Pharmacy (Preparation and Dispensing Errors—Registered Pharmacies) Order 2018
Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Baroness Jolly(6 years, 4 months ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Read Hansard Text
Baroness Jolly (LD)
My Lords, I shall be brief in my support of this statutory instrument. I too had a feeling of déjà vu when preparing for this debate. I looked up the debate and sure enough, it was on 19 December 2011 that I spoke, as did my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and as indeed did the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, who is currently our Deputy Chairman of Committees. The only person we are missing is the noble Lord, Lord Patel.
Baroness Jolly
Indeed, yes.
My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones has given the Committee the detail. I, too, champion local community pharmacies and pharmacists. This SI covers some of the content of his original amendment and will have a considerable impact on the profession. We are all human; we make mistakes. In the previous debate, I outlined a mistake which happened within my own circle at home and caused a large high-street pharmacy to change the way in which it dispensed and stored medicines. The measure will have an impact in that some pharmacists and pharmacy assistants will feel more confident in owning up to making mistakes. We are encouraging people within the health and social care service to do this because we will then learn and share good practice. It is good legislation: mistakes are confessed to and rectified, and lessons are learned.
We heard from the Minister at the outset of this debate that more legislation will be coming down the track to look at other things. When that legislation comes before us for debate, I hope that all the areas that have been exposed today as being in need of tidying will be tidied up.
Consumer Rights Bill
Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Baroness Jolly
Baroness Jolly (LD)
My Lords, the debate on this important issue in Committee was a very good one, as my noble friend said. The discussion focused more on the protections for net neutrality than on the specifics of this amendment. I sympathised with the points made and committed to a meeting to discuss them. I thought it important that the relevant interested parties were present, especially Ed Vaizey, the Minister for Culture and the Digital Economy. His diary proved to be completely immovable. The meeting is now in the diary for this Thursday and I am looking forward to it.
It is clear from the discussions so far that this is a really complex area, and one which is causing a great deal of debate both in Europe and across the Atlantic. We believe that we are global leaders in delivering open internet services. In the UK, a competitive market, effective self-regulation and consumer expectation have delivered a much more open internet than perhaps elsewhere.
As noble Lords may be aware, industry has developed two self-regulatory codes of practice—both now with full sign-up from major ISPs, with Vodafone, EE and Virgin Media signing up to the open internet code in recent weeks. This is the code that governs their behaviour and ensures that they do not block services that compete with their own. Mobile operators that restricted some services such as Skype no longer offer new packages that do so. Ofcom, the regulator, has been in dialogue with the provider whose behaviour this clause attempts to address and there is a commitment to review the wording in its terms and conditions to ensure that these are not misinterpreted in any way.
Critics of this self-regulatory regime will say that there is no penalty for falling foul of the open internet code and that ISPs can change their mind about being signatories at any time. While this is true, it is also the case for many other areas that are self-regulated, for example in online advertising, where great strides have been made to ensure a transparent sector. However, it is also true that in the two and a half years since the open internet code was agreed, no breaches have been reported. If there is a significant change in the number of signatories or we see common breaches reported, the Government will look at this again. Consumer expectations are such that we do not envisage this happening again.
In answer to my noble friend’s comments, we have discussed these issues with Ofcom. We agree with Ofcom that there may be some room for interpretation regarding its powers in this area. However, we do not believe that the amendment would deliver the intended restrictions on internet access providers. Furthermore, Ofcom’s analysis of the market for internet access services suggests that there is not an urgent need for intervention. The market is continuing to move towards the comprehensive provision of neutral open internet access services, and there is no evidence of present consumer harm. Therefore, for the time being, and because of the recent developments in this area, we see no evidence of the need for legislation.
However, by way of reassurance, as noble Lords will know, Clause 64(2) in Part 2 of the Bill means that providers will be unable to hide definitions of the service provided—such as broadband access—in the small print, and will have to give them due prominence. The Bill also retains the protections currently in force through the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999, which give regulators the powers to tackle such abusive behaviours, if proven. We are also taking a power in the Bill to allow us, after parliamentary scrutiny, to update the grey list. This means that were consumer or trader behaviour to change, or evidence of particular consumer detriment to emerge, we could add terms to the grey list to accommodate that. That could apply in this case should changes by providers not take place or we see a shift in provider behaviour across the board that is not currently evidenced. That means that ISPs will not be able to hide any clauses and that there is a route for action for regulators, should this prove still to be an issue. I believe that that is a more appropriate way to deal with this than legislating at this point, especially given that this is being addressed by the regulator.
We should also be aware of the ongoing process in Europe regarding net neutrality as part of the telecoms single market package. The Government have always championed the self-regulatory approach, but we recognise that not all markets are the same as the UK’s and that there is growing demand for further protections for net neutrality from other member states. It is clear from the European Council that there is the will to include text on net neutrality. We will continue to engage proactively with the European Council on that, and believe that an appropriate solution can be found. The latest text from the Italian presidency shows movement towards a more principles-based and outcome-focused approach, which we believe would be more appropriate.
To conclude, while I am sympathetic to the intentions of the amendment, the Bill is not the right place to do this. Telecoms regulation needs to be handled through telecoms legislation. We do not believe that the amendment will change the regulator’s power in this area; nor do we believe it be necessary at this time, given the market developments. We will continue to engage with the EU in a constructive manner.
I commend my noble friend’s persistence on the issue. The Government are unable to accept his amendment, but I hope that I have offered sufficient assurance to persuade him to withdraw it.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that reasonably comprehensive response. Although I do not agree with large parts of it, it was comprehensive. It is interesting that the Minister, along with others, seems to have confused the issue of the open internet with net neutrality. They are rather different issues. It will be useful to have that discussion on Thursday. This is not a net neutrality amendment. It is about the enforcement of the open internet principles. I shall not take up the House’s time by explaining the difference, but it is considerable. The Minister’s meeting with me and the industry on Thursday will be helpful.
The Minister’s reply was a mixture of, “The problem has gone away”, “Voluntary agreements will do the business” and “We don’t need the back-up”, but the bottom line, which I find quite baffling, is, “We don’t agree with Ofcom”. The CEO—albeit the outgoing CEO, who may be more frank than an incoming one —was very clear about the powers that Ofcom did and did not have and what he thought was appropriate.
I do not know what discussions there have been between DCMS and Ofcom, but a dialogue of the deaf seems to be going on. I understand what my noble friend said about this not being an urgent need, but I do not believe that the CEO of Ofcom would have gone on the record twice—first on 4 November with the CMS Select Committee and then a fortnight later with the Communications Committee of the House of Lords—unless he thought that this was a live topic.
I note the slightly comforting words of my noble friend that under Clause 64 no small print will henceforth be allowed and that there will be no hiding place. I cannot remember the exact words that she used, but they were ringing phrases. I hope that they will have some substance. There is scepticism whether they will bite in the way my noble friend outlined. We shall see.
As the discussion with the Minister has not yet taken place, I reserve the right to bring this matter back at Third Reading if absolutely necessary but, in the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Consumer Rights Bill
Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Baroness Jolly(9 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text
Lord Clement-Jones
Logically, one thing follows another. That is exactly the purpose of this amendment. Indeed, I shall refer again to the speech made by the noble Baroness, Lady King, on 20 October, as recorded at column GC 183 of Hansard. It has been extraordinarily helpful in formulating the terms of this amendment.
Let me explain. Amendment 34, tabled in Grand Committee, sought to amend Clause 34 to include a provision stating that it is common for computer software to include defects due to its dynamic nature and the complex environment in which it operates. In response to that amendment my noble friend Lady Jolly asserted that,
“the Bill is flexible enough to cope with”,
the differences between complex software and simpler forms of digital content such as music. She said that “reasonable consumers” understood that complex content contains bugs, and that,
“freedom from minor defects is an aspect of satisfactory quality only ‘in appropriate cases’”.—Official Report, 20/10/14; col. GC 184.]
The Minister was clear about this in Grand Committee, but, as the Federation Against Copyright Theft has said, it is far from the case that a district court or a county court would be clear about it.
In the debate, the noble Baroness, Lady King of Bow, suggested that,
“it seems reasonable to say that where minor defects in software do not affect the overall functionality of the product, that digital content should not be deemed unsatisfactory”.—[Official Report, 20/10/14; col. GC 183.]
I agree—and the software industry agrees, and very much supports this approach, as it is much more outcome based. We have reformulated the amendment as a result, and it now says that as long as the defect does not affect the main functionality of the digital content, it should not be regarded as rendering it unsatisfactory.
My noble friend Lady Jolly questioned in Grand Committee what the driver for industry would be to improve the software if the legislation stated that some types of software contain bugs and, as such, this would not mean that the digital content was faulty. However, it is in industry’s commercial interest constantly to improve its products. In fact, to the contrary, the clause as formulated might have an adverse effect in encouraging industry not to make changes or improvements to its digital content. The consequences of strict compliance are likely to be increased costs to consumers and slower product evolution, arising from the increased time and resource required for testing. It is preferable for consumers and businesses to require that minor defects or malfunctions that may surface as a product or service is used be fixed as promptly as possible.
Amendments 18 and 19 aim to remove the risk of claims in relation to minor software glitches. Such claims are potentially expensive and time-consuming for software providers to resolve and would not benefit consumers. In Grand Committee, Amendments 37 and 38 sought to amend Clause 36 to clarify that the presence of bugs in complex types of digital content does not mean that the content is not as described. My noble friend Lady Jolly responded by commenting that,
“digital content either meets the description or … not”,
and that the amendments would undermine,
“the requirement that the digital content should be as described”.—[Official Report, 20/10/14; col. GC 186.]
My noble friend provided a simple example of a defect in software where the spellchecker no longer worked yet the software was described as having this function. With all due respect, the spellchecker example is very simplistic. It is a different situation with regard to complex software such as security software, which has to evolve over time and needs to be updated to address the myriad situations to enable the software to continue to interface with other third-party software and platforms, to continue to function or to address new vulnerabilities.
These issues were discussed during the debate in Grand Committee on Amendment 40A, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Haskel. His amendment would have amended Clause 40 to enable suppliers to make modifications to the software if they are of benefit to the consumer, remedy risks or improve functionality, irrespective of whether the modification would mean that the digital content no longer meets that description. I am pleased that the Government have partially relented on that and that, as a result, we now have government Amendment 20 to Clause 40. The supplier can now add functionality but software suppliers will still not be able to remove features. Neither Clause 36 nor Clause 40 takes into consideration that certain features may have to be removed or disabled from security software. Suppliers of security software may have to remove a function as it is in the very interest of a consumer to do so, as the function could be vulnerable to attack and this specific vulnerability could leave the consumer open to a range of threats—from a virus that will steal personal information or credit card details to malware that will infect a user’s machine, rendering it unusable and/or wiping data such as precious family photos.
Functions of security software are not removed without good reason. If suppliers do not remove a function, there are many circumstances where this will be to the detriment of consumers. I hope that my noble friend will recognise the particular circumstances of software and give her approval at least to the tenor of these amendments. I beg to move.
Baroness Jolly
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for setting out his stall, and I will set out mine. The new quality rights that we are introducing for digital content provide that digital content should be of satisfactory quality, fit for any particular purpose and as described. These core rights mirror those already used for goods, building on consumer expectations and familiar concepts for business. The core rights are principles-based and flexible. This is important for goods and especially important for digital content, which is constantly evolving. They are intended to work effectively in a wide range of scenarios, applying to goods ranging from rubber ducks to luxury yachts. Similarly, they are designed to apply to the range of digital content, from music files to complex security software products.
The key to the success of the Bill is to balance solid consumer rights with workable outcomes for business. This will create an environment where consumers are confident about buying more, contributing to more innovative products and driving growth and innovation for industry. The concept of freedom from minor defects comes into Clause 34 as a factor that could be taken into consideration in the assessment of satisfactory quality.
I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones for his consideration of the question of how freedom from minor defects would apply to digital content which is of a type that commonly contains defects. However, noble Lords should note that, crucially, freedom from minor defects is only part of the assessment of satisfactory quality in appropriate cases. We have made it clear in the Explanatory Notes, as I mentioned in Committee, that it is the norm to encounter some bugs in a complex game or piece of software on release, so a reasonable person might not expect that type of digital content to be totally free from minor defects. The Government, and most consumers, understand that these types of products are commonly released with minor bugs, as a result of the development cycle of these products or the complex environment in which they operate. So while a reasonable consumer might expect a music file or an e-book to be free from minor defects or bugs, they would not have the same expectations of a complex computer game or a complex suite of business software.
We have not taken the step of defining what is or is not a minor defect because that will depend on the context. For example, in the goods context, a reasonable consumer may not expect the design on some hand-painted pottery to be completely uniform, but may reasonably expect it to be scratch-free. Similarly, consumers may reasonably expect some defects in goods sold as seconds, but there would come a point where a defect may render the goods unsatisfactory. However, a defect that has an adverse effect on the functionality of digital content should be capable of being taken into account in assessments of quality. Minor defects are defects that are unlikely to affect the functionality of the product but which, depending on the context, may or may not affect assessments of quality. For example, a minor defect in digital content could be something such as a click sound on a music file, or a character who has the wrong colour hair in one level of a computer game. Whether or not this would affect the satisfactory quality of the digital content would depend on the context, which would include factors such as the type of content and whether that type commonly contains defects.
I understand that industry would take some comfort from having the fact that some forms of digital content contain minor defects reflected in the Bill but I believe that this is neither necessary nor desirable for consumers. Moreover, as I have said already, under Clause 34, “freedom from minor defects” is only an aspect of satisfactory quality “in appropriate cases”. The amendment, as drafted, could narrow an understanding of what a reasonable person would expect in other circumstances.
Taking Amendments 18 and 19 together, I recognise that a defect affecting the functionality of digital content is unlikely to be minor. It is quite right that a defect that affects the functionality of the digital content could affect assessments as to fitness for a particular purpose and would match the description. Of course, if the digital content is specifically described as being free of defects then any defects in the digital content would not match the description. However, “fit for a particular purpose”, and “as described” are concepts that go broader than simply the functionality of the digital content. As such, I would be concerned that excluding defects that do not affect functionality from assessments as to whether digital content is fit for a particular purpose or as described would risk creating a lack of clarity for consumers and lowering consumer protection.
It is also worth reflecting briefly on the requirements of a trader should digital content not be of satisfactory quality, fit for a particular purpose or as described. As there is no short-term right to reject intangible digital content, the remedy would be a repair or a replacement. As the industry usually provides fixes to remedy issues in the form of an update where digital content is not of satisfactory quality, the Bill provides a remedy that is proportionate and in line with industry practice.
Consumer Rights Bill
Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Baroness Jolly
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, in moving Amendment 43, I shall speak also to Amendment 44. Very significantly, the effect of Clause 47 is that liability under most of the provisions of Chapter 3 cannot be excluded or restricted. Broadly, the clause in its present form prohibits any exclusion or restriction of liability whatever, however reasonable it may be to exclude or restrict such liability. The intention of these amendments is to allow such exclusion or restriction of liability if it is reasonable. This is particularly important because, as we discussed earlier, software often contains defects and is known to do so. Increasingly, software is installed and runs alongside or on other applications or platforms. These are often refined and altered as new versions are released and indeed may have incidental defects as well. The performance of one software program may therefore often depend on other applications, interfaces and programs, and it is the resulting interplay that can expose unexpected defects, but these may not be evident or even exist when running the same program in another manner or configuration.
The appearance of a defect might lead to the conclusion that a software program is defective as an absolute and verifiable characteristic of that software, but many such defects may exist only in certain circumstances or in specific configurations. This is very different from a single consumer good which, operating alone, either functions in accordance with the marketed description or is defective. It may well be reasonable to allow the supplier to exclude liability for defects. It is important to stress that the amendment would permit the supplier to exclude or restrict liability only if a court thought it reasonable to do so.
The fact of the matter is that virtually all software contains defects. There are limited exceptions but they are highly specialised and tend to be found in application areas where the consequences of failure are so grave as to demand ultra-resilient and dependable software—for example, aircraft and automotive control systems, software for nuclear installations, software in surgical scenarios, or software to guide or launch weapons. To the extent that defect-free software exists, it will tend to be infinitely expensive.
Cheap consumer software is wholly different. It cannot be polished for ever and, if so, would be very expensive to buy a licence for. Apps are being developed all the time for the consumer at the cost of, for example, around 69p or free. Without the ability to limit such liability, this law could chill software development by micro-business and SMEs. Costs will be pushed up for such small developers as they will need to seek to mitigate or insure against such legal risks. It could end up by stifling innovation. It could make the developer think, “Why supply software under such a law to consumers at all? It’s too risky”.
In any event, this law is unnecessary as in practical terms the software industry will always find a workaround or fix to a problem. Such solutions happen each day and often very quickly. The rule will be divorced from reality. The remedy is not proportionate and, in the view of many in the software industry, is somewhat draconian. It is out of step with the way in which the industry works and looks after its customers, who are its lifeblood. A solution could be that such a rule under Clause 47 applies only if a workaround or fix is not implemented. Thus, unlimited exposure kicks in only if a fix fails.
The clause is too much of a blunt weapon to cure, at best, only a technical legal problem. Have the consequences been properly considered on developers? The effect of such potential unlimited or excludable liability can be foreseen as the near certainty of choking back innovation and the further distribution and take-up by consumers of advanced technologies in application areas where it is not reasonable for them to expect a perfect product—especially where the product is at zero or very low cost. In any event, it is reasonable to take into account any fix offered, together with a number of factors, in order to determine reasonableness.
In conclusion, as the Federation Against Software Theft suggests, a more equitable approach would be to permit the exclusion or restriction of liability to the extent that it is reasonable to do so, taking into account factors analogous to those under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999—SI 1999, No. 2083. That would enable the courts to develop a fair and equitable system on a case-by-case basis. I beg to move.
Baroness Jolly
My Lords, we have heard that this amendment seeks to introduce into the digital content chapter a right for businesses to be able to exclude or limit their liability for meeting the quality rights if doing so is “reasonable”.
We have chosen not to allow “reasonable” limitations on liability for the quality rights in any of the goods, services or digital content chapters of the Bill. This reflects the current law in relation to business-to-consumer contracts for goods. Clause 47 prevents a trader contracting out of the consumer’s statutory rights and remedies specified in that clause. This is because, in practice, the liability will for the most part be limited to the contract price of the digital content, as for goods. So there is a natural cap.
Clauses in consumer contracts that exclude liability entirely, or limit liability to significantly less than the contract price, are unlikely to be judged as reasonable anyway. I have heard industry concerns about the complex environment in which digital content works, and I know that contractual relationships between traders may be complex, as may the technical issues. Against this backdrop, it is difficult for a trader to have full control over the quality of the digital content that they supply, so traders have concerns about being liable for problems that are not entirely in their control. However, as I said earlier, is it right, from the consumer’s perspective, that traders can limit their liability? Surely if a trader offers to sell digital content for a consumer, they should take responsibility for the consumer getting what they expect.
Consumer Rights Bill
Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Baroness Jolly(9 years, 6 months ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Read Hansard Text
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I am intervening rather unfairly on this amendment to say that I do not support it and that, as the Bill’s passage carries on, a number of sectors will have their voices represented. I want to raise issues that have been raised with me by the motor sector, particularly the Finance and Leasing Association, which represents a wide range of those who finance the purchase of motor cars by consumers.
As we heard, Clause 22 introduces this 30-day right to reject goods if they are of unsatisfactory quality, however minor the defect. Sellers are unable to deduct the costs incurred—for example, depreciations—while the goods have been used by the consumer. As a result, the right to reject could have a particular cost implication in the world of motor finance, where 75% of private new car sales are bought on finance. New cars, as my noble friend may know, typically lose 15% to 20% of their value in the first 30 days, and in the event of a defect the car dealer will have to offer to repair the car, although the customer is not obliged to accept that and can simply opt to hand back the vehicle. In a worst-case scenario, as the FLA says, the customer might have had the car for a month and driven it extensively, clocking up thousands of miles, only to hand it back because of a very minor defect—for example, the windscreen wipers failing to work properly. That is the case that the FLA makes.
I am very happy for my noble friend to write, since this is a rather unexpected intervention. There is clearly a balance to be struck between ensuring that customers are able to return faulty goods and preventing potential abuse. I therefore ask my noble friend whether the department will clarify, in the accompanying guidance to the Bill and in any associated publicity, that this new short-term right to reject should be invoked only if the quality of the goods is genuinely unsatisfactory—that is, the defects are not simply minor mechanical or cosmetic ones—and ideally it should be done as soon as possible within the 30-day period.
Secondly, could my noble friend confirm how this new short-term right to reject fits with Section 75 of the Consumer Credit Act, which already allows the customer to make a claim against a supplier or lender for breach of contract? This Consumer Rights Bill gives the consumer a right to challenge the supplier, whereas Section 75 of the CCA establishes an additional right to pursue the creditor for breach by the supplier. Will the Government be making clear in the guidance that the customer must obtain recourse from the supplier first, and that the supplier must not renounce responsibility on the grounds of Section 75?
Baroness Jolly
My Lords, this amendment reflects a recommendation by the Law Commission in its 2009 report, Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods. Many of the recommendations in that report are implemented in the goods chapter of the Bill. Indeed, a normal period of 30 days was recommended by the Law Commission as giving a reasonable opportunity for a consumer to inspect goods, as well as meeting the expectation of consumers. However, I am concerned that the amendment would undermine the benefits of certainty provided by the 30-day time limit for the short-term right to reject.
Here I am staying with the example of the pregnant lady buying a pram. Let us look at the example of a pregnant woman who buys baby equipment in preparation for the birth of her child. The amendment would allow her to exercise the short-term right to reject potentially months after purchasing the goods, should it transpire that they were faulty. On the face of it, that may seem fair, but I see many issues that could arise to make this impractical. If a friend who was not pregnant bought the same goods for the same unborn baby, it is not clear whether it would be reasonably foreseeable that there might be a delay before they were used. Should all baby-related goods be subject to a longer period for rejection because it is not unreasonable to think that they may be for a baby who has not yet been born? Or would this only be reasonably foreseeable if the consumer said something to indicate it, or had a sign, such as being pregnant?
If it was reasonably foreseeable that there may be a delay before the consumer would use the goods fully, it seems difficult to know what the reasonable period would be. Take the example of a consumer buying skis in the summer. What is the reasonable period for the consumer to be able to test them? A week into the European ski season, or a month? Not until the end of the season? How would the trader know when the consumer came to return the goods whether a delay was reasonably foreseeable when the consumer bought them? Would the trader have to keep a record of who bought what and any relevant circumstances, such as when they said they would start to use it? This would be extremely burdensome on businesses.