Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Thursday 15th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to oppose Amendment 379 and support most of Amendment 471, inadequate though it is. My views may not be the same as those of my noble friends on the Front Bench, of course. We all value the right to protest, but rights are not a shield for criminality. The Government and Policing Ministers have been very clear that live facial recognition is being developed and deployed as a targeted, intelligence-led tool to identify known or wanted individuals or criminals on watch lists. It is not a blanket surveillance tool of the public. The Home Office has opened a consultation and asked for stronger statutory rules and oversight precisely to ensure proportionate lawful use.

Amendment 379 would in effect tie the hands of senior officers at the very moment when targeted identification can prevent or stop serious crime. If a protest contains people who are wanted for violent offences, sexual offences or other serious crimes, the ability to identify them quickly and safely is not an abstract technicality; it is how we protect victims and uphold the rule of law. To say that demonstrations are somehow sacrosanct and must be free from tools that help catch criminals is to place form above substance. That is not to dismiss legitimate concerns about privacy and bias. We should legislate a clear statutory framework, independent oversight and robust safeguards, and I know that the Government are consulting on exactly that path.

I will want to see strong action to correct mistakes and address suggestions that it cannot tell the difference in some ethnic groups. That has to be remedied if that allegation is true. But the right response is to legislate proportionate limits and accountability, not to pre-emptively ban a narrowly targeted operational capability at protests and thereby risk letting wanted suspects slip away. For those reasons, I urge the Committee to reject Amendment 379 and instead press the Government to bring forward the statutory code and independent oversight that the public rightly expect.

Amendment 471 is a different kettle of fish—and possibly “off” fish as well. The amendment is far too liberal and fails to protect the public from out-of-control public authorities. I will explain why. As a person relieved of ministerial duties in 1997, I found myself a rather bored Back-Bencher on the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000—the famous RIPA. The Minister at the time—I think it was Alun Michael—was waxing lyrical about how it would tackle serious crime, terrorism and paedophiles. He mentioned how it would help the police, the National Crime Agency—or whatever it was called then—MI5, MI6, HMRC and a couple of other big national government departments.

We were all in agreement that it was a jolly good thing for these agencies to have that power. Then something the Minister said prompted me to table a Question on what other public bodies could use RIPA powers, and we were shocked to discover that there were actually 32, including at that time something called the egg inspectorate of MAFF, responsible for enforcing the little lion mark on eggs. Schedule 1, listing the public authorities with phone-tapping powers, has expanded a bit since those days, and it now numbers 79. However, that is not the correct number because one of the 79 entries says “every local authority”, so we can add another 317 principal local authorities to that list. I think “every government department” covers all the agencies and arm’s-length bodies under their command, so they also have access to RIPA. In other words, a worthy proposal to let some key government agencies have power to snoop on our mobile phones to detect serious crime, terrorism or paedophilia has now become available, to some extent, to hundreds and possibly thousands of public bodies.

The relevance of this is that if we agree that facial recognition technology can be extended beyond the police, immigration, the National Crime Agency, the security services and possibly a few other big government departments that are concerned with organised crime, people trafficking and immigration, I believe our civil liberties will be at stake if local authorities and some others get to use it as well. If local authorities get the power of facial recognition, I am certain that they will abuse it. A Scottish council uses RIPA to monitor dog barking. Allerdale district council, next to me in Cumbria, used it to catch someone feeding pigeons. Of course it would be brilliant, in my opinion, to catch all those carrying out anti-social behaviour, such as riding dangerously on the pavement with their bikes, not picking up dog mess or generally causing a disturbance. But that is why I think this amendment does not go far enough.

We do not need codes of practice and safeguards—we need a complete ban on all other public authorities using it until it has been tried and tested by the police and we are satisfied that it does not cause false positives and is operationally secure. Then, if it is ever extended to other public authorities, it must be solely, as proposed new subsection (1)(a) says,

“used for the purpose of preventing, detecting, or investigating serious crimes as defined under the Serious Crime Act 2007”.

If we do not have these protections, local councils will end up checking our recycling, what library books we take out and what shops and pubs we use, and will justify it by saying it will help them deliver a better spatial strategy or design services to user patterns.

I look forward to the Liberals going back to their original roots as real liberals and bringing forward a better amendment that will protect our liberties.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to support Amendment 379, to which I have added my name, and to very strongly support it. But before I do, I hope the Committee will forgive me if I digress very briefly to tidy up a matter that arose in Committee on Tuesday. I made the point that the police have the duty to facilitate protest rather than prevent it, and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, intervened to ask me where he might find a justification for that statement. Well, I have good news. I have here the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s protest operational advice document, and on page 10, under the heading “Role of the police”, it says that authorised professional practice

“identifies two duties associated with the policing of protest. Broadly these require that the police must … not prevent, hinder or restrict peaceful assembly … in certain circumstances, take reasonable steps to protect those who want to exercise their rights peacefully. Taken together, these duties (the first a negative duty, the second a positive one) are often described as an obligation to facilitate the exercise of the freedoms of assembly and expression”.

I also have here a very handy flow chart entitled “Facilitating Peaceful Protest”, and I will make it available to the noble Lord following this debate.

To return to this group, it is now eight years since South Wales Police started deploying early versions of live facial recognition technology. When it did so, the technology was extremely inaccurate and there was absolutely no legislation in place to regulate or oversee the use of this mass surveillance technology—and that is what it is.

For those noble Lords who have not had the opportunity to experience facial recognition technology, I will give a quick overview of how it is used. It currently involves a large van full of electronics being parked in a location, such as a busy shopping street, where large numbers of ordinary people will walk past going about their daily business. On the top of the van are cameras pointing in all directions; they are scanning and recording the faces of all the passers-by. The technology tries to match them to a pre-prepared watch-list, which is a set of images of people the police want to find for some reason. Throughout the many hours of the deployment, something like 20 police officers will be standing around chatting and waiting for the system to decide, rightly or wrongly, that somebody whose face matches a person on the watch-list has just walked past. Several of the otherwise unoccupied police officers then detain the target and try to determine whether it is a true match.

Big Brother Watch, which I chair, has observed many deployments of facial recognition by the Metropolitan Police, and has seen many false matches happen. As well as false positives, the system is also susceptible to false negatives, where it fails to recognise somebody who is on the watch-list, and anyone who the police would like to speak to but was not put on the watch-list can wander by undetected. The Committee can form its own view on whether this is a productive use of scarce police time and money, but one thing is clear: this is a highly intrusive mass surveillance of thousands of citizens, almost all of whom are completely innocent and should be of no interest to the police.

The UK already has one of the highest densities of CCTV cameras in the world. Facial recognition technology will in time be added to those fixed cameras in public spaces. The police, your local authority, supermarkets or whoever will be able to keep tabs on who you are and what you are doing. This technology is far more intrusive than fingerprints or DNA. Live facial recognition can capture your face and location from a distance without you having any idea it has happened. It is as if you have a barcode on your forehead that can be read without your knowledge.

The collection and retention of fingerprints is tightly regulated by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Crime and Security Act 2010. Similarly, the use of DNA is strictly regulated by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. But what regulation is there for facial recognition, the most intrusive technology of the lot? Since the first deployment in 2017, absolutely no legislation, none at all, has been introduced to control this serious threat to our privacy. As we have already heard, the phrase “facial recognition” is not mentioned once in UK legislation.

Police forces, including the Met, have had a go at writing their own rules and marking their own homework, but that is obviously not their skill set; it is the job of legislators. The police’s homemade rules vary from force to force, and nobody is monitoring what is actually happening on the ground. For example, they assure us that all images they collect that do not match someone on the watch-list are instantly and permanently destroyed to preserve the privacy of innocent passers-by, but whether that always happens cannot be verified because there is no scrutiny, as there would be with, for example, DNA. This serious legislative vacuum is not the fault of the police; it is the fault of all the Governments since 2017, who were asleep at the wheel and did nothing to control the use of this highly intrusive technology.

You might ask: “Why does it matter to me? Why should I care if the state knows where I am and what I am doing? I am an honest, law-abiding, clean-living citizen. There is nothing in my life that I need to conceal from the police, my boss or my spouse”. You might be told by advocates of mass surveillance, “If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear”. Well, that claim is first attributed to the great democrat Joseph Goebbels. The Chinese state, where much of the technology for facial recognition comes from, uses it to monitor the behaviour of its citizens. It is used not just to keep track of where they are, but to assess whether they are being good citizens in accordance with the state’s definition of what a “good citizen” is.

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[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

Shifty is a great description—the noble Baroness could have said far worse than that.

I was given a hard time and then let go. We have to accept that there will be errors, but we have to understand where this is going. We can less and less afford to have police on the streets—we have seen that problem—and technology has to take over. Look at the super-spotters, a very successful crime-fighting group in New York. They would go to an area where there was a lot of crime—noble Lords will know that there was a process in New York where they directed people to crime hotspots—where they looked at the gait of individuals to see whether they were carrying guns or knives. Soon, people in those areas discovered that they had better not carry guns because they would be stopped by these super-spotters and arrested. If you are not carrying a gun, which they had all stopped doing, you cannot kill somebody because you do not have a gun to kill them with. It was a tremendously successful operation in lowering crime.

State-of-the-art facial recognition, at least before I stopped looking at it a couple of years ago, was more in gait than in face. We have to understand that you can start training technology to be much more effective than even these super-spotters at spotting people who are carrying, using their gait to recognise an individual rather than their face. There are all sorts of ways in which this software will be used to recognise people. It will get better and better, and fewer mistakes will be made; mistakes will always be made none the less, but that is the way of policing. They were mistaken when they stopped me—I was this tremendously law-abiding good chap, but they stopped me, and so will the facial recognition.

I loved the description from the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, of the 20 police hanging around, which I am sure resonated with noble Lords around the entire Chamber as the sort of thing that happens, but over time we will have to depend on technology such as this. We will have to be extremely careful about civil liberties, but we cannot blanket get rid of this technology, because it will be very important to policing.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I had sought to intervene on the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, before he sat down, but the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, beat me to it. I want to ask him a simple question but, first, I am sorry that we are on different sides of this—when we served together on the snoopers’ charter Bill, we were totally united that it was a bad Bill and we worked hand in glove to amend it. Can he tell me the substantive difference between a camera and a computer watching everyone in the crowd and picking out the wanted troublemakers and those 20 policemen he talked about looking at everybody in the crowd and picking out the wanted troublemakers from their briefing or their memory? What is the real difference between them?

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

When I observed these deployments of facial recognition and looked at the 20 policemen standing around, it occurred to me that they would probably find a lot more of the people they were looking for if they just went round to their houses and knocked on the door, rather than working on the off-chance that they might walk past them in the high street.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Doocey for eliciting a very useful debate, as was the intention. I particularly welcome some of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, but say to him that a Crime and Policing Bill might possibly be the place for discussion of the use of live facial recognition in policing. Maybe we can make some progress with the Government, we hope, responding or at least giving an indication ahead of their consultation of their approach to the legislative framework around live facial recognition. I very much hope that they will take this debate on board as part of that consultation.

As my noble friend Lady Doocey clearly stated, these amendments are necessary because live facial recognition currently operates, effectively, in a legislative void, yet the police are rolling out this technology at speed. There is no explicit Act of Parliament authorising its deployment, meaning that police forces are in effect, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger indicated, writing their own rules as they go. This technology represents a fundamental shift in the relationship between citizen and state. When LFR cameras are deployed, our public spaces become biometric checkpoints where every face is indiscriminately scanned. By treating every citizen as a suspect in a permanent digital line-up, we are abandoning the presumption of innocence. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, made that point very well. As a result, there is a clear issue of public trust.

Amendment 379 would prohibit the use of LFR during public assemblies or processions unless a specific code of practice has been formally approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament. This is essential to protect our freedoms of expression and assembly under Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR. The pervasive tracking capability of LFR creates what the courts have recognised as a chilling effect, as described by my noble friend Lady Doocey and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. Law-abiding citizens are discouraged from attending protests or expressing dissenting views for fear of permanent state monitoring. We know that police forces have already used this technology to target peaceful protesters who were not wanted for any crime. People should not have to hand over their sensitive biometric data as the price of engaging in democratic processes. Without explicit parliamentary consent and an approved code of practice, we are sleepwalking into a surveillance state that bypasses democratic oversight entirely.

Amendment 471 would establish that LFR use in public spaces must be limited to narrowly defined serious cases—such as preventing major crimes or locating missing persons—and requires prior judicial authorisation specifying the scope and purpose of each deployment. The need for this oversight was made absolutely clear by the 2020 Court of Appeal ruling in R (Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales Police, which found LFR use unlawful due to fundamental deficiencies in the legal framework. The court identified that far too much discretion is left to individual officers regarding who ends up on a watchlist and where cameras are placed. We must replace operational discretion with judicial scrutiny.

The Government themselves now acknowledge the inadequacy of the current framework, which they describe as a “patchwork framework” and say it is

“complicated and difficult to understand”.

Well, that is at least some progress towards the Government acknowledging the situation. They say that the current framework does not provide sufficient confidence for expanded use—hear, hear. The former Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner made clear his concerns about the College of Policing guidance, questioning whether these fundamental issues require

“more than an authorised professional practice document from the College of Policing”

and instead demand parliamentary debate. The former commissioner raised a profound question:

“Is the status of the UK citizen shifting from our jealously guarded presumption of innocence to that of ‘suspected until we have proved our identity to the satisfaction of the examining officer’?”


Such a fundamental shift in the relationship between citizen and state cannot, and should not, be determined by guidance alone.

The College of Policing’s APP on LFR, while attempting to provide operational guidance, falls short of providing the robust legal framework that this technology demands. It remains non-statutory guidance that can be revised without parliamentary scrutiny, lacks enforceable standards for deployment decisions, provides insufficient detail on bias testing and mitigation requirements, and does not establish independent oversight mechanisms with real teeth.

Most critically, the guidance permits watch-list compilation based on subjective assessments without clear statutory criteria or independent review. This leaves fundamental decisions about who gets surveilled to operational discretion rather than judicial oversight. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, who was keen on one bit of our amendment but not the other, I say that this intelligence-led tool effectively delegates it to a senior police officer and they, in a sense, have a conflict of interest. They are the ones who make the operational decisions.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. It seems that he and his noble friends keep talking about the police and the restrictions which will be imposed on the police. But Amendment 471 seems to extend facial recognition to hundreds and hundreds of public authorities, provided they adhere to a code or comply with certain practices. Does he still stand by the idea that facial recognition should be extended to hundreds of public authorities, in addition to the police?

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

If the noble Lord accepts the fact that controls are required, which he did not in his earlier comments, I think he would be greatly reassured if you had to have judicial oversight of the use of live facial recognition, which is useful in circumstances other than purely policing. What we are talking about is a greater level of control over the deployment of live facial recognition. We can argue perfectly satisfactorily about whether or not it should be extended beyond the police, but we are suggesting that, alongside that greater deployment, or possible greater deployment, there should be a much greater degree of oversight. I think that effectively answers the noble Lord.

The Metropolitan Police’s own data from recent LFR operations shows a false alert rate requiring officers to make numerous stops of innocent people. Even with claimed accuracy improvements, when a system processes thousands of faces, even a small error translates to significant numbers of misidentifications affecting law-abiding citizens.

More concerning is the evidence on differential performance, and that is where I fundamentally agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. The National Physical Laboratory’s 2020 testing of facial recognition systems found significant variation in performance across demographic groups. While contemporary LFR systems used by UK police show better performance than earlier algorithms, independent research continues to identify measurable differences in accuracy rates across ethnicity and gender. The Court of Appeal in Bridges ruled that South Wales Police breached the public sector equality duty by failing to satisfy itself that the software was free from racial or gender bias, yet current deployment practices suggest insufficient progress in addressing these equality obligations.

We should also address the secrecy surrounding police watch-lists. The Justice and Home Affairs Committee of this House recommended that these lists be subject to compulsory statutory criteria and standardised training. There is no independent review of watch-list inclusion, no notification to those placed on lists and no clear route for challenge or removal.

I also very much appreciated what the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, had to say about the problems with software. But the chilling sentence he delivered was “Technology has to take over”. That is precisely the problem that we are living with. If technology is to take over, we need a legal framework to govern it. The current patchwork of overlapping laws addressing human rights, data protection and criminal justice is not fit for purpose.

These amendments provide the democratic and judicial guard-rails needed to contain this technology, and we cannot allow the convenience of new tools to erode our established civil liberties. Only Parliament should determine the framework for how LFR is used in our society, and only the courts should authorise its deployment in individual cases.

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[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 382F, an amendment that, carefully and proportionately, takes on tackling the problems of the ever-growing number of overlapping Acts and statutes that are used to limit free speech. If public order laws on protest are, to quote the Liberal Democrat Benches from the other day, a confused mess, the labyrinthine patchwork affecting free speech is an impenetrable quagmire. The noble Lord has done a real public service here by carefully going through how, inadvertently and often by mission creep, censorious laws undermine democratic speech rights and are actually damaging the UK’s reputation internationally.

I am not just talking about JD Vance or Elon Musk, who I have heard commented on in this House and dismissed sneeringly by many in Westminster as spreading just Trumpist misinformation or hyperbole. We need to recognise that even the bible of globalist liberalism, the Economist, no less, featured a cover last May proclaiming “Europe’s free-speech problem”, identified the UK as one of the most censorious on the continent and provided a lot of evidence. There has been lots of discussion all over the political spectrum in relation to the idea of 12,000 arrests a year, 30 a day, for speech offences that spring from laws that the amendment seeks to rein in, and for which this House is responsible. We are talking here about crime and policing, and the police are expected to treat speech offences as criminal acts and to police them.

Since the introduction of hate crime laws, which I remind the Committee is a relatively recent concept popularised from the mid-1980s, the legislative and regulatory implications of restricting hate and words that are said to have caused distress have proliferated, and it has grown into a real tangle of tripwires. In that tangle, many people in the police and the CPS, and even politicians, seem confused about what one can say legally and what is verboten.

I am sure that noble Lords will remember the extraordinary story of the Times Radio producer, Maxie Allen, and his partner, Rosalind Levine. They were the couple who were arrested by six uniformed officers, in front of their young children, for posting disparaging messages about their daughter’s school in a private WhatsApp group. It received a lot of publicity, and they have just been paid £20,000 for wrongful arrest, although they have not received an apology. What stood out for me about that story was that when the police officers went into her house, Ms Levine asked what malicious communication offence they were being accused of. The detective did not know, had to Google it and then read out what Google said. That strikes me as not healthy. We as legislators have a responsibility to tackle this. Too often, we just pass more and more laws, with more restrictions on freedom, and never stop to look at whether anything on the statute book can be repealed, streamlined or rolled back.

I commend the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, for his detailed, well-thought out and proportionate attempt at tackling the way the law has grown and the negative impact that is having on democratic free speech. I also want to commend him for his courage in taking on this issue. As we know, and he referred to this, if anyone takes on hate speech laws, you just think, “Oh, my goodness, he’s going to be accused of all sorts of things. He’s going to be accused of being a bigot. It’s a risk”, so when he told me he was doing this, I gulped. It is horrible to be accused of being a racist, a misogynist, homophobic, a hatemonger, or whatever, but that is the very point. Being accused of being pro-hate speech, if you oppose hate speech legislation, is itself silencing of a democratic discussion on laws and we as legislators should not be bullied or silenced in that way. Ironically, the best tool for any cultural shift in relation to prejudice, in my view, is free speech. To be able to take on bigotry, we need to be able to expose it, argue against it and use the disinfectant of free speech to get rid of the hate, whereas censorship via hate speech laws does not eliminate or defeat regressive ideas; it just drives them underground to fester unchallenged.

The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, has laid out the key legal problems in his approach to this, especially in relation to the lack of precision in terminology used across speech-restricting laws. He has raised a lot of real food for thought. Perhaps I can add a concern from a slightly different perspective, to avoid repeating the points he has made. For me, there is another cost when law fails to clearly define concepts such as abusive or insulting words, grossly offensive speech, and what causes annoyance, inconvenience and needless anxiety—these things are littered all over the law. It is that the dangerously elastic framing of what speech constitutes harm or hate has been deeply regressive in its impact on our cultural norms. There has been a sort of cultural mission creep which has especially undermined the resilience of new generations of young people. The language of hate speech legislation now trips off the tongues of sixth-formers in schools and university campus activists. When they complain that they disagree with or are made to feel uncomfortable by a speaker or a lecturer and say that they should be banned for their views, they will cite things straight out of the law such as, “That lecturer has caused me harassment, alarm and distress”. Where did they get that from? They will say that those words are perceived as harmful and that if they heard them, it would trigger anxiety—even claiming post-traumatic stress disorder is fashionable. It is because we have socialised the young into the world of believing that speech is a danger to their mental well-being, which has cultivated a grievance victimhood. It is a sort of circular firing squad, because the young, who feel frightened by words which they have picked up and been imbued with from the way the law operates, then demand even more lawfare to protect themselves and their feelings from further distress. They are even encouraged to go round taking screenshots of private messages, which they take to the police, or they scroll through the social media of people they do not like to see whether there is anything they can use in the law.

The law has enabled the emergence of a thin-skinned approach to speech, and this has been institutionalised via our statute book. The police do not seem immune to such interpretations of harmful words, either, and I am afraid that this can cause them to weaponise the power they have through this muddle. It wastes police resources and energy, an issue very pertinent to this Bill.

I will finish with an example. In August 2023, an autistic 16 year-old girl was arrested for reportedly telling a female police officer that she looked like her lesbian nana. The teenager’s mother explained that this was a literal observation, in that the police officer looked like her grandmother, who is a lesbian. The officer understood it as homophobic abuse, so a Section 5 public order offence kicked in on the basis of causing “alarm or distress” by using abusive language. If you witness the film of the incident, seven police officers entered the teenage girl’s home, where she was hiding in the closet, screaming in fear and punching herself in the face. You may ask who was distressed in that instance. The girl was held in custody for 20 hours and ultimately no charges were brought. But we must ask whether the statute book has created such confused laws and encouraged police overreach, and whether it encouraged that young police officer, who heard someone say the words “lesbian nana”, to immediately think, “arrest her, hold her for 20 hours and say that she is causing distress”. What has happened to the instincts of a police officer when they think that this would be the answer?

Many people to whom I speak about the problem addressed by this amendment suggest that it has been overstated. They say that, yes, the police are a bit too promiscuous in arresting people, but the numbers charged and convicted are fairly stable. In fact, a journalist recently told me that in some instances they are going down. But as legislators, should we not query whether this implies that the laws are giving too much leeway to the police to follow up malicious, trivial and politicised complaints? This creates the chilling consequence of the notion of process as punishment: you might not be charged, but you are arrested, and law-abiding citizens are humiliated and embarrassed with the cops at the door. We must take this amendment very seriously, and I hope that the Minister will give us a positive response.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, it is a delight to listen to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, who hit the nail on the head: in fact, she hit many nails on the head, and I agree with everything she said.

I support Amendment 382F because it restores the proper boundary between criminal law and free expression. Criminal sanctions must be reserved for conduct that poses a real risk of harm, threats, menaces and conduct intended to intimidate, not for speech that merely offends or causes hurt feelings. Section 127 of the Communications Act and related provisions currently include abusive and insulting material, and even communication that causes “anxiety”—a formulation that has produced inconsistent enforcement and a chilling effect on legitimate debate.

Should I have reported my MS consultant when he told me the good news and the bad news? The good news was that he knew what it was, and the bad news was that it was MS. He wanted to check how spastic I was. That word, “spastic”, can sound like a terribly insulting term, but it was a medical reference to my condition. This morning, I got a text message reminder: “Your UCLH appointment with the spasticity walk-in clinic at Queen Square will take place early tomorrow morning”. We must make sure that we do not treat all words which may seem insulting as actually being so. The law should be precise and proportionate. Vague criminal offences that hinge on subjective reactions invite over-policing in online life and risk criminalising satire, political argument and robust journalism. Recent parliamentary analysis shows that arrests under communications offences have increased, while convictions have not kept pace, suggesting that resources are being spent on low-value prosecutions rather than on genuine threats to safety. Legal commentary also suggests the difficulties courts face in applying terms like “grossly offensive” and “insulting”, and that undermines predictability and fairness.

This amendment would not leave victims without recourse. Civil remedies, harassment injunctions, platform moderation and targeted civil criminal offences for stalking, doxing and credible threats remain available and should be strengthened. That combination protects vulnerable people while ensuring that criminal law is not used as a blunt instrument against free expression.

Of course, there are trade-offs. Decriminalising insults means some distress will no longer attract criminal penalties, but the correct response is not to expand criminal law; it is to improve support for civil remedies and focus policing on genuine threats. That approach better protects both free speech and personal safety.

For these reasons, I urge the Minister to support Amendment 382F in order to defend free expression, sharpen the law so that it targets real harm, and ensure that our criminal justice system focuses on threats that endanger people rather than on words that merely offend them.