Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon Excerpts(10 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Greaves (LD)
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 53C. This small group contains two completely unrelated amendments. The first simply asks why premises owned by parish and town councils are not treated in exactly the same way as premises owned by district or other principal councils in terms of exemptions from alcohol bans. District councils are treated in a slightly less strict way compared with other premises, but I do not understand why town councils are not treated in the same way, as they very often own what people think are council-owned facilities in small and medium-sized towns.
Amendment 53C is a more important amendment, and it reads fairly cryptically. It proposes inserting at the end of line 41 on page 35,
“notify such other persons as may be specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State”.
It relates to Clause 60, which concerns orders restricting a public right of way over a highway. Therefore, we are back to that subject.
The existing legislation in a number of different areas relating to access contains designated or specified organisations. There is a list of those organisations and they usually appear in secondary legislation rather than in an Act. I remember arguing a long time ago during the passage of the Countryside and Rights of Way Bill, as well as the Commons Bill in 2006 and some others, that they ought to be in an Act, but they ended up in regulations.
In the CROW Act, proposals relating to access concern restrictions on access land; in the case of the Wildlife and Countryside Act, they concern closures and diversions of rights of way; and in the Marine and Coastal Access Act, they are to do with the designation of access land and the coastal route. In all these cases there is a designated or, in the more recent legislation, specified list of organisations which are notified of proposals. The list includes access organisations such as the Ramblers, the British Mountaineering Council and the Open Spaces Society. It also includes representatives of landowners. For example, the Country Land and Business Association, formerly known as the Country Landowners Association, is on a specified list, as are other organisations. It is a balanced list and it is a matter of automatic notification.
The purpose of this slightly cryptic amendment is to ensure that such a list—really it is the same list as in the other legislation—applies in the case of proposals to restrict, and particularly to stop access to, rights of way so that those organisations have the opportunity to make representations just as they have in other cases. Particularly on the rights of way we are talking about here, if what was being proposed was a closure or diversion under the Highways Act, as amended by the Wildlife and Countryside Act, that right would exist.
I shall say what I said before we had our dinner break: nowadays such notifications are far easier than they used to be. Once a system has been set up, it is just a question of pressing two or three keys on a computer keyboard. If I can set up that sort of system easily enough, I am sure that local authorities would have no difficulty doing so. I beg to move.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for tabling his amendments. On Amendment 53A, I appreciate and understand the important role that parish and town councils and community councils in Wales play in delivering key services in their area and, importantly, in creating a feeling of community; for instance, through the organisation of social events and so on and so forth.
The Bill provides some level of protection for council-operated licensed premises so that they can organise the kind of social events I have referred to but, as my noble friend has suggested, the narrower definition of local authority in this part of the Bill may mean that protection is not afforded to the types of council covered in the amendment. As such, it could result in the parish council not being able to sell alcohol at its annual fête because of a wider controlled drinking zone implemented by the district council. I have listened very carefully to my noble friend’s comments and have reflected on the amendment. If he will agree to withdraw it, we will certainly consider any further and wider implications of the change suggested and return to this on Report.
Amendment 53C would give the Secretary of State the ability to add, by regulation, to the list of persons who should be consulted before access is restricted. We believe that, as currently drafted, the Bill covers all those who should be consulted in each case. I am happy to provide further examples in the guidance but we do not believe there is a need to provide the Secretary of State with the ability to prescribe additions to the list. As my noble friend knows, it would, of course, be open to a local authority to consult more widely, if it so chose. On the basis that I accept in spirit his first amendment and with the explanation I have given on his second amendment, I hope that he will be minded not to press his amendments.
Lord Greaves
My Lords, having just had a splendid dinner, I am tempted to put the first amendment in this group to a vote and see what the Government do, but I shall not. I shall be a good boy. I thank the Minister for his very constructive response.
On Amendment 53C, I do not understand why organisations which are consulted at the moment on all similar proposals should not be consulted on these proposals. There is a suggestion that these national organisations ought to keep out of these local decisions, but we are talking about rights of way networks which have national or regional importance as public footpaths for many people who do not live locally. There is an issue of principle here which I would like to discuss further with the Government. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his amendment, and not least for his closing remarks. He raises an important and interesting issue. The City of London Corporation, as all noble Lords would agree, does a fantastic job managing a number of important spaces through both primary legislation and the effective use of by-laws. I also know that in discussions officials have held meaningful and constructive conversations with representatives from the City of London Corporation over the past few months to discuss the issue, and I note and appreciate the safeguards that have been built into the suggested amendment. I would like to consider the matter further ahead of Report, read through my noble friend’s contributions and the representations which have been made by the City of London, and consider any wider implications of this proposed change. In the mean time, given the strong case made by my noble friend and what I hope he feels is my positive response, I hope he will be minded to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville
My Lords, I am happy to do as my noble friend suggests. Should he wish to have further contact either with me or with the City of London Corporation, I hope that he will not hesitate to do so. I am very grateful to him for the spirit of his response, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville
Perhaps I may make a very brief intervention. Clause 67(2) seems to contain a drafting mistake because the subsection opens with the words “This section”, but it is in fact a reference to paragraph (b) immediately before it in subsection (1), referring to “public place”. I am not seeking to press this in any way but some attention might be drawn to it between now and Report to make sure that, if I am right, it is corrected.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
My Lords, Clause 67 provides interpretations of the terms used in this chapter, and I shall briefly explain the definitions and the reasoning behind the key terms.
First, perhaps I may pick up on the question of “public place”, which the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, has just raised. This is defined as,
“any place to which the public or any section of the public has access, on payment or otherwise, as of right or by virtue of express or implied permission”.
It is the same definition as is used for the current designated public place order. It does not apply where a private Act gives a person or body a power in relation to a certain area of land. However, if that person or body gives written notice to the local authority, the local authority can make a public spaces protection order in relation to that area of land.
Unitary authorities fall within the definition of “local authority” as currently drafted in the Bill. I am mindful that we have looked at the various definitions of local authorities, including parish councils and county councils, and we are looking at all these issues in more general terms. I hear what the noble Baroness says about the specific issue of unitary authorities but they fall within the definition of “local authority”.
There are a few other definitions which have not been raised in this debate, but I hope that I have reassured the noble Baroness on the two specific issues that she mentioned and that she will be minded not to press her opposition to the clause standing part. I thank my noble friend Lord Brooke for pointing out the drafting issue and we will certainly review it in advance of Report.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon Excerpts(10 years, 5 months ago)
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Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)
My Lords, may I raise a point about the further consideration of the Bill today? At 6.03 pm yesterday, we received quite a lengthy letter from the Minister with amendments that I am told are to be debated today. Is it appropriate to receive amendments at such late notice for debate the following day?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, as with the Opposition, we have also seen all the amendments and have been working through them. They have been tabled and agreed for debate; that is the programme that is scheduled for today. I know that the noble Baroness appreciates the challenges of the number of amendments we have on this Bill, and we wish to make progress.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
I am sorry. I understand the need to make progress. The Minister will know from the amendments we have tabled and our contributions to this debate that we agree with him in seeking to make progress. I am, however, questioning whether it is right to table amendments and notify some Members of your Lordships’ House—not all—at 6.03 pm for debate on the following day. That seems completely inappropriate. As we are speaking, I am trying to go through all the amendments to ensure that we have a response and can fully consider them. This House prides itself on scrutiny, but this does not leave us the opportunity to scrutinise adequately these amendments tabled by the Government.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
Again, I say to the noble Baroness that anyone who has been in the previous days of this Committee would not doubt for a moment that the House has been very careful in its scrutiny of the Bill. That is reflected in where we currently are in the progress of the Bill. As I said, these amendments have been tabled and we, as the Government, have looked at them. We look forward to the debate and the scrutiny that will take place of them.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
My Lords, we have tabled amendments 21E and 21F to seek to clarify the effect of changes made to Clause 12 on Report in the House of Commons. As I understand it, the effect of those changes is that the ability to exclude a person who is the subject of an injunction under Clause 1 from the place where he or she normally lives in cases of violence or risk of harm can now apply across all tenures, including owner-occupiers, and not just the social housing sector, as I think was originally proposed. Will the Minister confirm whether that is now the case?
If Clause 12 now applies across all tenures equally, what powers are now given under Clause 13 that apply only to someone with a tenancy agreement but do not apply to someone normally living in owner-occupied property who is also the subject of an injunction under Clause 1? One would have assumed that all tenures were now being treated equally but I take it that Clause 13, by its very wording, does not apply to a person in owner -occupied property. If there is still a difference in the powers available under Clauses 12 and 13, depending on the form of tenure, will the Minster say what those differences are and why they are necessary? Will he also say whether Clause 13 applies to the private rented housing sector or to just the social housing sector? Presumably the private rented housing sector is now covered by the changes made to Clause 12, so if a private sector housing tenant is not covered by Clause 13, in which ways does it mean that someone in social housing accommodation is being treated differently from someone who is a private sector housing tenant and who is also the subject of an injunction under Clause 1?
Amendment 21F would give local authorities extra flexibility in tackling anti-social behaviour in the private rented housing sector when private landlords refuse or are unwilling to act. It would be helpful to have the Minister’s comments.
Finally, under Clause 12, the injunction may exclude the respondent from the place where he or she normally lives. Under Clause 13, the tenancy injunction may include a provision prohibiting the person against whom it is granted from entering or being in any premises or any area specified in the injunction. What is the reason for the difference in wording apparently based on form of tenure?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, I totally understand the noble Lord’s concern that anti-social behaviour powers in this Bill should be, as far as possible, tenure-neutral. He is quite correct that this came up during the debate in the other place and Clause 12, which provides for exclusion, is now tenure-neutral following amendments made on Report in the Commons. Of course, it is of no consequence to the victims of such behaviour that the perpetrator is a tenant of social housing, in the private rented sector, or is indeed an owner-occupier. What matters is that action can be taken.
Clause 13 makes special provision for tenancy injunctions so as to preserve the powers in housing legislation. For the most part, the housing injunction can be used in the same way as an injunction to prevent nuisance and annoyance. However, it makes the express provision for a tenancy injunction to be made in some circumstances where the tenant allows, incites or encourages anti-social behaviour by another person and this constitutes a breach of the tenancy agreement. Such behaviour could be committed by a visitor or lodger, for example. Front-line professionals have demonstrated through discussions held that they value this power and that is why we have retained it.
I assure the noble Lord that we are satisfied that Part 1 already enables the police, a housing provider or a local authority to apply for an IPNA to prevent a person allowing, inciting or encouraging someone else to engage in anti-social behaviour. It can be used in this way not only against tenants in the social and private rental sectors, which are the sectors that these amendments are concerned with, but against owner-occupiers. Given that, we do not need to extend the tenancy injunction provisions to cover a wider category of persons, as these amendments seek to do.
I also assure the noble Lord that Clause 13 applies to anyone who has a tenancy agreement with a local authority or a social landlord, so it does not cover the private rental sector.
Based on the assurances that I have given in terms of the extension and the provisions that were discussed in the other place, I hope that the noble Lord is content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Rosser
I am still not entirely clear what the position is in the light of what the noble Lord has said. As I understood it, he seemed to be at some pains to say that the content of Clause 13 is also covered by Clause 12 because the police, or somebody making the application, would have the powers to make that application in respect of somebody in the private rented sector, or presumably even an owner-occupier, who was,
“allowing, inciting or encouraging any other person to engage or threaten to engage in anti-social behaviour”.
I think that that is what the noble Lord was seeking to tell me. That wording appears in Clause 13 in relation to tenancy injunctions but it does not appear in Clause 12, although the Minister is seeking to say that that is what Clause 12 actually means. Therefore, if owner-occupiers and the private rented sector are covered by Clause 12, why do we need Clause 13 to put in different wording for a tenancy injunction when the noble Lord is apparently seeking to say that that is already covered in Clause 12?
In my contribution, I drew attention to Clause 13(3), which says:
“The court may include in the tenancy injunction a provision prohibiting the person against whom it is granted from entering or being in … any premises specified in the injunction (including the premises where the person normally lives)”,
so it clearly covers premises other than where the person normally lives, but the subsection goes on to say that it could also apply to,
“any area specified in the injunction”.
Do the terms of Clause 13(3) apply also to owner-occupiers and the private rented housing sector or are we treating differently people in the social housing sector who may have one of these injunctions and who it is proposed should be excluded? Are the people concerned in the three different types of tenure all being treated equally or is there something different in this for the tenant of social housing accommodation? If there is no difference and it is all covered by Clause 12, why do we need a separate Clause 13?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
I repeat that as far as the first clause is concerned, the intention is to be tenure-neutral. As I said, we have considered the discussions that took place on Report in the House of Commons and have made appropriate amendments. I also repeat that the specific purpose of a tenancy injunction is to capture behaviour where a tenant has breached, or it is anticipated that they will breach, their tenancy agreement by engaging, or threatening to engage, in anti-social behaviour. We have tried to cover all elements in both clauses. As I have said before, it does not matter to the victim whether the perpetrator is a tenant of social housing or in the private rented sector. What matters is that action can be taken, and Clause 12 covers that.
Lord Rosser
With great respect to the Minister, I do not think that he has explained why Clause 13 is necessary. He keeps saying that Clause 12 is tenure neutral. If it is tenure-neutral, it covers social housing tenants as well as those in the private rented sector and owner-occupiers. Therefore, why do we need Clause 13? He refers to Clause 13 relating to anti-social behaviour, but Clause 12(1)(b)(i) also refers to anti-social behaviour. It also refers, in subsection (1)(b)(ii), to,
“a significant risk of harm to other persons from the respondent”.
The Minister has not addressed another question that I asked. Clause 12 refers to,
“excluding the respondent from the place where he or she normally lives”,
but in Clause 13, which covers tenancy injunctions, a prohibition can apply to,
“any premises specified in the injunction (including the premises where the person normally lives)”.
I therefore repeat that the provision envisages that the scope can extend beyond the premises where the person lives. There is also a phrase about preventing a person,
“from entering or being in … any area specified in the injunction”.
Is the Minister saying that the terms of Clause 13(3) are also included in Clause 12? He cannot have it both ways. He cannot say that Clause 12 covers all forms of tenure and then say that he still needs Clause 13.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
I can only repeat what I have already said: Clause 13 makes special provision for tenancy injunctions so as to preserve specific powers in housing legislation. In this case, it also makes an express provision for a tenancy injunction to be made in some circumstances where the tenant allows, incites or encourages anti-social behaviour by another person. This constitutes a breach of their tenancy agreement. As I said earlier, such behaviour could be committed by a visitor or a lodger. The reason for Clause 13 is that front-line professionals value this power. That is why we seek to retain it.
Lord Rosser
Why is it not equally important that the provision about,
“inciting or encouraging any other person to engage or threaten to engage in anti-social behaviour”
should apply to the private rented housing sector, and to owner-occupiers? Is the Minister saying that only somebody in social housing might incite or encourage others to engage or threaten to engage in anti-social behaviour, and that that would not apply to the private rented sector or to owner-occupiers? Of course it applies there, too. This is not tenure neutral. If it were, Clause 13 would not be needed.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
My Lords, either I am failing to comprehend totally what the noble Lord is saying, or vice versa. I am listening very carefully to what he is saying, but, rather than repeating myself, I think it would be in the best interests of making progress if I wrote to him about this. I hope that he has been reassured by some of what I have said, and by the commitments and assurances given by the Government. On that basis, I again ask him to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Rosser
Obviously, I accept that the Minister will, without any commitment, have another look at this and write to me—which presumably will require him to reflect on everything that has been said before his reply is signed and sent. On that basis I will withdraw the amendment. However, I put to him again this simple question: if he is arguing that Clause 12 is tenure neutral, why does he need Clause 13? I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I have Amendment 21J in this group. Consultation can mean a lot of things and sometimes mean different things to different people, depending on what they want it to mean. I have pretty much given up tabling amendments which add, to “consult”, “and have regard to the outcome of the consultation”, having been told quite frequently that of course that must be implicit. However, I have met times when the consulter has not recognised that.
We heard from the Minister on my previous amendments that local authority social services have a role when someone under the age of 18 is involved as the respondent or potential respondent to an IPNA. My amendment would insert a reference to,
“the local authority for the area where the respondent resides”,
meaning of course the social services part of the local authority. I am seeking consultation, without trying to define it, of the local authority as well as of the youth offending team.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord and my noble friend for their amendments. This group again relates to the balance that needs to be struck in ensuring that the appropriate consultation takes place, but relates specifically to cases involving young people under the age of 18.
Amendment 21H is concerned with the duty on applicants for injunctions under Part 1 to consult with the local youth offending teams in the case of under-18s. Crucially, that consultation must take place before the application is made to the court. That is an important change to the process where young people are concerned. Therefore, youth offending teams will help to ensure that the prohibitions in the order are appropriate and understood by the young person, and that any positive requirements are tailored to meet his or her needs. As we all recognise, as do I from my time in local government, youth offending teams are an important and established part of the youth justice system. They are well used to working with young people in these sorts of circumstances.
The noble Lord raised the issue of consultation. This would be an ongoing process and I would expect the consultation with the youth offending team to take place swiftly for the benefit both of the victims and of the communities that require protection. One of our primary objectives in reforming the response to anti-social behaviour is to speed up that response and I would not expect this consultation requirement to prevent that.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, is my noble friend aware of whether the Local Government Association has been consulted—sorry to use the term again—on this provision? It seems to me that the Government should have been talking to it about whether it would want a statutory role. I take his point about occasional urgency but it is always open to a local authority to say, “This is urgent. You had better get on with it”, or, at the other end of the spectrum, to say, “We have no comment”. If he is not aware of what talks underlay the provision as we see it now, perhaps he could let me know after today’s sitting.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
In direct response to that, I can say that representatives from the LGA and other organisations have attended meetings with my noble friend with regard to this Bill. I again reassure her that, as the guidelines are reviewed, I am sure that the LGA will be making representations and will be part of that process.
Lord Rosser
I certainly will withdraw my amendment but can the Minister respond to two of the questions I asked? Can the youth offending team oppose an application for an injunction under Section 1 for someone aged under 18 and can it oppose it in court? Will the court hearing an application for an injunction under Section 1 have to be told the outcome of the consultation with the youth offending team and the view of the youth offending team?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
The youth offending team cannot actually veto an application. If it objects to a particular application, we expect further dialogue to take place on what it has submitted, but that does not mean that the process should be dragged out unnecessarily.
Lord Rosser
I accept that the team cannot veto it, but my question was: if it does not agree with it, can it oppose it in court? When the thing goes to court, will it be necessary for the court to be told of the outcome of the consultation of the youth offending team and the view of the youth offending team?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
This is a specific issue. As I said, I would expect that the court would consider all consultations that had taken place and advice that had been received in considering this element. Certainly, the intention in providing for these orders would be that the youth offending team had a central role. It would also be represented in court. If there were an occasion where the team felt strongly enough, yes, the short answer is that it would be represented at the court hearing if it thought that its issues were not being considered in the right way.
Lord Rosser
I thank the Minister for his response to the question and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
The noble Baroness raises an interesting point. I have been wondering about other examples, and the one that immediately came to mind was the noise of aircraft coming into Heathrow in the middle of the night, which is a big issue in my area—but perhaps the order is not intended to be as extensive as that.
I have a serious question for the noble Baroness, which is whether it is appropriate for criminal offences to be created by regulations. That is in effect what subsection (3) of the proposed new clause would do, as it states:
“The Secretary of State shall, by regulations, set out the circumstances under which an offence has been committed”.
I appreciate that this is a probing amendment, so I do not want to be too tedious about it, but that struck me as a point of principle that one might want to consider.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
My Lords, the Government are often accused of not listening. I listened with great interest to the previous debate, initiated by my noble friend Lord Marlesford, and as I went over to the Box I noticed a piece of litter on the floor. I acted promptly and handed it to the doorkeeper—so there is some hope of instant action on the part of the Government.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for tabling her amendment with the proposed new clause and raising an important point. I agree with her that, where businesses act in a way that is likely to cause harm to others, they should be held to account. However, the Government feel that a corporate ASBO is unnecessary. We believe that we have drafted the new powers in such a way as to be flexible enough to deal with this eventuality.
For example, the new community protection notice, which we will discuss when we come to Part 4, can be issued against a corporate body. If that corporate body is persistently acting in an unreasonable manner and having a detrimental effect on the quality of life of those in the locality, it can be held to account through the new notice. While the community protection notice replaces litter and graffiti notices, it can be used for much more, including noise and other behaviours. What is more, breach is a criminal offence and, on conviction, a business could be fined up to £20,000. It is a power which provides real teeth.
Lord Beecham (Lab)
Will the Minister indicate whether unincorporated bodies will be caught by the provision, or would that require additional legislation?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
I believe that the clause as drafted could apply to an individual or an organisation. When we discuss that wording, it will be clarified. This applies to an individual or an organisation—which incorporates the issue raised by the noble Lord. In addition, where the use of business premises has resulted, or is likely to result, in nuisance to members of the public or disorder nearby, the new closure powers that we are introducing, to which the noble Baroness referred, will be able to close a premises immediately. The police and/or local authorities can act quickly where a business acts anti-socially. Again, breach is a criminal offence with the potential for a significant fine.
It is also worth saying that sometimes it may be a particular individual who is the root cause of the anti-social behaviour—for instance, the business owner or a store manager—and not the business as a whole. In those circumstances, the police, council or others listed in Clause 4 could apply to the court for an injunction against the individual on the test of nuisance or annoyance. Hopefully that would deal with the issue and, while breach in this case may not be a criminal offence, it could still result in a large fine or even a custodial sentence.
In putting forward this amendment, the noble Baroness said that it was a probing amendment to seek clarification. I hope that on the basis of the example I have given, by drawing the attention of noble Lords to the fact that we will be discussing this issue under Part 4 and with my explanation, she will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his explanation. I am not sure whether it will be helpful to probe the matter further when we get to community protection notices, because they deal with individuals. If there is a persistent litter problem in certain premises, it would not be possible to have a community protection notice against every individual. My worry with his other proposal, the closure of premises, is that it would deal with the problem by closing the business. Often, it might be better to take preventive action with the corporate body, the business, to prevent closure and to deal with the problem, rather than to act against individuals and then, if that does not work, close the business. I am trying to find a pre-emptive way to prevent the problem rather than deal with it once it had happened. However, I am grateful to the noble Lord for taking the point seriously. Perhaps we can return to it and discuss it further when we consider community protection. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, in moving this amendment I will also speak to Amendments 22H, 22J and 22K. My noble friend Lord Greaves has Amendment 22KA in this group.
On Monday, when we were discussing the relationship between provisions in the Bill and statutory nuisance, I explained that I had been asked to raise the matter by the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health, of which I am vice-president. I will speak briefly to my amendments today, but I also ask the Minister whether we can discuss the matter before Report. The institute is clearly concerned about remedies such as the community protection orders and noise abatement orders being too similar for comfort. The institute talked to me about the potential for confusion and conflict and twin-tracking by different authorities and different professions. However, I assure the Minister that we are willing to contribute to the guidance around all this. We take the point that the guidance is still in draft form. We are concerned to get the legislation right, not just to rely on guidance where the legislation may in itself not be as clear as it might be.
Amendment 22NA would provide for a significant detrimental effect to trigger a community protection notice. Where there is a civil process, the de minimis principle would apply. It has been put to me that the alternative to dealing with this in legislation is for it to come out over time in case law, which would obviously have a cost implication.
Amendment 22ND would require a person in authority to assure himself that the conduct is not already subject to any other statutory control. As drafted, that person may think it appropriate as a discretion. This seems to be quite a weak protection against different agencies wasting each others’ time chasing the same end. What is most important is to avoid obstructing or contradicting action that has already been taken, such as an indefinite prohibition in an abatement notice.
Amendment 22NE would provide that no notice was served where it would be controlled under any other statute, which is again about conflict. Where the problem is noise, apportioning responsibility and sorting out a fair and effective remedy can take a lot of technical—
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
I am responding to this debate, so I am listening with great attention, but for a moment I thought I had lost my place. I must point out that we are discussing group 9, which starts with Amendment 22E. I believe that my noble friend is speaking to group 13, which starts with Amendment 22NA. My apologies for not intervening sooner, but I thought that I had lost my place. Perhaps she would like to speak to the earlier group.
Baroness Hamwee
My noble friend is absolutely right. I apologise to the Committee. There is such enthusiasm to move on today that I was moving too fast. I must give my noble friend an opportunity to accept or possibly reject my Amendment 22E. It would provide in Clause 21 that the court must receive evidence about suitability. There must be a proportionality element in the requirements provided in the orders. I may be told that this yet again is something that is dealt with in guidance.
Amendment 22G takes us to the duration of the orders. We are presented in the case of under-18s with a fixed period of not less than two years or an indefinite period. I suggest that there should be a limit for everyone, as there is for under-18s. The criminal behaviour order can include a lot of requirements and restraints, which could, if they go on indefinitely, have a disproportionate impact. To have something hanging over one’s head indefinitely could be a disincentive—you could give up hope of ever getting it right.
Amendment 22H would provide that reviews are not confined to under-18s, which continues more of that thought. Amendments 22J and 22K are consequential on that. I beg to move.
Lord Rosser
I am very interested to hear the Minister’s response on all the issues that have been raised, particularly about the duration of a criminal behaviour order. This has already been stated. For those who reach the age of 18 there is a,
“fixed period of not less than 2 years, or … an indefinite period”—
then it says in brackets—
“(so that the order has effect until further order)”.
I am not quite sure what that means. What is the further order that is envisaged? It does not say, “until further notice” but “until further order”. Perhaps the Minister will clarify what that actually means.
As far as the order being allowed to go on for an indefinite period, the Minister has been quite eloquent during the passage of the Bill, telling us all about some of the existing provisions, how they are not working and how they are not having any effect. Bearing in mind that it says in the draft guidance that the criminal behaviour order,
“is aimed at tackling the most serious and persistent offenders where their behaviour has brought them before a criminal court”,
then I suggest that if such an order has been in effect for five years but has not had any impact and has not managed to tackle the most serious and persistent offenders, it is unlikely that it will do so beyond five years.
On how long the order period should last, if the Minister is determined that the facility should be there for it to continue for longer than, say, a period of five years and to go on indefinitely, does he not think it appropriate that there is a proper review to justify the need for it to continue on the basis that one would have thought five years a reasonable time to show the effectiveness, or otherwise, of an order?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Hamwee for her explanation of these amendments and for sharing her thoughts about a group yet to come. It gave those of us on the Front Bench advance notice of what she might be saying, so I thank her profusely for that.
Amendment 22E seeks to require a court to consider the proportionality, as my noble friend said, of positive requirements for including them in a criminal behaviour order. Positive requirements are of course an important element of both the criminal behaviour order and the injunction to prevent nuisance and annoyance. As currently drafted, the Bill states that the court must receive evidence about the suitability and enforceability from the person or organisation that will be supervising compliance with the requirement. Proportionality will therefore routinely be considered by a court as part of this decision.
The Bill sets out clear limitations on courts when determining whether to agree any positive requirement proposed in the application. The court must not impose any requirement that conflicts with, for example, an individual’s religious beliefs, or interferes with their work or education. Ultimately the court will have regard to an individual’s human rights—for example, Article 8 rights—when deciding to include positive elements. Such qualified rights can only be infringed where to do so is necessary and proportionate in pursuit of a legitimate aim. Proportionality, therefore, is a relevant legal consideration for the courts.
Amendment 22G, which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, focused on as well, would remove the ability of the court to grant a criminal behaviour order that lasted longer than five years. Of course, I understand the reasoning behind this. However, where the courts are dealing with the most anti-social individuals, they should have the option of imposing an order for a longer period. The courts, as I am sure all noble Lords will agree, will always consider the reasonableness and proportionality of a longer order before granting it. They will have access to relevant information about a particular case. We believe they are best placed to make a judgment about the appropriate length of an order. What is more, the offender has the ability under Clause 26 to apply to the court to vary or discharge the order at any time.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, sought clarification about the words “further order”. This refers to a further order of the court, not a further CBO.
Finally, I understand that Amendments 22H, 22J and 22K are designed to ensure that all orders are reviewed annually. As your Lordships are aware, we have ensured that this is the case for under-18s. We recognise the importance of frequent monitoring as a young person matures during the duration of an order. However, in respect of adults we have left the decision open to the relevant police force as to whether there should be such a review. In such cases where an individual is behaving in a way that is seriously anti-social, it may not be appropriate to review the case after 12 months, as this would be too soon and would simply result in an unnecessary burden on the police and courts. Again, we wish to make sure that such decisions are made by those on the front line who are best placed to assess each individual case.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon Excerpts(10 years, 5 months ago)
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Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)
My Lords, I would comment briefly that having looked at these amendments, Amendment 22QA seems to be a particularly reasonable and sensible way forward. If you think of the local authority as being at the centre of its place—not just part of the local council but managing the area—it seems very reasonable and sensible. This is perhaps a case, as the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, and my noble friend Lord Harris said earlier, of wanting the parts of the Bill that are useful to work. This may well assist the Government in ensuring that the clause is effective.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 22NC and 22QA are proposed by my noble friend to change the process at the point where a community protection notice is issued. Currently, when issuing a community protection notice, an authorised person—be that a police officer, an officer of a local authority or a person that the local authority has designated, such as a social landlord—would have to inform any body or individual that the person issuing the notice thinks appropriate. Amendment 22NC seeks to remove this requirement.
Amendment 22QA, in my noble friend’s name, then seeks to impose a requirement that an authorised person who is not the local authority must inform the relevant local authority of its issuing of a notice. I recognise that it is important that a local authority is aware that community protection notices are in operation in its area but, conversely, it is also important, as I am sure noble Lords will agree, that local authorities notify the police. The reality is that police and local authorities will be working together to tackle local anti-social behaviour and therefore it is not necessary to put into the Bill the requirement to inform the local authority. The existing provision in Clause 40(6) states that the authorising officer “must … inform” any appropriate individual or body of the issue of a community protection notice, and it is difficult to imagine any case where the relevant local authority would fall outside the definition of “appropriate”. I do not think it necessary to specify that the local authority must be informed.
However, there may well be others whom it would be appropriate to inform as well. As I have suggested, the police will often have an interest. I fear that the effect of my noble friend’s amendments would be to restrict the requirement to informing the local authority only.
Our guidance for front-line professionals states clearly that, where a community protection notice is being issued, there is clear merit,
“in involving the local council, which will have many years of experience in tackling environmental issues, when deciding whether or not to serve a CPN”.
As I and my noble friend have said on previous occasions, the guidance can be amended as we move through the parliamentary process. Of course, if there is a requirement, we can set a clearer expectation on the necessity of ensuring that the local authority is fully involved.
As an aside—I speak with some experience, although perhaps not with the same number of years’ experience as my noble friend—in my 10 years in local government, I served as both the cabinet member for the environment and then as the cabinet member for policing and community engagement. In that respect, my experience—albeit on a London council—showed that the local authority, the police and other local agencies work well on the ground, and we have faith that these agencies will continue to work well as we move forward.
Amendment 22QF concerns remedial works carried out by the local authority where there has been a breach of a community protection notice. Remedial works may be carried out if a person fails to comply with the terms of a notice served on them. The local authority may carry out the remedial work without the consent of the owner or the person who had defaulted on the notice on land “open to the air”, and Amendment 22QF would prevent this. The local authority cannot simply enter premises at will; I am sure that my noble friend knows that to be true. It must seek the “necessary consent” of the defaulter and the owner of the premises if that person is not the defaulter. However, there may be circumstances where the local authority has taken all reasonable efforts to find the owner but has not been able to do so. I do not believe that communities should continue to suffer in such circumstances, and that is why it is important that the authority is able to carry out remedial works.
I hope that my noble friend is reassured by the explanations I have given of what is behind the Government’s proposals here, and that he will be minded to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Greaves
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply, although I was a bit peeved by the first part of his response. If I have not made it absolutely clear that the first amendment is a probing amendment in order to find out what this subsection means, then I apologise. I shall try to be clearer in future. It is quite normal in Committee to table amendments that take out subsections, not because you want to take them out but because you want the Government to explain what they mean. They are called probing amendments and that is fairly normal procedure, but I am sorry that I did not make that clear in this case. Clearly, I do not want to take out the subsection; I want a clear explanation from the Government of exactly what it means, and I shall read Hansard before I decide whether I have had a clear explanation.
The Minister said that the reason why councils will have to be notified is that they have many years of experience. That is true but it is not why they have to be notified. They have to be notified because, as I understand it, they are the most important central body as far as community protection notices are concerned. I am not suggesting that the police are not important—they clearly are very important indeed—but the council is the body that has the staff and the ability to go on to the ground and do something about these problems, and remedy them if that is required. The Minister said that the Government have faith that these agencies will continue to work well on the ground as we move forward. I have no doubt that where this is working well already on the ground it will continue to do so, and I hope that it will be brought in where it is not yet working—so long as the people are still there on the ground.
I am sorry to hammer on about this, but in many parts of the country it is precisely those council staff and the local neighbourhood policing teams, who are so vital to this operation, whose employers are wondering how long they can continue to pay them, because of the cuts that are taking place. That is just a fact. I am not making a political point. If I were on the Labour Benches I would be making a horrible political point and attacking the Government over this, but I am not doing that now; I am just stating that this is the fact that we have to live with. Many of us are fighting hard to ensure that in our own patches the mechanisms, the structure and the networks continue, but with every year that passes that gets more difficult. It is one thing to pass legislation like this that puts forward exciting new ideas and measures to deal with the problems, but if we cannot do it on the ground because there are no staff left, it is very difficult. Having moaned in that way, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon Excerpts(10 years, 5 months ago)
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Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I have amendments tabled later on community protection notices and how statutory nuisance is to be dealt with, but I use this opportunity to ask the Minister a couple of questions.
In the Commons, the Government took out the exclusion from community protection notices of statutory nuisance—it was in Clause 40(5)—saying that they had established a technical working group including representatives from the police, the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health and the Chartered Institute of Housing to draft clear guidance as to what to use when. I should declare an interest. I am a vice-president of the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health, which is why it has come to me on this issue. It has told me that it was asked for a comment at one point but that it is not aware of the technical working group. Can the Minister explain to the Committee what is happening in that area?
The institute’s concern is about confusion over who should do what, whose responsibility it should be and whether, in the case of some nuisances, those who might have powers to deal with them are likely to have the technical knowledge. The point was made to me that you can tell what litter is, but it is not always easy to tell when noise is a statutory nuisance, because so many conditions and criteria surround it. I would be grateful for some help and news, which might shorten our debate later—although, of course, it might not.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Greaves for his amendments and my noble friend Lady Hamwee for her comments. It is interesting that she talks about noise. In one’s own personal experience, what is music to some is noise to others. I think we shall be returning to this.
With regard to the amendments to the new injunction, it is our view that they could make the actual process much slower and more bureaucratic—akin to the orders that we seek to replace. It would not help professionals deal with anti-social people and, more importantly, would not help victims who have to endure the perpetrator’s behaviour.
The new injunction is designed to be used quickly and, in many cases, preventively, to stop problem behaviours before they escalate. These problem behaviours will not always relate to a statutory nuisance. Therefore, to include an additional condition which suggests that statutory nuisance should be considered every time would, in all likelihood, result in some social landlords or police forces being unable to act quickly to protect the victim. We expect social landlords and police forces to work in partnership with local councils to deal with shared problems, such as anti-social noise nuisance. If social landlords and police forces felt obliged to seek advice from the local council’s statutory nuisance team before every injunction, this could delay the process of the application unnecessarily, and lead to victims suffering even more. Moreover, this new third limb of the test could open up the process to prolonged and costly legal challenges, as respondents sought to argue that their conduct amounted to a statutory nuisance.
The same is true of my noble friend’s amendment to Clause 40. As he will be aware, we had originally excluded statutory nuisance from situations in which a community protection order could be issued. However, after discussing the matter at length with environmental health officers and other professionals, we discovered that this exemption could result in an undesirable scenario. Some perpetrators might use the appeal mechanism to go unpunished via either the statutory nuisance or the breach of the community protection notice.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee is correct that the Opposition Front Bench raised such concerns in Committee in the Commons. Having considered the matter further, the Commons was content to make this change on Report. So I ask my noble friend to accept my assurances that we continue to work closely with statutory nuisance experts, to ensure that the guidelines reflect the important rule that the regime plays in protecting communities from behaviour that is a nuisance or prejudicial to health. In addition, I assure my noble friend Lord Greaves that the issue of a community protection notice, or the granting of an injunction by the court—which was a specific question he asked—in no way discharges the local authority from its statutory duty to serve an abatement notice where behaviour meets the required threshold.
I say to my noble friend Lady Hamwee that our draft guidelines already deal with the interface between statutory nuisances and the new powers in the Bill. I can reassure her that we continue to engage with environmental health practitioners on how this guidance can be further developed in advance of the commencements.
My noble friend Lord Greaves also asked about the choices available. There is no choice as to whether a local authority serves an abatement notice for statutory nuisance. It must serve one if it is satisfied that a matter is a statutory nuisance. He referred to the Explanatory Notes. There is a good example in there that is illustrative of what may be a nuisance, but not a statutory nuisance. A dog bounding over a fence, or through a hole in a fence, can be a nuisance. Recently, I experienced that with my young son, aged 20 months. Suddenly, a dog scurried under a fence, and appeared next to him. It was certainly more than a nuisance to his father, who was far more startled, whereas the dog was just being playful. In those cases, the first and most sensible thing for anyone who is trying to be a good neighbour to do is to talk their neighbour and see if the matter can be resolved locally. Where such behaviour persists, a non-statutory injunction is not appropriate, and a sensible solution is required before putting it on to a more serious basis.
Let me reassure my noble friend Lady Hamwee once again that the Government continue to talk to experts in the field. Based on my explanation, I hope that my noble friend will withdraw his amendments.
Lord Greaves
My Lords, I have found the Government’s answer to these amendments a bit less satisfactory than their answer to the previous group. We will get on to community protection notices later but I think that the last example that the Minister put forward was a good one. It provided a good reason why CPNs may be a very important and useful new power compared with what currently exists: they will not relate specifically to one thing, such as litter, dogs or whatever, but will be a general power based on whether an anti-social nuisance is taking place.
If I may say so, the other examples that the Minister gave show that the people here who are preparing these things and explaining to us how they will work do not fully understand how things work on the ground, if they work well. Noble Lords seem to think that the police and social landlords operate in one little area and that the local authority is something quite different. Where these things work well, those different groups work together on these issues all the time. The first people to go and investigate the noise may or may not be the police and it may or may not be the social landlord. However, most people who experience anti-social behaviour do not live in social housing. In my experience and, I think, that of many people, most people who experience anti-social behaviour live in private tenanted accommodation, and therefore social landlords are not relevant. The people who turn up to deal with the noise nuisance may be local authority officers. In my part of the world, there is a scheme in which the local authorities work together. They have an out-of-hours service whereby, even at three o’clock on a Sunday morning, somebody will answer the telephone and try to do something about it.
Therefore, if things work well, they work well because people on the ground from those three agencies, as well as from other agencies that may exist locally—some of them voluntary—work together in that way. That is why I think that saying that, on the one hand, there will be the council and the environmental health officers with their statutory nuisance abatement powers and, on the other hand, there will be everybody else with these powers is not quite how it is going to work. I hope that it will work but locally everything has to be much more flexible than the Minister seemed to suggest.
The guidance is going to be crucial but, as it stands, I do not think that it is adequate in this area. I am aware that work is taking place to improve it but, when it comes down to it, the idea that local authorities will stop the police or a social landlord going ahead and taking action because they may be investigating and they have other powers is just not how it works. In any case, even a local authority may have a statutory duty to serve an abatement notice if it is satisfied that a statutory nuisance is taking place, but in practice that is not how it works. In practice, a local authority will always go down the route of contacting the people involved, as well as the landlord, and attempting to resolve the matter without serving a notice. If it does serve a notice and the matter gets to court because people appeal against the notice, then, if the local authority has not gone out of its way to resolve the matter, the court will send it back and say, “You’re not having this. Go and do it properly”.
Having said all that, if they are willing, some further discussions on this matter with the Government in the mean time would be very helpful. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon Excerpts(10 years, 5 months ago)
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Baroness Berridge
My Lords, I refer to the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. The examples raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Harris, all seem to relate to the manifestation of somebody’s religious beliefs. The report states that the holding of religious beliefs by any individual is an absolute right under both the European convention and in international law, under Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is only the manifestation of one’s religious or humanist beliefs that can be restricted by a country on certain grounds, as defined in European and international law. Would the Minister please outline why the Bill, as currently drafted, only allows prohibitions and requirements to,
“so far as is practicable … avoid any conflict with the respondent’s religious beliefs”?
It should, surely, be the manifestation of those religious beliefs that the Bill is aimed at.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, in standing up and responding I feel like the Jedi knight next to the Jedi master. May the Force be with us all.
Amendments 20F and 22CA raise an important point in respect of the duty on the court to ensure, so far as is practicable, that any prohibitions or requirements attached to an injunction do not conflict with the manifestation—as my noble friend so eloquently put it—of the respondent’s religious beliefs. In line with the Equality Act 2010, reference to religious beliefs should go further than so-called “traditional” religious beliefs. I believe that this can be covered in guidance but I would like to go away and consider further the points made by my noble friend. We can return to the wording of this section if required. I hope my noble friend will accept my assurance that we will further consider this point and those made by the Joint Committee on Human Rights.
I turn to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Harris. I support the words of my noble friend Lady Hamwee: he raised bold and challenging concepts. As I said, in response to an earlier amendment, what may be perceived as perfectly acceptable to one person may not be acceptable to another. The courts are used to considering a person’s religious beliefs and do not need to be told that they can reject beliefs if they are spurious. In addition, to try to second-guess what would, in the words of the amendment, constitute activities “that would normally arise” is very difficult given that two people of the same religion may have different ways of practising their faith. I am a Muslim and there are 73 different denominations within Islam. During Ramadan, the time of your fast can differ depending on where you are. One obviously prefers to be at a place where the fast closes as the sun sets rather than when the sun is set totally. That is a practical illustration from a faith which is widely recognised.
The crucial point here is that, in considering an injunction, the court must avoid, so far as is practicable, any conflict with the manifestation of a respondent’s religious beliefs. If that is not practicable because, for example, avoiding the conflict would result in the respondent engaging in further anti-social behaviour purporting to be religious practice, the court would not be prevented from imposing prohibitions or requirements that it considered appropriate. This is something we can safely leave to the courts; they are more than capable of assessing the bona fide status of a respondent’s religious practice without express provision and, indeed, we have recently seen examples of that.
Amendments 20G and 22CB, tabled by my noble friend Lord Greaves, raise another important point. As we have made clear, the injunction should be available to help turn a troubled person’s life around, especially when they are young and impressionable. As such, it would not be helpful for requirements or prohibitions to unnecessarily stop them engaging in constructive training.
However, what is considered as training by some may not be worthy of special consideration by the court and some will try to use this term to delay the court’s process. Where training is worthy of consideration it is likely to be linked to an educational establishment or even a formalised work placement and, as such, is already provided for in the Bill. My noble friend also raised the issue of different wording in different parts of the Bill. We recognise that Clause 34(3) imports the word “training” whereas Clause 5(1) does not. I will certainly reflect on those two variations and return to them as required.
For the reasons I have given, I hope that my noble friend Lord Greaves will withdraw his amendment and that the noble Lord, Lord Harris—notwithstanding the important issues that he raised—will not press his.
Lord Greaves
My Lords, I am very grateful for that helpful response from the Minister and I look forward to the results of his reflection. To my noble friend Lady Hamwee I say, I am never legalistic; I may sometimes be pernickety, but that is a bit different. I had great sympathy for what the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, said, and had great sympathy for him, having to go to his Labour Party meetings on a Sunday morning. However, that reminded me that in the old days, and perhaps here and there now, there were things called socialist Sunday schools. If lads and lasses were getting out of hand, I am sure that going to socialist Sunday schools might have helped them. I cannot see how it could have done so, but it might well have helped them at least to organise their lives. Therefore, the question of regular events—such as non-religious ethical meetings—is important. I am grateful for the Minister’s comments, and I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 20F.
Drugs
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon Excerpts(10 years, 6 months ago)
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Lord Ramsbotham (CB)
My Lords, it is a great pleasure and privilege to be able to congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Manzoor, on her maiden speech in this House. Having heard the content of what she said, we look forward to other contributions that she will make to the work of this House. Although she mentioned that she had 20 years of experience in the NHS, she did not mention that in addition she has been a member of the Commission for Racial Equality, a trustee of the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children and has served as the Legal Services Ombudsman. I think that I can safely say on behalf of all Members of the House who have been privileged to hear her that we look forward to her contributions in many areas. I am sure that if they are of the quality of what we have just heard, they will be a huge enhancement to the work of the House.
I congratulate my noble friend Lady Meacher not only on securing the debate but on the exemplary way in which she introduced it. I entirely share her views on criminalisation and the need for both national and international reform of current drugs policy. I declare two interests: one as a member of her All-Party Group on Drug Policy Reform; and another as chairman of the cross-party group on justice, drugs and alcohol, which aims to link practitioners in the field with Members of this House.
I listened with interest as the noble Lord, Lord Fowler, introduced the word “military”, because the one thing that I have always thought was utterly inappropriate in talking about drugs is the word “war”. It introduces entirely the wrong perception of what people are meant to be doing. Yes, of course drugs are an evil and need to be tackled, but war is something entirely different. As for “military”, as was touched on by my noble friend Lady Meacher, I add that when I was serving in the Army, every time we went off to do something somewhere we felt that we had the country behind us and, in particular, that we had cross-party support behind us. That was broken, of course, in Iraq in 2003 and has been a matter of great concern ever since. On this issue, it has always seemed to me that cross-party agreement is essential, because the inevitable result of cross-party wrangling is inertia. In tackling something as urgent as this, with all the social and financial penalties for the life of this great country that it brings, the last thing we need is inertia caused by unnecessary wrangling on what should be a centralised policy.
I go back to my experience as Chief Inspector of Prisons. I have always thought that if anything encapsulates the nonsense of the present position, it is the way that drugs are treated in prisons. There is something called the mandatory drug test, which is meant to give a picture of drug use in prisons. It is absolute nonsense. Five per cent of people in prison are tested. I always remember going into a cell and finding nine pieces of paper on the wall. I said to the person, “What are those?”. He said, “They are my certificates for being drug-free. If you come next week, there will be a 10th. They always test me because they know I am drug-free and it makes the figures look good”. That is absolute nonsense. The only way to find out the actual size and shape of the problem is to test every person when they come in and decide from that what needs to be done with them.
The second thing that I found was that when the drug treatment and assessment programme started, it ended up with a lot of assessment but no treatment, because prisoners were moved around the country, away from the people who might have worked with them in prison and carried on doing so when they were released. Prison policy was totally against consistent assessment and treatment. I then found that there were masses of dealers in every prison. They were causing not only misery in prison by what they were doing to the prisoners who failed to pay them their dues for illegal substances, but terrible problems for their families outside. The misery was widespread, not helped by the fact that there did not seem to be proper liaison between the drug treatment organisations outside the prison and those people who were responsible for it.
Last week, those of your Lordships who saw the prison inspection report on HMP Oakwood would have seen that drugs were easier to obtain there than soap. It seems to me that our prisons, where we have people who cannot leave and could be treated, are the very place where we ought to have proper policies. You can do the assessment; you can start the treatment and make certain that it carries on. The whole situation shows the lunacy of the prohibition that seems to dominate our policy.
However, I do not want to end on a doom and gloom moment because I am very glad to see that while prison healthcare was not part of the NHS when I started as chief inspector, it is now. I am very glad to see that the prisons have put the responsibility for drug treatment in the hands of the NHS. That is an absolute endorsement of the way that we ought to go, and which my noble friend has so clearly recommended in her excellent report.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, I remind all noble Lords that this is a time-limited debate. Contributions from the Back Benches are of five minutes, which means that when the clock strikes five noble Lords should be looking to conclude their speeches.
Lord Condon (CB)
My Lords, I declare my registered interest in policing. I, too, thank the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, for initiating this very important debate. I also add my congratulations to the noble Baroness, Lady Manzoor, for her very stimulating maiden speech.
I will set out my position on drugs policy straightaway. I am not against the prospect of reform; I would also support a royal commission. However, based on my experience as a police officer and after, and taking account of all the most recent developments around the world, including in Portugal and Uruguay, I find myself still broadly supporting the Government’s evidence-based approach to reform and drugs policy. I am also encouraged by and support the most recent European Union drugs strategy statement, which for the very first time in the 2013 to 2020 policy statement incorporates the reduction of,
“health and social risks and harms caused by drugs”,
as a policy objective, alongside the more traditional reducing of supply and demand.
Those who use language such as, “The war on drugs has failed”, or who seek to polarise policy choices into a simplistic “criminalise or decriminalise” debate, undermine our ability to make informed, evidence-based strategic decisions. In the early 1970s, President Nixon and other world leaders spoke about the war on drugs and a drugs-free world. The reality is that a war in those terms has always been doomed to failure, as would a war against theft or burglary, if making progress was defined only by the total absence of illicit drugs.
As other noble Lords have said, the truth is that illegal drug use in this country is falling, and deaths from drug abuse are falling. Although, as other noble Lords have clearly articulated, there are absolutely no grounds for complacency or for ignoring the powerful calls for reform, current policies have made and make a significant impact on the drugs problem.
I respect the views of those who have argued today for change, and of others beyond this Chamber. I read with interest the views of Mike Barton, the chief constable of Durham Police, who argued that prohibition had failed and called for decriminalisation. However, I will briefly set out some concerns that still nag at me and stop me fully embracing the radical reform agenda. The current policy on illicit drugs enables parents, teachers and others to give very clear guidance to youngsters about the health risks and—yes—the criminal consequences of illicit drug use. Based on my experience with youngsters, and as a police officer, I believe that the social stigma and lifestyle impact of the criminal consequences of illicit drug activity remain a very powerful deterrent to many young people, and prevent them experimenting with drugs—which they might well do in a decriminalised regime.
Even though I welcome debate and have an open mind about many of the possible reforms, my major concern remains how any decriminalising regime could be pragmatically implemented. The experience of Portugal and other countries may not be replicated here, against the background of our very different scale, of our cultural differences and of the problems that we face.
If only so-called soft drugs are legalised—which some have argued for—the criminal suppliers will focus more intently on the supply of so-called harder drugs. Softer-drug supply may become a gateway, a loss leader and a route to addiction in the criminal market of harder drugs. Your Lordships’ House has heard in previous debates about the devastating potential brain damage from some of the stronger cannabis derivatives. A caring, responsible society should set criminal parameters to protect people from some of these so-called soft drugs.
If all drugs are decriminalised, criminals will still seek to make a market. Only a laissez-faire, total free-for-all, regardless of the consequences, will limit the link between criminality and drugs. I assume that we would want to have minimum age limits, and that we would not allow our youngest people to be involved in drugs. Perhaps there would be limits on quantities and impact. Anything other than a total free-for-all would allow an illegal market to continue.
In conclusion, by all means, as so many in your Lordships’ House have articulated today, let us explore reform and change to our drugs policy. However, in doing so, we must not demotivate or devalue the work of so many professionals in a variety of agencies who, day in, day out, combat and treat all aspects of drug abuse. They have not lost the so-called war on drugs. They may be coping with inadequate resources and facing real challenges, but they are making a difference.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
Perhaps I may remind the noble Lord that we are time-limited.
Lord Condon
My Lords, I do apologise; I am about to finish.
Nor must we, without hard evidence, dilute and damage the powerful deterrent effect of the stigma associated with the current criminal consequences of drug use or supply, which deters so many young people from experimenting. For these reasons, I support the Government’s evidence-based approach to reform.
Children: Sexual Abuse
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon Excerpts(10 years, 7 months ago)
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Baroness Howe of Idlicote (CB)
My Lords, I, too, congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, on securing this important debate. One of the challenges presented by the horror of child sex abuse pertains to the way in which it is growing, not just in its extent but also in its definition. There was a time when one thought of child sex abuse narrowly in terms of physical acts committed by an adult in relation to a child. While child sex abuse of that kind continues, it is also manifest in other ways, and in the brief time available to me this evening I will look at the public policy challenge of how best to address these more novel forms of child sex abuse.
New means of communication, principally the internet and mobile phones, play a key role. In recent years children and young people have started to use their mobile phones to take pictures of themselves or others naked and then to text those images to others or distribute them through new social media. This practice, called “sexting”, is hugely damaging. One can gain some appreciation of the problem by examining the Children’s Commissioner’s recent literature review on the subject, Basically... porn is everywhere, which is a deeply disturbing document.
Among other things, the report highlights studies demonstrating that between 4% and 17% of young people have sent or received “sexts” or have posted self-generated images online. I have references to them in my notes. Crucially, the report makes it very plain that such images can be taken and/or disseminated as part of bullying, or their discovery may lead to bullying. This may also lead to threats or blackmail, or may be posted to or shared by paedophile chat sites. Also, according to one of my sources, Wolf, online distribution of material generated via sexting has the potential to lead to self-harm and/or suicide.
Just because sexting and associated cyberbullying do not necessarily involve physical contact and may be committed by children on children as well as by adults on children, it does not follow that these practices, when they involve people under 18, are anything other than a new form of child sex abuse. If we are to have an adequate public policy response to child sex abuse, we must engage with sexting and associated cyberbullying. The truth is that these behavioral abuses of the otherwise wonderful potential that the internet has to offer can only be addressed through challenging and educating.
This is one of the two central provisions of my Online Safety Bill which is currently awaiting its Second Reading in your Lordships’ House. Clause 4 places an obligation on internet service providers and mobile phone operators to make customers aware of internet and mobile safety issues, which include the online behavioural challenges of sexting and cyberbullying. Clause 5, meanwhile, places an obligation on the Secretary of State to provide parents with education materials about online safety, including sexting and cyberbullying, to help them speak to and teach their children about such challenges. I would like to know what the Government plan to do to help parents engaging with this key educational challenge, and I hope that the Minister will enlighten us when he replies.
We then turn to another crucial issue: to what extent are we prepared to do what we can to help ensure that children do not stumble on legal but entirely inappropriate adult sexual content online? Knowing what we do about the development of the brains of children with respect to sexual images, I firmly believe that there is a real sense in which a culture that chooses not to invest appropriate resources on preventing children from accessing such material is itself guilty of a form of child sex abuse. While we may not yet have the public policy tools to provide complete safety for children online, I believe that at any given time we should do everything that it is technologically possible to do to protect children from stumbling upon such images.
If we pass on this opportunity, we ourselves are guilty of allowing a form of abuse. That is why Clause 1 of my Bill requires internet service providers and mobile phone operators to provide service users with an internet service that is free from inappropriate adult sexual and violent content at the point of purchase but with the option for anyone to access such material, subject to their opting in and going through a verification process demonstrating that they are 18 or over.
I warmly congratulate the Prime Minister on taking on this issue and, in particular, on his 22 July NSPCC speech in which he addressed both the availability of illegal child sex abuse images online and the current ease with which children can access legal but inappropriate adult content online. He has shown real leadership on the issue and for this I thank him. However, I gently suggest that his phrase, “Nothing is more important than this”, with which I completely agree, sits rather oddly alongside his refusal to introduce legislation in deference to the industry's desire for self-regulation. Self-regulation may sound very fine but it is worth remembering that it was tried before when seeking to engage with the great child rights challenges of the past. In 1847 any aspiration for self-regulation of the factories had to be abandoned in favour of a statute, and no one questions the wisdom of that now. I suspect that we will come, sooner or later, to the realisation that we require legislation—
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
I am sorry to interrupt the noble Baroness but I remind her—
Baroness Howe of Idlicote (CB)
I am just finishing. We will come to the realisation that we require legislation to address the problems that I have outlined and that in the future those looking back would be incredulous that we ever dared think otherwise.
Immigration: UK Citizenship and Nationality
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon Excerpts(10 years, 7 months ago)
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Lord Roberts of Llandudno (LD)
My Lords, I appreciate the opportunity to bring up the question of residency and access to the United Kingdom, and to ask the Government to look again at the requirements of those seeking UK citizenship: residency conditions; evidence of their good character; English language ability; and a matter that I have raised in the past, the Life in the UK test. A friend from Texas took this test several months ago. These were the questions she was asked: first, whether Elizabeth I handled her Parliament badly or had good relations with the legislature; secondly, whether UK citizens were renowned for backing individual liberty, intolerance, inequality or extremism; and thirdly, was it true or false that in 2002 Sir Winston Churchill was voted the “greatest Briton of all time”.
I should like to take the Minister up on an offer he made during Questions in February to meet interested groups in order to devise a more relevant and practical set of questions. As he will know, Dr. Thom Brooks of Durham University makes a number of recommendations for change. First, the handbook should make it clear which sections are to be tested. It contains about 3,000 facts—far too many for anyone to memorise—and the whole matter could easily become a pub quiz. There are inconsistencies and omissions that need to be rectified. The Government should decide what the rationale is for the test. Is it to be a stumbling block or a ladder in the immigration process? It appears totally unfair that it is used as part of the Government’s plan to reduce immigration. That is not what the test is there for.
Many of the current questions could be omitted. It does not help us at all to know when wives were granted the right to divorce their husbands. Let us make the test far more local: on the basic history of the community where the applicant lives, on where local schools, pharmacies and hospitals are, and so on. It would be interesting if we set up a parliamentary citizenship quiz—perhaps the Commons versus the Lords—on the Life in the UK handbook. If it succeeded here, we could then roll it out across the UK to see how many long-serving, ordinary UK citizens could answer the questions asked. Perhaps the Minister could set up a ministerial team to tackle these questions. The answers to irrelevant questions should play no part when one is making decisions about a person’s suitability for citizenship. I ask again: where is the necessary information about the NHS, how to report crime, or which subjects are taught to our children? We have to have someone looking at this new set of questions, and perhaps Dr Thom Brooks could do just that.
In 2008 the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, said of the test that it created a deep impression of unfairness among those who had to sit it. I agree with him but I would go further. I suggest that an accurate impression of the UK’s current immigration system is one that is deeply unfair and riddled with inequalities. I know many folk representing immigrant societies, trying to help them in their present situation, and the general impression is that the whole situation is shambolic.
There is much talk about how we must attract the brightest and the best. Is that done by restricting our immigration further? I have a Bill before the House to reduce from 12 months to six months the time within which those seeking asylum in this country will be able to work. Is it by indefinite detention? Is it by reassessing the family migration rules? These can be barriers but they can also be bridges.
Only 26 of the 193 countries in the United Nations have an average personal income of more than £18,600, which is the sum called for before people can take up their place in our community. You see families with far less than this. In Nigeria the average income is £1,022 and in India it is £935. We are setting impossible targets. How on earth can people raise this sort of money? How can they send their children to somewhere where they can fulfil their dreams? We rely so much on people from India, Nigeria and other countries in order to run our National Health Service. I looked at the list of consultants in the three north Wales general hospitals and a third of them come from outside the UK and outside Europe. If we had these sorts of limits when they were struggling in their own countries, our health service would have gone a long time ago. There could be a very real crisis and if we establish them now and insist on them, that crisis is waiting for us in the future.
Today’s new Immigration Bill, of which I have had a brief view, makes nonsense of the dreams of the past. When the Statue of Liberty was erected, what was written on it? It stated:
“Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free”.
In the UK today we say: “Stay where you are. The barriers are up; the bridges are destroyed. Forget the hopes and dreams for yourself and your children”. Of course, if you are a wealthy entrepreneur, you can buy residency here if you have £20,000 or £50,000 or £200,000—you can buy your citizenship in the UK—but if you are a little child, with tremendous potential, in one of the African countries, hard lines. The world will never benefit from what you could contribute.
On 25 March the Prime Minister said that he wanted the brightest and the best to come here, but what chances are there for so many? Do we not have an opportunity here to provide them with an opportunity? One thing we could do is to improve at an early stage our links in twinning with schools in places like Africa. There is a lot that can be done and perhaps in the new Immigration Bill we will be able to take up that opportunity.
I think of the vans that went out—they were actually lorries more than vans. The Home Office paid for posters. How effective were they? In the Commons today, it was revealed that only one person took advantage of that offer: one person from Pakistan. There was nobody else. Despite all the cost and the unease produced by the posters, they had such little effect.
This morning, I heard Mrs May trying to create a hostile environment for undocumented migrants in the UK. In an earlier debate, the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, said that denying asylum seekers the ability to work makes it difficult for them to integrate into our society, which is what we want.
I suggest that the whole culture and attitude is one that we must deplore. It is the new attitude. I imagine that when the Welsh dairymen came here more than 100 years ago, they were not really welcome, and that there was hostility. “Taffy” was one insult for the newcomers.
In 1938 the Daily Mail headlined its story: “German Jews are pouring into this country”. It went on to print:
“‘The way stateless Jews from Germany are pouring in from every port … is becoming an outrage. I intend to enforce the law to the fullest’. With these words, Mr Herbert Metcalfe, the Old Street magistrate, yesterday referred to the number of aliens entering this country through the ‘back door’—a problem to which the Daily Mail has repeatedly pointed”.
That was in 1938. The attitude was hostile. Where did it end? It ended in the Holocaust.
The response in 2013 can be much better than that. We should ask the Minister to look again at the contents of this test, and at the whole raft of immigration legislation.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
Before my noble friend rises, perhaps I may remind noble Lords that this is a time-limited debate, with contributions limited to six minutes. If any speech exceeds that, it will eat into the Minister’s time, and the time of the opposition Front Bench, so I would appreciate it if noble Lords could keep to time.
Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon Excerpts(11 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 3.
“Varying designations of authorities responsible for remanded young persons
(1) Section 102 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (where child remanded to youth detention accommodation, court must designate local authority to look after child and meet costs) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (7)(a) (authority that already looks after child to be designated) after “being looked after by a local authority” insert “otherwise than by virtue of section 104(1)”.
(3) In subsection (7)(b) (in other cases, court must designate authority for area where child habitually resides or offence committed) for “, the local authority” substitute “but subject to subsection (7B), a local authority”.
(4) After subsection (7) insert—
“(7A) In a case to which subsection (7)(b) applies, the court is to designate a local authority in whose area it appears to the court that the child habitually resides (a “home authority”) except where the court—
(a) considers as respects the home authority, or each home authority, that it is inappropriate to designate that authority, or
(b) is unable to identify any place in England and Wales where the child habitually resides.
(7B) If in a case to which subsection (7)(b) applies—
(a) the court is not required by subsection (7A) to designate a home authority, but
(b) it appears to the court that the offence was not, or none of the offences was, committed in England and Wales,
the court is to designate a local authority which it considers appropriate in the circumstances of the case.”
(5) After subsection (7B) insert—
“(7C) Where a child has been remanded to youth detention accommodation, the court—
(a) which remanded the child, or
(b) to which the child was remanded,
may designate a local authority (“B”) as the designated authority for the child in substitution for the authority previously designated (whether that previous designation was made when the child was remanded or under this subsection).
(7D) Where a child has at any one time been subject to two or more remands to youth detention accommodation, a court which has jurisdiction to make a replacement designation under subsection (7C) in connection with one or some of the remands also has jurisdiction to make such a replacement designation in connection with each of the other remands.
(7E) Where a replacement designation is made under subsection (7C) after the end of the period of remand concerned, the substitution of B for the previously-designated authority has effect only for the purposes of regulations under section 103.
(7F) Where a replacement designation is made under subsection (7C) during the period of remand concerned, the substitution of B for the previously-designated authority—
(a) has effect, as respects the part of that period ending with the making of the replacement designation, only for the purposes of regulations under section 103, and
(b) has effect, as respects the remainder of that period, for all of the purposes listed in subsection (6).
(7G) A court may make a replacement designation under subsection (7C) only if it considers that, had everything it knows been known by the court which made the previous designation, that court would have designated B instead.
(7H) Where a replacement designation is made under subsection (7C) in relation to a remand, the previously-designated authority is to be repaid any sums it paid in respect of the remand pursuant to regulations under section 103.
(7J) A court which has jurisdiction to make a replacement direction under subsection (7C) may exercise that jurisdiction on an application by a local authority or of its own motion.”
(6) A replacement designation under the new section 102(7C) may be made in respect of a remand ordered before this section comes into force, and the amendments made by this section have effect for the purpose of making a replacement designation in any such case; but, in such a case, the substitution of B for the previously-designated authority (and any entitlement to repayment under new section 102(7H)) does not have effect as respects any time before this section comes into force.
(7) Except as provided by subsection (6), the amendments made by this section have effect only in relation to remands ordered after this section comes into force.”
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
My Lords, in moving that this House do agree with Commons Amendment 3, I shall speak also to Commons Amendments 4, 7 to 10, 32 to 37, 42, 43, 51, 61 to 92, 93 to 130 and 132. This group of amendments covers a range of issues in respect of provisions in Part 2 of the Bill, as well as adding some new provisions to that part, but I believe that they will generally be welcomed. I propose to focus my remarks on the most significant of these amendments.
Commons Amendment 3 makes a specific and technical amendment to the youth secure remand provisions in Section 102 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. Under those provisions, local authorities are liable to pay the Youth Justice Board the accommodation costs of children subject to secure remand. As of 3 December 2012, courts ordering a secure remand must designate a local authority as the designated authority for the child. Full financial responsibility for the accommodation costs of securely remanded children will fall to the designated local authorities as of 1 April.
This amendment addresses a gap in the current law. When remanding a child, the court will tend to designate the local authority where the child lives. However, this is not always clear at the early stages of the case, so the court may designate a different local authority. By the next hearing, more information is generally available, so the court can change the designation to the local authority where the child lives. But under Section 102 of the 2012 Act, the liability to pay the secure accommodation costs for the period before the change is made still rests with the original local authority. This creates an unfair burden on a local authority where the child does not live, and puts at risk the effective recovery of costs by the Youth Justice Board. Therefore, Commons Amendment 3 gives the court powers to make a replacement designation, so all the accommodation costs can be recovered from the local authority that has subsequently been identified.
In addition, the amendment introduces the assumption that the court should designate the local authority where the child lives rather than the authority where the offence took place. The Government believe that in most cases it is right to designate the local authority where the child lives in accordance with the habitual residence test from which the duty for a local authority to provide accommodation and support flows. Of course, the court will retain overall discretion over deciding which local authority to designate.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I will confine myself to two topics. Taken in reverse order of importance, the first is what has become known in common parlance as “bash the burglar” legislation. The Minister emphasised the need for bringing this measure into force as quickly as possible. Given the paucity of cases to which this would apply, as we discussed when we were debating the Bill, I find this to be little more than an example of gesture politics of the cheapest kind.
The second more significant matter, which I entirely support the Government in raising, is Amendment 9 about making use of films and other recordings of proceedings. I would not have spoken at all on this matter except that there was a report in the press at the end of last week about the position in Scotland where it now appears that a drama is going to be broadcast based entirely on recordings in the criminal court. This is under Scottish legislation; it is not legislation that applies in this country. This is exactly what those who have expressed fears about filming proceedings in court were really worried might take place. Apparently witnesses, parties in criminal cases and, in this particular case, a retrial of a significant case regarding a serious offence have been filmed and will be shown on Scottish television, presumably, as a rather dramatic production rather than a factual and low-key look at how the courts work. The English legislation that we are debating does not facilitate that, and I would be glad to hear the Minister give a firm assurance that it will not be extended to allow that kind of development, which would be a significant change in the way that the Government have envisaged matters and one in which we should in no way seek to experience what Scotland is about to undergo.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
I thank the noble Lord for his support for much of what has been covered. He referred to self-defence as “bash the burglar”. He may think that; I could not possibly comment. We believe it is important that if the legislation is passed, no one should fall into the trap between Royal Assent being given and this becoming law so that it can be used as a defence. If we are making these changes, it is important that they happen as quickly as possible so that we prevent any occurrence of people who act. I contend that anyone confronted with a burglar, faced with such a situation where they are protecting their home, their family and their loved ones, is often faced with that instant decision. It is important that we give that instant protection. I therefore believe that the Government have taken the right way forward on this. I am sure that, on reflection, the noble Lord would agree with me.
The noble Lord mentioned broadcasting and, again, I welcome his support. As I said, we have put four locks in place. He raised the specific issue of broadcasting in Scotland and the filming of all parts of a trial. I assure him that we are not proposing to allow this at all. The safeguards that I have outlined will protect such an extension. He raised the specific issue of witnesses. I share his concern. The Government’s intention is to provide that level of protection. With those clarifications, I beg to move.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 4.
“Part 4A amends the selection procedure for certain senior judicial appointments until Part 4 of the Schedule is in force,”
Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon Excerpts(11 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
My Lords, it is always a pleasure to respond to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, at a rather earlier hour than has been the case in our previous exchanges, and that is always welcome. However, perhaps it is later than I thought would be the case.
Following the debate on Report, I know that my noble friend Lord McNally has corresponded with the noble and learned Lord and reassured him that paragraph 5(4) of Schedule 16 affords a broad discretion to prosecutors and the court when considering a financial penalty term for a deferred prosecution agreement. In particular, on the specific point raised by the noble and learned Lord, my noble friend Lord McNally has confirmed in his letter that the extent of the discretion is such that scope to reduce financial penalty will not be restricted to a maximum of one-third in all cases.
It is appropriate that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, has pointed to the additional discounts in the sentence available for convicted offenders under Section 73 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, which was predated by more informal arrangements. It is our view that in a suitable case the parties to a DPA and the court could consider whether this further discount might be available. The level of any such additional discount would depend on the circumstances and of course reflect the level of assistance given; and the parties should be guided by sentencing practice and pre-existing case law on this matter.
In the light of these assurances and the correspondence that has taken place, and, of course, the related assurances that I have given, I trust that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Goldsmith
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for what he said and for reminding us and the Government that we are going to come back to review these arrangements, we very much hope, for a number of reasons, including this one. My primary concern was to get an assurance that one-third was not the maximum discount that could be agreed. In the light of that assurance, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.