Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Empey Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 30th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Harper and Lord Empey, for signing this amendment. I will also speak to my Amendment 65 and consider an amendment put forward by the shadow Front Bench.

It is disappointing that the Justice Minister is not in her place on the Front Bench today, because in discussing these amendments I want to consider the important issue of assessing whether someone has capacity. The MoJ is responsible for that, and for several of the other matters I wish to speak on. We are only at Clause 1(3), but this is a key element to consider carefully: where do all these issues have to happen, and do they have to happen face to face?

As the Bill reads currently, it suggests that only the initial request for assistance, the first declaration, the doctor’s assessment and the second doctor’s assessment, and then the second declaration, have to happen while the person making all these requests is in the country. No other part of the Bill, including preliminary discussions and the act itself—all these other things—has to happen in this country; the person does not have to be here.

I think I have made it clear in a series of amendments that I have brought to the Committee that my concern is how this becomes something that is decided not just on paper. There should be real interaction, and I am trying to understand how the Bill will work in practice. That is why I have asked a series of questions on whether or not the terminally ill person making the request has to be in the country. We should get into other aspects, such as whether the panel has to be here.

We had a debate earlier in Committee, during which I made a clumsy attempt to make sure people had to be in this country. As I said, you can be ordinarily resident in more than one country at the same time. I want to continue to focus on this being a person-based process—I do not like using the term “patient-based process”, as I do not consider this to be a health treatment—and a lot of that is about where somebody is and whether there is a face-to-face link.

Recently, in a different policy, the Government rightly want to accelerate and increase substantially the number of face-to-face assessments for consideration of eligibility for sickness benefits. A lot of that was changed during Covid because, frankly, it was not practical to undertake that process. It has been gradually brought back and needs to be accelerated. The thinking alongside that policy is critical to the application of this Bill.

I have interpreted Clause 1(3)(b) as meaning that only

“steps under sections 10 and 11”

have to be done by persons in England and Wales, and that is the initial assessment. I put it to the Committee that a lot more of this should be done face to face. As the late James Munby pointed out, it is absolutely right that the panel should be considering this process and looking into this. I am conscious there will be medics here who have perhaps an even greater understanding than I of how the variety of assessments should be done face to face. What happens when people are making a declaration? Are we sure that somebody is not in the room, giving them the eyes so that they will give the right answers? How are we to understand whether coercion can happen or not?

In a documentary undertaken by ITV, the Bill’s promoter, Kim Leadbeater, expressed concerns about what happens in Oregon, where a lot of this is done by video link. I believe she was uncomfortable and would consider adding an amendment to make it clear that consultations with doctors could not be done by video call and should be done in person. That has not been done so far, and no explanation has been given. That is why I have tabled these amendments. They would be a very important way of making sure there are safeguards so that, as we go through this novel process to us— I appreciate it is not novel to the world—we have every confidence that a lot of the safeguards which people are concerned about are going to be appropriately applied.

Last week, a discussion on a group brought forward by the noble Lord, Lord Birt, gave us a picture of how this could look. Indeed, the amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, have started to touch on aspects of this, such as how a commission can happen. But I can see that, very quickly, especially bearing in mind some of the amendments last week—though I appreciate that the noble and learned Lord did not accept them—a panel could be meeting every day. Right now, it could involve somebody on holiday in Tenerife and somebody else elsewhere meeting on Zoom or Teams or whatever. That could quickly become a routine tick-box exercise. That is the very reason the late Sir James Munby pointed out that this should not be given to judges—what is the point of having a judge if it will be just a tick-box exercise? We need to be careful that we do not end up in that situation.

In Amendment 65, I have suggested specifically what needs to be done face to face: the preliminary discussion, the request—as is in the Bill—and the witness. The witness should be there and it should be face to face. That seems sensible. We have the first and second assessment already there, but I think we could go further. What about the interaction with the independent advocate? Is that going to be done down the phone? These are the serious things which we need to consider. Should the panel meet face to face with the person applying? I appreciate that, in Amendment 320A, the assumption is that it should be face to face, but perhaps with exceptions by a video link. Again, when I initially started observing this at the other end, I thought that this would happen. What seems to have evolved is that a lot of this will be done remotely. The only thing I have not included in Amendment 65 is the actual doctor being there and the assessment happening in this country—although that is not specified in the Bill. Clause 25(3) says that the co-ordinating doctor has to be there in person, although under the following clause that can all be delegated to somebody else.

I do not want to overly labour the point in consideration, but I hope noble Lords will give some thought to how they want to see the Bill work in practice. It may be that people are happy for this all to happen via video and are wondering why we are getting in the way, given that this is about autonomy. However, these would be sensible amendments to consider to make sure that, while no Minister yet has said this is a safe Bill, it is as safe as possible. We need to look at the operation of it. It is certainly the case in other parts of the health system that a lot of this would not be acceptable and would have to be done face to face. It is not a case of overengineering the Bill or leaving it to regulations. We should be clear in Parliament that this is what we are going to do.

I am conscious of Amendment 320A, and I appreciate that my noble friend Lord Evans of Rainow, in Amendment 376, has particularly singled out “in person” for parts of Clause 12. I get that some people may be so terminally ill that perhaps a video link might be used, but that should be exceptional, if we are going to go down that route at all. I look forward to hearing my noble friend explain why that is the case and how it can be administered. With that, I beg to move.

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

My Lords, I have put my name to some of these amendments. In the spirit of what the Chief Whip said, I will not repeat what the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, said, but I gently remind the Committee that this Private Member’s Bill is not normal, in so far as most Private Member’s Bills are five, six, seven or eight pages. This one is 51 pages, with 59 clauses. It is a very different animal from what we are used to.

I think the amendments in this group have been tabled because, in many respects, this aspect of the process is deeply disturbing. We are talking about life and death here; we are talking about making assessments of a person who is making an application for an assisted death. Noble Lords will be aware that, on 29 October, in the Select Committee, Professor Martin J Vernon, chair of the British Geriatrics Society’s ethics and law special interest group, said:

“Assessing somebody remotely, digitally, without a face-to-face assessment, particularly if they have complex health and social care needs, is nigh-on impossible”.


I would have thought that, to assess somebody’s state of mind and to have any sense of judging whether they are being coerced or not, one of the most obvious things is to see them in front of you and get the feel for that. How can a psychiatrist judge this?

The other point I would make is about the practicalities. Depending on where someone is in this country, they may or may not have the equipment or the capacity to use it; signals drop off. Inevitably, if somebody is in a frail and unstable condition, there will have to be other people present to operate this. Does that mean that a team from the hospital would have to go out to some remote location—or, even worse, are we doing stuff on the phone? Can you imagine how people would react? “Dial-a-death” would be the sort of way that people would describe it.

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[Lord Harper (Con)]

The noble Baroness makes a very good point which illustrates the importance of being able to ask people questions directly rather than hearing reports of what they have said or seeing it on a video call. That is the importance of in-person conversation and the ability to ask questions and hear answers so that you know what people actually think. I think the noble Baroness has illustrated and evidenced my point extraordinarily well, and I am grateful for her intervention.

At the beginning of this, the noble Baroness, Lady Gerada, referred to medical assessments. She is right in saying that many of them can be done very well remotely. I think that is excellent. I am a great supporter of technology. We do not all believe in quills and pens, and I do not think the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, was entirely suggesting that we were. She might want to reflect on that remark and whether it was entirely well-intentioned, given what the Chief Whip said to us about treating everyone with courtesy and respect. I support the use of technology where it is appropriate.

The problem here is that the noble Baroness, Lady Gerada, said that we can all rest assured that doctors would never view this as a routine exercise. The problem is that in other jurisdictions there is quite a lot of evidence that they do. While it is true, as the noble Baroness, Lady Blackstone, said, that the vast majority of doctors will approach this in absolutely the right way, I am afraid not all doctors are perfect. There was an example yesterday of a paediatrician at Great Ormond Street who had an appalling record. We have to make sure that the law makes sure that patients are properly protected in all cases, not just in the vast majority of them. Where I disagree with her slightly is that this is a policy decision, not a medical decision. Whether assessments should be face to face, either in every case or that the presumption should be that they are, is a policy decision, rightly for Parliament, not for clinicians. It should be informed by listening to clinicians, but it should also be informed by listening to evidence from the patient experience, so ably set out by the noble Baronesses, Lady Smith and Lady Berger.

The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, gave her own testimony that she has had to make decisions in these cases, and I was very struck by her view that we should certainly have a presumption that these decisions should be taken face to face. I was very struck by listening to her on previous occasions. Her experience on these matters carries a lot of weight. I also listened very carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, when he set out the GMC’s advice. Decisions for patients with a terminal illness about a course of action that will lead to the end of their life seem to me to fall squarely within the set of cases where you would want a face-to-face appointment, but equally I felt there was good counsel for us and challenge from the noble Baronesses, Lady Jay, Lady Pidgeon and Lady Blackstone, to think of the patient, the person who has the terminal illness who wants a decision. They were right to challenge us on that.

That is why I think, if we look at the balance of amendments in this group, they are very helpful because they set out a span of choices for your Lordships, from saying that every decision has to be taken in person, which I think would be wrong for the reasons that the three noble Baronesses set out, that you have to look at the patient’s views, but equally, I think the present wording is too loose and does not set out a presumption that they should be face to face. I would be very grateful to hear the view of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, on where he thinks he is likely to settle because that will be helpful for all of us when thinking about whether we have to table further amendments. It seems to be a presumption that it is face to face, but with a very limited set of circumstances where it can be not face to face. But we should not accept the presumption in a patient-centred model that the patient always has to go and see the panel or the doctors. It should absolutely be, particularly because so many people in these circumstances are going to be in poor health, that we think of a system that makes sure that when it comes to the panel at least one member of the panel, the independent person, is physically present.

That is important. These amendments touch on two parts of Clause 17. The first is subsection (6), which states:

“The duty under subsection (4)(b) to hear from the person to whom the referral relates does not apply if the panel is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which justify not hearing from that person”.


That means there are circumstances where the panel does not have to hear from the person at all: not by videolink, not in person, not by pre-recorded video, not at all. That was confirmed to me when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and I were doing a media programme—I think it was “The Week in Westminster”—where I challenged him on this. He confirmed that there were circumstances in which a decision could be taken for someone to seek assisted suicide and the panel would never have to see them at all. I do not think that is right.

The other subsection these amendments touch on is subsection (5), which states:

“Where the panel considers it appropriate for medical reasons, it may make provision for the use of pre-recorded audio or video material”.


That was inserted in the House of Commons by a Back-Bench amendment. It was not very well debated. The fact that it is pre-recorded means that it gets rid of any opportunity for questioning or challenge. The problem I have with the language there is that it says “medical reasons”, it does not say “medical reasons pertaining to the patient”. This is my last point—

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

We are forgetting that we can use the telephone in this circumstance. It is not even that you would have sight of the person, but you could have a pre-recorded telephone call.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

I am grateful for that. The final point I want to make is that we had experience during the pandemic of too many vulnerable people, people with learning disabilities, having “do not resuscitate” notices put on them by doctors. I do not want to see a system where, if we had a similar circumstance again, these sorts of decisions would be taken remotely at speed. We know from our deliberations in this House, and it is my experience in the other place, that there is no substitute for doing these things face to face where you can challenge people, ask questions, put people under that challenge and get good answers to make good decisions.

I commend this group of amendments to your Lordships, and I look forward to hearing the response of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer.

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I make no comment on other amendments in this group. As noble Lords are aware, the amendments have not had technical drafting support from officials. Further revision and corresponding amendments would therefore need to provide consistent and coherent terminology throughout the Bill.

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

In reference to Amendment 60, if I picked the Minister up correctly, she said that establishing where an individual was in the world would put a burden on the medical people involved. Surely if they are in touch with them, they can at least ask them where they are.

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There is therefore at the very least an ambiguity and, at a greater level, a grave injustice, if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, does not agree to clarify what I think is a point he would probably agree with in principle. That is why I support what was said earlier.

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

My Lords, this has been a very interesting debate. Many Members perhaps do not appreciate the extent of the potential, and the length of time over which that potential could remain open.

When I was Minister for Enterprise in Belfast and represented Belfast East as an elected Member, that area had vast numbers of people suffering from asbestosis, mesothelioma, pleural plaques and so on, because it was an industrial area. We had shipbuilding, aircraft-building and electrical work, and asbestos was involved in wiring. The workforce used to play snowballs with it; that was the extent of it.

What emerged—and this is the important point, as I am sure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, will understand—is that first, a lot of companies, such as Turner & Newell, a very famous company, had gone out of business and, in some cases, their insurers had gone with them because of the extent of the claims. What people need to understand, and the reason why the Northern Ireland Government got involved, is that, in some cases, the state had owned those companies at one point, so the state was the employer. Therefore, there was a direct line of liability between the client, the company and, ultimately, the state. Now, the state has owned a number of businesses on and off over the years, all over the UK. This is not confined to asbestosis or related diseases; as the noble Lord, Lord Harper, mentioned, there is the whole question of the Armed Forces, for example.

To give a sense of the spread of all this, it can take up to 30 years before a disease such as asbestosis becomes obvious, and for mesothelioma and many of these diseases, there is no cure; it is very brutal, and it can be very quick. It emerged that, when workers came home, their clothing passed the asbestos on to their spouses and children. I remember many years ago setting money aside, up to 2050, to cover potential claims arising from the state having owned parts of some companies over the years. So in the absence of any insurer or employer, the state ended up in that position.

These amendments have opened up a whole new frontier that we have to get sorted out. The risk, obviously, is that those dependants will therefore have absolutely no recompense: not only will their relative have died a pretty brutal death—as the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, knows from his experience—but they will be left destitute. This needs sorting out.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, with whom I have had conversations going back to last September. I have looked after many patients dying of mesothelioma, and it seemed to be a loophole if the chain of causation was not completely intact.

We had advice in several calls from extremely wise sources—I will not list them all—and I learned a great deal about the legal side and the Fatal Accidents Act. I have some questions for the noble and learned Lord, whom I met with yesterday. He assured me that he would be bringing forward amendments, but unfortunately, I did not see them at the time; it was only much later that they appeared in my inbox. I have not been able to go through them in detail to examine the precise wording.

The concern is that unless this is watertight, these companies will wriggle out of any type of compensation. Therefore, what is the position of coronial oversight in these cases, where perhaps even the diagnosis might be questioned by a company, and it could be difficult for a family to provide the evidence it might be demanding? One does not know. Also, what is the position regarding the life insurance policy of the individual when they have an industrial disease and there is a chain of causation? They might be eligible, one hopes, for compensation. That needs to be followed through. However, somebody could claim that in some way, the chain of causation had been broken.

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[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I will be very brief. The Government do not have any major technical or operational workability concerns on the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, and the noble Lord, Lord Harper, which were originally tabled, as we heard, by my noble friend Lord Hendy. To make the usual point, as noble Lords will be aware, these amendments have not had technical drafting support from officials, so further revision and corresponding amendments would be needed to provide consistent and coherent terminology throughout the Bill.

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

My Lords, I raised the point that the state could be liable in cases where the companies people worked for were nationalised or owned by the state. It seems not unreasonable that in due course the Minister could express a view on behalf of the Government, because the Government could be directly—and financially—affected by the consequences of the Bill.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I appreciate the point the noble Lord is making—and indeed the points that the noble Earl, Lord Howe, made. However, as your Lordships’ House knows, I correctly restrict myself to commentary on what is before us. Should the Bill include this amendment, we will then respond at the appropriate time.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Empey Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 16th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Grey-Thompson (CB)]

My Lords, I shall speak to three amendments in this group—Amendment 38, in the name of my noble friend Lady O’Loan, to which my name is attached, and Amendments 39 and 68. Amendment 38 seeks to address the challenges of those who have bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder or other conditions associated with episodic suicide ideation, who face a higher baseline risk of self-harm and suicide. Research indicates that suicidal thoughts and behaviours are significantly more prevalent among people with these diagnoses, even without terminal illness, as reported by NICE in 2022 and Public Health England in 2021. Critically, evidence also shows that suicidal ideation tends to increase following a terminal diagnosis, so without the safeguard of this amendment, the Bill risks enabling assisted dying decisions to be influenced by pre-existing mental health vulnerabilities exacerbated by the receipt of a terminal diagnosis.

I support calls in the Chamber today to look at the benefits system. It is a really complicated process, whether you have a terminal diagnosis or not. It is important to learn from other jurisdictions. The 2024 Oregon official report cited that 9% of those who requested to end their lives did so for financial reasons and 42% requested it because they were felt a burden. I think it has already been quoted that in 2011, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, with the Demos report, said that no remedial mental health condition should be eligible for assisted suicide. I do not expect an answer in the Chamber on this question this afternoon because it might take a long time—I am very happy to meet outside—but I am interested to understand what has changed from his view in 2011 to thinking that this would work in the Bill now.

Many of the amendments talk about a settled wish. I could almost see how somebody could try to justify that, for someone with a terminal condition and suicide ideation, requesting assisted dying might be a form of suicide prevention. I feel like I am tying myself in knots with this argument, but I think when we hear the argument that people are already dying, we need protection for those groups of individuals. The noble Baroness, Lady Jay, who I do not think is in her place—I am sorry, I do not have my glasses on—raised evidence given in the Select Committee and talked about paternalism. My personal experience is that I do not see much paternalism in the health service. What I do see is an awful lot of ableism, and I think that if we are talking about paternalism, we should be talking about ableism as well. From a disabled person’s perspective, this recognises the intersection between disability, chronic illness and mental health vulnerability.

The panel has already been raised in the Chamber this afternoon. The panel is a really important part of the eligibility determination and deciding whether somebody can go forward. I think that one of the only things that the noble Lord, Lord Winston, and I could agree on today is that words are important. This relates to the place of the panel. I draw your Lordships’ attention to the clarification statement that was issued by the Association for Palliative Medicine this week. Because words are important, I am going to read it. It states:

“In Friday’s … debate (9/1/26), Lord Falconer cited, and misrepresented, expert evidence presented to the Terminals Ill Adults committee last year by the Association for Palliative Medicine … Crucially, panel members would not be required to meet the patient. They would, therefore, have no individual clinical perspective to bring to bear on the person applying for an assisted death. This renders the panel a mere administrative review, stripping it of the very nuance and human understanding that defines robust, compassionate decision-making at the end of life”.


This is why these amendments are even more important in terms of what we are trying to do.

I have previously discussed suicide among unpaid carers and the pressure on them. In Canada, there is a case of a man who had carer burnout and arranged for an urgent assessment for his wife. She died that day. That is listed in the Ontario coroner’s report. There is also written evidence to show that two men who had caring responsibilities for their partners ended up doing a mercy killing, which is often, strangely, very sympathetically portrayed in the media.

Amendment 39, in my name, is about recognising where an assisted death could take place and who will be most directly affected. The settings that could be affected include care homes or nursing homes—communities that care for those living with dementia, frailty, disability or advanced illness, where dependency is a condition of daily life rather than an exception.

It is important to recognise that a significant proportion of people living with dementia or cognitive impairment remain undiagnosed until the later stages of the disease. On average, people with dementia live with symptoms for three and a half years before receiving a diagnosis. Current NHS England and Alzheimer’s Society data show that only about two-thirds of those with dementia receive a formal diagnosis. The diagnosis rate in Wales is even lower. This further underscores the need for a specialist clinical assessment before any conclusion about capacity is reached. If one in three people with dementia are never diagnosed, one in three potential applicants under the Bill may have an unrecognised impairment in capacity. This is not a margin of error that any legislator can reasonably accept.

A recent report by the whistleblower charity Compassion in Care further illustrates the heightened vulnerability of care home residents. Based on evidence submitted by over 1,000 care workers who called the charity’s helpline to express their concerns about the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill, the most predominant issue raised in 97% of cases was that of fluctuating capacity, which is common among those residing in care homes. The British Geriatrics Society, which gave evidence during the Select Committee, estimates the prevalence of delirium among care and nursing home residents to be as high as 60%.

Amendment 68 is about protecting autonomy. It would ensure that the right to request assistance to end one’s life remains solely with the individual who is terminally ill. It would prevent any surrogate, family member or medical professional making that decision on their behalf. By explicitly prohibiting third-party decisions, we safeguard vulnerable individuals from coercion or misinterpretation of their wishes.

Finally, I would like to ask the noble and learned Lord a few questions. How will he specifically seek to protect those who are in care homes or who may be vulnerable? How will the Bill protect those individuals who have had previous suicide ideation? Where does the Bill seek to understand the intersection of those with suicide ideation who then receive a terminal diagnosis and whether this is a genuine, settled wish? How, through the Bill, will we be able to offer protection to those who have a previous history of self-harm?

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

My Lords, following on from the proposal in Amendment 39, from the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, one of the issues that perhaps is not fully appreciated or understood—it is only if you have actually witnessed it that you get the full implications—is delirium brought about by a combination of medications that are applied. One particular medication can clash with another and can produce a situation which appears almost like dementia, but the patient is not suffering from dementia but delirium. The noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, expressed that very well.

The noble Baroness, Lady Berger, spoke to Amendment 31. Again, it seems an elementary thing but, whether a person is sufficiently capable at the relevant point in time and is not suffering from delirium and/or dementia is best judged by the clinician who knows and works with the patient, rather than somebody with a white coat who is dashing in and out of a ward room and trying to assess the person on the hoof.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and others who spoke earlier, I do not like this Bill. However, as I said at Second Reading, like everybody else in this room I am a legislator. We have a role above and beyond our personal prejudices and beliefs.

I must say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, that, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, mentioned, a lot of issues have come up in the past few weeks. Last week, we had the series of amendments that were ably put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, which dealt with a very serious issue. The week before, we had five separate issues dealing with prisoners, pregnant women, et cetera, and we have had other issues. I know we are only part way through Committee, but if the noble and learned Lord wants the House to compress the process, rather than have to reiterate all this on Report, then I think it would make a difference to how people approach the rest of this legislation if he brought forward coherent amendments that address the issues that have been raised.

I do not mean to be unkind, but there is no point in him getting up every Friday like Stonewall Jackson and saying, basically, “I’m right and you’re wrong”. There is a difference of opinion—a chasm, in many respects—over a lot of these issues. To be brutal about it, we need to see the colour of his money. I hope that would allow us to go forward, but unless we deal with these fundamental, basic issues then we will have a very long slog indeed.

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[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton of Dallington Forest, for that excellently clear way of expressing some of the discomfort and what we would like to see. I would be much happier and feel that I did not have to speak too much if I was getting reassurance and seeing on paper what exactly will address our concerns. At the moment, we are not getting that. We wish the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, were here. The fact that he is not is a real shame for the quality of this debate.

Inside and outside this House, I know plenty of people who support assisted dying and this Bill, inasmuch as they know the broad sense of what it is about. I try to avoid living in echo chambers. Whenever we discuss why they support the Bill, and potentially have a bit of an argument, they invariably say, in a very humane and compassionate way, that they think it will help people who are suffering, and that anyone who says they are suffering should have access to assisted dying. It is assumed, therefore, that the motivation of illness-induced suffering is at the heart of the Bill. That is what most people think. It has come up a lot in this Chamber but, ironically, suffering is not mentioned in the Bill, and neither is there any reference to motivations in the way that one would imagine. That bothers me, because the Bill checks on capacity, prognosis and residence, but it does not enforce a check on motivation. It seems to me that we should ask somebody who says that they want assisted dying, “Why?” It is a crucial absence in the Bill, and I hope that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, might rectify that or explain exactly why the Bill does not think that doctors should ask, “Why do you want assisted dying?” I think it would throw up a whole range of red flags in relation to coercion.

I have added my name to two amendments in this group, Amendment 30 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, so ably moved by the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme, and Amendment 56 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey. To save time,I will concentrate on Amendment 30, which seeks to ensure that those who seek assisted dying are not substantially motivated by a number of factors. I will focus on two of those—not wanting to be a burden on others or public services, and not being motivated by mental disorder, including depression.

This week was the 29th anniversary of the death of my father, John Fox. He was only 66. He was diagnosed with cancer and given three months to live, although he actually made it for four and a half months. When he was told, the whole family was devastated, as anyone would be. The one thing that really shocked me to the core, and stays with me, was that when I had that initial, very emotional father to eldest daughter conversation, my father kept apologising. Believe me, that was not usual. In our relationship, he did not say, “Sorry, Claire” lots of times. He was so distraught. He was convinced that he would be a burden on us, and that his daughters and my mother, in looking after him, would all have to miss work and all the rest of it. He kept saying, “I’m really, really sorry”. He was worried about how we would cope. He did not want to distress others—a point that the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, was making on her amendment to this amendment.

I also noticed that he kept saying sorry to the nurses and the doctors. To everybody, he kept saying, “I’m really sorry for taking up your time. I’m really sorry that you’re having to give me so much attention”. There were stories in the media at the time about bed blocking. He was a vociferous reader of newspapers, and I was hiding the newspapers because I thought he would say sorry even more, convinced that he was taking up NHS resources. It took some time and determination for the family to reassure him, but I kept thinking afterwards how sad it would have been if he had been on his own or in a care home or whatever. To be honest, if a GP had suggested that assisted death was a medical option, in today’s circumstances, I think my father would have said yes—not because he wanted it but because he felt he was a burden on the family. It would not be the GP’s fault, as it is an internal feeling of being a burden. That is not the same as choice.

I was struck by a letter from Lord Sumption in the Times that is worth reflecting on. He says:

“The current bill contains a number of provisions designed to ensure that patients are not ‘pressured by any other person’ into taking their own lives”—

that was in relation to something else. He continues:

“The real problem, however, is not the pressure applied by ‘other persons’. It is assumptions which many old and ill people spontaneously make about the attitudes of the society around them. They are afraid of being an emotional or financial burden”.

That is very important.

By the way, I had better say that, in the four and a half months following his diagnosis that my father lived, we had some of the most meaningful time of our lives with him. It was through a veil of tears, but there was love, joy and reconciliation, there were conversations that would never have otherwise happened, and so on and so forth. It was a time that was important to him and to us as a family in a way that I cannot really describe.

Another motivation that I feel strongly we need to explore is on the part of those with a mental disorder. As many noble Lords have noted, a number of mental health conditions have suicidality as a feature. Again, I am sorry to do the personal stuff, but the first time I encountered that was as a young mental health community worker. I met a young man who was bipolar. I and others—psychiatric medics and social workers—worked hard not just to prevent his suicide but, using all our skills in pharmacological and psychological interventions, to alleviate the terrible “black dog” of depression and the horror of the obsessive suicide ideation that that young man had. I have to ask, then, whether the Bill would allow such a suicidal person’s depression-induced desire for death, and whether all those who had worked with him would suddenly be expected not just to welcome it if this young man made the choice of an assisted suicide but to say, “Oh, look, a perfect exemplar of autonomy and choice”.

I was therefore a little taken aback that the noble and learned Lord, in his summation of the last group on eligibility, said in relation to those with a mental disorder that it is their choice, and that if they want it and they have capacity then that is all right. I point out that, for anyone who wants to commit suicide, it is their choice and they want it, but some of us spend a lot of time asking them please not to do it, not saying, “Yippee!” I cannot think that, in that situation, if that young man had said, “I’ve got a terrible story. I’ve got a terminal illness in addition to my bipolar depression, and I want your support and help in assisted dying”, I would say that it is all perfectly fine and he should get on with it, and be delighted for him being able to show that he is a free, autonomous individual. I would say, “Please don’t”. The four and a half months that we had with my father was the kind of quality time that I would want to ensure that young man had, every day of his life, even if he was terminally ill and dying. I would want to make sure that he was not depressed or suicidal during the time he lived.

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

My Lords, I am associated with some of these amendments. I do not think we want to get completely hung up on the minutiae of each particular line, because there are variations that one could make. I guess that when one is drafting a Bill there are choices to be made and language can be better if one gets professional assistance.

The fundamental point, as has been outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Weir, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is that anyone here who has represented an inner-city, working-class constituency will know that the approach that a lot of people have towards doctors and the medical profession is perhaps different from the approach that we have. If we want medical assistance, I guess most people in this room can pay for it if they so wish. That is not an option that other people have.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Empey Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 12th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

My Lords, in my opinion, these amendments are really about safety, but we have turned the debate into a generalised whinge-fest about the shortcomings of the National Health Service, and we are all aware that there are many.

However, from recent personal experience, I accept what the noble Baroness, Lady Gerada, said. I am fortunate that we have a local health centre; it has four floors and four practices—a separate practice on each floor—each with multiple members within them, who come and go. In general, if somebody is seriously ill, we are fortunate in that we would be able to have established contact with more than one team member.

However, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said that he wanted the GPs mentioned to be a central point for the records. Here we come to an entirely different issue. I have seen records that include what the GP practice puts in, as well as discharge letters from the various hospitals people have been in. Those discharge letters are written by F1 doctors—which is the most junior doctor grade—who have just come out of university. Sitting there late at night, writing these discharge letters is regarded as one of the worst things a doctor has to do. I have seen serious mistakes in those letters, even regarding one of the problems the patient had. Getting those records changed is very difficult. The making of decisions on the future of an individual on the basis of a record that might be totally wrong or misleading is the reason why we need additional protections. It is only common sense, because we humans are all frail and we make mistakes. We write and say mistakes. We overlook things.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Empey Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 21st November 2025 Lords Chamber

In conclusion, the proposed amendments—adding “influenced or encouraged”, clarifying “pressured” as “externally or internally”, and broadening “person” to encompass corporate and institutional actors—would significantly enhance the safeguards in the Bill. Also, broader structural disadvantages which may persuade a person to end their life, such as poverty, need to be taken into account. These changes would help ensure that decisions to end life are made with the highest standards of voluntariness and autonomy, free from all forms of undue influence, pressure or encouragement, whether from individuals, organisations or internalised feelings. I support all these amendments.

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

My Lords, there is one aspect of coercion that we have not so far discussed. It was mentioned tangentially by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins. It is institutional coercion. As somebody who has unfortunately had to bring a loved one into hospital to be treated and discharged on a large number of occasions in recent years, I have become familiar with the process called “clerking”, where an individual is brought into the hospital, the paperwork obviously has to be brought to bear, the healthcare staff have to fill it in and so on.

If this legislation gets on to the statute book, in whatever form, it has to be translated into paper that the health service will have to deliver when a patient is brought into a hospital. We already have the “Do not resuscitate” aspect of an induction, and we will now have to have another set of paperwork. I have seen how it works frequently: the pressure that the staff are under from time to time, and the fact that the people coming and going and dealing with a patient are frequently different and they change at 8 am in the morning and 8 pm in the evening. That paperwork has to be done by an individual, sometimes a relatively junior member of staff, and all these things have to be translated into a box that has to be ticked.

How is that to be done? The actual process that one has to go through, particularly dealing with somebody who is seriously ill, is challenging in itself, and when you have to ask the person, “Do you want me to tick the box that says, ‘Do not resuscitate’?”, that is a big thing to do, and the person needs to be coherent, informed et cetera. We are moving things to a stage well beyond that.

I had the experience of being in a hospice and, while it was not an issue with pain that was the problem, when the consultant comes along and says to your loved one, “Have you considered the D-word?”, that sobers you up. Somebody who was perfect intellectually, who had the ability and the capability, shut down completely and could not cope with, “Have you considered the D-word?”. So, I say to noble Lords, these are emotional things, coercion is a very hard thing to define, but I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that the difference between his scenario and what we are facing is that the state is co-operating, providing the mechanism and delivering the mechanism for a person to end their life. That is the antithesis of what the medical profession and the National Health Service have stood for since its inception.

With regard to how we treat things in this House, when Bills come to us, of course we have a view on whether we are for them or against them. I remember when the Brexit legislation came before this House and I gently remind the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that she was not running to try to improve it so that she could get into the Content Lobby. It is the way things are. On an issue such as this, we have to be driven by our conscience, not by our parties or anything else, but let us remember that this will have to be translated into the room where the patient is sitting. What box is a junior nurse or a junior auxiliary going to be asked to tick? What is the question? Who is going to fill it out?

As the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, said, if we had had a royal commission and a proper government Bill, we could have answered these questions, instead of having to sit here and go through the whole process again. I just ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, to bear these things in mind. These are gaps in the system which the staff are going to have to face. There will be shifts coming on and there will be some members of those shifts who will refuse to participate. What kind of chaos is that going to create? These things need to be thought through and they are not thought through.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

I just remind the noble Lord, Lord Empey, that of course I did vote for the Brexit legislation and in fact led the Labour Party into the Lobby to support the final agreement on Brexit.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Empey Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 14th November 2025 Lords Chamber

As I said at the beginning of my remarks, I am not yet convinced that the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, is the right way to address this gap, but gap there is. Unless the Government come forward with a clear proposal that addresses the concerns expressed by the First Minister of Wales, the Senedd, both the Senedd Select Committees, the leader of Plaid Cymru and in Committee in the other place, we risk doing real damage to the devolution settlement and to confidence in the capacity of Westminster to legislate in this area, and doing real injustice to those in Wales, who deserve better palliative care and better mental health care than would be the case if this legislation were to pass as it stands.

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said that some people were suffering from insomnia. I think this House is suffering from collective amnesia. All of a sudden there is a great hurrah about the Sewel convention and respecting devolution. I gently remind this House that it had no hesitation whatever in legislating over the heads of the Northern Ireland Assembly against the expressed wishes of that Assembly on abortion, for instance, and on other matters. So, if we have suddenly decided that we are going to respect these settlements, it is a Damascene conversion, and I hope that it is perfectly obvious that there are huge holes in where this legislation is taking us, as has just been ably pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Gove. Like him, I leave it open as to whether this is the right amendment, but I just gently remind everybody that we in this House are not scoring very high on consistency.

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

I will be brief—everybody will be delighted to hear that. I should say that I am a supporter of the intentions of the Bill, and I agree with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said, particularly when he suggested that the Government will need to be involved in sorting out some of these problems.

What concerns me is that we are now going to try to improve a Bill, which is demonstrably flawed, with 900 amendments—many of which seem to make sense to me—on the Floor of the House between now and Christmas. Surely the Government should now be listening, and grasping that they need to take the Bill in themselves. They need to consult nationally and widely, to try to find as much consensus as possible, and then in a considered way they need to come back to the House. To attempt to deal with these 900 amendments in this way will end up with the Bill being talked out, with us being in a place we do not want to be—at least those of us who want to see progress on the Bill—and we will end up in a worse place than we would have been had the Government done the sensible thing at the beginning and taken the Bill in, as they did with Private Members’ Bills such as the Suicide Act.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Gove (Con)]

My Lords, I speak briefly in support of the point made by the noble Baroness. I entirely understand why many Members of the Committee regard the suggestion to replace “capacity” with “ability” as wholly inadequate. The challenge that has been made by my noble friend Lord Markham and others is entirely fair enough, but the definition of “capacity” in the Bill itself is inadequate.

It is the case that the Mental Capacity Act was not designed for this purpose and that this legislation has been retrofitted to use the Mental Capacity Act because inadequate effort was put into defining the ability of an individual to make this decision in an appropriate way. It is the case that the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel has made it clear that the effort to put this Bill together was “done on a shoestring”. It is also clear, as the noble Baroness pointed out, that the Royal College of Psychiatrists—the people who are responsible for addressing mental capacity—said that assessing a person’s mental capacity to decide to end their own life is an entirely different and more complex determination requiring a higher level of understanding than assessing capacity for treatment decisions, which is the purpose of the MCA.

We have been told by those responsible for the mental health of vulnerable people that the safeguard that we are about to legislate for is inadequate. More people will be placed at risk by its inadequacy. We may feel that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, in putting forward “ability”, is failing to meet the needs of the legislation. However, it is not her responsibility, but our collective responsibility, the promoter of the Bill’s responsibility and the Government’s responsibility to ensure that psychiatrists and this House can be satisfied that the threshold is sufficiently high.

We all recognise that, while this Bill may be about respecting personal autonomy, personal autonomy is not sovereign. We recognise that there may be circumstances in which that right cannot and should not be exercised. The promoters of the Bill have been very clear that they want to draw the lines narrowly to ensure that this is available only to people who are consciously capable at a time when their life will automatically end within a certain period.

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

Does the noble Lord agree with me that one of the issues, which has been sporadically mentioned, is the inconsistency of capacity or ability brought about by the interaction of certain drugs on an individual? They may be lucid at a particular point in time, but not lucid at another. Under our current proposals, the people who would be making that judgment do not even have to know or to have treated that person. Surely that has to be dealt with in any definition.

[Lord Gove (Con)]

The noble Lord is absolutely right. Again, there has been some debate about the evidence from psychiatrists and the reasons why they expressed doubts, but that evidence is plentifully available to Members of this House.

As a number of Members have made clear, the work of Alex Ruck Keene KC and the Complex Life and Death Decisions group of King’s College, which is available to this House and was examined in the Select Committee, makes it clear that the Mental Capacity Act is inadequate. It is inadequate to deal with the concept of suicidal ideation that occurs. It is inadequate to deal with the fact that capacity fluctuates, and that fluctuation can be affected by mental health and well-being in its broadest sense, as well as by other syndromes and conditions.

The psychiatrists would not have intervened as they did if they had felt that this was a matter that could be left to one side, a matter that was entirely, as it were, within the scope of parliamentarians or legislators to shrug their shoulders and to accept. They have sent a message to us that the Bill as framed endangers those who are most vulnerable. Can we really proceed on the basis of the MCA, a piece of legislation conceived at a different time for a different purpose and rendered in the eyes of the professionals as not the correct way to go forward?

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Empey Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 19th September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

My Lords, I have been shocked at the inaccuracy of the parliamentary process applied to the Bill. It has lacked the detailed scrutiny that such a major piece of legislation requires, as confirmed in recent devastating reports by committees of this House. Despite all the hype in the Commons, it failed to gain the support of a majority of MPs.

Let us be clear what the Bill does. It authorises medical professionals in the employ of the state to introduce and ultimately provide the means by which an individual in the care of the NHS can be assisted to commit suicide, and to observe and supervise that process. The Bill also gives unprecedented powers to the Secretary of State. The Bill is not fit for purpose, and I am not convinced that it can be adequately reformed. As a member of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, I accept my Church’s teaching on the principle of the Bill, but I am also a legislator, and that confers its own distinct obligations and responsibilities.

In my family’s case, we were faced with the illness of my late wife, Stella. She suffered from complicated medical conditions. In January 2023, she was very unwell—to the extent that the consultant called the family together and said that she was not going to pull out of it this time. Had he been asked whether she was terminally ill and would die within six months, he would have said yes. Would he have signed off as expecting her death in six days? I believe so, as that is what we were told. Nine months later, I was still taking her out most days, and she was able to enjoy that time with our children and grandchildren. I am also aware that she felt she was impacting on the ability of our children to get on with their careers. I could sense the anxiety she felt at impacting on our lives. This is the pressure point that is glossed over in the Bill and the discourse around it.

Doctors do not get it right all the time, and this arbitrary six-month timescale is a dangerous nonsense. The Bill would fundamentally change the relationship between the medical profession and patients at all levels. Gone would be the days of “do no harm”. Doctors could be seen not only as healers but as instruments to end the life of a patient in hospital, maybe spurred on for financial reasons. Families are not always welcoming environments. They can be toxic with competing pressures, especially over money. It is in these circumstances where subtle pressures to end a life can be generated.

Some of the basic practicalities have not yet been investigated because of this mad dash to get the Bill through. I know that all of us in this Chamber want the same thing: to reduce and minimise suffering. None of us knows how our days will end, but I believe that we are adding to suffering by introducing massive anxiety to patients at the most vulnerable time of their lives.

Our mailbags have been characterised by messages from disabled people, the elderly and others who feel a sense that they are no longer valued by society, surplus to requirements and mere cost centres. I know this is not the intention of the sponsors, but that is the inevitable outworking. To involve the entire NHS and turn its ethos upside-down is a serious mistake. People may also be afraid to present themselves to doctors for fear of getting a one-way ticket. Those of us with the financial means to get the best advice can do so, but for those without the resources it is the NHS or nothing.

It is time to think again. We have underinvested in palliative care for years, thus reducing rather than enhancing choice. Surely it makes sense to follow that route, as emphasised by former Prime Minister Gordon Brown, rather than risking the nearly 80 years of the embedding of a life-saving NHS in our nation’s DNA.