Alleged Spying Case: Home Office Involvement

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Tuesday 21st October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am giving the noble Lord the answer that I will give him to whatever he has asked. I say to him now that we recognise there are certain threats in China, and certain issues with the Chinese Government that we need to address, but we also recognise that China is a major trading partner that we need to work with.

The Home Secretary and the Foreign Secretary have submitted evidence from their perspective about the nature of the embassy. A planning application is being undertaken, which will be considered in due course, following a report by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government. That is the right and proper way to undertake that instance. The Prime Minister is cognisant of the fact that there are opportunities with China, but there are also threats. That is why we have to keep all these matters under constant review. That answer may not satisfy the noble Lord but it is the answer I have given him.

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

My Lords, as chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, and on its behalf, I thank the agencies for their very detailed briefing last week on the intelligence behind this incident. We have now decided to have an investigation into the intelligence part of this incident. As a former member of the committee, the Minister knows that we have statutory powers to call that evidence, but could he assure the committee that the Government will fully co-operate with those investigations?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I welcome the fact that the Intelligence and Security Committee is undertaking its statutory duties to look at these issues. Of course the Government will co-operate fully with the Intelligence and Security Committee and give information on whatever issues are requested.

Manchester Terrorism Attack

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Wednesday 15th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful. I condemn all those actions that the noble Lord mentioned in his contribution. It is a worry as to how that has manifested itself, and that is a long-term issue that we the Government need to examine. People should be allowed to live their lives in peace and security in their communities, without physical security. But it is important that we provide—as we have done—some £18 million to the Jewish community this year through the Community Security Trust.

We have supplied an even larger amount of money to help protect mosques and places of religion of the Islamic community, because, as the Peacehaven arson attack showed, this is not something that is restricted to one side of the community. If people have differences of opinion on political issues—and there are differences of opinion on some of the political issues relating to situations in the Middle East—I want to see them resolve those through political process, not through violence, intimidation or harassment.

I say to the noble Lord that, as a Government, we will do what we can to ensure that we return to a position where political differences are resolved by discussion and where respect for other people’s lives and community activity is engendered in our society. But, until we can get to that stage, we have to provide—and the Government will provide—financial, political and material support to protect people to live their own lives.

I hope, when we do that, that the Jewish community, in this instance in particular, wherever it resides in the United Kingdom, will take comfort from the fact that the Government remain on its side to ensure that it can enjoy its life in whichever way it seeks to enjoy it without fear, intimidation or harassment. That is why we have not only brought forward the measures to date but are also looking at potential measures to improve security in relation to protests and parades.

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

My Lords, I think all our thoughts are with the victims, their families and the Jewish community not just in Manchester but throughout the country. I echo the thanks to the security services, the police and other emergency services that reacted so swiftly to this event. I ask the Minister to pass on my thanks as chair of the ISC to the security services for the update we received this morning on the ongoing investigation. We will obviously be expecting other reports as the investigation continues.

The Jewish community in this country is clearly under attack from Islamist extremism, as well as state-backed terrorism—which was highlighted in our 2025 report on Iran—but also from extreme right-wing terrorism, as set out in our 2022 report. They are both threats to the peaceful Jewish community in our country. One thing that is quite clear in both is the online space. It is used not just for perpetrating the tropes that have been outlined but for the self-radicalisation of individuals both on the right and in the Islamist space. What more can be done to tackle that?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend. As chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee of both Houses of Parliament, he will have access to information that gives greater detail and background to some of the threats that we face from people of both Islamist and right-wing neofascist tendencies. He will know that in this online space there is greater potential for the radicalisation of individuals who will sit in a bedroom and look at stuff and be drawn down a kaleidoscope of activity to reach areas where people who wish this country or individual communities ill will radicalise them downstream.

We introduced the Online Safety Act. As a matter of some urgency, we need to look at making sure that technology companies take down information that is poisonous, and we keep that under constant review. I would welcome recommendations and support from the Intelligence and Security Committee, which will see information that Members of this House will not see, to ensure that we improve the policy objective of ensuring that online radicalisation is as limited as it can be as a result of actions that the Government and tech companies on an international and national basis can take.

Borders and Asylum

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

My Lords, in 2019 Boris Johnson and the Conservative Government stood on a slogan of taking back control of our borders and our laws. Over the next four years, we saw record levels of immigration and a shambolic and dysfunctional asylum system. Over the summer, we have seen the extreme right try to weaponise this subject, intimidating communities throughout the nation. In spite of that, ordinary people have genuine concerns about the levels of immigration. One particularly relevant issue is foreign prisoners. Can the Minister explain what the Government are doing to ensure that foreign prisoners who come to the end of their sentences are deported?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

To live in this country requires basic adherence to tenets of good behaviour, and if foreign nationals commit offences then they should be deported at the end of their sentence. My noble friend will know, I hope, that, since 5 July 2024, 5,179 foreign national offenders have been removed from the United Kingdom. That is an increase of 14% over the previous year and one that we intend to further increase for those foreign nationals who have abused the privilege of being a resident of the United Kingdom by committing an offence. That is coupled with the other issues he mentioned, such as a 13% increase in returns and a 24% increase in enforced returns. But the key to all of this, ultimately, is to speed up the asylum system and make sure that, when someone arrives and claims asylum, that asylum claim is dealt with speedily and effectively. That is what the new body announced in the Statement and the efforts we have made to date are really going to be focused on.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2025

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Thursday 3rd July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

The acts at Brize Norton were certainly criminal acts and should be prosecuted, as they are being at this very moment. As has been described, it is a matter of sub judice.

Please remember that the suffragettes were arrested and subjected to harsh terms of imprisonment, including force-feeding when they went on hunger strikes. We are trying to discuss the contemporary situation, but we should consider it against the background of historical reality. I seek to make that point, because it is very relevant. They went on hunger strikes and were subject to force-feeding for doing so.

Now look at the real terrorists: al-Qaeda and Islamic State. Members of al-Qaeda suicide-attacked New York’s twin towers on 11 September 2001, killing 2,753 people. That is real terrorism. Islamic State deliberately targeted its civilians in public spaces to instil fear, spread panic, gain media attention and punish any groups or Governments opposing them. ISIS became notorious for filmed beheadings and executions. It engaged in widespread sexual slavery, particularly of Yazidi women. That is real terrorism. In 2015, Islamic State members killed 130 people in Paris. In 2016, its suicide bombers struck Brussels Airport and the metro system, killing 32, and it attacked Istanbul Airport, killing 45. In Easter 2019, Islamic State terrorists bombed churches and hotels, killing over 250 people, in Sri Lanka. That is real terrorism, real terrorists.

Nazi-like US racists and, here in the United Kingdom, the IRA also committed terrible terrorist atrocities, targeting or killing innocent civilians. They are properly and rightly labelled terrorists. This Government are treating Palestine Action as equivalent to Islamic State or al-Qaeda, which is intellectually bankrupt, politically unprincipled and morally wrong. Frankly, I am deeply ashamed, which is why I support the regret amendment.

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome my noble friend’s statement but start with a sense of disappointment that the Home Office did not see fit to give the intelligence assessment behind this, which he rightly says cannot be made public, to the ISC. He is a former member of the ISC, so he knows our remits. I understand that, yesterday, his colleague in the other place, Dan Jarvis, made attempts to contact certain privy counsellors to give them a Privy Council brief. The committee met this morning and was quite angry that the Government had not given it this information before this legislation was put forward; no attempt had been made by the Home Office to do so.

My noble friend well knows the remit of the committee under the Justice and Security Act, so I ask him to remind his colleague in the other place and his civil servants that the ISC is not a Select Committee of Parliament; it is a parliamentary committee set up by statute, which has a right to information. I think we agreed this morning that we expect this intelligence assessment as soon as practically possible.

I welcome the inclusion on the list of the Russian Imperial Movement. This appeared in the ISC’s Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism report in 2022. It is a neo-nationalist paramilitary organisation based in St Petersburg. It has defined links to international white supremacist movements throughout the world and it is a clear danger. As we said in our report, in April 2020, the Americans proscribed this organisation. At the time, from the intelligence we saw, it did not meet the threshold, so it will be interesting, when we get our briefing from the Home Office, to see what has changed over that period. I have no problem at all with proscribing that horrible, detestable organisation.

I turn now to Palestine Action, and I think the Minister’s point is right. I would defend to the death the right of anyone in this country to protest peacefully. That is something that we should celebrate in a democracy, but it is not what we are dealing with in Palestine Action. It is progressing a false narrative that the UK is arming Israel to bomb innocent civilians—the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, used the word “genocide”—in Gaza.

Arms exports from the UK to Israel in 2023 were worth £8.2 million. The Government have already moved to restrict some exports to Israel after the conflict, but this narrative justifies in the minds of members of that organisation attacking defence industries across the UK—and they are not even very good at it. Some of the sites that they are attacking have nothing to do with Israel and do not export anything to Israel. There was an issue around the F35, but we do not export F35s to Israel. We do produce components, and I am proud that 15% of the content of every F35 in the world is from the UK, but we are not directly exporting them. The court upheld that view. If we suddenly said that we are not going to be part of that contract, it would affect our security, because not only our allies use that plane; the UK does as well. So that is complete nonsense. Palestine Action is attacking companies legitimately involved in the production of instruments and pieces of kit that keep us and our allies safe.

The noble Lord, Lord Hain, asked whether he would have been included in this legislation when he was protesting against apartheid. It crossed my mind that he was a liberal many years ago and that, clearly, in older age he is reverting back to his youth. In answer to him I say yes; if he were damaging property and attacking the national security of this country, he would be included in this legislation. As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, pointed out, it meets the threshold in this legislation.

Foreign Influence Registration Scheme

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd April 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome this Statement. As the Minister has already outlined, the FIRS was one of the key recommendations of the Intelligence and Security Committee’s 2020 report on Russia, which both he and I were involved in.

I concur with his statement on why the full, unredacted report cannot be published. I assure the House that this is a long process. We try to put as much as possible into the public domain, but there are certain elements in this work that would help our adversaries if it was produced in public.

I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, is a keen reader of our reports, and I recommend the Iran report, which will be coming out in the next few weeks.

I ask my noble friend the Minister about Russia’s proxies and satellites—Belarus, Chechnya and others. Are the Government thinking of including them in the FIRS as well?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The FIRS we announced yesterday includes the leadership of Russia, political parties that support the leadership of Russia and a number of other state apparatuses, including the security services in Russia. We have and we will, in due course, present to this House and the House of Commons a statutory instrument that sets out in detail the applicability of the FIRS. I hope that my noble friend can wait for that to see the detail of the specific organisations and individuals named under it.

In informing him of that, I also pay tribute to him and his work with the Intelligence and Security Committee. It is done behind the scenes and appears only when reports such as the Russia report are published. I know, from spending four and a half years on that committee, that there is a tremendous amount of work going on under the surface all the time to both challenge the security services, Government Ministers and agencies on their performance on security and to make the sorts of recommendations that appeared in the Russia report to date.

I am pleased that my noble friend supports the Government’s position not to seek the publication of the unredacted report. For the reasons he has mentioned, this is about national security, and it is also about themes: The themes of the Russia report were that the Russian state was seeking to undermine UK democracy and be a malevolent actor and, as we have seen in Salisbury and in Ukraine since the Russia report, it is not a player on the international stage that abides by the rules. In producing that report, we have to withhold some aspects. It is welcome that my noble friend supports the Government’s approach to that issue.

Iranian State Threats

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Thursday 6th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome this Statement. I know that it will be particularly welcomed by my noble friend who, like me, was on the Intelligence and Security Committee when we produced our Russia report in 2020. The FIRS scheme was one of our major recommendations from that. My noble friend said he would work with local police forces to roll out information around the FIRS scheme, but what work is being done with the diaspora in the UK, which is based not only in London but throughout the UK, to make sure that they are aware of, and can be protected from, the Iranian influence that is out there?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend. He is right that the genesis of the FIRS scheme came out of the investigations undertaken by the Intelligence and Security Committee, of which I was a proud member from 2015 to 2019. We are now developing at pace the implementation of the FIRS scheme, which requires significant infrastructure investment. It was delayed under the previous Government, but has now been given added energy by my right honourable friend Dan Jarvis, the Minister, and myself to make sure it is on stream for the summer of this year. It is, therefore, important that we send out two strong messages: first, that we are standing up to intimidation and criminal activity by the Iranian regime, and, secondly, that people in the diaspora need to know that the scheme is in place. We need to put some efforts behind ensuring that those who qualify for registration under the scheme are aware of it. That will be a major part of the communications strategy in the post-Easter period of this year.

Southport Attack

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Monday 27th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for his question and for the work that he has done in this field. He will know that 33 of the 34 recommendations from the Shawcross report have already been fully implemented. We have one outstanding recommendation. We have already launched new statutory guidance and new training for front-line professionals, including on Islamist extremism. We are overhauling our decision to take in non-Prevent referrals that enter the system. We have launched pilots to tackle online radicalisation, to support those that do not meet the Prevent thresholds. We have recruited, as I mentioned in my initial comments, the first independent Prevent commissioner.

Everything will be kept under review, but I hope that the Shawcross recommendations that are implemented will make a difference. Self-evidently, failings have happened and, therefore, we need to review those failings independently of ministerial action and, in doing that, bring forward—sadly—further recommendations to tighten and improve the system.

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

My Lords, the Intelligence and Security Committee showed in its 2022 report, Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism, the toxic nature of how online extremism is affecting young minds. I accept what the Minister said, that there rightly has to be a threshold for something to be deemed terrorism, but does he agree that the real gap is that, for those individuals who are affected by these images and propaganda online, there is nothing currently in the mental health services that they are referred to for dealing with that?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My noble friend raises an important issue. This is an important part of the process that we need to review now: if individuals are being radicalised in their bedrooms in whatever way—right-wing, Islamist or just for the purposes of enjoying killing—we need to try to find a mechanism to remove the content that is leading to that radicalisation. Equally, if people come into contact with social services, the police or other agencies—as indeed the perpetrator did in this case—that needs to be sensitively picked up and support, whether mental health, directional or another form, needs to be given to help change that behaviour. That is the purpose of Prevent and of the regime that both Governments have had in place over a long period of time. Self-evidently, in this case, it failed. The purpose of our public inquiry is to look at why it failed and at the interventions that happened, why they did not work and why they were not picked up and developed further. We need to ensure that, from whatever background violent behaviour is being directed, we take action to mitigate against it.

United Front Work Department

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Tuesday 17th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The enhanced list will be brought forward, as will FIRS, for summer next year. If there are issues that we wish to bring forward on an enhanced list, we will do that but not announce it strictly in advance. I anticipate early in the new year looking at some of those issues in more detail. The noble Lord asked whether we take economic factors and visits by British Ministers into consideration. We do not. The most important issue is the security of this United Kingdom, and if there are threats we will take action. A pragmatic approach is still necessary, however. There are areas of co-operation with countries of all types that have difficult records and which potentially seek harm to the United Kingdom. There are areas where we need to examine those, and we will take a pragmatic approach. As the Prime Minister has said, we will co-operate where we can, challenge where we can, and do business where we can, but national security is paramount.

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

My Lords, FIRS came out of a recommendation from the Intelligence and Security Committee in its Russia report in 2020, and whether the enhanced tier was workable was questioned by many of us on the ISC, including myself. Does my noble friend agree that, irrespective of whether a country is designated into that second tier, individuals will still have to register if they are promoting the interests of a foreign nation? Does he also agree that our security services have an extensive network of monitoring Chinese activity in this country, which is outlined in the ISC’s report in 2023?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I declare my interest that I was on the Intelligence and Security Committee at the time; I was one of the authors of the Russia report that my noble friend mentions. It is extremely important that we examine the issues that he has raised. We know about this matter because the security services notified the Home Secretary in the previous Government that the individual in the news this week following the court case was a person of interest to the security services and that we should designate him accordingly. That is why it is coming to the public domain. The question of tiers and the question of actions are ones that we will consider, and we will make announcements in the interests of the security of the United Kingdom when those matters are ready to be announced. I hope that assists my noble friend.

Counter-Extremism Strategy

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Wednesday 20th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I will take that as a representation on the outcome of the review, because I cannot comment on the review today. There are two aspects to extremism, the first of which is an external threat, so the Government have to be cognisant of individuals. That is why we have watch lists, security services and advice looking at potential threats from abroad. Equally, the strategy will be concerned with radicalisation at home—not just people from communities that relate to the faith of Islam, but people who might well be radicalised online by a range of sources, from outside the UK or from inside. Counter-extremism is about looking at the total envelope, at home and abroad, and the Government will focus on that when the review’s recommendations are brought forward.

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

My Lords, the ISC, in its report on right-wing extremism, highlighted the issue of young men, in particular, being attracted by right-wing extremism online. Will my noble friend outline what the Government are doing to ensure that platforms take down content that is leading to the radicalisation of some young people?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Again, my noble friend tempts me to produce the outline of the review’s conclusions. But we genuinely take this issue seriously. When I was a Member of Parliament, a constituent of mine in a small village in north Wales was badly attacked and injured by someone with a machete who was radicalised by Nazi philosophy online. That radicalisation is extremely important, and we need to look at how we build up the stability of individuals to resist that radicalisation and, as my noble friend said, stop that radicalisation at source. If it comes from outside this country, we need to take effective action through the security services and others to close it down. I will give my noble friend further information once the review is complete.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment)Bill [Lords]

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 25th March 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dan Jarvis]

That is a very useful clarification, and I thank the Minister for it.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

I accept what the Minister has just said, but where is the threshold for publicity? As he said, the Panama papers were widely distributed in the public domain, but somebody’s Facebook feed might be put into the public domain. If it gets into the national newspapers and on the internet, or it is shared by a certain number of people, do we then determine that it is in the public domain? We need to be very careful about this.

[Dan Jarvis]

My right hon. Friend is undoubtedly right: we do need to be very careful. In the end, the Government have to take a view about where they draw the line. These are very difficult decisions that have to be made. We had really useful and constructive debates in Committee about where the line should be drawn, but the issue will no doubt continue to be debated in the future.

Before I draw my remarks to a close, I will briefly speak to other amendments on the Order Paper, including those tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham, other members of the ISC, and the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Sir David Davis). We support amendment 23, which stands in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham. It is very similar to the amendments we proposed in Committee regarding the Prime Minister’s delegation to a Secretary of State to issue a warrant to interfere with equipment relating to a Member. The amendment sets out that the Prime Minister must be informed of a decision taken by a designated Secretary of State on their behalf as soon as the circumstances that prevented the Prime Minister from approving a warrant in the first place have passed.

We believe that the Prime Minister’s overall involvement in those warrants must be retained, even if it is retrospective in designated cases, so it was a positive step that the Minister said he would look into including such a provision in the statutory guidance, in response to the very sensible points made by the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings. However, we believe this does not go far enough, when this important notification arrangement should be on the face of the Bill.

This House should consider as many scenarios as possible when it comes to arrangements for prime ministerial power delegation on investigatory powers, even if scenarios of Cabinet members desperately trying to undermine the Prime Minister by any means possible perhaps belong more appropriately in “House of Cards” or “The Thick of It”. [Interruption.] I am sure that Conservative Members would have no idea about those kinds of activities; I am happy to take their word for that. But these are important matters, and we must seek to legislate carefully. The amendments tabled by the ISC are thoughtful and constructive, and I hope that, even at this late stage, the Government will consider accepting them.

--- Later in debate ---

The Minister has a difficult job; there are no two ways about it. The task faced by the Home Office, and indeed the agencies, in dealing with the threats to this country is incredibly difficult but, from time to time, we have historically slipped from the standards we view as essential to our national character—a proper understanding and belief in the rule of law, and abiding by that rule of law almost irrespective of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. The first test—the first criterion—when considering a Bill such as this should be, “Do we always obey the rule of law? Does the Bill encourage Governments always to obey the rule of law, whether they are dealing with suspects abroad or with subjects at home?”

[Mr Kevan Jones]

First, let me put on record the apologies of the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis), who chairs the Intelligence and Security Committee. Unfortunately, he is attending Lord Cormack’s funeral, and I thought it was important to put the reason why he is not here on the record.

First, let me refer to new clause 1, which stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis), and say that it is disappointing that we have to have this debate. I am the longest serving member of the ISC, having been on it for nearly eight years. It is a serious Committee; its members take its work seriously and work collegiately. We work on the basis that we support the work of our security services, recognising the difficult job they sometimes have and the dangerous work they do, but that we are also there to provide scrutiny and oversight. If anyone cares to look at our reports over the years, they will see that they are not only thorough, but forensic in their approach. So it is disappointing that the current Government and the previous few have downplayed the Committee’s role.

On Second Reading, I referred to the scrutiny of our intelligence services being a bit like a three-legged stool, as we have the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, the tribunal and the ISC. Together, we should be an effective mechanism to reassure the public that there is oversight of our security services. This is important because the work they do cannot be discussed in open session, and that mechanism gives the confidence that in a parliamentary democracy, where we take freedom of speech and democracy seriously, we have that oversight. The problem with the Government is that, for whatever reason, they have set out their course to undermine our work—I put that on the record.

The new clause will say that the Prime Minister should attend our meetings. It should not be necessary to include such a provision—I believe you served on the ISC at one stage, Madam Deputy Speaker, and so you understand the work we do—but we have a situation where it seems this is seen as not important. The only one in recent times who offered a meeting was the right hon. Member for South West Norfolk (Elizabeth Truss), but that was because she was looking for friends in the last dying days of her Administration, so I do not think it counts. Again, I do not understand the reason behind this. The walls on the way into our office have various photographs of the Committee—you are on one of them, Madam Deputy Speaker—with various Prime Ministers of the day. But this is not about that; it is about the Prime Minister of the day knowing exactly what we are doing and our being able to raise things directly in our secure setting, which we do. That is important, but there is also a wider point to be made about how we scrutinise our security services and give the public that opportunity.

The amendments I have tabled also stand in the names of five other members of the Committee, and we support this Bill. Will we be back in a few years’ time with another Bill? Yes, we will, because, as was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central, technology is changing very fast and we will have to react to it. When the original Bill was taken through by the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes), he recognised that it would not be set in tablets of stone and that this new Bill would be required. The right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Sir David Davis) is right to say that AI will set some other tests that we have not perhaps thought about yet and those might have to be covered by future legislation. Are we reactive as a Parliament? We always are reactive, but this Bill is important because it will give our security services the abilities to react to the ever-changing world that we face.

I wish to refer to two pairs of amendments that relate to clauses 22 and 23, which go to the issue associated with the triple lock and the authorisations—

[Sir David Davis]

Before the right hon. Gentleman moves on, I wish to pick up on his point about the need for continually keeping up with the changing technology. One thing that was expected when the ISC was created was that it would become, if not quite a grandees Committee, a Committee of people who knew exactly what they were doing and took very seriously the issues before them, including the confidentiality of what they do. At least one of the Chairmen of the ISC has complained in the past about the level of redaction of ISC reports. That matters in the context of keeping up with the times because the only way the House of Commons has of understanding the ISC’s opinions is by reading its reports, and if Members are reading a lot of blank or black lines, they will not learn very much.

[Mr Jones]

I understand the right hon. Gentleman’s frustration, but, as Madam Deputy Speaker knows, there are good reasons for those redactions. The Committee does not just agree to everything being redacted; a thorough process takes place and we have some long arguments with the agencies. I would not want anyone to go away thinking that the members of the ISC are a pushover on redacting information. A lot of attention was given to why certain things were redacted from the Russia report. I am comfortable in the knowledge that the things redacted in that report could not have been put in the public domain. The main reason for this is not to save embarrassment for government or any of the individuals; it is about the ability to protect the tradecraft of our services. If we did put certain things in the public domain, our adversaries who want to do us harm would be able to work certain things out. I assure the House that we push back hard and some redactions that have been put forward over the years have been silly, as other ISC members in the Chamber tonight will recognise.

Let me get back to the issue about the triple lock, which is important. The issue is sensitive because it relates to intrusion into the communications of Members of this House and of devolved Administrations. We are talking about what is commonly known as the Wilson doctrine, but, it is like a lot of things in this age; it was announced in 1966, when it was about telecommunications and picking phones up, but we are in a different world now, as the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden said. We now have smartphones, and God knows what is going to be invented in the next few years in terms of how we communicate. As with a lot of things, the convention was thought to be the way forward, but clearly in 2015 it was found that the devolved Administrations were not covered by it and neither were MEPs. The Investigatory Powers Tribunal found that it had no legal enforcement at all, so it was credit to the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 that a formal process was put in place for it—that is important.

Currently, the 2016 Act has three layers of safeguards: the Secretary of State who asks for the warrant; a judicial commissioner who examines the communication that is the target of interception and the type of equipment involved, if it relates to a member of a relevant legislature; and, thirdly, the Prime Minister, who, as the final stop, has to agree this.

The Bill will allow the Prime Minister to designate “up to five” Secretaries of State who can approve the warrants in the event that he or she is unable to be available. As has been raised, the obvious example was when Boris Johnson was incapacitated through covid. When we think about the issue, this measure makes sense. The ISC recognised other unique situations when a Prime Minister may not be available, for example if they were abroad and secure communications were not possible. The ISC was keen that the circumstances needed to be exceptional, but we accept that there is a need for the requirement.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I very much hope the right hon. Gentleman has brought Lord West’s smelling salts with him, because I would like to clarify the concession that Lord West got in the Lords here in the Commons. I can happily commit to strengthening the language on notification requirements in the code of practice, when it is formally brought forward in due course, to require that the Prime Minister “will” be notified of any decisions under the alternative process, rather than “should” be.

[Mr Jones]

I welcome that, but can I hear it again and pin the Minister down a little more? I am sure it is a massive victory, but is he giving a solemn pledge to the House that the code of practice will remove the word “should” and insert the word “will”? Is that what he is agreeing to?

[Tom Tugendhat]

Yes.

[Mr Jones]

Victory at last—there is such power in changing one word. The Minister has given a solemn undertaking on the Floor of the House that the code of practice will change the word “should” to “will”. A small victory for the ISC, but I am sure my colleagues will take it in the spirit in which it is offered. I say to the Minister gently that we could have agreed that the other day when we met, but no doubt the issue that we will be voting on tonight was concentrating his mind.

With that great victory under my belt and those of the members of the ISC, I turn to other amendments. New clause 3, in the name of the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden, deals with

“cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”.

I understand why he has proposed the new clause. It is always worthwhile debating the issues, which run through the entire Bill. Am I assured that there are processes in place that protect our civil liberties? Yes, I am. However, there are occasions when things can go wrong or people ignore them. I think they have been strengthened greatly, but the right hon. Gentleman refers to an important point. I was on the Committee in 2017 when we did the inquiry into detention and rendition. That took a long time, but it was a good report given where it got to. It unearthed things that were not pleasant but had been done in our names as a democracy.

One conclusion the Committee came to was that in its view the UK tolerated actions and took others that were regarded as inexcusable. Well, they were inexcusable, because as the report outlined, we passed on information to allies who then used it. I think things have changed, and to give Members an example of how the ISC can improve things, we called for a review of the consolidated guidance surrounding the way that security operatives should operate regarding issues of rendition or torture. That led to the Fulford principles, which I think have moved on and tightened up the rules and guidance for members of our security services. That was a big movement forward.

I do not think the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden will push the new clause to a vote, but it reinforces the point that if we have a situation whereby, again, we get information that is passed to one of our allies, we must ensure that those principles are upheld. Am I confident that they are upheld now? I think I am, but how did we get to that pretty damning report in 2017? We got there because those principles and the guidance in place were not followed. We must be vigilant about that, and over the years the right hon. Gentleman has done not only this House but the country a service through his tenacity on these subjects.

[Sir David Davis]

I will not press new clause 3 to a vote, but I tabled it because in 2010-11 David Cameron, the then Prime Minister, made a promise that there would be a review and that the issue would be investigated properly, but that never happened. The implicit undertaking was that we would not do it again, and we did it again—over and over again. That is why at some point we needed to put our foot down. The problem is that whenever we put our foot down and make an absolute requirement, somebody says, for example “What about the Russians, with the terrorist attack in the last few days?” I am afraid there comes a point where we say, “We are not going to provide information if you torture people.” If we are clear about that, it helps the country and probably also helps the international battle with terrorism.

[Mr Jones]

I agree totally with the right hon. Gentleman, and I think that is where we are as a Government. Certainly those are the Fulford principles—that we do not share information. Again, some of the people who perhaps do not understand what our security services do, and those who want to malign their great work on our behalf sometimes say, “They are doing x, y and z.” Well as I know from seeing some examples, there are occasions where we deliberately do not pass on information to our allies because of the fear that the right hon. Gentleman set out. The detention and rendition report raised that issue, and the Fulford principles now give us strong guidance. Those principles have been put into being and sewn into the DNA of all new officers. As a result of a huge training programme, not just for existing officers but for new entrants into the service, officers now see that as an important part of their work. That is how it must be done, but it is always important to have this debate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir David Davis]

Again I do not intend to press the matter, but if the ISC discusses this issue in the future, I point the right hon. Gentleman to the German model. They look at something and do not always release information if it is operationally sensitive.

[Mr Jones]

I agree, but that then places an unnecessary burden on the system. The current process with the Secretary of State, the judicial commissioner and the Prime Minister is robust enough to ensure that people are not doing this to find out what someone ordered on Amazon Prime this weekend or to look at their Tesco account, so I think those assurances are fine.

New clause 4 would

“remove the ability of the Secretary of State to authorise the interception of the communications of, or the obtaining of communications intended for, or private information belonging to, Members of Parliament.”

Again, it is good to have this debate, but I would support such a measure for the reasons I have outlined.

The other change in the Bill concerns bulk data. The right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings covered the original investigatory powers in detail, but there are now big data sets held not only by public authorities but by others, and that has made it more important that our security services are able to access them. Whenever we do this, however, it means more intrusion, so let me deal with the issue of oversight in the Bill, and with the broader, more intrusive powers to obtain internet connection records for the discovery of targets.

Again, that is something that I and other ISC members totally support, but the authorisation process is internal. One stance that the ISC has taken throughout all this is that if we are to give more powers to our security services, there must be a balance. There will not be a situation whereby what people have seen can be identified, but this power will drag in a lot of people who, as the right hon. Gentleman said earlier, are completely innocent. As I said, there is a need for such a power, but we thought there should be more oversight from the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. Therefore, the points I made about amendment 15 are important.

The Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office does a great job of ensuring public support for what we do, but, again, there is an issue around bulk datasets. Some of the examples that were given to ISC members—thanks must go to the Minister, who arranged a meeting for the Committee to be briefed on this—make sense when it comes to the issue of low or no reasonable expectation of privacy. It is burdensome, for example, to access the electoral register, but today the Government have said that somehow that is a secret document. Well, that is not the case under this Bill, in which case it is important that the security services should be able to use it, rather than having to go through the warrantry process. That goes to the point, which my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central raised earlier on, about the definition of “low expectation”.

Another perfectly legitimate reason that the security services need these measures is related to testing new AI models of learning. They need access to these new big datasets, which are out there and which companies use, and the Bill will allow them to have it without going through the warrantry system. If intelligence is going to be on the front foot when it comes to AI, we will have to have these big datasets that will teach the systems how to do it.

The problem comes back my hon. Friend’s question of what is deemed a low or no reasonable expectation of privacy. That is something we have considered throughout this process. One thing the ISC has considered is adding to the existing categories. One suggestion we put forward was that, when the agencies do this, they should have to email the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to notify them that they have done it.

[Tom Tugendhat]

rose—

[Mr Jones]

I hope the Minister is not going to intervene again. My legs might get wobbly if I have to sit down again. I might even need some smelling salts. He has explained the internal system, which I am quite satisfied with, but as I said to him and his civil servants—I think other members of the ISC have also said this—it is not us that he has to convince, but the public.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank the right hon. Member for giving way. I just want to assure him that I have taken on board his points. I went back to the agencies and assured myself of the challenge that he had raised and found what I think is a better answer than the one we looked at when we were chatting. I wrote to Sir Brian Leveson and I am delighted to say that he responded, confirming that he will pay specific oversight to this regime in the early years until he is content that it operates in the way that the ISC, the Government and the British public would expect. IPCO has taken on this responsibility, which, I think, answers the question more succinctly than it would be if it were included in the Bill.

[Mr Jones]

Well, I shall take that as half a victory.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Take them where you can get them!

[Mr Jones]

May I just get some clarity? That is a perfectly legitimate way of doing it, and it will mean not interfering with the existing system, which was the concern of both the services and the Minister. I understand that this not as simple as an email being sent. Will that mean that there will be a section looking at this issue in the first annual report? If that is the case, we could at least say to the public that it is actually being considered and the promise is being followed up.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Member will understand that IPCO is operationally independent, so I will not instruct the office or speak for Sir Brian, who has been unbelievably rapid and helpful in his response today. I am sure that he will have heard the comments that the right hon. Member made and, no doubt, will want to draw attention to any areas where he has any doubts at all.

[Mr Jones]

That would be helpful. That would give reassurance to the public and provide a test of how the system works. As I have said, I am comfortable with the process of authorisation, but the public must be comfortable with it as well.

[Sir John Hayes]

I note the right hon. Gentleman’s proper consideration of the balance between privacy and security, which lies at the heart of the Bill, but I also recognise the Minister’s concern that we must not make the process too unwieldy and bureaucratic. I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman might invite the Minister to commit to a regular report going to IPCO as authorisations are made. That might be monthly, but it would at least mean that there was some iterative process of a kind that might reassure the right hon. Gentleman, me and others about that balance.

[Mr Jones]

I understand where the right hon. Gentleman is coming from. Our original idea about having an email was explained when I met the Minister and his civil servants. I think that that would really cut across some of the processes that we have in place. The suggestion that has been made would be one way of doing it, but IPCO already has the powers to look at such things. The only problem with doing that is that we would then have to set up someone in the agencies to produce another report. I do not want to do anything that holds up their work, and I think that that might do it.

Possibly the Minister’s suggestion of how Sir Brian Leveson is going to do it will give the public some reassurance. Let us not forget that Sir Brian has the power to take action if things are not being done correctly. If we read his reports, we can see that he is not fearful of doing these things. A fair compromise has been put forward. I think we have one and a half victories so far—

[Tom Tugendhat]

I think it’s two.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

No, I would not quite say it is two. Hopefully, I might get another one on my other amendment, and then we can all go home happy.

[Sir John Hayes]

Is this an example of my being more hardline than the right hon. Gentleman? It seems like it to me, but perhaps not.

[Mr Jones]

I would not have thought that the right hon. Gentleman could be seen as hardline on anything, pussycat that he normally is. He portrays himself as hardline, but I know from working with him very closely on the ISC that he cares about this information. He has referred to the Investigatory Powers Act as his baby. It has grown up a little bit and is now being brought into the modern age. I should put on the record again his dedication and work as a Minister to bring in the original Act, which was groundbreaking for this country. It has stood the test of time. We know that we will be back here, so the measures will change. I have no problem with that. It is just that, as technology changes, things will change.

May I finish by thanking the members of our security services for the work that they do? I also thank them for the way that they have engaged with the ISC on the Bill. Hopefully, with the changes that have been brought forward, we can reach agreement on the Bill and our security services will have the ability to face up to the challenge that is coming forward: the ever growing use of larger datasets, and the more sophisticated way in which state actors and non-state actors have access to technology. That will enable the security services to do what we all want to do, which is to keep individual citizens and, just as importantly, our democracy safe.

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), who is a fellow member of the Intelligence and Security Committee. As he mentioned, we work collegiately, and one of the many advantages of that collegiate approach is that I do not need to repeat everything that he has just said; I need only say that I agree with him. I realise that that is a radical approach in this place, but I will not say it all again. I will simply say that I agree with him; he is absolutely right. His point is that, when it comes to the consideration of warrants to authorise the interception of, or interference with, the communications of Members of Parliament, there is huge significance to such a decision. That is the reason the Prime Minister has had to be involved in it, and it is the reason we should not widen too far the pool of deputies who, for sensible and understandable reasons, as the right hon. Member explained, we now need to provide for.

That is why I hope that the next concession that the Minister will make will relate to the pool of deputies, and that in the language the ISC suggests that he adopts we ensure that it is a controlled group, based on either current responsibilities or previous experience. I am sure that we can discuss with him any changes to the wording that he thinks are necessary, but as the right hon. Member for North Durham explained, the current provisions allow for only one restriction: that the member of the Cabinet in question should receive a briefing on how to conduct their warrantry responsibilities. We do not think that that is restrictive enough, given the significance of this decision-making process. I am grateful to the Minister for what he has already said about notification of the Prime Minister in the process. That is a sensible change, which I welcome.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir John Hayes]

I am seeing the Minister nodding. He might want to say a word or two more when he sums up.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

May I gently suggest that the right hon. Gentleman goes back to the Minister now, just to pin down exactly what he is agreeing to? We on the ISC have no problem with the idea of our security services having these powers, and I do not think the public would either. They would be less comfortable, as I and the right hon. Gentleman are, with other organisations having them.

[Sir John Hayes]

The Minister may want to intervene on me again to do exactly what the right hon. Gentleman has suggested.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

Again, just to clarify for my right hon. Friend, this Bill offers no greater expansion than his own Bill did in 2016. In the same way he ensured that Bill was no snoopers’ charter, I assure him that this one is not either.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

rose—

[Sir John Hayes]

I was going to say that I have done this matter to death, but I can see that the right hon. Gentleman wants to intervene.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I think the Minister is getting another “dancing on the head of a pin” award for his explanation. What I think the right hon. Gentleman is trying to get on the record—perhaps not for the benefit of people in this House who understand this Bill, but for the wider public—is that the way the Bill will be used is that it will include, for example, a local authority when an investigation is being driven by a security issue, such as in his example of organised crime in cigarette smuggling.

[Sir John Hayes]

Yes, exactly. The right hon. Gentleman has put it very clearly, and the sense of what the Minister has said has reassured me that it is not the Government’s intention to extend those powers beyond the very strict legal limits associated with the kind of organised crime that he and I have both cited. For me, that is considerable progress. The right hon. Gentleman spoke earlier about half a win; I think that is three quarters of a win, at least. For that reason, I feel that I can move on to my next request of the Minister.

We spoke earlier about IPCO, and its role and association with Government. As the Minister will know and as the right hon. Member for North Durham referred to, this legislation provides for a report to be made available to the ISC on an annual basis. There has been some concern that that report might be rather different from the one that is made available to Ministers and others, and my anxiety is that it should not be different. All that it should exclude is current operational matters; nothing else should be excluded from what my Committee considers, and clearly, it needs to be the same as what IPCO gets. We cannot have three or four different reports.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes), and indeed all the fellow members of the ISC who have spoken on both sides of the House in our debate on seeking to improve this important piece of legislation. I must say that it is very rare, when one is called towards the end of a debate, for there to have been concessions on most of the areas at issue, leaving very little else to say. It makes me happy that I did not write my speech in advance, since I would have had to rip most of it up following the Security Minister’s very welcome concessions on a range of issues during our debate. They are on the record, and they are indeed extremely welcome.

However, there is one area of detail that I want to comment on, which is about the triple lock amendment—amendment 22—on the qualifications and experience of the Secretaries of State who, under the widening of the triple lock, could if the Prime Minister of the day is incapacitated for some reason, be drawn into making a warrant to intercept the communications of a Member of this Parliament, or indeed a Member of any of the devolved legislatures in the UK. The right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Sir David Davis) was very explicit about why that particular protection should be in existence, and I completely agree with his analysis. One of the ways we defend our democracy is by allowing Members of Parliament to do their unique jobs without interference unless it is for an exceptional and a very good reason, and has been authorised at the highest level.

There has been a lot of to-ing and fro-ing while the Bill has been going through its parliamentary stages about precisely how this widening of the power to make such a warrant away from the Prime Minister, if he or she is indisposed or unable to be near secure communications, should actually be defined. We have got down to the stage where everybody agrees that to make the system robust there should be an expansion, and we have even come up with a number of Secretaries of State—five—who should be authorised in such exceptional circumstances to make that warrant.

We are now down to the last piece of disagreement between the ISC and the Minister, which is about what the qualifications of those Secretaries of State should be. In seeking to try to draw out precisely what the Government mean, we have asked as a Committee that the relevant Secretaries of State who may be down to do this duty ought already to be responsible for warrantry, or have had previous responsibility for it. Thus far, however, the Government and the Minister have been unwilling to be that deliberate in the arrangements they have made.

As the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) said in his contribution to the debate, the only qualification apart from being a Secretary of State that the Government appear to have admitted is that the person standing in for the Prime Minister ought to have had a 20-minute security briefing about warrantry.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Does my hon. Friend agree with me that this is so important, because the Secretary of State will be acting as the Prime Minister at that time? Once that decision has been taken—even though we now have the commitment from the Minister that the Prime Minister will be told, not should be told—they will not be able to overturn or review it in any way, so that person is acting as the Prime Minister at that stage.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Yes, and it is clearly important that there is a reassurance that the Secretary of State who is picked to do that job in these exceptional circumstances will either have previous experience of being responsible for warrantry and issuing warrants, or have current experience. I do not see why the Security Minister cannot concede that that is where we should be. I do not understand why, over all of the parliamentary time spent on this Bill, the Government have not been able to give us that assurance, which just shores up the important nature of the commitment to widening the triple lock.

Clearly, the Minister’s very welcome decision to make the concession on amendment 23, as my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) has just pointed out, strengthens the situation, because that means the Prime Minister will have to be notified of such a warrant. However, my right hon. Friend is also correct in pointing out that the warrant cannot be rescinded if it has already been granted. I therefore gently ask the Security Minister whether he will not take the opportunity, in responding to the debate, to give the ISC members and the public we all represent the reassurance that the Secretaries of State who may have this power delegated to them either will already be responsible for warranting, or will have previously had responsibility for warranting. I do not understand why he cannot just get up and give us that final assurance. If he does, I think we will have done extremely well on Report and in Committee. I am rather disappointed that the Minister is not leaping to his feet, since he has been leaping to his feet a lot while my colleagues have been making their speeches. I see no such flicker in him as I am making mine. I suspect and hope that that is because he is just thinking about how he will wind up the debate and give us that final assurance that we need.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

The measure is doable, because we are not asking for something in the Bill; it could be done in the guidance. The Minister has already agreed on changing the “should” to “will”, so this measure could be reflected in the guidance that goes alongside the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I can see that the Minister is looking pensive, so I hope that means he is thinking of some way to reassure us on this final, important point with respect to the triple lock and the widening of those powers to other Ministers who are not the Prime Minister.

The whole debate around the Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill demonstrates that when threats evolve, the requirement to meet them also has to evolve. We know that this area is rapidly developing, and we know also that we will probably be back in the not-too-distant future to see how these powers can be changed again to defend our democracy and meet some of the threats of serious organised crime and terrorism, which our security forces help us deal with day in, day out. We also know that if our citizens are to give us effective permission and consent to take some of these powers, any increase in powers has to be accompanied by an increase in proper oversight, to reassure them that democracy is being defended, not undermined. That includes oversight by the ISC, which is why I am a big supporter of new clause 1 as tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis). It is important that that can be an ongoing reassurance.

I do not want to repeat a lot of the arguments made by colleagues, and it is important now to listen to what the Minister has to say. I thank him for the concessions he has made, and I hope he can make just a slight move towards us on the warrantry issue in the instance of the triple lock, so that we can be even more content than we are now.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

If my right hon. and learned Friend will forgive me, I will be able discuss that in a more secure environment, but I can only say, “Not necessarily.” I will be able to describe why that is in a different environment, but I cannot do it here.

The reason for not accepting amendments 22 and 23 —I understand the points made by right hon. and hon. Friends and Members across the House—is that we are talking about a very limited number of people. One Secretary of State is already used to do the initial request. The second person on the triple lock is a judicial commissioner—a judge. The third therefore has to be one of the four Secretaries of State left. Therefore, it is important that we make sure that it is somebody in whom the Prime Minister has confidence. Given that we are about to have a new Government—I hope the new Conservative Government, but still a new one—it is entirely possible that there will be a new Cabinet and that the routine explanation will not be satisfactory. As routine duties do not have legal clarity, we will not use them.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

The Minister has used that argument before about new Secretaries of State, and it is complete nonsense, is it not? It would not happen on day one unless the Prime Minister suddenly got covid or was indisposed. By the time this came in, those three people would be there anyway. His argument is pretty weak.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Member has made his point and I have made mine; I am afraid I will leave it there rather than continue. The ways in which we have been able to engage on the Bill has been incredibly supportive and helpful.

The removal of clause 15 from the Bill would prevent the intelligence agencies and the National Crime Agency from detecting some national security and serious crime threats, and those intent on committing child sexual exportation and abuse. Given the robust oversight of the regime in general, and the internet connection records in particular, we simply do not believe that this is in the best interests of the British public. Removal would benefit only those who threaten our safety and serve to make the work of the intelligence services and the NCA significantly harder as they seek to protect us and bring paedophiles to justice. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner already has the necessary powers to inspect and report on all parts of the CD regime. If the Investigatory Powers Commissioner wishes is to focus attention on condition D of the internet connection record, they have the power to do so. With those clarifications, I commend the Bill to the House.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Kevan Jones]

It is gratifying that we will get this Bill on the statute book, because it will give our security services the necessary powers to keep us all safe. I add my thanks to the staff of the Committee on which I and other Members served, and like the Minister I thank the civil servants who I have engaged with throughout the passage of the Bill. I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis) for his engagement on the Bill. The right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) would have liked to have been here today. He has played an integral part not just in speaking about the Bill, but in his work on the ISC. As I said earlier, unfortunately he is at the funeral of Lord Cormack; the House will understand his reason.

As I said, the Bill will improve our abilities. Perhaps the Minister would also like to put on record his thanks to the ISC, which he forgot to do. It might have been a painful process at times, but can I give him some advice, possibly for the future? He may well have been able to solve some of these issues earlier in our discussions, and avoided keeping his colleagues here on a Monday night—[Interruption.] The Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities says from a sedentary position that that was impossible, but the Minister has agreed to our amendments.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I was going to do so!

[Mr Jones]

The Minister says that he was going to, but if he had done that last week we could perhaps have had very short discussions tonight.

[The Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (Michael Gove)]

Some of us should take yes for an answer.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

Well some of us do, but if the amendments had been agreed to last week, we could have had a shorter debate today and the Minister’s colleagues would not have been kept here for so long.

Finally, the biggest thanks we need to give is to the men and women of our security services who, as the Minister said in his earlier contribution, do not get any recognition publicly. They do their work day in, day out, some in very dangerous circumstances, to keep us all safe.