that time. I remember the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen) organising some of the opposition on the day I spoke in February. We voted against it, and we spoke against it. Needless to say, I have looked at my speech, and I am very sad to say that I think I predicted quite a lot of the consequences and what would happen. We all agree that, “Never again if we can avoid it,” but this is a big subject and it is no good reading the report and just saying we should have a look at the intelligence arrangements; we should have a look at other arrangements as well, such as the way our Government are run, the way this Parliament organises itself, and how we get sensible accountability to the House of Commons the next time the Government have to engage in such difficult decisions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

It is a privilege to follow the right hon. Member for Derby South (Margaret Beckett), although I felt that at the end she destroyed her own argument by attributing to other people views that nobody holds: that somehow IS is allowed off the hook of blame because of the weaknesses and failures of the British Government.

Let us be clear what those failures are: 150,000 deaths by violence, a large majority of them innocent civilians; over 1 million deaths, on medical estimates, as a result of this war; and a destroyed country. Iraq was a nasty dictatorship, but containment—sanctions, inspections when they were allowed, and no-fly zones—was broadly working. There was damage to the stability of the middle east. Of course it is not the entire story, but let us not forget that IS started in an American prisoner-of-war camp in Iraq. That is where its high command comes from, so let us not put that to one side either. There has been a significantly increased terrorist threat worldwide, something that was known and warned about before we took this action. That is what we are talking about. That is what the worst foreign policy mistake in our modern history means for many, many innocent people in the world.

In the 1990s, before that happened, I had responsibility for counter-proliferation in the Conservative Government of the time. I accept that the behaviour of the Saddam Hussein regime was peculiar to say the least. As far as we could tell from inspections and our intelligence, it did not have WMD or a workable WMD programme but was deliberately trying to create confusion about that, by not co-operating from time to time, by moving trucks from one site to another before inspectors arrived, and so on. It was probably doing that to keep Iran convinced that it had a WMD programme. That was what it was worried about—not us, but its next-door neighbour against which it had fought a massive war shortly before. That explains some of the strange behaviour of the regime.

At that time and—I guess—up until just before 2001, the general belief was that this was a moderate and controllable threat. Indeed, Carne Ross, the middle east specialist among our delegation to the UN, said that when he first took the job he was briefed:

“Basically we don’t think there’s anything there. We are justifying sanctions on the basis that Iraq has not answered questions about its past stocks”.

Since then, all the JIC, SIS and GCHQ reports have corroborated that. It was considered a moderate and controllable threat at that point.

Then what happened? We had 9/11, which, quite properly, shocked the world: 3,000 deaths in a hideous terrorist spectacular. Of course, Tony Blair justifies his actions on that basis, but I have to say to him that this was a reason for getting it right, not an excuse for getting it wrong. There was understandable paranoia that something like it might happen again, either here or somewhere else, but then there came a dangerous and simplistic conflation of the real, present and continuing threat from al-Qaeda and Iraq—the axis of evil nonsense that President Bush generated at the time. This fiction was reinforced in February 2002, when the Americans rendered to Egypt somebody called Sheikh al-Libi, who was tortured on the question of whether there was a chemical and biological weapons relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Essentially, he was tortured until he said yes, and that was the evidence that Colin Powell cited at the United Nations—the House might remember—when he talked about having “substantial evidence”. Of course, it was a fiction obtained under torture.

I am quite sure that that intelligence was shared with Mr Blair, who, not knowing the source, would have found it persuasive, as something told to the Americans by an al-Qaeda commander. It seems from the Chilcot report that, at some point between December 2001 and possibly March 2002 but certainly by July 2002, Mr Blair effectively signed Britain up to the American military effort. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) said, the issue was not our soldiers but our reputation. It was our involvement that legitimised the American action.

This, however, produced a problem for our Prime Minister. Under American law, to go to war on the basis of regime change is entirely legal. They do not recognise the international laws that render it otherwise, so for them regime change is a perfectly legitimate casus belli. From comments made and the items to which the right hon. Member for Gordon (Alex Salmond) referred, it seems that Tony Blair agreed, but he had a problem, because our law and international law did not allow it. He therefore saw his role as building a coalition to support the Americans.

There was nothing dishonourable in that, if Tony Blair believed the aim, but to do it he had to achieve a number of things. He had to create a casus belli under international law, and for that he needed proof of weapons of mass destruction and of a terrorist threat, and a UN resolution and thereby proof of legality. The result was UN resolution 1441, the thrust of which was that it was the final opportunity for Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations. The vote was 15:0 in favour. As the right hon. Member for Derby South said, it did not include a deliberate trigger to war; it required a further resolution. The UN inspectorate went in and did 700 inspections of over 500 sites. Interestingly, it went to three dozen sites given to it by the CIA and MI6, who thought that was where the weapons were located. The inspectorate found not a thing—over three and a half months, it found nothing whatsoever.

Then the American President set a timetable, creating a real problem over and above the United Nations—war by March. That is why Chilcot said that going to war was not the last resort. It was not. It gave Mr Blair a problem. What should he do? Many other countries, including France and Russia, viewed the inspection process as incomplete—and, of course, it was. The UN vote was then lost by 11 to four, so when Blair returned to the UK, he had to win a debate and vote in the House of Commons. He made what some people think was the greatest speech of his life, but in order to persuade us, he had to say five things that were a clear misrepresentation.

Mr Blair accused France of saying that it would never vote for war. That was simply not true, and he knew it was not true. I refer to an interview given on Radio 4 in the last year by Sir Stephen Wall. As a Foreign Office adviser in No. 10, he was privy to what was going on and clarified what was really said, which was that, effectively, “As of now, France will vote against”. When he was asked whether Downing Street deliberately lied about Chirac’s statement, he said yes, it deliberately lied.

The next two misrepresentations were quotations from the UN inspectors’ reports. Time is short, so let me read briefly what was said by Hans Blix, the head of the inspectorate. Speaking of the British Government, he said:

“If they had gone to the British Parliament in 2003 and said that we have a lot of things unaccounted for here, and we suspect there may be something, and we think it is safer to invade them, would the British Parliament have dreamt of saying yes to such a thing? I don’t think so. I think in order to go ahead they needed to make the allegations which they made and which were not sustainable…In substance yes they misrepresented what we did and they did so in order to get the authorisation they shouldn’t have had.”

That was Hans Blix’s view of what Tony Blair did in the House of Commons. Mr Blair also misrepresented what Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, had told the allies about the WMD programme.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke]

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

[Mr Davis]

I do not have time. Oh, I will give way.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Clarke]

I had it in mind that my right hon. Friend would get a bit more time.

Does my right hon. Friend think, with hindsight, that given that Hans Blix was perfectly willing to carry on with inspections, if the Americans could have been persuaded to delay for another month, all this could have been avoided? The Americans dismissed Blix, however, and regarded him as a waste of time; they were trying to get him out of the way.

[Mr Davis]

That is exactly right. That should have been the stance that Mr Blair took, but he did not. He chose instead to come to Parliament to misrepresent the case.

Mr Blair also misrepresented the line put forward by Mr Hussein Kamel, who was later killed by Saddam Hussein, to claim that the WMD programme was continuing. What was, in fact, said in an interview with the inspectorate, was that the WMD had all been destroyed by 1991.

Finally, Mr Blair was asked by Tam Dalyell about the risks of terrorism arising from the war, but the Prime Minister did not give him an answer—despite having been told by the JIC and by MI5 that it would increase both the international and domestic risk of terrorism and would destabilise the states in the area.

On five counts, then, Mr Blair misrepresented to this House the substantive aspects of the argument for the war. If this House is to contribute to decisions on war in the future, it must be able to rely on being told the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth by our Prime Minister.