Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Black of Brentwood Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Lords Chamber

Debate on whether Clause 152 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)]

My Lords, I oppose Clauses 152 to 155 standing part of the Bill. I declare my interests as deputy chairman of the Telegraph Media Group and chairman of the News Media Association. This stand part notice is in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who unfortunately cannot be here today as he is on business abroad. I added my name to it along with the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, to whom I am very grateful. Like the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, I am aware that I am surrounded by lawyers wherever I look, but I must admit to not being one of them.

These clauses introduce a statutory presumption of anonymity for firearms officers charged with a qualifying offence involving the discharge of a lethal weapon. Clause 152 creates a presumption that the criminal courts grant anonymity to any firearms officers charged with a “qualifying offence”, unless to do so would be

“contrary to the interests of justice”.

Clause 153 allows the court to preserve or reimpose anonymity after conviction if there is an appeal. Clause 154 defines the reporting direction as barring the publication of any matter that might lead to identification, including name, address, place of work, photographs and video. Clause 155 sets out the kinds of measures that may be required to be taken under an anonymity order, including screening or voice modulation during a court appearance.

Under the clauses, anonymity would apply from the point of charge until conviction and sentence or, where relevant, an appeal is abandoned or dismissed. If an officer is acquitted or charges are dropped, anonymity, including reporting restrictions, can persist indefinitely. Taken together, these measures are a significant attack on open justice, press and media freedom, and the public’s right to receive information, something that should be curtailed in only the most exceptional circumstances. They would undermine the already fragile trust in the police, limit opportunities for public scrutiny of those entrusted with firearms—which is a most serious manifestation of state power—and have a profound chilling impact on public interest reporting.

I will outline the reasons why I believe these clauses are wrong. First, their provision is unnecessary. Judges already have the power to grant anonymity where there is clear evidence of a real and immediate risk to an officer or their family, with proper and proportionate safeguards in place for fairness and review. Under the current law, a defendant applying to the court for anonymity must rightly demonstrate, with clear and cogent evidence, that anonymity is strictly necessary to protect their rights. Such orders are tailored, time-limited and subject to review. They therefore do not interfere with the rights of the media or the expectations of the public, and they strike the right balance between officer safety, which we must obviously be very concerned about, and open justice. That is a workable and trusted balance between safety and open justice. These clauses reverse that position for a special category of alleged offender and are therefore an unprecedented shift in English law.

Secondly, there is no evidence for making such sweeping changes to the law. The Home Office has never provided evidence that police officers as a group are more likely to be subject to harm by being identified as a defendant in a criminal case than any other defendant in a high-profile or controversial case. There is therefore no need to upend the existing law to give firearms officers greater protection from legitimate scrutiny than anyone else. That would create a justifiable perception in the public’s mind that there is one rule for firearms officers and another for everyone else, and they would be right.

Thirdly, these provisions clearly undermine the long-standing principles of open justice that are a fundamental tenet of our legal system and essential to our free society. Justice must not only be done; it must also always be seen to be done by the public, and therefore by the press. Such a sweeping privacy regime, which would apply automatically, regardless of any actual risk posed to an officer, and which gives protection to state agents, would clearly undermine confidence in the system. If anything, there is the clearest possible public interest in serious criminal cases involving police officers being subject to the highest form of rigorous public scrutiny and transparency, not the most lax. Anything that undermines open justice risks increasing the possibility of miscarriages of justice.

Fourthly, one of the most practical advantages of open justice and transparency is the critical role of a robust media in identifying systemic issues and patterns of offending. These clauses would make that impossible. Clause 155, for instance, allows for a wide range of contextual information to be kept from the public, including, vitally, an officer’s workplace. How can the press and the public help identify patterns or bring additional information to light in the absence of such basic information? That would hamper investigations and make public appeals for information far less effective. Indeed, Metropolitan Police Commissioner Mark Rowley has recently supported calls to share more details, not fewer, about suspects with the public earlier, in a bid to stop the spread of misinformation.

Fifthly, and on that very point, these clauses create a heightened risk of jigsaw identification of a suspect, where separate, anonymised details are combined with publicly available information to identify an individual. This is inevitable, particularly in small communities with their own online networks. The danger of false identification, with very serious repercussions for an individual, is all too obvious. That would also produce a chilling effect on legitimate, verified journalism, because editors would inevitably act with extreme caution in reporting, needlessly censoring it to avoid harsh penalties for breaching a court order.

Finally, there are issues about the compatibility of these clauses with the ECHR. Others are far more expert on this than I am, and I will let them deal with it during this debate, but it is clear to me as a lay person that the interference with freedom of expression contained in these clauses is wholly disproportionate given that no pressing social need has been demonstrated.

In summary, no evidence has been provided as the basis for such a sweeping change in the law set out in these clauses, which would produce a two-tier justice system. They would interfere with press and media freedom in a wholly disproportionate way and create a profound chilling effect on public interest reporting. They undermine the principles of open justice that are the bedrock of our judicial system and vital to our open democratic society. They risk further damaging public confidence in the police, already at an all-time low after the appalling murder of Sarah Everard, and in our judicial system. Above all, they are unnecessary because suitable safeguards that balance officer safety with public accountability and scrutiny already exist and have proved themselves workable and effective. For all these reasons, these clauses should not stand part of the Bill. I hope the Minister will indicate that the Government are going to think again.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for giving notice of his opposition that Clauses 152 to 155 stand part of the Bill, and the noble Lord, Lord Black of Brentwood, for introducing the clause stand part debate and allowing this important and interesting discussion. I acknowledge from the outset that the Government agree these are not easy issues.

Clauses 152 to 155 largely stand or fall together, creating a bespoke system for a very small and discrete category of defendants in criminal trials; namely, authorised firearms officers charged with offences arising from the discharge of their weapon during the course of their official duties.

Notwithstanding the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, about lawyers—of which, of course, I am one—made during the course of the debate on the last group, I agree with much of what he has said. The starting point for the Government is that armed police officers perform a unique and high-risk role. They are trained to use lethal force, on behalf of the state, to protect the public, often in fast-moving and dangerous situations. This puts them personally at risk of death or serious injury every day in the course of their duties. They deserve our thanks and admiration for putting themselves in harm’s way to protect the public—and that, a point made by many of your Lordships, includes you and me. Because many of those with whom they engage are involved in serious crime, it exposes them and their families to the risk of retribution. That is the Government’s starting point.

There is another equally important principle in play: we do not have secret trials in this country. The principles of open justice and the ability for the press to report on cases continues to be one of our proudest and most carefully and jealously guarded traditions. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for whom I have the utmost respect, for putting in impassioned terms the importance of freedom of the press and freedom of speech.

So why then have the Government decided to introduce a presumption of anonymity in trials for authorised firearms officers? This limited presumption is being introduced due to the unique nature of firearms officers’ roles and the risks that arise from them being identified during court proceedings. What marks them out from other categories of defendant is that these are not risks merely to their reputation but to their lives. These are not theoretical risks. Firearms officers who have been charged with an offence can face serious death threats and other forms of intimidation. The threats do not stop with them but extend to their families as well. The real and present nature of this danger cannot be ignored.

I want to give two illustrations of incidents which demonstrate how extreme the consequences can be for those who serve as firearms officers. In one case, a contract for murder was issued against an officer who had acted in the line of duty and who was later found to have acted entirely within the law. In another, a bounty was placed on an officer who, as things turned out, had been lawfully carrying out their responsibilities. The threat is not theoretical; it is a stark reality. The safety of our officers and those they love must not be compromised. Some of these officers may later be found not guilty by a jury, but if they and their families have faced real and credible threats, by then the damage is done.

The time has come for action to be taken. The National Police Chiefs’ Council has said that firearms officers are fearful of the consequences and processes for them if they are involved in a death or serious injury case because of what has happened to colleagues, mostly so because of how it has played out in the media.

The noble Lord, Lord Black, and the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, made the point that the courts already have the power to order reporting restrictions in a case where the court judges that disclosure of a defendant’s identity would give rise to a real and immediate risk to life, and asked why a presumption is necessary. Our answer is this. It must be remembered, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, pointed out, that police officers volunteer for armed roles and they are not compelled to undertake such duties, nor are they paid more to do so. Data from armed policing shows the start of a slow decline in the number of those wishing to serve as armed officers. The armed policing attrition and retention document records that, since 2019, there has been a loss of 583 armed officers. That is an 8.8% reduction. Everyone hearing this should be worried. We rely on these officers to keep us and those we love, as well as our fellow citizens, safe. We, a Labour Government, are persuaded and have decided to act.

We have concluded that we need to strike a balance between the safety and security of our brave firearms officers, who are presumed innocent unless or until convicted by a court of law, and their families and our inviolable principles of open justice and freedom of the press. I venture to suggest that this is what these provisions achieve. The most important things to note are that these. First, once a jury has decided that the defendant is guilty then of course their identity will be made public. Secondly, these provisions establish only a presumption of anonymity during the trial. The judge at any stage has the ability to order that part or all of the defendant’s identifying characteristics should be revealed. It changes only where we start, not necessarily where we end up. Thirdly, the media and others will be informed, as is usual, of cases where there is a reporting restriction in place. Journalists and others will be able to make representations to the judge as to why they say that the identity should be known at an early stage, to help the judge decide where the balance should be struck in any individual case.

I remind your Lordships of the old truism about the difference between what is in the public interest and matters in which the public are interested. It is judges who make decisions of this kind every day and are best placed to do so. I add the reassurance that, where a judge concludes that narrower steps will suffice, the court will order only the minimum necessary. I can say to your Lordships from my own experience, and knowing my former judicial colleagues as I do, that they take the freedom of the press to report trials very seriously indeed. I venture to say that the two distinguished former judges who have spoken in this debate—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—have shown just that.

Open justice remains the starting point. This measure introduces a narrow, rebuttable presumption for a small, clearly defined cohort. Proceedings will remain public, evidence will be tested in open court, and judicial reasons are given. Only the defendant’s details may be withheld, where necessary, until the point of conviction. It expressly allows the court to lift anonymity wherever it would be

“contrary to the interests of justice”

for the anonymity to remain.

I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, that this is a difficult issue that needs to be approached with care and that everyone should be moderate in the way they approach it. However, this measure does not compromise transparency or judicial independence. All it does it ensure that officers are not exposed to undue risk before the facts have been tested and decided upon by a court. It is about fairness, safety, and maintaining confidence in policing and justice.

I hope that my explanation of these clauses has gone some way to reassuring your Lordships. It would, as always, be a pleasure to meet the noble Lords, Lord Black and Lord Faulks, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, again—I think this is the third time in 48 hours that I have offered to meet him—as well as representatives of the News Media Association, who have written to me at least twice on this important topic. I would be more than happy to discuss all of their concerns. In the meantime, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Black, to withdraw his opposition to the clause standing part.

[Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)]

I thank the Minister very much for her comments and the offer to meet. I suspect she is involved in a large number of meetings at the moment, and we will try not to add too much to the burden.

This has been a very good debate on a difficult subject, but one, as we have heard from a number of people, that is of profound importance. We have to get the balance right, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said, and that is what this debate has shown.

I will make three quick points, if I may. First, to underline what we heard a number of times in this debate, of course we all have huge admiration and respect for firearms officers. They are a very brave group of people who do a great deal here to protect us, and we are in their debt. They deserve protection. The points we have tried to make are that they have it at the moment. The difficulty with these clauses is that it is made automatic. That means, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, it is not always going to be easy to rebut.

There is an issue, as far as the media is concerned, that a presumption of anonymity could mean that the media is not put on proper notice and therefore is unable to challenge the presumption, if indeed those media outlets possess the resources to do so. If it is left to potluck that reporters become aware then open justice erodes, because the media has not got a chance to consider whether it should contest the presumption.

Secondly, the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and others have said that, thankfully, it is a very small number of cases such as this that ever come to court. It is not about that; this is a matter, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said, of high principle. In my experience, open justice and press freedom do not perish because of obvious assaults against them but because of apparently innocuous incremental changes such as this and the provision of special cases. The point, as my noble friend Lady Cash said, is that if anonymity becomes the default, openness has to be justified. That is the end of a very slippery slope, which is one of the things the Minister and I can talk about when we meet.

Finally, to echo a point that the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, made, at the end of the day, this is about state power and the exercise of state power. We chip away at the scrutiny of that at our peril. To do so, we should have overwhelming evidence. I appreciate what the Minister said in summing up, but I still do not believe that the case has been made. A number of noble Lords have said that we have time before Report to consider this further. It is a matter of huge importance, so let us take the time before Report to do so. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my opposition to the clause.

Clause 152 agreed.