United States Budget: Economic Impact

Lord Forsyth of Drumlean Excerpts

Monday 10th December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, if the Government had not adopted a credible fiscal policy in 2010, it is almost certain that interest rates in the UK would now be significantly higher than they are, as they are in much of the eurozone. Bear in mind that every 1% increase in interest rates means £12 billion extra in mortgage payments. This would have been have been a huge gamble that would almost certainly have failed had we not taken decisive action in 2010.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

My Lords, is the lesson that we need to learn from both sides of the Atlantic not that if Governments live beyond their means and raise the tax burden too high, growth disappears—a lesson that my noble friend Lord Lawson taught us in the 1980s and which we need to relearn?

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, the key challenge for Governments, either in this country or on the other side of the pond, is to ensure that there is a credible fiscal framework and a competitive economy so that businesses can invest. That is what the Government have been seeking to achieve.

Banking: National Savings & Investments

Lord Forsyth of Drumlean Excerpts

Wednesday 5th December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, the Government are very well aware of the needs of savers. Those who have done the right thing in the good times should not be penalised in these difficult times and the Government understand that. Specifically on National Savings & Investments, as I said, it keeps its product range under regular review so, of course, it looks to see when it is appropriate to bring products back in. However, it has to balance the need to deliver finance to the Government at rates that represent value for money for the taxpayer and the need not to compete unfairly in the savings market by offering products that compete with other providers in the market. The noble Baroness may look askance at that but I assure her that I get constant complaints from the retail savings market if it thinks that NS&I is using its power unfairly in the market.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

My Lords, will my noble friend accept my warmest congratulations on the announcement by the Chancellor today that he will consult on allowing AIM shares to be included in ISAs, following the persistent representations of my noble friend Lord Lee of Trafford?

Autumn Statement

Lord Forsyth of Drumlean Excerpts

Wednesday 5th December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, that seemed to be a speech rather than a question. However, I am grateful for some of what the noble Lord, Lord Myners, had to say and I shall miss sparring with him. I remain an optimist. In less than three years since the previous election, the private sector in this country has created 1.8 million new jobs, which is twice what the OBR projected, and the OBR’s projection today for the period up to 2018 is that 2.4 million further new private sector jobs will be created at a time when it estimates that public sector employment will be reduced by 1.1 million. Times are difficult, but I remain optimistic about the underlying strength and vibrancy of the private sector in this economy.

As to the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Myners, about offshore centres, some of the issues that he raises are certainly on the agenda, but it is inappropriate to talk about offshore centres and others. The key thing is to make sure that the so-called offshore centres are brought up to the standards of the best. Some of them have made huge strides; others need to. I take his points.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

My Lords, does my noble friend not think it remarkable that the Official Opposition have no proposals for reducing the deficit by cutting public expenditure, and that there does not appear to be a scintilla of humility for the fact that they were running a deficit of some £70 billion at the height of the boom times? It was their irresponsible conduct over the economy that has got us into this mess. Should the Chancellor not be congratulated on not being more outraged at the response that he has had from the Opposition, in which former spokesmen are reduced to criticising the grammar of the Statement rather than its content? The truth is that they have nothing to offer the country to get us out of the mess that they created.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend and agree with every word that he uttered.

Banking: Offshore Accounts

Lord Forsyth of Drumlean Excerpts

Tuesday 20th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Newby]

I obviously agree with the noble Lord’s latter statement. Many recent examples clearly are unacceptable, which is why we have taken a great interest in, and are looking forward to hearing more about, the initiative that the EU Commission has taken this week in terms of reformulating what constitutes a tax haven. He is right that we can do a certain amount ourselves but we are going to deal with this international issue only through international co-operation.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

My Lords, will my noble friend clarify the position, as I genuinely do not know the answer to the question? Are we able to deal with companies such as Google and Starbucks and others which are not paying the tax that they should pay in this country or are we constrained by European law from being prevented from doing so?

[Lord Newby]

I can reassure the noble Lord that we are being constrained not by European Law but by international accounting standards. There is no suggestion that Starbucks and the other companies are breaking the law but the accounting standards allow them to manipulate the point at which they take a tax charge on revenues that they raise.

Taxation: Avoidance

Lord Forsyth of Drumlean Excerpts

Wednesday 25th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, the important broad picture here is that on the latest annual figures, those for 2010-11, HMRC collects approximately £469 billion a year. The estimated tax gap is 7.9%, a percentage that compares favourably with, for example, the USA at 14% and Sweden at 10%. Nevertheless, there is a gap of £35 billion and it is very important that HMRC does all that it can to close it, which is why it is prioritising this area in many respects. I hear what the noble Lord says about a specific issue and I will take his suggestion away, but I can assure the House that HMRC is prioritising it right across the board.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that if Treasury Ministers wish to minimise avoidance and maximise revenue they should leave delivering moral guidance to the church and concentrate on delivering simpler, lower, flatter taxes as our manifesto promised?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, the lowering of the top rate of tax, for example, makes my noble friend’s point very clearly. By putting the top rate of tax at 50%, the previous Government, as the analysis has now shown, delivered absolutely nothing—or very little at best—in terms of revenue, and made this country uncompetitive. So we need wherever possible lower and broader taxes. I agree with my noble friend on that.

Ulster Bank

Lord Forsyth of Drumlean Excerpts

Thursday 5th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I do not know the cause of this significant failure. The noble Baroness may be right but, as I said, the FSA expects RBS to provide it with a complete account of the issues. I welcome the fact that the chief executive of RBS, Stephen Hester, has made a commitment to a full and detailed investigation overseen by independent experts and publication of those findings. In due course, we will know what the explanation is.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

My Lords, is my noble friend satisfied with the role of the FSA? Surely it is not enough for the FSA to say, “We want a report”. The FSA is supposed to satisfy itself that people with banking licences have back-up systems to prevent what has happened, which is causing not only distress to families but real damage to commerce in our country. Surely the FSA should be far more active and should be giving an explanation to the Minister for why it has allowed this to happen.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, we delude ourselves if we think that there will ever be a no-failure regime in financial regulation. Regrettably, issues will arise. We want the FSA to do what it is doing: not getting in the way but doing whatever it can to ensure that RBS solves the immediate problems. Then it will get the full explanation and, on the back of that, the lessons for all concerned, including, I am sure, the FSA, will be learnt.

Economic Policies

Lord Forsyth of Drumlean Excerpts

Wednesday 4th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sassoon]

I did not bring my IMF quote book today to trade on this one, because the Question is about the Government's assessment of the success of their economic policies, not what the IMF is saying about them. I am sure that we will come back to that on another occasion.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

My Lords, although reducing the deficit, and even more so the debt, is important, is not relying exclusively on reducing the deficit a bit like playing golf with only one club? Do we not have to have more emphasis on supply-side measures that will encourage the private sector to create the jobs and wealth that the country desperately needs?

[Lord Sassoon]

My noble friend is completely right, and it would be a one-club game if we were not doing all sorts of things on the supply side, such as reducing corporation tax from 28% to 22%, the national loan guarantee scheme of £20 billion, cutting red tape for the first time in living history, enterprise zones, the Regional Growth Fund, the largest number of apprenticeships ever funded by any Government and completely overhauling the planning system, to name a few supply-side reforms.

Taxation: Avoidance

Lord Forsyth of Drumlean Excerpts

Thursday 28th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I certainly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, about the seriousness of the problem. That is why the Government—and HMRC in particular—are tackling it with all the available weapons. I stress that the Disclosure of Tax Avoidance Schemes regime, which was introduced by the previous Government in 2004, has been a successful part of that. Of the total tax gap, that is estimated to be around £35 billion, £5 billion is estimated to be as a result of avoidance. It is important to be clear on the figures.

In relation to schemes of wealthy individuals, the K2 and Icebreaker schemes, which have had much recent publicity, are under investigation by HMRC. HMRC and, of course, the Government want to make sure that everyone, wealthy or not, pays a fair amount of tax. HMRC has rolled out some very specific initiatives within its High Net Worth Unit in order tackle even more vigorously the particular challenges around individuals of high net worth.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

Does my noble friend agree that the best way to avoid people coming up with complex tax avoidance schemes is to have simpler, lower taxes—which will maximise revenue and obviate the need for people to use their energies in this way—and concentrate on creating wealth and growth in our economy?

[Lord Sassoon]

As a general proposition, I very much share the view of my noble friend.

Wales: Barnett Formula

Lord Forsyth of Drumlean Excerpts

Wednesday 20th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sassoon]

No, my Lords, the Treasury is not remotely casual about the national finances, and what the noble Baroness says about the Scottish funding situation might well be challenged by others in other devolved parts of the nation.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

My Lords, it would not be challenged by me—and, indeed, the Select Committee came to that unanimous view. But what is the difficulty with finding an agreed needs-based formula for funding when the money that Scotland receives is distributed to health and local authorities using precisely a needs-based formula for funding? Surely it is time to deal with a matter that is creating division in the United Kingdom at a time when we need unity.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, one difficulty is that there is no consensus on the appropriate way in which to measure needs for any replacement. As the previous Government said in response to the Select Committee report,

“the Barnett formula has a number of strengths, among them the merit of allowing the devolved administrations to determine their own assessment of needs and priorities in devolved areas”.

Financial Services Bill

Lord Forsyth of Drumlean Excerpts

Monday 11th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for introducing this important Bill. Its importance can hardly be in doubt, given the core dilemma presented by the place of financial services in the British economy. On the one hand, Britain is a world leader in financial services and a considerable measure of our future prosperity depends on that industry. On the other hand, as we have seen, it is the industry that has greater potential than any other to inflict severe damage on Britain’s economy. The goal of regulation is to secure the benefits while minimising the costs and to achieve that in a manner that passes the tests of accountability, clarity, efficiency and transparency. Regrettably, the Bill fails all those four tests.

It certainly fails the test of clarity, being both complex and incomplete. The Bill is unnecessarily complicated because, instead of drafting a new template for the financial services industry, superseding all past relevant Acts and incorporating the new banking Bill that is yet to be published enacting the Vickers proposals, the Government have constructed a dog’s breakfast of amendments to earlier legislation.

Last week, noble Lords were no doubt surprised to receive a passionate entreaty from the Treasury Committee of the other place insisting that the Bill had been cobbled together with undue haste and had not received adequate consideration—in the case of some clauses, no consideration at all—and providing a checklist of serious failings in the legislation as currently drafted. From these Benches, I can assure the Treasury Committee that its despairing plea will not go unanswered. We intend to devote just as long as it takes to sort out this flawed Bill and thank goodness that the procedures of this House will allow us to do so. I am sure that all sides of the House will support this commitment, since this is essentially a non-partisan Bill. We all have a strong vested interest in getting it right. I hope that the Government will approach our deliberations in that spirit, although their negative performance in the other place was not encouraging.

The noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, referred to the regulatory failures that have been all too evident in the financial crisis. That there were serious failures is beyond doubt—most notably in the operation of the tripartite memorandum of understanding. But these were less failures of structure and more failures of the then conventional wisdom with respect to regulatory theory and practice. As the Joint Committee on the Bill noted:

“Successful regulation depends more on the regulatory culture, focus and philosophy than on structure”.

That point was made even more forcefully by Mr. Alan Greenspan in his evidence to the US House of Representatives in October 2008. Referring to the intellectual framework that guided the regulatory stance of the Federal Reserve System, Mr. Greenspan said:

“This modern risk management paradigm held sway for decades. The whole intellectual edifice, however, collapsed in the summer of last year”.

That was as true of the thinking of British institutions as it was of the United States.

In this context it is worth remembering why the tripartite system was created in the first place. One of the key reasons was that the Bank of England had proved to be such a fallible regulator. The cases of Johnson Matthey, BCCI and Barings come to mind. In the latter instance, the Bank’s performance was so bad that the Board of Banking Supervision was moved to comment that it would be a good idea if the Bank of England understood the products that it was supposed to be regulating.

Nonetheless, on the basis of what we have all learnt over the past four years, the fundamental thinking behind the reforms set out in this Bill is clearly well-founded, even if the execution falls a little short. The key thing that we learnt was that focusing on the stability of individual institutions, however large—so-called microprudential regulation—is not enough. The whole is bigger than the sum of the parts; systemic risk is all pervasive and by its very nature cannot be managed by individual firms. Hence the need for macroprudential regulation, spelt out so clearly in the FSA’s Turner review. But macroprudential regulation poses major new challenges to economic and financial policy-making. It will necessarily involve measures that cross what has previously been deemed to be the boundary between actions that might reasonably be left to unelected officials and actions that are necessarily the province of politically accountable decision-makers.

The essence of the macroprudential structures as set out in this Bill is that the Treasury cannot be trusted. Just as it was feared that the Treasury might approach the setting of interest rates with an inappropriate eye to political advantage, and hence the Bank of England was given control over interest rates, so now it is feared that the Treasury will fail to take away the punch bowl of loose credit in order to reap the short-term political benefits of a debt-fuelled boom. Accordingly, the Bank of England is given, via the new Financial Policy Committee, virtually autonomous control over a variety of instruments to manage the supply of, and perhaps later the demand for, credit. In addition, microprudential regulation is also taken into the Bank, in the form of the Prudential Regulation Authority.

This agglomeration of powers in the Bank of England poses two vital questions. Is the governance of the Bank of England such as to result in accountable, clear, efficient and transparent utilisation of these extraordinary powers? Equally, does the relationship between the Bank of England and the Treasury, as set out in the Bill, meet the test of these four principles? The answer given by the Treasury Committee to both of these questions is a resounding no. We on this side broadly agree with the Treasury Committee, though we differ in some details. We certainly agree that the governance of the Bank should not be a matter for the Bank itself. Our major disagreement with the Treasury Committee’s proposals is that they do not go far enough.

First, with respect to the governance of the Bank, the Government have responded to the evident lack of co-ordination in the crisis by designing a model of perfect co-ordination; namely, that one person should be responsible for everything. The Governor of the Bank of England will chair the Monetary Policy Committee, the Financial Policy Committee and the Prudential Regulation Authority, as well as being in overall charge of the Bank of England’s special resolution unit and its payment and clearing and settlement systems oversight department. When he or she has some spare time, this individual will also chair a number of important international committees. Even if it is possible to find the exceptional individual who can effectively take on all these tasks simultaneously, that person will be driven mad, for many of these activities will demand contradictory policies. Moreover, if ever there were a structure likely to result in the dangers of group think, this is it, since the group is a group of one.

Side by side with the inefficient, unaccountable and untransparent role of the governor is the now anomalous position of the court of the Bank. The Financial Policy Committee is to be a committee of the court. It is envisaged that primary responsibility for determining and keeping under review the strategy for achieving the financial stability objective will sit with the court, although the court will be required to consult the FPC and Treasury, and the FPC may at any time make recommendations to the court. On a moment’s reflection, it is clear that the court’s composition and powers are simply not up to the job.

In Grand Committee we will propose wide-ranging reform to the governance of the Bank of England to ensure that it has a structure of decision-making appropriate to the first half of the 21st century, rather than to 1694. In particular, we will require a more collegiate form of decision-making and propose measures to improve the accountability of what is, after all, a public institution. I was delighted to hear from the Minister that the Government are searching for good ideas in that area. I think that we have some.

Given that the governance of the Bank, as the Treasury Committee puts it, falls,

“well short of what would be expected in a modern institution, whether public or commercial”,

and that this is,

“especially important given that vitally important decisions made by the Bank’s executives, especially during times of financial instability, may not reasonably be made public and therefore be immediately available for scrutiny”,

the next question obviously arises. Are the powers of autonomous action endowed on the Financial Policy Committee and, accordingly, the Bank, appropriately balanced with the need for political oversight by the Treasury of the overall conduct of economic and financial policy? Does the Bill provide for sufficient parliamentary scrutiny to endow the FPC and the Bank with an appropriate level of legitimacy? Again, we believe that the Treasury Committee does not go far enough. The FPC is described by the Government as,

“a powerful new authority sitting at the apex of the regulatory architecture”.

The mechanisms to ensure democratic accountability of the FPC need to be commensurate with the strength of its powers.

The most important aspect of the relationship between the Bank and the Treasury is what should be done in a crisis. After all, it was in a crisis that the system failed. This is spelt out in Part 4 of the Bill and in the draft memorandum of understanding on crisis management. The draft memorandum of understanding, which, by the way, is in general far less clear than the old tripartite memorandum, at least makes clear that the Bank is the gatekeeper, defining when the Treasury may play a crisis management role. It is worth quoting the MoU. It states:

“The Bank has primary operational responsibility for financial crisis management. The Chancellor and the Treasury have sole responsibility for any decision involving public funds. When the Bank has formally notified the Treasury of a material risk to public funds, and either there is a serious threat to financial stability, or public funds are already committed by the Treasury to resolve or reduce such a serious threat and it would be in the public interest to do so, the Chancellor may use powers to direct the Bank. … Where the Bank is able to manage a financial crisis without public funds being put at risk, it will have autonomy in exercising its responsibilities”.

This is the most extraordinary nonsense, a fetishisation of the use of public funds. First, whatever is happening, the Treasury must wait for notification by the Bank of England before it can act. Given the Bank’s record on Northern Rock, that notification will come far too late. But secondly, and more seriously, households may be losing their savings, businesses may be collapsing, and economic activity may be in precipitate decline as the result of financial instability, but if there is no threat to public funds the Treasury is shut out of any active financial stability role until the governor invites it in.

This betrays a lack of understanding of the mutually reinforcing co-operative role that the Bank and the Treasury need to adopt to tackle macro-risk. This was put very clearly by Jacques De Larosière to the Economic Affairs Committee of your Lordships’ House three years ago. He said:

“Let us not hide ourselves from reality. Often ... fiscal policies can be part of systemic risk”.

The only sensible solution seems to be for a fundamental rewriting of Part 4 of the Bill to allow the Treasury to act when severe financial problems arise without the Bank acting as a gatekeeper. In 2008, the problem was not that the Treasury was too strong but that it was too weak. To ensure that the roles of the Bank and the Treasury are clear beyond all reasonable doubt and given that the MoU will evolve in the light of operational experience, the MoU itself must be the subject of enhanced parliamentary scrutiny. By the way, the definition in the Bill of the objectives of the Financial Policy Committee, with its peculiar emphasis on leverage, debt and credit growth in the UK, also betrays a worrying lack of understanding of the nature of systemic risk in a global financial system.

Many other aspects of the Bill require substantial revision by your Lordships’ House, ranging from procedures for consultation at all levels, the role of the tribunal in disciplinary cases, to the duty of care that retail financial institutions should exercise towards their customers, and the range of access to financial services and to the procedures for parliamentary scrutiny of the avalanche of secondary legislation that the Bill will stimulate. My noble friends and I are committed to playing a constructive part in that revision. However, at the core of the Bill—the core that we must get right—are the new procedures for macroprudential regulation. If an open and successful financial services industry is to be sustained, it is imperative that an accountable, clear, efficient and transparent mechanism for the management of systemic risk is established. Moreover, that mechanism must have as its ultimate objective the promotion of employment and growth in this country.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

The noble Lord has made a passionate and powerful speech about the importance of the Bill. Why have the Opposition agreed that it be referred to Grand Committee for its Committee stage?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharkey]

My Lords, I shall speak about two aspects of the Bill regarding two areas that it needs to cover but does not. I think that it is commonly accepted on all sides that a significant problem facing the economy is the question of lending to small and medium-sized businesses. It is generally accepted that we have been unsuccessful in getting sufficient lending to take place. The Bank of England confirms that the UK’s biggest banks failed to meet last year’s lending targets. The five banks that signed up to Project Merlin lent £1 billion less to SMEs than their 2011 target—and the Merlin deal has of course not been renewed. The Bank’s trends and lending report for April this year reports that in the three months to February 2012 the stock of lending to small and medium-sized enterprises continued to contract, and had in fact been negative since late 2009. In January this year, BIS published a report on SME access to external finance. Among its findings, the report states that 21% of SME employers that sought finance from any source did not achieve success, which was a significant increase on the 8% seen in 2007-08.

These figures are bad enough, but they conceal areas where there are more significant problems. The effects of the financial crisis are being most keenly felt in those areas of the country that have long been the most deprived. Workless households are concentrated in the old industrial areas of the north of England, the Midlands, Scotland and Wales, as well as in a number of seaside towns and inner-city urban areas. We urgently need to stimulate demand for SMEs in our deprived areas and to make finance available to help them develop. At the moment, according to a 2012 report by the Centre for Responsible Credit, just 4% of all lending to SMEs goes to businesses in the most deprived areas.

The only data provided by the six largest banks concerning their lending to SMEs are produced on an aggregate basis. This means that there is no information available to allow local economic development agencies, including local enterprise partnerships and community development finance initiatives, to enter into effective dialogue with the banks with a view to assessing and improving performance, nor any way of knowing which banks are performing better than others. Similarly, the current dataset provided by the banks tells us nothing about the terms on which credit is being made available to SMEs. There are other indications that the shift by banks from term lending to overdraft lending will probably lead to a significant increase in financing costs, but we do not know how much or where. We also do not know to what extent, if at all, the banks are supporting the third sector to take advantage of the new rights under the Localism Act. The Act provides for local communities to take over the running of local authority services to build new homes, businesses, shops, playgrounds and meeting halls.

All this requires planning and funding. That means the active involvement of the banks. We need access to information to show us what the banks are doing, area by area, bank by bank, to support this agenda. All this can be achieved by making a couple of simple amendments to the Bill. I believe that we should consider adding a fourth operational objective to the three set out for the FCA. This new objective could be called something like “the sustainable economic growth objective” and could be defined as ensuring an appropriate level of financial services provision in disadvantaged areas by having regard to the needs of SMEs and third-sector organisations in deprived communities for affordable loans, savings and insurance products.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

How are the banks expected to provided more lending at the same time that they are being required to make greater provision for capital and liquidity purposes? Surely that is asking them to do two contradictory things.

[Lord Sharkey]

I had a more minimalist objective: to make it plain that that is the case with the banks at the moment. We need to make sure that we know that they have an obligation to support SMEs and third-sector organisations in deprived communities. I add in passing that the need for some growth objective is evident not only in this part of the Bill, but in the objective set out for the FPC itself. Stability is a necessary objective, but stability without growth is, at best, a recipe for stagnation.

The existing objectives for the FCA include a competition objective. This competition objective includes the statement that the FCA may have regard to,

“how far competition is encouraging innovation”.

Apart from noting that the word “may” should read “must” if the paragraph is to have any real meaning, I also want to note that this is the only time that the word “innovation” appears in the 330 pages of the Bill.

That brings me to the second area that I want to address. Innovation in the provision of traditional retail financial services is obviously important. The Breedon report, commissioned by BIS and delivered in March this year, estimates that by 2016 there will be a shortfall of between £26 billion and £59 billion in finance needed by SMEs for working capital and growth. In their response, the Government acknowledged the problem and said,

“The Government welcomes the development of new and innovative forms of finance such as peer-to-peer lending and recognises the potential of these models to have a positive impact on the SME lending market”.

Currently, the total amount of peer-to-peer lending in the UK is small, but growing rapidly, and even more rapid growth is projected. The Government are encouraging growth in this area with a £100 million investment. Earlier this year, Andy Haldane, head of policy at the Bank of England, even suggested that these non-traditional lenders could eventually replace banks, but if these new models are to succeed in providing real and substantial competition for the banks, they need more help from the Government than £100 million in pump priming. At the moment, the non-traditional peer-to-peer lending sector is unregulated. As the Daily Telegraph said two weeks ago,

“if it is serious about encouraging the growth of a genuine long-term alternative to bank lending for SMEs, the Government also needs to address the thorny question of regulation. At present, alternative funding providers are not regulated by existing financial services legislation, leaving both borrowers and lenders vulnerable to rogue players entering the market”.

Alternative funders are in favour of regulation. They recognise the dangers to their business model of a scandal generated by some rogue entrant to their market. This is not a theoretical danger or a distant prospect and is certainly not a trivial problem. There is nothing to stop such an event occurring and permanently destroying confidence in the peer-to-peer model. As the Daily Telegraph also said:

“SMEs desperately need a genuine alternative to borrowing from banks and those using alternative funders must be protected so that both they and the market can flourish”.

The Government need to take action now, and this Bill provides the perfect opportunity.